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EXPLAINING LAND FORCE

DOCTRINE
RQ Signals Lt Course

Date: 17 MAR 2022


Contents
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STAGE 1 …………………………….……………………………………………………………………………………………………………..2-11

STAGE 2 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………12-18

STAGE 3 …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………18-29

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STAGE 1

National Command Structure

DND and the CAF share a unique relationship in the Government of Canada. DND and the
CAF have complementary roles to play in providing advice and support to the Minister of
National Defence, and in implementing Government decisions regarding the defence of
Canadian interests at home and abroad.

In most respects, DND is an organization like other federal


departments of the Government of Canada. It is established by
a statute, the National Defence Act, which sets out the Minister
of National Defence’s responsibilities, including his or her
responsibility for both the Department and the CAF. In other
words, DND exists to carry out the work assigned to the
Minister of National Defence, and the department’s
relationship with the CAF is that of a support system.

Under the National Defence Act, The CAF are an entity


separate and distinct from the Department. The CAF are headed by the Chief of the
Defence Staff, Canada’s senior serving military officer. The CDS is responsible for the
conduct of military operations of all components of the CAF, and to ensure that the CAF is
always ready to carry out the tasks that Parliament assigns through the Minister of
National Defence.

DND and the CAF are together the largest federal government
department and share a unique relationship in the Government of
Canada. It is the only department where military members work
alongside civilians. Together, it is comprised of almost 120,000
employees, including:

a.68,000 Regular Force members


b.27,000 Reserve members
c.24,000 civilian employees
d.
In practice, members of the CAF and DND often serve side-by-side, under a common chain
of command and management structure. This is most readily seen in National Defence
Headquarters, where CAF members and DND public servants work together in areas such
as strategic direction, policy formulation, defence procurement and many others, but it is
also seen at most lower levels throughout the defence structure, with public servants
integrated into base headquarters, training establishments and even in operational units.

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Senior Leadership

The Governor General of Canada is the Queen’s representative and the Commander-in-
Chief of the Canadian Armed Forces, a largely ceremonial function. DND is headed by the
Minister of National Defence, a federal Cabinet Minister. The Deputy Minister of
National Defence is the Department’s senior civil servant. The CAF are headed by the
Chief of the Defence Staff, Canada’s senior serving military officer. Each has different
responsibilities:
a.The Governor General is responsible for appointing the Chief of the Defence Staff on the
recommendation of the Prime Minister, awarding military honours,
presenting colours to CAF units, approving new military badges and
insignia and signing commission scrolls.
b.The Minister of National Defence presides over the Department
and over all matters relating to national defence
c.The Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for command, control
and administration of the CAF and military strategy, plans and
requirements;
d.The Deputy Minister is responsible for policy, resources,
interdepartmental coordination and international defence
relations.

Chief of Defence Staff


As defined in the National Defence Act, the Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) has direct
responsibility for the command, control and administration of the Canadian Forces, and is
appointed by the Governor General, on the advice of the Prime Minister.

The CDS is accountable to the Minister of National Defence


for the conduct of all CAF activities, as well as for the
readiness and the ability to fulfill military commitments and
obligations undertaken by the government. The CDS
implements government decisions that involve the CAF, by
issuing orders and instructions.

The Chief of the Defence Staff is the senior serving military


advisor to the Government of Canada. Whenever required,
the CDS advises the Prime Minster and Cabinet directly on
major military developments and issues.

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Environmental Command Structure

In peacetime, the bulk of CAF belongs to the environmental command structure comprised
of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army, and the Royal Canadian Air Force.
The three environments or services have similar overarching missions, namely to generate
combat-capable, multipurpose maritime, land or air forces respectively.
This primary force generation mission implies that environmental commands devote the
majority of their command and ensure their readiness for operations. With a few
exceptions, however, the environmental commands do not actually command or employ
the forces they generate on operations.
Force employment on operations, particularly of joint forces composed of elements from
at least two of the environmental commands, is usually carried out by the operational
command structure.

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) is Canada’s naval force consisting of


approximately 8,500 Regular Force and 5,000 Reserve sailors, supported
by more than 5,000 Reserve sailors, supported by more than 5,000 civilian
employees.
The mission of the Royal Canadian Navy is to generate combat-capable,
multipurpose maritime forces that support Canada’s efforts to participate
in security operations anywhere in the world, as part of an integrated
Canadian Armed Forces.
The RCN fleet, divided between the Atlantic (Halifax, N.S.) and Pacific (Esquimalt, B.C.)
coasts, is composed of 33 warships, submarines, and coastal defence vessels, plus many
more auxiliary and support vessels.
Three formations - Maritime Forces Pacific, Maritime Forces Atlantic, and the Naval Reserve
- are directly responsible to the Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy.
Maritime Forces Pacific and Maritime Forces Atlantic are responsible to generate, maintain,
and sustain an armed capability to guard Canada’s Pacific and Atlantic maritime
approaches respectively and to contribute forces to meet national, domestic and overseas
commitments, in order to enhance international peace and security.

The Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) strength includes


approximately 13,000 Regular Force, 2,400 Air Reserve personnel,
and approximately 2,000 civilian public servants.
The mission of the RCAF is to generate and maintain combat
capable, multi-purpose air power capabilities to meet Canada’s
defence objectives. Like the other environments, although the
RCAF generates these operational forces, they are generally
employed by other organizations such Canadian Joint Operations
Command (which we will examine shortly), NORAD, the North American Aerospace
Defence Command, NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the United Nations.

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The RCAF is organized into two air divisions. 1st Canadian Air Division (1 CAD) is
responsible for generating operation-ready air forces for rapid deployment and
employment. Its subordinate Wings (bases) and units operate a diverse range of combat
and combat support aircraft and are located throughout the country. Of particular interest
to the Army is 1 Wing, which is comprised of the RCAF’s fleet of tactical aviation (helicopter)
squadrons flying the CH-146 Griffon and CH-147 Chinook medium and heavy lift
helicopters. The commander of 1 CAD is also the commander of the Canadian NORAD
Region.
20. 2nd Canadian Air Division (2 CAD) is responsible for RCAF training and the professional
development of RCAF officers and NCMs.

The Canadian Army is Canada’s land force, and is the largest element
of the Canadian Armed Forces, with 22,800 Regular Force, 18,700
Reserve Force soldiers, 5,000 Rangers who serve in Canada’s sparsely
settled North, and 4,500 civilian employees who support the Army.

The mission of the Army is to generate and maintain combat capable,


multi-purpose land forces to meet Canada’s defence objectives. In
order to fulfil its mission the Army must constantly assess and align its
structures and capabilities. The role of Army formations and units is to conduct land
operational and tactical operations.

Army Organizations

The Army staff is based on the continental staff system, with functional staff branches
from G1 to G9, overseen by:
• Three functional Chiefs of Staff
• COS Ops, who is responsible for the planning, generation, sustainment and readiness of
combat-capable forces
• COS Strat, who is responsible for force and capability development, including the
definition of Army concepts and equipment requirements
• COS Army Reserve, who is responsible for the unique requirements of the Army Reserve
One of the Army’s staff branches, the G6 Branch, is headed by a Signal officer, and is
responsible for the Army’s command support program. The G6 is double-hatted as the
Director of the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals, “D Sigs”, and as such is responsible for the
personnel management of the RCCS.

The Canadian Army Doctrine and Training Command (CADTC), as its name implies, is
responsible for developing the Army’s doctrine and for conducting the Army’s individual
and collective training. CFSCE is one of several schools belonging to CADTC.

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The Director General Land Engineering Program Management (DGLEPM), while not a
part of the Army staff, supports the Army by procuring and maintaining its equipment
fleets. One of DGLEPM’s subordinate directorates, the Directorate of Land Command
Support Systems Management (DLCSPM) is responsible for procuring and supporting the
Army’s command support, signals, surveillance and target acquisition equipment.

The Army’s combat-capable forces are organized into four geographically-based


Divisions. These are:

1. 2 Cdn Div, headquartered in Montreal


2. 3 Cdn Div, headquartered in Edmonton
3. 4 CDN Div, headquartered in Toronto
4. 5 Cdn Div, headquartered in Halifax
Each division is comprised of two or more Reserve Canadian Brigade Groups (CBGs), And
except for 5 Div, a Regular Force Canadian Mechanized Brigade Group (CMBG).

Each division also commands a Divisional Support Group, responsible for division-wide
service support.

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Operational Command Structure

As previously discussed, environmental commands are responsible for generating


operationally-ready forces (force generation), but only rarely command them for
operational employment.

Most force employment is carried out by the operational command structure, which was
deliberately designed to enable and exploit the enhanced capabilities of joint forces.

The operational command structure “ owns” some specialist forces


and capabilities, such as:
• deployable headquarters
• signal and logistics units
• intelligence capabilities
• special operations forces
• other unique capabilities that don’t fit well into the environmental
command structure

The bulk of the forces is employed by the operational commands
and task-tailored into task forces (often joint task forces, or JTFs) for
each mission.

Depending on the mission, JTFs can be structured along environmental lines, with Air,
Maritime and Land Component Commands (ACC, MCC, functional commands such as a
Special Operations Component Command (SOCC).

Canadian Joint Operations Command


Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) is responsible for conducting full-spectrum
Canadian Armed Forces operations at home, on the continent of North America, and
around the world. With its integrated command-and-control structure, CJOC directs these
operations from their earliest planning stages through to mission closeout, and ensures
that national strategic goals are achieved. The only Canadian Armed Forces operations in
which CJOC does not engage are those conducted solely by:
a. Canadian Special Operations Forces Command CANSOFCOM)
b. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)

CJOC Units & Formations

CJOC comprises the following units and formations:


a.CJOC Headquarters in Ottawa, Ont
b.Six standing regional Joint Task Force Headquarters across Canada
c.1st Canadian Division Headquarters (1st Cdn Div HQ)

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d.The Canada-wide network of units that make up the Canadian Forces Joint Operational
Support Group
e.Task forces deployed on expeditionary operations around the world

Standing regional joint task force headquarters are based on existing headquarters
capabilities of the
environmental command structure, with the environmental headquarters commander
double-hatted as
the regional joint task force commander. They are prepared to take under command
whatever joint forces
might be required to conduct domestic operations within their area of responsibility.

CJOC Headquarters Locations

Standing regional joint task force headquarters are located across Canada as follows:
1. JTF North - JTFN HQ in Yellowknife, NWT, responsible for Yukon and Northwest
Territories and Nunavut
2. JTF Pacific - Based on Maritime Force Pacific HQ in Victoria, BC, responsible for British
Columbia
3. JTF West - Based on 3 Div HQ in Edmonton, AB, responsible for Alberta, Saskatchewan
and Manitoba
4. JTF Central - Based on 4 Div HQ in Toronto, ON responsible for Ontario
5. JTF East - Based on 2 Div HQ in Montreal, PQ, responsible for Quebec
6. JTF Atlantic - based on Maritime Force Atlantic HQ in Halifax, NS, responsible for New
Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, Newfoundland and Labrador.

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Expeditionary Operations

The Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) provides the command and control
structure required to conduct expeditionary (ie International) operations.
Task forces (often joint task forces) comprised of all the CAF personnel and assets
committed to a specific mission come under command of CJOC.

An expeditionary operation may be part of a Canadian “whole-of-government” engagement


in a crisis where the military operation is one component of a long-term program that
includes development and governance initiatives as well as security and stability
operations.

In many cases, expeditionary operations are part of larger international or coalition


missions.

The Canadian Armed Forces take part in several United Nations, NATO and other
multinational missions in which they operate alongside allies and other likeminded nations.

CJOC High-Readiness

1st Canadian Division Headquarters


The 1st Canadian Division headquarters (1st Cdn Div HQ) is a CJOC high-readiness
deployable joint headquarters capable of leading JIMP operations throughout the full
spectrum of conflict to meet national objectives.

The Canadian Forces Joint Operational Support Group


The CFJOSG is the CJOC high-readiness formation that generates task-tailored operational
and support capabilities for employment in Canadian, continental, and world-wide theatres
of operations.
Responsible for planning and delivering operational support capabilities including
command support, communications, military engineering, logistics, movement control,
heath services and personnel support, the CFJOSG is comprised of several national,
operational-level units and formations specialized in delivering these capabilities. Of
particular interest to Signal officers, the CF Joint Signal Regiment, responsible for providing
deployable joint, operational command support and CIS, is a unit of the CFJOSG.

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CANSOFCOM
Canada’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) are generated and commanded by the Canadian
Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM).
CANSOFCOM is a high-readiness organization, ready to deploy SOF on very short notice to
protect Canada and Canadians from threats to the national interest at home and abroad.

CANSOFCOM is organized into a headquarters element and five units:


a. Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2)
b. Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR);
c. 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (427 SOAS);
d. Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit - Chemical, Biological, Radiological and
Nuclear (CJIRU-CBRN);
e. Canadian Special Operations Training Centre (CSOTC).

CANSOFCOM has five strategic tasks:


a. Provide advice on special operations to the Chief of the Defence Staff and other CAF
operational commanders;
b. Generate deployable, high readiness Special Operations
Forces (SOF) capable of deploying as part of a broader CAF
operation, or independently;
c. Conduct and command SOF operations on behalf of the CDS;
d. Continuously develop SOF capabilities and tactics; and
e. Maintain and promote relationships with Canadian security
partners and allied special operations forces.

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STAGE 2

Continuum of Operations

The raison d’être of the land force is the application of combat power. This ability to fight
also creates organizations capable of performing a wide variety of other activities.

Throughout history, land forces have been required to operate effectively across the
spectrum of conflict, to undertake tasks ranging from building civil infrastructure through
policing conflicts to major combat. They must be able to conduct this variety of activities
simultaneously and sequentially, and transition quickly from one type of activity to another
during rapidly evolving conflicts.

Commanders must not focus on a single activity or


sequential progression. Rather, they must be able to
effectively visualize how a campaign or operation will
evolve over time, in the light of changing
circumstances throughout their area of operations,
and how the balance across different types of
activities will or should shift.

Campaign success is likely to depend upon understanding such simultaneity, how it evolves
throughout the campaign, and how it affects the planning and execution of operations.
This concept is relevant to all levels of command and is referred to as full-spectrum
operations.

Conceptual Framework

The continuum of operations is a conceptual framework used to explain the relationship


between operational campaigns and the various types of tactical activities that constitute
their conduct. It helps in understanding the complexity of the operational environment
while planning, preparing for, conducting, and assessing operations.

This model enables missions to be visualized with a


broader perspective that goes beyond military
combat. It allows for the visualization at the tactical
level of military input into campaign lines of
operation in which the land forces have a lead or a
supporting role. Commanders must maintain a
long-range vision of where a campaign is going and
consider the long-term effects of current

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operations. This framework should help commanders think beyond the specifically
assigned mission to what may come next.

Major Concepts

Spectrum of Conflict
The spectrum of conflict spans from high intensity combat (great deal of violence) at the
other end, and it provides the overall environment for the continuum and campaigns. It
reflects the intensity and level of violence expected and found in a campaign, and success
is reflected in a move to the lower levels of violence on the spectrum.
The spectrum of conflict reflects the environment in which operations occur. The principle
discriminator is the prevalence, scale and intensity of violence. These vary between
absolute peace and absolute war. Land forces operate throughout this spectrum.

No conflict will exist at just one point on the


spectrum of conflict. Its intensity will vary in
time and place. At any one time there may
be a humanitarian crisis in one location, a
requirement to conduct crowd
confrontation in another, and intense
fighting in a third. A battle group may have
to complete all of these simultaneously. It is
important to recognize that a campaign will
consist of simultaneous and sequential
activities from various locations on the spectrum of conflict.

Predominant Campaign Themes


Predominant campaign themes reflect and describe the general nature of an operational
campaign and will change over time.

Types of Operations
Campaign plans are executed at the tactical level through various types of tactical activities
and operations, in addition to enabling operations.
Priorities and resources ebb and flow between these tactical activities as required by the
situation and campaign theme, particularly as the campaign theme changes over time.

Simultaneity
Tactical operations and their constituent activities and tasks will be conducted
simultaneously.
For example, one tactical unit or subunit may be conducting an attack, while another is
defending a vital point, and a third may be assisting with reconstruction or the delivery of
humanitarian aid, all within the same area of operations, at the same time.

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Specific Campaign Themes

States of peace, tension, conflict and combat may be local or widespread, and transient or
prolonged. The character of any particular campaign may be difficult to define precisely
and is likely to change over time. It will probably consist of a wide and changing variety of
activities across the spectrum of conflict.
It is possible to describe several predominant campaign themes within the continuum of
operations. The character of the campaign varies according to the theme, and major
combat for example, is identifiably different from counter-insurgency. They demand
different approaches, are guided by specific principles and require different force
packages.
Campaign themes within the continuum of operations can be broadly divided into the
following categories:

Major Combat
Major combat campaign is the most demanding of military campaigns and operations. It is
characterized by combat that is frequent, widespread and intense. It will usually be
conducted against other formal, conventional military forces.

Counter-Insurgency
Counter-insurgency (COIN) is defined as “those military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological and civic actions taken to defeat insurgency.” A COIN campaign is
characterized by an insurgent-based adversary engaged in armed political struggle, a need
to address multiple facets of the environment and root causes of the crisis through a
comprehensive approach with the military in an overall supporting role, and a degree of
combat that is less than that experienced in a major combat campaign.

Peace Support
A peace support campaign impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means,
normally in pursuit of United Nations (UN) Charter purposes and principles, to restore or
maintain peace. Such operations may include conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace
enforcement, peacekeeping, or peace building.

Peacetime Military Engagement


Peacetime military engagement is defined as
“military activity in peace time that involves
cooperation with other nations or agencies,
primarily intended to shape the security
environment.” It includes initiatives to
improve mutual understanding and
interoperability. It may include programmes
and exercises with other nations designed to
improve mutual understanding, improve

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interoperability, and improve the standards and capabilities of other nations. Military
involvement may be complemented by activities conducted by other agencies seeking to
improve other aspects of the host nation government and society.

Limited Intervention
Limited intervention consists of those operations that have limited objectives and
scope, such as the rescue of hostages, security and/or evacuation of non
combatants, re-establishing of law and order, or providing disaster relief. They are
usually conducted with a specific, limited aim and for a short duration, often a
number of days. Due to their limited scope, they are not true military campaigns.
They may occur at point along the spectrum of conflict and may occur while other
operations are occurring in the same area. Most domestic operations are classified
as limited intervention.

Link with the Spectrum of Conflict

The campaign themes can be arranged along the spectrum of conflict to reflect the general
level of violence and conflict expected.

Major combat tends to occur when the environment is characterized by extreme violence,
while in peacetime military engagement (PME), the level of violence can be expected to
be low. However, within major combat there may be large areas within the theatre or area
of operations that are comparatively peaceful.

Conversely, within peace support there may at times be extremely violent incidents. Thus,
it is useful to describe operations as taking place across the spectrum of conflict, where the
character of the conflict, and hence campaign theme, is only partly shaped by the varying
degrees of violence within that spectrum.

Limited intervention can occur anywhere along the continuum. It should be noted that
descriptions of campaign themes are broad and tend to overlap, as depicted in the slide.

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Tactical Activities

Campaigns and operations are prosecuted through the conduct of tactical operations and
activities. Land forces will undertake a wide range of tactical level activities in the
prosecution of an assigned operation and the overarching campaign.

They may be simultaneous or sequential depending upon the level of command. For
example, a unit may be conducting command. For example, a unit may be conducting an
attack in one location, defending a vital point in another location, and securing a local
populace and giving emergency aid in a third location.

Tactical activities are divided into offensive, defensive, stability, and enabling operations.
Together, they describe all tactical military activities conducted within a campaign:

Offensive operations are tactical activities in which forces see out the enemy in order to
attack them.

Defensive operations are tactical activities that resist enemy offensive activities.

Stability operations are tactical


activities and are defined as: “a
tactical activity conducted by
military and security forces, often in
conjunction with other agencies, to
maintain, restore or establish a
climate of order.” They allow for
responsible government to
function, development to occur and progress to be achieved.

Enabling operations are tactical activities that link, support or create the conditions for
offensive, defensive and stability operations.

Full Spectrum Operations

Campaigns and operational plans are realized at the tactical level through the
simultaneous and sequential conduct of these tactical activities.
Priorities and resources ebb and flow between these tactical activities as required by the
situation and campaign theme, particularly as a security situation improves. This
simultaneous conduct of enabling, offensive, defensive and stability activities is termed
full-spectrum operations.

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Full-spectrum operations are defined as: “The simultaneous conduct of operations by a
force across the spectrum of conflict.”
Generally, all types of tactical operations and activities may be conducted simultaneously,
regardless of the campaign theme.
For example, in peace support, which consists mainly of stability activities, there may be a
requirement at some point to attack a stubborn adversary (offensive) or a constant
requirement to defend a security base (defensive). Major combat will consist primarily of
offensive and defensive activities, while COIN may have a complex mix of all three types.
Enabling operations are never conducted in isolation for their purpose is to enable other
operations.
Even when activities are sequential, it is important to plan them simultaneously as linkages
between the different operations are important. If not coordinated, early actions may
compromise subsequent operations. For example, bridges destroyed during defensive
operations might be required later during offensive operations, and their destruction might
radicalize a civil population, whose support is required.

Balancing Tactical Activities

The balance between the different tactical activities will be dictated by the type of
campaign, the principles by which the campaign is conducted, the situation at hand and the
commander’s intuition in terms of how to best achieve the operational objectives.

Commanders must consider and plan for the simultaneous conduct of each type of tactical
activity regardless of the nature or theme of the campaign they are undertaking. Even
during major combat, there will be a requirement to undertake or at least plan for some
stability operations.
As campaigns move to the lower end of the spectrum of conflict, the opportunity and
requirement for stability operations will increase. Tactical level commanders and their
subordinates must be mentally and physically prepared to transition rapidly between these
types of operations and tasks.

This combination of simultaneous offensive,


defensive, and stability operations reflects a
campaign’s predominant theme at any one time
and place and can be illustrated by the
continuum of operations model. The model also
demonstrates how this combination of tactical
activities will change over time. This slide
represents the evolution of operations in
Southern Iraq in 2003 and early 2004. While the predominant campaign theme changed
several times throughout this period, all types of tactical activity were conducted
throughout. Their relative weight and prevalence varied with the campaign theme and
situation.

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Battlespace in the Past

In simpler times, the “battlefield” was quite literally the field upon which opposing armies
did battle.

The 20th Century


The 20th century has seen this straightforward
definition stretched in many directions as the scope of
military operations has grown to encompass all
aspects of the societies at war. During WWI, the
“battlefield” expanded physically, extending from the
Swiss Alps all the way to the North Sea, an entirely
separate Eastern front, and several other theatres of war not physically adjacent to the
main “battlefield” in Western Europe.

Expansion
The “battlefield” expanded environmentally to include global naval operations and the
entirely new environment of air operations. In WWII, the perfection of aerial bombardment
expanded the “battlefield” to include entire civilian societies, and the use of sophisticated
electronic capabilities and propaganda on an industrial scale pushed the limits of the
“battlefield” beyond the physical plane and into the electromagnetic spectrum and onto the
psychological plane.
The space race of the 1960’s and 1970’s saw space exploited for military purposes, and
numerous unconventional, counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations led to the
realization that public opinion, information operations and non-governmental organization
activities were inescapably part of the new “battlefield”.

Information Technology
Recently, our increasing dependence on information technology has led to our defining an
entirely new realm of operations, that of computer network and cyber operations.

Clearly, the “battlefield” of today is far removed from the pasture where two small armies
of the past met to do muddy battle. Today’s battlefield is a multi-dimensional space that
extends from the physical plane (including its electromagnetic spectrum) to the moral and
psychological planes, while overlaid by the ever-growing information domain. The
“battlefield” of today has become a “battlespace”.

Definition of Battlespace

The Army’s current definition of battlespace is “the area of interest that includes both the
physical and moral planes and the electromagnetic spectrum.”

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In its future operational concept entitled “Land Ops 2021”, it is more usefully defined as the
environment, factors, and conditions the commander must understand to successfully
accomplish the mission and shield the force.
This includes air, land, and sea spaces, enemy and friendly forces, infrastructure, weather,
terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum and the information environment.

The battlespace is conceptual. It is not assigned by the


higher commander and is determined based on the
commander’s understanding of the situation and concept of
operations.
Commanders visualize and adapt the battlespace as the
situation or mission changes. The key is to recognize that it
is the environment the commander must understand in
order to be successful, the ability and authority to act in the battlespace is defined and
constrained by higher authority in accordance with the battlespace framework.

Battlespace Framework

The battlespace framework includes areas of interest, areas of influence, and areas of
operation, each of which will be described in detail below. The Land Ops 2021 operational
concept adds the information environment:

Areas of Interest
The area of interest is defined as: “the area of concern to a commander relative to the
objectives of current or planned operations, including his areas of influence, operations
and/or responsibility”.

This area also includes areas occupied by the adversary and interested neutrals, all of
which could jeopardize or influence the accomplishment of the mission and may be global
in scope. Areas of interest serve to focus sense and information operations activities at
factors outside the AO that may affect the operation.

The understanding of an area of interest must be expanded beyond immediate


geographical and time concerns. Areas of interest may include areas and activities that are
affected by events in a commander’s Area of Operations (AO), or conversely, may include
external events and influences that affect systems or individuals in the commander’s AO.

Limited resources, time, and personnel will place limitations on the commander’s ability to
collect and process information from the entire area of interest and its scattered
influences. The commander must set priorities for monitoring the area of interest.

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Areas of Influence
An area of influence (A of I) is defined as: “a geographical area wherein a commander is
directly capable of influencing operations, by manoeuvre or fire support systems normally
under his command or control.”

It is the physical volume of space within which a commander can directly influence the
situation by manoeuvre, fire support systems that are under his command or control, and
through information operations that affect understanding, perceptions and will of
target audiences.

The ability to influence, that is, create effects within the area of influence, exists on both
the physical and psychological planes. The physical area of influence is measured by the
limit of the physical effects that a commander may deliver such as the range of his weapon
systems included electronic warfare (EW) means. These are first order effects on the
physical plane and can be termed fires.

The targets and audiences that may be psychologically


affected by a commander’s decisions and activities, that
is, psychological effects of influence, may not be
physically within the AO or adjacent geographical area.

They may be physically removed from the immediate


AO and local environment and located in another area.
For example, activities to undermine or support a
particular ethnic group in the AO may influence the behaviour of other audiences of the
same ethnic group in another region or part of the world.

Thus, although effects on the physical plane will be within the physical boundaries of an
area of influence, the effects created on the psychological plane may be wide ranging in
both space and time. It is this linkage to psychological effects that in many cases will bind
tactical level activities to operational and strategic effects.

Areas of Operations (AO)


An AO is defined as: “a geographical area of ground, sea or air over which a commander
has the necessary authority and power to exercise command.” An AO is assigned to a
commander by his higher commander.

It is a permissive control measure that provides freedom of action within defined


boundaries and increases flexibility in unit operations. Commanders can, in turn, partition
their assigned AO and assign portions of it to subordinate units and subunits.

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Within an assigned AO, unless directed otherwise, the commander is responsible for the
following:
a. Conduct of operations
b. Coordination of fires
c. Control of movemen
d. Development and maintenance of installations
e. Terrain management, to include installations
f. Force protection security
g. Maintenance of the common operating picture (COP)
h. Area of intelligence responsibility (AIR)

When assigning an AO to a subordinate, the higher commander must ensure that the
subordinate unit or formation has the means to achieve the desired effects and objectives.

Many campaigns and operations will present significant geographical challenges. Many
situations and AOs will not allow for a linear or contiguous deployment. Coordination,
cooperation and mutual support between elements may be difficult. Mission command
and the use of well-practised reserves at all levels become increasingly important under
such circumstances.

The four recognized types of AOs are:


a. Contiguous, linear
b. Contiguous, non-linear
c. Non-contiguous, linear
d. Non-contiguous, non-linear

A linear AO is one where there is a “front line”


beyond which is enemy territory. When the
enemy is dispersed throughout the AO and there
is no “front line” as such, such as in COIN
operations, the AO is said to be non-linear. A contiguous AO is one where the entire AO is
contained within a single geographic boundary, whereas a non-contiguous AO is one that
has two or more separate geographic regions.

Factors affecting the assignment of AOs will vary by mission. Apart from geography, there
are a wide range of factors that must be considered in the delineation and allocation:
a. Mission
b. Targets and desired effects on those targets
c. Capabilities of own troops to create desired effects and conduct required activities
d. Assigned and implied tasks
e. Terrain
f. Threat

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g. Time and space (particularly in terms of the size of AO, threat and movement
capabilities)
h. Cultural boundaries
i. Linguistic boundaries
j. Political and/or judicial boundaries and social power structures
k. Tribal, historic, ethnic and or religious boundaries
l. Need for an economy of force
m. Presence of other agencies in the JIMP framework with which cooperation is
planned

Mission command has three enduring tenets.


a. timely decision-making
b. the importance of understanding a superior commander’s intent
c. a clear responsibility to fulfil that intent

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Areas Unassigned
In non-contiguous AOs there will be areas that are not assigned to subordinate
commanders. An area unassigned is the space not assigned to subordinate units within a
higher headquarters AO.

The commander remains responsible for these areas and for operations within them. They
determine what resources they will assign to monitor these areas and to conduct activities
in them when required. This may be done with reconnaissance forces in an economy of
force concept. Close, deep and rear – Operations in time and space.

Conduct of Operations and Activities


Within the battlefield framework, the concept of close, deep and rear areas and operations
exist. Originally defined for contiguous, linear battlespaces such as that during the Cold
War or the First Gulf War, their use has been expanded to include other battlespace
configurations.

They describe the placement of forces and the conduct of operations and activities in terms
of space and time. These are described as follows:

Close Operations
Close operations are “operations conducted at short range, in close contact and in the
immediate timescale.” Close operations are those that involve friendly forces in direct
contact with the adversary or operations in which commanders anticipate direct contact
taking place.

The means used in close combat could range from physical destruction with lethal
weapons, to arrest of detainees. Combined arms coordination is the hallmark of close
operations. Close operations will normally occur on the physical plane, although there may
be instances when they will occur on the psychological plane.

Deep Operations
Deep operations are: “operations conducted against forces or resources not engaged in
close operations. They expand the battle area in time and space, help to shape the close
battle, make it difficult for the enemy to concentrate fighting power without loss, and
diminish the coherence and tempo of his operations.”
Deep operations are those operations conducted at long range and over a protracted time
scale against adversary forces or resources not currently engaged in close operations.
For example, a deep target engagement may reduce the combat effectiveness of the
adversary’s reserve force prior to a main attack. At each level of command, the extent of
the deep operations and related area is dependent upon the commander’s means of
acquiring information and engaging targets. Deep operations include three principle

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activities: information operations; surveillance and target acquisition; and interdiction. They
may be conducted on the physical and psychological planes, the latter seeking to create
long term influences in a target audience.

Rear Operations
Rear operations are defined as: “operations which establish and maintain one’s own forces
in order to generate the freedom of action to allow for the conduct of close and deep
operations.”

Rear operations are the largely administrative and logistic activities that occur out of
contact with adversary forces, that is, behind or away from the area in which close
operations are occurring.

Rear operations require security, particularly in campaigns involving an asymmetric, non-


conventional adversary. In non-contiguous and/or nonlinear battlespaces (that is, in areas
with no identifiable rear area), there is a need to secure the lines of communications and
critical centres.

Deep and close operations may also be identified in terms of time, for both execution and
planning purposes. Normally, close operations will occur against adversary forces that will
be encountered within 48 hours. Operations against adversaries that will be encountered
by the forward line of troops not before 48 to 72 hours will normally be considered deep
operations, depending upon the level of engagement. When operating to create effects on
the psychological plane, deep operations may be conducted for months to years before
they result in a close operation, if ever at all.

Adaptive Dispersed Operations

Since the start of this Enabling Objective on Canadian Army doctrine, we have progressively
built your understanding of the various environmental factors that influence doctrine, as
well as your understanding of key foundational concepts.

Many of these factors and some of the foundational concepts are in evolution; the reality of
the continuum of operations, the requirement for Joint, Interagency, Multinational and
Public (JIMP) operations, and the whole-of-government approach demand appropriate
doctrinal responses, and enduring concepts such as our military ethos, mission command,
manoeuvre warfare, and our understanding of the contemporary battlespace need
refreshing to ensure they remain operationally relevant.

In 2007, the Army published Land Operations 2021 – The Force Employment Concept for
Canada’s Army of Tomorrow, a doctrinal concept incorporating the ongoing evolution of

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environmental factors and doctrinal concepts into a coherent whole meant to guide Army
development through 2021 and beyond.

This doctrinal concept is entitled Adaptive Dispersed Operations or ADO, and it will shape
how you will fight and conduct operations for the foreseeable future.

ADO envisages an operating environment characterized by complex, multidimensional


conflict, a non-contiguous dispersed operational framework and an approach to operating
within that environment based on adaptive dispersed land forces conducting simultaneous
full spectrum operations. It incorporates all of the evolving environmental factors and
many of the foundational concepts we have covered so far.

The Complex Operating Environment


Land operations will be undertaken to resolve the root causes of conflict in the future
security environment, and must therefore address the multi-threat, multidimensional,
multinational, joint and interagency aspects of the operating environment.

The Battlespace Framework


Within the Land Ops 2021 operational framework, the battlespace includes the
environment, factors, and conditions the commander must understand to successfully
accomplish the mission and shield the force.

The Land Ops 2021 battlespace includes associated areas of influence, areas of interest,
and the information environment as described previously.

The Area of Operations


AOs will be large enough for the commander to accomplish the mission and shield the
force.

Commanders must be able to see and understand their entire AO and exercise command
of all forces and resources within it. AOs will be more non-contiguous than contiguous and
will be widely dispersed.

New ADO Concepts

The Battlefield Organization


The ADO battlefield organization allocates forces
within the AO in terms of purpose rather than
geography. Given the non-contiguous nature of the
battlespace, commanders will normally organize their
forces according to purpose by determining whether

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each element’s operation will be decisive, shaping, or sustaining:
a. Decisive operations are those that directly accomplish the task assigned by the
higher headquarters and conclusively determine the outcome of the operation or
action. There is only one decisive operation for any given unit or element, but that
decisive operation may include multiple actions conducted simultaneously
throughout the AO.
b. Shaping operations create and preserve conditions for the success of the decisive
operation. Shaping operations include lethal and non-lethal activities conducted
throughout the AO. They support the decisive operation by affecting enemy
capabilities and forces or by influencing enemy decisions.
c. Sustaining operations enable shaping and decisive operations by providing combat
service support, security, movement control, terrain management, and
infrastructure development. Sustaining operations focus on preparing for the next
phase of the operation and assure the ability to take advantage of any opportunity
and exploit success.

Adaptive Forces
Land forces that are agile, lethal and non-lethal, net-enabled, multipurpose, and full
spectrum capable:

a. Agile, capable of planning and conducting actions faster than the adversary can
respond
b. Capable of lethal and non-lethal effects
c. Net-enabled, operating within a network of Land Forces supported by joint sensor,
fire support, and command and control (C2)
d. Multipurpose, providing full spectrum capability derived from a combination of
integral capability plus the full use of joint and coalition assets

Full spectrum, capable of participating in all aspects of a whole of government campaign


plan across the entire spectrum of conflict.

Dispersion
Dispersion in the ADO context refers to dispersion in time, space and purpose:

Dispersion in Time
Decentralizing decision making through mission command and net-enabled situational
awareness will allow commanders to speed up or slow down operational tempo to produce
a combination of effects that present the enemy with a rapidly deteriorating, cascading
situation, thereby disrupting his decision cycle. This will in turn disrupt the adversary’s
cohesion, enabling the land force to develop and conduct actions faster than the adversary
can react.

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Dispersion in Space
The ability to employ multiple forms of manoeuvre and to create effects from net-enabled
and integrated forces, alternatively dispersing and aggregating over extended distances,
will present the enemy with a complex and unpredictable array of actions over the entire
battlespace, thereby increasing his sense of confusion.

Dispersion in Purpose
Land forces will be required to undertake operations along a continuum that encompasses
offensive, defensive and stability actions across the full spectrum of conflict from
peacetime military engagement to major combat operations.

The Nature of Adaptive Dispersed Operations

The Adaptive Dispersed Operating Concept seeks to


create and sustain operational advantage over adept,
adaptive adversaries through the employment of
adaptive land forces alternatively dispersing and
aggregating throughout the multidimensional
battlespace.
Adaptive dispersed operations are grounded in
manoeuvre warfare theory and an effects-based approach, in that they are undertaken to
create enhanced positional, psychological and temporal advantages over the adversary,
vice attrition, and in that they employ a synergistic application of capabilities to produce
cascading and cumulative effects to achieve a desired outcome.

Decentralized decision making through common situational awareness and junior leaders
empowered to make quick decisions based on commander’s intent will enable the
commander to create and exploit opportunities while simultaneously creating dilemmas
for the adversary. Commanders at all levels must be confident that their subordinates are
capable of understanding their intent and rapidly taking decisive action to achieve the
desired end state.

Dispersed operations undertaken by geographically dispersed teams will enable the land
force to dominate a much larger battlespace and develop a better understanding of that
battlespace through information provided by dispersed teams and sensors. Moreover,
dispersed teams—empowered to take the appropriate action in a timely manner—provide
an effective means of engaging local civilian authorities and interagency representatives
involved in the whole of government campaign plan. The dispersed force must always be
capable of rapid aggregation in order to conduct operations as a larger aggregated force.

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NOTES:

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STAGE 3

Command Relationships

The basis of the command framework, in peace, conflict and war, is


the chain of command, the structure by which command is exercised
through a series of superior and subordinate commanders.

An important factor in a stable chain of command is establishing the


command relationships of subordinate formations and units.

In particular, establishing clear command and administrative relationships is a


fundamental requirement in all operations, and especially so in those of a JIMP nature.

In establishing command relationships, a commander delegates authority to subordinates


commensurate with their responsibilities. A commander can determine whether and how
he can employ subordinate formations or units by using the following questions:

a. Can he employ the unit for any purpose (can he give them a mission)?
b. If the mission (the purpose of their employment) is not within his purview, can he
give them tasks within the given mission?
c. Can he break up the formation or unit or must it retain its integrity?

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d. Are there any restrictions on their use (for example, for hostilities only or for a
specified duration or place)?

Full Command

Full command describes the command relationship where a superior commander has the
authority to assign missions and tasks, to deploy units, to group different subordinate units
together, to reform them as required (“re-assign” units or subordinate parts of them), and
to delegate their authority to subordinate commanders.

Full command is the only command relationship that includes administrative responsibility
(ie. full authority for all logistics and personnel support functions) for subordinate units.

Canadian and most allied doctrines do not permit the surrender of full command of a unit
or formation to forces of another nation or to a multi-national commander.
The national authority, normally the Chief of Defence Staff, always retains full command.

Operational Command

Operational Command (OPCOM) describes a


command relationship similar to full command, but
lacking administrative responsibility.

It is the authority granted to a commander to assign


missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to
deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or
delegate operational/tactical command or control as
may be deemed necessary.

“Command” terms like OPCOM and TACOM are normally used for manoeuvre arms
(infantry, armoured, and reconnaissance).

Tactical Command

A commander assigned forces under TACOM may give tasks to those forces but only for
the current mission given to them by the higher authority that assigns the forces.

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They may not break up the forces assigned TACOM, and cannot delegate their use to a
subordinate commander under any command relationship less restrictive than TACOM.
Once the task and mission are complete, the
forces assigned under TACOM revert to their
former command.

TACOM is used where the superior commander


recognizes the need for additional resources for a
task but requires the resources intact for a later
role.

An example would be a combat team required for


a bridge demolition guard assigned TACOM to the appropriate battle group (BG)
commander. When the task is complete, the TACOM relationship with that BG ends.

Operational Control

OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the
commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by
function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned and to retain or assign tactical control
of those units.

A commander assigned forces OPCON can assign them


missions, but cannot break them up or delegate their
employment to subordinate commanders under any
command relationship less restrictive than OPCON.

“Control” terms like OPCON and TACON are normally


used with support or service support arms and
services such as artillery, signals, military police and
general support engineers, where a technical authority exists to advise on the employment
of these resources.

Tactical Control

TACON is the most restrictive of command relationships. A commander assigned forces


under TACON may only coordinate their local movement, emplacement and local defence,
and include them in their planning and coordination. They may only delegate their use
TACON to their subordinate commanders.

TACON is usually used for elements required to complete a specific task requiring support
and coordination, such as a Radio Rebroadcast detachment assigned TACON to the
infantry battalion in whose AO it is located in order to provide security.

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Planning Authority

Planning Authority is used where there is the potential for a command relationship in the
future.

Planning Authority gives the units/formations


involved the authority to liaise directly (i.e.. without
having to go through their respective chains of
command) for planning purposes.

This authority could be given, for instance, to a unit


undergoing pre-deployment training in Canada with
the deployed unit they are to relieve.

Command Relationship Notes

In general:
1. No commander may delegate forces to a subordinate under a less restrictive
command relationship than the one under which the forces have been assigned to
him.
2. Command relationships will always be qualified by the date/time group (DTG) at
which they begin. The DTG at which they end should also be specified if known.
3. Sustainment responsibility is not included with the command relationship for any
joint, combined or multinational operation. Within national arrangements only,
OPCOM, TACOM and OPCON normally include the administrative responsibility for
daily maintenance and replenishment of normal combat supplies (non-specialist
ammo, POL rations and water). If the relationship must be specified. The reference
contains descriptions of the various administrative relationships possible.

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