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North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox

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The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Vol. 28, No. 2, June 2016, 181－198

North Korea, Nuclear Weapons, and the Stability-Instability Paradox*1

Terence Roehrig**2

U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, USA

As the chances wane of North Korea relinquishing its nuclear weapons, how will
this capability affect its behavior and tolerance of risk? Increasingly, scholars
are using the Cold War concept of a stability-instability paradox to describe the
possibility of Pyongyang being more willing to tolerate risk and conduct increased
numbers of lower-level provocations under the cover of nuclear weapons. North
Korea has long been tolerant of accepting a great deal of risk prior to its acquisition
of nuclear weapons, and it is not clear if nuclear weapons have increased that
tolerance––or as some have argued, it may actually decrease North Korea’s risk
tolerance, making it more cautious. While North Korea’s rhetorical barrages in
recent years have exceeded past outbursts, and weapons testing has done a great
deal to rattle nerves, much of this can be viewed as part of its deterrence-posturing
and less of the more aggressive, status quo-altering actions predicted by the
stability-instability paradox.

Keywords: North Korea, nuclear weapons, stability-instability paradox, deterrence,

risk tolerance, South Korea, ROK-U.S. Alliance, nuclear proliferation

Introduction

On January 6, 2016, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted

its fourth nuclear weapons test claiming it had tested a hydrogen bomb. A little over a
month later, Pyongyang placed a satellite in space though it is reported to be tumbling
in orbit and not functioning properly. However, although North Korea argued it has the

*
I‌ would like to thank Richard Samuels, David Shambaugh, Uk Heo, Negeen Pegahi, and
the Editorial Committee of the Korean Journal of Defense Analysis for comments on earlier
drafts but any errors are mine alone. I also want to thank the Academy of Korean Studies
for its support through the grant funded by the Korean Government (MEST) (AKS-2012-
AAZ-2101).
‌The views expressed in this report are the author’s alone and do not represent the official
position of the Department of the Navy, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.
**
E-mail: terence.roehrig@usnwc.edu

ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online

© 2016 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda
182 Terence Roehrig

right to the peaceful use of outer space, previous UN Security Council resolutions ban
these activities since the technology needed to launch a satellite is nearly identical to that
of long-range ballistic missiles. Through these tests and others that are likely to follow,
North Korea has demonstrated that it is committed to developing these programs and the
possibility of negotiations leading to a denuclearized North are long gone. Despite a new
round of tougher economic sanctions following the latest tests, North Korean nuclear
weapons are here to stay.
As North Korean nuclear capabilities increase, how will they affect its behavior and
tolerance for risk? What are the implications of these developments for Korean security
relations? Given the DPRK’s determination to maintain its nuclear forces, these have
become central questions for maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula. A framework
that is increasingly mentioned by analysts to address these concerns is the Cold War
concept of a stability-instability paradox where nuclear weapons help to maintain
stability at the strategic level but in turn, free up adversaries to act provocatively at
lower levels believing neither side will wish to escalate a conflict that might put nuclear
weapons into play. How useful is this framework in describing current and future Korean
security relations? Is it an accurate appraisal? How have South Korea and the United
States responded to this possibility?
At this point in time, it is uncertain how nuclear weapons have affected North
Korean behavior and whether it has further emboldened its actions. North Korea has
long been tolerant of accepting a great deal of risk and it is not clear if nuclear weapons
have increased that tolerance––or as some have argued, may actually decrease North
Korea’s risk tolerance, making it more cautious. While North Korea’s rhetorical barrages
in recent years have surpassed past outbursts, much of this can be viewed as part of
its deterrence posturing and less of the more aggressive, status quo-altering actions
predicted by the stability-instability paradox. Cyber attacks may be an exception, but its
work in this domain is also an indicator of more cautious behavior rather than aggressive,
kinetic actions to alter the status quo. However, the impact of nuclear weapons on North
Korean behavior continues to evolve and deserves careful attention. In the end, short of
military action that few are interested in taking, the likely and prudent response for the
United States and South Korea in confronting a potential stability-instability model is to
maintain a robust deterrence posture and improve missile defense capabilities, but also
continue to seek possibilities to establish a dialogue, at least to have an opportunity to
keep tension levels on the Peninsula at manageable levels.

Stability-Instability Paradox

After the first atomic bombs were dropped, scholars and analysts began examining the
role nuclear weapons might play in state behavior. Early in the Cold War, B. H. Liddell
Hart argued that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons and the possibility of
mutual annihilation deterred conflict at the strategic level, but had the paradoxical effect
of possibly freeing up states for conducting lower levels of violence. Later labeled the
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 183

stability-instability paradox, Liddell Hart argued, “To the extent that the H-bomb reduces
the likelihood of full-scale war, it increases the possibilities of limited war pursued by
widespread local aggression.”1 Glenn Snyder added that while the United States had
a monopoly on nuclear weapons, “The Soviets probably feel, considering the massive
retaliation threat alone, that there is a range of minor ventures which they can undertake
with impunity, despite the objective existence of some probability of retaliation.”2 Yet,
to what degree do nuclear weapon states facing a nuclear adversary take the potential
opportunity offered by the stability-instability paradox? Moreover, are the dynamics
between symmetric adversaries such as the United States and the Soviet Union similar to
asymmetric relationships such as North Korea, the United States, and South Korea?
Subsequent scholarship has been divided on the impact of nuclear weapons on state
behavior.3 Looking at the U.S.-Soviet case, Lambeth maintained that Moscow worked
hard to achieve strategic parity because it “forced the United States to abandon its
commitment to strategic superiority and obliged it to accept the Soviet Union as a full-
fledged strategic equal.”4 However, according to Lambeth, strategic parity “played a
major part in emboldening the [Soviet] leadership toward vigorous efforts to project its
presence and influence in contested Third World areas with little fear of serious U.S.
opposition” and provided a “license to meddle in such troubled Third World areas as
Angola, the Horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia.”5 Robert Jervis agreed that nuclear
weapons helped preserve strategic stability between Washington and Moscow but made
it more likely that violence would occur at lower levels. Thus, Jervis argued, “It is then
not surprising that some observers attribute Soviet adventurism, particularly in Africa,
to the Russians’ ability to use the nuclear stalemate as a shield behind which they can
deploy pressure, military aid, surrogate troops, and even their own forces in areas they
had not previously controlled.”6
For other less-powerful states, particularly those determined to alter the state of
affairs in their immediate security environment, nuclear weapons may provide the
political and military capability to alter the status quo.7 In the India-Pakistan case, S.
Paul Kapur maintains that “nuclear weapons can create strong incentives for rational
states to adopt aggressive, extremely risky policies.”8 Kapur attributes this incentive
to two primary factors. First, nuclear weapons provide weak states a “shield” against
stronger, conventionally-armed adversaries. As a result, according to Kapur, “the
danger of a nuclear response would constrain the strong state, making it much less
likely to launch a full-scale conventional attack against its adversary.” The possibility of
escalating to nuclear weapons will inhibit the use of military force and “embolden the
weak state to behave in ways that were previously too dangerous.”9
Second, Kapur maintains a conflict between nuclear weapons states creates
a dangerous security situation and an opportunity that can draw in international
involvement to prevent the conflict from escalating. As a result,

aggressive conventional military behavior that threatens to create a nuclear crisis

can attract international attention, including mediation efforts by outside states.
Such third-party intervention can result in a territorial settlement superior to any that
184 Terence Roehrig

the weak state could have secured in purely bilateral negotiations with this stronger
adversary. Weak, dissatisfied states therefore may have a diplomatic incentive to
engage in aggressive conventional military behavior that provokes their adversaries
and creates a danger of nuclear confrontation.10

Vipin Narang refers to this approach as a catalytic posture where a state uses ambiguous
nuclear capability that “envisions catalyzing third-party military or diplomatic assistance
when a state’s vital interests are threatened.” In the North Korean case, this would entail
triggering Chinese intervention in a crisis to protect Pyongyang’s concerns.11
States may also be able to use nuclear weapons as part of a compellence strategy
that allows the weaker state not only to deter retaliation by larger states but also to
challenge the status quo with less fear of retaliation. Regarding Iran, several studies
have maintained that nuclear weapons will protect it from retaliation and allow it to act
more aggressively either through its own actions or support for terrorist surrogates such
as Hezbollah.12 Yet others maintain that Iran may already be deterred by conventional
options so that the acquisition of nuclear weapons may do little to prompt Iran into using
more aggressive compellent behavior.13 Thus, deterrence and compellence are often
intertwined14 and in the North Korean case, both have long been part of security relations
on the Peninsula.
Other scholars maintain that, while nuclear weapons may not guarantee peace at
all levels between adversaries, possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily
encourage violence and instability. For example, Waltz has argued that nuclear weapons
make states more cautious and less opportunistic because the danger of nuclear
escalation is always present. Concerning North Korea, Waltz contends, “the weaker
and the more endangered a state is, the less likely it is to engage in reckless behavior.
North Korea’s behavior has sometimes been ugly, but certainly not reckless. Its regime
has shown no inclination to risk suicide.”15 Echoing Waltz, Šumit Ganguly argues
that even “minimally rational leaders” understand the destruction wrought by nuclear
weapons and the impossibility of achieving political goals through their use. As a result,
according to Ganguly, “such a realization in turn induces substantial caution when in
the midst of a crisis for fear of inadvertent or uncontrolled escalation to the nuclear
level. Consequently, governments have every incentive to circumscribe the scope and
dimensions of the conflict.”16 Finally, Michael Cohen argues that new nuclear weapons
states may initially see an opportunity upon acquiring nuclear weapons but “quickly
learn that nuclear threats do more harm than good, …are not useful for changing their
environments,…[and] then have accepted their regional order.”17
While there may be some impact on disputes between states where one side
possesses nuclear weapons, the effect is far less pronounced when both sides have
nuclear weapons. Pegahi maintains that whether a newly arrived nuclear weapons
state feels emboldened depends on whether the strong state could inflict catastrophic
conventional retaliation and whether the strong state relied on this capability to deter
the weak state from undertaking lower level, provocative actions. Thus, it is crucial to
“determine the conditions under which acquisition does, and does not, embolden.”18
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 185

In the Korean case, the United States has long had significant conventional
capability to retaliate on the North without resorting to nuclear weapons. Moreover,
a U.S. conventional response could have similar strategic effects to impose costs on
North Korean leadership, industry, and hardened targets. If North Korea pushed the
envelope too far, the United States and South Korea could respond with any number of
conventional weapons leaving the choice to escalate to nuclear weapons to the DPRK.
Should North Korea use nuclear weapons first, the response would be catastrophic and
likely lead to the end of the Kim regime. Thus, while North Korea has demonstrated a
willingness to accept significant risk, the danger of escalation to nuclear weapons poses
serious problems for North Korea and ones that the Kim regime may not be willing to
tolerate given it may be the cause of its downfall.
Before proceeding, it is necessary to define more precisely the concept of “instability”
that is central to the paradox. The paradox indicates that states may take lower-level
actions that cause instability under the cover of nuclear weapons. Yet what types of
lower-level actions are expected and qualify as instability under this model? Liddell Hart
spoke of “widespread local aggression” and Waltz acknowledged the possibility of “a
spate of local wars.”19 Kapur maintained states are likely “to adopt aggressive, extremely
risky policies,” often to “directly challenge territorial boundaries.”20 Finally, Lavoy posits
that states “might bully or attack their non-nuclear neighbors” or “attempt to use military
force against the other state in an effort to alter the territorial or political status quo,”
arguments he made referring to the dynamics of the stability-instability paradox and
how Pakistan might seize Kashmir.21 The point here is not to assess whether the paradox
predictions are correct but rather to determine what qualifies as an action generating
“instability.” In all of these examples, the new nuclear state undertakes aggressive,
offensive, military action to alter the status quo by seeking to change boundaries or use
nuclear weapons to blackmail. The presumption is that the actions are offensive and
kinetic in nature making increased rhetoric, deterrence signaling, and follow-on weapons
tests insufficient to describe the expected instability side of the paradox.

North Korean Military Capabilities

North Korea maintains a large conventional force of 1.19 million with reserve forces
and paramilitary units that add another six million.22 The DPRK has the fourth-largest
military in the world and on a per capita basis, ranks first. The Korean People’s Army
(KPA) has a large tank force that surpasses that of the South but many are old Soviet
and Chinese models. Of greater concern are the 8,500 artillery pieces and over 5,000
multiple rocket launcher systems (MRL), many of which have the range to reach Seoul.
The KPA also maintains 200,000 well-trained special operations forces.23 The Korean
People’s Navy (KPN) is almost exclusively a coastal defense force with its surface fleet
possessing only three frigates and the remainder coastal patrol vessels. More serious is
the KPN’s submarine force consisting of 72 boats including 20 midget submarines, the
type that likely sank the ROK corvette Cheonan in March 2010. The KPA Air Force
186 Terence Roehrig

(KPAF) has a considerable number of combat aircraft––but again, many are older
Russian and Chinese airframes that would not do well against modern ROK and U.S.
fighters. In addition, training and readiness remain a question mark as reports indicate
KPAF pilots train a meager 20 hours per year in their planes and the force suffers from
an overall lack of spare parts and fuel.24
The conventional military balance is not in North Korea’s favor and there is little
chance it would mount another Korean War-style invasion of the South. Yet, it retains a
conventional capability that could wreak havoc in the early stages of a war, particularly
with the thousands of artillery and MRL systems trained on Seoul. Most estimates
indicate the KPA could sustain this effort for 30 to 90 days before succumbing to
superior ROK and U.S. firepower. In many respects, North Korea has long had the
ability to punish the South and deter Washington and Seoul with only its conventional
weaponry.
To increase its deterrent posture and in part, to offset a declining conventional
capability that is costly to upgrade, North Korea has pursued in earnest asymmetric
capabilities such as ballistic missiles, nuclear weapons, and a growing cyber capability.
The North Korean missile force is composed of approximately 500 short-range Scud
missiles that can cover most of the peninsula and 150–200 medium range Nodong
missiles that have range sufficient to target most of Japan and U.S. military bases there.
North Korea has also conducted tests of the KN-02, a short-range solid fuel missile and
work continues on the medium-range Musudan and intercontinental-range KN-08. All
three systems are mounted on mobile launchers. However, the Musudan has had two
failed flight tests and the KN-08 has never been flight tested by North Korea, although
they have been deployed and used in parades at various times.25 North Korea has also
devoted considerable effort toward the intercontinental Taepodong missile as well as
a space program to improve its long-range capability. In February 2016, North Korea
succeeded in placing a satellite in orbit further demonstrating its progress on a long-
range missile. Finally, work continues on a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
Though the DPRK is a long way from a functional SLBM, it appears to be a major
priority for Kim Jong Un and several tests have been conducted to eject an SLBM from
a launching tube.26
North Korea has tested nuclear weapons on four occasions, October 2006, May
2009, February 2013 and most recently in January 2016. Although Pyongyang claimed
the January test was a hydrogen bomb, the blast yield was far too small for a weapon of
that type. Instead, the test was more likely a boosted fission device though North Korea
proclaimed “by succeeding in the H-bomb test in the most perfect manner to be specially
recorded in history the DPRK proudly joined the advanced ranks of nuclear weapons
states possessed of even [the] H-bomb.”27
Current estimates place the DPRK nuclear arsenal at 10–16 nuclear weapons, an
increase from the 4–8 weapons that was the standard for years.28 A study by Joel Wit and
Sun Young Ahn notes that 6–8 of these weapons likely originate from spent fuel from
the Yongbyon reactor with the remaining 4–8 from new uranium enrichment facilities.
Chinese scientists were cited in April 2015 as placing the arsenal at 20 nuclear weapons
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 187

with the expectation of it doubling within a year.29 Even more disconcerting, a report by
David Albright projected three possible scenarios for the DPRK’s future arsenal with a
stockpile of 20, 50, or 100 nuclear weapons by 2020.30
One additional question remaining is whether North Korea has succeeded in
weaponizing a nuclear device to fit on a ballistic missile. North Korea has not conducted
a definitive test to demonstrate it has mastered this difficult technological challenge.
However, increasingly, the assessments of analysts are moving toward the assumption
that North Korea has succeeded.31 In March 2016, Admiral William Gortney, head of
NORAD and commander of U.S. Northern Command stated in congressional testimony:
“while the KN-08 remains untested, modeling suggests it could deliver a nuclear payload
to much of the Continental United States.”32 In March 2016, Kim Jong Un appeared with
scientists next to a silver globe that was likely a mock up of a nuclear warhead. 33 Though
analysts disagree on the extent of North Korean capabilities, the DPRK will continue
working on them and will acquire various capabilities sometime in the future. Moreover,
even if DPRK systems are less than fully capable and reliable, they may be close enough
to generate some deterrence benefit for the North.
Another important and growing North Korean asset of concern for defense planners
is its offensive cyber capability.34 Housed in Bureau 121, Pyongyang’s cyber force
consists of 6,000 personnel, and over the years has become proficient in taking down
South Korean media outlets, financial institutions, and parts of the ROK government.35
North Korean hackers conducted cyber attacks in 2009 against several ROK and U.S.
government websites including the Blue House, South Korea’s presidential office,
the ROK Ministry of Defense, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission and the U.S.
Treasury Department. In 2013, North Korea hacked the sites of three South Korean
banks and three television stations,36 and a year later, pulled off the infamous cyber
attack on Sony Corporation networks to retaliate for the pending release of the movie,
The Interview, a comedy that parodies an assassination attempt on Kim Jong Un.
Pyongyang congratulated the hackers who accomplished the “righteous deed” but
denied responsibility for the attack.37 The origins of cyber attacks are often difficult to
determine, thus providing North Korea with some degree of cover––along with being
non-kinetic actions that are less likely to provoke a strong counter-response from South
Korea or the United States. Moreover, the desire to avoid attribution makes it difficult to
use as a coercive tool since attaching a goal to the act becomes almost impossible.

North Korean Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine

The role nuclear weapons play in North Korean security planning is difficult to identify,
given the opaque nature of the regime, but there have been several efforts to ascertain
what that might be.38 While there are a number of motives for North Korea acquiring
nuclear weapons including international prestige, political leverage, and domestic
politics, from a military and security perspective, most of North Korea’s pronouncements
indicate deterrence is the primary reason. Pyongyang has serious security concerns, in
188 Terence Roehrig

particular the threat from the United States that it believes requires the possession of
nuclear weapons to deter an invasion and protect the Kim regime. In February 2005
prior to its first nuclear test, North Korea declared itself a nuclear weapons state arguing
the U.S. threat “compels us to take a measure to bolster [our] nuclear weapons arsenal in
order to protect the ideology, system, freedom and democracy chosen by [our] people,”
and as a result, DPRK nuclear weapons “will remain [a] nuclear deterrent for self-
defense under any circumstances.”39
Four years later, the DPRK Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a statement criticizing
a U.S. pronouncement that denuclearization was a precondition to normal ties between
Washington and Pyongyang: “It is the reality on the Korean Peninsula that we can live
without normalizing the relations with the U.S. but not without [a] nuclear deterrent.
… If there is something to be desired by us, it is not to normalize the relations between
the DPRK and the U.S. but to boost the nuclear deterrent in every way to more firmly
defend the security of our nation.”40 Finally, in the formal announcement of the H-bomb
test in January 2016, regarding the importance of its nuclear weapons, “nothing is more
foolish than dropping a hunting gun before herds of ferocious wolves.” Thus, “there
can neither be suspended nuclear development nor nuclear dismantlement on the part of
the DPRK unless the U.S. has rolled back its vicious hostile policy toward the former.
The army and people of the DPRK will steadily escalate its nuclear deterrence of justice
both in quality and quantity to reliably guarantee the future of the revolutionary cause of
Juche for all ages.”41

Deterrence in Both Directions

Strategic stability in Korea has been preserved largely through robust deterrence postures
maintained on both sides of the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The strategic balance has
long been relatively stable and North Korean forces are unlikely to roll across the DMZ.
Moreover, deterrence works in both directions and has been a central element of security
relations for all concerned.42
The core tenet of deterrence is the use of threats to convince an adversary to desist
from taking an unwanted action. The threats must be able to impose unacceptable
costs in order to alter the adversary’s cost-benefit calculus. Deterrence can come in two
different varieties––deterrence by denial and deterrence by punishment.43 Deterrence
by denial occurs when a defender maintains sufficient military capability to prevent an
adversary from achieving its goals─either by defeating the assault, or by making the
endeavor so costly that the adversary will refrain from taking the unwanted action in the
first place. Deterrence by punishment is grounded in the ability to impose unacceptable
costs, whether or not a state could stop an invasion. States have been able to punish with
conventional means such as aerial bombardment or an artillery barrage, but this has been
made exceedingly easier with the advent of nuclear weapons allowing states to threaten
massive suffering.44
For deterrence to be successful, the theory maintains that it be credible. States must
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 189

convince an adversary that it has the necessary capabilities to carry out its threats.
Without the capability to impose unacceptable costs and the resolve to follow through, it
is unlikely a deterrence strategy will succeed.45 Yet, the possession of a nuclear capability
need not be explicit. Israel has never tested a nuclear weapon yet few doubt it has them.
In North Korea’s case, it has tested nuclear weapons on four occasions and has several
operational ballistic missile systems. Yet, a great deal of uncertainty exists regarding the
exact nature of North Korean capabilities. Has it succeeded in weaponizing a warhead?
Are the Musudan and KN-08 mobile missiles operational? While the reliability of these
systems may be in doubt, even if they might work only a small percentage of the time,
they may yet provide some degree of deterrence benefit for North Korea. As Wit and
Ahn have noted, even if some North Korean missiles have a small chance of working
properly, deploying them in a crisis as an “emergency operational capability” may make
the United States and South Korea hesitate in their response to the North.46
Finally, the defender must convince its adversary that it has the resolve to carry out
the threats should deterrence fail. Resolve is a tricky issue and it does not matter whether
the defender believes it will carry out the threats but rather whether the adversary is
convinced. For North Korea, the appearance of irrationality and high risk tolerance
may also be a deliberate strategy to demonstrate it might be willing to use nuclear
weapons. Also, while nuclear weapons are often central to considerations of deterrence
by punishment, given the strategic situation in Korea––Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ,
North Korean artillery and MRL systems forward deployed, and U.S. conventional
power––conventional weapons play an equally important role in the ability to punish.
Since the end of the Korean War, the United States and South Korea have sought to
deter another North Korean assault across the DMZ, and more recently made concerted
efforts to deter lower-level provocations conducted by Pyongyang. In turn, North Korea
has worked to deter what it fears is a possible U.S.-ROK invasion or coercion to force
regime change and reunification by absorption. During the early decades of North-
South hostility, Pyongyang accomplished its deterrence goals by maintaining a large
conventional force that could blunt an assault, and make a ROK-U.S. invasion very
costly. Most importantly, North Korean artillery and missile units deployed forward and
within range of Seoul had the ability to deter by punishing South Korea. Over the past
two to three decades, North Korea has sought to expand this capability by growing its
nuclear weapons program and an array of ballistic missiles that can reach all of South
Korea and Japan, along with continued efforts to target the United States with longer-
range systems.
At various times, security relations have resembled what Patrick Morgan has called
an immediate deterrence situation whereby circumstances deteriorate to a crisis that
prompt one or both sides to issue specific counter-threats to deter an action or to impede
the possibility of escalation.47 Tensions in Korea moved again in this direction in spring
2016, reminiscent of 2013, and Kim Jong Un’s statements to put DPRK nuclear forces
on alert for possible preemptive action was another example.48 The measures taken to
reinforce deterrence create something of a “credibility spiral” with states seeking to
signal and reinforce their capability and resolve for successful deterrence with tension
190 Terence Roehrig

levels rising to dangerous levels as a result. Both sides in Korea remain locked in a
deterrence relationship that shows little likelihood of diminishing.

North Korean Risk-Taking and Willingness to Provoke

Over the past decade, Korean security discourse has focused extensively on DPRK
provocations. Yet, North Korea’s willingness to undertake risky behavior is hardly a
new phenomenon. Beginning with the Korean War and on into the rash of infiltration
incidents in the late 1960s, the DPRK under Kim Il Sung was willing to launch numerous
operations in hopes of destabilizing the South and bringing about reunification. In 1967,
224 North Korean infiltrators were killed while conducting missions in the South, and
in 1968 there were 629 incidents reported along the DMZ.49 The most serious episode
was the Blue House raid on January 21, 1968 when a 31-man commando team made it
to within a short distance of the ROK presidential residence on a mission to assassinate
President Park Chung-hee. All but two of the infiltrators were killed. Two days later,
North Korea seized the USS Pueblo and held the crew for 11 months before releasing
them, but keeping the ship.
These events have been followed by others including another assassination attempt in
1974 that failed to kill President Park but succeeded in killing his wife, the 1983 attempt
in Burma to assassinate President Chun Doo-hwan that missed Chun but killed 17
including three high-level ROK ministers, and the downing of Korean Air Lines Flight
858 in 1987 that killed all on board. These last two operations are believed to have been
ordered by Kim Jong Il who by this time had been designated the successor to his father,
Kim Il Sung, and all of this done without the protection of nuclear weapons.
In 2010, North Korea conducted two particularly bold provocations. First, on
March 26, the ROK corvette Cheonan was sunk killing 46 sailors aboard. Initially, the
cause of the sinking was unclear but an investigation eventually determined it to be a
North Korean torpedo likely launched from one of its midget submarines. North Korea
denied responsibility but many believed it was retaliation for the November 2009 naval
skirmish off Daecheong Island where one of its naval vessels was badly damaged. The
following November, North Korean artillery shelled South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island
killing two ROK Marines and two civilians. DPRK guns fired approximately 170 rounds
and ROK artillery returned fire with 80 rounds on DPRK firing positions.
Both actions were an act of war on North Korea’s part and very risky ventures that
could have easily sparked a broader conflict. Moreover, both occurred under Kim Jong
Il’s leadership who is often assessed to be more predictable and experienced than his son
Kim Jong Un.50 Did nuclear weapons play a role in Kim Jong Il’s decision to order these
attacks? Answering this question is difficult and any attempt is highly speculative, yet
North Korea’s nuclear capability at this point in time was very rudimentary and unlikely
to have been in any way operational to be part of a credible North Korean response.
Thus, it seems unlikely that nuclear weapons were much of a factor. More likely, North
Korea believed that it could sink the Cheonan without certainty of attribution and
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 191

that in both the sinking and shelling, the United States would restrain the South from
responding based on a history of U.S. risk-averse behavior.51
Since that time, North Korea has appeared to restrict its behavior to less violent
military actions compared to those of 2010. Most DPRK provocations have been
confined to weapons tests, cyber attacks, placing three land mines on the ROK side of
the DMZ, a careful exchange of artillery fire in August 2015 with no casualties, and
crossings of the Northern Limit Line. There has been a significant increase in incendiary
DPRK declarations but these have not been matched by similar actions. Nuclear
weapons have allowed North Korea to make more inflammatory threats that are now
couched in the language of nuclear weapons. However, much of this has been about
deterrence which is not the same as the instability and offensive actions suggested by
the paradox. Though North Korea continues to test various weapons systems, generating
a great deal of angst along with political, military, and economic responses from South
Korea and the United States, these do not reach the level of offensive provocative
behavior one would expect based on the predictions of the stability-instability paradox.
Thus, as its nuclear weapons capability has grown, North Korea does not appear to have
increased its risk tolerance significantly from what it has been in the past.
North Korea has long demonstrated a willingness to take on significant risk.
Moreover, an argument could be made that when removing weapons tests from the list
of provocations, a very different type of action than sinking a ship, North Korean actions
have actually been somewhat restrained, in part perhaps, due to South Korea’s stated
determination through proactive deterrence after the Yeonpyeong shelling to respond
should North Korea again use military force along with increased alliance efforts to
buttress deterrence. In March 2011, ROK Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin told the
military that for future attacks: “Do not hesitate whether to shoot or not. Report after
taking action first.”52 It was clear ROK leaders had had enough and made it very clear
there would be a vigorous response should the North use force again. Thus, it is not clear
that nuclear weapons have increased North Korean risk tolerance beyond previous levels
and much of North Korean bombast, weapons tests, and other actions can be chalked
up to deterrence rather than the aggressive, offensive actions predicted by the stability-
instability paradox.
North Korea’s cyber activity requires further discussion. As noted earlier, there
has been a significant growth in DPRK cyber actions the past few years that could be
interpreted as the actions of a more risk-tolerant North Korea emboldened by nuclear
weapons. While this reading is certainly plausible, it is more likely that cyber actions
are actually a sign of restraint and caution than a willingness to take greater risks. In
the face of Seoul’s determination to retaliate after the Yeonpyeong shelling, cyber
activities provide a non-kinetic route for Pyongyang to aggravate its adversaries in a
way that will not trigger a military response. In addition, given the attribution challenges
of cyber attacks, North Korea is able to conduct these operations with less chance of
being identified as the instigator. Finally, DPRK cyber attacks do not appear to have an
attached objective that alters the status quo other than irritating its enemies and collecting
intelligence. North Korea’s move into the cyber world would have likely come with or
192 Terence Roehrig

without its nuclear weapons and may in fact, demonstrate that North Korea is seeking a
less risky behavior because ROK-U.S. efforts to deter its lower level kinetic are actually
working.

ROK and U.S. Efforts to Bolster Deterrence

To counter North Korean nuclear weapons, South Korea and the United States have
undertaken a number of efforts to bolster deterrence at several levels. At the strategic
level, Seoul and Washington signed a bilateral “Tailored Deterrence Strategy” in
October 2013 that is designed to counter North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons threat. The strategy developed from meetings of the Extended Deterrence
Policy Committee, now the Deterrence Strategy Committee, formed in 2010 which was
also created in response to North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and provides a set of
options for U.S. and ROK forces to counter these weapons. The formal announcement
of the strategy by U.S. and ROK defense officials stated the strategy “establishes a
strategic Alliance framework for tailoring deterrence against key North Korean nuclear
threat scenarios across armistice and wartime, and strengthens the integration of Alliance
capabilities to maximize their deterrent effects.”53
Details of the strategy are classified but press reports have noted that the plan
includes the possibility of preemptive strikes against North Korean targets should there
be signs that nuclear use is imminent. The United States and South Korea have also
concluded a new war plan, OPLAN 5015, that is also reported to contain contingency
planning for prompt strikes on the DPRK leadership and military facilities following
an attack.54 For the spring 2016 joint exercises, ROK and U.S. forces simulated war
plans for preemptive strikes against North Korea’s nuclear weapons including its mobile
missile launchers, along with underground and hardened storage facilities.55 The exercise
implemented a pre-emptive strike plan called “4D” (detect, disrupt, destroy, and defend)
that is designed to secure and destroy North Korean nuclear and chemical weapons
facilities and assets so that they do not disappear and show up in other countries or in the
hands of any terrorist groups.
To address lower level provocations, in March 2013, ROK and U.S. defense officials
adopted the Combined Counter-Provocation Plan (CCP). Though the details are also
classified, press reports indicated South Korea will take the lead in responding to North
Korean actions but is able to request U.S. assistance if necessary. In the press release for
the CCP, U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) noted: “By completing this plan, we improved our
combined readiness posture to allow us to immediately and decisively respond to any
North Korean provocation. The completed plan includes procedures for consultation and
action to allow for a strong and decisive combined ROK-U.S. response to North Korean
provocations.”56 The CCP helps to bolster deterrence and signal to North Korea the
likelihood of a joint ROK-U.S. response that will convince Pyongyang from taking the
action in the first place.
For the United States, the CCP also had another motivation. Though the ROK
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 193

response after the sinking of the Cheonan was restrained, in large part due to the initial
uncertainty of the cause, the island attack provided a clear “smoking gun” of DPRK
responsibility and South Korea was ready to retaliate. Though U.S. officials understood
ROK frustration, there was a great deal of fear events could spiral out of control should
the South strike back. Then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted in his memoirs,
“We were worried the exchanges could escalate dangerously. The president, Clinton,
Mullen, and I were all on the phone often with our South Korean counterparts over a
period of days, and ultimately South Korea simply returned artillery fire on the location
of the North Korean’s batteries that had started the whole affair.”57 Concluding the CCP
was likely a decision where Washington believed it was better to be part of a response
providing some degree of influence and control over its ally rather than being an
observer.58

Ballistic Missile Defense

Since the likely delivery method for North Korean nuclear weapons entails the use of
ballistic missiles, missile defense has been a key part of the response. The United States
has been working to construct a regional ballistic missile defense (BMD) system that
includes its chief allies in the region, Australia, Japan, and South Korea. Important assets
in the system include Aegis-class destroyers equipped with AN/SPY-1 radar and SM-3
surface-to-air missiles along with ground-based interceptors such as PAC-2 and PAC-3
systems and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system. The U.S. Navy
has Aegis destroyers based in Japan and has often sent these ships to Korean waters to
monitor a pending North Korean missile launch. Japan and South Korea also have Aegis
destroyers but only Japan’s are equipped with the SM-3 interceptor. ROK destroyers
have the SM-2, an interceptor suited more for anti-ship and air defense missions making
it difficult for them to shoot down a North Korean missile.
Japan has been an enthusiastic participant in U.S. regional BMD but South Korea
has been reluctant preferring to maintain a separate system it calls Korea Air and Missile
Defense (KAMD). The ROK BMD system consists of its three Aegis destroyers along
with PAC-2 interceptors though South Korea is planning on buying the more advanced
PAC-3 missile. In addition, the ROK military maintains a “Kill Chain” capability
that would allow it to conduct preemptive strikes on North Korean targets with
conventionally armed ballistic and cruise missiles along with air strikes.
South Korea has insisted on maintaining its separate KAMD system in part due
to the costs it would entail to join the U.S.-led system but more importantly because
of objections raised by Chinese leaders.59 Beijing is convinced that the BMD system
and any BMD assets in the region are chiefly targeted at them, and North Korea is a
convenient rationale for U.S. BMD. Chinese pressure on South Korea to stay out is
exacerbated by the fact that China is the South’s largest trading partner accounting for
larger trade volumes than Japan and the United States combined. The issue surfaced
again in June 2014 when USFK Commander General Curtis Scaparrotti recommended
194 Terence Roehrig

a THAAD missile battery be deployed to protect U.S. bases in South Korea. China
expressed its vehement opposition to the deployment, and its concern was more for the
THAAD radar system that could monitor Chinese actions than its missile interceptors.
South Korea pushed the issue to the sidelines as ROK President Park Geun-hye has
exerted great efforts to build good ties with China, not only for economic reasons but
also recognizing the important role Beijing plays in dealing with the North.
Following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, the THAAD issue took some interesting
turns. When China’s early response to North Korea’s fourth test was viewed in Seoul
as tepid and disappointing, ROK officials announced they were reconsidering THAAD.
Planning talks with Washington were announced and it appeared the deployment
would go forward, despite China’s objections.60 Yet, while this was playing out, the UN
Security Council was struggling through deliberations to pass a resolution that would
increase the sanctions regime on North Korea. As expected, opposition from Beijing and
Moscow, both reluctant to increase sanctions, delayed a new resolution. Within a week
in what appeared to be a quid pro quo for Chinese support for a tougher UN resolution,
South Korea and the United States announced that their THAAD talks were on hold.61
The sanctions resolution [UNSCR 2270] passed by unanimous vote on March 2, 2016,
imposing new sanctions on the sale of coal, iron, gold, and rare earth metals, along
with increased authority to inspect all cargo transiting to and from North Korea among
other provisions. Yet, within a few days, U.S. and ROK defense officials announced
the THAAD talks would resume. Attention will be focused on China’s implementation
of the sanctions and the fate of THAAD in South Korea is uncertain. For China, the
THAAD decision is not only about the deployment of this one asset but also the
possibility that this measure is an incremental step toward South Korea joining the U.S.
ballistic missile system.

Conclusion

From this assessment of the stability-instability paradox playing out in Korean security,
there are several important conclusions. First, it is difficult to determine the effect of
nuclear weapons on North Korean behavior and whether possessing a nuclear capability
has made the Kim regime more risk tolerant, particularly given North Korea’s past
record of risky behavior. For example, in the wake of the nuclear test and satellite
launch, the UN Security Council has imposed expanded sanctions and soon after, South
Korea and the United States began their spring military exercises Key Resolve and Foal
Eagle. North Korea responded with short range missile tests, exercises, and threatening
rhetoric that was chilling even by past DPRK standards. In many respects, Kim Jong
Un’s reaction to sanctions and exercises is not a surprise; that has been a standard
response to what Pyongyang has for years viewed as a threat, though the volume and
intensity of their rhetoric was significantly worse. Yet, how much of North Korea’s
response was a result of possessing nuclear weapons? Certainly, having a nuclear
weapons capability now allows North Korea to formulate its threats in terms of nuclear
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 195

weapons and there should be no surprise it would do so. Yet North Korea’s actions since
2010 have not risen to the level of offensive, aggressive behavior to alter the status quo
predicted under the stability-instability paradox. North Korean weapons tests and nasty
rhetoric do a great deal to rattle nerves and elevate security concerns, but it is largely an
effort to deter and to protect the Kim regime.
Second, much of the analysis of the stability-instability paradox and the effect of
nuclear weapons focus on the possibility of aggressive action taken to alter the status
quo. Yet, it is also central to consider the role nuclear weapons play in deterrence and
maintaining the status quo. Deterrence is a central element of North Korea security
strategy and though Pyongyang already had the ability to punish South Korea with
conventional weapons trained on Seoul, nuclear weapons provide an additional layer that
helps to secure the DPRK leadership from any regime change operation. North Korean
negotiators have indicated they are painfully aware of the fate of Iraq and Libya when
these regimes gave up their nuclear weapons. While North Korean nuclear capabilities
are uncertain but growing, its strategy to demonstrate resolve by using threatening
language that dramatically raises tension levels is often in the context of deterrence, not
an effort to alter the status quo. In fact, the goal is largely to preserve the status quo of
the survival of the Kim regime.
Finally, the ROK and U.S. response has relied extensively on buttressing their
deterrence posture to confront the potential dangers of a stability-instability situation.
There is little interest in Seoul or Washington in conducting any preventive military
action to destroy the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program or remove the Kim regime.
Increasing levels of economic sanctions have sought to force the North to give up its
nuclear ambitions and punish Pyongyang for violating UN Security Council resolutions.
The use of sanctions to force denuclearization was always a long-shot and the new
round of sanctions will also likely fail to coerce North Korea to give up its nuclear
weapons. Yet, these measures may have succeeded in slowing down the North Korean
effort and in the future, force Pyongyang to restrain the size and capability of its nuclear
arsenal. The challenge of altering North Korean nuclear ambitions has been difficult,
but considerable effort has also been devoted to further ensure North Korea does not use
its nuclear weapons directly or use nuclear deterrence as a shield to conduct lower level
provocations. Strategic stability has been secure for decades but deterring lower level
provocations remains the chief challenge. Time will tell if ROK-U.S. efforts in the face
of a potential stability-instability paradox have been successful.

Notes

1. B. H. Liddell Hart, Deterrent or Defense, a Fresh Look at the West’s Military Position (New
York, NY: Praeger, 1960), 23.
2. Glenn Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1961), 226.
3. T. Negeen Pegahi provides a solid assessment of the literature in, “Dangerous Deterrent?
Assessing the Risk that Nuclear Acquisition Will Embolden Weak States” (Ph.D. diss.,
196 Terence Roehrig

University of Chicago, June 2010).

4. Benjamin S. Lambeth, “The Political Potential of Equivalence,” International Security 2, no. 2
(Fall 1979): 32–33.
5. Ibid., 33.
6. Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment,” International Security
13, no. 2 (Fall 1988), 81.
7. Peter R. Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” Security Studies 4, no.
4 (Summer 1995): 695–753; and Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, “The Economic
and Political Incentives to Acquire Nuclear Weapons,” Security Studies 2, nos. 3/4 (Spring/
Summer 1993): 287–310.
8. Šumit Ganguly and S. Paul Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb: Debating Nuclear Stability
in South Asia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2010), 30.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., 30–31.
11. Vipin Narang, “Nuclear Strategies of Emerging Nuclear Powers,” Washington Quarterly
(Spring 2015), 75–76.
12. Scott Sagan, “How to Keep the Bomb From Iran,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (September/
October 2006): 45–59; Shahram Chubin, Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions (Washington, D.C.:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); and Checking Iran’s Nuclear Ambitions,
eds., Henry Sokolski and Patrick Clawson (University Press of the Pacific, 2004).
13. Barry Posen, “A Nuclear-Armed Iran: A Difficult, But Not Impossible Policy Problem,” The
Century Foundation, December 6, 2006, http://web.mit.edu/cis/pdf/posen_frenchcen.pdf.
14. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 2–3.
15. Kenneth Waltz, in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed (New
York, NY: WW Norton, 2003), 39–40.
16. Ganguly and Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 25.
17. Michael D. Cohen, “Fear and Learning in Tehran: What Recent Psychological Research
Reveals about Nuclear Crises,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2015): 120.
18. Pegahi, “Dangerous Deterrent?” 21.
19. Liddell Hart, Deterrence or Defense, 23; and Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War: A
Theoretical Analysis (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1954), 236.
20. Kapur, India, Pakistan, and the Bomb, 29–30.
21. Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” 737–39.
22. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014 (London: IISS, 2014),
254.
23. ROK Ministry of Defense, 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul: MND, 2014), 29.
24. The Military Balance 2016, 266; and Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security
Developments Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” 2015, 9–10, http://www.
defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_
Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF.
25. Markus Schiller and Robert H. Schmucker, “The Assumed KN-08 Technology,” April 26,
2012, http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/files/2012/05/Addendum_KN-08_Analysis_Schiller_
Schmucker.pdf.
26. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Full Steam
Ahead,” 38 North, January 5, 2016, http://38north.org/2016/01/sinpo010516/.
27. “DPRK Proves Successful in H-bomb Test,” Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), January
6, 2016.
28. Joel Witt and Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea’s Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy,” U.S.
Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/NKNF-NK-
Nuclear-Futures-Wit-0215.pdf.
29. Jeremy Page and Jay Solomon, “China Warns North Korean Nuclear Threat is Rising,” The
Wall Street Journal, April 22, 2015.
30. David Albright, “Future Directions in the DPRK’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Three Scenarios
 North Korea’s Stability-Instability Paradox 197

for 2020,” U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015, http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/

NKNF-Future-Directions-2020-Albright-0215.pdf.
31. See Jeffrey Lewis, “North Korea’s Big Bang,” Foreign Policy, February 13, 2013, http://
foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/13/north-koreas-big-bang/.
32. Admiral Willam E. Gortney, “Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee,” March
10, 2016, http://www.northcom.mil/Portals/28/Documents/Gortney_Posture%20Statement_
SASC_03-10-16.pdf.
33. “Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Rockets,” KCNA,
March 9, 2016.
34. Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korea’s Cyber Warfare and Challenges for the U.S.-ROK
Alliance,” Korea Economic Institute Academic Paper Series, December 2, 2014, http://keia.org/
sites/default/files/publications/kei_aps_mansourov_final.pdf; and Stephan Haggard and Jon R.
Lindsay, “North Korea and the Sony Hack: Exporting Instability Through Cyberspace,” Asia-
Pacific Issues, East-West Center, May 2015.
35. “North Korea boosted ‘cyber forces’ to 6,000 troops, South says,” Reuters, January
6, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/06/us-northkorea-southkorea-
idUSKBN0KF1CD20150106.
36. Choe Sang-Hun, “Computer Networks in South Korea Are Paralyzed in Cyberattacks,” New
York Times, March 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/21/world/asia/south-korea-
computer-network-crashes.html?_r=0.
37. Anna Fifield, “North Korea denies hacking Sony but calls the breach a ‘righteous deed’,”
Washington Post, December 7, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/north-korea-
denies-hacking-sony-but-calls-the-breach-a-righteous-deed/2014/12/07/508d6991-c242-419c-
b71c-59a3d1173766_story.html.
38. Alexandre Y. Mansourev, “Kim Jong Un’s Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy: What Everyone
Needs to Know,” NAPSNet Special Reports, Nautilus Institute, December 16, 2014; Peter
Hayes and Roger Cavazos, “North Korea’s nuclear force roadmap: Hard choices,” Nautilus
Institute, March 2, 2015; Shane Smith, “North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy,” U.S.-
Korea Institute at SAIS, August 2015; and Terence Roehrig, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons
Program: Motivations, Strategy, and Doctrine,” in Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power,
Ambition, and the Ultimate Weapon, eds., Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes (Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012).
39. “DPRK FM on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-Party Talks for Indefinite Period,”
KCNA, February 10, 2005.
40. “DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Spokesman Dismisses US Wrong Assertion,” KCNA, January 17,
2009.
41. “DPRK Proves Successful in H-bomb Test,” KCNA, January 6, 2016.
42. Terence Roehrig, “Deterring the Hegemon: North Korea, the United States and Asymmetrical
Deterrence,” Pacific Focus 20, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–51.
43. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, 9-16; and John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 28–30.
44. Morgan, Deterrence Now, 13–14.
45. William W. Kaufmann, The Requirements of Deterrence (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1954), 19.
46. Wit and Ahn, “North Korea’s Nuclear Futures,” 9.
47. Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE, 1983),
33–42.
48. “Kim Jong Un orders North Korea’s nuclear arsenal on standby,” The Telegraph, March 4,
2016, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/12182916/Kim-Jong Un-
orders-North-Koreas-nuclear-arsenal-on-standby.html.
49. Terence Roehrig, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense Commitment to South
Korea (Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006), 46.
50. Choi Sung-jin, “Kim Jong Un ‘more arrogant, unpredictable than father,’” Korea Times,
 198 Terence Roehrig

February 29, 2016, http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/02/113_199292.html.

51. See Van Jackson, Rival Reputations: Coercion and Credibility in US-North Korea Relations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
52. Lee Tae-hoon, “Defense chief tells troops to act first, report later,” Korea Times, March 1,
2011, http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2011/03/113_82270.html.
53. Department of Defense, “Joint Communique – the 45th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative
Meeting,” October 2, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/pubs/Joint%20Communique,%2045th%20
ROK-U.S.%20Security%20Consultative%20Meeting.pdf.
54. “OPLAN 5015 [Operational Plans],” Global Security.org, March 7, 2016, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/ops/oplan-5015.htm.
55. Brice Padden, “U.S., South Korea to Practice Offense During Joint Exercises,” Voice of
America, February 22, 2016, http://www.voanews.com/content/us-south-korea-forces-to-
practice-offense-during-joint-exercises/3201231.html.
56. U N C / C F C / U S F K P u b l i c A f f a i r s O f f i c e , “ R O K - U S S i g n F i n a l Ve r s i o n o f
Combined Counter-Provocation Plan,” March 22, 2013, http://www.usfk.mil/
usfk/%28S%280tpzvysqf4cjmi1hxahi0b4v%29%29/press-release.rok.us.sign.final.version.
of.combined.counter.provocation.plan.1025?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1.
57. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, (New York, NY: Knopf, 2014), 497.
58. Terence Roehrig, “Reinforcing Deterrence: The U.S. Military Response to North Korean
Provocations,” in Joint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies––Facing Reality in East Asia: Tough
Decisions on Competition and Cooperation, ed., Gilbert Rozman (Korea Economic Institute,
2015), 221–39.
59. Kim Joon-hyung, “Seoul should not join U.S. missile defense,” Korea Times, October 21, 2014,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2014/10/116_166734.html; and Choi Kang and
Kim Gi Bum, “Breaking the Myth of Missile Defense,” Issue Brief, Asan Institute, August 8,
2014, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/breaking-the-myth-of-missile-defense/.
60. Yi Whan-woo, “THAAD talks will begin this week,” Korea Times, February 21, 2016, http://
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/02/113_198569.html.
61. Jun Ji-hye, “Korea, U.S. may delay THAAD talks,” Korea Times, February 29, 2016, http://
koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2016/02/113_199344.html.

Notes on Contributor

Terence Roehrig (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison) is professor of National Security Affairs

and the director of the Asia-Pacific Studies Group at the U.S. Naval War College. He has been a
research fellow at the Kennedy School at Harvard University in the International Security Program
and the Project on Managing the Atom and a past president of the Association of Korean Political
Studies. He has published several books including most recently South Korea’s Rise: Economic
Development, Power, and Foreign Relations (Cambridge University Press, 2014) a work coauthored
with Uk Heo. In addition, he is the author of the forthcoming book entitled Japan, South Korea, and
the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella: Extended Deterrence and Nuclear Weapons published by Columbia
University Press. He has published numerous articles and book chapters on Korean and East Asian
security issues, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, the Northern Limit Line dispute, the South
Korean Navy, deterrence, the U.S.-South Korea alliance, human rights, and transitional justice. 

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