Western Metaphysics and Comparison With-2

Western Metaphysics and Comparison with Eastern Metaphysics RLP Vimal
Copyright © 2011 (except quotes and responses from other authors, i.e.,
those texts which are not written by the author of this article) by Ram
Lakhan Pandey Vimal and Vision Research Institute. Author’s permission is needed for re-
producing and/or quoting any portion except the text quoted from other authors. For referring, the
following content should be included: Vimal, R. L. P. (2011) Western Metaphysics and Comparison
with Eastern Metaphysics. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research
[Available: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/Vimal-2011-West-East-Metaphysics.pdf
>]. In preparation, 4(5), 1-20. [Last update: Tuesday, February 22, 2011, 3:39 PM]. This manuscript is
still under development phase. Commentaries from colleagues and my responses are also given.
Western Metaphysics and Comparison with Eastern

Metaphysics
Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal
Vision Research Institute, 25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 and 428 Great Road, Suite 11,
Acton, MA 01720 USA; Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road,
Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat, India; Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, c/o NiceTech Computer
Education Institute, Pendra, Bilaspur, C.G. 495119, India; and Dristi Anusandhana
Sansthana, Sai Niwas, East of Hanuman Mandir, Betiahata, Gorakhpur, U.P. 273001,
India
rlpvimal@yahoo.co.in; http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home
Abstract
General history of western metaphysics is given (Section 1.1) first then the history of
dual-aspect monism is elaborated (Section 1.2). Western metaphysics is summarized
in Section 2 along with the speculative comparison with eastern metaphysics. In
western metaphysics, we categorize all entities in just two categories: mind and
matter. All theist metaphysics, have built-in separability hypothesis between ‘soul’ and
‘body/brain’ at the time of death, i.e. mind and matter are NOT inseparable, rather
mind and matter can be separated by the process of death and interact by the process
of birth and the interaction is maintained during whole life (behaves as if mysteriously
inseparable). Thus, they have 7 problems of interactive substance dualism. It is
concluded that the ‘dual-aspect monism framework with dual-mode and varying
degree of dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities’ has the least
number of problems compared to all religions and all types of metaphysics.
1. Introduction
1.1. General History of Western Metaphysics
A colleague commented that a good review would possibly start with Socrates
and run through Plato, Aristotle, Bible, St Augustine, Schopenhauer, Kant,
Spinoza, Hegel, Heidegger, and Russell.I
1
1.1.1. Socrates (469 BC–399 BC):1 Socrates believe in the immortality of the
soul and reincarnation.
Socrates have been characterized as "paradoxal" because they seem to conflict
with common sense. The following are among the so-called Socratic Paradoxes:
• No one desires evil.
• No one errs or does wrong willingly or knowingly.
• Virtue—all virtue—is knowledge.
• Virtue is sufficient for happiness.
One of the best known sayings of Socrates is "I only know that I know nothing".
1.1.2. Plato (428/427 BC – 348/347 BC):2 Plato was a student of Socrates.

Plato believed in immortality of the soul and afterlife. The term ‘Platonism’
refers to the intellectual consequences of denying, as Socrates often does, the
reality of the material world.
Socrates says that he who sees with his eyes is blind, and this idea is most
famously captured in his allegory of the cave, and more explicitly in his
description of the divided line. The allegory of the cave is a paradoxical analogy
wherein Socrates argues that the invisible world is the most intelligible and
that the visible world is the least knowable, and the most obscure. People who
take the sun-lit world of the senses to be good and real are living pitifully in a
den of evil and ignorance. Few climb out of the den, or cave of ignorance.
According to Socrates, physical objects and physical events are "shadows" of
their ideal or perfect forms, and exist only to the extent that they instantiate
the perfect versions of themselves. Just as shadows are temporary,
inconsequential epiphenomena produced by physical objects, physical objects
are themselves fleeting phenomena caused by more substantial causes, the
ideals of which they are mere instances.
Theory of Forms: It typically refers to the belief expressed by Socrates in some

of Plato's dialogues, that the material world as it seems to us is not the real
world, but only an image or copy of the real world. The forms, according to
Socrates, are roughly speaking archetypes or abstract representations of the
many types of things, and properties we feel and see around us, which can only
be perceived by reason; (that is, they are universals). In other words, Socrates
sometimes seems to recognize two worlds: the apparent world, which
constantly changes, and an unchanging and unseen world of forms, which may
be a cause of what is apparent.
1 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socrates
2 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato
2
Platonic epistemology: Many have interpreted Plato as stating that knowledge is

justified true belief, an influential view that informed future developments in
modern analytic epistemology. Plato argues that belief is to be distinguished
from knowledge on account of justification.
Unwritten doctrine: It stands for the most fundamental metaphysical teaching

of Plato, which he disclosed only to his most trusted fellows and kept secret
from the public. Plato criticizes the written transmission of knowledge as
faulty, favoring instead the spoken logos: “he who has knowledge of the just
and the good and beautiful ... will not, when in earnest, write them in ink,
sowing them through a pen with words, which cannot defend themselves by
argument and cannot teach the truth effectually.”
Aristotle’s description of Plato’s metaphysical doctrine: In Metaphysics he
writes: "Now since the Forms are the causes of everything else, he [i.e. Plato]
supposed that their elements are the elements of all things. Accordingly the
material principle is the Great and Small [i.e. the Dyad], and the essence is the
One, since the numbers are derived from the Great and Small by participation
in the One" (987 b). “From this account it is clear that he only employed two
causes: that of the essence, and the material cause; for the Forms are the
cause of the essence in everything else, and the One is the cause of it in the
Forms.” (988 a).
1.1.3. Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC):3 Aristotle was a student of Plato and
teacher of Alexander the Great. His writings cover many subjects, including
physics, metaphysics, poetry, theater, music, logic, rhetoric, linguistics,
politics, government, ethics, biology, and zoology. He is one of the most
important founding figures in Western philosophy.
Aristotle defines metaphysics as “the knowledge of immaterial being,” or of

“being in the highest degree of abstraction.” He refers to metaphysics as “first
philosophy", as well as "the theologic science.”
Substance, potentiality and actuality: Aristotle concludes that a particular

substance is a combination of both matter and form. The matter of the
substance is the substratum or the stuff of which it is composed, e.g. the
matter of the house are the bricks, stones, timbers etc., or whatever constitutes
the potential house. While the form of the substance, is the actual house,
namely 'covering for bodies and chattels' or any other differentia. The formula
that gives the components is the account of the matter, and the formula that
gives the differentia is the account of the form.
3 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle
3
With regard to the change (kinesis) and its causes now, he distinguishes the
coming to be from: 1) growth and diminution, which is change in quantity; 2)
locomotion, which is change in space; and 3) alteration, which is change in
quality.
The coming to be is a change where nothing persists of which the resultant is a

property. In that particular change he introduces the concept of potentiality
and actuality in association with the matter and the form.
Referring to potentiality, this is what a thing is capable of doing, or being acted

upon, if the conditions are right and it is not prevented by something else. For
example, the seed of a plant in the soil is potentially plant, and if is not
prevented by something, it will become a plant. Potentially beings can either
‘act’ or ‘be acted upon’, which can be either innate or learned. For example, the
eyes possess the potentiality of sight (innate – being acted upon), while the
capability of playing the flute can be possessed by learning (exercise – acting).
Actuality is the fulfillment of the end of the potentiality. Because the end is the
principle of every change, and for the sake of the end exists potentiality,
therefore actuality is the end. Referring then to our previous example, we could
say that an actuality is when a plant does one of the activities that plants do.
“For that for the sake of which a thing is, is its principle, and the becoming is
for the sake of the end; and the actuality is the end, and it is for the sake of
this that the potentiality is acquired. For animals do not see in order that they
may have sight, but they have sight that they may see.”( Aristotle, Metaphysics
IX 1050a 5–10).
In summary, the matter used to make a house has potentiality to be a house

and both the activity of building and the form of the final house are actualities,
which is also a final cause or end. Then Aristotle proceeds and concludes that
the actuality is prior to potentiality in formula, in time and in substantiality.
With this definition of the particular substance (i.e., matter and form), Aristotle
tries to solve the problem of the unity of the beings, for example, “what is it
that makes a man one”? Since, according to Plato there are two Ideas: animal
and biped, how then is man a unity? However, according to Aristotle, the
potential being (matter) and the actual one (form) are one and the same thing.
(Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII 1045a-b)
Universals and particulars: Aristotle's theory of universals Aristotle's

predecessor, Plato, argued that all things have a universal form, which could
be either a property, or a relation to other things. When we look at an apple, for
example, we see an apple, and we can also analyze a form of an apple. In this
distinction, there is a particular apple and a universal form of an apple.
4
Moreover, we can place an apple next to a book, so that we can speak of both
the book and apple as being next to each other.
Plato argued that there are some universal forms that are not a part of
particular things. For example, it is possible that there is no particular good in
existence, but “good” is still a proper universal form. Bertrand Russell is a
contemporary philosopher that agreed with Plato on the existence of
“uninstantiated universals”.
Aristotle disagreed with Plato on this point, arguing that all universals are
instantiated. Aristotle argued that there are no universals that are unattached
to existing things. According to Aristotle, if a universal exists, either as a
particular or a relation, then there must have been, must be currently, or must
be in the future, something on which the universal can be predicated.
Consequently, according to Aristotle, if it is not the case that some universal
can be predicated to an object that exists at some period of time, then it does
not exist.
In addition, Aristotle disagreed with Plato about the location of universals. As

Plato spoke of the world of the forms, a location where all universal forms
subsist, Aristotle maintained that universals exist within each thing on which
each universal is predicated. So, according to Aristotle, the form of apple exists
within each apple, rather than in the world of the forms.
Biology and medicine: In Aristotelian science, most especially in biology, things

he saw himself have stood the test of time better than his retelling of the
reports of others, which contain error and superstition. He dissected animals
but not humans; his ideas on how the human body works have been almost
entirely superseded.
Aristotle, Samkhya, and Nagarjuna:4 In western philosophy (mostly due to

Aristotle), there are six types of causes5: (i) In the part-whole causation
(material cause), the parts forms the whole. (ii) In the whole-part causation
(formal cause: what form does the mind take? (Wurzman & Giordano, 2009)),
whole (macrostructure) is the cause for the production of its parts. (iii) In the
efficient cause, agents cause effects. (iv) In the final cause, there is a purpose
or end for the sake of which a thing exists or is done. It includes “modern ideas
of mental causation involving such psychological causes as volition, need,
motivation, or motives; rational, irrational, ethical - all that gives purpose to
behavior.” (v) In reciprocal or circular causation, entities can be causes of one
another as a relation of mutual dependence. (vi) The doctrine of causal factor
4 Adapted from (Vimal, 2009a)
5 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality.
5
suggests that the same thing can cause contrary effects as atmospheric
pressure can have opposite effect in various chemical or physical reactions.
In Indian philosophy, there are four types of causesII: (i) In Samkhya

philosophy (doctrine of satkaryavada) all causation is self-causation, i.e., the
effect potentially exists in its cause and is either an apparent or real
modification of its cause as in seed and sprout relation. (ii) The doctrine of
asatkaryavada (causation-from-another) argues that the effect is not present in
the cause, but cause has power to bring the effect; that effect is a new arising
as in parent-children relation. (iii) The doctrine of causation-by-both-self-and-
another argues that both is needed as soil, water, and so on are also needed in
seed-sprout relation. (iv) The doctrine of nihilistic-causation argues that
entities can spontaneously arise without any particular cause.
Acharya Nāgārjuna (150 - 250 AD) was an eminent Indian brahmin-buddhist

philosopher and the founder of the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna
Buddhism.6 Nāgārjuna argued that the real causes should have powers as their
essential properties and should have inherent existence.III The causes that do
not have these attributes cannot be real causes. Therefore, he proposes four
‘conditions’ (efficient, percept-object, immediate, and dominant conditions)
instead of such apparent causality to explain phenomena in conventional
reality: (i) an efficient condition explains the occurrence of successive events;
(ii) an object is the percept-object condition for its perception; (iii) an immediate
condition explains the various steps involved in a phenomena; (iv) a dominant
condition is the purpose for which an action is undertaken.IV Moreover, “all
phenomena come into being in dependence upon conditions, remain in
existence dependent upon conditions, and cease to exist dependent upon
conditions”(Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995)-page 160. Nāgārjuna can grant “that
effects are dependent upon collection of conditions, it cannot be that those
collections or that dependence exist inherently”(Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995)-
page 266. Moreover, individual conditions and their effects, the combination of
conditions, and the inherent dependence of any phenomenon on the
combination of all of its conditions lack inherent existence (Nāgārjuna &
Garfield, 1995)-p.258-66.
1.1.4. Metaphysics of Spinoza7
Comparison with Western Non-dualism: Baruch Spinoza, the 17th century

Dutch rationalist philosopher, in his magnum work Ethics establishes the
nature of God. Spinoza's pan-organistic God (i.e. God revealed as orderly
6 See also (Caponigro & Prakash, 2009; Vernette, Tandan, & Caponigro, 2007)
7 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vishishtadvaita
6
nature) is comparable to Brahman (having the individual selves' and Universe

as its body).
Spinoza makes the following propositions on the nature of God in his work
"Ethics". These positions closely reflect the VishistAdvaitic position on the
nature of Brahman:
PROPOSITION XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which

each expresses eternal and infinite essentiality, necessarily exists.
PROPOSITION XV. Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or
be conceived.
PROPOSITION XVII. God acts solely by the laws of his own nature and is not
constrained by anyone.
PROPOSITION XVIII. God is the indwelling and not the transient cause of all
things.
PROPOSITION XIX. God and all the attributes of God are eternal.
PROPOSITION XXX. Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must

comprehend the attributes of God and the modifications of God, and nothing
else.
Conclusion: Narayana is the Absolute God. The Soul and the Universe are only
parts of this Absolute and hence, Vishishtadvaita is panentheistic. The
relationship of God to the Soul and the Universe is like the relationship of the
Soul of Man to the body of Man. Individual souls are only parts of Brahman.
God, Soul and Universe together form an inseparable unity which is one and
has no second. This is the non-duality part. Matter and Souls inhere in that
Ultimate Reality as attributes to a substance. This is the qualification part of
the non-duality.
“Panentheism (… ‘all-in-God’) is a belief system which posits that God exists

and interpenetrates every part of nature, and timelessly extends beyond as
well. Panentheism is distinguished from pantheism, which holds that God is
synonymous with the universe.[1] Briefly put, in pantheism, ‘God is the whole’;
in panentheism, ‘The whole is in God.’ This means that the universe in the first
formulation is practically the Whole itself, but in the second the universe and
God are not ontologically equivalent. In panentheism, God is not necessarily
viewed as the creator or demiurge, but the eternal animating force behind the
universe, some versions positing the universe as nothing more than the
manifest part of God. In some forms of panentheism, the cosmos exists within
God, who in turn ‘pervades’ or is ‘in’ the cosmos. While pantheism asserts that
God and the universe are coextensive, panentheism claims that God is greater
7
than the universe and some forms hold that the universe is contained within
God.[2] Much Hindu thought is highly characterized by panentheism and
pantheism.[3]” 8
Comments: These views have separability between soul and body at the time of
death; thus mind and matter are not inseparable, rather mind and matter can
be separated by the process of death and interact by the process of birth and
the interaction is maintained during whole life. Thus, they have 7 problems of
interactive substance dualism.
1.1.5. Buddhist Metaphysics
Some of Buddhist’s views are given below:
“The Buddha lived at a time of great philosophical creativity in India when

many conceptions of the nature of life and death were proposed. Some were
materialist, holding that there was no existence that the self is annihilated
upon death. Others believed in a form of cyclic existence, where a being is
born, lives, dies and then is re-born, but in the context of a type of
determinism or fatalism in which karma played no role. Others were
"eternalists", postulating an eternally existent self or soul comparable to that in
Christianity: the ātman survives death and reincarnates as another living
being, based on its karmic inheritance. This is the idea that has become
dominant (with certain modifications) in modern Hinduism.
The Buddha's concept was distinct, consistent with the common notion of a
sequence of lives over a very long time but constrained by two core concepts:
that there is no irreducible self tying these lives together (anattā) and that all
compounded things are subject to dissolution, including all the components of
the human person and personality (anicca). The story of the Buddha's life
presented in the early texts does not allude to the idea of rebirth prior to his
enlightenment, leading some to suggest that he discovered it for himself.[6] The
Buddha's detailed conception of the connections between action (karma),
rebirth and causality is set out in the twelve links of dependent origination.” 9
“In Buddhism, anattā (Pāli) or anātman (Sanskrit: अनामन् ) refers to the notion
of "not-self." […] The anattā doctrine is not a type of materialism. Buddhism
does not necessarily deny the existence of mental phenomena (such as feelings,
thoughts, and sensations) that are distinct from material phenomena.[2] Thus,
the conventional translation of anattā as "no-soul"[3] can be misleading. If the
8 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebirth_(Buddhism)
9 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatman
8
word "soul" refers to a non-bodily component in a person that can continue in

some way after death, then Buddhism does not deny the existence of a soul.[4]
In fact, persons (… Sanskrit, pudgala) are said to be characterized by an ever-
evolving consciousness …,[5][6] stream of consciousness (… Sanskrit: vijñana
srotām), or mind-continuity (Sanskrit: citta-saṃtāna) which, upon the death or
dissolution of the aggregates (skandhas), becomes one of the contributing
causes for the arising of a new group of skandhas. However, Buddhism denies
the existence of a permanent or static entity that remains constant behind the
changing bodily and non-bodily components of a living being. Reportedly, the
Buddha reprimanded a disciple who thought that in the process of rebirth the
same consciousness is reborn without change.[8] Just as the body changes from
moment to moment, so thoughts come and go; and according to the anattā
doctrine, there is no permanent conscious substance that experiences these
thoughts, as in Cartesianism: rather, conscious thoughts simply arise and
perish with no "thinker" behind them.[9] When the body dies, the incorporeal
mental processes continue and are reborn in a new body.[4] Because the mental
processes are constantly changing, the new being is neither exactly the same
as, nor completely different from, the being that died.[10]
On one interpretation, although Buddhism rejects the notion of a permanent

self, it does not reject the notion of an empirical self (composed of constantly
changing physical and mental phenomena) that can be conveniently referred to
with words such as "I", "you", "being", "individual", etc.[11] Early Buddhist
scriptures describe an enlightened individual as someone whose changing,
empirical self is highly developed. According to Buddhist teachings, this
phenomenon should not, either in whole or in part, be reified, either in
affirmation or denial. The Buddha rejected the latter metaphysical assertions
as ontological theorizing that binds one to suffering.[12] On another
interpretation, Buddhism rejects any idea of the self. On this view it is incorrect
even to speak about an "empirical self". This is because constantly changing
physical and mental phenomena all have impermanence, and anything with
such imperamnence does not amount to the idea of a self. […]
Some Mahayana Buddhist sutras and tantras present Buddhist teachings on

emptiness using positive language by positing the ultimate reality of the ‘true
self’ (atman). In these teachings the word is used to refer to each being's inborn
potential to realize Buddhahood through Buddhist practices, and future status
as a Buddha.[14] This teaching, which is soteriological rather than theoretical,
portrays this potential or aspect as undying.
Anattā, dukkha (suffering/unease), and anicca (impermanence), are the three

dharma seals, which, according to Buddhism, characterise all conditioned
phenomena. […]
9
Anātman in other Indian traditions
The term anatman is found not only in Buddhist sutras, but also in the
writings of Shankara, the founder of Advaita Vedanta. Advaita Vedanta was
strongly influenced by Buddhism,[81] which was itself 'reformed
Brahmanism'[82]. In Advaita Vedanta, anatman is a common via negativa (neti
neti, not this, not that) teaching method, wherein nothing affirmative can be
said of what is “beyond speculation, beyond words, and concepts” thereby
eliminating all positive characteristics that might be thought to apply to the
soul, or be attributed to it. In this thinking, the Subjective ontological Self-
Nature (svabhava) can never be known objectively, but only through “the denial
of all things which it (the Soul) is not.”
Relationship to secular philosophy

David Hume's "bundle theory of the self" is in some ways similar to the
Buddha's skandha analysis, though the skandhas are not an ontological
exercise, but rather an explanation of clinging. Derek Parfit's reductionist
account is also reminiscent of Buddhism.” 10
According to (Lepine, 2008), “In Buddhism the deeper-lying monistic entity is

the pure wisdom of the Supreme Unified Consciousness which can give rise to
matter and/or mind. In scientific terms it is the quantum geometry at the
tiniest level (Planck scale) of the universe, which is called the unified quantum
field.”
As per (Vimal, 2009e), “According to Dalai Lama, (i) since a phenomenon can
arise from similar phenomenon and since consciousness is radically different
from non-experiential matter (mass-energy), ‘consciousness can arise only from
a continuum of phenomena similar to itself, in the same way that formations of
mass-energy give rise to formations of mass-energy’; (ii) Buddhist framework
argues for beginningless continuum of consciousness (or sentient beings) and
presumably beginningless continuum of matter (‘The origin or substantial
cause of the first matter in this universe was preceding matter’); and (iii)
‘evolution of the physical universe as intimately interdependent with the
sentient beings who inhabit and experience the external world’ (Luisi, 2008).
This argument is a form of (substance) dualism and hence one has to
address the problems of dualism […]
According to Buddhist centrist framework (Wallace, 1989), ‘Our thoughts,

intentions, and emotional states maneuver our bodies and thereby other
physical objects; likewise, material things are constantly influencing our
mental states. […] Both subject and object exist in interdependence, both are
evident to experience, and the distinction between them is conventional, not
10 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatman
10
intrinsic. […] Physical and mental events occur in mutual interaction and are
therefore interdependent. Thus, neither can be considered absolute in the
sense of being independent; nor is one more real than the other. […] We
thereby accept a dualism of a conventional sort, not of an absolute, Cartesian
variety. […] Mental states arise from previous mental states in an unbroken
continuum, much as physical entities arise from preceding physical entities.
[…] Indeed, it may be more accurate to think of a single entity−the
continuum−bearing physical and mental attributes. It is at this level that the
duality of physical and mental events disappears. […] Modern neuroscience
regards human sensory and mental cognitions as being emergent properties of
the brain. Buddhist contemplative science, in contrast, regards them as
emergent properties of the very subtle energy/mind’.
Perhaps Buddhist centrist framework (Wallace, 1989) does not contradict

our dual-aspect PE-SE framework with ‘property dualism and substance
monism’ because consciousness can arise from the mental aspect of
primal entities. The difference is that matter is the carrier of PEs/SEs in
PE-SE framework, as in hypotheses H1 and H2.
In our email correspondence (on 6-Feb-2008), Wallace commented, ‘Mahayana

Buddhism, especially in accordance with the Madhyamaka view, rejects the
substantial nature of all phenomena, so it does not accept a substance dualism
between body and mind along the lines proposed by Descartes. As I have
argued in my book (Wallace, 2007), Buddhism as a whole asserts the existence
of a ‘form realm’ (rupa-dhatu) that exists prior to and at a more fundamental
level than our human conceptual constructs of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. On a deeper
level, Vajrayana Buddhism asserts the existence of an ‘absolute space of
phenomena’ (dharma-dhatu), which transcends all conceptual categories,
including those of mind and matter. So that view, too, rejects any notion of
substance dualism in favor of aspect dualism similar to what you propose.’
Thus, Buddhist centrist framework (Wallace, 1989) does not contradict

the dual-aspect PE-SE framework.” (Bold mine).
Note: Metaphysics of Bible, St Augustine, Schopenhauer, Kant, Hegel, and

Heidegger are still under development. However, one can search them in Google
and/or in <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/>.
1.1.6. Contemporary views
As per (Baker, 2011), “Many Christians who argue against Christian

materialism direct their arguments against what I call ‘Type-I materialism’, the
thesis that I cannot exist without my organic body. I distinguish Type-I
materialism from Type-II materialism, which entails only that I cannot exist
11
without some body that supports certain mental functions. I set out a version
of Type-II materialism, and argue for its superiority to Type-I materialism in an
age of science. Moreover, I show that Type-II materialism can accommodate
Christian doctrines like the Resurrection of the Body, the Incarnation, and the
“intermediate state” (if there is one). […]
According to Constitutionalism, a human person is constituted by some body

or other at each moment of its existence. The body furnishes the mechanisms
that support a first-person perspective. It is an empirical fact that organs in a
human body can be modified (and made to function properly) by artificial
parts—cochlear implants, mind–brain interfaces, artificial hearts and other
organs (soon an artificial eye), prosthetic limbs, neural implants and on and
on. Even now, paralyzed people who have mind–brain interfaces are not simply
constituted by a human organism, but by a human organism and a nonorganic
prosthetic device. At some point, there could be enough nonorganic devices
that support your mental and behavioral functioning that we should say that
your body is no no longer organic. In that case, you would not have the same
body that you were born with. Constitutionalism is materialist in that it holds
that we cannot exist unembodied […]
Constitutionalism does not take there to be a sharp line between mental and
physical phenomena and hence is not ‘property-dualism.’ ‘Mind’ does not refer
to an entity, but to a congeries of abilities of thinking, deciding, remembering,
reasoning, evaluating, repenting and so forth—abilities that we group together
as mental. […] According to my version of Constitutionalism, human persons
are part of the fundamental reality of the (created) universe. Since the universe
itself and its inhabitants evolve, human persons come into being at some
time.34 But that only means that they are emergent, that they are not
reducible to subpersonal or nonpersonal items. […]
Unlike Type-I Christian materialism, Type-II Christian materialism can

withstand the criticisms of dualists. Of the various alternatives—Type-I
Christian materialism, Type-II Christian materialism, immaterialism, and
dualism—Type-II Christian materialism is most in tune with a scientific
worldview. Technology has developed to the point wherewe can radically
change our organic bodies into organic-inorganic hybrids, or perhaps into
wholly inorganic bodies—all the while remaining human persons with our first-
person perspectives. Constitutionalism, or some other Type-II materialism, is
well suited for this reality. Moreover, Constitutionalism is at home in both
theistic and nontheistic contexts. Although Constitutionalism itself does not
require any reference to God, here I have considered Constitutionalism in a
theistic, specifically Christian, context. I hope to have shown that it reveals a
new way to approach core Christian doctrines, as well as the natural world.”
Type-II materialism or Constitutionalism is nonreductive metaphysical view

and allows different explanations at different levels (See chapters 5 and 11 of
12
(Baker, 2007)) and (Baker, 2008). Therefore, it does not have explanatory gap
problem of materialism.
For other views, see Section 2.
1.2. History of Dual-Aspect Monism
The texts in this section are adapted from As per (Vimal, 2010a).
Historically, the dual-aspect view (neutral monism) has seen its ups and downs
over 6000 years. In RigVedic period (4000 BC-2000 BC: (Vimal & Pandey-
Vimal, 2007)), the dual-aspect framework was conceived along with other views
(Rao, 1998, 2005): Brahma (Prakriti or matter) and Vishnu (Purusha or
consciousness) were considered as the two aspects of Ädi-Shiva (Maharishi
Mahesh Yogi, 1997; Sarasvati, 1974-89; Vimal, 2009b, 2009d, 2009e). In
addition, Trika Kashmir Shaivism (Kaul, 2002; Raina Swami Lakshman Joo,
1985; Wilberg, 2008) is consistent with a dual-aspect view, where Shiva is
considered as the mental aspect and Shakti (energy) as the physical aspect of
the same entity.11 However, in theist version, mental and physical aspects
appear separable from each other by the process of ‘death’, whereas they
interact by the process of ‘birth’ and this interaction is maintained throughout
‘life’. Note that Shakti or energy E = mc2 = hν is a physical entity. Spinoza (Spinoza,
1677) provided extensive arguments for double aspects (neutral monism). Russell
(Russell, 1948) was a double aspect theorist too (one aspect known “by acquaintance,”
the other “by (scientific) description”). Feigl (Feigl, 1967) elaborated double aspect
theory and structural realism. Bohm’s implicate/explicate or enfolded/unfolded
framework (Bohm, 1980, 1990; Bohm & Hiley, 1993) is consistent with a dual-aspect
view; he is explicitly a double-aspect theorist. Moreover, the mental and material
aspects of fundamental particles (strings or elementary particles (fermions and bosons))
can be considered as implicate (enfolded) order, whereas structures, functions, and SEs
as explicate (unfolded). In the dual-aspect PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c), the mental
aspect of fundamental particles contains experiences (PEs/SEs) in superposed form and
the material aspect includes mass, spin, charge, force, quanta, and space-time. It is
argued that this framework has the least number of problems compared to other views
(Vimal, 2010b), which is elaborated further in Section 3.7.
Pauli (Pauli, 1952) suggested that physics and consciousness should be
considered as complementary aspects of the same reality, which is a dual-aspect view.
Feigl (Feigl, 1967) defines (i) physical or physical1 (or scientific) as, “the type of concepts
and laws which suffice in principle for the explanation and prediction of inorganic
11According to (Kaul, 2002), “Kashmir Shaivism postulates the single reality of Siva with two aspects -
one Transcendental and the other Immanent like two sides of one and the same coin. The first is beyond
manifestation. But both are real as the effect cannot be different from the cause.”p.9-36.
13
processes”, and (ii) physical2 as, “[i]f emergentism is not required for the phenomena of
organic life, "physical" would mean those concepts and laws sufficient for the
explanation of inorganic as well as of biological phenomena.” My definition of
materialism is equivalent to physicalism1 and/or physicalism2; and physicalism is
materialism plus experience (Strawson et al., 2006), which is consistent with the PE-SE
framework (Vimal, 2008c) because it involves non-reductive physicalism. Moreover,
according to Feigl [23], “[if] mental states have emerged, their very occurrence is
supposed to alter the functional relations between the neurophysiological (physical2)
variables in a manner in principle susceptible to confirmation. […] the ψ-φ (i.e., psycho-
neurophysiological) relations or correspondences can be empirically investigated […]
Parallelism [and isomorphism], then, in its strongest form assumes a one-to-one
correspondence of the ψ's to the φ's. It is empirically extremely likely that these
correspondences are not "atomistic" in the sense that there is a separate law of
correspondence between each discernible ψ1 and its correlate φ1. […] philosophers
have been emphasizing much more the action of "mind on matter" -- as in voluntary
behavior, or in the roles of pleasure, pain, and attention -- than that of "matter on mind."
This asymmetrical attitude usually comes from preoccupation with the freewill puzzle.”
The dual-aspect PE-SE framework is one-to-one relationship because mental and
material aspects are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, ψ-φ (i.e., psycho-
neurophysiological or function-structure) one-to-one correlation in dual-aspect is similar
to that in materialism. In addition, the ε-ψ-φ (experience-function-structure)
correspondence is also 1-1-1 in the dual-aspect PE-SE framework, which is not clear in
other views. According to Nagel, “It seems to me more likely, however, that mental-
physical relations will eventually be expressed in a theory whose fundamental terms
cannot be placed clearly in either category.” (Nagel, 1974)(p. 450).
The framework of Penrose (Penrose, 1994) is objective reduction (OR), which (i)
identifies consciousness with collapse/reduction, (ii) specifies a cause and threshold,
and (iii) connects consciousness to fundamental spacetime geometry by introducing
protoconscious qualia and mechanisms for non-computable Platonic influences
(Hameroff, 2006).
According to (Hameroff & Penrose, 1996), “We envisage that conformational states
of microtubule subunits (tubulins) are coupled to internal quantum events, and
cooperatively interact (compute) with other tubulins. We further assume that
macroscopic coherent superposition of quantum-coupled tubulin conformational states
occurs throughout significant brain volumes and provides the global binding essential
to consciousness. We equate the emergence of the microtubule quantum coherence with
pre-conscious processing which grows (for up to 500 milliseconds) until the mass-
energy difference among the separated states of tubulins reaches a threshold related to
quantum gravity. According to the arguments for OR put forth in Penrose (Penrose,
1994), superpositioned states each have their own space-time geometries. When the
degree of coherent mass-energy difference leads to sufficient separation of space-time
geometry, the system must choose and decay (reduce, collapse) to a single universe
state. In this way, a transient superposition of slightly differing space-time geometries
14
persists until an abrupt quantum classical reduction occurs. Unlike the random,
"subjective reduction"(SR, or R) of standard quantum theory caused by observation or
environmental entanglement, the OR we propose in microtubules is a self-collapse and
it results in particular patterns of microtubule-tubulin conformational states that
regulate neuronal activities including synaptic functions. Possibilities and probabilities
for post-reduction tubulin states are influenced by factors including attachments of
microtubule-associated proteins (MAPs) acting as "nodes"which tune and
"orchestrate"the quantum oscillations. We thus term the self-tuning OR process in
microtubules "orchestrated objective reduction" [Orch OR]".
Penrose initially advanced the notion of microtubules in the axons and not in the
dendrites of cortical neurons (R. R. Poznanski, 2010). However, Hameroff and Penrose
(Hameroff, 2006; Hameroff & Penrose, 1996; Hameroff & Penrose, 1998; Penrose, 1994)
later found some morphological evidence that points to dendrites of cortical neurons
having microtubules all the way up into the distal tips, while non-cortical neurons lack
such dense fabric of endogenous structures in their dendrites (R. R. Poznanski, 2010).
Microtubules are short, interrupted, and of mixed polarity in dendrites and cell body;
whereas, the microtubules in the axon are continuous and of uniform polarity
(unipolar) (Hameroff, 2006).
According to Hameroff (Hameroff, 2006), “The neural correlate of consciousness is
in dendrites of cortical neurons interconnected by gap junctions [mostly dendrite-
dendrite but also axon-axon, neuron-glia, glia-glia, and axon-dendrite gap junctions],
forming Hebbian ‘hyperneurons’. Chemical synapses and axonal spikes convey inputs
to, and outputs from, conscious processes in hyper-neuron [or one giant neuron]
dendrites, consistent with gamma EEG/coherent 40 Hz and the post-synaptic
mechanism of general anesthesia. [Inputs to the hyper-neuron are from axonal-dendritic
chemical synapses. Outputs from the hyper-neuron are from axons of hyper-neuron
components.] The molecular correlate of consciousness is the intra-dendritic
cytoskeleton, specifically microtubules and related proteins whose information
processing triggers axonal spikes and regulates synapses.” One could argue that the
molecular correlate of consciousness can be attributed to the electrical interactions
between charged particles in the Debye layer (electrical double layer: two parallel layers
with opposite electrical charge) of endogenous structures (such as cytoskeletal MT-
network) in the dendrites (Roman R. Poznanski, 2010). In addition, these charged
particles are dual-aspect entities in our dual-aspect framework.
According to Hameroff (Hameroff, 1987), “Electronegative fields surrounding MT
may act as excitable ionic charge layers (“Debye layers”) which are also thought to
occur immediately adjacent to cell membranes (Green & Triffet, 1985). Excitable “clear
zone” charge layers next to MT could facilitate collective communicative mechanisms
within the cytoskeleton […] It is unknown whether the interiors of MT are also
electronegative zones, or perhaps positive ones which would create voltage gradients
across MT walls. […] At high magnification, microtrabeculi of the ground substance are
seen to crosslink many elements in the cytoplasm. For example, they connect
microtubules with the smooth endoplasmic reticulum. […] The MTL [microtrabecular
15
lattice] and cytoskeleton also control the distribution of organelles, for example keeping
the endoplasmic reticulum from entering axons […] endoplasmic reticulum (ER) are
aligned along MT” […] Charge redistribution (i.e. dipole oscillation) can also couple to
conformational switching. […] Dynamic conformational changes of proteins are the
dynamics of living organisms. […] Anesthesia results from prevention of protein switching
between two or more different conformational states induced by binding of ligand, calcium ion,
or voltage change. […] Dipole-dipole attractions occur among molecules with permanent
dipole moments. Only specific orientations are favored: alignments in which attractive,
low energy arrangements occur as opposed to repulsive, high energy orientations. A net
attraction between two polar molecules can result if their dipoles are properly
configured. The “induction” effect occurs when a permanent dipole in one molecule can
polarize electrons in a nearby molecule. The second molecule’s electrons are distorted
so that their interaction with the dipole of the first molecule is attractive. The magnitude
of the induced dipole attraction force was shown by Debye in 1920 to depend on the
molecules’ dipole moments and their polarizability. Defined as the dipole moment
induced by a standard field, polarizability also depends on the molecules’ orientation
relative to that field. […] The sharp resonance of this sensitive window has a frequency
8
width of about 2 x 10 Hz. The layer of ordered water and ions subjacent to membranes
8
and cytoskeletal structures (the “Debye layer”) absorbs in the region of 10 Hz. This
suggests that the Debye layer is closely involved with the dynamic functional activities
of the biostructures which they surround. Green and Triffet (Green & Triffet, 1985) have
modeled propagating waves and the potential for information transfer in the dynamics
of the Debye layer immediately beneath membranes and cytoskeletal proteins. They
have hypothesized a holographic information medium due to the coherent vibrations in
space and time of these biomolecules. The medium they consider is the ordered water
and layers of calcium counter ions surrounding the high dipole moments in membranes
and biomolecules. Thus they have developed a theory of ionic bioplasma in connection
with nonlinear properties which relates to the existence of highly polar metastable
states. The small scale and ordering would minimize friction in these activities. Fröhlich
observes: “clearly the absence of other frictional processes would present most
interesting problems.” He suggests the possibility of propagating waves due to the lack
of frictional processes (“superconductivity”) in the biomolecule itself as well as the
layer of ordered water or Debye layer (Kuntz & Kauzmann, 1974). Moreover,
“[d]ecoherence can be avoided through isolation/shielding by actin gelation, Debye
layer screening and water/ion ordering and topological quantum error correction”
(Hameroff & Tuszynski, 2004).
According to Poznanski (Poznanski, 2009; R. R. Poznanski, 2010; Roman R.
Poznanski, 2010), endogenous structures includes both endoplasmic reticulum (ER) and
microtubules (MT). Penrose and Hameroff have advocated polymer structures as
conducive for the Debye layer (R. R. Poznanski, 2010). Although microtubules are
polymers and are conducive to the formation of a Debye layer, there is no reason to rule
out lipid proteins (endoplasmic reticulum) (Alberts, 2002) as not having a Debye layer
16
too (R. R. Poznanski, 2010). If this is correct, then one could argue that Debye layer
related to endoplasmic reticulum may also play some role in consciousness (R. R.
Poznanski, 2010). For example: (i) Debye layer charge distribution (such as around ER)
is in the sub-millisecond range slow enough to play an active role in neural processing
(Roman R. Poznanski, 2010); (ii) Debye layer may serve to screen/shield quantum
states from decoherence; coherence is needed for the objective reduction of states of
MT-network of the hyper-neuron (Hameroff & Tuszynski, 2004) by self-collapse or
external (or internal) stimuli.
Furthermore, Hameroff and Penrose (Hameroff & Penrose, 1998) seem to be double
aspect and protoconsciousness theorists, and sometimes Stapp conceives double aspect.
Hameroff and Powell (Hameroff & Powell, 2009) defend neutral monism (a branch of
dual-aspect view), where matter and mind arise from or reduce to a neutral third entity
‘quantum spacetime geometry (fine-grained structure of the universe.)’, and Penrose
OR (objective reduction)12 is the psycho-physical bridge: “Orch OR provides a possible
connection between quantum spacetime geometry—a possible repository of proto-
conscious experience—and brain processes regulating consciousness”. According to
Ashtekar, “Spacetime is not an inert entity. It acts on matter and can be acted upon”,
“gravity is geometry”, and “geometry is also a physical entity, on a par with matter”
(Ashtekar, 2005). However, it is not clear how matter and mind arise from or reduce to
the neutral third entity ‘quantum spacetime geometry’. According to Stapp (Stapp,
1996), “The complexity of the physical carrier has undoubtedly co-evolved with the
complexity of the associated experiential reality”, which is consistent with our
framework. According to Atmanspacher (Atmanspacher, 2006), “Such a “dual aspect”
option, although not much emphasized in contemporary mainstream discussions, has a
long tradition. Early versions go back as far as Spinoza and Leibniz. In the early days of
psychophysics in the 19th century, Fechner (Fechner, 1861) and Wundt (Wundt, 1911)
advocated related views. Whitehead, the modern pioneer of process philosophy,
referred to mental and physical poles of “actual occasions”, which themselves transcend
their bipolar appearances (Whitehead, 1978). Many approaches in the tradition of Feigl
(Feigl, 1967) and Smart (Smart, 1963), called “identity theories”, conceive mental and
material states as essentially identical “central states”, yet considered from different
perspectives. Other variants of this idea have been suggested by Jung and Pauli (Jung &
Pauli, 1955) [see also Meier (Meier, 2001) and Atmanspacher and Primas (Atmanspacher
& Primas, 1996, 2006)], involving Jung's conception of a psychophysically neutral,
archetypal order, or by Bohm and Hiley (Bohm, 1990; Bohm & Hiley, 1993; Hiley, 2001),
referring to an implicate order which unfolds into the different explicate domains of the mental
and the material.”
Bohm (Bohm, 1990) proposes the inseparable dual-aspect in the active
information and the quantum potential constitutes active information, “As with electric
and magnetic fields, the quantum field can also be represented in terms of a potential
12In OR, the quantum system is reduced from a superposition of multiple possible states to a single
definite state.
17
which I call the quantum potential. … at least in the context of the processes of thought,
there is a kind of active information that is simultaneously physical and mental in
nature. Active information can thus serve as a kind of or 'bridge' between these two
sides [aspects] of reality as a whole. These two sides are inseparable, in the sense that
information contained in thought, which we feel to be on the 'mental' side, is at the
same time a related neurophysiological, chemical, and physical activity (which is clearly
what is meant by the 'material' side of this thought). … From the mental side, it is a
potentially active information content. But from the material side, it is an actual activity
that operates to organize the less subtle levels, and the latter serve as the 'material' on
which such operation takes place. Thus, at each level, information is the link or bridge
between the two sides. … the quantum potential constitutes active information that
can give form to the movements of the particles … At each such level, there will be a
'mental pole' and a 'physical pole'. Thus as we have already implied, even an electron
has at least a rudimentary mental pole, represented mathematically by the quantum
potential. Vice versa, as we have seen, even subtle mental processes have a physical
pole. But the deeper reality is something beyond either mind or matter, both of which
are only aspects that serve as terms for analysis … These can contribute to our
understanding of what is happening but are in no sense separate substances in
interaction. Nor are we reducing one pole to a mere function or aspect of the other (e.g.
as is done in materialism and in idealism)“ (bold mine). Moreover, the quantum
potential is cybernetic, steering the location of the particle, according to Bohm. The
super-quantum potential steers the explication.
Hiley and Pylkkänen (Hiley & Pylkkänen, 2005) extends Bohm’s double aspect
view of active information (that has both a mental and a material aspect) to explain self
and how mental processes can act on neural processes without violating the energy
conservation law as, “the ontological interpretation suggests that a novel type of “active
information”, connected with a novel type of “quantum potential energy”, plays a key
role in quantum physical processes. […] In this proposal, quantum tunneling would
enable the “self” to control its brain without violating the energy conservation law.
[…] Based on the notions of active information and quantum potential energy, we
propose a coherent way of understanding how mental processes (understood as
involving non-classical physical processes) can act on traditional, classically describable
neural processes without violating the energy conservation law. […] we assume that
mind and matter are two aspects of or ways of looking at an underlying reality […] We
follow Bohm in proposing that such a reality can, for convenience, be analyzed in terms
of levels that differ with respect to their subtlety. Each level then has both a physical and
a mental aspect, and this makes a “two-way traffic” between levels possible. Bohm
suggested, radically, that even the quantum level can be thought to have, via active
information, a primitive mind-like quality, although it obviously has no consciousness.
[…] In this way we claim to avoid dualism or idealism without falling into reductive
materialism. The whole point of double-aspect approaches is to avoid these extremes.
[…] We follow Bohm in assuming that, at each level, information is the link or bridge
between the mental and the physical sides. […] mind can be seen as a relatively
18
autonomous, higher level of active information, which has both a physical and a
mental aspect … mind can have a genuine effect upon neural processes” (bold mine).
The term ‘information’ has double aspects to address the implicit explanatory gap of
materialism. Beck and Eccles’ mind-field (Beck & Eccles, 1992) has substance-dualism
that has 5 problems (Section 3.6), so it is avoided.13 The dual-aspect PE-SE framework
(substance-monism-and-property-dualism) does not have these problems; therefore the
dual-aspect active-information based PE-SE framework will have fewer problems. Our
assumption of ‘PEs/SEs in superposed form in strings or elementary particles’ is
analogous to their (Hiley & Pylkkänen, 2005) ‘primitive mind-like quality at the quantum
level via active information’ when it is unpacked and the seven problems (Section 3.4)
of implicit dual-aspect panpsychism is addressed; moreover, inert matter and ‘life with
no appropriate neural-network’ obviously have no specific SE in both frameworks. In
addition, their (Hiley & Pylkkänen, 2005) hypothesis that quantum tunneling (via
internal quantum potential energy and active information processing) enables the self-
related neural-network to control sensorimotor and other neural-networks for mind
(function and experience) is interestingly consistent with the PE-SE framework. The
motivation of explicating the enfolded ‘PEs/SEs in superposed form in strings or
elementary particles’ can be considered as ‘active information’ for the evolution to form
neural-networks in our brain so that specific SEs can be eventually unfolded. At neural-
network level, the environmental stimulus (such as long wavelength light) dependent
active information in feed forward signals (tilde mode) interacts with the active
information in the cognition (such as memory and attention) related feedback signals
(non-tilde mode) during the matching and selection of a specific SE (such as redness) in
related neural-network (such as V4/V8/VO red-green opponent neural-network). Thus,
one could argue that ‘information’ (Chalmers, 1995) has two aspects: material and
mental. Compare this with string or elementary particles that have two aspects: material
(mass, spin, charge, force, quanta, and space-time) and mental (such as SEs/PEs)
(Vimal, 2008c). If all (Bohm, 1990; Chalmers, 1995; Vimal, 2008c) are correct, ‘string or
elementary particles’ are ‘information’.
Velmans proposed (Velmans, 2007) an externalist reflexive model to address the
explanatory gap, “The reflexive model accepts that experiences of the world result from
dynamic organism-environment interactions, but argues that such interactions are
13
Beck and Eccles might be correct as for as quantum process in synapses is concerned for the information transfer
between neurons via classical axon-dendritic neural firing (spikes) sub-pathway of both feed forward and feedback
pathways. However, as far as the subjective experience aspect of consciousness is concerned, Beck and Eccles’
mind-field (Beck & Eccles, 1992) has substance-dualism that has 5 problems, so it is controversial. Stapp likes their
approach and he built his framework by extending Beck and Eccles’ framework and tried to address some of the
above problems and is very close to Dvait (~substance dualism) ↔ Advait (mental monism) Vedanta; some argue
that Stapp’s view is close to Solipsism (the skeptical philosophical idea that only one's own mind is certain to exist).
However, due to the 5 problems, I have avoided it. In neuroscience community (mostly materialists), Eccles’
framework is regarded controversial and there is no general consensus for it. However, if we combine our dual-
aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework and Beck and Eccles’ quantum process in synapses, then it would have fewer
problems. However, this is beyond the scope of current article.
19
preconscious. While the resulting phenomenal world is a consequence of such

interactions, it cannot be reduced to them. The reflexive model is externalist in its
claim that this external phenomenal world, which we normally think of as the “physical
world,” is literally outside the brain. Furthermore, there are no added conscious
experiences of the external world inside the brain. …. in closing the gap between the
phenomenal world and what we normally think of as the physical world, the
reflexive model resolves one facet of the hard problem of consciousness” (bold mine).
In addition, Velmans (Velmans, 2008a) proposed experiences in external world via
perceptual projection: “There are two quite distinct ways in which events that we
normally think of as “physical” relate in an intimate way to events that we normally
think of as “psychological”. One intimate relation occurs in exteroception at the point
where events in the world become events as-perceived. The other intimate relationship
occurs at the interface of conscious experience with its neural correlates in the brain.
[…] Normal exteroception involves an interaction between an event in the world (an
event itself) and the perceptual/cognitive systems of an observer, which results in an
event as-perceived. [...] According to dualists, S’s experience of a cat [an entity in the
world] is “nowhere”; according to reductionists, S’s experience of a cat [that entity] is in
her brain; according to the reflexive model, both former models misdescribe what S
actually experiences … the objects that we experience seem to be out there in the
world, not in our head or brain” (bold mine). For example, “this print seems to be out
here on this page and not in your brain.” He calls this empirically observable effect
“perceptual projection”, and notes, “We know that nonconscious processes within the
brain produce consciously experienced events, which may be subjectively located and
extended in the phenomenal space beyond the brain. We also know that this effect is
subjective, psychological and viewable only from a first-person perspective. Nothing
physical is projected from the brain. […] What are the consequences of thinking about
the perceived world in this reflexive way? Although we normally think of the objects
that we see around us as being “physical”, they are in another sense “psychological”.
This is because they are the objects as they appear to us and not the objects as they are
in themselves. “ (Velmans, 2008a) (bold mine). One could argue that this is Kantianism.
Velmans then considers the relation between the psychological and physical at the
interface of consciousness and brain. “The above analysis rather suggests a seamless
universe, of which we are an integral part, which can be known in two fundamentally
different ways. At the interface of consciousness and brain it can be known in terms of
how it appears (from the outside) and it terms of what it is like to be that universe (from
the inside). This is ontological monism, combined with epistemological dualism.” He
then goes on to ask “If mind grounds and unifies the first- and third-person views we
have of it, what can we conjecture about its nature? … 1 … the mind encodes
information. 2 … the mind can be described as a process, developing over time. …
mind can be thought of as a form of information processing—and the information
displayed in experiences and their physical correlates can be thought of as two
manifestations of this information processing” (Velmans, 2008a) (bold mine).
20
Finally, he asks, “what kind of ‘medium’ is the mind? … 1. In the human case,
minds viewed from the outside seem to take the form of brains (or some physical aspect
of brains). 2. Viewed from the perspective of those who embody them, minds take the
form of conscious experiences. [Consequently]… it is at once physical and conscious
experience. … [and combining this with the above] mind is a psychophysical process
that encodes information, developing over time. […] If first- and third person accounts
of consciousness and its physical correlates are complementary and mutually
irreducible, an analogous psychological complementarity principle might be required to
understand the nature of mind” (Velmans, 2008a) (bold mine).
Velmans’ reflexive-monism framework seems to imply that (i) objects have dual-
aspect (material and experiential), (ii) perceptual projection can be unpacked in terms of
conjugate matching between the SEs superposed in the mental aspect of stimuli and
that of neural-networks, and (iii) since “mind is a psychophysical process that encodes
information” (Velmans, 2008a), the Red-Green psychophysical channel can be viewed
as having two aspects: (a) its material aspect is composed of ‘V4/V8/VO’ neural-
network and its activity14, and (b) its mental aspect consists of SEs redness to greenness.
Therefore, reflexive-monism (Velmans, 2008a, 2008b) is consistent with the PE-SE
framework. The PE-SE framework differs from Velmans in that: PEs/SEs are in
superposed form in the mental aspect of fundamental particles in the PE-SE framework
(to address the various problems (Globus, 2008; Seager, 1995) such as combination
problem (Goff, 2009)), whereas this is not the case in Velmans’ framework. This means
that consciousness (SEs) is almost everywhere (wherever fundament particles are) in
unexpressed form. A specific SE, when expressed, is in the mental aspect of both the
stimulus and the neural-network, linked by conjugate matching/perceptual projection.
However, in Velmans’ Framework, a specific conscious experience is in the mental
aspect of the external world (stimulus). Furthermore Velmans’ reflexive monism
framework has at least two problems: (i) Assignment problem: for example, how to
assign redness (not blueness) to objects that reflect long wavelength light, and (ii) plenum
problem: where all SEs arise from and where they are stored. In the PE-SE framework,
assignment problem is addressed by natural selection and the plenum problem by
‘virtual reservoir’ as detailed in (Vimal, 2008c).
If the dual-aspect view with fundamental property dualism (as the PE-SE
framework) is correct, then consciousness (Vimal, 2008b) must have some causal impact
(Vimal, 2009b). One could argue that consciousness causes (Van Gulick, 2008): (i)
increased flexibility and sophistication of control such as in novel situations, (ii)
enhanced capacity for social coordination such as enhanced self-awareness and
understanding of other’s minds, (iii) more unified and densely integrated
representation of reality such as the unity of experienced space, (iv) more global
informational access such as in global broadcasting (Baars, 1996), (v) increased freedom
of choice or free will such as in the selection of our own action, and (vi) intrinsically
14“Neural activity exists in pulse densities of axons, wave densities of dendrites and in various forms of
thermal, electric, magnetic and especially chemical energy” (Freeman & Vitiello, 2006).
21
motivating states such as in the functional and motivational roles of conscious affective
states (e.g., pleasures and pains). In addition, “1. By relating input to its context,
consciousness defines input, removing its ambiguities in perception and understanding.
2. Consciousness is required for successful problem solving and learning, particularly
where novelty is involved. 3. Making an event conscious raises its “access priority,”
increasing the chances of successful adaptation to that event. 4. Conscious goals can
recruit subgoals and motor systems to carry out voluntary acts. Making choices
conscious helps to recruit knowledge resources essential to arriving at an appropriate
decision. 5. Conscious inner speech and imagery allow us to reflect on and, to an extent,
control our conscious and unconscious functioning. 6. In facing unpredictable
conditions, consciousness is indispensable in allowing flexible responses” (Velmans,
2009). Moreover, consciousness is necessary in the coordination of skeletal muscles
(Morsella, 2005; Pereira Jr. & Ricke, 2009). 7. As per (Beauregard, 2007), “the subjective
nature and the intentional content (what they are ‘about’ from a first-person
perspective) of mental processes (e.g., thoughts, feelings, beliefs, volition) significantly
influence the various levels of brain functioning (e.g., molecular, cellular, neural circuit)
and brain plasticity.”15 In addition, “In sum, consciousness appears to be the major way
in which the central nervous system adapts to novel, challenging and informative
events in the world” (Baars & McGovern, 1996).
Furthermore, the thermofield quantum brain dynamics (Vitiello, 1995; Vitiello, 2001;
Vitiello, 2002; Vitiello, 2004) and the dual-mode-thermofield-holoworld framework
(Globus, 2005; Globus, 2007) are dual-mode frameworks. In the dual-aspect PE-SE
framework (Vimal, 2008c), the dual-mode was implicit, which is made explicit here as
inspired by these dual-mode frameworks (Globus, 2004; Globus, 2006; Globus, 2008;
Globus, 1987; Globus, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Globus, 1998, 2002, 2003; Globus, 2005;
Globus, 2007) and (Vitiello, 1995; Vitiello, 2001; Vitiello, 2002; Vitiello, 2004) (elaborated
further in Section 2); therefore the degree of parsimony remains unchanged.
In the dual-aspect-dual-mode PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008a, 2008c, 2008d, 2008e,
2009d, 2009e), there are three competing hypotheses (Vimal, 2010c, 2010d, 2010e):
superposition based H1, superposition-then-integration based H2, and integration based H3
where superposition is not required. H3 is related to the dual-aspect panpsychism. One
could argue from the implication related to Dirac’s equation of the electron, in analogy
to Nunn (Nunn, 2007), as follows: The experiences (or PEs/SEs) superposed in
fundamental particles may simply be potentialities or possibilities that manifest reality
only in the context of particular experiments or observations. For example, when long
wavelength light is presented to the ‘V4/V8/VO’ Red-Green neural network, the
15 As per (Beauregard, 2009), “Mental functions and processes involved in diverse forms of
psychotherapy exert a significant influence on brain activity. With regard to the placebo effect, beliefs and
expectations can markedly modulate neurophysiological and neurochemical activity in brain regions
involved in perception, movement, pain and various aspects of emotion processing. The findings of the
neuroimaging studies reviewed here strongly support the view that the subjective nature and the
intentional content of mental processes significantly influence the various levels of brain functioning (e.g.
molecular, cellular, neural circuit) and brain plasticity.”
22
potentiality of SE redness turns into reality via (conjugate) matching and selection
mechanism. One could argue that this potentiality can be viewed as one of the
motivations for the evolution to eventually form neural-networks in brains so that SEs
can be realized. In other words, neural-networks can be viewed as ‘attractors’ for
evolution.
The matching process, the topic of this article, is required in all above three
hypotheses; whereas, the selection process is required only in H1 (not in H2 and not in
H3). This is because the mysterious emergence process is necessary in H2 and H3 (but not
in H1). In other words, the matching and selection processes are required in H1; whereas
the matching and emergence processes are necessary in H2 and H3 and hence the mystery
of emergence still remains in the latter two hypotheses. In H1, the mental aspect of the
fundamental entities and inert matter is the carrier of superimposed fundamental
experiences (or SEs/PEs) in unexpressed form. In H1, a specific SE is selected in a neural-
network as follows: (i) there exist a virtual reservoir (plenum) that stores all possible
fundamental experiences (SEs/PEs), such as in the mental aspect of the fundamental
entities in superposed form, (ii) the interaction of stimulus-dependent feed-forward
(tilde mode) and feedback signals (non-tilde mode) in the neural-network creates a
specific neural-network state, (iii) this specific state is assigned to a specific SE from the
virtual reservoir during neural Darwinism, (iv) this specific SE is embedded as the mental
aspect of memory trace of neural-network-PE, and (v) when a specific stimulus is
presented to the neural-network, the associated specific SE is selected by the matching
and selection process and experienced by this network that includes also self-related
neural-network (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). In addition, the necessary ingredients of
SEs (such as wakefulness, attention, re-entry, working memory, stimulus at or above
threshold level and neural-network-PEs) must be satisfied before the network can
experience.
Furthermore, the superposition of a large number of experiences (or PEs/SEs) in
the mental aspect of fundamental particles is (a sort of) related to Bohm’s implicate order
(enfolding). The matching and selection theory – the main topic of the paper – has a very
long history (Globus, personal communication): It is (a sort of) related to (i) Leibniz’s
appetition, (ii) Bohm’s explicate order (unfolding) (Bohm, 1980, 1990; Bohm & Hiley, 1993),
(iii) Globus’ holoworld, situatedness, world-thrownness, and conjugate matching (Globus,
2005; Globus, 2007) (call it the dual-mode-double-universe-thermofield-holoworld or
simply holoworld framework)16, (v) Freeman’s intentionality (Freeman, 2000; Globus,
2007), (vi) Neisser’s ecological approach to cognition (Neisser, 1976), (vii) Jerne’s
selection theory to the brain on analogy from immunology (Jerne, 1955, 1973; Jerne,
1984; Jerne, 1985), and (viii) Edelman’s neural Darwinism and evolutionary perspective
(Edelman, 1993).
Furthermore, the term ‘consciousness’ was unpacked as (Globus, 1998), “… the
vague term ‘consciousness’ is partially unpacked into … (1) the self or subject, denoted
16Double universes are (i) our-universe (tilde-mode) that is consists of brain, its immediate environment
and the rest of environment and (ii) alter-universe (non-tilde mode) that is entropy (or time) reversed
mirror image of our-universe, where ‘alter’ refers to ‘future’.
23
by ‘I’, (2) cognition, (3) thrownness in the world, and (4) ‘qualia’.” Inspired by this, in
(Vimal, 2008b), I “describe meanings (or aspects) attributed to the term consciousness,
extracted from the literature and from recent online discussions. Forty such meanings
were identified and categorized according to whether they were principally about
function or about experience; some overlapped but others were apparently mutually
exclusive – and this list is by no means exhaustive. Most can be regarded as expressions
of authors’ views about the basis of consciousness, or opinions about the significance of
aspects of its contents. The prospects for reaching any single, agreed, theory
independent definition of consciousness thus appear remote. However, much confusion
could be avoided if authors were always to specify which aspects of consciousness they
refer to when using the term. An example is outlined of how this can be done (using a
‘PE-SE’ framework).” However here, as in the PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c), we
limit to the SE aspect of consciousness, and consciousness and SE are interchangeably
used unless noted. In (Vimal, 2010b), my goal was “to search for optimal (that has the
least number of problems) and a general definition (that accommodates all views) [of
consciousness]; both are theory dependent definitions. My quest is based on the
premise that evolution must have optimized our system, which has structure, function,
and experience. There are many views related to consciousness and each view has its
own problems; some of them are described in this article. Then I tried to investigate
which view has the least number of problems. I found that the PE-SE framework, so far,
fits this litmus test. In this framework, I investigated the optimal definition of
consciousness that has the least number of problems, which is ‘consciousness can be
optimally defined as a mental entity that has dual-aspect: function and experience. A more
general definition is ‘consciousness is a mental entity that is a function, an experience, or both
depending on the context’. The term context refers to metaphysical views, constraints,
specific aims, and so on. The general definition appears to accommodate all views.”
In previous article (Vimal, 2008c), the PE-SE framework was presented where
classical and quantum concepts related to SEs and PEs were discussed. In this
framework, to address the explanatory gap of monistic materialism and ‘the mind-brain
interaction problem and the mental causation problem’ in dualism, we proposed dual-
aspect view (non-reductive physicalism) where we hypothesized that all types of
fundamental experiences (or PEs/SEs) are superimposed in the mental aspect of
fundamental entities (strings or elementary particles: fermions and bosons). This
implies that the mental aspect of inert matter carries experiences (or PEs/SEs) because it
contains all types of fundamental experiences (or PEs/SEs). Therefore, the inert matter is
non-specific to SEs/PEs, and it behaves as a non-experiential entity. When the
specificity is higher than its critical value (such as in neural-networks of brain), a
specific SE can be selected by matching and selection process. In this framework, ‘co-
evolution, co-development and sensorimotor co-tuning’ (neural Darwinism) play
important role as discussed in (Vimal, 2008c). In non-reductive views, fundamental SEs
are irreducible and appear unique and independent to each other. Therefore, each
fundamental SE/PE must exist on its own as a mental aspect of fundamental entities in
superposed form. The PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c) does not reject any neuroscience
24
models rather complements them by providing an ontological interpretation. It is a

different story that there is no single neuroscience model that can explain all the data
related to structure and function, and therefore there are many models and further
research is needed to sort out the optimum one.
In the PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c), the terms specificity and non-specificity
need further clarification. For example, electron (quantum particle), is non-specific
because its mental aspect has all fundamental experiences (or PEs/SEs) in superimposed
form and is found everywhere. However, redness-related neural-network, in classical
domain, is specific because its mental aspect has single SE/PE redness. The Red-Green
neural-network is more specific than cone photoreceptors because the mental aspect of
the Red-Green neural-network carries less number of superposed experiences than that
of the cones. Furthermore, a neural-network will have a specific SE when all essential
ingredients of SE are satisfied in the neural-network; otherwise the mental aspect of the
neural-network carries PE in embedded form. Co-evolution and co-developmental
processes (via sensorimotor tuning) yield neural-networks and associated neural-
network-PEs, and higher degree of specificity arises. For example, redness-related
V4/V8/VO-neural-network and associated neural-network color PEs are co-developed
(i.e., dependently co-arisen (Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995)), which is basically the mental
aspect of the red-green opponent channel containing all color SEs between redness and
greenness. This has higher specificity than elemental PEs. When long wavelength light is
presented, specific SE redness is selected out of these color-SEs by the selection process
during matching (Vimal, 2008c).
Furthermore, the PE-SE framework (Vimal, 2008c) is now extended to address (i)
“the localization of consciousness within the physical matter of the brain consistent
with contemporary theoretical physics, molecular and system biology, and
neuroscience” via a two-factor approach (MacGregor & Vimal, 2008), (ii) Self (Bruzzo &
Vimal, 2007), (iii) phenomenal time (Vimal & Davia, 2008), (iv) visual awareness (Vimal,
2008e), (v) emotion (Vimal, 2008a), (vi) integration of classical, quantum, and
subquantum concepts (Vimal, 2009d), (vii) integration of classical and quantum
concepts for emergence hypothesis (Vimal, 2009e), (viii) an overview of the meanings
attributed to the term ‘consciousness’ (Vimal, 2008b), (ix) optimal and general definition
of consciousness (Vimal, 2010b), (x) linking Dynamic Systems theory (DST) and Fractal
Catalytic Theory (FCT) with Standard Representation Theory (SRT) using PE-SE
framework (Vimal, 2009c) and DST-FCT’s “experience arises as an organism mediates
(catalyzes) the transitions in its surround”(Carpenter, Davia, & Vimal, 2009), and (xi)
the inclusion of consciousness in string theory towards a theory of everything (Vimal,
2010c, 2010d, 2010e).
We hypothesized that elementary particle such as an electron has two aspects:
material and mental aspects. However, it is argued in (Globus, 1996) that there are two
kind of relations rather than two aspects: (i) The material-aspect of electron should be
replaced with ‘describing something (other-relation)’, for example, interaction with
other particles. Then, one could argue that how self-interaction, mass, charge, and spin
of that electron will fit in. (ii) Mental-aspect of electron should be replaced with ‘the
25
case of being something (self-relation)’. If we hypothesize that the mental aspect of

electron carries all experiences (or PEs/SEs) in superposed form, which is the mental
aspect of electron, then how ‘self-relation’ will fit in. It appears that the hypothesis H3
might fit better with the ‘two kind of relations’ idea because both are close to the
restricted panpsychism (Globus, 2008).
The matching and selection mechanisms (how a specific SE is selected out of many),
the topic of this article, can contain quantum and/or classical concepts. The quantum
concept of superposition of SEs and classical concept of matching and selection process
are discussed in Vimal (Vimal, 2008c). The quantum concept of conjugate matching
between two modes is discussed in (Globus, 2004; Globus, 2006; Globus, 2008; Globus,
1987; Globus, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Globus, 1998, 2002, 2003; Globus, 2005; Globus, 2007)
and (Vitiello, 1995; Vitiello, 2001; Vitiello, 2002; Vitiello, 2004). In this article, the
classical matching and selection mechanisms are extended further using quantum conjugate
matching in experiential domain.
2. Western Metaphysics and Comparison with Eastern

Metaphysics
In Western Metaphysics, we categorize all entities in just two categories: mind

and matter.
Matter: This is western term and includes all elementary particles (fermions
and bosons), atoms, molecules, and all inert entities including our body, brain
and its activities (such as neural activities).
Mind: This is western term and includes all entities that are not material
entities; for example our thinking process, perception, experience, self and so
on are all mental entities; it is different from eastern term ‘manas’ or ‘mana’,
which is subtle matter and is liaison between Purusha and Prakriti.
Then it is easy to understand how various western metaphysical frameworks

arise by the appropriate arrangement of mind and matter:
2.1. Materialism: If matter is fundamental reality then it is monistic

materialism (materialistic idealism, which is the dominant view in science),
where mind somehow (we do not know how) arises from matter.
In materialism, a specific experience (SE: such as redness) is identical with a

specific state (such as redness-related state caused by long wavelength light) of
a specific neural-network (such as red-green V4/V8/VO-neural-net) (Levin,
2006; Levin, 2008; Loar, 1990, 1997; Papineau, 2006). In
emergentism/materialism, qualia/subjective experiences (such as redness) are
26
assumed to mysteriously emerge or reduce to (or identical with) relevant states

of neural-nets, which is a brute fact (that's just the way it is).17
The major problem of materialism is Levine’s explanatory gap (Levine,

1983)18: the gap between experiences and scientific descriptions of those
experiences (Vimal, 2008c). In other words, how can our experiences emerge (or
arise) from non-experiential matter such as neural-networks of our brain or
organism-environment interactions?
Furthermore, materialism/emergentism has 3 more assumptions (Skrbina,

2009): matter is the ultimate reality, and material reality is essentially objective
and non-experiential. These assumptions need justification.
Speculation: My working hypothesis is that materialism is close to Eastern

Charwak/Lokayat system.
2.2. Mentalistic idealism: If mind is fundamental reality then it is monistic

mentalistic idealism, where matter arises from mind. This is nondual
framework with respect to matter and mind.
Stapp’s quantum-physics-based dual-nondual is a good example. According to

(Stapp, 2009a), “Von Neumann (orthodox) quantum mechanics is thus
dualistic in the pragmatic and operational sense that it involves aspects of
nature that are described in physical terms and also aspects of nature that are
described in psychological terms, and these two parts interact in human brains
in accordance with laws specified by the theory. This is all in close accord with
classic Cartesian dualism. On the other hand, and in contrast to the
application to classical mechanics, in which the physically described aspect is
ontologically matterlike, not mindlike, in quantum mechanics the physically
described part is mindlike! So both parts of the quantum Cartesian duality are
fundamentally mindlike. Thus quantum mechanics conforms at the
pragmatic/operational level to the precepts of Cartesian duality, but reduces at
a deep ontological level to a fundamentally mindlike nondual monism.”
17
According to Carruthers (personal communication), “very few materialists endorse a brute identity claim. Most
are reductive representationalists of one sort or another.” However, the contextual emergence of higher-level stable
mental states from lower-level neurodynamics is a non-reductive framework (in analogy to temperature as an
emergent property), where contingent contextual conditions are necessary (Atmanspacher, 2007).
18
Levine’s argument is in the context of Philosophy of Science. One could ask: what is the impact of a detected
problem in scientific explanation for a metaphysical view? Is science relevant to metaphysics? Why? In my view,
for consciousness research, borders between various departments should melt and one should able to take advantage
of critical information from one department to another. Therefore, argument in the context of Philosophy of Science
should be relevant to metaphysics, and vice-versa.
27
2.3. Interactive substance dualism: If mind and matter are on equal footings
but interact then it is interactive substance dualism (somewhat close to
Eastern Sāṃkhya’s Purusha-Prakriti system, where Purusha ‘shines’ on Prakriti
to create our universe). Mind and matter are separable in interactive substance
dualism, which has 7 problems (Vimal, 2011); here there is clear cut duality
both substance-wise and property-wise. The seven problems, elaborated in
Section 1.1.2 of, are as follows:
(i) Association or mind-brain interaction problem: how does the non-

material mind interact with the non-experiential brain? For example, how can
we associate redness with red-green cells of ‘V4/V8/VO’ neural-net?19 This is a
problem of unexplained epistemic gap: how is the jump made from the mental
redness to material ‘V4/V8/VO’ neural-net (and vice versa). Furthermore, if
nature has two distinct aspects, namely, mind and matter, then how can these
distinct aspects of nature ever interact (Stapp, 2009b)?
(ii) Problem of mental causation: how can a mental cause give rise to a
behavioral effect without the violation of the conservation of energy and
momentum?
(iii) ‘Zombie’ problem: Dualism “allows us to subtract the mind from the
brain while leaving the brain completely intact. This possibility implies an
“epiphenomenalism” that claims that mind does not matter, that it makes no
difference what happens in the world, because it does not cause behavior. My
zombie twin behaves just like me but it has no mind at all” (Eerikäinen, 2000).
(iv) ‘Ghost’ problem: It is “the converse of the zombie problem. If the mind is
separate from the body, then not only can the brain exist without the mind but
also the mind can exist without the brain. Thus, the so-called “disembodiment”
becomes a real possibility” (Eerikäinen, 2000). Nunn argues (personal
communication) that the evidence for the occurrence of apparently
disembodied states is actually quite strong, for example, near-death
experiences (NDEs) (Blackmore, 1996; French, 2005). If this is true then this
may not be a problem. However, one could argue that although there is some
evidence for states that appear to be disembodied, but this is different from
19 The color area ‘V8/V4/VO’ refers to visual area V8 of Tootell-group (Hadjikhani, Liu, Dale,
Cavanagh, & Tootell, 1998; Tootell, Tsao, & Vanduffel, 2003), visual area V4 of Zeki-group
(Bartels & Zeki, 2000), and VO of Wandell-group (Wandell, 1999); they are the same human
color area (Tootell et al., 2003). VO is ventral-occipital cortex.
28
evidence for disembodiment, since the phenomenon may be illusory.20

Moreover, according to (Klemenc-Ketis, Kersnik, & Grmec, 2010), the higher
partial pressure of carbon dioxide (pCO2) in arterial blood proved to be
important in the provoking of NDEs and higher serum levels of potassium (K)
might also be important. In addition, the “factors that could be important in
provoking NDEs are anoxia …, hypercapnia …, and the presence of endorphins
…, ketamine …, and serotonin …, or abnormal activity of the temporal lobus …
or the limbic system ... These psychological theories try to explain the NDEs as
a way of dissociation …, depersonalisation …, reactivation of birth memories
…, and regression” (Klemenc-Ketis et al., 2010).V
(v) Neurophysiological many-one/many relation problem: Interactionism or

substance dualism is not favorable to neurophysiological tests because it
entails a many-one or many-many relations or correspondences (Feigl, 1967).
(vi) Causal pairing problem: “It is exceedingly odd that particular minds and
brains form a lifelong ‘monogamy’ despite the absence of any apparent
relational framework. For it is only within the terms of such a framework that
we could explain the persistent individual pairings as a consequence of a
contingent, external relationship between them, which relations structure
mental-physical causality in a general fashion. […] This difficulty might be
overcome by positing the emergence of the mental substance, so that the
asymmetrical dependency of mind on brain grounds their monogamous
interaction” (O'Connor & Wong, 2005). However, it will be then materialistic
emergence.
(vii) Developmental problem: “[E]ven an emergentist version of substance

dualism requires what is empirically implausible, viz., that a composite
physical system gives rise, all in one go, to a whole, self-contained, organized
system of properties bound up with a distinct individual. For we cannot say, as
we should want to do, that as the underlying physical structure develops, the
emergent self does likewise. This would require us to posit changing
mereological complexity within the self, which would give rise all over again to
problems of endurance that substance dualism is supposed to avoid, and
which would run counter to intuitions of primitive unity that substance
dualists have regarding persons. No, the emergent dualist view will have to say,
instead, that at an early stage of physical development, a self emerges having
20 In the dual-aspect framework, the mental aspect (OBE/NDE) of psychophysical entity related
to relevant NN-state appears projected outside (as we experience outside objects). However,
activities (such as visual and auditory) are still going on in NNs (but not detected clinically). To
reject this hypothesis, subject must wear eye-patches and ear-plugs effectively so no external
stimulus-information can travel inside visual and auditory system. Under these conditions,
hypothesis predicts no visual and auditory OBE/NDE related to external objects; however,
endogenous OBE/NDE can still occur.
29
all the capacities of an adult human self, but most of which lie dormant owing
to immaturity in the physical system from which it emerges” (O'Connor &
Wong, 2005). However, this seems to imply that self is not powerful and is a
slave of developing physical system.
Speculation: My working hypothesis is that the metaphysics of Sāṃkhya,

Geeta, and Advaita might be close to this western interactive substance
dualism; this is based on verses II/17-25 of Geeta (Swami Chinmayananda,
2000) pp.74-85). Advaita is derived from Sāṃkhya’s philosophy perhaps via
Mahat (Great-Brahman: Geeta:XIV/3: (Swami Chinmayananda, 2000).p.870)
concept. Advaita’s non-duality is between Atman and Pramatman (Purusha);
Advaita is silent on matter, so Advaita’s matter might be Sāṃkhya’s Prakriti. In
other words, Advaita and Geeta appear similar and are derived from Sāṃkhya’s
Purusha and Prakriti. Thus, Purusha and Prakriti are two different substances,
but they interact via ‘shining’ concept. Therefore, it is interactive substance
dualism framework. Geeta seems to mention that Purusha-Prakriti interaction
is via Hiranyagarbha (Golden Egg) concept (RigVeda, 10:121;21 Geeta:VIII/4,
XIV/4: (Swami Chinmayananda, 2000).p.488-91 and 871-2): Purusha shines
on un-manifested Prakriti (metaphorically makes her pregnant) for the creation
of universe. However, there is an explanatory gap problem of precisely how this
happens just saying it happens is not satisfactory because it would fall under
hand-waving hypothesis.
2.4. Dual-aspect monism: If mind and matter are two inseparable aspects of
the same entity, then it is dual-aspect monism. For example, you look at this
red text. The subjective color experience is redness, which is the mental aspect.
It also activates a brain area called visual V4/V8/VO color area, this structure
and related activities such as neuronal firing that you can measure it using
functional MRI is the physical aspect. This red text generates a state in brain,
which is called redness-related brain state; this state has two aspects: mental
and physical aspects. These two aspects are not separable in the dual-aspect
monism. Here substance is just one (so monism) but there are two properties
(so dual-aspects).
Speculation: My working hypothesis is that the theist interpretation of the

dual-aspect monism may be somewhat close to Eastern Vishishtadvaita and
Trika Kashmir Shaivism (TKS). However, there is one difference: in all theist
religions, the ‘soul’ is separable from body at the time of death, whereas mental
and physical aspects are inseparable in dual-aspect monism (dual-aspect
entities are disintegrated during death; after death, the actuality of soul or self
as being the SE of subject returns into its potentiality as in SEs potentially
superposed in each entity. In other words, the Brahman is the fundamental
dual-aspect entity in which all dual-aspect entities are in potential form. The
21See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hiranyagarbha and

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindu_cosmology
30
theist interpretation of the dual-aspect monism is that the Brahman is God and
atheist interpretation is simply the fundamental dual-aspect entity from which
physical and mental aspect of universes including us arise. In dual-aspect
monism, Ishvara and Jiva (purely mental entities) of Vishishtadvaita are the
mental aspect and Jagat (purely physical entities) of Vishishtadvaita is the
physical aspect of Brahman. It appears that mental and physical aspects are
separable in Eastern Vishishtadvaita and TKS, whereas they are inseparable in
the dual-aspect monism. The problems of Sāṃkhya, Geeta, and Advaita creep
up in Vishishtadvaita and TKS. The fundamental dual-aspect entity Brahman
is MIR (mind independent reality) entity; this is known via CMDR and UMDR
by ‘pure reasoning’.
“The typical interpretation of Neti-Neti is not this, not this or neither this, nor
that. It is a phrase meant to convey the inexpressibility of Brahman in words
and the futility of trying to approximate Brahman with conceptual models. In
VisishtAdvaita, the phrase is taken in the sense of not just this, not just this or
not just this, not just that. This means that Brahman cannot be restricted to one
specific or a few specific descriptions. Consequently, Brahman is understood
to possess infinite qualities and each of these qualities are infinite in extent.”22
One way to address the seven problems of the interactive substance dualism
metaphysics of all religions and relevant cosmology (including Sāṃkhya,
Bhagavad Gītā, Advaita Vedanta, Vishishtadvaita, Trika Kashmir Shaivism23,
and so on) is to postulate that Prakriti/Shakti/matter and Purusha/Shiva/mind
are two inseparable (even at and after death) physical and mental aspects,
respectively, of the same entity such as Brahman.
This modification [shown in Eqs. (1) and (2)] will then be consistent with the
dual-aspect monism framework with dual-mode and varying degrees of the
dominance of aspects depending on levels of entities. For example, at and after
death, (a) the mental aspect is dominant and physical aspect is latent in ‘soul’
(if it exists!) in the theist version as in Eq. (2); (b) ‘soul’ exists as self when a
person is alive but it does not exist at and after death in atheist version as in
Eq. (1). In both versions, at and after death, the dead body/brain disintegrates
(unless preserved as in anatomy labs or in cryonics 24) into dual-aspect entities
with their physical aspect dominant and the mental aspect latent as inert
entities, which return back to Nature (our permanent home) for re-cycling.
22 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vishishtadvaita
23 See (Kaul, 2002; Raina Swami Lakshman Joo, 1985; Wilberg, 2008); see also
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trika; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_Shaivism
24 “Cryonics (from Greek kryos- meaning icy cold) is the low-temperature preservation of
humans and animals who can no longer be sustained by contemporary medicine, with the
hope that healing and resuscitation may be possible in the future”
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryonics.
31
As science progresses, Eq. (2) will merge into Eq. (1), i.e., all attributes of
religions can be acquired by the atheist version of dual-aspect monism; this
will occur when science explains all aspects of all religions including all
miracles.
2.5. Atheist-theist phenomenon: Speculation: If atheist-theist phenomenon

is subject-specific (varies with subject’s metaphysical view) because of genetic
disposition (as in God gene) or acquired, then the conceptual fundamental
entity (such as ‘Brahman’) can be used by both theists (as God) and
atheists/scientists (as a fundamental dual-aspect entity from which universes
including us with mind and matter arise via co-evolution). If this is accepted, it
may bring science in religion in a complementary manner. This is the
framework of ‘dual-aspect monism with dual-mode and varying degree of
dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities’, which is my proposal.
2.6. Three Kinds of realities
There are 3 kinds of realities (Vimal, 2009a):

(1) Our daily conventional mind-dependent reality (CMDR)
(2) Ultimate Samadhi-state mind-dependent reality (UMDR)
(3) Mind-independent reality (MIR), which is partly known via CMDR and
UMDR.
One could argue that we live daily in conventional mind-dependent reality

(CMDR); entities around us are real in this CMDR, but they are illusion in
mind-independent reality (MIR). MIR is unknown as per Kant; however, it is
partly known as per neo-Kantians because mind is also a product of Nature; so
MDR must be telling us something about reality.
Speculation: In CMDR and UMDR, theists claim that God exists who created all
universes including us. Whereas, in CMDR, atheists claim that God is created
by human mind. Thus, there is a conflict in views. ‘God exists or not’ cannot be
proved or disproved. We cannot settle this issue in both MDRs. We need to
investigate in MIR, which is either unknown or partly known via CMDR and
UMDR. Thus, Truth remains unknown; however, it would be fair to say, there
is the fundamental entity (call it Brahman) from which universes including us
arise. Theists can call this entity God and atheists can call whatever they wish
as per their metaphysical view. For example, Brahman is a dual-aspect entity
as per dual-aspect monism.
32
2.7. Introduction of dual-aspect monism in religion and science
The goal is to introduce the dual-aspect monism in all religions to SAVE

religions from materialism-based science. This is our duty that religions must
be saved because they teach us how to live whereas so far materialism-based
science has not done this job well. Science has started accepting the dual-
aspect monism because (1) it resolves the explanatory gap problem of
materialism (how our subjective experiences such as redness can arise from
matter such as brain) and (2) it has the least number of problems compared to
all religions and all metaphysics. Dual-aspect monism has long history of over
6000 years (Section 1.2).
The relevant equations are:
Science + assumption of dual-aspect – materialism = Atheist version of dual-

aspect monism = Atheist-Brahman (1)
and
Religion + assumption of dual-aspect – interactive substance dualism = Theist

version of dual-aspect monism = Theist-Brahman (2)
In western metaphysics, we categorize all entities in just two categories: mind

and matter. All theist metaphysics, have built-in separability hypothesis
between ‘soul’ and ‘body/brain’ at the time of death, i.e. mind and matter are
NOT inseparable, rather mind and matter can be separated by the process of
death and interact by the process of birth and the interaction is maintained
during whole life (behaves as if mysteriously inseparable). Thus, they have 7
problems of interactive substance dualism. It is concluded that the ‘dual-
aspect monism framework with dual-mode and varying degree of dominance of
aspects depending on the levels of entities’ has the least number of problems
compared to all religions and all types of metaphysics. It can be used by both
theists and atheists/scientists. VI
As per (Kirkpatrick, 2006), “ [Aspect-1] One aspect of religion seems clearly to

involve certain kinds of beliefs, such as belief in supernatural deities or an
afterlife. [Aspect-2] Another involves certain kinds of behavior, such as prayer
or participation in group rituals. [Aspect-3] A third involves certain kinds of
emotion or phenomenological experience—that is, powerful “spiritual” or
“religious” experiences. [Aspect-4] Finally, organized religions have a social
structure and institutional forms within which there are specifi c roles and
hierarchies of power and influence. […] [Aspect-5] many scholars have argued
(from both evolutionary and other perspectives) that religion confers various
psychological benefits, such as providing comfort, allaying fears about death,
33
making people more optimistic, or raising their self-esteem.”
All the above 5 aspects of religion can be accomplished by the dual-aspect

monism, which combines science and religion.
3. Conclusions
1. In western metaphysics, we categorize all entities in just two categories:

mind and matter.
2. All theist metaphysics, have built-in separability hypothesis between soul

and body at the time of death, i.e. mind and matter are NOT inseparable,
rather mind and matter can be separated by the process of death and interact
(behaves as if mysteriously inseparable) by the process of birth and the
interaction is maintained during whole life. Thus, they have 7 problems of
interactive substance dualism.
3. It is concluded that the ‘dual-aspect monism framework with dual-mode and

varying degree of dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities’ has
the least number of problems compared to all religions and all types of
metaphysics.
Acknowledgments
The work was partly supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision
Research Institute research Fund. Author would like to thank Anil Naik,
colleagues, anonymous reviewers, Manju-Uma C. Pandey-Vimal, Vivekanand
Pandey Vimal, Shalini Pandey Vimal, and Love (Shyam) Pandey Vimal for their
critical comments, suggestions, and grammatical corrections.
Competing interests statement

The author declares that he has no competing financial interests.
34
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I
The colleague further commented that the thrust in western philosophy is the role of "man"
and its role in the universe. Hence the phrase "freedom" and its powerful analysis led to the
modern world eventually. You would see the treatment of God as you go along. In some way it's
pre-upanasadic, that the larger cosmic vision is not contemplated until understood by
Schopenhauer. The church has been too powerful to deny analysis, so it becomes theological
speculations and not philosophical speculations.
II“[I.] 1. Neither from itself nor from another, Nor from both, Nor without a cause, Does
anything whatever, anywhere arise. “(Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995).p.105. See also
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality.
III
“Nāgārjuna rejects ‘inherent existence’ or ‘essence’ in favor of co-dependent origination, and
that is also why he rejects causality.” (Vimal, 2009a). As per (Blumenthal, 2009), “Thus, an
object's lack of, or emptiness of having an inherently existent nature is an ultimate truth for
Śāntarakṣita. […] Thus an object's lack of an inherent nature is an ultimate truth.”
As per (Zimmerman, 2008), “The intrinsic value of something is said to be the value that
that thing has ‘in itself,’ or ‘for its own sake,’ or ‘as such,’ or ‘in its own right.’ Extrinsic value is
value that is not intrinsic.”
Inherent is something that's basic and inherited through genes, while intrinsic plays more
in forming it. Also, inherent is more existing and intrinsic is more belonging. It's a hard
question as they are practically synonyms.
As per (Callicott, 1995), “Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary, tenth edition, defines
"intrinsic" thus: "belonging to the essential nature or constitution of a thing." A And it defines
"inherent" thus: "involved in the constitution or essential character of something...: intrinsic."
The English word "value" comes from the Latin word "valere to be worth, to be strong"; and
"worth" comes from the Old English word "weorth worthy, of value." Lexically speaking, to
claim that the value (or worth) of something is intrinsic (or inherent) is to claim that its value
(or worth) belongs to its essential nature or constitution.”
IV “[I.] 2. There are four conditions: efficient condition; Percept-object condition; immediate
condition; Dominant condition, just so. There is no fifth condition. […] 4. Power to act does not
have conditions. There is no power to act without conditions. There are no conditions without
power to act. Nor do any have the power to act. […] Efficient conditions are those salient events
that explain the occurrence of subsequent events: Striking a match is the efficient condition for
its lighting. […] The percept-object condition is in its primary sense the object in the
environment that is the condition for a mind’s perception of it. So when you see a tree, the
physical tree in the environment is the percept-object condition of your perceptual state. […]
The dominant condition is the purpose or end for which an action is undertaken. My hoped for
understanding of Mādhyamika might be the dominant condition for my reading Nāgārjuna’s
text, its presence before my eyes the percept-object condition, and the reflected light striking
my eyes the efficient condition. The immediate conditions are the countless intermediary
phenomena that emerge upon the analysis of a causal chain, in this case, the photons striking
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my retina, the excitation of photoreceptor cells, and so forth. ” (Nāgārjuna & Garfield,
1995).p.105-13.
V As per (Laws & Perry, 2010), “Quantum mechanics arose to explain 'wobbles' in predicted
effects of Newtonian physics, such as the stability of electron orbitals. Similarly, scientifically
verified phenomena in the field of neuroscience which contradict known theories of brain
function, could give weight and credibility to neuroquantology, stimulating new research and
discovery. The existence of consciousness outside the physical brain, often recounted
anecdotally in various forms, if verified, could be such a phenomenon. […] ‘Out of Body
Experiences’ (OBEs) are episodes, during which a person’s consciousness seems, according to
their subjective recall afterwards, to ‘leave’ the body, and therefore the physical brain,
remaining aware of physical surroundings. Reports have accumulated over the years and
across many cultures. They often incorporate ‘Near Death Experiences’, (NDEs), which seem to
transcend physical surroundings and enable subjects to perceive an ‘after life’ scenario. Such
experiences are usually linked to extreme stress, emotional or physical, factors such as drug
intoxication, or actual short periods of ‘brain death’ or flat lining. […] OBE/NDEs are reported
in increasing numbers, due to improved technology for resuscitation of patients who may now
return to tell their stories after suffering from previously lethal injuries and conditions. […] We
choose to focus on OBEs during flatlining or emergency procedures, as NDEs are less open to
fraud, delusion, or contamination by sensory input during minimal consciousness, but the
study of other forms of ‘out of body’ consciousness (eg survival after death, shamanic journeys,
telepathy) could also be moved forward if this approach bears fruit. […]
OBE/NDEs commonly include the sensation of ‘rising’ out of one’s body, and actually being
able to ‘hover’ above it and look down on it, being still visually and aurally aware of
surroundings even if unconscious, from a viewpoint outside the physical body, somehow
independent of physical eyes or ears. Sometimes this disembodied consciousness moves to
another room or place, even outside. Especially if the subject is in extremis, in a coma or
flatlining, the experience may then go on to the classic NDE. The subject moves through a dark
tunnel, with a light at the end. They may ‘see’ their life history, the ‘life review’ feature. They
emerge into this light, to awareness of feelings of peace, happiness, an awareness of a benign
intelligence, a state they would wish to stay in. Typically, they encounter loved ones who have
previously died, who explain to the subject, that they can’t stay but must return to their body
until the time is right. These experiences occur in many cultures, indeed, sometimes a culture-
or religion specific figure is present, but generally, the experiences do not conform to the taught
dogmas of the subject’s religion or culture. There is often a ‘boundary’ between the subject’s
state and that of their loved ones, which may be culturally determined, eg a river, a line, a wall,
that must not be breached. Instead, the subject is guided or sent back into the body. The
conscious subject typically recalls their experience as very clear, detailed, and coherent. The
individual commonly reports this as a life-changing experience, with feelings of peacefulness,
lack of fear of dying, and happiness which remain with them and shape the rest of their lives. It
has to be said that sometimes the experience of the OBE/NDE is not so positive. Frightening,
‘warning’ experiences are also reported. There is a tendency to associate these with would-be
suicides, being ‘warned’ against self-slaughter, or drug fuelled states, but there are some
instances of negative NDEs not associated with these states. These instances are not so often
cited, for obvious reasons. We’d all like to think that if consciousness survives death, of which
those who have NDEs become subjectively convinced, it will be a pleasant experience. This
feature of ‘wishful thinking’ can become a distorting factor, in the Chinese Whispers effect. […]
(Greyson, 2000) found that amongst 98 self-reported NDE’s (compared to 38 coming close to
clinical death reporting no NDE) these were associated with ‘ dissociative experiences’ (which
include amnesia, periods of time unaccounted for, feeling unfamiliar with one's surroundings
or even one's own body) consistent with a non-pathological response to stress as opposed to a
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psychiatric disorder. In a later paper, Greyson (Lange, 2004) refers to his NDE scale published
in 1983 and 1990. In this survey, with increasing intensity, NDEs reflect ‘peace, joy and
harmony’ and provide new insights. […] as quantum theory tells us that the observer
influences, even determines, the observed; so the notion of the truly detached independent
scientist/observer is already challenged. […]
(French, 2005) reviewed some possible explanations of NDEs: spiritual - consciousness

detaches from neural substrate of brain providing glimpse of afterlife; psychological – defense
mechanism in extreme danger; biological - cerebral hypoxia, anoxia, hypercarbia., causing
release of endorphins and other brain neurotransmitters inducing hallucinations and temporal
lobe hyperactivity. […] A brain, which shows no measurable activity, ‘flatlining’ for example,
cannot undergo experiences involving sensory impressions, except from physiological effects of
hypoxia/anoxia. The fact that similar experiences can be artificially induced by electromagnetic
stimulation of the brain, drugs such as Ketamine, extreme fatigue, etc, means that those
resulting from clinical death after cardiac arrest or similar, are not ‘real’ either. They are
hallucinations, induced in a damaged brain. […] Hypoxia is characterised by mental confusion
and yet NDEs/ OBEs are characterised by great clarity of thought, recall, and ordered
narrative. […] So the question should surely be, is there a possibility of consciousness outside
the brain, which is suggested by a verifiable account of an NDE/OBE? Then, we can ask, how
does it come about? […] The commonly reported features: peaceful ‘out of body’ experience, the
tunnel, the wonderful light holding ‘god’ like intelligence and love, deceased loved ones waiting
for us, the life review, the feeling that everything that happens actually makes sense: all this is
very seductive. In a Japanese study (Yamamura, 1998), 14 of 48 consecutive patients admitted
to hospital in a deep coma subsequently reported an NDE. Features included flying in a dark
void with a light ahead, encountering relatives and friends, and returning to the world in
response to a voice calling. […]Subjects however, they found, assumed more ‘sincere values’
afterwards, and viewed death as a peaceful calm experience. In a Taiwan study (Lai, 2007), 45
out of 710 dialysis patients reported NDEs with women, younger patients and those
participating in religious ceremonies being more likely to be in the NDE group. Out of body,
precognitive visions and tunnel experiences were included in the reports and after effects
included ‘being kinder to others’ and being more motivated. This might suggest NDEs have a
real psychological or even evolutionary advantage, regardless of their intrinsic reality. […] your
deceased mother is actually there waiting for you … A sense that something good’s waiting for
them at the end. […] OBEs and NDEs are reported in cases of extreme stress, such as
traumatic childbirth, or the use of shamanic plants, drugs, meditation … Subjects, sometimes
after undergoing fleeting ‘brain death’, say that they could ‘see’ people, light, rivers, walls…
how could someone ‘see’ without functioning physical eyes, let alone a functioning cortex? […]
if some form of consciousness operates outside the body, possibly it perceives in more
dimensions than our usual three (as string theory has postulated there are ten dimensions).
We cannot step outside our brain to examine such a possibility. We are ‘of’ three dimensions;
mathematical points and lines, supposedly in one and two dimensions, are actually three
dimensional models of notional one and two dimensional concepts … perhaps the returning
patient’s brain ‘translates’ what was perceived ‘outside’ three dimensional perception, into
‘normal’ three dimensional terms, using their own culturally influenced imagery: we naturally
think metaphorically. […] a few seconds have encompassed a mental odyssey! […] If the NDE
is purely a construct of the brain, perhaps the patient was clinically dead and totally devoid of
consciousness or awareness, until just coming out of the unconscious state, and the whole
NDE happened in the seconds as consciousness returned? As the brain tried to make sense of
the hiatus in self-awareness? Sceptics could argue it might be a tendency of the afflicted brain,
developed through natural selection, to help the species live less traumatised lives after major
trauma. That argument does not take into account, that very few would ever have come back
before modern technology and resuscitation, and that the very many more who experience less
drastic but severe trauma and pain, respond with PTSD, which is often disabling and life-
threatening. […] Indeed, it’s suggested that the brain itself uses quantum processes, possibly
44
measured in femtoseconds, as well as currently detectable functioning on a ‘slower’ scale. […]
Persinger and Koren (Persinger and Koren, 2007; Persinger et al., 2008) suggest that ‘brain
space could contain inordinately large amounts of information reflecting the nature of
extraordinarily large increments of space and time.’ […] Radin (Radin, 1997; Radin, 2006) has
included quantum reality in his search for scientific explanations for psychic phenomena, while
Schwartz et al., (2005) have used quantum physics to set up a neurophysical model for mind-
brain interaction. […] A chance, surely, too good to miss by merely dismissing all this human
experience as wishful thinking. […] some of the NDEs and OBEs have involved remote viewing
– such as rising out of the body and ‘seeing’ the doctors and nurses in the ICU. […] the most
convincing state for a subject to have an OBE/NDE would be when they are in fact near death,
and in surroundings where their life signs, brain function, consciousness etc can be monitored.
Therefore, cases arising during clinical death before resuscitation, (e.g., cardiac arrest) when by
orthodox thinking, no coherent thoughts or experiences can occur, would seem to be the best
for closer study. There have been attempts at this, like placing objects or messages on high
surfaces in operating rooms, to see if OBE/NDE subjects report seeing them. […] Subjects
ideally should return to consciousness and report (the sooner the better) an OBE/NDE which
includes physical events or details which other people witnessed – a doctor dropping
something, a nurse’s remark, which happened during the time they were clinically dead, or a
feature of the room either high up or that they could not have seen when conscious, e.g., if
they were outside the room when they regained consciousness. The more detailed and specific,
the better, the less likely to be explicable by ‘coincidence’, that useful catchall for the
unexplained. […]
The Pam Reynolds case, 1991, is often cited online and in discussions, lectures and books as
an example of a convincingly genuine OBE/NDE, in a patient undergoing a ‘standstill’
procedure, in which the body is deeply chilled, the brain is drained of blood, the heart is
stopped, for brain surgery to take place. Reynolds recovered, and recalled an OBE, observing
(hearing instruments and conversations of medical staff, seeing procedures) her operation or
part of it from outside her body. She described the bone saw, recalled remarks made on the
smallness of her veins, described procedures, before she apparently moved into a classic
transcendental NDE scenario. Michael Sabom (Sabom, 1998) described her case, and
published a clear timeline of events in the operating room, and Reynolds’s reported
experiences. […] The actual ‘standstill’ and flatline period was only a few minutes. Sabom
asserts as fact that Reynolds’ NDE afterlife experience took place during flatline: there is no
evidence that this is the case, nor can there be, except faith and hope. Further distorting the
account, many believers assert as fact that her ‘remote viewing’ of her operation, bonesaw, etc,
coincided with the standstill period, which is often quoted as much longer than it was. […]
(Augustine, 2007) has explained Reynolds’ hearing, as due to incomplete anaesthesia, and
earplugs, which were not soundproof. […]Apparently during this period she had a detailed
veridical near-death OBE. […] as if her whole OBE experience took place during flatline. […]
Sceptic Gerald Woerlee goes on to claim that the spiritual and psychological after-effects often
reported of NDE subjects, are due to brain damage during hypoxia! Pam Reynolds had a
verifiable, or at least supportable by witnesses, timeable, out of body experience while under
anaesthesia and not near death. […] facts (times, procedures, number of witnesses of events or
sights, medical condition of patient). […]
Reynolds case would not get through the algorithm. It would not get beyond the first question
as she was having elective surgery. Even if starting at Question 2, she was awake entering the
operating room, so the case fails there too. […] If any cases exist now, or are reported in the
future, of a patient who, eyes taped, saw an event, or some other verifiable sight, in an unseen
room, which can be timed by observers to a period of the brain measurably flatlining or deeply
unconscious, which the patient reported as soon as they woke up in the recovery room, and
staff posted the report somewhere safely retrievable in its original form, then possibly a) the
45
brain is actually conscious in some hitherto unmeasurable way when we believe it is not, If any
cases exist now, or are reported in the future, of a patient who, eyes taped, saw an event, or
some other verifiable sight, in an unseen room, which can be timed by observers to a period of
the brain measurably flatlining or deeply unconscious, which the patient reported as soon as
they woke up in the recovery room, and staff posted the report somewhere safely retrievable in
its original form, then possibly a) the brain is actually conscious in some hitherto
unmeasurable way when we believe it is not, and/or b), consciousness and perception can
exist outside the brain, in which case, serious efforts can begin to find out, how? […] (Do
neutrinos, a million million of which go through your head while you read this sentence? Does
memory? Does gravity, which acts at a distance and instantly?) […] Or, equally significantly,
we’d have to consider the possibility that the brain we thought was ‘dead’ or not showing any
function, was actually functioning during clinical death, and that there are forms of
consciousness at present undetectable (perhaps relating to quantum processes at subatomic
levels or superfast speeds). After all, presently measurable phenomena such as gamma
brainwaves were unknown fairly recently, until advances in technology allowed their detection.
There would be implications for further refining definitions of life and death, including
decisions of when to switch off life support machines. […] If just one case can be verified, or
not discredited at least, then all sorts of possibilities blossom. ‘Death bed coincidences’, in
which family members some distance away, ‘see’ the loved one at the moment of death, and
which are also widely reported: astral projection, telepathy, and all those other embarrassing,
ne’er do well poor relations, will clamour for attention and a seat at the table of conventional
wisdom, a disturbing prospect to those who like order and Newtonian certainty to prevail. But
let’s just find out, scientifically, whether there are
biological equivalents of quantum tunnelling, the uncertainty principle, or string theory, which
might just be here with us all along. […] If we can show that perception is possible outside a
conscious brain, we may find explanations for how it is possible, which prove, or disprove, the
possibility of some of these other forms of out-of-body experiences, such as shamanic journeys,
telepathy, and telekinesis, which do involve a functioning brain. In fact, scientific evidence,
obtained as a result of experimental observation under carefully controlled conditions, already
suggests there are small but statistically significant effects of mind on mind (Sheldrake, 2005:
Schmidt, 2004), or mind on matter (Radin and Ferrari, 1991) which do not involve direct
interactions (non local) and are not explicable in terms of currently understood mechanisms.
However, most scientists are not aware of the evidence or, worse, refuse to accept it – mainly
because there is no scientific explanation. Yet physicists accept the principle, indeed the
inescapability, of ‘the influence of the observer on the observed’, as a cornerstone of quantum
theory. One verifiable case of out of body consciousness could revolutionise biomedical science
as quantum theory did to Newtonian physics”.
As per (Beauregard, Courtemanche, & Paquette, 2009), “To measure brain activity in near-
death experiencers during a meditative state. METHODS: In two separate experiments, brain
activity was measured with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and
electroencephalography (EEG) during a Meditation condition and a Control condition. In the
Meditation condition, participants were asked to mentally visualize and emotionally connect
with the "being of light" allegedly encountered during their "near-death experience". In the
Control condition, participants were instructed to mentally visualize the light emitted by a
lamp. RESULTS: In the fMRI experiment, significant loci of activation were found during the
Meditation condition (compared to the Control condition) in the right brainstem, right lateral
orbitofrontal cortex, right medial prefrontal cortex, right superior parietal lobule, left superior
occipital gyrus, left anterior temporal pole, left inferior temporal gyrus, left anterior insula, left
parahippocampal gyrus and left substantia nigra. In the EEG experiment, electrode sites
showed greater theta power in the Meditation condition relative to the Control condition at FP1,
F7, F3, T5, P3, O1, FP2, F4, F8, P4, Fz, Cz and Pz. In addition, higher alpha power was
detected at FP1, F7, T3 and FP2, whereas higher gamma power was found at FP2, F7, T4 and
T5. CONCLUSIONS: The results indicate that the meditative state was associated with marked
46
hemodynamic and neuroelectric changes in brain regions known to be involved either in

positive emotions, visual mental imagery, attention or spiritual experiences.”
An alternative hypothesis: Near death, system may become introverted (immersed in thinking
and experiencing process for survival purpose, in analogy to head of the state is put into best
protected cell from war. Outside, there may be no sign of life, but self might still be alive with
very little nutrients in analogy to hibernation. I might be thinking/experiencing deeply but
outside I might appear unconscious or dead. Varied experiences might occur for the survival of
the system.
VI Critique2. Is there single fundamental entity (such as Brahman) independent of religions?
Response. YES.
Critique (AN): Not every religion believes in concept of Brahman. And not every person believes
in any specific religion itself because there are many who do not believe in any religion itself.
They may have taken birth in a religion but taking birth and practicing are two different things.
It is not necessary to practice any specific religion to live a life successfully. Every religion is a
window or set of beliefs to way the life is lived. Each window will show different belief system.
Each set of belief is like set of assumptions blindly kept faith on it. However, those who do not
practice any religion also live their life as efficiently by believing in time. Doing things on time
and staying up with time. Any concepts in any religion cannot be generalized to accept as
fundamental entity when it comes to science. I think, Science + Assumptions(Beliefs) =
Religion. Variations in assumptions/beliefs make each religion different.
Response: Well said; I agree. However, my use of the term ‘Brahman’ has multiple meanings
depending on religions and metaphysical views. For dual-aspect monism: ‘Brahman’ is a dual-
aspect fundamental entity from which all universes including us arise. For Shri Sai: ‘Brahman’
= ‘sabkA mAlik ek hae’.
Critique (AN): No religion is going to die as long as respective belief stays. And belief will never
die, if belief dies then all the words of hope, prayers, etc will have time to be removed from
dictionary. Variation in belief makes a religion. If dual-aspect monism also have some level of
assumptions then so referred as problem is not resolved. Problem that you think will be solved
by dual-aspect monism is not seen as problem by religious person so how will you implement it
in any religion. Those problems addressed by dual-aspect monism are considered faithfully as
belief/s by religion/s and they do not see it as problem/s at all.
Response: I agree that the dual-aspect monism also has assumption of dual-aspect, but it is
justifiable with our daily empirical data. For example, when we subjectively experience (mental
aspect) redness of ripe tomato, our visual color area V4/V8/VO-neural-network (physical
aspect) gets activated; we can measure it with functional MRI. If we delete this area, ripe
tomato will look dark grey; we have clinical data of few subjects who had accidents and this
area was damaged. Thus, the dual-aspect assumption is justified by our thousands of daily
empirical data in every moment of our lives.
Belief/faith is a placebo effect, as per research. As science progresses and start answering
paranormal (Nunn, 2011; Rao & Palmer, 1987) and miracles (Dabholkar-Hemadpant, 2009)
related data via scientific mechanisms (such as quantum entanglement, weak field but strongly
entangled, and so on), the belief/faith system will decrease. We can look at history; compare
1000 years ago and now. Human mind created God because we could not answer miraculous
empirical data and we are still scared of ‘death’; we want ‘life’ after death. We should remember
when our loved one died and how we solace ourselves and our family members that soul is
47
immortal as per Geeta so nothing to worry about that much; and we go through rigorous death
ceremony (see Garun Puran, priest reads this book during this sad period).
Equations (1) and (2) imply that the dual-aspect monism is not going to hurt anybody’s belief
system, rather it will answer questions raised especially our children (who are reluctant to visit
temple) and future generations; it is Jnâna yoga (ान योग) which is complementary to Bhakti
yoga; it is for both theists and atheists; business will be as usual in terms of our rituals, pooja,
prayer, Arti, pAlki, gathering, prasAd, and so on except we will propose dual-aspect monism
carefully to devotees: such as follow 3 principles of Shri Sai daily in our daily lives as an active
process, rather than via passive process (which is like bribing Shri Sai to do the job for us; we
are supposed to make rigorous effort ourselves: we must remember there is no ‘free-lunches’).
And then let devotee to decide if they want to follow the active process or not. If they do not
follow active process, it is going to take very long time to fulfill their wish-list via belief/faith-
system re-organizing the brain-mind; this re-organization is the real process which fulfills our
wishes in any system as per research; some people may not be aware of this process.
Critique (AN): I do not agree with your understanding of devotion. Therefore, I am unable to
understand your challenge.
Response: Devotion is based on faith (Shraddha), which activates our brain-mind’s belief
system. If Hamer’s hypothesis of God-gene is correct (theism is based on genetic disposition
and/or it is acquired phenomenon), then it is natural that you (being an ardent theist) will
never agree with atheist version of dual-aspect monism as in Eq.(1). To understand theist-
atheist phenomenon, one has to be highly open-minded. I do not think that my devotion to my
framework has significant probelm. For example, I, being open-minded, am devoted/committed
to the dual-aspect monism (both equations), because this has the least number of problems,
namely, just one brute fact assumption of dual-aspect, which is also justifiable. If any body
shows me better framework, then I will re-consider because I am NOT under the clutches of
any particular framework. Perhaps, some colleagues are devoted/committed to their own
frameworks other than the dual-aspect monism, I wish them all the best; but those frameworks
have more number of problems as discussed in (Vimal, 2011) and Sections 1-3.
Critique5: I do believe that there is a super being and we all need this being to help us in good
times, bad times, everyday living, but I must also agree that science has just about the same
importance as our super being, be it God, Abraham. Without science our bodies would not
function. So, in reality, we are talking about uniting the two theories, God + religion.
Response: I agree with Critique5.
Critique6: Faith is something that cannot be proved or disproved. If one can prove or disprove
any belief, it is not a matter of faith.
Response: I agree with Critique6. As science progresses and explains a specific faith/belief
then that it will be no longer faith/belief; it will be science.
Critique2: Q1. Do, somehow, the genes in the DNA's of the parents are able to acquire the
information of some of their respective life experiences, during their life time?
A1. Yes; there is some speculation; we need to search for.
Q2. Do such genes get transferred to the offspring as part of their predisposed behavior
patterns, through parents?
48
A2. Children do get the information via genetic, epigenetic (heritable changes in
phenotype/appearance or gene expression caused by mechanisms other than changes in the
underlying DNA sequence), cultural, and other pathways.
Q3. If answer to 1. is affirmative, then at what stage of human development these God genes, if
any, came to be?
A3. As you know, some are dominant that gets expressed and some are recessive that they are
not expressed in children, but pass on to future generations. If children are born after gene-
modification (if any) then information might get transferred to children; epigenetic and cultural
information transfer also can occur.
Q3a. Before the humanity began to start wondering about the source of its creation, and thus
formulated the idea?
A3a: Further investigation is needed.
Q3b. After it had postulated or recognized the source and then began to worship?
A3b. Further investigation is needed.
Q4. Depending upon the answers, would not the God Gene be either cause or the effect, if it
exists?
A4. Co-arise dependently (via interaction) as per Nagarjuna.
Q5. In his book, Hamer backs away from the title and main hypotheses by saying “Just
because spirituality is partly genetic doesn't mean it is hardwired.” In Short: Jury is out.
Conclusions at present are naïve.
A5. Yes; you are correct. Spirituality may be genetic, epigenetic, cultural, and acquired. There
may be many genes, not just one single one related to theism. ‘The’ needs to be replaced by ‘A’
in Hamer, D. (2005). The [A] God Gene…
49

Western Metaphysics and Comparison With-2

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Western Metaphysics and Comparison with Eastern Metaphysics RLP Vimal

Western Metaphysics and Comparison with Eastern

1.1.2. Plato (428/427 BC – 348/347 BC):2 Plato was a student of Socrates.

Theory of Forms: It typically refers to the belief expressed by Socrates in some

1 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socrates

2 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plato

Platonic epistemology: Many have interpreted Plato as stating that knowledge is

Unwritten doctrine: It stands for the most fundamental metaphysical teaching

Aristotle defines metaphysics as “the knowledge of immaterial being,” or of

Substance, potentiality and actuality: Aristotle concludes that a particular

3 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle

The coming to be is a change where nothing persists of which the resultant is a

Referring to potentiality, this is what a thing is capable of doing, or being acted

In summary, the matter used to make a house has potentiality to be a house

Universals and particulars: Aristotle's theory of universals Aristotle's

In addition, Aristotle disagreed with Plato about the location of universals. As

Biology and medicine: In Aristotelian science, most especially in biology, things

Aristotle, Samkhya, and Nagarjuna:4 In western philosophy (mostly due to

4 Adapted from (Vimal, 2009a)

5 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality.

In Indian philosophy, there are four types of causesII: (i) In Samkhya

Acharya Nāgārjuna (150 - 250 AD) was an eminent Indian brahmin-buddhist

1.1.4. Metaphysics of Spinoza7

Comparison with Western Non-dualism: Baruch Spinoza, the 17th century

7 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vishishtadvaita

nature) is comparable to Brahman (having the individual selves' and Universe

PROPOSITION XI. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, of which

PROPOSITION XXX. Intellect, in function finite, or in function infinite, must

“Panentheism (… ‘all-in-God’) is a belief system which posits that God exists

1.1.5. Buddhist Metaphysics

Some of Buddhist’s views are given below:

“The Buddha lived at a time of great philosophical creativity in India when

8 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rebirth_(Buddhism)

9 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatman

word "soul" refers to a non-bodily component in a person that can continue in

On one interpretation, although Buddhism rejects the notion of a permanent

Some Mahayana Buddhist sutras and tantras present Buddhist teachings on

Anattā, dukkha (suffering/unease), and anicca (impermanence), are the three

Anātman in other Indian traditions

Relationship to secular philosophy

According to (Lepine, 2008), “In Buddhism the deeper-lying monistic entity is

According to Buddhist centrist framework (Wallace, 1989), ‘Our thoughts,

10 Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anatman

Perhaps Buddhist centrist framework (Wallace, 1989) does not contradict

In our email correspondence (on 6-Feb-2008), Wallace commented, ‘Mahayana

Thus, Buddhist centrist framework (Wallace, 1989) does not contradict

Note: Metaphysics of Bible, St Augustine, Schopenhauer, Kant, Hegel, and

1.1.6. Contemporary views

As per (Baker, 2011), “Many Christians who argue against Christian

According to Constitutionalism, a human person is constituted by some body

Unlike Type-I Christian materialism, Type-II Christian materialism can

Type-II materialism or Constitutionalism is nonreductive metaphysical view

For other views, see Section 2.

1.2. History of Dual-Aspect Monism

preconscious. While the resulting phenomenal world is a consequence of such

models rather complements them by providing an ontological interpretation. It is a

case of being something (self-relation)’. If we hypothesize that the mental aspect of

2. Western Metaphysics and Comparison with Eastern

In Western Metaphysics, we categorize all entities in just two categories: mind

Then it is easy to understand how various western metaphysical frameworks

2.1. Materialism: If matter is fundamental reality then it is monistic

In materialism, a specific experience (SE: such as redness) is identical with a

assumed to mysteriously emerge or reduce to (or identical with) relevant states