DEVELOPMENTAL REVIEW 3, 339-350 (1983)

On Ego Development and the Structure of Personality

JANE LOEVINGER
Social Science Institute. Washington Universit>

J. Snarey, L. Kohlberg, and G. Noam (L>evelopmenfulRevieu 3, 303-338, 1983)

present a theory of ego development as composed of several substructures
related so that achievement of a given stage in one substructure is necessary but
not sufficient for achieving the corresponding stage of another. The postulation
of an exact relation belies what is known of the texture of human behavior and
is premature in the absence of precise measurement of the several substructures
and precise matching of stages. An alternative, the empirical method of simul-
taneously constructing a measure of ego development and portraits of the several
stages, which Snarey et al. criticize for lack of strict logical coherence, is in the
best tradition of contemporary science. The stage portraits are “prototypes” or
“fuzzy sets.” Any mental structure can be divided into substructures, but the
most general, superordinate structure is likely to prove most useful.

The distinction between structural stages, functional phases, and cul-

tural age-periods that Snarey, Kohlberg, and Noam (1983) have drawn
may prove to be a valuable addition to discussions of personality devel-
opment. Structural stages, to oversimplify their thesis, represent uncon-
scious (or more likely unattended to) modes of thought processes, and
cultural ages represent socially imposed developmental tasks. Functional
phases are harder to reduce to a phrase. The authors’ suggestion that
functional phases represent products of the “interaction and synchroni-
zation of stages and ages” is attractive but somewhat vague and, to the
extent that it means something definite, unproven. Perhaps functional
phases are closer to observable behavior than stages or ages (Note 1).
THE PROBLEM OF STRUCTURE
Within the realm of structural stages, they propound a view of ego
development that is in some respects consonant with mine, in some re-
spects opposite. Pointing out ways we agree and differ should clarify both
views. The most obvious difference, though not necessarily the most
fundamental, is that they propose a view of the ego, or of ego develop-
ment, as made up of separate substructures. That view is not absurd. It
is neither grossly at variance with nor strongly supported by the frag-
mentary data presently at hand.
Their model was arrived at after many of Kohlberg’s students and

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340 JANE LOEVINGER

colleagues had worked out new stage theories, each for a different topic,
almost as a kind of initiation ritual. The proposal of substructures seems
designed to provide a legitimacy for this plethora of stage conceptions.
Their article mentions many of the stage theories that have come out of
the Harvard group, but not all. They admit, with respect to their Table
1, that many more theorists could be added.
Their approach plunges them into a profound problem, that of the fun-
damental structure of personality. That any single solution to this problem
will carry the day seems unlikely in the near future. Cattell (1957) has
addressed a related problem over a period of years with his Universal
Index of personality traits, but his followers are not universal.
Even in the field of abilities, factor analysis has not succeeded in pro-
viding a universally accepted solution. At one time I remarked to Lloyd
Humphreys that numerical ability was the only factor that was regularly
recovered in factorial studies and did not subdivide into smaller factors
on subsequent studies. He replied that it did subdivide into four factors,
addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. He has subsequently
made a case for returning to a hierarchical conception of ability and a
general intellectual factor on the grounds that “test behavior can almost
endlessly be made more specific, . . . factors can almost endlessly be
fractionated or splintered” (Humphreys, 1962, p. 475). Abilities at dif-
ferent levels of the hierarchy, i.e., different degrees of generality, may be
useful for various purposes; however, the broadest, most general factors,
highest in the hierarchy, will generally be found most useful (Humphreys,
1962).
Obviously, any trait, ability, or structure that can be measured by a
psychological test can be subdivided by the expedient of providing sub-
tests that are more similar in content internally than they are to the con-
tent of other subtests. Does this mean that new structures must be pos-
tulated, ad infinitum? The very concept of structure has a contrary im-
plication; to me it implies that a variety of different behaviors have a
common basis in the person. The merit of a homogeneous test lies in
“controlled heterogeneity” (Humphreys, 1962), i.e., demonstration of
homogeneity with respect to some trait despite heterogeneity with respect
to as many other facets of the situation as possible (Loevinger, 19.57).
Given that substructures of the ego exist (and, in the light of the fore-
going, it is possible to construct or assemble sets of data for which that
is a reasonable interpretation), the next structural issue is whether there
is a necessary but not sufficient relation between corresponding stages
of different substructures. The problem of mental structure is the topic
that first interested me in psychology, though originally only in relation
to abilities. I proposed that the condition for tests composed of dichot-
omous items to be strictly homogeneous (now usually called Guttman
 EGO DEVELOPMENT 341

scalable) is that passing an easier item is a necessary but not sufficient

condition for passing any harder item (Loevinger, 1947, 1948). This pro-
posal attracted some attention, mostly unfavorable (e.g., Cronbach,
1951). Such strict, mathematically precise relationships between behav-
iors are uncharacteristic of most performances of people, some critics
correctly pointed out. Moreover, from a methodological point of view, a
noisy (that is, probabilistic rather than strictly deterministic) signal may
under certain circumstances convey more information than a noise-free
signal can; that is the “attenuation paradox” (Loevinger, 1954).
There are reasons other than the purely methodological argument for
dealing with stochastic rather than nonstochastic approaches to person-
ality. The idea that the most statistically precise model is therefore the
most rigorous one is what Egon Brunswik (1952), following A. N. White-
head, called “misconceptions of exactitude in psychology.” Where the
texture of behavior is probabilistic, as it almost always is, a nonproba-
bilistic model for tests is fallacious and inexact. Test behavior is, after
all, always behavior (Loevinger, 1957, 1966b).

THE PROBLEM OF MEASUREMENT

In science, measurement is regularly the leading edge of theory. Thus

it seems extraordinarily prescient of Snarey et al. to be able to specify a
mathematically exact relation (necessary but not sufficient) between a set
of variables of which few if any can be measured with any precision. It
is not even clear exactly how many substructures of the ego they discern.
Is it nine? Or are those simply a sample from a larger domain?
Even assuming that there were excellent, precise measures for each
substructure, the assertion of a necessary but not sufficient relation be-
tween corresponding stages of the substructures is meaningless without
a way to specify which stage in one sequence is matched to which stage
in another. Their matching was done by “observation of logical parallels
between the structure and function of particular stages in the different
models,” plus the parallels drawn by the several theorists, plus age norms,
plus parallels demonstrated empirically. In view of the strong claim for
the relation between sequences, this topic should have been developed
in greater detail. The age norms are not cited, the empirical demonstra-
tions of parallels are fragmentary and weak, and the logical reasoning is
not given. Further, how are those various considerations combined?
In comparing the conception of ego development that my colleagues
and I have worked out with the conception of Kegan (1982), Snarey et
al. strike a balance: Kegan’s is stronger theoretically, whereas ours is
stronger psychometrically. Certainly Kegan deserves credit for single
handedly producing a witty and literate way of looking at ego develop-
342 JANE LOEVINGER

ment. However, with 39 cases apparently drawn from a single hospital

ward, one cannot convincingly accomplish all that he has tried to do:
create a theory of ego development, create a theory of kinds of depres-
sions, and determine the relation between kind of depression and stage
of moral development.
The work of our group has been that of many hands, including a wide
variety of people, many of whom left their imprint on our conception in
some way. Our unpublished pilot studies for the trial versions of the
Sentence Completion Test (hereafter, SCT) included more than 39 people.
We entertained many neat theories at the beginning and along the way
that did not stand up in the face of thousands of cases studied subse-
quently, hence were never published. To be sure, none of us had a theory
of the scope of Kegan’s. At any rate, the two projects do not seem in
any way commensurate.
Snarey et al. do not acknowledge or deal with what I consider the
justification for many years’ work on the SCT. This work was never
intended as merely a technological contribution to personality measure-
ment. Rather, the process of test construction has been simultaneously,
intrinsically, a process of correcting the details of the conception of stages.
That program has as respectable a philosophical foundation as their pro-
gram.
Here are a few examples of empirical findings that our method has
yielded that could never have been vouchsafed to us had we proceeded
as the Kohlbergian coterie does, by seeking first and primarily the logical
structure of the sequence.
(1) We have resolved issues of the order of stages. Comparing the stage
theories of Peck and Havighurst (1960), Sullivan, Grant, and Grant (1957),
and Isaacs (1956) revealed enough similarities to justify comparisons but
differences as to order of stages. Sullivan et al. saw conformity (their I-
3 Conformists) and opportunism (their I-3 Cons) as on the same level,
whereas our data, changing the definition of each somewhat, showed the
opportunistic protocols lower, among other reasons because they resem-
bled the Impulsive Stage protocols more than the Conformist Stage pro-
tocols. This change also brought the conception into closer alignment
with that of Isaacs, from whom we borrowed the code term Delta for the
Opportunistic Stage.
Peck and Havighurst, on the other hand, classed their Irrational-Con-
scientious Stage at the same level as the Conformist. Again, changing the
stage definitions somewhat to accommodate data, we dropped the “ir-
rational,” which seemed to be another dimension, and confirmed that
the Conscientious Stage is higher than the Conformist Stage.
(2) Data led us to change the characterization of certain stages, partic-
ularly the Opportunistic Stage, now renamed Self-Protective, on the
 EGO DEVELOPMENT 343

grounds that outright opportunism is rarely expressed directly. The tran-

sition between the Conformist and Conscientious Stages, originally named
Self-Conscious, has been progressively renamed Self-Aware and Consci-
entious-Conformist, in part to disavow any pejorative connotations for
this frequent level. We found no evidence that persons at that level were
less well adjusted than others, an implication some saw in the term Self-
Conscious.
(3) An intimate intertwining of psychosexual stages and ego level, which
Erikson’s readers particularly might be led to expect, has consistently
failed to materialize, despite our initial belief in its likelihood. Unbridled
self-indulgence as to impulses-sexual, aggressive, drinking, eating-can
be one indication of low ego level, but the subtle distinctions some psy-
choanalysts make between oral, anal, and phallic impulses or traits have
not proved useful, echoing results we achieved earlier with an objective
test (Loevinger, 1962).
(4) We discovered that certain responses indicating total self-rejection,
obviously possible signs of depression, which is not formally scored, also
may indicate very low ego level. Thus it has been gratifying that Wishnie
(1977), studying impulsive, delinquent men, makes the point that typically
in such people depression is just below the surface and represents a
hazard in intensive treatment.
The fruitfulness of our method has resulted from the rule that every
response is scored, no matter how irrelevant to our current conception
of ego development. This rule results in some error or unreliability, since
many responses are given by persons of widely different levels, hence
are nondiscriminating. As everyone knows, tests with a sufficient number
of items can accommodate unreliability so long as the errors in the several
items are independent. The result of this method has been many insights
with respect to every stage represented in our work. The following are
samples.
At the Impulsive Stage, there is often a confusion or amalgamation of
clean-dirty with good-bad. At the Self-Protective Stage hostile humor
and aiming to “stay out of trouble” are characteristic. Moralistic cliches
(which many people consider ipso facto unscorable in any system) are
characteristic of the Conformist Stage. Concern with masculinity and
femininity and with multiple possibilities (Perry’s Multiplicity, 1970) are
characteristic for the Conscientious-Conformist level. At the Conscien-
tious Stage work is looked at in terms of opportunity rather than as
onerous, as the preconformist sees it, and a fully developed conception
of patterns of behavior and hence of traits appears. Interest in psycho-
logical causality and psychological development appear at this stage but
are even more prominent and clear-cut at higher stages.
That these results and numerous others cannot be logically deduced
344 JANE LOEVINGER

from the conception of ego development or from the code name for the
stage is deemed a philosophical flaw in the scheme of Snarey et al. It is
precisely what justifies years of labor in this scientific vineyard.

STAGES AND TYPES

Many psychologists (Habermas, 1979; Broughton & Zahaykevich, 1977;
Snarey et al., 1983) have correctly pointed out that, unlike many other
post-Piagetian stage theorists, I have not resorted to ratiocination or “phi-
losophy” as a way of fleshing out the structure of each stage of ego
development. As Snarey et al. put it, the several stages of my conception
are “ideal types” a la Max Weber. This label is evidently considered a
criticism. Let us set aside the question of whether empirical stages are
any more aptly characterized as “ideal types” than logical stages such
as Kohlberg’s.
If, instead of classing stages under a conception proposed by Weber,
one classes them under a more modern title, the sting of the criticism is
withdrawn. The most apropos descriptions are prototypes (Evans, 1967),
family resemblances, or “fuzzy sets” (Wickelgren, 1981). Indeed, the
idea of categories defined by a strict logic of necessary or invariant char-
acteristics is now widely recognized, even by biologists, as often so un-
characteristic of the real world as to sound slightly dated.
The identifying feature of prototypes, for example, is precisely that
they do not have any invariant feature. Rather, they comprise a loose
assembly of features, any sufficient number of which identifies a member
of the class. “Frequently, only a tiny subset of all the characteristic at-
tributes of a concept will be sufficient to cause us to think of that concept.
There is nothing common to all of the sufficient cue sets for a given
concept. . . , but there are many attributes that appear frequently in these
cue sets. Following Wittgenstein (1953), we say that the cue sets for a
given concept have a family resemblance to each other” (Wickelgren,
1981, p. 33). This logic corresponds exactly to the Brunswikian logic on
which my method is based, namely, that for any “deep structure” of
personality, there are many alternative, mutually substitutable manifes-
tations (Loevinger, 1983).

THE PROBLEM OF THE REALITY OF THE EGO

Is the ego real? That is a topic on which my view and that of Snarey
et al. differ. In one respect I view the ego as more real, in another respect
as less so.
My belief that the ego is real is stronger than that of Snarey et al. in
the sense that they go about defining the ego, whereas I maintain it cannot
and need not be defined. It need only be pointed to (Loevinger, 1966a).
 EGO DEVELOPMENT 345

Ego development is what is occurring as a person grows from impulsivity

to self-protectiveness to conformity, etc.
In another way, in declaring that the ego judges, synthesizes, inte-
grates, and so on, they make of the ego something real in a concrete way
that I find unacceptable. For me, the ego does not do anything. At this
point I am in accord with (and perhaps influenced by) Roy Schafer (1976,
1978). Schafer maintains that there is just one agent per person, that
nothing by way of explanation is gained by adding an “ego” or “self”
as an agent within the person.
When Damon (1977) writes of “informative and supportive conceptual
relations” (p. 327) between substructures, he appears to be anthropo-
morphizing, as do Kohlberg and his collaborators, to an extent equaled
only by the most naive of psychoanalytic theorists.
Fingarette’s version of the ego is appealing: striving for coherence,
approximately what psychoanalysts sometimes call the “synthetic func-
tion, ” is not what the ego does; it is what the ego is, or what the ego is
a name for (Fingarette, 1963; Loevinger, 1976). This idea does not imply
or require that anyone is wholly successful in being consistent. Rather,
the implication is that meaning-making is coextensive with ego, an idea
that Kegan (1982) has wisely adopted.
Snarey et al., although labeling all domains of ego development as
“meaning making,” straddle this issue widely, with their doctrine of a
“multifaceted but unified ego” and of substructures within “the more
holistic superstructure of the unifying ego.” If the ego is a collection of
substructures, wherein is the unification?
EGO DEVELOPMENT AND PSYCHOANALYTIC EGO PSYCHOLOGY
At risk of sounding pettish, I protest Kohlberg’s (1981; Snarey et al.,
1983) propagation of a misleading version of my intellectual history, in
particular, the accusation that my conception of “the ego” derives from
psychoanalysis. It cannot be so that I am both too empirical and too
theoretical, and I gladly plead guilty to the former. As a high school
journalism student I was impressed with the slogan, “The printer follows
the copy, even if it flies out the window,” and I have adopted as my
secret motto a distorted version: The scientist follows the data, even if
theories fly out the window.
When pushed to say something about my conception of the ego (Loe-
vinger, 1979b, Note 2), I find myself with embarrassingly little to say, but
unable to dispense with the concept altogether. In my actual work, how-
ever, “the ego” as an agent is never mentioned, still less the superego
or the id, which are the invariable complements of the ego in the current
psychoanalytic conception. (See, e.g., Loevinger, 1979a; Loevinger &
Wessler, 1970; Loevinger, Wessler, & Redmore, 1970). Thus it is bewil-
346 JANE LOEVINGER

dering that Kohlberg continues to see some special psychoanalytic im-

print in my conception, a view that no psychoanalyst shares. I use the
term “ego development” in two ways, either as a shorthand term for
whatever is measured by the SCT or somewhat loosely to cover a broad
domain not precisely defined, probably including all but the purely cog-
nitive domain that Snarey et al. call structural stages. Both are entirely
different from the so-called (indeed misnamed) “structural theory” of
psychoanalysis.
The work that led me to the field that, perhaps unfortunately, 1 came
to call ego development began with a study of mothers’ attitudes toward
problems of family life (Loevinger, 1962). We were looking for evidence of
character types or traits influenced by stages of psychosexual develop-
ment, but the data did not conform to that pattern (Loevinger, 1979d;
Loevinger & Sweet, 1961). Something similar seems to have happened
to the authors of The Authoritarian Personality (Adomo, Frenkel-Bruns-
wik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). In the case of both the Berkeley group
and my group, the data displayed or suggested a pervasive, diffuse, psy-
chologically plausible but not easily labeled constellation, which the
Berkeley group named authoritarianism. Although they originally dis-
claimed developmental implications, Frenkel-Brunswik (1951) was moving
toward a developmental interpretation in subsequent writing. I began with
calling the central factor in our data (which excluded all political refer-
ences) as Authoritarian Family Ideology. Later investigation confirmed
the developmental implications of the variable and led to interpreting it
in terms of ego development (Loevinger, 1962).
Although it is true that I have had a long-standing interest in psycho-
analytic theory (which Snarey et al. illogically equate with my taking over
the psychoanalytic conception of the ego), at the point that I was con-
cluding the work on mothers’ attitudes, I felt that the failure to confirm
psychosexual stages or traits had cut loose my psychoanalytic moorings
and that I must follow the data where they led, even at the expense of
my friendship with a few psychoanalysts. It came as a surprise to me
that during the period when I had been out of touch with my psychoan-
alytic friends, psychoanalysis had also moved to greater emphasis on ego
psychology. The received psychoanalytic version of ego psychology,
however, differs radically from mine, a point that Snarey et al. acknowl-
edge that I have made.
Indeed, a leading representative of psychoanalytic ego psychology, re-
viewing my 1976 book (Blanck, 1976), stated that I knew nothing of recent
psychoanalytic ego psychology and advised against reading the book.
Although I do not agree with her criticism or her recommendation, they
are an answer to the misleading charge that my view of “the ego” is
derived from psychoanalysis. Some recent radical revisions of psycho-
 EGO DEVELOPMENT 347

analytic theory (see Loevinger & Knoll, 1983) may be compatible with
my views; however, the topic remains a different universe of discourse.
Having been driven to the topic of ego development by my data, I did
indeed search for theoretical underpinnings. At the suggestion of Abel
Ossorio, I found relevant theory in the work of Harry Stack Sullivan
(1953), who adopted the term “self-system” to express his deliberate
separation from the psychoanalytic conception of ego, superego, and id.
Although studying Sullivan partly satisfied my craving to understand the
dynamics of the developmental sequence we have traced, particularly the
dynamics of ego stability, our work stands on its own. It constitutes a
different universe of discourse from Sullivan’s theory also.
A SYNTHESIS?
The passage cited by Snarey et al., as evidence for my “initial psy-
choanalytic moorings” (Loevinger, 1979c, pp. 25-.55), in fact begins with
a disclaimer of any connection between my empirical studies and the
topic of ego development in psychoanalytic theory. I now propose that
there is still a third domain not integrated with either of the others, the
domain of Sullivan’s theory of the self-system. But if there is no mutual
implication or tidy connection between these three domains, there is also
no necessary contradiction. I confess it would give me personal satisfac-
tion if a significant coterie of psychoanalysts would recognize the empir-
ical studies of ego development as filling a gap in psychoanalytic facts
and theories, but that is not likely to happen. Indeed, not many analysts
seem prepared to acknowledge publicly the cogency of Sullivan’s theory
of ego stability.
Whether it is true that 1 do not “have” a theory of ego development
depends on what “have” means. While 1 make no pretense to being a
major theorist, my chapter on theory of ego stability (1976, Ch. 12) is, to
my knowledge, the most explicit discussion of this topic in print.
As to theory of ego change, I have written about several such theories
(1966c, 1976, 1979~). Beginning in Freud’s writings and developed later
by Erikson, Ricoeur, and Loewald, there are three psychoanalytic prin-
ciples: First, experience is mastered by actively repeating what has been
passively undergone. Second, progression often occurs through regres-
sion. Third, intrapersonal differentiation is both shaped and driven by
interpersonal relations. The last of these is usually discussed as “iden-
tification.”
A minor contribution to this subject has come from our work with the
SCT. We have found repeatedly that a response combining three or more
different responses that would separately be classed at one level indicates
achievement of the next higher level. This suggests that finding several
incompatible “contents” compatible with a given “structure” (to borrow
348 JANE LOEVINGER

the Kohlbergian rubrics) provides one dynamic of growth (Loevinger,

1979d).
The most convincing theory of growth is, in my opinion, that presented
by Perry (1970). He traces the intellectual odyssey of college students
from initial dualism through multiplicity to relativity and finally commit-
ment. When the student who sees all knowledge in dualistic, right-wrong
terms first perceives the relativism of knowledge, he or she understands
relativity only in some small restricted sphere. Gradually the sphere per-
ceived in relativistic terms grows, and the remaining sphere of dualism
shrinks. At some point, without the student being aware of the shift,
rather than dualism being the general case with relativism an encapsulated
special case, the student assumes the relativism of knowledge as the
general case with clearcut right-wrong answers as a limited special case.
This is a kind of ameboid movement, like an organism putting out one
pseudopodium and the remainder of the organism flowing along after it.
The most clearcut difference between this model and that of Snarey et
al. is that Perry does not assume that all students make their first forward
steps in the same domain.
Probably Snarey et al. are not referring to any of the foregoing as
“theories” of ego development, since they do not discuss these topics.
They seem rather to mean a theoretical organizing principle for each
stage, operating simultaneously as the principle for the sequence of stages.
Such principles are the hallmark of many of the Kohlberg-school stage
sequences.
The process suggested by Perry’s “ameboid” model of growth is not
compatible with the model of Snarey et al. Perry’s model, however, leaves
open the question of what then determines the sequence of stages. Is
there necessarily a neat, clear answer? Humans are marvelously various
in their ways. I am more comfortable than Kohlberg and his colleagues
with the idea that the path of the pilgrim is at least partly ineffable.
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REFERENCE NOTES
1. Englander, J. Personal communication.
2. Loevinger, J. The concept of self or ego. Paper presented at conference on Self: Ex-
perience, Narration, Construct, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, Pa, Feb. 19, 1983.
RECEIVED April 11, 1983