Anacleto Ballaho Alanis Ill v.

Court of Appeals
Anacleto Ballaho Alanis Ill's appeal to change his name to Abdulhamid Ballaho
His parents separated when he was five years old
ARTICLE 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the
father.
But the word "principally" as used in the codal-provision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so
that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the
surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled.
may warrant the grant of a petitioner for change of name; a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence of legitimation or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when
one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change
of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
The purpose of the law in allowing change of name as contemplated by the provisions of Rule
103 of the Rules of Court is to give a person an opportunity to improve his personality and to
provide his best interest[.]
The spirit and mandate of the Convention, the Constitution, and Republic Act No. 7192, which
all require that the State take the appropriate measures to ensure the fundamental equality of
women and men before the law.
Petition granted.

Disini v. Secretary of Justice

Petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Strict scrutiny standard, an American constitutional construct, useful in determining the
constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to this
standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise of
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional.
Ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and techniques used by criminal hackers but
would neither damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical hackers evaluate the
target system’s security and report back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and
give instructions for how these can be remedied.
Overbreadth doctrine a proper governmental purpose, constitutionally subject to state
regulation while it seeks to discourage data interference, it intrudes into the area of protected
speech and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on these guaranteed freedoms.
It is well-settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function.
Executive agencies have the power to issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory
powers.

DABALOS v. RTC
Being then the boyfriend of the complainant, x x x did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use personal violence on the complainant, by pulling her hair, punching
complainant’s back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading the complainant’s
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, in violation of Section 5(a) of the Republic Act
9262, "Violence against women and their children".
The petition has no merit.
Petitioner insists that the act which resulted in physical injuries to private respondent is not
covered by RA 9262 because its proximate cause was not their dating relationship. Instead, he
claims that the offense committed was only slight physical injuries under the Revised Penal
Code which falls under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.
The law is broad in scope but specifies two limiting qualifications for any act or series of acts to
be considered as a crime of violence against women through physical harm, namely: 1) it is
committed against a woman or her child and the woman is the offender’s wife, former wife, or
with whom he has or had sexual or dating relationship or with whom he has a common child;
and 2) it results in or is likely to result in physical harm or suffering.
Hence, applying the rule on statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish,
neither should the courts, then, clearly, the punishable acts refer to all acts of violence against
women with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship.
It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim
when the physical harm was committed.

SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner
Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli
detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child
once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7,
1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and
detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following
items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.)
COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking
Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door
Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
Serious Illegal Detention and for four (4) counts of Rape
China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.
The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to
escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the
Presiding Judge.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's
economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was
the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the
country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those
entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive.
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and
investors.
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this
is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience.

City of Manila v. Perfecto Laguio

Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of
operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC
Petition) with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon.
Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila
(City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as
among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no
person, partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro
M. Kalaw Sr. Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and
Roxas Boulevard in the West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and
engage in, any business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and
facilities where women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the
community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
SEC. 2 The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are
prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and
accepting payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.
SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses
enumerated in Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of
this ordinance within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside
of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within
the area, such as but not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows,
stage and theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the
zoning ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot,
dock or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or
funeral establishments.
SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General
Manager, or person-in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in
case of subsequent violation and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be
closed and padlocked permanently.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. It must not only be within the corporate
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure
prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must
not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
1) The Ordinance contravenes the Constitution. The Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
2) The Ordinance infringes the Due Process Clause, requires the intrinsic validity of the law
in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and property.
3) The Ordinance violates Equal Protection Clause.
4) Modality employed is unlawful taking.
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF CACERES v. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM
Archbishop is the registered owner of several properties in Camarines Sur, with a total area of
268.5668 hectares. Of that land, 249.0236 hectares are planted with rice and corn, while the
remaining 19.5432 hectares are planted with coconut trees.
Archbishop appealed from the order of the Regional Director, and sought exemption from OLT
(Operation Land Transfer) coverage of all lands planted with rice and corn which were
registered in the name of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Caceres. In his appeal, Archbishop
cited the following grounds:
a) That said properties are all covered by conditional donations subject to the prohibitions of
the donors to SELL, EXCHANGE, LEASE, TRANSFER, ENCUMBER OR MORTGAGE the properties;
b) That they are used for charitable and religious purposes;
c) That the parishes located in depressed areas badly need them for the furtherance of their
mission work, propagation of the faith, maintenance and support of their chapels, churches and
educational religious institutions like the Holy Rosary Major and Minor Seminaries for the
promotion of the priesthood vocation;
d) For the preservation of good relationship between church and state thru non-infringement
of the right to exercise religious profession and worship;
e) For the maintenance of the Cathedral and Peñafrancia Shrine, which now include the Basilica
Minore Housing our venerable image of Our Lady of Peñafrancia and the venerable portrait of
Divine Rostro;
f) That the petitioner (church) is amenable to continue the leasehold system with the present
cultivators or tenants.
He further claims that an express trust had been created wherein he only held naked title to the
subject properties on behalf of the beneficiaries. He argues that it is not the "landowner"
contemplated by the law, but merely a trustee, and as such is entitled to as many rights of
retention on behalf of the beneficiaries of each particular property.
The petition has no merit.
The laws simply speak of the "landowner" without qualification as to under what title the land
is held or what rights to the land the landowner may exercise. There is no distinction made
whether the landowner holds "naked title" only or can exercise all the rights of ownership.
Archbishop would have us read deeper into the law, to create exceptions that are not stated in
PD 27 and RA 6657, and to do so would be to frustrate the revolutionary intent of the law,
which is the redistribution of agricultural land for the benefit of landless farmers and
farmworkers.
Moreover general welfare legislation such as land reform laws is to be construed in favor of the
promotion of social justice to ensure the well-being and economic security of the people.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. LACAP

On October 29, 1992, personnel of the Office of the District Engineer of San Fernando,
Pampanga conducted a final inspection of the project and found it 100% completed in
accordance with the approved plans and specifications. Accordingly, the Office of the District
Engineer issued Certificates of Final Inspection and Final Acceptance. Thereafter, respondent
sought to collect payment for the completed project.8 The DPWH prepared the Disbursement
Voucher in favor of petitioner.9 However, the DPWH withheld payment from respondent after
the District Auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA) disapproved the final release of funds on
the ground that the contractor’s license of respondent had expired at the time of the execution
of the contract.
Republic Act No. 4566 (R.A. No. 4566), otherwise known as the Contractor’s License Law, does
not provide that a contract entered into after the license has expired is void and there is no law
which expressly prohibits or declares void such contract, the contract is enforceable and
payment may be paid, without prejudice to any appropriate administrative liability action that
may be imposed on the contractor and the government officials or employees concerned.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear,
plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.
Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus,
respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without
prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.

GARCIA v. SSS
In sum, the core issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not petitioner, as the only
surviving director of Impact Corporation, can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations
of Impact Corporation pertaining to unremitted SSS premium contributions and penalties
therefore.
As a covered employer under the Social Security Law, it is the obligation of Impact Corporation
under the provisions of Sections 18, 19 and 22 thereof, as amended, to deduct from its duly
covered employee’s monthly salaries their shares as premium contributions and remit the same
to the SSS, together with the employer’s shares of the contributions to the petitioner, for and in
their behalf.
Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable. It is a rule in statutory construction
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.
The liability imposed as contemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social Security
Law does not preclude the liability for the unremitted amount.
Basic is the rule that a corporation is invested by law with a personality separate and distinct
from that of the persons composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it
may be related. Following this, the general rule applied is that obligations incurred by the
corporation are its sole liabilities.
However, there are peculiar situations or valid grounds that can exist to warrant the disregard
of its independent being and the lifting of the corporate veil. This situation might arise when a
corporation is used to evade a just and due obligation or to justify a wrong, to shield or
perpetrate fraud, to carry out other similar unjustifiable aims or intentions, or as a subterfuge
to commit injustice and so circumvent the law.
Court rules that although a corporation once formed is conferred a juridical personality
separate and distinct from the persons comprising it, it is but a legal fiction introduced for
purposes of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice. The concept cannot be extended
to a point beyond its reasons and policy, and when invoked in support of an end subversive of
this policy, will be disregarded by the courts.

TAN-ANDAL v. ANDAL
Mario Victor M. Andal (Mario) and Rosanna L. Tan (Rosanna) married on December 16, 1995.
On July 27, 1996, Rosanna gave birth to Ma. Samantha, the only child of the parties.
After four years of marriage, Mario and Rosanna separated in 2000. Rosanna has since kept the
sole custody of Ma. Samantha.
On August 6, 2003, Rosanna filed a Petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage, claiming
that Mario was psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations to
her. When Rosanna and Ma. Samantha were discharged from the hospital, Mario showed
symptoms of paranoia. He thought everyone was out to attack him and, at times, would hide
Ma. Samantha from those he thought were out to hurt them.
In July 1999, an electrician working on the wires of the house opened the door to the small
room. He found Mario and Ma. Samantha inside, with the room filled with smoke that did not
quite smell of cigarettes. The electrician informed Rosanna of what he saw, and Rosanna knew
that Mario relapsed into his drug use.
Dr. Valentina Del Fonso Garcia diagnosed him with narcissistic antisocial personality disorder
and substance abuse disorder with psychotic features.
Court determined that psychological incapacity should mean "no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."[177] It
added that "psychological incapacity" must refer to "the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage." Court cited the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso (Dr. Veloso) that
psychological incapacity "must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."
The Molina guidelines are as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
Andal Guidelines:
a) Plaintiff-spouse must prove his or her case with clear and convincing evidence. This is a
quantum of proof that requires more than preponderant evidence but less than proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
b) Psychological incapacity is neither a mental incapacity nor a personality disorder that
must be proven through expert opinion. There must be proof, however, of the durable
or enduring aspects of a person's personality, called "personality structure," which
manifests itself through clear acts of dysfunctionality that undermines the family.
c) Article 36 is clear that the psychological incapacity must be existing "at the time of the
celebration" of the marriage, "even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
 solemnization." Proof of juridically antecedent psychological incapacity may consist of
testimonies describing the environment where the supposedly incapacitated spouse
lived that may have led to a particular behavior.
d) That psychological incapacity is "incurable," but in a legal sense, that the incapacity is so
enduring and persistent with respect to a specific partner, and contemplates a situation
where the couple's respective personality structures are so incompatible and
antagonistic that the only result of the union would be the inevitable and irreparable
breakdown of the marriage. It must be shown that the incapacity is caused by a
genuinely serious psychic cause.
e) This only shows that the spouses' obligations to their children, once children are
conceived, is as much a part of the spouses' obligations to each other. Failure to
perform these obligations to their children may be a ground to nullify a spouse's
marriage.
To summarize, psychological incapacity consists of clear acts of dysfunctionality that show a
lack of understanding and concomitant compliance with one's essential marital obligations due
to psychic causes. It is not a medical illness that has to be medically or clinically identified;
hence, expert opinion is not required.
As an explicit requirement of the law, the psychological incapacity must be shown to have been
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage, and is caused by a durable aspect of
one's personality structure, one that was formed before the parties married. Furthermore, it
must be shown caused by a genuinely serious psychic cause. To prove psychological incapacity,
a party must present clear and convincing evidence of its existence.

IMBONG v. Ochoa
O'Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy
Plaintiffs Kevin O'Connor and four others ("Drivers") worked as delivery drivers for defendant
Oakhurst Dairy ("Oakhurst"). The Drivers filed a lawsuit against Oakhurst in federal district court
seeking unpaid overtime wages under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.S. §§ 201
et seq., and the Maine overtime law, 26 M.R.S.A. § 664(3). The matter was referred to a
magistrate judge, and the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment to resolve
their dispute over whether the Drivers were covered by Exemption F of Maine's minimum wage
and overtime law. Exemption F stated that the protection of the overtime law did not apply to
certain listed occupations, and particularly work that involved the "packing for shipment or
distribution" of agricultural produce, meat and fish products, and perishable foods. The Drivers
contended that they fell outside of Exemption F and thus the overtime law protected them.
Oakhurst argued to the contrary. The magistrate judge recommended that Oakhurst's motion
for summary judgment be granted and that the Drivers' motion be denied. The district court
adopted the magistrate's recommendation and granted Oakhurst summary judgment. The
Drivers appealed.
The appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the matter for further
proceedings. The court observed that § 664(3) omitted a final comma after the word
"shipment," and thus there was an ambiguity as to whether it referred to two distinct exempt
activities—"packing for shipment" and "distribution," and the act's legislative history did not
cure that ambiguity. Maine's default rule of construction, which required that wage and hours
law be liberally construed to further its remedial purpose, favored a narrow reading, such as
that urged by the Drivers. The court adopted the Drivers' interpretation: § 664(3) referred to
the single activity of "packing," whether the "packing" was for "shipment" or for "distribution,"
and although the Drivers handled perishable foods, they did not engage in "packing" them. As a
result, the Drivers fell outside Exemption F.

OPLE v. TORRES
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. Petitioner claims that A.O.
No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence, beyond the power of the
President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of identification that is all-
encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident,
and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It is here that administrative legislation
must he restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a substitute
for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although
administrative regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and
regulations is not an independent source of power to make laws.
PHILIPPINES JUDGES v. PRADO