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LEVERAGING ARTICLE 36:

HOW TO FREE YOUR CLIENT FROM
AN INCONVENIENT MARRIAGE

By ATTY. KATRINA T. LEGARDA

INTRODUCTION

I believe there is a need to understand the rulings of the Supreme Court on the implementation of Article
36 of the Family Code.

Media has popularized this by calling the process “annulment.”

And most lawyers use Article 36 to free their clients of “inconvenient” marriages.

All well and good if the Republic and/or respondent makes no appeal of a decision of a lower court
granting a nullity of marriage under Article 36 – but, should there be any opposition, we all need to
remember that only 10 nullity decisions, out of thousands of cases appealed to the Supreme Court, have
been affirmed.

Hi, I’m Atty. Katrina Legarda.

I hope this module will help lawyers succeed in cases they take on for their clients. Generally, I would
advise that it you are not a family law practitioner it would be better not to take on cases involving family
law – but that is impractical, since most lawyers outside Metro Manila are general practitioners and face
all sorts of problems and issues.

Having a marriage dissolved is one of the main cases handled by lawyers outside Metro Manila.

MODULE 1: The First Cases on Article 36

How did the Supreme Court decide on the first case involving Article 36?

The first case of Santos versus Court of Appeals laid the basis for:

1. the strict interpretation of Article 36

2. that psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in psychological disciplines “might be
helpful or even desirable,” and
3. that the failure of a wife to return home, or at the very least to communicate with the husband, for
more than five years, is not psychological incapacity.

The very first case was LEOUEL SANTOS v. CA [ GR No. 112019, Jan 04, 1995], and the ponente was
the then foremost civilist on the court, Justice Jose C. Vitug. In an en banc decision, the Supreme Court
defined Article 36, at the very beginning of their decision, as “a highly, if not indeed the most likely,
controversial provision introduced by the Family Code.”

The basic complaint of Mr. Santos was that the failure of his wife to return home, or at the very least to
communicate with him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being
psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.

What did the Court do?

1. The Supreme Court reviewed the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee to provide an
“insight” into the definition of the term “psychological incapacity” and decided that in its lack of specificity,
the law was “designed" to “allow some resiliency in its application.”

2. Then, the Court cited Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee, that “the
Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals
which, although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.”

3. So, the Court opined that while jurisprudence under Canon Law is “neither decisive nor even perhaps
all that persuasive for having no juridical or secular effect,” said jurisprudence “cannot be dismissed as
impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the interpretation or construction of the codal.”

And thereafter concluded, after reviewing a treatise by Ladislas Orsy, S.J., a book entitled "Canons and
Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, Fr. Artemio
Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," and the
work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the
Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, the Court concluded “that the use of the phrase "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as,
likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like
circumstances.”

4. The Court ruled that “Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed independently of,
but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus correlated,
"psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code,
include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support.

“There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

“This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.”

5. Finally, the Court ruled, “Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every
circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity
must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity
is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.”

And, as we know, after reviewing Article 1 of the Family Code and Article 1, XV of the 1987 Constitution,
which the Court described as “the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage and the family, and … the tenets
we still hold on to,” ruled that “The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come
close to the standards required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel
stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.”

Interestingly, this case is constantly cited as having laid down the rule that psychological incapacity “must
be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”
 Actually, the Court never ruled in this way.

The Court merely cited Justice Sempio-Diy, who cited the opinion of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, as one of the
sources for the definition of the term “psychological incapacity.”

MODULE 2: The Second Case – Never Repeated

How can a medical examination rather than a psychological or psychiatric evaluation assist a practitioner in
an Article 36 matter?

If the marriage has not been consummated – and the husband admits that there has been no sexual
intercourse after one year of marriage – then there is psychological incapacity.

“Absence of empathy’ between husband and wife, “That is, a shared feeling which between husband and
wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual
communion … in a sublime social institution” is psychological incapacity.

The wife must be “a virgin” by medical examination.

The Second Division of the Supreme Court, ruling under Justice Torres, in
CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS [G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997], began their ruling thus:

“Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters.
Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand
of Him who created all things. Who is to blame when a marriage fails?”

You know the Court will grant a nullity when it describes a wife as “distraught.”

The parties were married on May 2, 1988, and up to March 15, 1989, the marriage was never
consummated. They underwent a medical examination by a urologist on January 20, 1989. The wife was
still “a virgin.” The results of her husband’s examination “was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was also kept
confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he
never did.”

On the other hand, the husband said that “he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is physically and
psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if there is any differences
between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities (sic), there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any
defect, it can be cured by the intervention of medical technology or science.”
The husband admitted that “since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989,
there was no sexual contact between them.” And another doctor stated “that there is no evidence of
impotency, and he is capable of erection.”

The Court ruled:

1. There has never been coitus between them.

2. The action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically
incapacitated.

3. If the petitioner claims that the reason for lack of coitus is a physical disorder on the part of the wife and
not his psychological disorder, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

4. The Court cited “Psychological Incapacity,” G.T. Veloso, p. 20, as cited in The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, Pineda, 1989 ed., p. 51 that

"If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to
psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.”

5. The Court ruled that one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate
children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage. The senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill this marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.

6. Interestingly, the Court quoted with approval the decision of the Court of Appeals which, among other
things, stated:

“This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she
would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not
necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital status.”

MODULE 3: The Third Case – Guidelines Are Instituted

What is NOT psychological incapacity?

By 1997, the Supreme Court had been “swamped” with various petitions to declare marriages void based on
this ground under Article 36 and sympathized with the then Solicitor General who labelled Article 36 as the
“most liberal divorce procedure in the world.”

Hence, the Court found the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Immaturity and an intensely quarrelsome nature do not constitute psychological incapacity.

A “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital obligations; mere
showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities” do not also constitute psychological
incapacity.

It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it
is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical)
illness.

The facts of Republic v CA [G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997; we call it the Molina case) reflect that the
petition alleged only that “after a year of marriage,” Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility,” he lost his job making the wife the sole breadwinner, they had intense quarrels over
finances, and after the wife went to live with her parents in Baguio City, the husband abandoned the family.

The wife claimed that the husband was “psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital
obligations” because he was “a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served” and that couple needed to be free “from what appeared to be an
incompatible marriage from the start.”

The Court, en banc, ruled that neither the petition nor the witnesses adduced any evidence “showing … the
gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability.”

It was this case that ruled that the Court in the Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals case ruled that: “Citing
Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.”

Other than that, the Court actually was quite clear about what should be in the petition or adduced as
evidence in an Article 36 case:

1. The personality traits constitutive of psychological incapacity must be shown to be existing at the time of
marriage celebration.

2. Pre-nuptial impressions and expectations unfulfilled “merely shows love’s temporary blindness to the
faults and blemishes of the beloved.”

3. Here, the psychiatrist, Dr. Teresa Hidalgo-Sison of the Baguio General Hospital, presented as an expert
witness, found “no incurable psychiatric disorder, but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.”

4. The evidence must prove or the psychologist or psychiatrist must prove the gravity of the disorder, the
incurability of the, and the “juridical antecedents” of the disorder.

The Guidelines tell us what “juridical antecedent” means: The root cause of the psychological incapacity
must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists. AND, The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of
the marriage.

“Mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted
as root causes.”

There must be “a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.”
5. The evidence must prove the incapacity to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. “Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against every one of the same sex.”

Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to
those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.

6. The “illness” must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.

7. And, if your client has obtained a church decree nullifying her Catholic marriage, the basis of the church
nullity must be the 3rd paragraph of Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law so that “interpretations
given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines” will be “given
great respect by our courts.”

MODULE 4: Next Two Cases – Very Confusing

There have been some confusing decisions by the Supreme Court on the requirements of Article 36. The
early cases of Hernandez v Court of Appeals, promulgated in December 1999, and Marcos v Marcos,
promulgated in January 2000, or just one month later, are good examples.

As a practitioner, you must decide whether you will retain the services of a psychologist, or depend only on
the testimony of your client and her witnesses.

The goal is to present such a totality of evidence as would persuade the court that there is a ground for the
declaration of nullity of the marriage.

In Hernandez, the Court denied the nullity of the marriage of a woman who was married to a man who
devoted most of his time engaging in drinking sprees with his friends, cohabited with another woman with
whom he had an illegitimate child, while having affairs with different women, and that, because of his
promiscuity, and then infected her with a sexually transmissible disease (STD). In this case the Regional
Trial Court and the Court of Appeals had denied the petition.

The Supreme Court said;

“… habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute
grounds for finding that he is suffering from a psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make private
respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, and not merely due
to … [his] youth and self-conscious feeling of being handsome…”

The Court ruled that “expert testimony should have been presented to establish the precise cause of private
respondent’s psychological incapacity, if any, in order to show that it existed at the inception of the
marriage.”

On the other hand, in Marcos, the Court denied the nullity of the marriage of a woman who was married to a
man who “would hit and beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he
chastised them…. He even inflicted physical harm on … her mother who came to her aid. The following
day, October 17, 1994, she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house… [on
another occasion] … he ran after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver….”
The Court of Appeals ruled that “the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or psychiatric
evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist Natividad Dayan were based only
on the interviews conducted with the appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists is essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was assuming, or as would make him
or her x unable to assume them.”

On this issue, the Supreme Court ruled: “The foregoing guidelines [in Molina] do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically
or clinically identified."

What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

MODULE 5: What is and what is not psychological incapacity?

Finally, I hope practitioners can be helped by a quick analysis of what worked. What were the facts and the
circumstances that persuaded the Supreme Court to allow a declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article
36?

Finally, I hope practitioners can be helped by a quick analysis of what worked. What were the facts and the
circumstances that persuaded the Supreme Court to allow a declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article
36?

It is possible to successfully declare a marriage void under Article 36.

You need to:

1. make the proper allegations in the petition,
2. get a good psychologist,
3. ensure that third parties who knew the parties before the marriage allow themselves to be
interviewed by the psychologist,
4. ensure that third parties who knew the parties before the marriage testify in court and
5. never, ever, aver that the couple was happy at any time!

Study how these are reflected in the following cases. Click each one to learn the details.

1. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals

2. Antonio vs. Reyes
3. TE vs TE
4. Azcueta vs Republic
5. Halili v Halili
6. Camacho-Reyes vs Reyes
7. Kalaw vs Fernandez
8. De la Fuente v De la Fuente
9. Republic vs Javier
10. Republic vs Mola Cruz
1. In CHI MING TSOI vs. COURT OF APPEALS, January 16, 1997, it was clear that prior to the marriage,
the wife was a “virgin.” This fact was established by a medical examination. Thus, it was clear to the Court
that the couple had never engaged in any sexual intercourse prior to or during the marriage. Note that in this
case, no psychological evaluation was conducted. Nor was psychological evaluation required.

2. In Antonio vs. Reyes, March 10, 2005, the petitioner proved that respondent “persistently lied about
herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things.”
Petitioner presented a psychiatrist (Dr. Abcede) and a clinical psychologist (Dr. Lopez). They testified that
“respondent’s persistent and constant lying to petitioner was abnormal or pathological.”

Click the tabs to learn more.

The Supreme Court explained that “Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional
protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the
family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not
further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.”

And finally, the Court said: “If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to adduce a
diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological incapacity of a
spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.”

3. In TE v TE, February 13, 2009, The Court affirmed the nullity of the marriage, finding the psychological
evaluation conducted “adequate.”

Click the tabs to learn more.

the Court acknowledged that: “In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid
set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the
Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to
the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world". The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral
insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation
of their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently
applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the
like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled
marriages on account of the personality disorders of the said individuals.”

The Court affirmed the nullity of the marriage, finding the psychological evaluation conducted “adequate.”
The psychological assessment produced the findings that both parties are afflicted with personality disorders
— dependent personality disorder for petitioner, and narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder for
respondent. The Court found that the parties' whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six (6) months. They
met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The Court
ruled “Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage which they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.”
4. In Azcueta vs Republic, May 26, 2009, the Court found that the parties also married each other very
quickly from time of meeting, “less than two months after their first meeting.”

Click the tabs to learn more.

The Court affirmed the nullity of the marriage rationalizing that “in more recent jurisprudence, we have
observed that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other
perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article
36. Each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is
trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court. With the advent of Te v. Te, the Court encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends
on the interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major deviation or paradigm shift from the
Molina doctrine.”

Here, “petitioner’s narration of facts was corroborated in material points by the testimony of a close relative
of Rodolfo. Dr. Villegas likewise testified in court to elaborate on her report and fully explain the link between
the manifestations of Rodolfo’s psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.”
The Petition itself alleged that from the beginning of their marriage, Rodolfo was not gainfully employed; that
from the choice of the family abode to the couple’s daily sustenance, Rodolfo relied on his mother; and that
the couple’s inadequate sexual relations and Rodolfo’s refusal to have a child stemmed from a
psychological condition linked to his relationship to his mother.

Thus, Dependent Personality Disorder is psychological incapacity.

5. In Halili v Halili, June 9, 2009, in a Special First Division, The Supreme Court overturned their denial for
nullity of the marriage and found: “the testimony of petitioner's expert witness revealed that petitioner was
suffering from dependent personality disorder.”

6. In Camacho-Reyes v Reyes, August 18, 2010, the Court granted the nullity of the marriage. The reports
of two clinical psychologists, Dr. Dayan and Dr. Estrella Magno, and a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, were
presented in evidence. Their assessments were not based solely on the narration or personal interview of
the petitioner. Other informants such as respondent’s own son, siblings and in-laws, and sister-in-law (sister
of petitioner), testified on their own observations of respondent’s behavior and interactions with them,
spanning the period of time they knew him. These were also used as the basis of the doctors’ assessments
that he suffered from a Mixed Personality Disorder.

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Clinical psychologist Dayan diagnosed him as suffering from Mixed Personality Disorder (Schizoid
Narcissistic and Anti-Social Personality Disorder); clinical psychologist Magno found him to be suffering from
an Antisocial Personality Disorder with narcissistic and dependent features; while Dr. Villegas diagnosed
him to be suffering from Personality Disorder of the anti-social type, associated with strong sense of
Inadequacy especially along masculine strivings and narcissistic features.

7. In Kalaw v Fernandez, January 14, 2015, the Supreme Court again reversed themselves “Upon an
assiduous review of the records.”

Click the tabs to learn more.

The Court referred to Te and stated: “The [Molina] guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their
application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of
certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied
given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to
enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, … every “trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that
of the trial court.”

The Court returned to Hernandez and said that sice Courts are not experts in psychology, courts “must of
necessity rely on the opinions of experts…. to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the
conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by
experts.”

Here, the Court found that “Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates
to the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with
Anti- Social Disorder.”

Fr. Gerard Healey, S.J., also testified. The Court said: “Given his credentials and conceded expertise in
Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions
and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive
and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the
nullity of marriage, and he could as well thereby provide to the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject
as esoteric to the courts as psychological incapacity has been.”

8. In De la Fuente v De la Fuente, March 8, 2017, the Court granted the nullity on the ground that “Dr.
Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from
psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality disorder made him distrustful and prone to
extreme jealousy and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential
obligations of marriage.”

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The root causes? - hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a similar disorder.

The juridical antecedence? - Petitioner attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before their
marriage, and that he would often follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.
She believed that he would change after they got married. However, respondent's jealousy and paranoia
were so extreme and severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.

The incurability? - Dr. Lopez vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit
that there was something wrong and that there was a need for treatment.

9. In Republic v Javier, April 18, 2018, the Court partially reversed the nullity ruling of the lower court
because it did not find that the totality of the evidence proved the psychological incapacity of the wife.

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However, the Court affirmed the nullity on the basis of the husband’s psychological incapacity because
“Martin was also subjected to several psychological tests, as a result of which, Dr. Adamos diagnosed him
with Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Additionally, the diagnosis was based on Dr. Adamos' personal
interviews of Martin, who underwent several counselling sessions with Dr. Adamos from 2008 to 2009.
These facts were uncontroverted by the Republic.
The root cause? - the traumatic experiences he experienced during his childhood, having grown up around
a violent father who was abusive of his mother.
Juridical antecedence? – not addressed

10. Finally, in Republic v Mola Cruz, July 23, 2018, the Court affirmed the grant of nullity of marriage
because: “Dr. Tudla's psychological report confirms, …, that Dr. Tudla personally interviewed both spouses
regarding their personal and familial circumstances before and after the celebration of their marriage.
Information gathered from the spouses was then verified by Dr. Tudla with Ma. Luisa Conag, Liez's
youngest sister, a close relation privy to Liezl's personal history before and after she got married. …Her
findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic psychological evaluation of the parties as individuals and
as a married couple under a factual milieu verified with an independent informant.”

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The root causes? - Liezl's histrionic personality disorder was the cause of her inability to discharge her
marital obligations to love, respect and give concern, support and fidelity to her husband.

Juridical antecedence? –The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl was an adolescent
and continued well into adulthood.