Professional Documents
Culture Documents
OUTLINE FINALS
Nature of International Law
1. Obligation Erga Omnes
- The general rule is that only the directly injured State is entitled to act against
the violation of an international obligation by another State.
- Obligations erga omnes are concerned with the enforceability of norms
of international law, the violation of which is deemed to be an offense
not only against the State directly affected by the breach, but also
against all members of the international community.
2. Jus Cogens
- a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a
peremptory norm of general international law.
- A peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character. – Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
N.B. Jus Cogens is more superior than Obligation erga omnes.
3. Ex Aequo et bono
- A decision in which equity overrides all rules.
- While a judge may not give a decision ex aequo et bono, he/she can use equity
to interpret or fill gaps in the law, even when there is no express authorization
to do so. The principle of equity is a general principle common to
national legal systems.
DOCTRINE OF TRANSFORMATION
- It must be expressly and specifically transformed into domestic law
through the appropriate constitutional machinery such as an act of
Congress.
DOCTIRNE OF INCORPORATION
- International law, wherever any question arises which is properly the object of
its jurisdiction, is adopted in its full extent by a common law, and is
held to be part of the law of land.
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
means for the determination of rules of law.
a) a permanent population;
b) a defined territory;
c) government; and
d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
-provides only as a guideline. Not absolute
The Nationality Principle- every state has jurisdiction over its nationals even when
those nationals are outside the state.
Each state has the right to decide who are its nationals using either the principle of jus
sanguinis or jus soli or naturalization laws. However, for a state to claim a person as a
national, the state must have reasonable connection or an “effective link” with that
person. The consent of the individual alone is not enough for him to be recognized
by other states as a national of the state to which he claims to belong.
❖ TREATMENT OF ALIENS
The following principles govern extradition: (1) No state is obliged to extradite unless
there is a treaty; (2) Differences in legal system can be an obstacle to interpretation of
what the crime is; (3) Religious and political offenses are not extraditable.
The Court emphasized that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon
a clear and convincing showing (1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community, and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances.
In defining the extraditable offenses, the Treaty includes all offenses "punishable
under the Laws of both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period of at least
one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty."
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is
deemed inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right
to prohibit and prevent their entry into the country.
However, under clause 1 of Section 37(a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 an "alien
who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of false
and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated
port of entry" is subject to deportation.
A. Applicable Law
Arts. 38 and 59, ICJ Statute
Article 38
1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:
subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a case ex aequo et
bono, if the parties agree thereto.
Article 59
The decision of the Court has no binding force except between the parties and
in respect of that particular case.
B. Jurisdiction
Arts. 36(1), (2) & (3), ICJ Statute
Article 36
1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it
and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in
treaties and conventions in force.
2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all
legal disputes concerning:
the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation.
Under the Palmas decision, three important rules for resolving island territorial
disputes were decided:
Airspace.
Before the First World War, there were those who held that the airspace was completely free.
The outbreak of the First World War brought about the realization that the use of the air had
security implications. Out of this realization came the approach which considers the air above
as an extension of the territory below. Each state has exclusive jurisdiction over the
air space above its territory. Therefore, consent for transit must be obtained from the
subjacent nation.
The present regime on air navigation has developed from the Chicago Convention on
International Civil Aviation (1944) which entered into force in 1974. The Chicago Convention
created the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), an agency of the United Nations, and
prescribed the rules for international civil aviation.
Outer Space.
The assertion under air space law used to be that air sovereignty extended to an unlimited extent,
usque ad coelum. The development of the law on outer space modified this assertion. Sovereignty
over air space extends only until where outer space begins. But where is that?
There is as yet no definite answer to that question. The answer will eventually come from
technological capabilities of conventional aircraft to reach greater heights. Different numbers
ranging from fifty to one hundred miles from the earth have been mentioned. Nonetheless, the
development of outer space law has started. It is now accepted that outer space, wherever
that might be, and celestial bodies, are not susceptible to appropriation by any state.
Among the first achievements in this area is the 1967 Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space.
Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris. – Successor states shall respect colonial boundaries of
colonial rulers.
❖ Jurisdiction of States
- is one of the methods by which States prevent their national courts from
deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State,
the other two being immunity and non-justiciability. It is an avoidance
technique that is directly related to a state’s obligation to respect the
independence and equality of other States by not requiring them to
submit to adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their
disputes without their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise
restraint in the adjudication of disputes relating to legislative or other
governmental acts which a foreign State has performed within its territorial
limits.
Archipelago
- it means a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters
and other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands,
waters and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical,
economic and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as
such. (Article 46)
Archipelagic Strate
- it means a State constituted wholly by one or more archipelagos and
may include other islands (Article 46)
Contiguous Zone
- It is a maritime zone which is not beyond 24 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea (Article 33(2)) of
the adjacent coastal state, is measured. Such may exercise certain
protective jurisdiction, to wit:
1. Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary
laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea; and
2. Punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed
within its territory or territorial sea. (Article 33(1))
In this area, the coastal state does not exercise sovereignty; only those preventive
jurisdiction as provided under the UNCLOS.
Continental Shelf
- It comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its (the coastal state’s) territorial sea throughout the
natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the continental
margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer
edge of the continental margin does not extend up to that distance. (Article
76(1))
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
- An area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, not extending
beyond 200nm from the baselines from which the territorial sea is
measured, in which the coastal state has sovereign rights for the
purpose of:
1. Exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing natural
resources;
2. As well with regard to other activities for economic exploitation
and exploration zone; and
3. In which it has jurisdiction with regard artificial islands,
environmental protection and marine scientific research.
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with
regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures;
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due regard to the rights and duties of other States
and shall act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the seabed and subsoil shall be exercised in
accordance with Part VI.
Artificial islands do not possess the status of islands because they have no territorial
sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the
EEZ, or the continental shelf.
Article 58
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to
the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation
and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other
internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with
the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other
provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply to the exclusive economic
zone in so far as they are not incompatible with this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Convention in the exclusive
economic zone, States shall have due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal State
and shall comply with the laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in
accordance with the provisions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as
they are not incompatible with this Part.
Article 70
Rights of geographically disadvantaged States
Geographically disadvantaged states- Coastal States: (a) which, for geographic reasons,
cannot claim economic zones; or (b) whose economic zones are less than 30% of the
area they could have claimed.
Land-locked state- One which does not border the sea and therefore do not have an EEZ.
1. Geographically disadvantaged States shall have the right to participate, on an equitable basis,
in the exploitation of an appropriate part of the surplus of the living resources of the exclusive
economic zones of coastal States of the same subregion or region, taking into account
the relevant economic and geographical circumstances of all the States concerned and in
conformity with the provisions of this article and of articles 61 and 62.
2. For the purposes of this Part, "geographically disadvantaged States" means coastal States,
including States bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, whose geographical situation makes
them dependent upon the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zones of
other States in the subregion or region for adequate supplies of fish for the nutritional purposes
of their populations or parts thereof, and coastal States which can claim no exclusive economic
zones of their own.
3. The terms and modalities of such participation shall be established by the States
concerned through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements taking into account, inter alia:
(a) the need to avoid effects detrimental to fishing communities or fishing industries
of the coastal State;
(b) the extent to which the geographically disadvantaged State, in accordance with the provisions
of this article, is participating or is entitled to participate under existing bilateral,
subregional or regional agreements in the exploitation of living resources of the
exclusive economic zones of other coastal States;
(c) the extent to which other geographically disadvantaged States and land-locked States are
participating in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive economic zone of the
coastal State and the consequent need to avoid a particular burden for any single coastal State
or a part of it;
(d) the nutritional needs of the populations of the respective States.
4. When the harvesting capacity of a coastal State approaches a point which would enable it to
harvest the entire allowable catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone, the
coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the establishment of
equitable arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or regional basis to allow for
participation of developing geographically disadvantaged States of the same
subregion or region in the exploitation of the living resources of the exclusive
economic zones of coastal States of the subregion or region, as may be appropriate
in the circumstances and on terms satisfactory to all parties. In the implementation of
this provision the factors mentioned in paragraph 3 shall also be taken into account.
5. Developed geographically disadvantaged States shall, under the provisions of this article, be
entitled to participate in the exploitation of living resources only in the exclusive economic
zones of developed coastal States of the same subregion or region having regard to the
extent to which the coastal State, in giving access to other States to the living resources of its
exclusive economic zone, has taken into account the need to minimize detrimental effects on
fishing communities and economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in
the zone.
6. The above provisions are without prejudice to arrangements agreed upon in subregions or
regions where the coastal States may grant to geographically disadvantaged States of the same
subregion or region equal or preferential rights for the exploitation of the living resources in the
exclusive economic zones.
Peaceful Purposes- The area shall be open to use exclusively for peaceful
purposes by all states.
Navigation
Right of Navigation
- Every State, whether coastal or land-locked, has the right to sail ships
flying its flag on the high seas.
Nationality of Ships is that of Flag State
Ships carry the nationality of the state whose flag they are entitled to
fly. There must be a genuine link between the state and the ship. The
purpose behind including this concept is to secure more effective implementation
of the duties of the flag state. It is not a criterion by reference to which the validity
of the registration of ships in a flag state may be challenged by other states.
Such state shall have its own conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships,
their registration within its territory, and for the right to fly its flag.
A ship sail under the flag of one State only. A ship with two or more states
has no nationality and may not claim any of the nationalities represented
by these flags. It cannot also change its flag during voyage or while in a
port of call, except in case of transfer of ownership or on the basis of
change of registry.
GR: Exclusive jurisdiction over all ships sailing its flag in the high seas. It covers
all legislative and enforcement jurisdiction over administrative and social matters
concerning the ship, its master, officers, and crew. It has Penal or disciplinary
powers.
Exceptions:
The State of which the person is a national
o Piracy
o On persons or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting
from the high seas
o Exercise of the right of hot pursuit
o Pollution from a marine casualty
Warships and Ships owned or operated by a State and used only on government non-
commercial service enjoys complete immunity from jurisdiction of any other state
other than the flag state.
Unauthorized Broadcasting
It refers to the transmission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or
installation on the high seas intended for reception by the general public, contrary
to international regulations.
All States shall cooperate in the suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from
the high seas.
Right to Visit
A warship may board a foreign ship not protected by immunity in the high seas if
there is reasonable ground of suspecting the foreign ship that is:
1. Engaged in piracy
2. Engaged in slave trade
3. Engaged in unauthorized broadcasting
4. Without nationality
5. Of the same nationality as the warship but flying a foreign flag
or refusing to show its flag.
Jurisprudence
Romulo v. Vinuya
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic
protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own
right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it
is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they have no remedy
in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with
a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter
this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese
army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or
that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an erga omnes
obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a
legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as
a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the
international community as a whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of
diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of
the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their
protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command
peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms
are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit
derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent
authority
Edye v. Robertson
***“A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It depends for the
enforcement of its provisions on the interest and the honor of the governments which
are parties to it. If these fail, its infraction becomes the subject of international
negotiations and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek redress,
which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvious that with all this the
judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.
But a treaty may also contain provision which confer certain rights upon the citizens
or subjects of one nation residing in the territorial limits of the other, which partake of
the nature of municipal law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in
the courts of the country.
…The constitution of the United States places provisions in the treaties in the same category as
other laws of Congress by its declaration that “this constitution and the laws made in
pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made under authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land”.
A treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions
prescribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be
determined. And when such rights are of a nature to be enforced in a court of justice,
that court resorts to the treaty for a rule decision for the case before it as it would to
a statute.
But even in this aspect of the case there is nothing in this law which makes it irrepealable or
unchangeable. The constitution gives it no superiority over and act of Congress in this respect,
which may be repealed or modified by an act of a later date. Nor is there anything in its essential
character, or in branches of the government by which the treaty is made, which gives it this
superior sanctity.
***The court opined that so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign
nation can become the subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it
is subject to such acts as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or
repeal.”
Whitney v. Robertson
ISSUE: Where a treaty and an act of legislation is in conflict, will the one last in date control?
RULING: Yes. ***The one with a later date will control where a treaty and an act of
legislation conflict. The act of congress under which the duties were collected was passed
after the treaty and therefore is controlling.
***A later inconsistent statute does not abrogate or repeal a treaty. The treaty still
exists as an international obligation although the terms of the treaty may not be
enforceable.
It follows, therefore, that when a law is clear in its provisions, its validity cannot be
assailed before the courts for want of conformity to stipulations of a previous treaty
not already executed. Considerations of that character belong to another department
of the government. The duty of the courts is to construe and give effect to the latest
expression of the sovereign will.
In Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, it was objected to an act of Congress that it violated
provisions contained in treaties with foreign nations, but the Court replied that so far as the
provisions of the act were in conflict with any treaty, they must prevail in all the
courts of the country, and after a full and elaborate consideration of the subject it held that
“so far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can be the
subject of judicial cognizance in the courts of this country, it is subject to such acts
as Congress may pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal.”
Yamashita v. Styer
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the
Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part
of and are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In
facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nations the United State
and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and principles therefore
form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and
extensive in its scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of
international law as contained in treaties to which our government may have been or
shall be a signatory.
Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on the ground that the United
States (D) was responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and
against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice to entertain
the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. was
challenged by the United States (D).
1. The Court held that the United States violated its customary international law
obligation not to use force against another State when its activities with the contras
resulted in the threat or use of force.
(1) “most grave forms of the use of force” (i.e. those that constitute an armed attack);
and
(2) “other less grave forms” of the use of force (i.e. organizing, instigating, assisting,
or participating in acts of civil strife and terrorist acts in another State – when the
acts referred to involve a threat or use of force, but not amounting to an armed attack).
(Para 191),
The United States violated the customary international law prohibition on the use
of force when it laid mines in Nicaraguan ports. It also violated this prohibition
when it attacked Nicaraguan ports, oil installations, and a naval base (see below).
The United States could only justify its action on the basis of collective self-defense, if
certain criteria were met (these criteria are discussed below).
The United States violated the customary international law prohibition on the use of force
when it assisted the contras by “organizing or encouraging the organization of
irregular forces and armed bands… for incursion into the territory of another state”
and participated “in acts of civil strife…in another State” and when these acts
involved the threat or use of force.
The supply of funds to the contras did not violate the prohibition on the use of
force. On the contrary, Nicaragua had previously argued before the Court that the United
States determined the timing of offensives against Nicaragua when it provided funds to
the contras. The Court held that “…it does not follow that each provision of funds by the
United States was made to set in motion a particular offensive, and that that offensive
was planned by the United States.” The Court held further that the arming and training
of the contras and the supply of funds, in itself, only amounted to acts of
intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua and did not violate the prohibition
on the use of force (para 227) (again, this aspect will be discussed in detail below).
2. The Court held that the United States violated its customary international law
obligation not to use force against another State when it directly attacked
Nicaragua in 1983 and 1984 (see paras 187 – 201).
Note: A controversial but interesting aspect of the Court’s judgement was its definition
of an armed attack. The Court held that an armed attack included:
Mere frontier incidents will not have considered as armed attacks, unless, because
of its scale and effects, it would have been classified as an armed attack had it been
carried out by regular forces.
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter and under CIL – self-defence is only available
against a use of force that amounts to an armed attack (para 211).
The case involved the delimitation of the continental shelf areas in the North Sea between
Germany and Denmark and Germany and Netherlands beyond the partial boundaries previously
agreed upon by these States. The parties requested the Court to decide the principles and rules
of international law that are applicable to the above delimitation because the parties disagreed
on the applicable principles or rules of delimitation.
The jurisprudence of the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases sets out the dual requirement for
the formation of customary international law: (1) State practice (the objective element)
and (2) opinio juris (the subjective element). In these cases, the Court explained the criteria
necessary to establish State practice – widespread and representative participation. It
highlighted that the practices of those States whose interests were specially affected by the
custom were especially relevant in the formation of customary law. It also held that uniform
and consistent practice was necessary to demonstrate opinio juris – opinio juris is the belief
that State practice amounts to a legal obligation. The North Sea Continental Self Cases also
dispelled the myth that duration of the practice (i.e., the number of years) was an
essential factor in forming customary international law.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 (VCLT), which came into force
in 1980, discusses in more detail treaty obligations of third States (those States who are
not parties to the treaty). It clearly stipulates that obligations arise for third States from a
provision of a treaty only if (1) the actual parties to the treaty intended the provision
to create obligations for third States; and (2) third State expressly accept
those obligations in writing (Article 35 of the VCLT). The VCLT was not in force
when the Court deliberated on this case. However, as seen above, the
Court’s position is consistent the VCLT.
For a customary rule to emerge the Court held that it needed: (1) very widespread and
representative participation in the Convention, including States whose interests were
specially affected (in this case, they were coastal States) (i.e. generality); and (2) virtually
uniform practice (i.e. consistent and uniform usage) undertaken in a manner that demonstrates
(3) a general recognition of the rule of law or legal obligation (i.e. opinio juries). In the
North Sea Continental Shelf cases the court held that the passage of a considerable
period of time was unnecessary (i.e. duration) for the formation of a customary law.
Ang Ladlad
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and
guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or
social origin, property, birth or other status.
Wright v. CA
The principles of international law recognize no right of extradition apart from that arising from
treaty. 4 Pursuant to these principles, States enter into treaties of extradition principally for
the purpose of bringing fugitives of justice within the ambit of their laws, under
conventions recognizing the right of nations to mutually agree to surrender individuals
within their jurisdiction and control, and for the purpose of enforcing their respective
municipal laws. Since punishment of fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on the
willingness of host State to apprehend them and revert them to the State where their
offenses were committed, 5 jurisdiction over such fugitives and subsequent enforcement of penal
laws can be effectively accomplished only by agreement between States through treaties
of extradition.
As the Las Palmas case, infra, shows, control over territory is of the essence of a
state. The exact boundaries might be uncertain, but there should be a definitive core
over which sovereignty is exercised. Acquisition of territory more precisely means
acquisition of sovereignty over territory. Judge Huber in the Las Palmas case said
that “sovereignty over a portion of the surface of the globe is the legal condition
for the inclusion of such portion in the territory of any particular state.”
Eastern Greenland Case
Where there are two or more claimants to a territory, effective control is also
relative to the strength of claims. (Eastern Greenland Case PCIJ 1933) The
Permanent Court of Justice deciding in favor of Denmark, said:
Before proceeding to consider in detail the evidence submitted to the Court, it may be
well to state that a claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such
as a treaty of cession but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two
elements each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to act
as sovereign, and some actual exercise or display of such authority.
Another circumstance which must be taken into account by any tribunal which has to
adjudicate upon a claim to sovereignty over a particular territory, is the extent to which
the sovereignty is also claimed by some other Power. In most of the cases
involving claims to territorial sovereignty which have come before an international
tribunal, there have been two competing claims to the sovereignty, and the tribunal has
had to decide which of the two is the stronger.
Although Thailand did not expressly recognize the validity of the maps, the Court
concluded that the circumstances were such as to impose on Thailand a duty to inspect
the maps, and a failure to protest was to be taken as a tacit adoption. This conclusion
was based on the concept of "acquiescence" which protects a country having taken
a position adverse to the interest of another, where the other fails to protest within
a reasonable time. The theory is that the first country may have relied on its own position
and the other country ought to be estopped to contest the result at a later time. This is
said to be "an essential requirement of stability" in the international sphere.
Acquiescence may have relevance either with respect to changes in the status of
international rights and customs, or with respect to modification of treaties, as in
the instant case. However, for the acquiescence to be effective, it must be under
circumstances from which consent on the part of the adversely affected nation
could reasonably be inferred. Thailand's duty to inspect the maps also prevented it from
claiming that any adoption at the time of publication was vitiated by the undetected error.
A plea of error will not be allowed in international law where the parties could have
avoided it, and here the circumstances were such as to put Thailand on notice of possible
error.
Credit Suisse v. District Court of California- case that Act of State applies
The Swiss Federal Council issued an Executive Order freezing all assets of the Marcos
family that were held in Switzerland. Loretta Ann Rosales filed an action seeking relief
from district courts of Switzerland for an injunction restraining the Banks from transferring
or otherwise conveying any funds or assets held by the Banks on behalf of the Marcos
Estate. The arising issue in the case is that whether the relief sought would
violate the act of state doctrine. That relief sought actually violates the act of state
doctrine. District court compelling the Banks to transfer or otherwise convey Estate assets
would be in direct contravention of the Swiss freeze orders.
- States that a foreign court chooses to uphold and respect the foreign
state acts done within its territory so it will not imperil the amicable
relationship between nations
- Apply to judicial decisions, legislative and executive actions
No (Israel v. Bulgaria). The Court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction on
the grounds that Bulgaria’s acceptance of the optional clause in the Statute
of the Permanent Court of International Justice (the PCU, precursor to the
ICJ) did not carry over to acceptance of the optional clause for the ICJ when
Bulgaria joined the UN in December 1955, since Bulgaria had not been an
original party to the UN Charter and the Statute of the ICJ.
The US withdrew its application.
El Honduras
The Court relied on the uti possidetis juris principle, according to which the
national boundaries of former colonies correspond to the earlier
administrative borders of the colonies. The Court underlined that it was the
application of this principle which provided States liberated from former colonial empires
with internationally recognized borders. The different titles invoked by the parties to the
case were of different legal value; thus, the Court decided to recognize only the title
deeds granted by the Spanish crown as valid proof of title as well as
topographical characteristics in order to define a clearly recognizable
borderline.
Relevant cases:
Edye v. Robertson
Kuroda v. Jalandoni
Yamashita v. Styer
North Sea Continental Shelf Case
Nicaragua v. US
Portugal v. India
Las Palmas
Eastern Greenland case
SS Lotus Case
Eritrea Yemen Arbitration
Libya v. Chad
Anglo Norweigian Fisheries Case
Philippines v. China
El Salvador v. Honduras
Province of North Cotabato