1AC — ICE

We stand firmly resolved, The United States Federal Government should ban the
collection of personal data through biometric recognition technology.

Biometrics play an integral part in identifying and punishing immigrants, all the while
violating cultural lines of modesty & humanitarianism, Agnieszka, who holds a Ph.D in
social anthropology writes that,
Agnieszka, ’20 — Agnieszka Radziwinowiczówna, PhD, Sociology, Social Anthropology, Iberian and
Ibero-American Studies, Migration Studies, migration and deportation regimes, the sociocultural
consequences of human mobility and transnational care in migrant families. 29 th August 2020. “Bare life
in an immigration jail: technologies of surveillance in U.S. pre-deportation detention.” Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies. https://sci-hub.se/https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1796266//LFS — GOF
— [edited for contextual grammar]

Biometrics The intake screenings register the evidence taken from detained bodies : special features and biometric identifiers
(fingerprints). This register will serve to identify the bare life of detainees in the future. This is how two former deportees,

Emiliano and Javier, described the collection of their biometric data by U . S . officials: Emiliano: They took all my
fingerprints , they took a lot of photos : my full-face photo and my profile photo, my height , ‘ Take off your shirt. Take off your
trousers. ’ Figure 1. Immigration detention centres where the research participants were imprisoned 8 A. RADZIWINOWICZÓWNA Agnieszka: Tattoos ?
Emiliano: Tattoos. Javier’s account was similar to Emiliano’s: [They took my] fingerprints, once again photos, if you have tattoos, ‘Do you have tattoos?’ ‘No.’ ‘Take
off your shirt.’ Emiliano and Javier had different experiences of criminal custody (Javier had been in jail before, Emiliano had not); however, they both

emphasised the experience of being asked to undress . People in San Ángel are not accustomed to
taking off their shirts in public (even on hot days, builders work with their T-shirts on, and people prefer to swim wearing clothes). High
levels of shame attributed to body practices in San Ángel [can be] contribute[d] to the experience of biopolitical
practices related to deportation as humiliating and stressful . As in Javier’s case, the biopolitical tattoo or, simply the
collection of biometrics, helps to identify and punish a re-entering deportee[s]. Marlon, who, after deportation, resigned
himself to not going back to the U.S.A, told me: If one day you want to get visa, get the documents, they have all of that in your record. And that’s bad … They have

your fingerprints, if you have tattoos, everything. All of that. And they pay attention to it. Biometrics not only digitalises life but is also a
digital version of social control . As Peter Adey observes about surveillance (2004, 1369), it is ‘now being focused with greater intensity upon the body of the
individual, the body becoming the stable token of identity’. Electronically enhanced technologies of surveillance and the registering

of the bare lives of migrants create their governmentality , as some resign themselves to a life outside the U.S. When deported, they
receive a re-entry bar or a notification of the deadline before which they are not permitted to lawfully
return to the United States, and obtaining the Attorney General’s permission to come back in that time span is virtually impossible. If apprehended
during a clandestine border crossing, their data will be retrieved from the fingerprint database and their border

crossing will become a federal crime punishable with prison time, as stipulated in the Immigration and Nationality Act (1965, sec. 276
amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996; see also Macías-Rojas 2016). Put another way, due to biometrics,

even once expelled, former deportees are still under surveillance . The ‘panopticon’ of surveillance is constructed far from the
U.S. border, externalising U.S. sovereignty on Mexican territory. Deported individuals might refrain from unauthorised border
crossings for fear of being identified as re-entering (Radziwinowiczówna 2019). The biopolitical tattoo has a sound impact on transnational migration in communities
like San Ángel. During my last fieldwork visit to San Ángel in 2019, I observed that the villagers[of San Ángel] were less interested in undocumented migration than
five years earlier and instead dreamt of migrating to the U.S.A with temporary work permits. Such plans, although not always feasible to begin with, exclude former

deportees, who are aware that their record makes getting a visa impossible . The process when the sovereign finds the bare life of
detainees eliminable involves a dynamic between [of] animalisation and humanisation (Agamben 2004b). While collection of biometric data is
an example of the former, a correct database hit that reveals the detainee’s name is a humanising element of biometric identification. A press article by Brooke
Jarvis (2016) provides an example of the paradoxical humanising use of fingerprinting. ‘Unclaimed’ describes a man in a coma who, after a deadly traffic accident,
was hospitalised, unidentified by San Diego hospital staff, for 16 years. His name was revealed, and his family notified only after his fingerprints were correctly
checked and returned a ‘hit’ on the DHS database – he was a Mexican border crosser who had been detained by the Border Patrol a few months prior to the
accident.

The Center on Privacy & Technology cites that the Immigration and Customs
Enforcement agency, also known as ICE has recently invested billions into biometric
identification systems—relying on them for deporting immigrants,
CPT, ’22 — Center on Privacy & Technology, Georgetown Law is a think tank focused on privacy and
surveillance law and policy—and the communities they affect. May 10 th 2022. “DATA-DRIVEN
DEPORTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY.” CPT. https://americandragnet.org///LFS — GOF — [edited for
contextual grammar]

This report argues that you should. Our two-year investigation, including hundreds of Freedom of Information Act requests and a comprehensive
review of ICE’s contracting and procurement records, reveals that ICE now operates as a domestic surveillance agency. Since
its founding in 2003, ICE has not only been building its own capacity to use surveillance to carry out
deportations but has also played a key role in the federal government’s larger push to amass as much
information as possible about all of our lives. By reaching into the digital records of state and local governments and buying databases with billions of
data points from private companies, ICE has created a surveillance infrastructure that enables it to pull detailed dossiers on nearly
anyone, seemingly at any time. In its efforts to arrest and deport , ICE has – without any judicial , legislative or public
oversight – reach[ing] into datasets containing personal information about the vast majority of people living in the U.S.,

whose records can end up in the hands of immigration enforcement simply because they apply for
driver’s licenses ; drive on the roads; or sign up with their local utilities to get access to heat , water and
electricity . ICE has built its dragnet surveillance system by crossing legal and ethical lines, leveraging the trust
that people place in state agencies and essential service providers, and exploiting the vulnerability of people who volunteer
their information to reunite with their families. Despite the incredible scope and evident civil rights implications of
ICE’s surveillance practices, the agency has managed to shroud th[e]se practices in near- total secrecy ,
evading enforcement of even the handful of laws and policies that could be invoked to impose limitations. Federal and state lawmakers, for the most
part, have yet to confront this reality. This report synthesizes what is already known about ICE surveillance with new information from thousands of previously unseen and unanalyzed records, illustrating the on-the-ground impact of ICE surveillance through
three case studies – ICE access to driver data, utility customer data and data collected about the families of unaccompanied children. The report builds on, and would not have been possible without, the powerful research, organizing and advocacy of immigrant rights organizations like
CASA, the Immigrant Defense Project, Just Futures Law, Mijente, the National Immigration Law Center (NILC), Project South and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Northern California (among many others), which have been leading the effort to expose and dissever ICE’s

American dragnet. A. Key Findings ICE surveillance is broader than people realize. It is a dragnet. Most Americans probably do not imagine that their information is captured
by ICE’s surveillance networks. In fact, ICE
has used face recognition technology to search through the driver’s license
photographs of around 1 in 3 ( 32% ) of all adults in the U.S. The agency has access to the driver’s license data of 3 in 4 (74%) adults and
tracks the movements of cars in cities home to nearly 3 in 4 (70%) adults. When 3 in 4 (74%) adults in the U.S. connected the gas, electricity, phone or internet in a
new home, ICE was able to automatically learn their new address. Almost all of that has been done warrantlessly and in secret. ICE
built its surveillance
dragnet by tapping data from private companies and state and local bureaucracies. For most of its
history, immigration enforcement in the U nited S tates was a small data affair, relying primarily on ad hoc tips
and information sharing agreements with state and local law enforcement agencies. [but] after 9/11, ICE paired
those programs with much broader initiatives , tapping vast databases held by private data brokers as well as
state and local bureaucracies historically uninvolved with law enforcement. Through those initiatives, ICE now us[ing]
information streams that
are far more expansive and updated far more frequently , including Department of Motor Vehicle ( DMV )
records and utility customer information, as well as call records , child welfare records, credit headers,
employment records, geolocation information, health care records, housing records and social media posts.
Access to those new data sets, combined with the power of algorithmic tools for sorting, matching, searching
and analysis has dramatically expanded the scope and regularity of ICE surveillance . ICE has scanned the driver’s
license photos of 1 in 3 adults. ICE has access to the driver’s license data of 3 in 4 adults. ICE tracks the movements of drivers in cities home to 3 in 4 adults. ICE
could locate 3 in 4 adults through their utility records. ICE has invested heavily in surveillance and has acquired advanced surveillance technology far earlier than

people realize. A review of over 100,000 spending transactions by ICE reveals that the agency spent approximately $2.8
billion between 2008 and 2021 on new surveillance , data collection and data-sharing initiatives. Those transactions also
reveal that ICE was building up advanced surveillance capacities roughly half a decade earlier than previously known. Until now, the earliest records obtained by the
Center on Privacy & Technology suggested that ICE began requesting and using face recognition searches on state and local data sets in 2013. However, our
research uncovered a contract from 2008 between ICE and the biometrics contractor L-1 Identity Solutions. The contract enabled ICE to access the Rhode Island
motor vehicle department’s face recognition database to “recognize criminal aliens.” That places the first known ICE face recognition searches during the waning

days of the George W. Bush administration. ICE exploits people’s vulnerability and trust in institutions to get its hands
on more data. To locate its targets, ICE takes data that people give to state and local agencies and institutions in
exchange for essential services. ICE often accesses that data without the permission or even awareness of the entity that originally collected the
information. ICE has also taken advantage of the vulnerability of unaccompanied children seeking to

reunite with their families.

As the American Immigration Council writes that millions of deportees & their children
suffer increased suicidal ideations, premature death, and countless other medical
repercussions from ICE raids,
AIC, ’21 — American Immigration Council, Washington, D.C.-based 501 nonprofit organization and
advocacy group. It was established in 1987, originally as the American Immigration Law Foundation, by
the American Immigration Lawyers Association. June 24 th 2021. “U.S Citizen Children Impacted By
Immigration Enforcement.” American Immigration Council.
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/us-citizen-children-impacted-immigration-
enforcement//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar]

In the U nited S tates today, more than 16.7 million people share a home with at least one family member, often
a parent, who is undocumented. Roughly six million of these people are children under the age of 18. Consequently,
immigration enforcement actions—and the ever-present threat of enforcement action—have significant
physical , emotional , developmental , and economic repercussions for millions of children across the country.
Deportations of parents and other family members have serious consequences that affect children—including U.S.-citizen children
—and extend to entire communities and the country as a whole . This fact sheet provides an overview of the children who are impacted by immigration enforcement actions, the challenges and risk factors
that these children face, and the existing mechanisms designed to protect children if a parent is detained or deported. Millions of U.S.-citizen children have undocumented parents and family members. 4.4 million U.S.-citizen children under the age of 18 lived with at least one
undocumented parent as of 2018. 6.1 million U.S.-citizen children under the age of 18 lived with an undocumented family member as of 2018. As many as half-a-million U.S.-citizen children experienced the deportation of at least one parent from 2011 through 2013. As of 2017,
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) holders from El Salvador, Honduras, and Haiti had an estimated 273,000 U.S.-citizen children. If these TPS designations are terminated, many of these parents will become undocumented. 17.8 million children in the United States had at least one foreign-

Immigration enforcement—and the threat of enforcement—can

born parent, including parents who were naturalized citizens, lawfully present immigrants, or undocumented immigrants, as of 2019.

negatively impact a child’s long-term health and development. A child’s risk of experiencing mental health
depression , anxiety , and severe psychological distress increases following the detention and/or
problems like

deportation of a parent. Since late 2016, doctors and service providers report having seen more children exhibiting stress- and anxiety-related
behavioral changes, including symptoms of “toxic-stress,” due to fear that a family member will be deported. Children experience toxic stress when they are

suddenly separated from their parents, which negatively impacts brain development . They are also at greater risk of
developing chronic mental health conditions that include depression and post-traumatic stress disorder [like]( PTSD ), as well
as physical conditions such as cancer , stroke , diabetes , and heart disease . A 2010 study of immigration-related
parental arrests (at home or worksites) found that the majority of children experienced at least four adverse behavioral

changes in the six months following a raid or arrest. Compared to the previous six months, children cried or were afraid more often; changed their
eating or sleeping habits; and/or were more anxious, withdrawn, clingy, angry, or aggressive. A 2020 study found that the detention or deportation of a

family member was associated with significantly higher rates of suicidal thought , alcohol use , and
aggression among Latino adolescents in Atlanta, Georgia. A 2020 study examined the impact on children, families, and communities of
worksite raids in Ohio, Texas, and Mississippi. The study found that many of the children of workers swept up in the raids exhibited signs of PTSD, including difficulty

sleeping, frequent crying, and heightened fear. Even before birth , immigration enforcement can put a child’s health at
risk. The 2008 [a]worksite raid in Postville, Iowa (the largest single-site immigration raid in U.S. history) was tied to premature and
underweight births—complications that put babies at risk for infant death or long-term health problems.
Researchers found that babies born to Latina mothers in Iowa within 37 weeks of the raid were 24 percent more likely to be
underweight compared to births over the same amount of time one year earlier. This increased risk was not evident in babies born to non-Latina white
mothers in Iowa. Fear and uncertainty among immigrant families leads to decreased participation in Medicaid and the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP). In turn, lack of health coverage through Medicaid/CHIP can hinder a child’s healthy growth and development
and threaten a family’s financial stability. U.S.-citizen children with at least one parent who is an immigrant are more likely than children with U.S.-born parents to be uninsured. Children who reside in communities that partner with ICE or are the focus of ICE raids experience negative
educational outcomes. Communities with local law enforcement agencies that choose to partner with ICE by entering into 287(g) agreements experience a large displacement of Hispanic students as families choose to leave or avoid moving into those communities. A Stanford University

Large-scale
study analyzing the effects of 287(g) agreements on public school enrollment found that when local communities entered into 287(g) agreements between 2005 and 2010, the number of Hispanic students decreased nearly 10 percent within 2 years.

raids by ICE can impact school attendance for students with friends or family members affected by raids. After a mass raid in
eastern Tennessee occurred in April 2018, more than 500 students were absent from school the following day . Educators
surveyed in 2017 and 2018 reported several concerns related to immigration enforcement, including student absences, decline in academic performance, and less
involvement from parents. Eighty-four percent of educators said students from immigrant families expressed concerns about enforcement while at school. A 2020
study analyzed the educational outcomes of Latino students in school districts located in communities where
large numbers of deportations
were taking place. The study found that the number of deportations occurring in the larger community correlated with
greater gaps between white and Latino students in terms of math achievement and chronic absenteeism.

Not only do deportations create lasting psychological & physical effects, needless
violence is suffered at the hands of border agents, William Aceves a law professor at
California Western school states that,
Aceves, '22 — William J. Aceves, law professor at California Western School of Law in San Diego. Nov
30th 2022. "Op-Ed: U.S border killings evade justice . An international commission can change that." LA
Times. https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2022-11-30/u-s-border-killings-anastasio-hernandez-
rojas-death-hearing//LFS — GOF

On May 28, 2010, Hernández-Rojas — an undocumented Mexican national and father of five — attempted to cross
from Mexico into the U.S. at the border near San Diego. He was detained by border patrol agents. He was then
violently abused , according to detailed allegations presented to the Inter-American Commission. Hernández-Rojas was punched , kicked ,
dragged , Tasered and denied medical treatment by officers. Witnesses reported that he did not attempt
to harm the officers. On recordings, he is heard screaming in pain and begging for mercy. As a result of this
brutal assault, Hernández-Rojas suffered severe physical injuries , brain damage and eventual cardiac arrest .
He died three days after being taken into custody. The San Diego medical examiner’s office ruled the death a
homicide . No criminal charges were ever filed in this case. In fact, the Justice Department declined to bring
charges against the CBP officers involved on the grounds that their actions complied with established use of force
policies. A lawsuit filed by Hernández-Rojas’ family against the United States government resulted in a $1-million settlement, but no admission of fault by U.S.
officials. For decades, the same cycle — kill , pay and deny responsibility — has continued. Since 2010, there have
been nearly 250 fatal encounters between migrants and CBP agents. Despite these deaths, few CBP officers have been
prosecuted. There have been no known convictions of agents for border killings.

Kari Hong, an assistant professor at the Boston College Law School cites that ICE
crosses legal thresholds violates free speech, and uses racial profiling all to be
unsuccessful in preventing crime,
Hong, ’19 — Kari Hong, Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School, and founder of the Boston
College Ninth Circuit Appellate Program, graduate of Columbia Law School and Swarthmore College.
2019, couldn’t find more specific date. “10 Reasons Why Congress Should Defund ICE’s Deportation
Force.” Social Change NYU. https://socialchangenyu.com/harbinger/10-reasons-why-congress-should-
defund-ices-deportation-force//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar/acronyms]

Note: *ERO = Enforcement and Removal Operations. HSI = Homeland Security Investigations.

Because [Homeland Security]HSI is targeting transnational crim [ e ] s enterprises,51 the [Enforcement and
removal operations]ERO deportation force is left arresting those who are not suspected of any current
criminal conduct. Rather, the ERO deportation force is arresting parents , workers , neighbors , family members of
citizens, and even those with green cards 52and citizenship .53 The ERO deportation force has arrested fathers dropping off their
citizen children at school,54 snatched a mother off a public street leaving her three citizen children alone,55 and even detained those married to citizens who
showed up at their green card interviews.56 These are not aberrations, but are the direct result of the agency’s current mandate.57 ICE maintains roadside

checkpoints during hurricane evacuations; it roams buses, airports, and public streets across the country asking for
papers —a scene from a World War II movie, not a slice of Americana.58 The ERO deportation force also is apparently lying to non-
citizens, falsely claiming to be the police force to secure immigration arrests of people who are not even
accused of crimes.59 Supporters of ICE argue that we need the ERO deportation force to keep us safe, but
the ERO deportation force is not even pretending to go after people who commit serious crimes. Rather, the agency
devotes its excessive government resources to harass immigrants and citizens alike and surveil those who advocate
for social justice. For example, in October 2018, ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility subpoenaed Daniel Kowalski, a U . S .
citizen who is a journalist, immigration attorney, and editor of a website used by practitioners to stay informed on immigration law.60 Mr.
Kowalski had published on his website an ICE internal memorandum that provided guidance to government attorneys regarding the recent rule changes made by
former Attorney General Sessions that make it harder for those fleeing domestic violence and gangs to qualify for asylum.61 The ICE Special Agent demanded

information from Mr. Kowalski about who had sent the memorandum. The “ summons ” was issued by ICE ( not a judge ), lacked the
force of law , and violated the First Amendment and state laws protecting journalists from revealing
their sources.62 It is unclear how and why targeting a citizen for information about a government leaker is in the
mandate of the ERO deportation force. Similarly, in November 2018, it was revealed that the ERO deportation force
had embedded informants in a Vermont-based labor organizing group. Using tactics that law enforcement agencies
typically employ to disrupt organized crime , ICE targeted labor organizers who were undocumented for
arrest and deportation .63 The ERO deportation force is responding to criticisms of irrationality and excess by doubling down and investigating lawful
permanent residents and even naturalized citizens in the hopes of deporting even more people. This list will also shortly include the DREAMers, hundreds of
thousands of those who had legal status for decades under the Temporary Protected Status programs, and veterans who were promised citizenship.64 FIFTH,

Americans are losing— not gaining —jobs from this overly aggressive deportation strategy. ICE’s
deportation efforts are hurting American workers . One Bush-era ICE raid in Postville, Iowa resulted in an entire
factory shutting down and the decimation of the town due to loss of renters , homeowners , and
customers who had previously supported the local economy.65 More recently, mom and pop businesses cannot
open during tourist season,66 racetracks cannot find workers ,67 and deportations threaten the dairy
industry, which is largely supported by immigrant labor .68 Deportations are not protecting jobs for American workers. To the
contrary, deportations of workers result in the loss of U.S. jobs and economic well-being. Indeed, our
economic prosperity requires that we welcome more immigrants , not fewer. As Shikha Dalmia has argued, “[T]he idea
that America is experiencing mass immigration is a myth . The reality is that we desperately need to pick
up the pace of immigration to maintain our work force and economic health.”69 SIXTH, the ERO deportation force
has a toxic culture that resists reform, and thus must be brought to an end. Since its inception in 2002, ICE
has been repeatedly caught making
mistakes, lying to the public , acting outside its legal authority , acting overzealously, causing preventable deaths ,

targeting law-abiding community members, and making decisions tainted by racism .70 The Obama administration
was unable to rein in and reform the internal culture of ICE that aggressively—and at times unlawfully—abused discretion, norms, and immigrants themselves.71 As
a result, it stands to reason that the problems with ICE and the ERO deportation force will not end when the Trump Administration is over.
 1AC — Profiling
We stand firmly resolved, The United States Federal Government should ban the
collection of personal data through biometric recognition technology.

On [January 26th] 2003 Berna Cruz, a Canadian citizen , was detained and questioned by US Immigration and

Naturalization Service (INS) officials at Chicago’s O’Hare International Airport, and

subsequently [was] ‘ deported ’ to India. After
returning from a three week vacation in India, Cruz was scheduled to take a connecting flight from Chicago to Toronto. On
arrival in Chicago, she met with a US Customs official who, upon examining Cruz’s Canadian passport, deemed it
‘ funky ’ and claimed that it contained unspecified chemicals . In a later interview with a reporter from the Toronto Star
newspaper, Cruz stated that she was subjected to questioning , including: ‘ How come your name is not Singh? ’ ,
‘What is a toonie?’, 1 ‘ Why do you have a Latin name ? ’, ‘ Aren’t you smart using a Spanish name ? ’ and ‘ Did you
buy this passport in Sri Lanka? ’
Two diff testimonies from different pieces of of ev—first from beginning of Browne, second from bottom of Pugliese

[Or] abuse of power that this proposed Bill may generate is exemplified by the recent treatment of Zeky ‘Zak’ Mallah, the
The

first Australian arrested and then acquitted, under Australia’s new terrorism laws. Mallah has alleged that: … prison officers beat him , repeatedly
desecrated the Koran , urinated on prayer mats and kept him in solitary confinement for nine months ,
even though he was on remand and had not been sentenced at the time. He also says he was punished by being
stripped to his underwear and kept in a bare cell for 24 hours with the air-conditioning on full blast. ‘They treated me like I
was in Guantanamo Bay,’ he said. ‘I wasn’t even convicted of terrorism. Why was I handcuffed with padlocks so
tight around me like shackles ? Why did they hold a shotgun when ever I was moved ?… They took me to
the cage, where there are no cameras. I got punched in the chest , an upper-cut to the jaw , and then they held my
hair and smashed my head into the wall .’68 The abusive treatment meted out to Mallah whilst in Silverwater prison, even though he was
on remand, was inflected by both race-hate and religious vilification; the desecration of Mallah’s prayer mat and the Koran underscores as much.

Berna Cruz and Mallah’s stories have not been isolated events, thousands of similar
encounters have plagued airports, civil institutions, and federal courts since the post-
9/11 paranoia for national security.
[***both testimonies come from the following pieces of evidence, spliced—Cruz = card A. Mallah = card B.***]

Browne, ’10 — Simone Browne, faculty at the University of Texas at Austin, BA (with honors), MA, and
PhD at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies.
February 1st 2010. “Digital Epidermalization: Race, Identity, and Biometrics.” Sage Journals, Critical
Sociology. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0896920509347144?journalCode=crsb//LFS
— GOF — [edited for contextual grammar, denoted in brackets] — Cruz ev
(Rankin 2003). This line of questioning reveals how nation profiling operates at international border crossings. In this case, Sri Lanka
is imagined as producing suspect identification to facilitate illicit travel. Cruz provided numerous identity documents for the INS officials, including her Province of
Ontario Driver’s Licence, Ontario Health Card and a letter of employment from her employer, which she had in her possession at the time. The INS officials told Cruz that her passport was forged. In this case, Cruz was subject to the customs officer’s ‘nationalizing gaze’ (Löfgren 1999) that situated her as not Canadian. In the Toronto Star interview,
Cruz stated that she was given the option of either being sent to India or to jail, and that her repeated requests to contact Canadian officials were ignored. Instead, her passport was cut and each page was marked ‘expedited removal’. An expedited removal order, once issued at the prerogative of a customs official, cannot be contested. Cruz was placed on a Kuwaiti Airlines flight to
India. Cruz was eventually issued an emergency passport that was affixed to her damaged one through the Canadian consulate in Dubai, where officials verified that her now defaced passport was not counterfeit or altered but was indeed genuine (Cruz 2003). In regard to Cruz’s ordeal, US Congressman Joseph Crowley wrote a letter to then US Secretary of Homeland Security Tom
Ridge about Cruz’s encounter, demanding an explanation about the situation. The response from the Department of Homeland Security: ‘colour of skin is not the issue. The issue at hand is the document’, and ‘what she perceives as abuse was mistaken for her own malfeasance in attempting to enter with an altered document’ (Sperry 2003). Identification documents serve as a key
technology in the contemporary management of human mobility, security applications and consumer transactions, particularly those that are state sanctioned. By putting identity into practice, identification documents, such as photo enhanced credit cards and more so passports, not only codify gender, race and often citizenship, but they also help to organize understandings of

security, the nation and its material and discursive borders. In this article, I consider the ways in which what Paul Gilroy terms ‘epidermal thinking’ (1997: 195) operates

in the discourses surrounding certain surveillance practices and their applications, with a focus on identification
documents and biometric technologies in particular. Epidermal thinking marks the epistemologies concerning sight and the
racialized body. My intent here is not in defense of ‘race-thinking’ (Gilroy 2000: 30), nor is it an effort to re-ontologize race, but to situate
biometric tech nology as a technique through which the cultural production and the visual economy of
race can be understood. Following Eugene Thacker’s call for a ‘critical genomic consciousness’ (2005: 172) in relation to biotechnology, what I am
suggesting here is that we must engage a critical biometric consciousness as well. A critical biometric [that]consciousness entails

informed public debate , accountability by the state and the private sector and sees biometric technology as a human
technology, where the ownership of and access to one’s own body data and other intellectual property that is generated from one’s body data must

be understood as a human right .

**GAP BETWEEN EVIDENCE**

Pugliese, ’14 — Joseph Pugliese, Associate Professor Joseph Pugliese lectures in the Department of
Critical and Cultural Studies, Macquarie University. July 8 th 2014. “In Silico Race and the Heteronomy of
Biometric Proxies: Biometrics in the Context of Civilian Life, Border Security and Counter-Terrorism
Laws.” Australian Feminist Law Journal. https://doi.org/10.1080/13200968.2005.10854342//LFS — GOF
6. ‘ELECTIVE DICTATORSHIP’55 AND THE WAR OF TERROR: BIOMETRIC TEMPLATES AS PROXIES FOR CRIMINALISATION In the context of everyday life, the digital
segregation that results from biometric FTE divides into the three fundamental categories that constitute the practical application of biometric systems; it can
preclude a subject from gaining: ‘logical access to data or information’; ‘physical access to tangible materials or controlled areas’; as well as identifying or verifying

‘the identity of an individual from a database or token.’56 The racialised practices of digital segregation that I have been discussing
dovetail perfectly with what David Lyon, in his analysis of surveillance post September 11, terms ‘digital discrimination,’ which ‘ consists of the ways in

which the flows of personal data — abstracted information — are sifted and channelled in the process of risk
assessment , to privilege some and disadvantage others, to accept some as legitimately present and reject others ,’ and this is
‘increasingly done in advance of any offence.’57 As I have discussed elsewhere, the crux of the problem in the discriminatory
deployment of biometric technologies post 9/11 resides precisely in the fact that discrimination occurs ‘in
advance of any offence,’ in the context of the targeted subject being compelled to inhabit that fraught ‘modality of the quasiprior.’ The modality of the
quasi-prior enunciates the manner in which targeted racialised subjects (such as those identified by the ethnic descriptor

‘ of Middle Eastern appearance ’ ) are, already in advance of their actual identities, erroneously precomprehended and often
unjustly apprehended by technologies and figures of surveillance .58 As Lyons explains, in the paranoiac post 9/11
climate, ‘systems [are] being developed…to create a “threat index” for each passenger.’59 This racialised ‘ threat index ’ has, in the wake of
the London bombings, been
transposed beyond the confines of airport security to the contexts of everyday Australian life.
Michael Roach, former ASIO Assistant Director, has publicly advocated that ‘the public’ deploy their mobile phone

cameras in order to photograph figures of ‘ Middle Eastern appearance acting suspiciously ’ : ‘They [the public] need
to be given a criteria as to what they should be looking for and there is a criteria. What the public needs to be looking for, what trained officials need to be looking
for, is somebody standing in a corner, somebody who is holding onto their backpack, somebody who looks really concerned and anxious…And [of] Middle Eastern

appearance.’60 As I have argued elsewhere, the ethnic descriptor ‘of Middle Eastern appearance’ is a fundamentally flawed and
untenable category, as the racialised entity it attempts to represent exceeds the geopolitical and ethnic
bounds of any identifiable figure , precisely because it encompasses an impossible heterogeneity of
nationalities and bodies that fall outside of the Orientalist construct of the ‘Middle East’; as such, the figure ‘of Middle
Eastern appearance’ is compelled to inhabit the paradoxical ‘locus of the non’ (non-legal subject inhabiting no geography as such).61 What Roach’s exhortation
underscores is an implicit racialised caesura between ‘the public’ — as the representative, normative white corpus of the nation — and that racialised

target of hyper-surveillance — figures of ‘Middle Eastern appearance’ — who, by definition, occupy an other space located outside the corpus of
the nation: even as they live and work within the civic spaces of the nation, they are simultaneously positioned as
interlopers who must be kept under constant surveillance and who are now at risk, with the proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill 2005,
of being detained without charge for two weeks under the law of ‘preventative detention.’62 The law of ‘preventative detention’ will ensure, in the words of Joseph
Wakim, Australian Arab Council of Victoria, that Australia’s Arab and/or Muslim citizens ‘will be treated as guilty until proven innocent.’63 This proposed law, in
other words, will function to criminalise a subject before the fact of having committed any criminal offence: in advance of the fact, the subject will not only be found
guilty, they may also risk being detained without being told why they are being held. The proposed Bill enables a new regime of hyper-surveillance: it empowers the police with stronger ‘stop, question and search powers’
and it states that a person served with a ‘control order’ be ‘require[d] to wear a tracking device.’64 Under the powers of the ‘preventative detention’ order, a suspect will also be compelled to give such identificatory biometric material as ‘fingerprints, recordings, samples of handwriting
or photographs.’65 Most disturbing of all, the Bill allows for a ‘shoot-to-kill’ policy with regard to persons who attempt to resist being taken into custody or who, detained under a ‘preventative detention’ order, attempt to escape.66 In the words of the Australian iman Sheik Taj el-Din al
Hilaly,‘These laws are akin to holding a M-16 and pointing it at the Muslim population. It makes things worse and that’s the advice I have given politicians.’67

Mallah citation and ev^^

Biometric profiling seeps into everyday life—privilege exercised through the police
and normalization makes systemic discrimination okay
Kaudman, ’16 — Emily Kaufman, University of Kentucky., Lexington, United States, PhD, Geography,
M.A in Socio-legal studies . November 2016. “Policing mobilities through bio-spatial profiling in New
York City.” Political Geography, Volume 55, November 2016, Pages 72-81.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0962629816300828//LFS — GOF

The discourse of state racism has evolved to obscure its racist nature. Race has ceased to be a socially or
legally accepted justification for discrimination (Alexander, 2012: 2). Instead, writes Michelle Alexander, “we use our criminal
justice system to label people of color ‘ criminals ’ ” against whom “it is perfectly legal to discriminate…in
nearly all the ways it was once legal to discriminate against African Americans” (2012: 2). This systematic state discrimination achieves an

internal coherence and domination in the US through an interweaving of fear of the enemy within, and calculated aggression
directed at ‘the other’ (Feldman, 2004: 331). Cities, as sites of unscripted interactions with ‘the other,’ are the stage on
which this symbiosis plays out. New York in particular, as a global city, is marked both by cosmopolitanism and great diversity as well as racialized
tropes of the ‘other’ and a Janus-faced city government that has “vacillated between celebrating and enhancing such diversity, on the one hand, and repressing it,
on the other” (Fincher & Jacobs, 1998: 1). While New York was hardly new to contact with ‘the other,’ the
9/11 attacks mobilized the
construction of a vulnerable nation embarking on uncharted ground. Pre-existing conditions of hyper-mobility and
connectivity were depicted as new threats and longstanding processes of ‘othering’ were drawn upon, embodied in statement by former US
Secretary of Homeland Security, Tom Ridge: “as the world community has become more connected through the globalization of technology, transportation,
commerce and communication, the benefits of globalization available to peace loving, freedom loving people are available to terrorists as well” (in Amoore, 2006:

339). This perceived risk arising from proximity has been hugely influential in securitizing policy in the city. The
attacks led not only to violent retaliation in the form of war, but to the justification of heightened policies of
containment and control at home. Emblematic of these internal mobility-controlling policies is Operation Impact , which identified
high-crime neighborhoods and flooded these Impact Zones with what the New York Times called “a small army ” of new
graduates of the NYPD's training academy (Rivera et al., 2010). In its first year it deployed around 800 officers per day to 19 zones. New
York's longest-serving Police Commissioner, Raymond Kelly, called the program “an all-out blitz on crime: by carefully analyzing where crimes are located, we are
able to strategically target areas with the greatest propensity for crime” (Kelly in www.nyc.gov, 2003). Current Police Commissioner William Bratton (appointed by
Mayor De Blasio in 2014) expressed hope to expand Operation Impact, calling it an “extraordinarily good program” (in Parascandola, 2014). Besides the rare
celebratory comment, Zones are invisibilized in various ways. Information
on the number and location of zones is not public ly
available, and NYPD officials have declined my inquiries, refusing to acknowledge the program's existence . Impact Zones are
also hidden by Saskia Sassen's (2000: 82) “new geography of centers and margins,” which allows zones within cities to “become increasingly peripheral, increasingly
excluded from the major economic processes that are seen as fueling economic growth in the new global economy.” Thus Impact Zones are
hidden not only by topography (physical distance, rivers separating boroughs), but topology as well, in the sense that “class
confrontation is diffused through urban fragmentation and segregation ” (Secor, 2013: 432). Some topological
boundaries, even while physically permeable—an industrial park, above-ground train tracks, highways, a busy avenue—enhance the perception of segregated urban
fragments. Impact Zones can hide even from those who find themselves within one. As Mat Coleman and Angela Stuesse (2016) observed researching mobile

checkpoints, what is felt as a constant state for its targets may be experienced as a disappearing state for researchers in search of it. When militarized
policing becomes part of everyday life, life goes on around it, which can mask its deep-seated effects from the
casual observer. This masking can be temporal: because most officers arrive at night, it is possible to pass through an Impact Zone by day and not see many
police officers. A visitor to the Zone might not notice the ubiquitous surveillance cameras affixed to apartment buildings, stores, and telephone poles, and may not
recognize crane-carrying NYPD vans as mobile surveillance stations. Militarized policing can also be obscured by its increasing banality. Katz (2007) builds upon
Billig's ‘banal nationalism’ to highlight what she calls ‘banal terrorism’: “everyday, routinized, barely noticed reminders of terror or the threat of an always already
presence of terrorism in our midst” (Katz, 2007: 350). Impact Zones
display a melding of ‘banal terrorism’ and ‘banal criminality’; a
militarized post-9/11 police presence has become part of residents' everyday life. Yet banality is not synonymous
with invisibility, even to those whose view is already obscured by various markers of privilege. As Nyers (2010: 250) points out, “ Acts of security seek
to provide protection from danger, freedom from doubt, and relief of anxiety,” for some, while they simultaneously “encourage fear,
foster apprehension, and feed off of nervousness in the population.” This “double movement to security” (Nyers, 2010: 250) can at once reassure and worry an
individual, but it can also work simultaneously to reassure one subset of the population, while encouraging fear in others. That is, privilege does not always obscure
acts of security, but can bring them into view. Nonetheless, as a white researcher, I cannot see or experience militarized policing the same way as its targets. Thus

the militarized urbanism (Graham, 2010) of these zones is masked by space, time, and privilege—and additionally
obscured by its banality. It is under-reported in the media, and largely ignored by the social sciences (Coleman, 2016). This paper analyzes the
city's advanced police profiling technologies , which, despite their partial obscurity, are part of thousands of New Yorkers' everyday lives,
particularly in Impact Zones. The profiling is racial, social, biometric, and spatial, and works to demarcate not only
dangerous people but dangerous places as well. At the neighborhood scale, the practices also mark ‘dangerous’ mobilities, for
the ways residents move through their neighborhood, from the transportation they take to the times and routes they travel , are

marked as differentially suspect by police. In turn, this profiling of dangerous people, places, and mobilities shapes
residents' mobility, policing it through fear . While profiling is often described using a single attribute , such
as “racial profiling,” the multiple intertwined layers of the NYPD's profiling can further obfuscate its practices, making them
less visible, less clear, and more difficult to contest. This complexity calls for a new conceptual apparatus to challenge the NYPD's
simultaneously violent and elusive tactics. Here, I introduce an analytic called bio-spatial profiling to refer[s] to the police practices of

biometric, biopolitical, and spatial profiling —and to help identify how these enhance or obscure each other. The analytic also calls attention
to the lived experience of those profiled. While no single analytic could encapsulate a population's everyday lives, the term does highlight the interplay of forces
shaping the lives of those targeted within Zones.

When evaluating each team’s claims you should prefer structural violence first
because large-scale threats of future suffering stake a hegemonic claim on moral
urgency that makes the violence of imperialism invisible, deferring its priority to a
future that won’t come.
Olson, ’15 — (Elizabeth Olson, prof of geography at UNC Chapel Hill, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting
and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)//recut by GOF—[edited for
contextual grammar]

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the
body is increasingly
set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted
suffering . Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can
distort moral reasoning . Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious
and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to
worry about :¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so
high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at
stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the
urgency to secure the
state, the citizenry, the economy[etc.], or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of
response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as
impulsive and thus requiring management . McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate
security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral
reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only
fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently
suffering cannot be urgent , because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be
suffering everywhere in some future time . Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in
writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street
and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns
are institutionalized , the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and
coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-
scale emergency is a ‘ built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies . The
urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage
(e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing
on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151)
of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and
vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency
planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the
urgencies of the body provide justifications for social
exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future
emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of
preparedness and risk avoidance . Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to
explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible
actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state.
But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed
priority of the large-scale future emergency , the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non
sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent .¶ If the important ethical work of
urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future
emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting
compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see
Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes,
‘waiting
… produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those
which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that
though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed
Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence
experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010:
186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and
open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of
study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the
present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards
infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul
suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any
value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for
essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of
indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that
waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012:
loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures
domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect
surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting
can therefore function as a potentially important
spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing
individuals , but also to retain claims over moral urgency . But there is growing resistance to the
capture of claims of urgency by the elite , and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of
containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming

urgency for the body . In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps ,
geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of
waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi
resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their
own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees
stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that
demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being
that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the
challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view , and also
reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of
struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it
is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked
– by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify
the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful
suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be
instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and
representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated
experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not
touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when
the urgent body is rendered as only waiting , both
materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006).
Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as
private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other
forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait ,
has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional
scope of large-scale futures . It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate
scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of
urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-
scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body . This
bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention
center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others,
the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g.
Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes
normative biases against subjugated people , and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle
where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still
should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires
a debate about what really cannot wait . My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of
urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. ¶ I conclude, however, by pulling
together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as
racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the
discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been
stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not
taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an
acknowledgement that thetemporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in
creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future
concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption
of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will
certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as
fertile ground for radical critique , a truly fierce urgency for now.

Thus the United States should ban the use of biometric technologies first because of
their prominence in racial profiling.
2AC — April
2AC — Profiling — O/V
 2AC — Profiling — O/V

We affirm a ban on personal data biometrics because when following the stories of
Berna Cruz and Zeky Mallah we can access narratives of biometrics that are often
silenced by big business and government agencies that sell such technology and use it
to legally discriminate leading to extreme inequalities and unfair treatment of
minorities—biometric data gathering makes this task infinitely easier—allowing law
enforcement to target ethnicities for crime based on groundless stereotypes. J.D
Stilton a graduate of Minnesota Law School writes that,
Stilton, ’02 — J.D Stilton, B.A., University of Michigan, University of Minnesota Law School JD, Law.
June 2002. “U.S. Prisons and Racial Profiling: A Covertly Racist Nation Rides a Vicious Cycle.” Minnesota
Journal of Law & Inequality. https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/cgi/viewc
ontent.cgi?article=1035&context=lawineq&source=post_page//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual
grammar]

While some segments of society may benefit from this prison boom, 10 its effect on African Americans is devastating: while
making up only
approximately 12% of the U.S. population , African Americans constitute 49% of its inmates." The War on Drugs, in

addition to contributing to the prison explosion, further perpetuates this lopsided demographic. 12 Inextricably linked with the War on Drugs, racial
profiling is a vehicle for propagating racial disparity in prisons. 13 In an effort to fight this War, our nation has focused its attack on
inner cities, and consequently, a disproportionate number of African Americans. 14 Because African Americans constitute only thirteen percent of U.S. drug users,1

5 this battle is in effect a War on Blacks. The result: drug use is just as prevalent as before, 16 drug-related incarcerations are up eleven-fold , 17
and African Americans constitute the overwhelming majority of these drug-related incarcerations.' 8 In spite of its
prevalence throughout history, racial profiling has only recently come to the attention of the U.S.
general public. 19 As a result of its newfound notoriety, racial profiling has become as important a political topic as strict law enforcement. 20 During the
second of the three 2000 presidential debates, Vice President Al Gore promised that if elected, his first act as President would be to issue an executive order
banning racial profiling. 21 Then Governor George W. Bush responded that he did not want to "federalize" the local police, but he did agree that something needed

to be done about racial profiling.22 That " something needs to be done " grossly understates the urgent need for
drastic reform in this country's [in our] law enforcement , legislative , and judicial systems . Racial profiling
and racial disparity in prisons are self-perpetuating problems that require practical solutions stronger than the
present protections available under the Constitution and civil rights legislation, which combat primarily manifest racism. 23
Legislation must be designed to attack the covert or "unconscious" racism that fuels and fosters racial profiling
and racial disparity in prisons.
 2AC — ICE — O/V

The Immigrations Customs and Enforcement agency, or ICE, has proliferated biometric
surveillance to raid migrants and deport them using camera’s on public locations,
illegally or not like the stories of Javier and Emiliano. Because biometrics are key to
identifying migrants, a ban would halt psychological and intercommunal violence
against these communities.
 2AC — Framing — O/V

When evaluating the consequences of each argument you should weigh structural
violence, i.e implicit racism, systemic inequalities, etc. over far fetched scenario’s like
[x] — there are a few reasons to prefer our method.

1 — Black and brown communities have always been placed on the back burner when
it comes to litigation, preferring big stick impacts continues to ignore their suffering.

2 — You should prefer linear impacts before ones that rely on a threshold i.e,
psychological violence is happening in the status quo but [x] is improbable and
ahistorical.
2AC — Pre-empts
2AC — AT: Case
 2AC —AT: Non-bias

1 — It doesn’t matter if the technology itself lacks bias, it unlocks the ability for law
enforcement to collect targeted data.
2 — We’ve given testimonials, examples of selective search, quotes from security
officials and the stories of Berna Cruz and Zeky Mallah—the negative can’t disprove
this empirical evidence.
2AC — AT: Neg Case
 2AC — AT: Definition

1 — The term “Biometric Identifiers” excludes things that can find criminals, affirming
the resolution doesn’t make law enforcement impossible,
Illinois General Assembly, ‘ND — IGA, legislature of the U.S. state of Illinois. It has two chambers,
the Illinois House of Representatives and the Illinois Senate. No Date Identifiable. “ Biometric
Information Privacy Act.” IGA. https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?
ActID=3004&ChapterID=57#:~:text =Biometric%20identifiers%20do%20not%20include,hair%20color
%2C%20or%20eye%20color.//LFS — GOF

" Biometric identifier " means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint , voiceprint, or scan of hand or face
geometry. Biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human biological
samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo descriptions , or physical descriptions
such as height , weight , hair color, or eye color. Biometric identifiers do not include donated organs, tissues, or parts as defined in the
Illinois Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or potential recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by a
federally designated organ procurement agency. Biometric identifiers do not include biological materials regulated under the Genetic Information Privacy Act.
Biometric identifiers do not include information captured from a patient in a health care setting or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment,
payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Biometric identifiers do not include an X-ray, roentgen
process, computed tomography, MRI, PET scan, mammography, or other image or film of the human anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or
other medical condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening.
 2AC — AT: Framing

1 —The sheer improbability of [x] and current suffering of minorities because of

biometric profiling makes weighing them easy.
2 — Large-scale threats of future suffering stake a hegemonic claim on moral urgency
that makes the violence of imperialism invisible, deferring its priority to a future that
won’t come.
Olson, ’15 — (Elizabeth Olson, prof of geography at UNC Chapel Hill, ‘Geography and Ethics I: Waiting
and Urgency,’ Progress in Human Geography, vol. 39 no. 4, pp. 517-526)//recut—[edited for contextual
grammar]

Though toileting might be thought of as a special case of bodily urgency, geographic research suggests that the
body is increasingly
set at odds with larger scale ethical concerns, especially large-scale future events of forecasted
suffering . Emergency planning is a particularly good example in which the large-scale threats of future suffering can
distort moral reasoning . Žižek (2006) lightly develops this point in the context of the war on terror, where in the presence of fictitious
and real ticking clocks and warning systems, the urgent body must be bypassed because there are bigger scales to
worry about :¶ What does this all-pervasive sense of urgency mean ethically? The pressure of events is so overbearing, the stakes are so
high, that they nec essitate a suspension of ordinary ethical concerns. After all, displaying moral qualms when the lives of millions are at
stake plays into the hands of the enemy. (Žižek, 2006)¶ In the presence of large-scale future emergency, the
urgency to secure the
state, the citizenry, the economy[etc.], or the climate creates new scales and new temporal orders of
response (see Anderson, 2010; Baldwin, 2012; Dalby, 2013; Morrissey, 2012), many of which treat the urgent body as
impulsive and thus requiring management . McDonald’s (2013) analysis of three interconnected discourses of ‘climate
security’ illustrates how bodily urgency in climate change is also recast as a menacing impulse that might require exclusion from moral
reckoning. The logics of climate security, especially those related to national security, ‘can encourage perverse political responses that not only
fail to respond effectively to climate change but may present victims of it as a threat’ (McDonald, 2013: 49). Bodies that are currently
suffering cannot be urgent , because they are excluded from the potential collectivity that could be
suffering everywhere in some future time . Similar bypassing of existing bodily urgency is echoed in
writing about violent securitization, such as drone warfare (Shaw and Akhter, 2012), and also in intimate scales like the street
and the school, especially in relation to race (Mitchell, 2009; Young et al., 2014).¶ As large-scale urgent concerns
are institutionalized , the urgent body is increasingly obscured through technical planning and
coordination (Anderson and Adey, 2012). The predominant characteristic of this institutionalization of large-
scale emergency is a ‘ built-in bias for action’ (Wuthnow, 2010: 212) that circumvents contingencies . The
urgent body is at best an assumed eventuality, one that will likely require another state of waiting, such as triage
(e.g. Greatbach et al., 2005). Amin (2013) cautions that in much of the West, governmental need to provide evidence of laissez-faire governing
on the one hand, and assurance of strength in facing a threatening future on the other, produces ‘just-in-case preparedness’ (Amin, 2013: 151)
of neoliberal risk management policies. In the US, ‘personal ingenuity’ is built into emergency response at the expense of the poor and
vulnerable for whom ‘[t]he difference between abjection and bearable survival’ (Amin, 2013: 153) will not be determined by emergency
planning, but in the material infrastructure of the city.¶ In short, the
urgencies of the body provide justifications for social
exclusion of the most marginalized based on impulse and perceived threat, while large-scale future
emergencies effectively absorb the deliberative power of urgency into the institutions of
preparedness and risk avoidance . Žižek references Arendt’s (2006) analysis of the banality of evil to
explain the current state of ethical reasoning under the war on terror, noting that people who perform morally reprehensible
actions under the conditions of urgency assume a ‘tragic-ethic grandeur’ (Žižek, 2006) by sacrificing their own morality for the good of the state.
But his analysis fails to note that bodies are today so rarely legitimate sites for claiming urgency. In the context of the assumed
priority of the large-scale future emergency , the urgent body becomes literally nonsense, a non
sequitur within societies, states and worlds that will always be more urgent .¶ If the important ethical work of
urgency has been to identify that which must not wait, then the capture of the power and persuasiveness of urgency by large-scale future
emergencies has consequences for the kinds of normative arguments we can raise on behalf of urgent bodies. How, then, might waiting
compare as a normative description and critique in our own urgent time? Waiting can be categorized according to its purpose or outcome (see
Corbridge, 2004; Gray, 2011), but it also modifies the place of the individual in society and her importance. As Ramdas (2012: 834) writes,
‘waiting
… produces hierarchies which segregate people and places into those which matter and those
which do not’. The segregation of waiting might produce effects that counteract suffering, however, and Jeffery (2008: 957) explains that
though the ‘politics of waiting’ can be repressive, it can also engender creative political engagement. In his research with educated unemployed
Jat youth who spend days and years waiting for desired employment, Jeffery finds that ‘the temporal suffering and sense of ambivalence
experienced by young men can generate cultural and political experiments that, in turn, have marked social and spatial effects’ (Jeffery, 2010:
186). Though this is not the same as claiming normative neutrality for waiting, it does suggest that waiting is more ethically ambivalent and
open than urgency.¶ In other contexts, however, our descriptions of waiting indicate a strong condemnation of its effects upon the subjects of
study. Waiting can demobilize radical reform, depoliticizing ‘the insurrectionary possibilities of the
present by delaying the revolutionary imperative to a future moment that is forever drifting towards
infinity’ (Springer, 2014: 407). Yonucu’s (2011) analysis of the self-destructive activities of disrespected working-class youth in Istanbul
suggests that this sense of infinite waiting can lead not only to depoliticization, but also to a disbelief in the possibility of a future self of any
value. Waiting, like urgency, can undermine the possibility of self-care two-fold, first by making people wait for
essential needs, and again by reinforcing that waiting is ‘[s]omething to be ashamed of because it may be noted or taken as evidence of
indolence or low status, seen as a symptom of rejection or a signal to exclude’ (Bauman, 2004: 109). This is why Auyero (2012) suggests that
waiting creates an ideal state subject, providing ‘temporal processes in and through which political subordination is produced’ (Auyero, 2012:
loc. 90; see also Secor, 2007). Furthermore, Auyero notes, it is not only political subordination, but the subjective effect of waiting that secures
domination, as citizens and non-citizens find themselves ‘waiting hopefully and then frustratedly for others to make decisions, and in effect
surrendering to the authority of others’ (Auyero, 2012: loc. 123).¶ Waiting
can therefore function as a potentially important
spatial technology of the elite and powerful, mobilized not only for the purpose of governing
individuals , but also to retain claims over moral urgency . But there is growing resistance to the
capture of claims of urgency by the elite , and it is important to note that even in cases where the material conditions of
containment are currently impenetrable, arguments based on human value are at the forefront of reclaiming

urgency for the body . In detention centers, clandestine prisons, state borders and refugee camps ,
geographers point to ongoing struggles against the ethical impossibility of bodily urgency and a rejection of states of
waiting (see Conlon, 2011; Darling, 2009, 2011; Garmany, 2012; Mountz et al., 2013; Schuster, 2011). Ramakrishnan’s (2014) analysis of a Delhi
resettlement colony and Shewly’s (2013) discussion of the enclave between India and Bangladesh describe people who refuse to give up their
own status as legitimately urgent, even in the context of larger scale politics. Similarly, Tyler’s (2013) account of desperate female detainees
stripping off their clothes to expose their humanness and suffering in the Yarl’s Wood Immigration Removal Centre in the UK suggests that
demands for recognition are not just about politics, but also about the acknowledgement of humanness and the irrevocable possibility of being
that which cannot wait. The continued existence of places like Yarl’s Wood and similar institutions in the USA nonetheless points to the
challenge of exposing the urgent body as a moral priority when it is so easily hidden from view , and also
reminds us that our research can help to explain the relationships between normative dimensions and the political and social conditions of
struggle.¶ In closing, geographic depictions of waiting do seem to evocatively describe otherwise obscured suffering (e.g. Bennett, 2011), but it
is striking how rarely these descriptions also use the language of urgency. Given the discussion above, what might be accomplished – and risked
– by incorporating urgency more overtly and deliberately into our discussions of waiting, surplus and abandoned bodies? Urgency can clarify
the implicit but understated ethical consequences and normativity associated with waiting, and encourage explicit discussion about harmful
suffering. Waiting can be productive or unproductive for radical praxis, but urgency compels and requires response. Geographers could be
instrumental in reclaiming the ethical work of urgency in ways that leave it open for critique, clarifying common spatial misunderstandings and
representations. There is good reason to be thoughtful in this process, since moral outrage towards inhumanity can itself obscure differentiated
experiences of being human, dividing up ‘those for whom we feel urgent unreasoned concern and those whose lives and deaths simply do not
touch us, or do not appear as lives at all’ (Butler, 2009: 50). But when
the urgent body is rendered as only waiting , both
materially and discursively, it is just as easily cast as impulsive, disgusting, animalistic (see also McKittrick, 2006).
Feminist theory insists that the urgent body, whose encounters of violence are ‘usually framed as
private, apolitical and mundane’ (Pain, 2014: 8), are as deeply political, public, and exceptional as other
forms of violence (Phillips, 2008; Pratt, 2005). Insisting that a suffering body, now, is that which cannot wait ,
has the ethical effect of drawing it into consideration alongside the political, public and exceptional
scope of large-scale futures . It may help us insist on the body, both as a single unit and a plurality, as a legitimate
scale of normative priority and social care.¶ In this report, I have explored old and new reflections on the ethical work of
urgency and waiting. Geographic research suggests a contemporary popular bias towards the urgency of large-
scale futures, institutionalized in ways that further obscure and discredit the urgencies of the body . This
bias also justifies the production of new waiting places in our material landscape, places like the detention
center and the waiting room. In some cases, waiting is normatively neutral, even providing opportunities for alternative politics. In others,
the technologies of waiting serve to manage potentially problematic bodies, leading to suspended suffering and even to extermination (e.g.
Wright, 2013). One of my aims has been to suggest that moral reasoning is important both because it exposes
normative biases against subjugated people , and because it potentially provides routes toward struggle
where claims to urgency seem to foreclose the possibilities of alleviation of suffering. Saving the world still
should require a debate about whose world is being saved, when, and at what cost – and this requires
a debate about what really cannot wait . My next report will extend some of these concerns by reviewing how feelings of
urgency, as well as hope, fear, and other emotions, have played a role in geography and ethical reasoning. ¶ I conclude, however, by pulling
together past and present. In 1972, Gilbert White asked why geographers were not engaging ‘the truly urgent questions’ (1972: 101) such as
racial repression, decaying cities, economic inequality, and global environmental destruction. His question highlights just how much the
discipline has changed, but it is also unnerving in its echoes of our contemporary problems. Since White’s writing, our moral reasoning has been
stretched to consider the future body and the more-than-human, alongside the presently urgent body – topics and concerns that I have not
taken up in this review but which will provide their own new possibilities for urgent concerns. My own hope presently is drawn from an
acknowledgement that thetemporal characteristics of contemporary capitalism can be interrupted in
creative ways (Sharma, 2014), with the possibility of squaring the urgent body with our large-scale future
concerns. Temporal alternatives already exist in ongoing and emerging revolutions and the disruption
of claims of cycles and circular political processes (e.g. Lombard, 2013; Reyes, 2012). Though calls for urgency will
certainly be used to obscure evasion of responsibility (e.g. Gilmore, 2008: 56, fn 6), they may also serve as
fertile ground for radical critique , a truly fierce urgency for now.
 2AC — AT: Trafficking

1 — They have no evidence that says advances in biometrics will stop trafficking — it’s
easy to assume that traffickers are going to keep trafficking, i.e smugglers

2 — Most traffickers abide by the law when transporting victims—making biometrics

obsolete
Chan, ’19 — Evangeline M. Chan, . 05/04/19. “DNA testing at the southern border won’t prevent
smuggling or human trafficking.” The Hill. https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/442104-dna-testing-
at-the-southern-border-wont-prevent-smuggling-or-human//LFS — GOF

In addition, what we know from our work assisting hundreds of trafficking victims that most
traffickers do not attempt to bring their
victims into the country by crossing the border illegally, presenting themselves to border officials and
requesting asylum. Most trafficking victims enter the country legally at ports of entry but under false promises or pretexts,
later to be subjected to labor and/or sex trafficking. Moreover, we occasionally have seen children trafficked by their own parents. DNA
testing at the border would not prevent that. Which raises the third concern — what happens to children and families after the test? Last summer, the federal
government was required by court order and executive order to end forced family separations. Despite this, reports have emerged that the practice continues at an
alarming rate, under the guise of suspected fraud or the “safety of the child”. Worse yet is that the
government still does not have an
accurate and reliable system of tracking children after they have left government custody or for reuniting families that
have been separated. This places vulnerable children at far greater risk of being trafficked.

3 — The U.S is solving this issue now with the National Action Plan to Combat Human
Trafficking without biometrics
White House Briefing, ’21 — The White house, yeah they’re pretty cool sometimes. December 3 rd,
2021. “FACT SHEET: The National Action Plan to Combat Human Trafficking (NAP).” White House
Domain. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/03/fact-sheet-the-
national-action-plan-to-combat-human-trafficking-nap//LFS — GOF

The N ational A ction P lan to Combat Human Trafficking is grounded in an integrated federal response to human trafficking. It
emphasizes the importance of collaboration across government when investing resources in anti-trafficking policies and programs.
Because human trafficking is a complex issue that cuts across many federal agencies’ mandates, the National Action Plan is focused on actions and

directs resources to where they are most needed. The Action Plan also emphasizes collaboration with
state and local governments, the private sector , and non-governmental partners. The Plan draws on survivor voices and
recommendations over the years on how to prevent human trafficking and provide the appropriate resources to protect and
respond to the needs of individuals who have experienced human trafficking. Survivor engagement is critical for empowerment and establishing effective

victim-centered and trauma-informed anti-trafficking policies and strategies. The National Action Plan emphasizes recommendations from
survivor-led groups , including the United States Advisory Council on Human Trafficking, to include input from individuals with lived experiences within
our strategic responses. The National Action Plan retains a central focus on the foundational pillar s of U.S. and global
anti-trafficking efforts – prevention, protection, prosecution, and partnerships: PREVENTION: Strategic prevention programs are
wide-ranging , from educating vulnerable populations and mitigating risk factors to seeking to prevent goods produced with forced
labor from entering U.S. markets.
 Enhance education and outreach efforts , including for at-risk populations.

Enhance community-coordinated responses to human trafficking.

Strengthen efforts to identify, prevent, and address human trafficking in global supply chains.

Build capacity to prevent the importation of goods produced with forced labor.
Address aspects of nonimmigrant visa programs that may facilitate the exploitation of visa applicants and visa holders.

PROTECTION: Protection encompasses the interventions, services, and supports needed to protect and assist victims of human trafficking.
Protection starts with robust outreach and proactive identification efforts, and includes providing comprehensive victim services and applying victim-centered,
trauma-informed strategies. Identify and engage with victims in a victim-centered, trauma-informed, and culturally competent manner. Support survivor-
informed interventions, in which survivors of trafficking are essential partners and help to improve service delivery and inform victim assistance policy
decisions. Seek to protect victims of human trafficking from incarceration , fines, or penalties for unlawful acts committed as a direct

result of being subjected to trafficking. Improve access to immigration benefits to help provide assistance to victims of human trafficking.

Expand and improve assistance to victims of human trafficking encountered by law enforcement agencies. Seek financial remedies for victims of human
trafficking. Increase access to social services for victims of human trafficking to increase short- and long-term stability. PROSECUTION: Prosecution

involves holding individuals and entities engaged in human trafficking accountable and dismantling human trafficking
networks.

Improve coordination among law enforcement to increase accountability for human trafficking.
Build capacity of Federal, state, local, Tribal and territorial law enforcement to investigate and prosecute human trafficking and its illicit proceeds using
a trauma-informed, victim-centered approach.

Enhance efforts to bring traffickers to justice by deploying a broad range of tools, including, where appropriate, financial
sanctions, federal contracting suspension and debarment, and travel restrictions.

Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute forced labor.

to address and combat human trafficking and forced labor.
 2AC — AT: Crime

1 — The term “Biometric Identifiers” excludes things that can find criminals, affirming
the resolution doesn’t make law enforcement impossible,
Illinois General Assembly, ‘ND — IGA, legislature of the U.S. state of Illinois. It has two chambers,
the Illinois House of Representatives and the Illinois Senate. No Date Identifiable. “ Biometric
Information Privacy Act.” IGA. https://www.ilga.gov/legislation/ilcs/ilcs3.asp?
ActID=3004&ChapterID=57#:~:text =Biometric%20identifiers%20do%20not%20include,hair%20color
%2C%20or%20eye%20color.//LFS — GOF

" Biometric identifier " means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint , voiceprint, or scan of hand or face
geometry. Biometric identifiers do not include writing samples, written signatures, photographs, human biological
samples used for valid scientific testing or screening, demographic data, tattoo descriptions , or physical descriptions
such as height , weight , hair color, or eye color. Biometric identifiers do not include donated organs, tissues, or parts as defined in the
Illinois Anatomical Gift Act or blood or serum stored on behalf of recipients or potential recipients of living or cadaveric transplants and obtained or stored by a
federally designated organ procurement agency. Biometric identifiers do not include biological materials regulated under the Genetic Information Privacy Act.
Biometric identifiers do not include information captured from a patient in a health care setting or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment,
payment, or operations under the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. Biometric identifiers do not include an X-ray, roentgen
process, computed tomography, MRI, PET scan, mammography, or other image or film of the human anatomy used to diagnose, prognose, or treat an illness or
other medical condition or to further validate scientific testing or screening.

2 — It’s a question of sequencing, the resolution mandates collection of “personal

data” be banned—if the criminal is arrested and processed only then do prosecutors
look for matches within the database where the suspect then becomes ‘federal
property’ of the government because of their criminal status and their data is no
longer personal because their rights to it have been revoked.

3 — Biometrics have only resulted in one successful trial

Valentino-DeVries, ’20 — Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, graduated from the University of Texas at
Austin and has a master’s degree from the School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University. Jan, 12th 2020. “How the Police Use Facial Recognition, and Where It Falls Short.” New York
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/12/technology/facial-recognition-police.html//LFS — GOF —
[edited for contextual grammar]

Officials in Florida say that they query the system 4,600 times a month. But the technology is no magic bullet : Only a small
percentage of the queries break open investigations of unknown suspects, the documents indicate. The tool has
been effective with clear images — identifying recalcitrant detainees, people using fake IDs and photos from anonymous social
media accounts — but when investigators have tried to put a name to a suspect glimpsed in grainy
surveillance footage , it has produced significantly fewer results . The Florida program also underscores
concerns about new technologies’ potential to violate due process . The system[s] operates with little oversight, and
its role in legal cases is not always disclosed to defendants, records show. Although officials said investigators
could not rely on facial recognition results to make an arrest, documents suggested that on occasion
officers gathered no other evidence . “It’s really being sold as this tool accurate enough to do all sorts of crazy stuff,” said Clare Garvie, a senior associate at the Center on Privacy and Technology at Georgetown Law. “It’s not

there yet.” Facial recognition has set off controversy in recent years, even as it has become an everyday tool for unlocking cellphones and tagging photos on social media. The industry has drawn in new players like Amazon, which has courted police departments, and the technology is
used by law enforcement in New York, Los Angeles, Chicago and elsewhere, as well as by the F.B.I. and other federal agencies. Data on such systems is scarce, but a 2016 study found that half of American adults were in a law enforcement facial recognition database. Police officials have
argued that facial recognition makes the public safer. But a few cities, including San Francisco, have barred law enforcement from using the tool, amid concerns about privacy and false matches. Civil liberties advocates warn of the pernicious uses of the technology, pointing to China,
where the government has deployed it as a tool for authoritarian control. In Florida, facial recognition has long been part of daily policing. The sheriff’s office in Pinellas County, on the west side of Tampa Bay, wrangled federal money two decades ago to try the technology and now serves
as the de facto facial recognition service for the state. It enables access to more than 30 million images, including driver’s licenses, mug shots and juvenile booking photos. “People think this is something new,” the county sheriff, Bob Gualtieri, said of facial recognition. “But what

everybody is getting into now, we did it a long time ago.” A Question of Due Process Only one American court is known to have ruled on the use
of facial recognition by law enforcement, and it gave credence to the idea that a defendant’s right to
the information was limited . Willie Allen Lynch was accused in 2015 of selling $50 worth of crack cocaine, after the Pinellas facial recognition
system suggested him as a likely match. Mr. Lynch, who claimed he had been misidentified, sought the images of the other possible matches; a Florida appeals court

ruled against it. He is serving an eight-year prison sentence. Any technological findings presented as evidence are subject to
analysis through special hearings, but facial recognition results have never been deemed reliable
enough to stand up to such questioning. The results still can play a significant role in investigations, though, without the judicial scrutiny
applied to more proven forensic technologies.

4 — Crime catching technology is simply inadequate

Magnet, ’11 — Shoshana Amielle Magnet, Associate Professor Feminist and Gender Studies Faculty of
Social Sciences University of Ottawa, PhD Seminar in Women's Studies. 2011, no month/day. “WHEN
Biometrics FAIL—Gender, Race, and the Technology of Identity.” Duke University Press.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9780822394822//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar, denoted in
brackets]

One of the earliest documented failures of a biometric identification system involves facial recognition technology
[was] used in Ybor City, Florida. Given the significant costs and possibilities for surveillance provided by the system, and given its use within a
predominantly Latino neighborhood, the system attracted significant media attention from its inception. In 2003 the A merican C ivil L iberties

U nion documented that, after its first year, the system worked so poorly that the police were unable to identify
a single criminal using a biometric facial recognition system that included thirty-five cameras . Although
the system was renewed for a second year, it proved so difficult , expensive , and time-consuming for the
police to use, while yielding only mismatches and failing to recognize known subjects , that it was ultimately
abandoned (Gates 2004). Other reports of biometricfailures soon followed . The ACLU (2003) obtained documentation
concerning a pilot project testing facial recognition technology at [the] Logan Airport in Boston in which
the photographs of forty employee volunteers were scanned into a database. The employees then tried to pass through two security
checkpoints equipped with biometric cameras. The volunteers could not be identified 96 times out of 249 over a period of

three months, a 39 percent failure rate. Key to these failures were lighting distinctions between the original photograph and the image
captured on the biometric cameras. A security expert, Bruce Schneier (2001 ), suggested that technological dependence on good lighting conditions might be problematic, given that it is unlikely that terrorists will stop to pose for
well-lit photographs. More recently the Face Recognition Vendor Test (frvt), conducted in 2006 and partially sponsored by the Department of Homeland Security and the fbi, concluded that the error rate for facial recognition technology has decreased since 2002, partly because the
technology is better able to identify faces across di√erent lighting environments. The ideal was set as a false rejection rate biometric failure 27 and a false acceptance rate of 1/1000. In 2002 one out of five people was not accurately identified; by 2006 one out of a hundred was not

accurately identified. However, an error rate of 1/100 is still very high. Given that the International Civil Aviation Organization standard requires that all passports eventually contain facial biometric information, and given the volume of tra≈c
that passes through airport security, this represents a significant number of people who will encounter di≈culty (P. J. Phillips et al. 2007:5). At
Logan
International Airport, which handles 27 million passengers a year, 739 people would not be correctly
biometrically identified on an average day . Even those biometric technologies that did not fail were only as strong as the privacy measures
in place to protect individual biometric information. There have already been a significant number of security breaches . At a
convention intended to showcase new biometric technologies, the fingerprint and retinal information of thirty-six people trying out vendor products accidentally
was sent by email to everyone attending the conference (Williams 2008). The
number of reports about the ease with which high-
tech biometric technologies are hacked also calls their security into question. Researchers at Yokohama National University
found that biometric fingerprint readers are easy to deceive using artificial gelatin fingers onto which a real print was dusted
(Matsumoto, Matsumoto, Yamada, and Hoshino 2002). In Germany the magazine c’t published extensive results on ways to

successfully spoof biometric[s] technologies (Thalheim, Krissler, and Ziegler 2002). Their methods included using high-quality
digital printouts of irises to deceive iris scanners, using a little water on a biometric fingerprint scanner
moving one’s head slightly from side to side to outwit facial
in order to reactivate the previous person’s latent image, and

recognition technology scanners. Marie Sandström (2004), a scientist, reproduced c’t’s success in deceiving biometric fingerprinting; she tested nine
di√erent biometric fingerprint recognition systems and found that each was fooled by an artificial gelatin imprint.
 2AC — AT: Drones

1 — T in — Collection of personal data would be banded ‘IN’ the U.S as per the
resolution although their evidence assumes the drones would be operating in foreign
countries, i.e Iraq, Syria, or Somalia where the U.S military has used them before—so
affirming the resolution wouldn’t effect data collection on the field.
2 — Immobilizing drones is good
A) Any inaccuracies lead to civilian deaths, since 9/11 there have been almost 50,000
Beaumont, ’21 — Peter Beaumont, British journalist who is the foreign affairs editor, citing U.S study
on airstrikes. September 7th 2021. “US airstrikes killed at least 22,000 civilians since 9/11, analysis finds.”
The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/sep/07/us-airstrikes-killed-at-
least-22000-civilians-since-911-analysis-finds//LFS — GOF

US drone and air strikes have killed at least 22,000 civilians – and perhaps as many as 48,000 – since the
9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, according to new analysis published by the civilian harm monitoring group Airwars. The analysis, based on the
US military’s own assertion that it has conducted almost 100,000 airstrikes since 2001, represents an attempt to
estimate the number of civilian deaths across the multiple conflicts that have comprised aspects of the “war on terror”.

B) More dangerous for global prolif

Kallenborn, ’20 — Zachary Kallenborn, Adjunct Fellow with the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Fellow at the Schar School of Policy and Government, a Research Affiliate with the
Unconventional Weapons and Technology Division of the National Consortium for the Study of
Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, B.A of
Science, Mathematics, and International Relations, Master of Non-proliferation and Terrorism Studies.
October 14th 2020. “A Partial Ban on Autonomous Weapons Would Make Everyone Safer.” Foreign
Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/10/14/ai-drones-swarms-killer-robots-partial-ban-on-
autonomous-weapons-would-make-everyone-safer//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar]

Instead of a broad ban on all autonomous weapons, the international community should identify and focus
restrictions on the highest-risk weapons: drone s warms and autonomous chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

weapons, known as CBRN weapons. A narrower focus would increase the likelihood of global agreement, while providing a normative foundation for broader
restrictions. In 2018, the tech company Intel flew 2,018 drones at once in a Guinness World Record-breaking light show in Folsom,
California. Earlier this year, Russia and China flew light shows of more than 2,000 drones too. The drones carried flashy lights and were meant as modern fireworks,

but similar drones [that] could be designed for war with thousands of guns , bombs , and missiles . A thousand-drone
swarm has a thousand points of potential error. And because drones in a true swarm communicate with one another , errors may

propagate throughout the swarm. For example, one drone may misidentify a cruise ship as an aircraft
carrier, then unleash the full might of the swarm on a few thousand civilians . The same may occur if the drone
correctly identifies the cruise ship as not a target, but the word not is lost, due to simple accident or adversary jamming . Swarm
communication also leads to emergent behavior— collective behaviors of the swarm that do not depend on the individual
parts—that further reduces both the predictability and understandability of the weapon . As P.W. Singer, a strategist and
senior fellow at New America, wrote in his book Wired for War, “a swarm takes the action on its own , which may not always be
exactly where and when the commander wants it. Nothing happens in a swarm directly, but rather through the complex relationships among the
 cheap drones can be flung one after another against
parts.” Drone swarms pose a greater threat to powerful militaries, because

expensive platforms until they fall. In 2018, a group calling itself the Free Alawites Movement claimed
responsibility for launching 13 drones made largely of plywood , duct tape , and lawnmower engines that
attacked Russia’s Khmeimim Air Base in Syria. The movement claimed the successful destruction of a $300 million S-400
surface-to-air missile system. (The exact identity of the “Free Alawites Movement” is unclear. The only attacks it has claimed are the Khmeimim attacks and
another drone attack on a Russian naval base in Syria on the same day. Sources have also attributed the attacks to the Islamic State, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and Ahrar
al-Sham.) Russian officials acknowledged the drones flew autonomously and were preprogrammed to drop bombs on the base but claim no damage was done. (The
Russian officials did not comment on whether the drones communicated with one another to make a true drone swarm.) However, in Libya, Turkish
Bayraktar TB2 drones disabled at least nine Russian air defense systems. The Bayraktar drones are considerably more
advanced than those used in Syria, but they illustrate the same principle: Drones pose major threats to air defenses and other expensive systems. An

adversary could fling tons of drones against a $1.8 billion USS Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer in an
attempt to disable or
destroy it and still have a cost advantage . Facing such a threat, great powers should choose to
lead—rather than resist—the arms control charge for certain weapons. Yes, great powers would give up the potential to unleash their own massive
swarms, but swarms are likely to favor weaker powers. If swarms are most effective when used en masse against big, expensive platforms, then major powers that
possess such expensive equipment stand to lose the most. Swarms might also be easier to control. A key arms control challenge for autonomous weapons is
knowing if a weapon is actually autonomous. At root, autonomy is just a matter of programming the weapon to fire under given conditions, however simple or
complex. A simple landmine explodes when enough weight is put upon it; an
autonomous turret fires based on analyzed
information collected from sensors and any design constraints. With autonomous weapons, an outside observer cannot tell
whether the weapon operates under predesigned rules or is being controlled remotely. However, no human
can reasonably control a swarm of thousands of drones. The complexity is simply too much . They must
monitor hundreds of video , infrared , or other feeds , while planning the swarm’s actions and deciding
who to kill. Such a massive swarm must be autonomous, may be a weapon of mass destruction in its own right, and could carry
traditional weapons of mass destruction . Discussion of autonomous weapons takes place under the auspices of the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, assuming the weapon fires bullets, bombs, or missiles. But an autonomous weapon could just as readily be armed with CBRN agents.
Autonomous vehicles are a great way to deliver chemical, radiological, and biological weapons. An autonomous vehicle cannot get sick with anthrax, nor choke on
chlorine. Drones can more directly target enemies, while adjusting trajectories based on local wind and humidity conditions. Plus, small drones can take to the air,
fly indoors, and work together to carry out attacks. Operatives from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria were reportedly quite interested in using drones to carry out
radiological and potentially chemical attacks. North Korea also has an arsenal of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and a thousand-drone fleet. When

robots make decisions on nuclear weapons, the fate of humanity is at stake. In 1983, at the height of the
Cold War, a Soviet early warning system concluded the U nited S tates had launched five nuclear missiles at
the Soviet Union. The computer expressed the highest degree of confidence in the conclusion. The likely
response: immediate nuclear retaliation to level U . S . cities and kill millions of American civilians.
Fortunately, Stanislav Petrov, the Soviet officer in charge of the warning system, concluded the computer was wrong. Petrov
was correct. Without him, millions of people would be dead. New restrictions on autonomous CBRN weapons should be a relatively easy
avenue for new restrictions. A wide range of treaties already restrict production, export, and use of CBRN weapons from the Geneva Convention to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons Convention. At minimum, governments could collectively agree to incorporate autonomous weapons in all
applicable CBRN weapons treaties. This would signal a greater willingness to adopt restrictions on autonomous weapons without a requirement to resolve the

question of autonomous weapons with conventional payloads. Of course, a ban may require giving up capabilities like a nuclear “dead
hand”—in the words of proponents, “an automated strategic response system based on a rtificial
i ntelligence”—but nuclear weapons experts are overwhelmingly against the idea. The risks to great
powers of increased CBRN weapons proliferation and accidental nuclear war are far greater than any
deterrent advantage already gained with a robust conventional and nuclear force.
 2AC — AT: Terrorism

1 — Evaluate their claims through the lens of hype, the best studies prove the success
of biometrics are artificially inflated by counterinsurgent operations to sell more
technology
Jacobsen, ’22 — Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, Ph.D. in International Relations from Lancaster University
(UK), and an MSc in Global Politics from London School of Economics and Political Science. February
2022. IRRC. https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/biometric-data-flows-and-unintended-
consequences-of-counterterrorism-916//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar]

After two decades of counterterrorism biometrics, challenges have surfaced. Scholars have shown how technology-derived “accuracy” in
enemy identification is problematic when mistaken for accuracy in political decisions about “who comprise legitimate targets for the use of violent force.”6

Challenges related specifically to biometrics have also become visible. Following the withdrawal of coalition
forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, the Taliban gained access to biometric devices left by US forces, giving
them access to biometric data through which persons registered by coalition forces in relation to training, salary payments or other collaboration
could be identified. In this case, biometric infrastructures – as will be explained in this article – came with new forms of
insecurity , thus challenging imaginaries of biometrics as straightforwardly delivering superior security. While this example is unique in many ways,
additional examples appear if we consider the use of biometrics in other contexts and by other actors,
including not only military but also [and] humanitarian. Exploring the use of biometrics in two different intervention contexts –
Afghanistan and Somalia – diverse challenges and cross-cutting dynamics, logics and effects come into view. Whether
resulting from biometrics falling into enemy hands, from biometrics being shared deliberately, or from real-world testing of unproven biometric modalities, both

contexts illustrate how the use of biometrics may generate new risks and insecurity . Both contexts also illustrate how isolated analyses of
either military or humanitarian biometrics risk overlooking the issue of data flows. In
Afghanistan, not only soldiers but also
humanitarian actors produced large amounts of biometric data. Also, in some contexts, data-sharing agreements enable biometric
data flows between humanitarian actors and State security actors. Starting our enquiry from a perspective that attends to flows, the analysis explores different ways

in which non-military biometric data flows [which] might – intentionally or unintentionally – interrelate with counterterrorism
infrastructures, e.g. at the level of data-sharing agreements (such as that between the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)). Further, in many contexts, different actors test biometrics in ways that generate
“ success stories ” which in turn feed into imaginaries of the accuracy and centrality of biometric data
gathering and sharing. If viewed in isolation, we fail to appreciate how military and non-military actors contribute in different ways to an emerging
digital intervention infrastructure. This article will more specifically focus on biometric infrastructures – as part of digital intervention infrastructures – as referring
to the makings and flows of biometric data that make up an infrastructure of databases used and produced by different intervention actors, for different purposes,
though sometimes with flows that enable the same data to be used across such differences. These biometric databases
constitute an often-
overlooked dimension of contemporary intervention infrastructures, an “infrastructure collecting, archiving and identifying digital
biometrics.”7 Following Brian Larkin, this article understands infrastructures as platforms that carry “not just water or cars” – in our case biometric data – but also
desires, dreams or imaginaries8 – in our case success stories or fear. But how and under what conditions are biometric infrastructures produced in the first place?
To appreciate this, the article combines Larkin's notion of infrastructure with Helen Tilley's notion of “living laboratory” to foreground the real-world trialing of
biometrics by different actors in various intervention contexts. During
such trials, biometric data is produced, and so are
“success[es] stories” that potentially animate imaginaries of the presumed value to various intervention
actors of biometric data(bases), thus potentially propelling quests for expanded biometric data-making and -sharing. By
combining these notions of infrastructure and laboratory, the article asks under what conditions biometric intervention infrastructures are produced, and what
flows they are comprised of and enable, including both biometric data flows (intentional or not) and the more invisible flows of success stories or fear. After this introduction,
the concepts of infrastructure and living laboratory are explained. Next follows an analysis of the makings and flows of biometric data, in Afghanistan and Somalia. The article concludes with a set of reflections on the broader relevance of these two cases and on the significance of

exploring the making of digital intervention infrastructures – specifically, biometric databases – in a manner that attends to power relations and inequalities, including during (varyingly experimental) practices of data-making.9 Methodological reflections

Diverse sources were used to explore these biometric intervention infrastructures. Eleven semi-structured interviews were conducted with
individuals from the International Committee of the Red Cross ( ICRC ), Food and Agricultural Organization ( FAO ), United Nations Office for Project
Services ( UNOPS ), UNHCR and the World Food Programme ( WFP ), all of whom had experience with the use of
biometrics in Somalia, Afghanistan or humanitarian programs more broadly . Interviewees include staff at different
levels and in different locations. Given the sensitive nature of data-sharing questions and other aspects, interviews were made under conditions of anonymity. In
addition, news stories, industry websites, expert reports and official documents were examined for accounts of how biometric data is made and may subsequently
flow. Sources cover the period from early uses in the aftermath of 9/11, to current examples from Afghanistan, recent data protection policies and data-sharing
agreements. Neither Afghanistan nor Somalia are in-depth case studies. Rather, the article draws on examples from both contexts to illustrate trends of broader
relevance, for example regarding how biometric data flows may generate insecurity.

2 — Empirical failures
O’Neil, ’06 — Patrick H. O’Neil, Professor of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound
in Tacoma, Washington. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University. 23 Augist
2006. “Complexity and Counterterrorism: Thinking about Biometrics.” University of Puget Sound Press.
https://sci hub.se/http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10576100591008962//LFS — GOF — [edited for
contextual grammar, denoted in brackets]

In the area of identification, skeptics argue that biometrics are a poor instrument to this end. The most touted technology in this area,
face recognition, suffers from a series of limitations that some believe make it virtually worthless . The first concern is that of
s

accuracy. Critics charge that the majority of successful tests of face recognition technology are [were] under controlled
conditions , where individuals are matched up against images taken under the best possible conditions. In the real world, however, identifying
suspects, especially when combing for such individuals out of large groups , is extremely difficult . Face
recognition systems often fail[s] to identify individuals when confronted with changes in lighting , suspects not
facing cameras head-on, or suspects wearing faceobscuring objects such as glasses . Identification can also degrade
with the age of the photo as
suspects get older .21 A second problem is that of comparable reference information. As noted earlier, in order for
face recognition to work, authorities need a reference photo with which to begin. In the case of terrorists, often their identities

are unknown until after the event. Among the [9/11]11 September hijackers, for example, only 2 of the 19 were
under surveillance by the CIA prior to 2001, complete with [had] photographic records. Even in this case, these two were
only placed on a watch list three weeks before the attacks, when they were already inside the U nited
S tates.22 This points to a related problem with face recognition, even when carried out under controlled conditions. Given that the 11 September
hijackers entered the country on legal visas , such biometric controls as the US-VISIT system would have done little
more than document , not prevent , their entry. As Mary Downloaded by [McMaster University] at 10:30 20 October 2014 Complexity
and Counterterrorism 555 Ryan, [the] former head of the State Department ’s Bureau of Consular Affairs, testified in January
2004 before the 9/11 Commission, “[that] even under the best immigration controls, most of the September 11 terrorists

would still be admitted to the United States today . . . because they had no criminal records , or known terrorist
connections, and had not been identified by intelligence methods for special scrutiny.”23 Third, there is the question of accuracy. As a number of critics note,
even a system with a high degree of accuracy, which is not currently promised by biometric[s] technology, will necessarily produce
a number of false positives. Bruce Schneier, a specialist on security issues, observes that even with a 99.9 percent accuracy rate, the result would be

frequent false positives —perhaps hundreds or thousands —at sites where there were large numbers of
individuals, such as airport s. I n the end guards would come to disregard all hits , rendering the system
useless .24 There are similar concerns raised about biometrics as a means of verification. Recall that here this is verifying that a person is who she says she is.
The claim of biometric supporters in this case should be much stronger, because rather than trying to identify an unknown person, biometrics can be used to
authenticate an individual using a set of measurements already on file. This would seem to make fraud difficult and identification easy given the degree of biometric
control. Yet here too there are problems. The issue goes back to the earlier discussion of identification. If dangerous individuals cannot be identified as such, then
verification instruments are be largely meaningless, as suspects would be essentially hiding only their intent , not their
identities. As known, a potential terrorist may travel on a valid passport and visa, with all the rights those imply.
Verification does not reveal motives , which are often available only after the fact . For example, the 9/11
Commission noted in its report that in several cases the hijackers entered the United States with new “clean” passports, legitimately issued from their home
countries, effectively erasing
any international activities that might have otherwise raised concern. Other
passports were additionally doctored by Al Qaeda operatives to add or erase entry and exit stamps.25 In no ne
of these cases would biometric identifiers have made any difference , given that, as mentioned earlier, these individuals were not
identified in advance by U.S. authorities as possible terrorists.

3 — Under review from Homeland Security, TSA failed 95% of the time.
Bier, ’15 — Daniel Bier; [study done by Homeland Security, a federal org]. June 3 rd 2015. “TSA Fails 95%
of the Time, Homeland Security tests show just how useless TSA really is.” FEE Stories.
https://fee.org/articles/tsa-fails-95-of-the-time/#:~:text=TSA%20Fails%2095%25%20of%20the
%20Time //LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar, denoted in brackets]

An internal investigation of the T ransportation S ecurity A dministration revealed security failures at dozens of the
nation’s busiest airports , where undercover investigators were able to smuggle[d] mock explosives or [and]
banned weapons through checkpoints in 95 percent of trials , ABC News has learned. The series of tests
were conducted by Homeland Security Red Teams who pose as passengers, setting out to beat the system.

4 — The myth that biometrics counter terrorism can be empirically deconstructed

Harper, ’13 — Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies at The Cato Institute, served as
counsel to committees in both the House and Senate. May 13 th 2013. “Cato’s “Deepbills” Project
Advances Government Transparency.” Technology Liberation Front.
https://techliberation.com/author/jim-harper//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar, denoted
in brackets]

There’s a terrific example written up here of a man turned away at the U . S . border (not by US-VISIT but by a program called ATS-
P) who later became a suicide bomber in Iraq. The implication DHS officials would like you to take from this
is that preventing his entry into the country prevented a suicide bombing in the U nited S tates. In fact, [But] it’s just as likely,
if not more, that this individual became suicidal because of being turned away – he had already lived in California for two years
without incident . And one can’t exclude the possibility that he was coerced to commit a bombing
through threats , or hostage-taking of a family member, or some other way. Anyway, turning someone away from the border is a
trivial security against terrorism because terrorists are fungible. Turning away a known terrorist merely inconveniences a
terrorist group, which just has to recruit someone different . The 9/11 attacks [was]were conducted for the
most part by people who had no known record of terrorism and who arrived on visas granted to them by the
State Department. Biometric border security would have prevented none of them [from] entering .
 2AC — AT: School Shootings

1 — Uvalde who had a surveillance system installed disproves the effectiveness of

biometrics in schools.

2 — Most shootings end in the perpetrator being killed where they can be identified
afterwards.

3 — Biometrics won’t provide early warning because most perpetrators aren’t already
in the system & algorithms can’t detect firearms
Kofman, ’18 — Ava Kofman, finalist for the Goldsmith and National Magazine awards and credited
with helping spur reforms. May 30th 2018. “FACE RECOGNITION IS NOW BEING USED IN SCHOOLS, BUT
IT WON’T STOP MASS SHOOTINGS.” The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2018/05/30/face-
recognition-schools-school-shootings///LFS — GOF

Yet giventhe nature of gun violence at schools , Lockport’s purchase of surveillance technology appears
inefficient and expensive . All of the major school shootings in the last five years in the U.S. have been carried
out by current students or alumnae of the school in question. “These are students for whom the school wouldn’t
have a reason to have their face entered into the face recognition system’s blacklist ,” explained Rachel Levinson-
Waldman, a security and policing expert at the Brennan Center for Justice. The object recognition system seems similarly pointless, she

said. Most shooters don’t brandish their guns before opening fire; and by the time they do, an object -

detection algorithm that could specify the exact type of weapon they’re firing would not be of much use . As Jim Shultz,
a Lockport parent, pointed out to the Buffalo News, the technology would give a school, at best, only a few extra seconds in
response time to a shooting. What’s more, most shootings typically end within seconds — so that face or weapon
recognition would provide about as much real-time value as a 911 call . Lockport schools, Shultz added, have already
instituted preventative — albeit less flashy — measures, such as keeping doors locked and requiring visitors to check in. Because face recognition

appears uniquely ill-suited to respond directly to school shootings — which are themselves statistically rare events — privacy
experts fear that the primary function of the technology will be to expand the surveillance and criminalization of adolescents. “Whether it was intended to be this
way or not, Lockport’s technology is effectively going to be a surveillance system and not a safety system,” Levinson-Waldman said.
 2AC — AT: Econ/Fraud

1 — Hacking
A) Hacking in to millions of peoples data is worse than single instances of data
acquisition
Symanovich, ’19 — Steve Symanovich, Penn State University, B.A. Norton, citing real events lol.
August 18th 2019. “Biometric data breach: Database exposes fingerprints, facial recognition data of 1
million people.” Norton. https://us.norton.com/blog/emerging-threats/biometric-data-breach-
database-exposes-fingerprints-and-facial-recognition-data//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual
grammar]

A breach of a biometric database recently exposed 28 million records , including fingerprints of more than 1 million people.
That raises a question: Could cybercriminals use biometric data to commit identity theft or other crimes? The
answer is possibly yes. Biometric data is personal information. Your Social Security number is personal information. Your email address, your financial
account information, and your username-and-password combinations are all personal information. Cybercriminals who access any of that [your]

information could potentially use it to commit identity theft — potentially entering a secured building while pretending to be you.

B) — Hackers were even able to target the government

FTS, ’23 — Forta’s Terranova Security, citing real attacks lol. January 31 st 2023. “Everything You Need to
Know About Biometrics Hacking.” Terranova. https://terranovasecurity.com/hacking-biometrics//LFS —
GOF

In 2015, the U . S . Office of Personnel Management (OPM) was the victim of a massive data breach in which the
personal info rmation of more than 21 million people was compromised . The hackers were able to gain
access to fingerprint data belonging to 5.6 million individuals, making it one of the largest known breaches of biometric data.
The hack raised serious concerns about the security of biometric data and the potential for it to be used
for identity theft or other malicious purposes . In 2016, a team of researchers from Michigan State University
demonstrated that it is possible to create fake fingerprints that can fool fingerprint scanners. The
researchers created fake fingerprints using gelatin and inkjet printers . They could use these fake fingerprints to
unlock smartphones and laptops equipped with fingerprint scanners.

C) — Even if conventional databases require less skill, the information hackers get is
permanent and can be linked to other bank accounts or stocks, you can change your
password, not your fingerprints.
2 — Alt Causes — Fraud occurs in so many other ways, i.e telephone scams, phishing,
skimming, etc. The amount of security biometrics provides pales in comparison to
other methods.
3 — Spoofing — Hackers can fake finger-prints and facial recognition data to steal
millions solely because of biometric systems
Kanapienis, ’21 — Liudas Kanapienis, Bachelor in business admin, medicine, and CEO of
cybersecurity company. May 20th 2021. “Businesses, Be Aware: A New Wave Of Biometric Crimes
Invades The Digital Space.” Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesbusinesscou
ncil/2021/05/20/businesses-be-aware-a-new-wave-of-biometric-crimes-invades-the-digital-space/?
sh=3bc8378e345d//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar]

Over the past few years, fraudsters have discovered an astonishing number of vulnerabilities in what was
believed to be a reliable method of identity data protection: biometric authentication. Now, a new set of sneaky ways to spoof
biometric authentication videos is [are] emerging in a fraud that uses stolen data. In March 2021, the facial recognition service of the
Chinese government was hacked. In less than two years, two hackers stole more than $76 million by sending fake tax

invoices to companies and their customers. How exactly did they pull it off? The hackers did it by using manipulated
personal data and high-definition photos purchased on the black market and then hijacking a camera of
a mobile phone to deceive the facial authentication process. When the camera would not work, the system received the pre-made
falsified video and, as simple as that, certification was completed. The fraudsters got the green light and started to issue tax invoices on
behalf of the shell company. Pretending To Be Someone Else Or Tricking Recognition Tax scams are not new, but have you heard about tax scams based on hacking
facial recognition systems? Even before the Chinese case made a splash, we had already witnessed biometric fraud repeating itself in a few
typical variations. According to the research carried out by Accenture back in 2012 , there are basic biometric fraud patterns that
hackers exploit systematically. Roughly classified into two categories, obfuscation and impersonation, these two primary attack schemes are what
the classic biometric fraud is based on. Obfuscation essentially means altering biometric traits to trick recognition systems. A case in point we've seen in the news
recently is fake fingerprints created with a 3D printer. Even though the production can be extremely challenging and time-consuming, they are often enough to
deceive biometric scanners. There are more hardcore examples of obfuscation out there as well. In January 2019, the
police in Madrid, Spain
detained a drug trafficker who cut and burned his fingers to alter fingerprints with injected micro-implants of skin.
Distressing as it is, he managed to avoid detention and was found only 15 years later thanks, in large part, to this surgical
Impersonation seems to be a more prevalent and easier to implement (well, at least it's not centered around mutilations)
alteration.

method used to spoof biometric authentication . Cybercriminals deploying other people's or company's
data or synthetic ID in attempts to pass as legitimate users is, beyond doubt, a vivid impersonation example. Ways to make it a reality? There are
plenty. In fact, the Chinese case mentioned earlier is a variation of impersonation, albeit an [which is] increasingly hard one to detect. The damage
caused by this threat can go beyond control , well-illustrated by the financial losses running into millions
of dollars and being an additional blow to each affected business's development.

4 — Arguments that say we’re missing out on future investments’ are illogical, they
don’t exist now, foreclosing the opportunity for it to exist doesn’t make the status quo
worse.
 2AC — AT: Pandemics

1 — No predictive evidence there will be another worse pandemic than COVID, sure
their scientists can dream up a nightmare but that only matters if it happens.
2 — COVID proves systemic resiliency in the CDC or WHO, and failures can be chalked
up to Trump’s mishandling of the virus.
2 — Masks — They are key in stopping the spread, but biometrics would require us to
stop wearing them
Drozdowski et. al., ’22 — Dr. Pawel Drozdowski, Ph.D, senior researcher with the da/sec group at
Faculty of Computer Science. Manuscript received December 1, 2021; revised July, 2022.
”Biometrics in the Era of COVID-19: Challenges and Opportunities.” Arxiv.
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2102.09258.pdf//LFS — GOF — [edited for contextual grammar]

The most significant evaluation of the impact of masks upon face recognition solutions was conducted by
the National Institute of Standards and Technology ( NIST ) [22], [23]. The evaluation was performed using a large
dataset of facial images with superimposed, digitally generated masks of varying size, 3 shape, and colour. The evaluation
test[ing]ed the face recognition performance of algorithms submitted to the ongoing Face Recognition Vendor Test
(FRVT) benchmark in terms of [for] biometric verification performance (i.e., one-to-one comparisons). The false-negative error

rates (i.e., false non-match rate) for algorithms submitted prior to the pandemic [22], where observed to increase by an order of
magnitude , even for the most reliable algorithms. Even some of the best-performing algorithms (as judged
from evaluation with unmasked faces) [which] failed almost completely , with false-negative error rates of up to 50%.

3 — Data collection would be impersonal & therefore not banned under the resolution
because they’re not ‘personal’ privacy concerns, i.e collecting stats for infection rates,
taking temperature, etc, NOT things that categorize people like catalogues of items to
be deported.

4 — Covid disproves the disease impact – it was the biggest disease in the past century
and it’s killed less than 7 million people around the world – there’s no reason that 1)
another, larger disease is coming now OR that 2) this larger disease would be 1000x
more deadly than COVID!

5 — Medicine and sanitation limit the potential damage of a disease

Halstead 19 John Halstead, doctorate in political philosophy. [Cause Area Report: Existential Risk,
Founders Pledge, https://founderspledge.com/research/Cause%20Area%20Report%20-%20Existential
%20Risk.pdf]//BPS

However, there are some reasons to think that naturally occurring pathogens are unlikely to cause human extinction. Firstly,
Homo sapiens have been around for 200,000 years and the Homo genus for around six million years without being
exterminated by an infectious disease, which is evidence that the base rate of extinction-risk natural
pathogens is low .82 Indeed, past disease outbreaks have not come close to rendering humans extinct. Although
bodies were piled high in the streets across Europe during the Black Death,83 human extinction was never a serious possibility, and some
economists even argue that it was a boon for the European economy.84 Secondly, infectious disease has only
contributed to the extinction of a small minority of animal species .85 The only confirmed case of a
mammalian species extinction being caused by an infectious disease is a type of rat native only to Christmas
Island . Having said that, the context may be importantly different for modern day humans, so it is unclear whether the risk is increasing or
decreasing. On the one hand, due to globalisation, the world is more interconnected making it easier for pathogens to spread. On the other
hand, interconnectedness could also increase immunity by increasing exposure to lower virulence strains
between subpopulations .87 Moreover, advancements in medicine and sanitation limit the potential damage
an outbreak might do.

6 — Risk of an existential disease threat is incredibly low.

Dr. Ilan Noy 22. Chair in the Economics of Disasters and Climate Change at the Victoria University of
Wellington, PhD from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and Dr. Tomáš Uher, PhD, Professor at
Masaryk University, “Four New Horsemen of an Apocalypse? Solar Flares, Super-volcanoes, Pandemics,
and Artificial Intelligence”, Economics of Disasters and Climate Change, 1/15/2022, SpringerLink

High-Mortality Pandemics

A naturally occurring pandemic (i.e., not from an engineered pathogen) that would threaten human extinction is a very
small probability event. However, historical accounts point to several instances where disease spread played an important role in causing very
significant decline of specific populations. For example, the introduction of novel diseases to the Native American population during the European colonization of
the Americas had deadly consequences. It is difficult to distinguish the effects of the diseases that came with the Europeans from the war and conflict they also
brought with them. Nevertheless, during the first hundred years of the colonization period, the American population may have been reduced by as much as 90%
(Ord 2020). Moreover, two major pandemic events, the Justinian Plague in the sixth century and the Black Death in the fourteenth century appear to have been severe enough to cause a significant population decline of tens of percent in the populations they affected. Both events are believed to have been caused by plague, an infectious disease caused by the
bacteria Yersinia Pestis (Christakos et al. 2005; Allen 1979). While there is a certain degree of uncertainty involved in studying these events’ societal impacts, historical accounts in combination with modern scientific methods provide us with some valuable insights into the effects they may have had on the societies of the time. With respect to the possibility of a future catastrophic
global pandemic, it appears that this risk is increasing significantly along with the advances in the field of synthetic biology and the rising possibility of an accidental or intentional release of an engineered pathogen. While some of the scientific efforts in the field of synthetic biology are directed towards increasing our understanding and our ability to prevent future catastrophic
epidemic threats, the risk stemming from these activities is non-trivial, and may outweigh their benefits. The Justinian Plague The Justinian Plague severely affected the people of Europe and East Asia, though estimates of its overall mortality vary. Focusing exclusively on the first wave of the pandemic (AD 541–544), Muehlhauser (2017) suggests the pandemic was associated with a
20% mortality in the Byzantine empire. This estimate is based on the mortality rate estimated for the empire’s capital, Constantinople, by Stathakopoulos (2007) to produce a death toll of roughly 5.6 million. For a longer time span, AD 541 to 600, which included subsequent waves of the plague, scholars estimate a higher mortality rate of 33–50% (Allen 1979; Meier 2016). The
demographic changes associated with this high mortality led to a significant disruption of economic activity in the Byzantine empire (Gârdan 2020). A decline in the labour force caused a decline in agricultural production which led to food shortages and famine (Meier 2016). Trade also collapsed. Decreased tax revenues caused by the population decline initiated a major fiscal
contraction and consequently a military crisis for the empire (Sarris 2002; Meier 2016). In the longer run, however, the massive reduction of the labour force appears to have had a positive economic effect for the surviving laborers, as the increased marginal value of labour caused a rise in real wages and per capita incomes. These beneficial effects for the survivors were also
observed after the Black Death (Pamuk and Shatzmiller 2014; Findlay and Lundahl 2017). The mortality and the disruption of activity the plague caused in the Byzantine empire also led to further direct and indirect cultural and religious consequences. Meier (2016) particularly highlights the plague’s indirect effect of an increase in liturgification (a process of religious permeation and
internalization throughout society as defined by Meier 2020), the rise of the Marian cult, and the sacralization of the emperor. The direct and indirect effects of the plague also appear to have had far-reaching and long-term political repercussions. The societal disruptions caused by the plague are believed to have significantly weakened the position of the Byzantine empire and
arguably led to the decline of the Sasanian empire (Sabbatani et al. 2012). Interestingly, the pandemic indirectly favoured the nomadic Arab tribes who were less vulnerable to the contagion while traveling through desert and semi-desert environments during the initial expansion of Islam (Sabbatani et al. 2012). Of note is the absence of a scientific consensus on the severity of the
Justinian Plague’s impacts. For example, Mordechai and Eisenberg (2019) and Mordechai et al. (2019) argue against the maximalist interpretation of the historical evidence described above. They suggest that the estimated mortality rate of the plague is exaggerated, and that the pandemic was not a primary cause of the transformational demographic, political and economic changes
in the Mediterranean region between the sixth and eighth century. Recently, White and Mordechai (2020) highlighted the high likelihood of the plague having different impacts in the urban areas of the Mediterranean outside of Constantinople. The Black Death The Black Death which ravaged Europe, North Africa, and parts of Asia in the middle of the fourteenth century is
considered the deadliest pandemic in human history and potentially the most severe global catastrophe to have ever struck mankind. With respect to its mortality, Ord (2020) argues that the best estimate of its global mortality rate is 5–14% of the global population, largely based on Muehlhauser (2017). The plague created a large demographic shock in the affected regions. It
reduced the European population by approximately 30–50% during the 6 years of its initial outbreak (Ord 2020). It took approximately two centuries for the population levels to recover (Livi-Bacci 2017; Jedwab et al. 2019b). As the mortality rates appear to have been the highest among the working-age population, the effects on the labour force were acute (Pamuk 2007). The
plague's mortality, morbidity and the associated societal disruption led to a major decline in economic output both in Europe (Pamuk 2007) and the Middle East (Dols 2019). In Europe, however, this decline in economic output was smaller than the decline in population; output per capita began to increase within a few years of the initial outbreak (Pamuk 2007). The large
demographic shock caused by the plague led to a shift in the relative price of labour which, similarly to the Justinian Plague, had a positive impact on wages. With a reduced labour force, real wages and per capita incomes in many European countries increased and were sustained at higher levels for several centuries (Voigtländer and Voth 2013a; Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk and
Shatzmiller 2014). Scott and Duncan (2001) point out that real wages approximately doubled in most countries of Europe in the century following the plague. An additional insight into the long-run relationship between the Black Death’s mortality and per capita incomes in Europe is offered by Voigtländer and Voth (2013a). Using a Malthusian model, they suggest that over time, the
rise in income caused by the plague’s mortality led to an increase in urbanization and trade. Furthermore, the increased tax burden (per capita), combined with the contemporary political climate, increased the frequency of wars. Consequently, higher urbanization and trade led to an increase in disease spread which along with a more frequent war occurrence caused a long-term
increase in mortality and a further positive effect on per capita incomes. In this way, the Black Death appears to have created a long-lasting environment of high-mortality and high-income specifically in Western Europe, functioning as an important contributing factor to its economic growth in the next centuries (Alfani 2020). However, while in Western Europe incomes remained
elevated over the next centuries, in Southern Europe they began to decline as the Southern European population started recovering after AD 1500 (Jedwab et al. 2020). Apart from the positive effects on wages, the increased marginal value of labour combined with other factors had further economic and social implications. A decreased relative value of land and the lack of workforce
to use it effectively caused land prices and land rents to decrease (Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk 2007). A decreased marginal value of capital assets in general led to a lapse in the enforcement of property rights (Haddock and Kiesling 2002). Interest rates and real rates of return on assets also decreased (Pamuk 2007; Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk and Shatzmiller 2014; Jordà et al. 2021;
Clark 2016). Higher wages in combination with a relative abundance of land increased people’s access to land/home ownership, likely reducing social inequality (Alfani 2020). On the other end of the income distribution, decreased incomes for landowners led to an overall decrease in income inequality (Jedwab et al. 2020; Alfani and Murphy 2017). With respect to the effects on
agriculture, the structure of agricultural output moved away from cereals to other crops following the plague. Furthermore, the workforce shortages and the incentives to increase the labour supply are believed to have caused a shift from male-labour intensive arable farming towards pastoral farming, consequently raising the demand for female labour (Voigtländer and Voth
2013b). However, while the Black Death appears to have caused certain structural agricultural changes, Clark (2016) finds no effect of the plague on agricultural productivity in the long run. In terms of other social consequences, the evidence suggests that the plague's mortality reduced labour coercion, particularly throughout Western Europe (Jedwab et al. 2020; Haddock and
Kiesling 2002; Gingerich and Vogler 2021). The increased bargaining power of labour caused by the plague’s demographic shock contributed to and accelerated the decline in serfdom and development of a free labour regime. Gingerich and Voler (2021) further argue that these effects may have had long-lasting political implications and that a decline of repressive labour practices
(such as serfdom) permitted the development of more inclusive political institutions. They find that the regions with the highest mortality were more likely to develop participatory political institutions and more equitable land ownership systems. They find that centuries later, In Germany, the populations in these high-mortality regions were less likely to vote for Hitler’s National
Socialist (Nazi) Party in the 1930 and 1932 elections in Germany. However, the positive effects on the emergence of freer labour did not take place in Eastern Europe, where serfdom was sustained and even intensified. Robinson and Torvik (2011) attempt to explain this asymmetry arguing that these differential outcomes may have been caused by the varying power and quality of
institutions. The authors suggest that opportunities generated by the increased bargaining power of labour, in an environment of weak institutions, were less likely to lead to a positive effect than in the case of regions with stronger institutions (with more robust rule-of-law or less corrupt or predatory practices). Apart from causing a negative demographic shock to the affected
populations, the Black Death appears to have caused further indirect demographic changes, particularly in Western Europe. The increased employment opportunities for females caused by worker shortages and a higher female labour demand led to a decline in fertility rates and an increased age of marriage (Voigtländer and Voth 2013b). This demographic transition to a population
characterized by lower birth rates likely helped to preserve the high levels of per capita incomes and contributed to further economic development of certain parts of Europe, enabling it to escape the “Malthusian trap” in the following centuries (Pamuk 2007). Siuda and Sunde (2021) confirm the pandemic’s effect on the accelerated demographic transition empirically, as they find
that greater pandemic mortality was associated with an earlier onset of the demographic transition across the various regions of Germany. Unfortunately, the Black Death also led to an increase in the persecution of Jews (Finley and Koyama 2018; Jedwab et al. 2019a). Interestingly, Jedwab et al. (2019a) were able to estimate that in the case of regions with the highest mortality
rates, the probability of persecution decreased if the Jewish minority was believed to benefit the local economy. It is important to highlight that the long-term repercussions of the Black Death were highly asymmetrical. While in Western Europe the pandemic appears to have led to some long-term dynamic shifts associated with increased wages, decreased inequality and a decrease
in labour coercion, this was not the case for other regions. A decrease in wages was observed for example in Spain (Alfani 2020) and Egypt. In Spain, the plague's demographic impact on an already scarce population caused a long-lasting negative disruption to the local trade-oriented economy. The workforce disruption in Egypt led to a collapse of the labour-intensive irrigation
system for growing crops in the Nile valley, with consequent disastrous effects on the rural economy (Alfani 2020). Borsch (2005) argues that the economic decline in Egypt caused by the Black Death “put an end to the power in the heartland of the Arab world” (p. 114) and to the impressive scientific and technological developments that came out of this region. A consensus for an
explanation of the Black Death’s varied impacts across regions, and their determinants, does not appear to exist. However, several researchers attempt to provide partial insights. For example, Alfani (2020) considers the differential outcomes to be broadly dependent upon the initial conditions in each region. More specifically, both Robinson and Torvik (2011) and Pamuk (2007)
propose that the asymmetry of impacts can largely be explained by the differences in the institutional environments of the affected societies. It is argued that the Black Death defined the threshold between the medieval and the modern ages, similarly to the way the Justinian Plague did for antiquity and the Middle Ages (Horden 2021). Furthermore, the differential long-term
outcomes of the Black Death likely provided a significant contribution to the so-called “Great Divergence” between Europe and the rest of the world and the “Little Divergence” between North-western and Southern and Eastern Europe (Jedwab et al. 2020; Pamuk 2007). From this perspective, it would seem rational to conclude that apart from causing substantial and long-term
demographic, economic, political, and cultural changes, both the Justinian Plague and the Black Death likely significantly altered the course of human history. Considering the above, it is not unreasonable to expect that a pandemic of a similar magnitude to these past catastrophes would do the same in the present day. However, what societal impacts a pandemic of similar or higher

In
mortality would inflict in the twenty-first century has not really been the subject of any study, as far as we were able to identify. A possibility exists, given the newly developed capacity of humanity to create new pathogens, that the outcomes of a future catastrophic pandemic will be even more adverse than those of the Justinian Plague and the Black Death. Probability

terms of the probability of naturally occurring pandemics, a n informal survey of participants of the G lobal
C atastrophic R isk Conference in Oxford in 2008 shows that the median estimate for a probability of a natural
pandemic killing more than 1 billion people before the year 2100 was surveyed to be 5% , and the
probability of such pandemic to cause human extinction was 0.05% . Ord (2020) uses a slightly broader
definition of existential risk, which apart from human extinction also includes a permanent reduction of
human potential. He estimates the probability of an existential risk stemming from a natural pandemic
in the next 100 years to be 0.01% .
Pandemics solve nuclear war---it’s likely now.
Barry. R. Posen 20. Ford International Professor of Political Science at MIT and Director Emeritus of the
MIT Security Studies Program. 4/23/2020. “Do Pandemics Promote Peace?”
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-04-23/do-pandemics-promote-peace. DOA:
9/2/2020. SIR.

What these analysts miss is that COVID-19 , the disease caused by the coronavirus, is weakening all of the great and
middle powers more or less equally . None is likely to gain a meaningful advantage over the others. All
will have ample reason to be pessimistic about their military capabilities and their overall readiness for
war . For the duration of the pandemic, at least, and probably for years afterward , the odds of a war between
major powers will go down , not up. PAX EPIDEMICA? A cursory survey of the scholarly lit erature on
war and disease appears to confirm Blainey’s observation that pessimism is conducive to peace . Scholars
have documented again and again how war creates permissive conditions for disease—in armies as well
as civilians in the fought-over territories . But one seldom finds any discussion of epidemics causing wars or of wars deliberately
started in the middle of widespread outbreaks of infectious disease. (The diseases that European colonists carried to the New World did
weaken indigenous populations to the point that they were more vulnerable to conquest; in addition, some localized conflicts were fought
during the influenza pandemic of 1919–21, but these were occasioned by major shifts in regional balances of power following the destruction of
four empires in World War I.) That sickness slows the march to war is partly due to the fact that war depends
on people . When people fall ill, they can’t be counted on to perform well in combat. Military medicine made
enormous strides in the years leading up to World War I, prior to which armies suffered higher numbers of casualties from disease than from
combat. But pandemics still threaten military units , as those onboard U.S. and French aircraft carriers, hundreds of
whom tested positive for COVID-19 , know well. Sailors and soldiers in the field are among the most
vulnerable because they are packed together. But even airmen are at risk , since they must take refuge from air
attacks in bunkers, where the virus could also spread rapidly . Ground campaigns in urban areas pose
still greater dangers in pandemic times . Much recent ground combat has been in cities in poor countries with few or no public
health resources, environments highly favorable to illness. Ground combat also usually produces prisoners, any of whom can be infected. A
vaccine may eventually solve these problems, but an abundance of caution is likely to persist for some time after it
comes into use. Major outbreaks damage national economies , which are the source of military power.
The most important reason disease inhibits war is economic. Major outbreaks damage national
economies, which are the source of military power. COVID-19 is a pandemic—by definition a worldwide
phenomenon. All great and middle powers appear to be adversely affected, and all have reason to be
pessimistic about their military prospects . Their economies are shrinking fast, and there is great
uncertainty about when and how quickly they will start growing again. Even China, which has slowed
the spread of the disease and begun to reopen its economy, will be hurting for years to come. It took an
enormous hit to GDP in the first quarter of 2020, ending 40 years of steady growth. And its trading partners, burned by their dependence on
China for much of the equipment needed to fight COVID-19, will surely scale back their imports. An export-dependent China will have to rely
more on its domestic market, something it has been attempting for years with only limited success. It is little wonder, then, that the
International Monetary Fund forecasts slower growth in China this year than at any time since the 1970s. Even after a vaccine is
developed and made widely available, economic troubles may linger for years. States will emerge from
this crisis with enormous debts . They will spend years paying for the bailout and stimulus packages they used to protect citizens
and businesses from the economic consequences of social distancing. Drained treasuries will give them one more reason to
be pessimistic about their military might. LESS TRADE, LESS FRICTION How long is the pacifying effect of pessimism
likely to last? If a vaccine is developed quickly, enabling a relatively swift economic recovery, the mood may prove short-lived. But it is equally
likely that the coronavirus crisis will last long enough to change the world in important ways, some of which will likely dampen the appetite for
conflict for some time—perhaps up to five or ten years. After all, the world is experiencing both the biggest pandemic and the biggest economic
downturn in a century. Most governments have not covered themselves with glory managing the pandemic, and even the most autocratic
worry about popular support. Over the next few years, people will want evidence that their governments are working to protect them from
disease and economic dislocation. Citizens will see themselves as dependent on the state, and they will be less inclined to
support adventures abroad . At the same time, governments and businesses will likely try to reduce their reliance on imports of
critical materials, having watched global supply chains break down during the pandemic. The result will probably be diminished
trade , something liberal internationalists see as a bad thing. But for the last five years or so, trade has not helped improve
relations between states but rather fueled resentment . Less trade could mean less friction between
major powers, thereby reducing the intensity of their rivalries . In the Chinese context, less international trade could
have positive knock-on effects. Focused on growing the domestic economy, and burdened by hefty bills from fighting the virus, Beijing could be
forced to table the Belt and Road Initiative, an ambitious trade and investment project that has unnerved the foreign policy establishments of
great and middle powers. The suspension of the BRI would soothe the fears of those who see it as an instrument of Chinese world domination.
Interstate wars have become relatively rare since the end of World War II. The United States and the Soviet Union engaged in a four-decade
Cold War, which included an intense nuclear and conventional arms race, but they never fought each other directly, even with conventional
weapons. Theorists debate the reasons behind the continued rarity of great-power conflict. I am inclined to believe that the risk of
escalation to a nuclear confrontation is simply too great. COVID-19 does nothing to mitigate such risks for world
leaders—and a great deal to feed their reasonable pessimism about the likely outcome of even a
conventional war.

It causes ceasefires and peace talks---COVID proves that pandemics incentivize them
to avoid disease spread which caps global escalation.
Deirdre Shesgreen 20. Foreign Affairs Reporter at USA Today. 4/28/2020. “'War and disease travel
together': Why the pandemic push for a global cease-fire is gaining ground.”
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/04/28/coronavirus-un-secretary-wants-global-
cease-fire-amid-pandemic/5163972002/. DOA: 9/4/2020. SIR.

When the head of the United Nations first called for a “ global cease-fire” on March 23, it seemed like a quixotic quest that would fall
on the deaf ears of warring guerrillas, militant terrorists and belligerent governments across the globe. But over the past month, fighters
from Colombia to Ukraine have signaled a willingness to put down their weapons as the world
confronts a deadly pandemi c that could devastate civilian populations and armies alike. The 15-member U.N.
Security Council may vote as early as this week on a resolution that demands an “immediate cessation of hostilities in all countries on its
agenda” and calls for armed groups to engage in a 30-day cease-fire , according to a draft of the measure obtained by USA
TODAY. Its fate is uncertain, and experts say it comes with many caveats and exceptions – including a loophole that could allow Russia to
continue bombing civilians in Syria. Right now, world powers are still quibbling over several provisions. The Trump administration has objected
to any language expressing support for the World Health Organization, among other provisions – disputes that could sink or stall the effort.
President Donald Trump has blasted the WHO being biased toward China and accepting Beijing's statements about the coronavirus outbreak at
face value. A State Department official declined to comment on the draft, citing ongoing negotiations. The official, who was not authorized to
speak on the record, said the Trump administration supports the call for a global cease-fire but wants to ensure it will not hinder U.S.
counterterrorism missions. If it passes, experts say its impact could be significant – albeit not sweeping – during an otherwise bleak moment of
global crisis. “This is not a piece of paper that’s going to save the planet, and it’s not even going to stop some of the nasty wars that are burning
out there,” said Richard Gowan, an expert on the United Nations and peacekeeping with the International Crisis Group, a nonpartisan
organization that seeks to prevent conflict. “But it’s at least something which could help ease middle-sized and
smaller conflicts in countries ranging from Colombia to Sudan , where we know that armed groups are
actually interested in pausing violence and talking about peace during the COVID crisis.” It could also
help staunch the flow of refugees in some war-ravaged countries – and thus slow the spread of COVID -
19, said Barry Posen, an international professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. " War
and disease
travel together and are usually causative," Posen said. While a global cease-fire may sound lofty and
idealistic, he said, it's also quite practical , particularly in places like Syria and Yemen , where health care
is scarce and civilians are extremely vulnerable to disease . "The intrusion of COVID into that situation
would make what's already a horror show into an even bigger horror show ," he said. "If you can do a little
something to suppress these wars at the moment, you would also be doing a little something to suppress the disease." And because these
conflicts are also producing refugees, it could help limit the further spread of the illness if civilians are not forced to flee conflict zones. In this
handout image released by the United Nations, U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres holds a virtual press conference on April 3, 2020, at
UN headquarters in New York. Guterres Friday renewed his call for a global cease-fire, urging all parties to conflict to lay down arms and allow
war-torn nations to combat the coronavirus pandemic. "The worst is yet to come," Guterres said, referring to countries beset with fighting like
Syria, Libya and Yemen. "The COVID-19 storm is now coming to all these theatres of conflict." The United Nation's secretary-general, , has used
both lofty rhetoric and harsh reality in his pitch for the cease-fire. "There should be only one fight in our world today: our shared battle against
COVID-19," he said in an April 3 news briefing on his effort. French President Emmanuel Macron has also championed the cease-fire proposal.
So far, about 16 armed groups and more than 100 countries have endorsed the measure, according to an
informal tally kept by U.N. officials. A few examples: In Colombia , a left-wing rebel group known as the ELN agreed to
a cease-fire starting April and said it would consider reviving peace talks with the government. In
Yemen, one side of that brutal war – the Saudi Arabia-led coal ition – agreed to a unilateral cease-fire
for at least a month, to help control the spread of coronavirus in a country already ravaged by starvation and other
diseases. The Houthis, backed by Iran, have not yet signed on. In Syria, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces agreed to a
cease-fire, saying its fighters would defend themselves against attacks but not engage in offensive military action.
“We hope that this humanitarian truce will help to open the door for dialogue and political solution and to put an end to the war in

the world and Syria,” the SDF said in a statement.

Outweighs---it causes extinction.

Steven Starr 17. 1/9/2017. Director, University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program;
senior scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility. “Turning a Blind Eye Towards Armageddon — U.S.
Leaders Reject Nuclear Winter Studies.” Federation of American Scientists.
https://fas.org/2017/01/turning-a-blind-eye-towards-armageddon-u-s-leaders-reject-nuclear-winter-
studies/
Now 10 years ago, several of the world’s leading climatologists and physicists chose to reinvestigate the long-term environmental impacts of
nuclear war. The
peer-reviewed studies they produced are considered to be the most authoritative type of
scientific research, which is subjected to criticism by the international scientific community before final
publication in scholarly journals. No serious errors were found in these studies and their findings remain
unchallenged . Alan Robock et al., “Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic
consequences,” Journal of Geophysical Research: Atmospheres 112 (2007). Owen Brian Toon et al., “Atmospheric effects and societal
consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts and acts of individual nuclear terrorism,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics 7 (2007). Michael
Mills et al., “Massive global ozone loss predicted following regional nuclear conflict,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the
United States of America 105, no. 14 (2008). Michael Mills et al., “Multidecadal global cooling and unprecedented ozone loss following a
regional nuclear conflict,” Earth’s Future 2. Alan Robock et al., “Climatic consequences of regional nuclear conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry
and Physics 7 (2007). Working at the Laboratory for Atmospheric and Space Physics at the University of Colorado-Boulder, the Department of
Environmental Sciences at Rutgers, and the Department of Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences at UCLA, these scientists used state-
of-the-art computer modeling to evaluate the consequences of a range of possible nuclear conflicts .
They began with a hypothetical war in Southeast Asia, in which a total of 100 Hiroshima-size atomic bombs were detonated in the cities of India
and Pakistan. Please consider the following images of Hiroshima, before and after the detonation of the atomic bomb, which had an explosive
power of 15,000 tons of TNT. The detonation of an atomic bomb with this explosive power will instantly ignite fires over a surface area
of three to five square miles. In the recent studies, the scientists calculated that the blast, fire, and radiation from a war fought
with 100 atomic bombs could produce direct fatalities comparable to all of those worldwide in World War II, or to those once estimated for a
“counterforce” nuclear war between the superpowers. However, the long-term environmental effects of the war could
significantly disrupt the global weather for at least a decade, which would likely result in a vast global
famine. The scientists predicted that nuclear firestorms in the burning cities would cause at least five
million tons of black carbon smoke to quickly rise above cloud level into the stratosphere, where it could
not be rained out. The smoke would circle the Earth in less than two weeks and would form a global
stratospheric smoke layer that would remain for more than a decade . The smoke would absorb warming sunlight,
which would heat the smoke to temperatures near the boiling point of water, producing ozone losses of 20 to 50 percent
over populated areas. This would almost double the amount of UV-B reaching the most populated regions of the mid-latitudes, and it
would create UV-B indices unprecedented in human history. In North America and Central Europe, the time required to get a painful sunburn at
mid-day in June could decrease to as little as six minutes for fair-skinned individuals. As the smoke layer blocked warming sunlight from
reaching the Earth’s surface, it
would produce the coldest average surface temperatures in the last 1,000 years .
The scientists calculated that global
food production would decrease by 20 to 40 percent during a five-year
period following such a war. Medical experts have predicted that the shortening of growing seasons and
corresponding decreases in agricultural production could cause up to two billion people to perish from
famine. The climatologists also investigated the effects of a nuclear war fought with the vastly more powerful
modern thermonuclear weapons possessed by the United States, Russia, China, France, and England. Some
of the thermonuclear weapons constructed during the 1950s and 1960s were 1,000 times more powerful than an atomic
bomb. During the last 30 years, the average size of thermonuclear or “strategic” nuclear weapons has decreased. Yet today, each of the
approximately 3,540 strategic weapons deployed by the United States and Russia is seven to 80 times more
powerful than the atomic bombs modeled in the India-Pakistan study . The smallest strategic nuclear weapon has an
explosive power of 100,000 tons of TNT, compared to an atomic bomb with an average explosive power of 15,000 tons of TNT. Strategic
nuclear weapons produce much larger nuclear firestorms than do atomic bombs. For example, a standard
Russian 800-kiloton warhead, on an average day, will ignite fires covering a surface area of 90 to 152 square
miles. A war fought with hundreds or thousands of U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons would ignite
immense nuclear firestorms covering land surface areas of many thousands or tens of thousands of
square miles. The scientists calculated that these fires would produce up to 180 million tons of black carbon soot
and smoke, which would form a dense, global stratospheric smoke layer. The smoke would remain in the
stratosphere for 10 to 20 years , and it would block as much as 70 percent of sunlight from reaching the surface of
the Northern Hemisphere and 35 percent from the Southern Hemisphere. So much sunlight would be blocked by the smoke
that the noonday sun would resemble a full moon at midnight . Under such conditions, it would only
require a matter of days or weeks for daily minimum temperatures to fall below freezing in the largest
agricultural areas of the Northern Hemisphere , where freezing temperatures would occur every day for a period of between
one to more than two years. Average surface temperatures would become colder than those experienced
18,000 years ago at the height of the last Ice Age, and the prolonged cold would cause average rainfall
to decrease by up to 90%. Growing seasons would be completely eliminated for more than a decade; it
would be too cold and dark to grow food crops, which would doom the majority of the human
population .2
 2AC — Extra

Drones card
Zwanenburg, ’21 — Marten Zwanenburg, Senior Legal Counsel-ministry of Foreign Affair-
Netherlands, Senior Legal Advisor for the ministry of defense, Faculty of Law at the University of
Amsterdam (UvA). The chair was established in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Defence, . 2021,
no specifics. “International Law Studies; Know Thy Enemy: The Use of Biometrics in Military Operations
and International Humanitarian Law.” 97 INT’L L. STUD. 1404 (2021), Volume 97, Stockholm Law, pg.
1407-1408. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2986&context=ils//LFS —
GOF

Biometric systems vary in how close a person must be for it to be possible to enroll that person biometrically. Traditionally,
systems need to be close to the person or even in physical contact with the person so that enrollment is difficult without that person’s knowledge. However,
technologies that can enroll biometric data remotely are being developed or have already been developed. According to William Buhrow, from the perspective of
combat operations, there will be a move towards biometric systems that provide better standoff distance between sensor and target.19 It was reported in May

2021 that the U nited S tates Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity, an organization that falls under the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
has a program called Biometric Recognition and Identification at Altitude and Range.20 This program aims to cultivate new algorithm-based
software systems capable of performing “whole body biometric identification from drones and other
platforms.”21 It has also been reported that the Turkish armed forces have unmanned aerial vehicles capable of facial recognition.22 The drones use
facial recognition to detect human targets and can autonomously launch fire-and-forget missiles
through the entry of target coordinates , it is reported.23 The use of biometrics offers advantages in comparison to recognition systems used
previously. In particular, they promise greater accuracy . Biological and behavioral characteristics used in biometric systems
are unique to an individual. This means that they allow the recognition of that individual with scientific
accuracy .24 Another advantage has to do with the fact that a biometric system is an automated system. As a result, the process of recognizing
an individual can be carried out much faster than if it had to be done manually.

Defines both the process and what it includes

Zwanenburg, ’21 — Marten Zwanenburg, Senior Legal Counsel-ministry of Foreign Affair-
Netherlands, Senior Legal Advisor for the ministry of defense, Faculty of Law at the University of
Amsterdam (UvA). The chair was established in collaboration with the Dutch Ministry of Defence, . 2021,
no specifics. “International Law Studies; Know Thy Enemy: The Use of Biometrics in Military Operations
and International Humanitarian Law.” 97 INT’L L. STUD. 1404 (2021), Volume 97, Stockholm Law, pg.
1407-1408. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2986&context=ils//LFS —
GOF

A biometric s ystem is an automated process that includes the following

steps:

i) Biometric data is collected (sometimes this is also referred to as “capture” or “enrollment”) from an individual via a
biometric identification device, such as an image scanner for fingerprints or palm vein patterns or a camera to collect
 facial and iris scans . The data can be captured either directly from the individual or from an object.14 An example of the latter would be a
fingerprint left on an object by the individual.

ii) The system extracts the data from the submitted sample.

iii) It compares the scanned data from those captured for reference .

iv) It matches the submitted sample with templates.

v) It determines or verifies whether the identity of the biometric data holder is authentic .15
Biometric technologies, therefore, consist of both hardware and software. A biometric identification device is hardware that collects, reads, and compares biometric

data. Biometric data is a sample taken from an individual that is unique to that individual. Software is used to
process gathered biometric data.16 The software typically works with the hardware to operate the biometric data capture process, extract the data, and undertake
comparison, including data matching.17

Unbiased
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/11/04/biometrics-arent-inherently-biased---
were-training-them-wrong/?sh=794241c01ebd

Pandemics are good---they solve impending nuclear war---every warrant goes NEG:

1---Logistics---it’s literally impossible to mobilize an army during a pandemic because

of the risk of disease spread.
2---Studies---our ev sites a meta-analysis on the association between disease and war
and concludes that they statistically reduce the risk of conflict.
3---Economics---COVID proves pandemics screw the economy which makes powers
pessimistic regarding their relative military might and readiness for conflict.
4---Trade---reduced trade makes friction between great powers less likely.
5---They deck public support for military excursions because populations don’t
support them when they’re focused on preventing disease spread
That’s Posen.

Far right coopts the CP---extinction

---their text fiated calling a “limited” concon, and passing the outcome---BUT did NOT fiat what happens
in between, nor could they even if they wanted to

Marcetic 18, Staff Writer at Jacobin, holds an M.A. in History from the University of Auckland (New
Zealand). (Branko. 11-16-18, Can Republicans Rewrite the Constitution?”, Jacobin,
https://jacobinmag.com/2018/11/gop-constitutional-convention-state-legislatures-balanced-budget-
amendment/)

In coverage of the midterms, we’ve heard a lot about the House, the Senate, governorships, and even ballot measures, but almost
nothing about state legislatures. That may soon change, because the Democrats’ meager gains in this department will be crucial to
stopping corporate America’s next strategy to further roll back the twentieth century . The weekend before election
day, a little-noticed article was run by the A ssociated Press, detailing plans by right-wing groups to push for a
con stitutional con vention after the midterms to alter the United States’ founding document. This itself is nothing new: the Right has
spent the past few decades pushing for just such a thing. But with
a historically radical GOP in power, and with the
Democratic takeover of the House frustrating right-wing congressional legislation for the foreseeable
future, the next couple of years could well see the Right go all in on circumventing Congress entirely by
simply rewriting the Constitution. “Having a divided Congress may cause the proponents to feel even more committed to this idea,”
says Michael Leachman, senior director of state fiscal research at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. “They might imagine that this is
the only way they’re going to win the radical changes to the Constitution that they want.” There’s good news and, obviously, bad news to this.
The bad news is, this is a scary prospect that would not only be a disaster for any future left-wing project---a
Bernie Sanders presidency, for example---but would severely hobble efforts to mitigate rapidly
intensifying environmental collapse . The good news is, it can be stopped. But first let’s back up for a second. For the last
few decades, the Right has been gradually setting the table to pass a particular constitutional
amendment (more on the details below). The most familiar way of doing this is to get two-thirds of both houses of Congress to approve it,
before convincing three-fourths of all state legislatures---or thirty-eight of them---to ratify it. Congress actually came perilously close to doing
this in 1995, when the amendment in question failed by one vote in the Senate. Now, with Democrats controlling the House and a thinning GOP
majority in the Senate, this is a non-starter. But there is another way to pass an amendment: have two-thirds of all states, or thirty-four of
them, adopt resolutions calling for a constitutional convention on just this issue. The proposed measure is the fabled balanced
budget amendment. While its exact mechanics differ depending on who writes the language---in some versions Congress is simply
barred from raising the debt ceiling, other times a supermajority is required to do so---the basic idea is to make it extremely
hard, if not impossible, for the federal government to spend more than it takes in . It’s not hard to see why this
measure would be disastrous. The strict spending limit would serve as a constant, ready-made pretext to
slash social spending. It would debilitate any effort to forestall catastrophic climate change , such as
through unprecedented, large-scale investment in infrastructure. And it would magnify the impact of
economic crises by taking away the government’s ability to stabilize the economy through spending .
According to a couple of different estimates, balancing the budget in the face of the Great Recession would have sent GDP plunging by 22
percentage points and doubled the unemployment rate to 18 percent. But wait, you say. Couldn’t a future Democratic president use this to jack
up taxes on the rich? The answer is, not if the Right crams through any other constitutional amendments, such as an abolition of the federal
income tax or a ceiling on federal spending, making brutal spending cuts the only avenue for meeting this legal standard. The Koch-funded
American Legislative Exchange Council, one of the right-wing groups most aggressively engaged in this fight, included wording that would open
the door to such limits in its model legislation in 2016. And that brings us to the other terrifying thing about an
Article V convention, so-
named after the constitutional provision that governs it: there’s a good chance it could see the entire Constitution rewritten

amid an orgy of corporate spending and lobbying . This might sound like an exaggeration, but consider
that the last time a constitutional convention met was in 1787. Originally called to simply amend the
Articles of Confederation that then served as the country’s supreme legal document, the convention
decided to rewrite the whole thing instead . Far from “the greatest document ever written,” the 1787 constitution---“the
Constitution”---was the product of mess of bickering, wheeling and dealing, and bitter compromise that initially barely passed, and some of
whose authors doubted would survive more than a couple of decades. Now imagine that already chaotic, rancorous process re-done, except
with an army of lobbyists with bottomless wallets deployed to put their clients’ stamp on the process. Imagine every form of legalized bribery
dangled in front of hapless delegates to ensure they vote in line with corporate America, from generous campaign donations to the prospect of
cushy, well-paid corporate jobs just through the revolving door. “Ethics and campaign finance rules don’t apply to these delegates,” says Jay
Riestenberg, who manages Common Cause’s campaign work on this issue. “I think Article V will work similar to ALEC---corporations and
legislatures sitting around the table as equals.” “This would be the mother of all opportunities for powerful interests to change the country’s
Constitution,” says Leachman. In such an environment, there’s no telling how many items on the Right’s long-term wishlist would be stuffed
into a new founding document. One additional possibility mentioned in the AP report is a repeal of direct election of senators by voters, rather
than selection by state legislatures, another anti-democratic bulwark against the GOP’s gradually fading electoral fortunes. There’s
also no
telling how the rules might be tilted to ensure the Right’s agenda passes . Republican dominance of
the states guarantees the party would choose most of the delegates, and there’s no legal guidance as
to how such a convention is supposed to work, from drafting all the way to voting. The ratification
process could even be radically changed, as in 1787, when the convention straight up ignored the existing process and decided
to make ratification substantially easier. But the sky would really be the limit . When 137 state legislators got together in 2016 to
simulate such a convention, some of the drafted amendments required a congressional supermajority to raise taxes, empowered three-fifths of
states to nullify federal laws, let congress override regulations, and limited the commerce clause of the constitution, which has been used to
authorize everything from Obamacare to the Civil Rights Act. And it’s easy to imagine even more radical amendments being made: a
constitutional ban on abortion, for instance, or all manner of language limiting government power at a time when large corporations, some
industries in particular, are increasingly spooked about their future bottom lines.

B---STATISTICALLY---growth is decoupled now, resource use declining, and degrowth

causes bounce back emissions.
Kounis et al. ’23 — Nick Kounis, Head of Financial Markets & Sustainability Research, ABN AMRO Bank,
M.Sc., Economics & Finance, Durham University; Casper Burgering, Senior Economist, ABN AMRO, B.A.,
Economics, Vrije University, Amsterdam; Sonia Renoult, Rates Strategist, ABN AMRO; February 26, 2023;
“The Decoupling of Emissions From Economic Growth”; ABN AMRO Economics Growth, SustainaWeekly;
https://www.abnamro.com/research/en/our-research/sustainaweekly-the-decoupling-of-emissions-
and-economic-growth
The difference in the degree of decoupling and the stage of economic development also emerges from our analysis. For example, a clear
difference can be seen between different regions, such as Asia, South America (emerging economies) on the one hand, and North America and
the eurozone (developed economies) on the other. China has indicated that peak CO2 emissions will be reached in
2030 . India's peak emissions are also around that year . Both countries are still developing and have high
economic growth numbers, which is associated with high and increasing greenhouse gas emissions . However,
the figures also show that Asia is often also in the phase of weak decoupling . In this case, both GDP and CO2 emissions are
growing, but the GDP growth rate is at least 20% higher than the growth rate of CO2 emissions .
Most countries in South America are also emerging economically and, as a result, an expansion of negative decoupling is still frequent.
However, according to a November 2022 OECD report, South America is in a ‘good position to begin an effective green transition and make
faster progress toward its economic, social and environmental goals’. The region ranks relatively well on many sustainability indicators. For
example, per capita emissions are lower than other regions with similar levels of development, and its energy mix is
already greener today. Renewable energy sources represent 33% of its total energy supply, compared to
13% worldwide, according to the OECD.

Many countries in Europe have already decoupled CO2 emissions from GDP growth. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Italy, the Czech Republic and Romania are some examples where this process is observable. Outside Europe, the
US is the largest country that has experienced several consecutive years in which economic growth
has been largely decoupled from CO2 emissions growth.
The table above shows that ‘strong negative decoupling’ (the darkest red areas) is more something of the past and, for
now, only occurs during major economic shocks . In any case, this extreme situation has not been observed at the regional
level since 2016. Of course, this situation can occur at the country level. In any case, it is clearly visible from the table that during
economic shocks or other external dismay (like a pandemic ), the trend in the linkage between CO2 emissions and GDP is disturbed
considerably. Around economic shocks the negative decoupling often increases, varying between strong, weak and expanding. We see this
occurring during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2000 Dotcom Crisis, the 2008 -2009 Financial Crisis, and
the milder crises in 2012 and 2016. In the Covid year 2020, it was especially recessive decoupling across all regions. Then both
GDP and CO2 emissions declined firmly, but CO2 emissions declined much more sharply. The world was in lockdown, and this resulted in a
strong decline in the movement of people and goods, causing CO2 emissions to fall more quickly.

Decoupling in the Netherlands

The decoupling of GDP growth and CO2 emissions growth is partly seen in the Netherlands as well, although here the variation in outcomes are sometimes much
larger. In the left graph below, the dots are scattered across almost all areas of the matrix, except in the 'strong negative decoupling' area. The outliers in the
Netherlands in the relationship between growth in CO2 emissions and GDP growth are particularly noticeable in the 1970s, but partly also in the 1980s.

<<FIGURES OMITTED>>

The general trend seen for the Netherlands run from weak decoupling to strong decoupling. However, in terms of emission reduction since 1990, the Netherlands
compares worse than other EU countries. Compared to 1990, total greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands have fallen less than the EU average and almost all
major economies in the eurozone. This underperformance has been linked to relatively slow progress towards renewables, and to some extent also because of large
reliance on gas in the Netherlands. But over the past decade, the Netherlands has stepped up and performed better than the EU average.

In many sectors, CO2 emissions have declined since 1995, while their value added has grown. These are all dark green dots in the right-hand figure above. Almost
two-thirds of the sectors are plotted there, with mostly industrial sectors, but also energy supply, retail and ICT-services sector. About eight sectors show a weak
decoupling over time, with GDP growth exceeding growth in CO2 emissions. Finally, two sectors show both a decline in value added and emissions, where the
decline in CO2 emissions has been sharper.

Maintaining economic growth is important for further sustainability

This analysis shows that reducing carbon emissions need not necessarily be accompanied by a decrease in economic growth.
Decarbonization of an economy can be well achieved by improving energy efficiency and reducing
carbon intensity. To this end, companies in sectors have various measures and techniques available to decarbonise, with many low-
hanging fruit (see here). However, there is no one standard success formula, no common climate policy or other typical solution that leads to
stronger decoupling. Some countries have an ambitious and strict climate policies, which accelerates decoupling, while other countries have
managed to increase both private and public investment sharply in renewable energy.

In any case, our analysis shows that limiting CO2 emissions can go well hand-in-hand with maintaining economic
growth . The data show that many countries have achieved a strong decoupling, with CO2 emissions decreasing and the economy growing.
The results thus offer a strong argument that economic growth is an important and perhaps crucial condition for further
sustainable development. However, it does not take away from the fact that a strong rationalization of our consumption behaviour
for further sustainable development is eminently a good way to contribute to our goal of a stronger reduction of CO2 emissions towards 2030
and 2050.

The fear that immigrants take ‘our’ jobs is not based in fact
Washington, ’19 — John Washington, citing economists Gihoon Hong, John McLaren, and Michael
Clemens, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development. April 24 th 2019. “What would and Open-
Borders World Actually Look Like?” The Nation. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/open-
borders-immigration-asylum-refugees//LFS — GOF

But it is the economic argument that typically dominates open-borders debates . Contrary to the
commonly invoked fear that “ they ” will steal “ our ” jobs, the economists Gihoon Hong and John McLaren have found that in
the U nited S tates, “immigrants can raise native workers’ real wages, and…[each] immigrant creates 1.2
local jobs for local workers.” Michael Clemens, a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development, where he leads research on migration,
displacement, and humanitarian policy, said, “The bottom line is that if even one in 20 people currently in poorer countries could

work in richer countries, that would add more value to the world economy overall than removing every
remaining policy barrier to goods-and-services trade —every tariff, every quota.” If borders were opened ,
economists, both conservative and liberal, predict an enormous boost in global GDP, which would ratchet up by
about $40 trillion —a 60 percent rise.
1AR — April
1AR — Profiling — O/V
 1AR — Profiling — O/V

Biometric identification surveils minority populations—like the director of airport

security calling on the ‘public’ to report people of ‘ Middle Eastern appearance acting
suspiciously ’ : or data-bases that are used to apprehend those who law enforcement
pre-comprehend, training AI on racist stereotypes seen through the persecution of
Berna Cruz and Zeky Mallah.
 1AR — Framing — O/V

You should alter your paradigm when evaluating our cases because:
1 — Minority communities have always been put on hold for the ‘largest risk’ — all of
our defense on their case should catalyze this framing.

2 — The improbability of their impacts means you err affirmative because you know
your ballot can resolve structural violence but a slim chance of [x].
 1AR — AT: Crime
1 — Biometric identifiers exclude things that could or would be used to solve crime i.e
cops can still collect DNA, photos, tattoos, height, weight, etc — our definition of
these identifiers comes from the Illinois General Assembly which is a much more
qualified source than theirs [x] which means you should prefer it.

2 — The moment someone gets arrested and prosecuted they get stripped of their
rights and no longer have a ‘right to personal data’ which is what the resolution bans
the collection of, meaning this process of biometrics after criminals get arrested will
still be protected.

3 — Even so, biometrics have only been useful in ONE court the evidence needs to be
subjected to special hearings where they always fail reliability tests — other than
arresting one dude selling $50 worth of coke every other instance has been useless,
that’s our Valentino-DeVries evidence.

4 — There are a few key warrants from our evidence from Shoshana Magnet,
biometrics were put into practice in florida with 35 camera’s and they have yet to
catch a single perpetrator in a decade because of their inaccuracy on the streets due
to weather, angles, lighting, facial coverings, etc. Also tested was installing technology
in airports—but the quality was so poor that false positives happened 39% of the
time, making officials believe every instance of detection a false reading, leading them
to disregard actual criminals. Spoofing, or faking out sensors is also a large concern—
German scientists were able to trick 9 different recognition systems with fake
fingerprints or simply tilting your head so the camera is unable to detect you.
 1AR — AT: Terrorism
1 — Often times the U.S sells their counter-insurgency through the defense budget,
our Jacobsen evidence backed by international research indicates that in Somalia and
Afghanistan the DoD artificially inflated the accuracy of technology to gain support for
the War on Terror and the military industry — you should be skeptical of their claims
because of this.

2 — Our O’Niel evidence indicates that in real tests most were under controlled
conditions, i.e lighting, angle, subject, glasses, masks, etc. For example among the
9/11 hijackers only 2 out of 19 were under surveillance before the attacks but that
was while they were already inside the U.S. Most terrorists have no criminal record or
connections our intelligence agencies are aware of meaning we can’t even trace
potential suspects. Even with a 99% success rate there would be so many false
positives in airports that officials would disregard all hits entirely because of the sheer
mass of subjects.
2AR — O/V
 2AR — ICE

Migrants have been subjected to expulsion from the U.S due to biometric surveillance,
we have given empirical testimony like Emiliano and Javier who were caught using
camera’s, ID photo’s, etc, leading to raids that cause physical psychological violence
because of trauma.

They said we just have to prove that biometrics have to do anything — they said that
we don’t have a warrant to prove that biometrics are bad but there were two
unanswered responses — 1) even if we don’t win that biometrics are intrinsically bad
ICE are the ones who use the technology, by banning it they can’t use it anymore—
and 2) we’ve given empirical examples like Emiliono who got deported because of
biometrics—that’s beside the evidence that proves psychological violence as a result
of raids.

Because they did not extend their weighing metric and didn’t answer that we fit in
theirs because we protect civil liberties, in the second to last speech you prefer our
method— you know that structural violence is happening now, making your ballot
resolve most of it but not “human trafficking”—which we’ll catalyze on our framing
below.

Crime —

Throughout the debate we’ve won that biometrics exclude “biological samples used
for valid scientific testing or screening” — all of the NEG speeches did NOT contest why
our definition is better 1) because it’s a legal court and is MORE specific definition
than theirs because it both defines what is INCLUDED and EXCLUDED. The resolution
would not ban ALL biometrics, just the one’s we have defined. They also didn’t answer
the fact that their definition is a justification to push discriminated communities on
the backburner—for those reasons you prefer ours. — so because blood, semen, hair,
etc. are not counted as biometrics police can use them to cath criminals—but even
post ban we just have to wait three days which is not a big time to wait.
vote AFF.
 2AR — Profiling

you should prefer our method of evaluating the impacts because it brings minorities
to the forefront of U.S legislation and we have given you empirical evidence of real
people to prove our case like personal testimony — you know that structural violence
is happening now, making your ballot resolve most of it but not ‘pandemic’ which is
very improbable as seen in cross examination — their interpretation justifies one
population over another just because it’s the Utilitarian thing to do—you should just
mark this as a justification to ignore discriminated communities—now is when they
will become part of our legislation.

They said that police can still racially profile people without biometrics but they have
not answered the fact that biometrics are the conduit for profiling, they make it easier
for this profiling.

They said that we can improve biometric data sets to stop bias but this argument is
completely unresponsive to our argument that 1) their analysis has no prescriptive
analysis that the data sets will improve 2) biometrics are what cops use to
discriminate, if we take away that key tool then cops will have a much harder time
discriminating, circle these args on notes—this answres their bias contention.

They did not clearly extend their health case, you can group bias on our case, so we’ll
answer innovation here

Firstly id like to state they did not clearly extend this contention, so you should be VERY skeptical of
voting on it when you dont really know what you would be voting for

They have still NOT outlined how BioM are key to US innovation. Sure you can say that these BioM are a
growing sector, but saying that they are growing and taking over old forms of data is not a reason they
are key to innovation, other things fuel innovation, things like SpaceX, Apple, etc., other tech industries
are innovating in so many other ways, they have NOT read evidence saying it is key

Additionally our definition takes out their contention, other things in that are excluded in our definition
and therefore wouldnt be banned can be innovated on, meaning innovation still happens even after we
ban BioM
So—so you should prefer impacts that center on solving discrimination.
Extra
 Baudrillard
Biometrics serve as a vehicle for surveillance cap
https://monoskop.org/images/b/ba/Baudrillard_Jean_The_Mirror_of_Production_1975.pdf

Political Revolution and "Cultural" Revolution During the last hundred years, capitalism has been able to
prevent serious social and political changes by absorbing contradictions when they were posed only at
the level of material production. Contradition only becomes radical when, as is the case 16. This would
mean that traditional contradictions no longer have any apparent meaning. But perhaps they never
had? 142 CHAPTER 5 today, it reaches a level of total social relations. It is by expanding the field of social
abstraction to the level of consumption, signification, information and knowledge, by expanding its
jurisdiction and control to the whole field of culture and daily life, even to the unconscious, that the
system has resolved the partial contradictions connected with economic relations of production.
Through a restoration that has taken a century to accomplish, capitalism, by radicalizing its own logic,
also has succeeded m radically altering the Marxist definitions of contradiction and revolution. The
"cultural revolution," which corresponds to the radicalized logic of capital, to "in depth" imperialism,17
is not the developed form of all economic-political revolution. It acts on the basis of a reversal of
"materialist" logic. Against the materialist postulate according to which the mode of production and the
reproducion of social relations are subordinated to relations of material production, one can ask if it is
not the production of social relations that determiens the mode of material reproduction (the
development of productive forces and relations of production). A genealogy of social relations shows
many criteria of domination other than the private ownership of the means of production. Species, race,
sex, age, language, culture, signs of either an anthropological or cultural type - all these criteria are
criteria of difference, of signification and of code . It is a simplistic hypothesis that makes them all
"descendants" in the last instance of economic exploitation. 1 7. The economic and political planetary
extension of capitalism is only the "extensive" modality of this deepening of capital. Moreover, it is to
this level that the analysis of "imperialism" is in general limited. THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
143 On the contrary, it is truer to say that this hypothesis is itself only the rationalization of an order of
domination reproduced through it. A domination that plays the economic as a tactic, a detour and an
alibi. Today the essential fact is no longer profit or exploitation. Perhaps it was never so even in the
Golden Age and Iron Age of capitalism. It is directly at the level of the production of social relations that
capitalism is vulnerable and en route to perdition. Its fatal malady is not its incapacity to reproduce itself
economically and politically, but its incapacity to reproduce itself symbolically. The symbolic social
relation is the uninterrupted cycle of giving and receiving, which, in primitive exchange, includes the
consumption of the "surplus" and deliberate anti-production whenever accumulation (the thing not
exchanged, taken and not returned, earned and not wasted, produced and not destroyed), risks
breaking the reciprocity and begins to generate power. It is this symbolic relation that the political
economy model (of capital), whose only process is that of the law of value, hence of appropriation and
indefinite accumulation, can no longer produce . It is its radical negation. What is produced is no longer
symbolically exchanged and what is not symbolically exchanged (the commodity) feeds a social relation
of power and exploitation. It is this fatality of symbolic disintegration under the sign of economic
rationality that capitalism cannot escape. One can also say, with Cardan, that its fundamental
contradiction is no longer between the development of productive forces and relations of production,
but in the impossibility of having people "participate ." However, the term "participation" has a
connotation that is much too contractual and rationalist to express the nature of 144 CHAPTER S the
symbolic . Let us say that the system is structurally incapable of liberating human potentials except as
productive forces, that is, according to an operational finality that leaves no room for the reversion of
the loss, the gift, the sacrifice and hence for the possibility of symbolic exchange. The example of
consumption is significant. The feudal system died because it could not find the path to rational
productivity. The bourgeoisie knew how to make the people work, but it also narrowly escaped
destruction in 1 929 because it did not know how to make them consume. It was content, until then, to
socialize people by force and exploit them through labor. But the crisis in 1 929 marked the point of
asphyxiation : the problem was no longer one of production but one of circulation. Consumption
became the strategic element ; the people were henceforth mobilized as consumers; their "needs"
became as essential as their labor power. By this operation, the system assured its economic survival at
a fantastically expanded level. But something else is at play in the strategy of consumption. By allowing
for the possibility of expanding and consuming, by organizing social redistribution (social security,
allotments, salaries that are no longer defined as the strict economic reproduction of labor power) by
launching advertising, human relations, etc., the system- created the illusion of a symbolic participation
(the illusion that something that is taken and won is also redistributed, given, and sacrificed). In fact, this
entire symbolic simulation is uncovered as leading to superprofits and super-power. In spite of all its
good will (at least among those capitalist who are aware of the necessity of tempering the logic of the
system in order to avoid an explosion in the near future), it THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 145
cannot make consumption a true consummation, a festival, a waste. To consume is to start producing
again. All that is expended is in fact invested ; nothing is ever totally lost. Even when coffee stocks burn,
when enormous wealth is squandered in war, the system cannot stop having this lead to a widening
reproduction. It is caught in the necessity of producing, accumulating, making a profit. Its assistance to
developing countries is returned in multiple profits. Even if the liberal experts denounce, as they have
for twenty years, the catastrophe that will come at the end of this process, the rich nations cannot
reduce (even if they clearly wanted to), at the cost of real sacrifices, the gulf that separates them from
the Third World. And this also means that each individual, each consumer, is locked into the profitable
manipulation of goods and signs for his own interest. He can no longer really waste his time in leisure.
18 Inexorably, he reproduces, at his own level, the whole system of political economy : the logic of
appropriation, the impossibility of waste, of the gift, of loss, the inexorability of the law of value. There is
the same con juncture at the political level. Power consists in the monopoly of the spoken word ; the
spoken word (decision, responsibility) is no longer exchanged. But this situation is explosive ; those who
have power know it. And we see them desperately attempting to divest themselves of a portion of the
spoken word, of redistributing a part of the responsibilities in order to avoid a boomerang of the kind
that occurred in May, 1968. But they cannot do it. They would like to have participation, but
participation is revealed each time as being only 18. Cf. Baudrillard, La societe de consommation (Paris:
Denoel, 1970). 146 CHAPTER 5 a better tactic for the wider reproducton of the system. The more
autonomy is given to everyone, the more decision-making is concentrated at the summit.19 Just as in
1929, when the system almost died from an inability to circulate production, so today it is perishing
from an inability to circulate the spoken word. Because it is a system of production, it can only
reproduce itself. It can no longer achieve any symbolic integration (the reversibility of the process of
accumulation in festivals and waste, the reversibility of the process of production in destruction, the
reversibility of the process of power in exchange and death). At all levels, the system is sick from
desublimation, from liberalization, from tolerance, while seeking to transcend itself in order to survive.
Consumption, satisfaction of needs, sexual liberation, women's rights, etc., etc . - it is prepared to grant
anything in order to reduce social abstraction so that people will play the game. But it cannot do it, once
again, because this liberalization is only hyperrepressive. Needs which were once contingent and
heterogeneous are homogenized and definitively rationalized according to the models of the system.
Sexuality, which was once repressed, is liberated as a game of signs. It objectifies sexuality as the
functionality of the body and the profitability of the pleasure principle. Information is liberated, but only
in order to be better managed and stylized by the media. Everywhere the pressure of the system of
political economy is heightened. The final avatars are anti-pollution and job enrichment. Here also the
19. The autonomy of the faculties is, as we know, the best means of aligning them with capitalist
productivity, just as the independence of colonial nations was the best means of perpetuating and
modernizing their exploitation. THE SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 147 system seems to slacken its
limits and restore nature and work in their dignity : a desublimation of productive forces in relation to
traditional exploitation. But we know very well that a symbolic relation of man to nature or to his work
will not reemerge here. There will only be a more flexible and reinforced operationality of the system.
We are faced with coding, super-coding, universalization of the code, proliferating axiomatization of the
capitalist system (Deleuze). But against the triumphant abstraction, against the irreversible
monopolization, the demand arises that nothing can be given without being returned, nothing is ever
won without something being lost, nothing is ever produced without something being destroyed,
nothing is ever spoken without being answered. In short, what haunts the system is the symbolic
demand.
 Deleuze

Debate key
Bogue, ’03 — Ronald Bogue, Research Professor and a Josiah Meigs Distinguished Teaching Professor,
PhD in philosophy. 2003-02-28. “Deleuze on Literature.” Accessed through KU libraries. Chapter Four;
Minor Literature, pp 91-114//LFS — GOF

Language for Deleuze and Guattari is a means of action, a way of doing things. As speech-act theorists
have long pointed out, there are certain expressions that in their enunciation clearly constitute an
action, such as “I thee wed” when pronounced by a minister. Deleuze and Guattari see in such
performatives the paradigm of all language and argue that linguistics should be regarded as a
subdivision of a general pragmatics, or theory of action. The function of language is not primarily to
communicate, they argue, but to impose order—to transmit what they call mots d’ordre (“slogans,”
“watchwords,” literally “words of order”) (MP 96; 76). Every language encodes the world, categorizing
entities, actions and states of affairs, determining their contours, specifying their relations, and so on.
With the inculcation of a language comes the organization of reality according to a dominant social
order, and everywhere speech-acts take place a dominant social order is confirmed and reinforced.
Language operates by inducing “incorporeal transformations” (MP 102; 80) of the world, speech-acts
changing things, acts, states of affairs, and so on, through their codification, in the same manner as the
groom and bride are transformed into husband and wife with the phrase, “I now pronounce you man
and wife.”3 Such incorporeal transformations presuppose regular patterns of action and organized
configurations of entities, and it is via socially sanctioned networks of practices, institutions and material
entities that the codification of language is enacted. These complex networks are comprised of
“assemblages” (agencements), collections of heterogeneous actions and entities that somehow function
together. 4 Two broad categories of assemblages may be distinguished, the first consisting of
nondiscursive machinic assemblages of bodies, “of actions and passions, an intermingling of bodies
reacting to one another,” the second of discursive collective assemblages of enunciation, “of acts and
statements, of incorporeal transformations attributed to bodies” (MP 112; 88). Machinic assemblages
are the various patterns of practices and elements through which a world’s entities are formed, and
collective assemblages of enunciation are the patterns of actions, institutions and conventions that
make possible linguistic statements. When the judge pronounces the defendant “guilty,” for example,
her verdict presupposes all the regularities of the legal code, of judicial, legislative and executive
institutions, the conventions of behavior in court rooms, and so forth, all of which function together as a
collective assemblage of enunciation. Entities of this assemblage are also formed through nondiscursive
practices, the court building, the gavel, the judge’s robes, and so on, being produced through
multifarious networks of actions that function as machinic assemblages. Although the two kinds of
assemblages are intermingled, they remain separable processes, collective assemblages of enunciation
functioning as a level of expression, and machinic assemblages as a level of content. Expression and
content, however, are not related to one another as signifier to signified, but as distinct patterns of
actions and entities interfering with one another, intervening in each other’s functioning: “In expressing
the noncorporeal attribute, and at the same time attributing it to a body, one does not represent, one
does not refer, one intervenes in a certain manner, and that is an act of language” (MP 110; 86).
Linguists generally analyze language in terms of constants and invariants, whereas Deleuze and Guattari
argue that the standard, fixed forms of language are secondary effects produced by regular patterns of
action. Primary for Deleuze and Guattari are variables, which exist in a virtual dimension comprised of
multiple “lines of continuous variation,” and which assemblages actualize in specific, concrete instances.
Consider the statement “I swear!,” for example. Phonemically, one may view variations in the
pronunciation of “swear” as insignificant deviations from a standard phonemic unit, but Deleuze and
Guattari look on all the possible pronunciations of “swear” as forming a continuum of sounds, a line of
continuous variation, which has a virtual existence, real without being actual. Each speaker actualizes a
particular portion of that continuum, and the regulating patterns of action of a dominant social order
determine which point along the continuum counts as the “correct” pronunciation and which points are
“incorrect,” “nonstandard,” “deviant.” A similar continuum underlies the syntax of “I swear!,” a line of
continuous variation containing “I do swear,” “Me swear,” “So do I swear,” “Swear I,” and so on, norm
and deviations again being enforced through regular patterns of action. Finally, a semantic line of
continuous variation passes through “I swear!” Commonly, the semantic content of a statement is seen
as a stable, denotative core that takes on various nuances of meaning in diverse contexts. But Deleuze
and Guattari regard each speech act as the actualization of a particular point on a continuum of
semantic variables. When the son swears before his father, the fiancé before his betrothed or the
defendant before the judge, in each instance “I swear!” is a different speech-act with a different
semantic content. Each performance is an actualization of a continuum of virtual “I swears!,” the
variable nuances of meaning receiving sanction as standard or deviant, literal or figurative, serious or
whimsical, and so on, according to the dominant practices of the social order. All the lines of continuous
variation of a language are parts of an “abstract machine,” which also includes as complementary parts
the variable trajectories of the nondiscursive patterns of action that shape entities in the world.
Collective assemblages of enunciation and nondiscursive machinic assemblages actualize the abstract
machine, and the abstract machine puts the two assemblages in relation with one another. The regular
practices of a given social order control and restrict variables, but lines of continuous variation remain
immanent within assemblages, making possible nonstandard actualizations that destabilize norms and
rules. Hence, the various “errors” of Prague German and the deformations of German produced within
Yiddish are so many actualizations of points along lines of continuous variation, variables that
undermine the regularities of standard German and thereby destabilize as well all the assemblages of
practices, institutions, entities and states of affairs that those linguistic regularities presuppose. One can
see, then, why Deleuze and Guattari regard the deterritorialization of language as political action, for
language is itself action shaped by structures of power, and a minor use of language, such as that made
of German by Prague Jews, necessarily engages power relations as it counters the restrictive controls of
standard usage and sets nonstandard variables at play within the language.
 NEG
1 — Biometric data collection isn’t the discriminatory actor, corrupt police or airport
officials are the agents who act on retrieved information-pointing to the need of law
enforcement reformation, not gutting biometrics—their argument forecloses the
benefits of biometrics without considering alternate approaches to solving racial
profiling which disregards all positives.

1 — group arguments 1 & 4, guns don’t kill people, people do — you should compound our framing here
— a broad ban excludes the possibilities for future improvements, Ritter 20 explains that the data-bases
that biometrics are being trained on use biased data, because source data is improving a ban would
foreclose opportunities for those improvements — if we win a risk of them improving then you

2 — A ban on biometrics can’t stop racial profiling in car stops, TSA checks, etc. —
ultimately profiling is up to the officers that use the data.

3 — If we win that future biometric data systems can be unbiased you should be
unwilling to vote affirmative.

4 — It’s the data training that makes it biased—improved training can solve
Ritter, ’20 — Stephen Ritter, B.A Cognitive Science at UC San Diego, held many positions in research
firms, Forbes technology council. November 4th 2020. “Biometrics Aren’t Inherently Biased — We’re
Training Them Wrong.” Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2020/11/04/
biometrics-arent-inherently-biased---were-training-them-wrong/?sh=794241c01ebd//LFS — GOF

There is a common misconception that biometric recognition solutions have an intrinsic bias, but even the
most advanced technologies today lack the cognition necessary to be deliberately racist (unless the Terminator
was hiding a dark secret). That isn’t to say many solutions don’t have issues recognizing the faces of certain groups — they do. In one study, researchers at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) found that facial recognition algorithms "falsely identified African American and Asian faces 10 to 100 times
more than Caucasian faces." That’s a problem, but rather
than being a fundamental problem with biometrics, the issue
stems from either a bug in the algorithm or, more likely, from the datasets used to train the machine
learning model in the first place. Before we can better understand how to fix the problem, we need to understand what created it.
Defining Biometric Bias Biometrics are our inherent physical or behavioral attributes — but let’s stick to physical traits for now. The color of our eyes, the scar on our left cheek — these are all distinguishing biometric markers. By training machine learning models to scan, understand and
recognize these unique features, we can essentially turn ourselves into highly secure passcodes. That sounds straightforward, but an AI system doesn’t inherently know what a nose is — or an eyebrow or even a human face. Researchers who develop facial capture and recognition
technologies first need to collect huge quantities of pictures of people’s faces, which they use to teach the model what to look for and distinguish when detecting facial biometrics. The problem with bias arises when the training data skews toward one specific demographic. This results in
a very specific type of error known as over-fitting. When datasets disproportionately exhibit certain characteristics, a machine learning model will inherently focus more heavily on that characteristic. That means a biometric system isn’t biased against any particular race or gender, but
instead it is less able to identify the patterns typically found in that face’s demographic. In one example, a 2018 study by MIT and Stanford researchers found that the facial data used to train at least one commercially available system was more than 77% white and more than 83% male.
That obviously looks nothing like the demographics of the United States, let alone the world — but because it was trained on that skewed data, the program will struggle to recognize faces that fall outside the white male user group.

Removing Bias Depends On Consistency, Not Just Accuracy If limited or disproportionate datasets are the primary
cause of biometric technology bias, then the solution seems simple enough : Make sure new algorithms are trained with an equally diverse range of data, right? Unfortunately,

problems with relatively new technologies like biometrics are rarely so simple, especially when people with their own inherent norms and biases are involved. We also have to consider the limitations of working in a sterile lab environment. When testing in a lab, developers supply the

machine learning algorithm with images that are both readily available (hence the predominantly white male demographic) and that match the qualities the system prefers — in this case, front-facing images with clear lighting. But these settings don’t account
for the full range of factors a user will encounter in the real world. In this case, that means not just training
a system to capture and compare facial
data consistently across all demographics, but also capturing images from an equally diverse range of angles, backgrounds

and lighting conditions. That means eliminating bias requires biometrics technologies be both accurate and consistent in how they capture and identify
users. One without the other is meaningless. For instance, if a system can regularly identify 90% of white males faces but only 40% of black female faces, it offers accuracy but lacks consistency and perpetuates the problem of bias. Alternatively, if a
solution is able to consistently identify roughly 70% of all faces 80% of the time, it is slightly less accurate but is ultimately a better, more equitable tool. Ensuring both accuracy and consistency in biometrics not only helps to eliminate the problem of bias, but ensures that companies using

the product are better able to serve their entire user base — not just a single demographic. Solving The Problem Starts At The Source: People And Technology Organizations

creating and working with new biometrics solutions need to be aware of both the human and technical
limitations that have stymied technology up to this point and address them at the earliest stages of the design process.
Testing also needs to become more rigorous, both for the organizations designing the solution and companies that ultimately purchase the
technology. By implementing and refining set standards to ensure proper design , training and testing

processes — a practice called model governance — we can eliminate many of the technical and operational flaws that
have led to biometric bias . We can learn from Jennifer L. Eberhardt, a social psychologist at Stanford University,
in her 2020 TED Talk, "How racial bias works — and how to disrupt it." When talking about how to disrupt bias in the physical world, she

and her team are now actively looking to technology — and machine learning — to interrupt and address this
troubling problem. Biometric bias remains an issue, but there are also many facial recognition systems today that have
done an excellent job managing this potential bias. And there’s a lot we can learn from them. It’s a complicated process to train new
machine learning models with faces, especially when our own biases or norms get in the way, and each use case presents its own challenges. But in order to

solve the problem for everyone, businesses and consumers need to have a better understanding of what a
truly unbiased system means to them and continue to test new tech nologies for it. In the physical world, as well as
the digital world, it’s critical everyone receives the same opportunity, security and convenience.
 Human Trafficking

2 — Their own Zivo evidence concedes that the data is NOT private or personal
information meaning it would not be banned under the resolution of “banning
collection of personal data”
Zivo, 19, “Biometrics Are The Future Of Anti-Trafficking”, Adam Zivo completed his Bachelor of Arts in
Philosophy at the University of Toronto, and his Masters of Public Policy and Governance at The Munk School, University of
Toronto, February 4, 2019, NATO Association of Canada, https://natoassociation.ca/biometrics-are-the-
future-of-anti-trafficking/ SH

In the past few years, biometrics companies have been exploring how technology can be used to track victims
and break apart trafficking networks. While new, the biometric technology has a number of potential applications here.
Biometric tracking could be used to prevent the cross-border transportation of victims, since traffickers
aren’t able to easily forge new identities like they currently do with physical paperwork. Families who
have had a child abducted, but for whom they lack documentation, may be able to provide photographs of
their children’s faces for analysis. Investigators can use these photographs to create a biometric file, at least a
partially complete one, that they can use to eventually identify and rescue the victim . Biometric data can be
hashed, meaning that it can be encrypted via being converted into a string of numbers. This allows this
data to be shared more easily between different investigative teams across various jurisdictions. Once hashed into
a number-string, the data becomes unintelligible and therefore doesn’t disclose any private

information. This not only protects the privacy of the system’s participants , it also means that the
hashed data doesn’t count as personal
information , making it much easier to legally share across borders. If the hashed data of a victim
matches a hashed profile in a tracking system, investigators can then secure subpoenas to move forward with un-hashed data.

Their definition is some government agency defining what it uses as biometrics, not
like ours which is from legal documents—we’ll read their evidence here.
National Institute of Justice, 22, “Federally Backed Human Trafficking Task Force Model
Yields Progress, and Opportunities for Continued Growth”, January 6, 2022, NIJ.gov
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/federally-backed-human-trafficking-task-force-model-yields-
progress
NIST's biometric activities include: research on the various biometric modalities : fingerprint, face, iris, voice, DNA, and
multimodal; standards development at the national and international level; and technology testing and evaluation, which leads to
innovation.

There are tons of alternative causes to catching human traffickers—this is from their
own evidence
National Institute of Justice, 22, “Federally Backed Human Trafficking Task Force Model
Yields Progress, and Opportunities for Continued Growth”, January 6, 2022, NIJ.gov
https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/federally-backed-human-trafficking-task-force-model-yields-
progress SH

Human trafficking can be hard to detect and harder to stop. Inherently complex , human
trafficking crimes can pose a number of barriers to enforcement . They include
victim identification challenges, victim fear of seeking help, and a lack of
appropriate agency resources . A significant barrier to progress, in many jurisdictions, is local
authorities’ lack of recognition of trafficking crimes as such, for both sex and labor trafficking. As
a result, those offenses are often not prosecuted under available trafficking statutes, denying
survivors the full protection of the law.
Biometric drones are key to creating humanitarian corridors
Lewis, et. al., '21 — Larry Lewis. May 26th 2021. "Technology, Humanist, and the End of War." West
Point. lieber.westpoint.edu/technology-humanity-end-war//LFS — GOF
Once hostilities begin to wind down, such technologies can also inform and facilitate negotiations, helping to establish the foundations for peace, no matter how
tenuous. Beyond continued and further use of the technological capabilities mentioned above, the wide array of sensors and tools available to gather and verify
data can create a consensus set of facts shared by the warring parties as well as third parties who might facilitate the end of conflict through negotiation and/or

humanitarian assistance. For example, using drones to document situations in the area of conflict will provide negotiators
with instantaneous “ground truth .” Biometric data will allow for a more accurate picture of the
movement of refugees and others on the battlefield. Stationary sensors will enable verification of the location and movement of both
military units and civilian populations. This trusted set of facts can then facilitate negotiations by ensuring that all
parties are operating from a shared factual picture . These same systems can also be promoted as means
for the verification of ceasefires and methods to monitor future compliance with the provisions of a
peace agreement. Stationing a drone over a contested area where a cease-fire has been agreed will allow constant
monitoring and recording of any border incidents. In an environment marked by distrust and uncertainty,
blockchain tools can ensure verification for the transfers of goods, services, and money and even the movement of people, and remote sensors can

provide trusted sources of information. Biometrics can support demilitarization schemes and the return of displaced

civilians by allowing individualized fingerprint, DNA, and retinal scan verification to confirm that groups and
fighters have disarmed and that families are reunited . These technologies also serve as confidence-building tools to introduce the
foundations for sustainable peaceful engagements.

https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/human-trafficking-data-collection-activities-2022#:~:text=The
%20number%20of%20persons%20prosecuted,in%202020%20(658%20persons).
The number of persons prosecuted for human trafficking increased from 729 in 2011 to 1,343 in 2020,
an 84% increase.

The number of persons convicted of a federal human trafficking offense increased from 2011 (464
persons) to 2019 (837 persons), before falling in 2020 (658 persons).

https://preventht.org/reference/tech-vs-human-trafficking/#:~:text=Biometrics%20is%20a%20game
%2Dchanger,into%20a%20string%20of%20numbers.

Biometrics

Since traffickers go where there is demand, it is quite common for trafficking victims to be ushered from
one location to another. In many instances, traffickers move their victims across international borders,
using fraudulent documentation as a means to evade detection. For those victims with little or no official
documentation, it becomes even more difficult to identify and find them. Biometrics is a game-changer
in this type of situation. Law enforcement agencies now have the ability to create individual profiles of
potential trafficking victims based on a single photograph, which is analyzed and the data encrypted into
a string of numbers. This encryption allows for information to be transported across borders. When an
individual matches the information found in the biometric file, a subpoena may be issued to detain the
individual.

Some countries are seeking to fully implement biometric systems by collecting data from all their
citizens. Although it is a huge undertaking, the benefits appear to outweigh the laborious task since the
broad use of biometrics in border security will impact a trafficker’s ability to transport their victims.

Artificial Intelligence

Traffickers that use personal ads to exploit their victims may be in for a rude awakening. Technology has
been developed that can identify signs of trafficking in a personal ad. Although law enforcement
personnel have long been able to successfully distinguish ads posted by traffickers and those posted by
sex workers, artificial intelligence allows them to do so at a more efficient rate.

Companies such as XIX have formulated software that searches images and identifies items that may be
indicative of human trafficking. For example, the photograph of an individual with signs of bruising or
injury can point to sex trafficking. Impressively, the software “can scrape and analyze about 4,000 ads
per minute,” a task that would normally take investigators several hours. When the analysis is complete,
a report is generated and provided to law enforcement.

Traffickers have long been using technology to further their criminal enterprises. However, as
technology evolves, those determined to see the end of trafficking continue to harness the power of
technology to their advantage. Blockchains, biometrics, and artificial intelligence are just a glimpse of
technologies that can be honed and used to combat this human rights epidemic.