Naryad-V
Spaceand
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
BART HENDRICKX
Minervastraat 39, 2640 Mortsel, Belgium.
This paper discusses various anti-satellite projects initiated by the Soviet Union in the 1980s, mainly in response to the Strategic
Defence Initiative announced by US President Ronald Reagan in 1983. Most attention is focused on Naryad-V, which reached
the flight testing stage in the early 1990s and later evolved into the Rokot/Briz-KM launch vehicle programme.
Keywords: Soviet anti-satellite programme, Naryad-V, Rokot, Briz, IS, Skif, Kaskad, Kamin, Kontakt, Strategic Defence Initiative
Introduction
A rocket that Russia occasionally launches from the Plesetsk
cosmodrome these days is the Rokot booster, a converted
ICBM topped by the Briz-KM upper stage. This is used to place
relatively small satellites into low Earth orbits. What few people
realize, however, is that the Rokot/Briz-KM has its roots in a
ground-based Soviet anti-satellite (ASAT) system developed
in the 1980s. Called Naryad-V, this was only one component
of a much larger Soviet ASAT effort initiated in the 1960s and
later bolstered by the announcement of the American Strategic
Defence Initiative in 1983. The Naryad-V programme saw two
suborbital test flights in 1990 and 1991 and there is evidence to
suggest that an orbital mission launched by the Rokot booster
in late 1994 included an attempted covert test of the system in
orbit.
The IS Programme
By the time work on Naryad-V got underway in the mid-1980s,
the Soviet Union already possessed an operational anti-satellite
system. Called IS (for istrebitel’ sputnikov or “satellite destroyer”),
it had been conceived in the early 1960s at the OKB-52 design
bureau headed by Vladimir Chelomei. At the time Chelomei
enjoyed almost unconditional support from Soviet leader Nikita
Khrushchov, whose son worked at Chelomei’s bureau. Brimming
with ambition, Chelomei proposed a wide array of military space
projects, some more realistic than others. One of those was to
develop a piloted anti-satellite vehicle, but eventually he had to
settle for a more modest unmanned system. The IS programme
was officially approved by a government decree on 16 March
1961. It was a so-called “co-orbital” ASAT system, in which a
weapon with conventional explosives is launched into the same
orbit as the target and then moves near enough to destroy it.
Two test flights of the IS system were performed in November
1963 and April 1964 using a booster of Sergei Korolyov’s OKB-1
This paper was presented at the British Interplanetary Society Soviet/
Chinese Technical Forum held on 19-21 June 2015.
Chronicle,
the Soviet Anti-Satellite
Vol. 69, pp.?-?, Fleet
2016
design bureau based on the R-7 missile. The Soviet TASS news
agency announced these missions to the world as Polyot-1 and
Polyot-2 (polyot meaning “flight”) and described them as the
first manoeuvrable satellites, not giving away anything about
their true purpose. Polyot-1 used its on-board engine system
to change both altitude and inclination, but Polyot-2 barely
manoeuvred at all and recently declassified documents suggest
that it may not have been as successful as the Russians claimed
at the time [1].
In October 1964 Chelomei lost much of his political support
when Khrushchov was ousted by Leonid Brezhnev. The change
of power in the Kremlin had two immediate implications for the
IS programme. Chelomei was forced to relinquish control of
the programme to the KB-1 design bureau (more particularly,
a division of KB-1 called OKB-41, which in 1973 became
independent under the name TsNII Kometa). This had earlier
acted as a subcontractor to develop the satellites’ guidance and
control systems. Now the roles switched, with KB-1 becoming
the lead design bureau and OKB-52 relegated to the role of
subcontractor, being responsible only for the development of
the satellite bus. Another consequence was that Chelomei had
to abandon plans to launch the IS satellites with his own UR-
200 rocket. The UR-200 was cancelled in 1965 and replaced
as IS launch vehicle by a rocket based on the R-36 ICBM of the
OKB-586 Yangel design bureau (the rocket was retrospectively
called Tsiklon-2). This had two launch pads in Area 90 of the
Baikonur cosmodrome.
The IS satellites were built around a drum-shaped bus
that contained the main power and control systems (Fig. 1).
Attached to one side of the bus was a radar antenna to locate
the target. An alternative infrared homing system was also
developed, but it failed on all its four missions [2]. Mounted on
the other side of the bus were spherical propellant tanks and
a truss structure carrying the main engine. The satellite also
had a variety of attitude control thrusters. Extending from either
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Bart Hendrickx
Fig. 1 The IS satellite. Key: 1. Radar antenna; 2. Guidance and
control systems; 3. Thrusters; 4. Propellant tanks; 5. Explosive
charges; 6. Guidance and control systems; 7. Main engine.
(A. Lobanov/I. Afanasyev/A. Suvorov/A. Novichkov)
side of the satellite were short extendable booms that carried
explosive charges. The shrapnel resulting from the explosion
was supposed to knock out the target satellite. The first target
satellites were also manoeuvrable and apparently based on
the IS design. In 1971 they were replaced by lighter, non-
manoeuvrable target satellites (designated DS-P1-M) built
by the Yangel bureau that were launched by the Kosmos-3M
booster from Plesetsk.
Test flights of the IS system began in 1967 and the first
successful intercept took place on 1 November 1968. Two
basic mission scenarios were observed in the following years.
In one of them, the target satellite was placed into a relatively
low orbit (usually around 500 km high) and the interceptor
into a highly elliptical orbit, intercepting the target at perigee.
In another pattern, the target satellite entered a higher orbit
(about 1,000 km up) and the interceptor rendezvoused with
it during the apogee of its elliptical orbit. Most intercepts
occurred at altitudes around 500 km or 1,000 km, but there
were exceptions. The lowest intercept altitude observed was a
mere 150 km and the highest 1,575 km. All interceptors were
inserted into orbits co-planar with their targets, with inclinations
ranging from 62° to 66°. The rendezvous usually took place
during the 2nd revolution, but in some instances the intercept
was carried out near the end of the 1st revolution, less than two
hours after launch.
Initially, the purpose of the tests was to actually destroy the
targets, but later the focus shifted to demonstrating the ability
to approach the target close enough for the explosive charges
to do their job and the interceptors either self-destructed or
de-orbited themselves after the intercept. Several Tsiklon-2
boosters were reportedly on standby at Baikonur, ready to be
2
rolled out the pad at very short notice if the need arose. It would
have taken only about 1.5 hours to prepare the rocket for launch
in case the command was given [3].
An early operational capability was achieved in February
1973. That same year work got underway on a slightly modified
interceptor called IS-M that began test flights in 1976 and
achieved operational status in November 1979. In all, 41 objects
were placed into orbit in the framework of the IS programme
(including the Polyots). The last mission (Kosmos-1375/1379)
was flown in June 1982 and was part of a large-scale military
exercise that also included ICBM, IRBM and SLBM test
launches. The exercise, which tested the Soviet command,
control and communications networks in a simulated wartime
environment, became known in the West as the “seven-hour
nuclear war” [4].
Just over a year later, on 18 August 1983, Soviet leader Yuriy
Andropov, who had replaced the deceased Leonid Brezhnev in
November 1982, announced a unilateral moratorium on anti-
satellite tests. What drove Andropov to declare the moratorium
is open to speculation, but the decision may well have been
prompted by a genuine concern over the escalation of the
arms race into space. Having said that, the Soviet Union was
in an advantageous position, because unlike the US it had an
operational ASAT system that could be re-activated at any time if
needed. Moreover, the moratorium didn’t stop the Russians from
continuing extensive research on more advanced ASAT systems.
The Soviet Response to SDI
On 23 March 1983 President Ronald Reagan unveiled plans
for a multi-layered defence system capable of intercepting
incoming Soviet missiles and warheads throughout their flight
(boost, post-boost, midcourse and terminal), thus creating a
shield against a massive Soviet nuclear attack. Formally called
the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), the programme became
popularly known as “Star Wars”, since it would include a
significant amount of space-based components. The prime goal
of the space-based components was to negate Soviet missiles
during the boost or post-boost phase, before they had a chance
to deploy their multiple warheads and decoys.
Early plans called for the use of directed energy weapons
(DEW) such as lasers and neutral particle beam accelerators,
but DEW technology was still immature and the costs associated
with fielding such weapons in the short term were prohibitive.
Therefore the focus soon shifted to more conventional kinetic
weapons. In 1987 the Department of Defence approved a
Phase 1 Architecture that envisaged the launch of big “garage
satellites” (officially called Carrier Vehicles) housing multiple
kinetic kill vehicles called Space-Based Interceptors (SBI).
Also part of the space-based tier of SDI were early warning
satellites equipped with infrared sensors to detect Soviet missile
launches. The Boost Surveillance and Tracking System (BSTS)
was a constellation of satellites in geostationary orbit to detect

missiles in the boost phase and the Space Surveillance and
Tracking System (SSTS) was to be deployed in medium Earth
orbits (MEO) to spot missiles in the midcourse phase.
Reagan’s speech immediately spawned negative reactions
from the Soviet Union, which claimed that the missile shield
undermined the delicate strategic balance between the two
superpowers. It was widely believed that it was aimed at giving
the United States a first-strike capability and significantly
downgrading the retaliatory potential of Soviet strategic forces.
Nevertheless, Reagan’s speech does not seem to have
immediately set in motion a major Soviet initiative to counter
SDI. After all, the true scale of the programme did not really
become clear until February 1984 with the official establishment
of the Strategic Defence Initiative Organization (SDIO).
Andropov’s announcement of the ASAT moratorium in August
1983 was most likely not directly linked to Reagan’s “Star Wars”
speech, but the culmination of earlier efforts to ban space-based
weapons and a reaction to appeals by the international scientific
community to prohibit the deployment of ASAT weapons [5].
One step undertaken in response to SDI under Andropov
was the formation of a commission to study the feasibility of
the missile shield and, in particular, the use of directed energy
weapons, which were a key component of the earliest “Star Wars”
proposals. Appointed by the Military Industrial Commission
(VPK), a powerful body under the Council of Ministers that
managed the entire defence industry, the commission was
headed by nuclear physicist Yevgeniy Velikhov (Fig. 2), the vice-
president of the Academy of Sciences. It was a multidisciplinary
group that included representatives of the scientific community,
the military and the defence industry [6].
In making its assessment, the commission had more to go
on than the information available on the American programme.
The Soviet Union itself had done some limited research on
space-based missile defences since at least the late 1960s, but
none of it had led to any concrete results [7]. The latest proposal
had been put forward in the late 1970s by Vladimir Chelomei.
Inspired by Anatoliy Basistov, the head of the NPO Vympel
design bureau, Chelomei had proposed a network of space-
based interceptors to destroy US ICBMs, apparently involving
the use of Proton-launched spaceplanes called LKS. However,
a commission appointed by Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
came to the conclusion that the shield would be unable to
stop a massive US nuclear attack. One of the members of the
commission had been Velikhov [8].
Not surprisingly, after several months of work, the Velikhov
commission came to the conclusion that SDI was unrealistic
and that even prototypes of space-based directed energy
weapons were unlikely to be orbited before 2000 [9]. While
the commission set up by the VPK worked in secret, Velikhov
also launched a public attack on SDI in close co-operation with
equally skeptical American scientists. Shortly after Reagan’s
speech, he took the initiative to set up the Committee of Soviet
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
Fig. 2 Yevgeniy Velikhov. (IPPI)
Scientists for Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat (CSS),
which together with the Federation of American Scientists
published several reports throughout the 1980s that questioned
the technological feasibility of SDI and underlined its negative
impact on strategic stability.
Despite these developments, the almighty Soviet military
industrial complex, eager to obtain lucrative new subsidies for
the design bureaus and production facilities, managed to secure
a top-level decision on a response to SDI. On 15 July 1985 the
Central Committee and the Council of Ministers passed a decree
that approved two major “umbrella” programmes that together
comprised nearly 300 projects ranging from fundamental
research to development of specific systems. The first, called
D-20, concentrated on ground-based missile defences and was
assigned to the Ministry of the Radio Industry, which traditionally
had managed missile defence programmes. The second, dubbed
SK-1000, focused on space-based elements and was entrusted
to the Ministry of General Machine Building, which oversaw most
of the design bureaus involved in space and missile programmes.
More specifically, SK-1000 encompassed space-based missile
defence, anti-satellite systems (both ground-based and space-
based) and systems designed to strike targets on the ground
from space. However, it also included almost all launch vehicle
and satellite programmes already underway at the time (including
manned programmes such as Buran and the Mir space station).
In fact, many of the projects under D-20 and SK-1000 had already
been under development prior to the July 1985 decree and were
now brought together under a common denominator, probably
in an attempt to obtain stable funding. D-20 and SK-1000 were
expected to cost tens of billions of rubles, keeping the design
bureaus and production facilities occupied into the late 1980s.
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Bart Hendrickx

However, at the same time no commitment was made to actually
deploy most of these systems. Rather the goal was “to create by
1995 a technical and technological base in case the deployment
of a multi-layered missile defence system would be necessary”
[10]. Another government decree specifically focusing on space-
based elements to counter SDI is known to have been issued in
January 1986 [11].
The July 1985 decision came despite the rise to power of
Mikhail Gorbachov, who had been appointed the new Soviet
leader in March 1985 after the death of Andropov’s successor
Konstantin Chernenko. Gorbachov was wary of pouring more
money into the Soviet Union’s vast military industrial complex,
but having been in office for only several months, there was little
he could do at this point to keep the influential Soviet defence
industry from imposing its wishes. However, as his political
influence grew and US-Soviet relations evolved, the focus of
the anti-SDI effort gradually shifted to an asymmetric response.
Accounts suggest that a prominent role in this change of direction
was played by Velikhov, who became one of Gorbachov’s key
science advisors [12].
Rather than deploy a Soviet missile shield, something that
would place a heavy burden on the country’s ailing economy, it
made more sense to concentrate on developing countermeasures
against America’s space-based missile defences. This could be
achieved by improving the ability of missiles to penetrate the
shield, but also by neutralizing the space-based elements of the
missile shield. The big orbiting garages housing the Space Based
missiles, but also to destroy enemy satellites as well as targets
on the ground, in the air and on the sea. In fact, the objectives
were very similar to those of the later SK-1000 programme.
The ASAT tier of the NPO Energiya programme consisted of
two types of “battle stations” based on the civilian Salyut space
stations (Longterm Orbital Stations or DOS). One was called
Kaskad (“Cascade”) and would be equipped with a large amount
of self-guided missiles developed by the KB Tochmash design
bureau of Aleksandr Nudelman to nullify targets in medium
and high Earth orbits. The other was called Skif (“Scythian”)
and would use laser systems to destroy targets in low Earth
orbits (Fig. 3). The stations would be periodically visited for
maintenance and refuelling. Experimental versions would be
launched by the Proton rocket and operational versions by the
Buran space shuttle. Also initiated in 1976, Buran was mainly
seen by the Russians as a project to counter the perceived
military threat of the US Space Shuttle [15].
In 1981 NPO Energiya transferred its ASAT work to a newly
acquired branch that received the name “Salyut Design Bureau”
(KB Salyut). Headed by Dmitriy Polukhin, this had formerly been
“Branch nr. 1” of the rival Chelomei design bureau (known at
the time as the Central Design Bureau for Machine Building
or TsKBM) and had been responsible (among other things) for
the development of the Proton rocket and the cargo sections
Fig. 3 The original NPO Energiya design of Skif (above) and
Kaskad. (RKK Energiya)

Interceptors were essentially sitting ducks in orbit and a single

Soviet ASAT could easily destroy an entire garage and its suite
of interceptors. The aim was not to destroy the entire US missile
shield, but breach it sufficiently for the Soviet Union to launch
a successful retaliatory strike [13]. The asymmetric response
programmes were grouped under new umbrella programmes
called “Protivodeistviye” (“Counteraction”) and “Kontseptsiya-R”
(“Conception-R”), approved in the second half of 1987 [14].
While ASAT weapons had already been an important part of the
SK-1000 programme, they now became one of the most critical
components of the asymmetric response to SDI.

A Plethora of ASAT Systems

The existing IS anti-satellite system was clearly deemed

insufficient to counter the perceived US threat, forcing the
Russians to significantly upgrade their ASAT capability. Not
only was it necessary to initiate the development of several new
systems, but also to speed up work on two ASAT projects that
had already been conceived in the 1970s.

In 1976 the Soviet government had issued a decree that

placed NPO Energiya (the former Korolyov bureau) in charge of
a space weapons programme that according to the company’s
official history was a response to similar work “begun by the
United States in the late 1960s-early 1970s”. It envisaged the
use of space-based weapons not only to destroy incoming US

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 Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet

(“Functional Cargo Blocks” or FGB) of the 20-ton Transport

Supply Ships (TKS) that were to launch cosmonauts and
supplies to Chelomei’s military Salyut space stations (Almaz).
The transfer of the design bureau from TsKBM to NPO Energiya
in June 1981 took place only months before a government
decree banned Chelomei’s bureau from any involvement in
space-related projects.

However, it should be noted that the branch enjoyed a great

deal of independence from its central design bureau. Even while
it had been subordinate to Chelomei’s bureau, Branch nr. 1 had
acted as a subcontractor to NPO Energiya for the development
of the civilian Salyut space stations. Similarly, when KB
Salyut became part of NPO Energiya, it retained much of its
independence and seems to have had only loose ties with the
new central design bureau in Kaliningrad. KB Salyut was based
in the Moscow suburb of Fili and located on the same territory as
the Khrunichev Machine Building Factory. Although Khrunichev
manufactured the hardware designed or co-designed by KB
Salyut (like the Proton rockets and the Salyut space stations),
it was an independent entity. In June 1988 KB Salyut split
off from NPO Energiya to become part of a newly formed
organization called NPOEM (Scientific Production Association
of Experimental Machine Building). In 1991 KB Salyut acquired
independent status before being merged with the Khrunichev
factory in 1993 to form the Khrunichev State Space Scientific
Production Centre (GKNPTs imeni Khrunicheva).

After the transfer to KB Salyut, both Skif and Kaskad Fig. 4 The Energiya rocket with the Skif-DM/Polyus payload.
underwent significant changes. Because the gas dynamic laser (V. Lukashevich)

system needed for Skif turned out to be much heavier than

projected, the spacecraft was transformed into a 100-tonne
Although Skif and Kaskad pre-dated SDI, indications are
class vehicle to be launched by the Energiya heavy lift launch
that prior to SDI NPO Energiya’s space weapons programme
vehicle. An experimental version (called Skif-DM or Polyus) not
had been a relatively poorly funded research effort that took
equipped with a laser system was flown on the maiden mission
a backseat to NPO Energiya’s ongoing manned programmes
of Energiya on 15 May 1987, but failed to reach orbit due to
(Soyuz/Salyut and Buran) [18]. When they were incorporated
a problem with the spacecraft’s navigation system following
into the SK-1000 anti-SDI programme in July 1985, they are
separation from Energiya (Fig. 4).
likely to have received a boost in funding.

Kaskad remained within the 20-tonne launch capacity of the

Proton rocket, but instead of being built on the basis of the DOS
space stations would now use a bus derived from the propulsion
section that delivered the Kvant astrophysics module to the
Mir space station in 1987. This propulsion section, known as
Functional Service Block (FSB) or 77K, in turn was a stripped-
down version of the FGB cargo sections of the TKS transport
vehicles designed by KB Salyut in the 1970s. Attached to the
bus would be three small space tugs each carrying one or more
missiles of the Tochmash design bureau (the exact amount
is unknown). After separating from Kaskad in low Earth orbit,
the space tugs would use their own propulsion and guidance
and control systems to get as close as possible to their targets
in higher orbits and then launch the missiles at them [16].
Incidentally, the FSB also served as the bus for an offensive
space-to-ground system called Bolid that KB Salyut worked on
in the second half of the 1980s [17].
In addition to Skif and Kaskad, KB Salyut began work on
three new ASAT systems that were also part of SK-1000:
• Naryad-V[19]: a ground-based kinetic kill vehicle using a
silo-based ICBM (the UR-100N UTTKh) and a new upper
stage to reach targets from low Earth orbits (LEO) to
geostationary orbits (GEO).
• Kamin (literally “Fireplace”, but in fact a compound of the
words kosmicheskaya mina or “space mine”): a constellation
of small ASAT weapons deployed in orbits close to potential
target satellites for very quick intercepts. Using a new
lightweight bus, several of them could have been launched
in one go by launch vehicles such as Zenit or Buran.
• Lider (“Leader”): an ASAT vehicle using particle beam
weapons to disable electronic systems of enemy satellites.
Like Kaskad, Naryad-V and Kamin were to be outfitted with
space-to-space missiles of the KB Tochmash design bureau for
a hit-to-kill intercept of target satellites. In order to save costs,

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Bart Hendrickx

the initial hope was that the three systems could employ a
common space tug that would be loaded with different amounts
of propellant depending on the mission. However, that plan was
abandoned by late 1987 because the distances to be covered by
the tugs were too different. Instead, Kaskad would be equipped
with tailor-made tugs and Kamin, flying very close to its target,
could do without a tug and instead carry more space-to-space
missiles or perform the intercept itself through a direct collision
with the target (with or without the use of explosive devices).
The ground-based Naryad-V would rely on a more powerful
propulsion unit that would act both as a third stage and a space
tug. It would first be ignited to place itself into a parking orbit and
then be re-ignited one or several times to approach the target
and then deploy its missile(s) [20].

In addition to the aforementioned ASAT projects, the Soviet

Union began working on an air-launched ASAT system very
similar to one that had been under development in the United
States for several years. The US ASAT programme had been
much smaller in scope than the Soviet programme, possibly
because Soviet military satellites were not considered as much
of a threat to US strategic forces. Apparently, the main driving
force behind US ASAT programmes (at least in the 1970s and
1980s) was not so much to disable Soviet satellites, but to
deter the Russians from using their ASAT weapons against US Fig. 5 American ASAT test on 13 September 1985.
(P. Reynolds/USAF)
satellites [21].

Plans for an Air Force co-orbital ASAT system called SAINT
were cancelled in 1962 in favour of two ground-based direct
ascent systems that would use nuclear warheads to knock out
enemy satellites in orbit. One was an Army project (Program
505) using Nike Zeus missiles from the Kwajalein Atoll in the
Marshall Islands chain in the Pacific. The other was an Air
Force project (Program 437) relying on Thor missiles stationed
on Johnston Island in the Pacific. Although both programmes
saw a number of test launches in the 1960s, they had many
operational drawbacks. Program 505 was cancelled in 1966
and Program 437 in 1975, among other things because it was
found to offer little or no protection against the Soviet Fractional
Orbit Bombardment System (FOBS), a single-orbit nuclear
weapon delivery system that was considered to be the main
Soviet space-based threat against the US [22].
One of the disadvantages of the ground-based ASAT
missiles was that they had to wait for a target satellite to overfly
their launch sites. In the late 1970s the Air Force initiated
the development of an air-launched hit-to-kill ASAT system
that would provide more flexibility in engaging satellites. The
programme became known as the Air-Launched Miniature
Vehicle (ALMV) and involved the use of ASM-135 missiles that
would be launched from an F-15 fighter jet. The ASM-135 was a
two-stage solid-fuel missile carrying a kinetic energy warhead.
After two test flights on 21 January and 13 November 1984,
the ASM-135 successfully destroyed a partially operational US
scientific satellite called Solwind on 13 September 1985 (Fig. 5).
Although the US Congress banned further tests of the ASM-135
on targets in space in December 1985, there were two more
successful test flights using simulated targets in August and
September 1986. However, in 1988 the Reagan administration
cancelled the project due to its ballooning cost and a variety of
technical problems.
In what clearly was a direct response to ALMV, the Russians
started the development of a similar air-launched ASAT system
called Kontakt (also named 30P6). The formal go-ahead was
given by a government decree on 27 November 1984, barely
two weeks after the second US ASM-135 test. Indications are
that Kontakt was not billed by the defence industry as an anti-
SDI project, but justified by the proven argument that any new
American weapons system needed to be matched by a Soviet
counterpart. An initial order to start work on the project is said
to have come in January 1983, two months before Reagan
unveiled SDI. The lead design bureau was TsKB Almaz (the
former KB-1), which like TsNII Kometa (the bureau in charge of
IS) was also under the Ministry of the Radio Industry. The carrier
aircraft was a modified MiG-31 fighter jet (designated MiG-31D)
outfitted with a three-stage solid-fuel missile named 79M6
developed by the MKB Fakel design bureau (Fig. 6). Two of the
aircraft were built. Test flights from the Flight Research Institute
(LII) in Zhukovskiy (near Moscow) began on 17 January 1987
and were later transferred to the Sary-Shagan test range in
Kazakhstan. The system was reportedly capable of engaging
targets up to an altitude of 600 km with inclinations ranging from
50° to 104° [23].

6

Fig. 6 The MiG-31D jet and the 79M6 ASAT missile. (www.airwar.ru)
Finally, it should be noted that the A-35 and A-135 nuclear-
tipped anti-missile defence systems deployed around Moscow
are also said to have had a limited capability to destroy targets
in LEO [24]. Around the mid-1980s the TsNPO Vympel design
bureau reportedly also began work on a non-nuclear satellite
interceptor for the A-135 system that was known as Amulet [25].
Putting it all together, by the mid-1980s four different Soviet
design bureaus were working simultaneously on at least eight
ASAT systems:
• Ground-based/Air-based kinetic systems: IS-M (TsNII
Kometa), Kontakt (TsKB Almaz), Naryad-V (KB Salyut),
Amulet (TsNPO Vympel)
• Space-based kinetic systems: Kamin, Kaskad (both KB
Salyut)
• Space-based directed-energy weapons: Skif, Lider (both
KB Salyut)
Complementary Capabilities
The multiple ASAT systems were supposed to complement each
other and compensate for some of the shortcomings of IS, the
only operational ASAT system. First, IS was limited to relatively
low orbits (with a demonstrated ceiling of 1,500 km), implying
that many critical American military satellites remained out of
its reach. These were the Navstar/GPS navigation satellites in
20,000 km circular orbits and a variety of geostationary satellites
for early warning, communications and signals intelligence. On
the other hand, virtually all low-orbiting US military satellites would
have been vulnerable to an IS attack (inclinations attainable from
Baikonur were between 45° and 135°, assuming range-safety
restrictions would have been lifted in a wartime situation) [26].
Second, the IS interceptors were co-planar, meaning
they had to wait for a target’s orbital plane to pass over the
launch site. Therefore they could be launched at a target only
twice each day from any given launch site. A launch into the
same orbital plane as the target was also a dead give-away
of intent and this, combined with the relatively long intercept
time, would have given the target satellite enough time to make
evasive manoeuvres or take other countermeasures to prevent
destruction [27].
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
Third, the IS system relied on just two launch pads at
Baikonur, making it vulnerable to attack. Two Tsiklon pads
were also available at the northern Plesetsk launch site, but
these were only used for the three-stage version of the rocket
(Tsiklon-3) and there is no evidence that IS interceptors were
ever deployed at Plesetsk.
The air-launched Kometa system offered the advantage that
it was not tied to a specific launch site and therefore had more
flexibility in reaching its targets, but it was also restricted to LEO
targets and had a ceiling even lower than IS (600 km).
Both Naryad-V and Kaskad addressed the altitude problem.
They were primarily designed to attack satellites in MEO and
GEO, although they could also have been aimed at targets
in LEO. Deployed in orbit, Kaskad theoretically had a quicker
intercept time than Naryad-V, but Naryad-V had the advantage
of being stationed in hardened ground-based silos that were
less vulnerable to attack. The estimated intercept time for
Naryad-V was from 30 minutes (for LEO targets) to 7 hours (for
GEO targets) [28].
The Kamin interceptors would have been the quickest-
response kinetic ASAT weapons, possibly needing only minutes
to sneak in on their targets. Kamin was originally conceived to
engage targets in LEO, but later it was decided to deploy the
system in higher orbits as well. The low-altitude version became
known as Kamin-N (“N” standing for nizkiy, “low”) and the high-
altitude version as Kamin-V (“V” standing for vysotnyy, “high”)
[29].
The laser-equipped Skif was also targeted at objects in LEO.
Whereas the American space-based laser systems proposed
under SDI had to be accurately aimed at ballistic missiles or
warheads flying at large distances and high speeds, Skif
needed less power-hungry lasers to hit orbiting satellites at
much closer range and lower relative speeds [30]. Advantages
over the kinetic systems were the shorter intercept times and
the ability to destroy multiple targets with a single vehicle.
However, Skif was a cumbersome vehicle that was dependent
on the expensive Energiya rocket and, like the carrier vehicles
7
Bart Hendrickx
of the US Space Based Interceptors, would have been an easy
target for enemy ASATs. Moreover, even the development of a
short-range space-based laser was a challenging task that was
continuously running far behind schedule. The Skif-DM mission
in 1987 was not part of a carefully devised step-by-step test
programme, but a stopgap mission thrown together relatively
quickly to test the Energiya rocket until the much-delayed Buran
space shuttle was ready for flight. The Soviet Union also studied
ground-based laser systems for satellite negation, but the
research never advanced as far as some alarming Pentagon
reports in the 1980s suggested [31].
Lider, the space-based particle-beam weapon, was
also a huge vehicle requiring the Energiya rocket [32]. The
development of a space-based particle-beam weapon was in
an even more immature stage than that of a laser system and
the project probably never advanced beyond the drawing board.
War Scenarios
The simultaneous existence of so many ASAT projects can only
be explained by the fact that each of them would have been
assigned specific tasks in a given wartime situation. Some
insight into the objectives of the various ASAT systems has been
provided by a KB Salyut veteran who worked for the design
bureau’s so-called “systems analysis department” (Department
117). The department’s task was to assess how feasible the
technical specifications issued by the military “customers” were
from the standpoint of spacecraft designers. In order to do that,
the department also needed to know what kind of targets the
ASAT systems were aimed at, but since the military community
was not prepared to share that sensitive information with the
civilian design bureaus, the systems analysis department
had to draw up potential scenarios for the use of such ASAT
systems itself, essentially duplicating the work already done by
the military customers. Although little information is available on
the actual scenarios modelled by the military R&D institutes, KB
Salyut’s systems analysts were able to deduce from the rare
contacts with their military colleagues that they were thinking
along the same lines. KB Salyut’s analysis (performed in the
1987-1988 timeframe) centred mainly on Naryad-V, Kaskad
and Kamin, because Skif and Lider were expected to be fielded
much later and IS and Kontakt were developed by other design
bureaus [33].
The basis for KB Salyut’s analysis were three possible war
scenarios. In the first scenario (considered the most likely from
the Soviet standpoint) the United States would launch a nuclear
attack on the Soviet Union and then activate its SDI missile
shield to defend itself against a Soviet retaliatory strike. In the
second scenario a large-scale conventional war would break out
between the two superpowers. In the third scenario (considered
the least likely) the Soviet Union itself would be forced to mount
a nuclear attack on the United States.
In the first scenario, the main objective of the Soviet ASAT
8
constellation would have been to destroy the low-orbiting carrier
vehicles of the Space Based Interceptors, allowing as many
Soviet missiles as possible to penetrate the US missile shield in
a retaliatory strike. The response time was estimated to be no
more than 15 minutes (the time needed for American submarine
launched ballistic missiles to reach Soviet territory minus the
time needed to detect the US launches and send the necessary
commands to the ASATs). This was too short for ground-based
systems as Naryad-V and IS (and, presumably, Kontakt) to
reach their targets. Although Naryad-V could reach LEO in a
matter of minutes, its upper stage would still have needed to
make manoeuvres (possibly plane-changing burns) to reach its
target and therefore would not have been much more efficient
than the co-orbital IS system. The Kaskad platforms, although
having the advantage of already being in orbit, would not
necessarily be positioned correctly for their tugs to reach the
US battle stations in time. Naryad-V and Kaskad would only be
useful in this scenario if they were deployed in huge quantities,
outnumbering their targets. The most effective weapons in such
a scenario were considered to be the Kamin-N space mines,
circling the Earth very close to their targets.
An additional way to ensure the success of a Soviet
retaliatory strike would have been the quick destruction of
geostationary DSP early warning satellites (or the BSTS and
SSTS early warning systems developed in the framework of
SDI), limiting America’s capability to detect Soviet missiles
launched in response to the US attack. Since Naryad-V and
Kaskad would have needed hours to reach GEO, Kamin-V
was seen as the primary ASAT system for that task (and that
seems to have been its very raison d’être). In short, the Kamin
vehicles were to become the core element of the Soviet anti-
SDI ASAT response. Nonetheless, the development of Kamin
seems to have proceeded without a sense of urgency. When the
programme was initiated in 1985, the preliminary design was to
be finished in 1989, with test flights not getting underway until
1992, another indication that the Soviets did not expect SDI to
become a reality in the immediate future [34].
Systems such as Kaskad and Naryad-V were primarily
needed in the second scenario, a non-nuclear conflict between
the USSR and the US. In such a conflict the prime targets would
have been the GPS/Navstar navigation satellites in MEO and
communications satellites in GEO. Here the response time
was less critical and ample time was available for Kaskad and
Naryad-V to reach their targets in high orbits. Although not part
of the KB Salyut analysis, one can assume that IS and Kontakt
were also best suited for use in a non-nuclear conflict, targeting
US reconnaissance satellites in LEO and possibly also the
Transit navigation satellites that orbited the Earth in roughly
circular 1,000 km orbits with an inclination of 90°. Although
Transit was being phased out in the 1980s in favour of the higher
orbiting GPS/Navstar satellites, the final IS mission in 1982
(flown at an altitude of 1,000 km) is said to have simulated the
intercept of a Transit satellite (despite the lower 65° inclination
used by the mission) [35].
 Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet

KB Salyut’s analysts also considered scenarios

in which a conventional war between the US and
USSR would escalate into a nuclear conflict. In
case the Americans were on the brink of losing
the conventional war, the analysts reasoned, they
might be tempted to launch a desperate nuclear
strike against the USSR. This would lead to the
first scenario, the only difference being that a
considerable portion of the ASAT assets would
have been exhausted during the conventional war.
Alternately, if the Soviet Union threatened to lose
the conventional war, it might be forced to unleash
its nuclear arsenal, resulting in the third scenario.
One option considered was to use only the Kaskad
platforms in a conventional war, leaving the
Naryad-V interceptors on stand-by in their hardened
silos in case the war turned into a nuclear conflict.

All these scenarios assumed that the Soviet ASATs

themselves would not be targeted by American
ASAT systems. However, the Russian also worked
out scenarios that took into account the capabilities
of the US air-launched ASM-135 interceptors. The
20-tonne Kaskad satellites were considered to be
most vulnerable to US ASAT attacks and one way of
avoiding their destruction would have been to deploy
decoys or quickly change their orbits. The small
Kamin interceptors would circle the Earth so close
to their targets that any attempts to disable them
with the ASM-135 missiles were expected to fatally
damage the targets themselves. Nevertheless,
the TsNII-50 military research institute did devise
plans for stealthy Kamin vehicles that would have
been difficult to detect by optical, radar and infrared Fig. 7 Brilliant Pebbles. (SDIO)

means [36].
Scaling Down the ASAT Programme
Of course, American SDI architects were equally aware of the
potential threat posed by Soviet ASAT systems. Realizing that
the big orbiting garages were easy targets for Soviet ASATs, SDI
planners shifted their attention to smaller interceptors that would
be highly autonomous through the use of miniaturized sensors
and computers, giving them the capability to operate without the
sensors and communications equipment of the garages. Called
Brilliant Pebbles, they would be housed in protective cocoons
(“life-jackets”) to provide housekeeping support. When a Soviet
missile attack was detected, the Pebbles would be armed for
combat, shed their life jackets and be sent on a collision course
with the attacking Soviet missiles (Fig. 7). The Brilliant Pebbles
concept was publicly revealed in early 1988 and integrated into
the SDI architecture in 1989/1990.
of inclinations, making an efficient ASAT response extremely
challenging, if not impossible. One crazy idea was to launch a
huge quantity of solid particles into orbit that essentially would
have formed a ring around the Earth and destroyed the Pebbles
upon impact. However, the ring would, of course, also have been
lethal to Soviet satellites, basically ending satellite operations in
low Earth orbit. Another idea was to shoot down American launch
vehicles before they could deploy the Pebbles, but it would have
been very difficult to distinguish between launches related and
unrelated to SDI, not to mention the fact that any such action
would undoubtedly have given rise to a further escalation of
tensions. The only way out for the Russians was to deploy their
own constellation of Brilliant Pebbles, but that would have forced
them to abandon the concept of an “asymmetric response” to SDI.
NPO Energiya did conduct some studies of a Soviet equivalent
to Brilliant Pebbles, but it is unclear whether this research ever
progressed beyond the paper stage [37] (Fig. 8).

For the Soviet ASAT planners, Brilliant Pebbles presented a As the decade drew to a close and warming relations between
nightmare. Not only would they be launched in huge numbers, the two superpowers diminished the threat of a nuclear war, the
they would also be scattered around the Earth in a wide variety Russians scaled down their ASAT programme. The appearance of

9
Bart Hendrickx
Fig. 8 Soviet equivalent of Brilliant Pebbles. (RKK Energiya)
Brilliant Pebbles probably sounded the death knell for the Kamin-N
interceptors. Before that the military had already lost most of their
interest in Kaskad (presumably because of its vulnerability) and the
high-orbiting Kamin-V space mines [38]. Apparently, the objective
of quickly neutralizing satellites in MEO and GEO had gradually lost
priority. Meanwhile, the Skif project was suspended in September
1987 because of its high cost [39]. The only programmes that
survived into the 1990s were Kontakt, IS and Naryad-V. This very
fact adds further weight to the assumption that their main goal
was not to attack elements of the SDI constellation. In early 1991
President George Bush shifted the focus of SDI to theatre missile
defence. Responding to the growing threat of nuclear proliferation,
the shield was now supposed to provide protection against
accidental, unauthorized or limited missile attacks from what later
would become known as “rogue states”.
The Kontakt test programme may have been much broader
in scope than initially believed. Some of the MiG-31D test pilots
involved in the project later revealed that numerous test flights
were carried out from the Sary-Shagan range with “live” missiles
being shot at targets in space, albeit it only with the intention of
passing close to them rather than actually hitting them [40]. One
source claims the tests continued until 1995 [41].
The IS programme was resumed after the death of Yuriy
Andropov in early 1984. In 1978 work had already begun on
a further modification called IS-MU capable of intercepting
manoeuvrable targets. In the late 1980s TsNII Kometa is said to
have initiated the development of yet another modification called
IS-MD to reach targets in geostationary orbits, but details on this
are sketchy. Despite attempts by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in 1989-1990 to terminate the project, the IS-MU system
was declared operational in April 1991 after a series of ground-
based simulations. Sixteen of the interceptors were reportedly
kept in storage at the Baikonur cosmodrome. It wasn’t until April
1993 that President Boris Yeltsin signed an order to dismantle
the IS-MU system [42].
With Kontakt and IS-MU constrained to LEO and IS-MD in
the very early stages of development, Naryad-V was the sole
10
ASAT system with MEO/GEO capability that stood a chance
of becoming available in the short run. Relying on an existing
ICBM, Naryad-V was much cheaper than the Proton-launched
Kaskad. When the project was initiated in 1985, it was expected
to reach flight status as soon as 1987 [43]. Indeed, it would
become one of the few elements of the SK-1000 umbrella
programme to reach the flight testing stage, but later than
planned.
Naryad-V Design
Naryad-V was developed at the KB Salyut design bureau under
the leadership of Lev Kiselyov [44]. Its launch vehicle was an
ICBM designated UR-100N UTTKh (also known as 15A35,
RS-18B and by the NATO code SS-19 mod 2 (Stiletto)) [45].
This was the last modification of the Chelomei bureau’s UR-
100 ICBM conceived in the 1960s (earlier modifications having
been the UR-100K, UR-100U and UR-100N). Actually, the
idea of using UR-100 type missiles for an ASAT role was not
entirely new. In the early 1960s Chelomei had proposed the
development of a missile shield called Taran that would have
seen the deployment of nuclear-tipped UR-100 missiles to
destroy incoming American ICBMs in space. Although the prime
purpose of Taran was anti-missile defence, an additional goal
was to destroy enemy satellites in low orbits. The preliminary
design of Taran was finished in July 1964, but the system
was deemed too expensive and cancelled in the wake of
Khrushchov’s overthrow in late 1964 [46].
Development of the UR-100N UTTKh was approved by a
government decree on 16 August 1976. Like its predecessors,
it consisted of two lower stages and a post-boost stage to
place its six multiple warheads on the proper trajectory for re-
entry. All engines burned storable propellants (unsymmetrical
dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4)).
Improvements included a modernized post-boost stage,
upgraded engines, an increased range and better protection
against nuclear blasts. Test flights from the Baikonur
cosmodrome began on 26 October 1977 and were finished on
26 June 1979. The missile was officially declared operational

on 17 December 1980. In all, about 360 of the missiles were
deployed in silos in four locations in the western Soviet Union
(Tatishchevo (Saratov region), Kozyolsk (Kaluga region),
Pervomaisk and Khmelnetskiy (Ukraine)). The missile was
manufactured by the Khrunichev factory [47].
Turning the UR-100N UTTKh into an ASAT booster was a
relatively straightforward affair. The two lower stages essentially
remained unchanged. The main change required was to replace
the post-boost stage by a more powerful, restartable upper
stage equipped with one or more space-to-space missiles of
Nudelman’s KB Tochmash design bureau (Fig. 9). KB Salyut
designers did struggle to keep the mass of the upper stage and
Fig. 9 The UR-100N UTTKh missile
with the Briz upper stage. Key:
1. Fairing; 2. Briz upper stage; 3.
Interstage; 4. Second stage oxidizer
tank; 5. Second stage fuel tank; 6.
Second stage engine; 7. First stage
oxidizer tank; 8. First stage fuel
tank; 9. Tail section.
(Yu. Pavutnitskiy)
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
its payload within the same parameters as that of the post-boost
stage and its multiple warheads. Lacking the power to place
itself into MEO or GEO, the upper stage would first insert itself
into a parking orbit in LEO. Once positioned correctly, it would
re-ignite its engine one or more times and approach its target as
closely as possible, subsequently releasing the missile(s) for a
high-speed intercept [48].
The new upper stage was called “Briz” (“Breeze”) [49] (Fig.
10). Briz had the shape of a truncated cone that fitted under
the existing payload shroud of the UR-100N UTTK and was
attached to the second stage via a short, newly developed
interstage. It consisted of an equipment bay (in the upper part)
and a propulsion section. The fuel tank (UDMH) and oxidizer
tank (N2O4) were separated by a common bulkhead and the
lower oxidizer tank surrounded the main engine. Each tank
contained baffles, feed pipes and ullage control devices to
facilitate main engine restarts in weightlessness. Development
of the main engine was assigned to KB KhimMash (the
former Isayev bureau) in Kaliningrad (near Moscow), which
specialized in spacecraft and upper stage engines. The engine
was designated S5.98M (14D30) and was derived from the
S5.92 engine of the Phobos interplanetary probes (launched
in 1988) (and later also used on the Fregat upper stage). This
in turn was based on the 11D417 engine used by the third-
generation Luna probes and the 11D425 engine of the Mars-
2/3 probes. It was a pump-fed engine that could be gimballed
and restarted at least eight times (compared to five times for
Fig. 10 The Briz upper stage at the 1995 Paris Air Show.
(C. Lardier/Air et Cosmos)
11
Bart Hendrickx

the S5.92). The Briz also had four low-thrust engine units used interceptors that could be deployed. Any UR-100N UTTKh silo
for propellant settling and attitude control. Each unit consisted converted for Naryad-V could no longer be used by the ICBM (at
of one 11D458 propellant settling thruster and three 17D58E least in the short run). Building dedicated silos for Naryad-V was
attitude control thrusters. All these thrusters were developed by not an option because the START agreement being negotiated
the NiiMash design bureau in Nizhnyaya Salda. The 11D458 at the time between the US and the Soviet Union limited the
was originally developed for an unmanned radar-equipped number of ICBMs that could be deployed, irrespective of
version of the Almaz space station and later also flew together whether they carried nuclear weapons or ASAT weapons. This
with the 17D58E on the Mir modules Kvant-2, Kristall, Spektr meant that the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN), the branch
and Priroda and on the Zarya module of the International of the armed forces overseeing missile programmes, would
Space Station. Briz had a dry mass of 1,500 kg and a maximum have been forced to sacrifice a certain number of its UR-100N
fuel and oxidizer mass of 1,665 kg and 3,300 kg respectively, UTTKh silos for Naryad-V. It is not clear if any deal on this was
giving a maximum total mass of 6.465 tonnes. Standing 24.6 m ever reached between the RVSN and the Missile and Space
high, the UR-100N UTTKh/Briz combination had a launch mass Defence Forces (Voiska PRO i PKO), the branch of the armed
of 106.7 tonnes. More details on the rocket’s dimensions and forces that had operational control over ASAT programmes.
engine systems are given in Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4. Even KB Salyut seems to have been kept in the dark about
the number of silos that would be converted for Naryad-V,
The Briz required a significantly modified guidance and although internally specialists of the design bureau estimated
control system. Developed by the NPO Elektropribor design that the best they could hope for was about ten [50]. However,
bureau in Kharkov (Ukraine), this was not only supposed to declassified documents indicate that as many as one hundred
control the lower two stages, but also had to ensure the proper were discussed at one point, which would have been about a
functioning of the upper stage itself and control the complex third of the total amount available [51].
manoeuvres needed to get it close to the target satellites. The
new guidance and control system necessitated significant Very little is known about the space-to-space missiles of
modifications to the launch control equipment in the silos. the KB Tochmash design bureau, not even how many were
This had important implications for the number of Naryad-V supposed to be installed on the Briz upper stage (probably one
or two) [52]. Once the Briz had reached the vicinity of its target,
TABLE 1: UR-100N UTTKh the missile would have been released upon a command of the
Dimensions. Briz guidance and control system. The interceptor was capable
Length Diameter of adjusting its trajectory with small bursts from four liquid-fuel
Stage 1 17.2 m 2.5 m thrusters installed at 90° angles to one another in the vehicle’s
Stage 2 3.9 m 2.5 m centre of mass perpendicular to the flight path. The thrusters
Briz 3.38 m 2.28 m reportedly used a “specially developed fuel”, which was injected
into the combustion chamber in small portions by a mechanism
that worked according to the same principle as a rapid-firing
TABLE 2: UR-100N UTTKh First Stage Engine Data.
cannon. The interceptor would home in on its target with the help
Name RD-0233 (15D95) (3x)
of a self-guided seeker head (developed by the KB Geofizika
RD-0234 (15D96) (1x)
design bureau) that had its own miniature computer [53].
Manufacturer KBKhA (Voronezh)
Type cardan gimballed/pump fed/closed cycle The missiles have been described as being very similar
Propellants UDMH/N2O4 to the Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV), the final stage of the
Sea-level thrust 1870 kN (each engine 470 kN) American air-launched ASM-135 ASAT missile [54]. This used a
Vacuum thrust 2070 kN (each engine 520 kN) cryogenically cooled infrared sensor to detect its target, but unlike
Sea-level Isp 285 s the Soviet missiles had solid-propellant motors for manoeuvring
and attitude control. The infrared sensor maintained track of
Vacuum Isp 310 s
the satellite and reported the satellite’s position to the guidance
Burn time 121 s
computer, which then calculated the manoeuvres needed to keep

TABLE 3: UR-100N UTTKh Second Stage Engine Data.

Name RD-0235 (15D113) (main engine) (1x) RD-0236 (15D114) (vernier) (1x)
Manufacturer KBKhA (Voronezh) KBKhA (Voronezh)
Type fixed/pump fed/closed cycle fixed/pump fed (single pump and four combustion chambers)/open cycle
Propellants UDMH/ N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4
Vacuum thrust 240 kN 15.76 kN (total)
Vacuum Isp 320 s 293 s
Burn time 183 s 200 s

12
 Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet

TABLE 4: Briz Engine Data.

Name S5.98M (14D30) (main 11D458 (settling thruster) (4x) 17D58E (attitude control
engine) (1x) thruster) (12x)
Manufacturer KB KhimMash (Kaliningrad) NIIMash (Nizhnyaya Salda) NIIMash (Nizhnyaya Salda)
Type cardan gimballed/pump fed/ fixed/pressure fed fixed/pressure fed
closed cycle
Propellants UDMH/N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4 UDMH/ N2O4
Vacuum thrust 20 kN 400 N 13 N
Vacuum Isp 325.5 s 275 s 270 s
Mode Steady state with up to 8 Pulse mode with up to 33,000 Pulse mode with up to
ignitions ignitions 450,000 ignitions
Total available impulse 2 x 107 Ns 14112 Ns -
Minimum impulse bit 25000 Ns 40 Ns 0.068 Ns
Minimum/maximum burn time 1 s/1000 s 0.1 s/3000 s 0.03 s/10000 s
Off time 15 s to 1 h - -

the satellite in the cross hairs of the sensor. This process was
continued repetitively until the MHV collided with its target [55].

It is known that the space-to-space missiles intended for

Kaskad were supposed to have been tested in space from
modified Progress cargo ships. The NPO Energiya design
bureau even started the construction of five such vehicles for
missions in 1986-1988. When those plans were abandoned,
the vehicles were rebuilt as standard resupply ships for the Mir
space station [56]. The space-to-space missiles intended for
Naryad-V, Kaskad and Kamin are likely to have been very similar
and therefore the Progress-based tests would undoubtedly
have been applicable to Naryad-V as well.
One declassified document has revealed that at one point
consideration was given to outfitting both Naryad-V and the
A-135 Moscow ABM system with warheads generating X-rays
[57]. A similar warhead called W-71 was developed in the
1960s for the US Spartan ABM system and was designed for
intercepts of re-entry vehicles at high altitudes comparable
to low Earth orbit. It had the advantage of being capable of
disabling incoming re-entry vehicles at much greater distances
than traditional warheads (up to 16 km), making guidance less
challenging. Why such a warhead was envisaged for an ASAT
system as Naryad-V is unclear.
Naryad-V Suborbital Test Flights
The Naryad-V test programme envisaged several suborbital
missions and also at least one orbital mission. The test flights
were to be performed from the Baikonur cosmodrome, where
two UR-100N UTTKh silos were modified for test flights of the
Naryad-V system (Fig. 11). These silos were located in Areas
131 and 175 in the western part of the cosmodrome in the same
general area as the Proton and Tsiklon-2 pads.
A new military unit (Military Unit 55056, also known as the
326th Independent Engineering and Testing Unit) was formed to
Fig. 11 UR-100N UTTKh missile being installed into a silo at
Baikonur. (www.leninsk.ru)
perform the test missions. The establishment of this unit began
with an order from the commander of the Baikonur cosmodrome
in October 1985 and was completed on 22 September 1987.
Military Unit 55056 was subordinate to a new directorate
established at the cosmodrome on that very same day. Known
as the 7th Scientific and Testing Directorate for Special Space
Systems (7 NIU), this directorate also absorbed the unit in
charge of Tsiklon-2 launches (Military Unit 46180), which earlier
had been part of the directorate that oversaw Proton launches
(4 IU). Apparently, the purpose of the new directorate was
to integrate launch operations in the interests of the Soviet
Missile and Space Defence Forces and the Navy. The Tsiklon-2
launched not only the IS interceptors, but also radar and
electronic ocean reconnaissance satellites (known as US-A and
US-P). However, as part of cutbacks in military spending, the 7
NIU and 4 IU directorates were merged in November 1989 to
form the 2nd Centre for Tests and Applications of Space Assets
(TsIP KS 2).
Military Unit 55056 consisted of two groups and a so-called
“independent brigade”. Group 1 was in charge of transporting
the missile to the silo and fuelling it. Group 2 was responsible

13
Bart Hendrickx

for integrated tests of the launch vehicle and its payload and
the independent brigade for preparing the Briz upper stage
and its payload (which the Russians called “the space head
unit” (KGCh), freely translated as “upper composite”). The first
commander of the unit was Leonid Baranov (25 November
1987 - 1 November 1989), later followed by Vladimir Faikov (1
November 1989 - 8 November 1992) and Vladislav Kazantsev
(28 November 1992-1 October 1994) [58].

In mid-May 1987 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachov paid

a visit to the Baikonur cosmodrome, just days before the maiden
launch of the Energiya heavy-lift launch vehicle. While touring
one of the facilities at the cosmodrome, he was shown a mock-
up of the Naryad-V ASAT system, with Anatoliy Zavalishin,
deputy commander of the Baikonur cosmodrome, giving him
the necessary explanations. As Zavalishin later recounted, he
pointed out the shortcomings of the IS interceptors to Gorbachov,
not forgetting to mention Margaret Thatcher’s negative attitude
to the Soviet anti-satellite tests. Reminding Gorbachov of the
American ASAT test in 1985, Zavalishin proposed a similar
experiment using the Naryad-V system, promising they would
find some kind of cover story for such a test. Gorbachov,
however, displayed little enthusiasm for the idea and basically
forbade to perform an ASAT test in space [59].

Despite the changing political climate, preparations for

Naryad-V suborbital test flights continued. By early 1988 the
first test flight was planned for 1989. Clearly, the best way of
testing the system would have been to destroy an actual target
in space, but there were not only political, but also technical
obstacles to performing such a test. The guidance system used
by Briz to precisely home in on the target was not yet ready,
nor were the space-to-space missiles. Therefore the objective
of the first flight was scaled down to simulating an attack on
an imaginary target in space, which required less precision.
One alternative idea floated within KB Salyut’s Department
117 was to target Naryad-V onto an orbiting satellite that had
exceeded its guaranteed lifetime but was still able to transmit
signals. Those signals could then be used by Naryad-V to home
in on its target. However, the idea was not passed on to KB
Salyut’s leadership because it was not the department’s task to
formulate such mission proposals [60].
Fig. 12 UR-100N UTTKh test launch from Baikonur.
(www.leninsk.ru)
The main objective of the flights was to test the Briz upper
stage and its new guidance and control system [63]. According
to information later provided by the Eurockot company, the Briz
was fired several times, demonstrating that it could be re-ignited
in zero-g conditions. Aiming for an inclination of 65°, the upper
stage reached a maximum altitude of 900 km. Another aim of
the test flights was to study the vibrations and acoustic loads
that the payload experienced during launch. The upper stage
reportedly carried “scientific equipment”, although the exact
nature of that has never been identified [64]. One source says
that on the second mission the Briz was restarted more often
than on its maiden mission the year before [65].

Eventually the first suborbital mission slipped to the end of 1990.
By that time ground-based tests of the KB Tochmash missiles had
been suspended, although only several months earlier the goal
had been to finish the tests by the end of the year and fly them on
the second suborbital mission in 1991 [61]. The launch took place
on 20 November 1990 at 7.02 Moscow time (4.02 GMT) from
silo nr. 29 in Area 131 of the Baikonur cosmodrome. A second
suborbital mission was planned for 1991, but the rocket originally
earmarked for the test had to be returned to the manufacturer when
it turned out that its transport and launch container had become
damaged during installation in the silo [62]. A replacement missile
was fired from silo nr. 58 in Area 175 on 20 December 1991 at
23.30 Moscow time (20.30 GMT) (Fig. 12).
The missions were not officially announced by the Soviet
Union at the time. The first reports about the flights surfaced
in the Russian press in late January 1992 and sparked angry
reactions from Kazakhstan, which complained that it had not
been notified in advance of the second flight, which took place
from its territory four days after the former Soviet republic had
declared its independence. Just one day after the test, on
21 December 1991, the heads of 11 former Soviet republics
(including Russia and Kazakhstan) had gathered in the Kazakh
capital of Alma-Ata to proclaim the end of the Soviet Union and
its replacement by the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS). The reports about the tests also stirred controversy in
the US, where some considered they had represented a breach

14

of the yet-to-be ratified START treaty. However, the US had
reportedly been informed in advance of the second launch
exactly to avoid such criticism [66].
Naryad-V Goes Commercial
The two suborbital missions were carried out with funds already
allocated for the Naryad-V programme [67]. They demonstrated
the potential of using the Briz upper stage and its guidance
and control systems for ASAT missions, although not at the
kind of altitude that Naryad-V had been primarily designed for.
Meanwhile, with the military interest in ASAT missions gradually
fading, KB Salyut was setting its sights on turning the UR-100N
UTTKh/Briz combination into a commercial satellite launcher
and the suborbital missions (certainly the second one) had
clearly been geared to that end as well.
International strategic arms reduction talks underway at the
time offered the prospect of converting a significant number
of ICBMs into satellite launch vehicles. Under the START II
agreement, signed by the US and Russia on 3 January 1993,
Russia was allowed to retain 105 UR-100N UTTKh missiles
provided they were downgraded to carry one instead of six
warheads. The 65 other missiles remaining on operational
duty at the time were to be decommissioned and many of them
became available to serve as satellite launchers.
Studies performed by KB Salyut in early 1991 showed that
there was a growing demand for such boosters from companies
aspiring to place constellations of small communications
satellites into LEO (such as Iridium and Globalstar). The
main modification needed was to enlarge the payload shroud,
which was too small to house the satellites that were potential
customers for the rocket. Another problem was that the silo
launches placed high acoustic loads on the payloads, but it was
hoped that most foreign payloads could handle those and that
the existing silos at Baikonur could host commercial launches.
Building a dedicated conventional pad for the rocket was
considered too expensive at the time [68].
KB Salyut first advertised the possible commercial use of
the rocket at an international space exhibition in Moscow in
April 1991 [69]. With little experience in marketing rockets,
KB Salyut began looking for a foreign partner to put the rocket
on the commercial market. An initial overture seems to have
been made to the German company Daimler-Benz Aerospace
(DASA) during a visit by a KB Salyut delegation in December
1991, just days before the second suborbital mission. The main
purpose of the visit was to discuss the joint development of
a communications satellite, but the commercial prospects of
the UR-100N UTTKh/Briz were mentioned to the Germans in
passing [70].
As was to be expected, KB Salyut officials did not mention
the ASAT roots of the Briz upper stage in their negotiations with
the Germans and instead of using the name Naryad-V referred
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
to the rocket as Rokot (meaning “roar” as in the roar of a rocket
engine). The name first appeared in the press in early 1992.
The upper stage was now referred to as Briz-K (the “K” standing
for “kosmicheskiy”, “space”). In its Naryad-V configuration it had
apparently been known simply as Briz [71].
On 16 December 1992 the Russian government gave the
official go-ahead for the commercial use of the Rokot booster
and on 16 May 1994 the newly formed Khrunichev Centre
(resulting from the merger of KB Salyut and the Khrunichev
factory) and DASA signed an agreement on the creation of a
joint venture called Eurockot Launch Services GmbH to market
the rocket and carry out launch services. The new company was
officially registered on 22 March 1995, with DASA holding 51 %
of the shares and Khrunichev 49 %. Undoubtedly, the Germans
had been impressed by the rocket’s almost flawless track
record. By 1994 the UR-100N UTTKh and its predecessor (UR-
100N) had accumulated 148 launches (68 for the UR-100N and
80 for the UR-100N UTTKh) and only three of those had failed
[72]. Test launches of the ICBM continued to be performed
from Baikonur on a regular basis to guarantee the reliability of
the ageing launch system and provide training for the military
launch teams.
Khrunichev officials found themselves in an awkward
situation in early 1997 when they were obliged to provide
information on the origins of the Rokot booster during a session
of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, a body
that regularly met in Geneva to oversee the implementation
of the START I treaty. In its advertising campaign for Rokot,
Eurockot had made no secret of the two silo-launched suborbital
missions in 1990 and 1991, saying that these had carried the
Briz upper stage. Since the missions had taken place before
the commercialization of Rokot, the question naturally arose
what the purpose of the test flights had been. Instead of
acknowledging that the Rokot project had evolved from an ASAT
programme, the Russians concocted a cover story, claiming the
rocket had been developed to quickly replenish constellations
of low-orbiting military satellites after the outbreak of a nuclear
war. That also explained the need to launch them from silos,
which were hardened to protect them from nuclear blasts [73].
Although the ASAT roots of Rokot/Briz are no longer a secret,
even in today’s Eurockot commercial literature any mention of
its true origins is carefully avoided.
Shortly after the formation of the joint venture the German
side agreed to finance work needed to modify an existing
Kosmos-3M launch pad at the Plesetsk cosmodrome for
launches of the Rokot. In fact, in its December 1992 decision
on the commercial use of Rokot, the Russian government had
already called for operating the rocket from Plesetsk, no doubt
because of the political problems associated with flying it from
Kazakh territory. The decision to use Plesetsk made it possible
to launch the rocket above ground from a conventional pad in
a much more benign acoustic environment. However, it would
still be ensconced in the transport and launch container used
15
Bart Hendrickx

for the silo launches in order to maintain commonality with the

basic ICBM and carry out launch preparations under climatically
controlled conditions. Plans to fly the rocket from Baikonur silos
were definitively shelved in 1999.

Another possibility studied was to fly Rokot from the new

Svobodnyyy launch site, a decommissioned ICBM base in the Far
East of Russia. However, the Svobodnyy silos had housed only
the original version of the UR-100 and the modifications needed
for Rokot were considered too costly. Work to modify the silos
did continue for another launch vehicle based on the UR-100N
UTTKh, namely the Strela rocket of NPO Mashinostroyeniya,
the former Chelomei bureau. Strela was a virtually unchanged
version of the UR-100N UTTKh that retained the ICBM’s post-
boost stage and therefore had less payload capacity than Rokot
(Fig. 13). In the end, even the plans to fly Strela from Svobodnyy
did not materialize and Strela would only fly from the Baikonur
cosmodrome.

The first launch of Rokot from the converted Kosmos-3M

pad at Plesetsk was slated for early 2000 with a small military
satellite called RVSN-40. Unfortunately, during launch pad tests
in late December 1999 the payload shroud was accidentally
jettisoned from the rocket and the mission was cancelled. This
was the last planned flight of the Briz-K upper stage.

Although an enlarged payload shroud had been designed

by the mid-1990s for the Briz-K and its satellite payloads, it
was found to be inadequate for launches of Iridium satellites,
which were to become the first commercial payloads for Rokot.
In order to accommodate larger payloads and reduce dynamic
loads, a bigger composite payload shroud was developed
and the Briz-K itself also underwent structural changes. The
equipment bay was widened and shortened by redistributing
the control equipment and its walls were stiffened to provide
more structural rigidity. The interstage between the Briz and the
second stage was lengthened, making it possible to suspend
the upper stage inside the interstage, which thereby replaced
the upper stage as the main load bearing structure. The payload
volume under the shroud was increased by 8.8 m³, allowing the
Rokot to carry a wide diversity of payloads, ranging from single
to multiple payloads positioned either on a single level or on Fig. 13 Comparative view of the UR-100N UTTKh/Strela (left),
two or more levels using a customized dispenser. The modified Rokot/Briz-K (middle) and Rokot/Briz-KM (right). (Eurockot)
upper stage became known as Briz-KM (Fig. 14). Rokot/Briz-
KM flew its maiden mission from Plesetsk on 16 May 2000, kerosene Blok-DМ in the lower position and a Briz-K on top of
carrying two mass simulators of the Iridium satellites (Simsat 1 that [74]. However, the Blok-DM upper stage was a product of
and Simsat 2). At the time of writing, the booster has flown 24 RKK Energiya and the Khrunichev Centre was not eager to
missions, with both commercial and government payloads. One share the profits it expected to earn from commercial Proton
mission ended in complete failure and one failed to place its missions with a rival design bureau. The basic Briz was too
satellite into the proper orbit. small and not powerful enough to fly on Proton, but Khrunichev
elegantly solved the problem by mounting a toroidal, jettisonable
Yet another modification of the Briz, called Briz-M, flies as an propellant tank around a shortened and widened version of the
upper stage on the Khrunichev Centre’s Proton rocket. It was basic Briz stage. This ensured that the upper stage fitted atop
conceived around 1994, several years before Briz-KM. An early the Proton and had enough propellant to place payloads into
idea to increase the MEO/GEO launch capacity of the Proton high orbits. The Briz-KM was an outgrowth of Briz-M (essentially
was to equip it with a dual upper stage consisting of a LOX/ the Briz-M without the toroidal fuel tank). Briz-M made its maiden

16
 Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet

Fig. 14 Comparative view of Briz-K and Briz-KM. (Eurockot)

mission on 5 July 1999. It will also be used as an upper stage on

the Angara-5 rocket and flew on that rocket’s maiden mission in
December 2014.

Naryad-V’s Swan Song

Before Rokot definitively entered the commercial market in the

mid-1990s, the rocket flew one final mission from Baikonur in
December 1994, this time using the Briz-K to put a payload
into orbit. Remarkably enough, the flight took place only
weeks after Military Unit 55056, which was in charge of Rokot
launches at Baikonur, had been formally disbanded. The
order to do that had already come in early 1994, but it wasn’t
until 1 November that the unit officially ceased to exist. Much
of its staff was transferred to the Far East of the country in
anticipation of Rokot launches from the new Svobodnyy launch
site. As a result, preparations for the launch were made by a
remaining skeleton crew that was 10 times smaller than for the
two suborbital launches [75].

The mission was launched on 26 December 1994 at 6.01

Moscow time (3.01 GMT) from silo nr. 58 in Area 175 and
inserted a small amateur radio satellite called Radio-ROSTO
(RS-15) into a 1,885x2,165 km orbit with an inclination of 64.6°
(Fig. 15). When the mission came within range of the US Naval
Space Surveillance System (NAVSPASUR) several hours later,
it detected not only Radio-ROSTO and the Briz upper stage,
but also 32 other objects associated with this launch (which
received the international designator 1994-085). Backtracking
the orbit, it turned out that some kind of fragmentation event had
occurred at around 6.27 GMT, about 3.5 hours after launch [76].
At the time not much attention was given to this event, but the
Fig. 15 The Radio-ROSTO satellite. (G. Krebs)
hindsight knowledge of Rokot’s ASAT roots raises the question
if it may have been the result of an ASAT-related test and if the
orbiting of the Radio-ROSTO satellite merely served as a cover
to mask the true purpose of the launch. It is known that in 1990
KB Salyut was hoping to follow up the two suborbital missions
with an orbital mission of Naryad-V involving the destruction of
a target in space. The plan was to deploy a small target from the
Briz, after which the upper stage would home in on the target

17
Bart Hendrickx
and release one or more space-to-space missiles to destroy
it [77]. The question is how much of that plan, if anything,
remained intact four years later.
The most obvious argument against an ASAT-related
experiment on this mission is that by the end of 1994 the political
climate was hardly conducive to conducting an ASAT test. The
flight took place several years after the end the Cold War and
one and a half year after President Yeltsin had reportedly shut
down the IS-MU anti-satellite project. Even during the final years
of the Cold War the Soviet Union had observed its self-declared
ASAT moratorium by testing IS-MU on the ground rather than
in space. Moreover, by the time of the 1994 mission Khrunichev
had already signed its deal with DASA on the formation of
Eurockot and there can be little doubt that the December 1994
mission served to demonstrate the potential of the Rokot as a
commercial launch vehicle.
Still, there are some tantalizing clues that there may
have been more to this mission than just the deployment of
an amateur radio satellite. First, the Radio-ROSTO satellite
weighed just 72 kg, which was way below the maximum
payload capacity of the Rokot to the observed orbit (over 1
tonne). Second, the fragmentation event was unusual in that
it happened so shortly after launch. Upper stages have been
known to explode in orbit, but this usually happens months
or years after launch due to leakage of residual propellants
(the Briz-M, for instance, suffered several such break-ups after
Proton launches).
Third, a handful of publications in recent years point to an
additional objective for this launch. In a book about the history of
the Baikonur cosmodrome, Leonid Baranov, the first commander
of Military Unit 55056, said the Rokot carried Radio-ROSTO and
what he calls a “Kosmos” satellite [78]. Although no Kosmos
satellite was officially announced for this mission, Baranov may
have been trying to say there was more to this mission than
meets the eye. Another clue comes from an authoritative list of
Baikonur launches which lists Naryad-V as the main payload
for this mission and Radio-ROSTO as a “subsatellite” [79].
Another source says that the military teams in charge of Rokot
at Baikonur performed three launches of Naryad-V (the two
suborbital missions plus the orbital mission) [80].
The best evidence for an ASAT-related test on this mission
comes from the memoirs of a KB Salyut veteran. He says that
although the prime purpose of the mission was to demonstrate
the Rokot as a satellite launch vehicle, it also involved an
experiment related to Naryad-V in which the Briz would test
equipment “for initial homing on a space target”. However, he
claims that the test failed, adding that it was “the last test in
the framework of this project, after which Naryad-V definitively
turned into Rokot” [81].
So what could such an ASAT test have been all about? Since
work on the space-to-space missiles had been suspended four
18
years earlier, it is safe to conclude that the originally planned
all-up test of Naryad-V with the destruction of a target had been
cancelled. Instead, the idea seems to have been to deploy a
target from the Briz and subsequently use the guidance and
control systems of Briz to approach it without actually destroying
it. The Briz guidance systems lacked the precision to carry out
an actual intercept (which was the task of the KB Tochmash
missiles) and an ASAT-related test would have to be kept secret,
which could hardly be achieved by creating a cloud of debris in
orbit.
Therefore, if an ASAT-related test was carried out, the
fragmentation event was probably accidental rather than
the result of a pre-conceived intercept. What may have gone
wrong, though, remains a mystery. One possibility is that the
Briz was supposed to release one or several inflatable balloon
type targets (similar to the ones carried by the ill-fated Skif-DM
vehicle in 1987) that somehow burst during deployment [82].
Whatever went wrong, any Briz homing test would likely have
been timed to take place before the objects came within range of
US tracking assets, which would explain why the fragmentation
event occurred so early in the mission.
One possible motive for such a test may have been the
continued US interest in ASAT systems. In the late 1980s,
shortly after the cancellation of the Air Force’s air-launched
ASAT system, the US Army was ordered to develop a ground-
launched system called KE-ASAT (KE standing for “Kinetic
Energy”). Consisting of a tried-and-tested ICBM and a kinetic
kill vehicle, this was quite similar in concept to Naryad-V. The
booster was a Minuteman-class solid-fuel ICBM that would
fly in the general direction of the target and then release the
kill vehicle for terminal homing and intercept. The project
suffered severe budget cuts after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, but continued as a technology effort. This culminated
with a ground-based test on 11 September 1994, just 2.5
months before the Rokot launch. In the test, a strapped-down
prototype of the kill vehicle tracked a moving light source as it
fired its thrusters in response to commands from its avionics/
seeker subsystem. The closed-loop demonstration simulated
an actual anti-satellite mission, including launch, target
acquisition and intercept [83]. Despite strong opposition from
the Clinton administration, the KE-ASAT programme managed
to survive on shoe-string budgets until after the turn of the
century.
After the end of the Cold War the US ASAT programme was
mainly aimed at preserving the monopoly of the United States on
satellite reconnaissance imagery in future wars. The emergence
of relatively low-cost imaging satellites increased the likelihood
that the US would one day face an enemy having access to
high-quality reconnaissance information. By continuing ASAT
development, the US military hoped to discourage other
nations from relying on high-resolution satellites to obtain
reconnaissance data for their own needs or sell that imagery to
potential adversaries of the US.

It is hard to say if a possible orbital Naryad-V test was
driven by similar motives or merely part of an effort to try and
keep up pace with the US ASAT programme. At any rate, all
indications are that it was not intended to be followed by more
in-orbit tests. The end of the Cold War and the near-collapse
of the Russian economy in the 1990s relegated ASATs to the
bottom of the military space programme’s priority list. The
plummeting space budgets made it hard to maintain even a
basic constellation of military satellites, let alone deploy a fleet
of ASATs.
Renewed Interest in ASAT Systems
It wasn’t until after the turn of the century, with the Russian
economy showing signs of recovery and Vladimir Putin rising to
power, that there was renewed interest in ASATs. During a visit
to the Khrunichev Centre in January 2002 Putin was reportedly
told that the Naryad-V programme could be reinstated (with
some modifications) if the need arose. The visit came just about
a month after US President George W. Bush had announced
America’s intention to withdraw from the 1972 ABM treaty in
six months. Although Naryad-V was not an anti-missile defence
system, Putin reportedly ordered the Ministry of Defence to
study the need for the resurrection of Naryad-V and estimate
the costs associated with that [84].
In March 2009 the then Deputy Minister of Defence Vladimir
Popovkin stated that Russia was continuing to develop anti-
satellite systems, saying that “we can’t just sit and watch while
others are doing this”. Popovkin was reacting to a journalist’s
question about the first Chinese ASAT test in January 2007
and a US operation in February 2008 in which a standard ship-
based anti-ballistic missile system had been used to destroy a
decaying out-of-control American reconnaissance satellite that
might have posed a health hazard if it survived re-entry [85].
Commenting on Popovkin’s statement the same day, the state-
run RIA Novosti news agency noted that Russia had retained
hardware of its old ASAT systems that “like LEGO bricks” could
be assembled into a combat system if there was a clear threat
to the nation’s security. The report singled out the IS-MU and
IS-MD systems, the Kontakt air-launched system and what it
referred to as Naryad-VN and Naryad-VR . In addition to that,
the possibility was being studied of adding ASAT capability to the
S-400 and S-500 surface-to-air missiles and the former Almaz
design bureau (now called GSKB Almaz-Antei) was said to be
working on an airborne infrared laser system to counter ground-
based, sea-based and space-based enemy reconnaissance
assets [86].
In January 2010 the commander of the Russian space forces
Oleg Ostapenko repeated that Russia was ready to respond to
threats from space. “Our policy is that there should be no war
in space, but we are military people and should be ready for
everything. Our activities in this direction will depend on others,
but, trust me, we will be able to react quickly and adequately”
[87].
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
Twenty years after the suspension of the Naryad
programme, it was again the Rokot and the Briz upper stage
that were involved in a series of tests that may ultimately pave
the way for restoring Russia’s satellite negation capability.
During routine launches of communications satellites in
December 2013, May 2014 and March 2015, the Rokot
carried a mysterious piggyback payload that performed
puzzling manoeuvres in space. The last two of these payloads
surprised observers by rendezvousing with the Briz-KM upper
stage that had deployed them in orbit. On one occasion, one
of the payloads even seems to have nudged the Briz-KM into
a slightly higher orbit. No official explanation was given by
Russia for these orbital manoeuvres, but they do demonstrate
Russia’s renewed capability to perform close inspections
of satellites in orbit and, if necessary, to disable them.
Despite alarming reactions in the West, similar rendezvous
experiments had been carried out by the US and China.
Interestingly, the suspected inspection missions used a flight
profile that was almost opposite to that of Naryad, with the
Briz now acting as the target rather than the chase vehicle
[88]. One other indication of renewed Russian interest in
ASAT systems came in early December 2015, when a US
source reported that Russia had tested a direct-ascent anti-
satellite missile as part of a research programme known as
Nudol that is apparently aimed at upgrading the ABM network
around Moscow. The test, which came after two unsuccessful
attempts, was reportedly carried out from a mobile transporter
on 18 November. The report did say that the system may be
limited to hitting satellites that pass over Moscow since it
appears to use a stationary rather than a mobile radar [89].
Whatever ASAT system(s) Russia may intend to deploy
in the future, the old Naryad hardware is unlikely to play any
role in this. The UR-100N UTTKh missiles are reaching the
end of their guaranteed service life. Only about thirty are
believed to remain in service and they are expected to be
retired in 2019 [90]. One final role for the missile appears to
be its involvement in Project 4202, a top-secret programme
to develop a hypersonic glide vehicle (Yu-71) that would be
hard to counter by enemy missile defences. For that purpose,
one of the R-36M silos at the Dombarovskiy missile base near
Yasnyy has reportedly been modified to launch the UR-100N
UTTKh, but the test flights performed so far are believed to
have failed. If the hypersonic glide vehicle is ever declared
operational, it will almost certainly be installed on a new-
generation ICBM [91].
The Rokot launch vehicle is also being phased out, not
only because of its age, but also because there are said to be
problems with the delivery of components for its Ukrainian-
built guidance and navigation system (Fig. 16). At the time of
writing only five more Rokot launches were planned, two for
domestic missions and three to launch European Sentinel Earth
observation satellites. Rokot will be replaced by the Angara 1.2
and Soyuz-2.1v launch vehicles, which have already made their
first test flights.
19
Bart Hendrickx
Fig. 16 Rokot launch. (Eurockot)
References
1. V. Polyachenko, “Na more i v kosmose”, Morsar AV, St. Petersburg,
p.93, 2008; S. Kudryashov (ed.), “Sovetskiy kosmos”, Arkhiv
Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii, Moscow, pp.590-593, 2011.
2. K. Vlasko-Vlasov, “Ot Komety do Oko”, Izdatel’stvo Ol’ga, pp.127-
128, 2002
3. A. Perminov (ed.), “Baikonuru – 50 (istoriya kosmodroma v
vospominaniyakh veteranov)”, Novosti, Moscow, p.482, 2005.
4. The most up-to-date history of the IS programme can be found
in: A. Siddiqi, “The Soviet Co-Orbital Anti-Satellite System: A
Synopsis”, JBIS, 50, pp.225-240, 1997. A good overview of the
various missions is given in: N. Johnson, “Soviet Military Strategy
in Space”, Jane’s Publishing Company, London, pp.125-161,
1987.
5. P. Podvig, “Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War? Soviet
Response to the SDI Program”, Russian Nuclear Forces Project,
Working Paper, March 2013, pp. 3-4. (Podvig’s paper is largely
based on the archival collection of Vitaliy Katayev, a senior advisor
to the Secretary for the Defence Industry of the Central Committee
of the Soviet Communist Party from 1974 to 1990). Online at http://
russianforces.org/podvig/2013/03/did_star_wars_help_end_the_
col.shtml (Last Accessed 13 January 2016); Ye. Velikhov, “Ya na
valenkakh poyedu v 35-i god… Vospominaniya”, Astrel, Moscow,
p.52, 2010.
6. According to the memoirs of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs official,
the commission was set up in the very first days after Reagan’s
announcement. O. Grinyovskiy, “Perelom. Ot Brezhneva k
Gorbachovu”, Olma Press, Moscow, 2004.
7. In the late 1960s there was a joint effort between TsKBEM (the
former Korolyov bureau) and the Institute of Nuclear Physics in
Novosibirsk to develop space-based particle beam weapons to
shoot down US missiles. See: R. Sagdeyev, “The Making of a Soviet
Scientist”, John Wiley, New York, pp.123-125, 1994. In 1976 NPO
Energiya was placed in charge of a space weapons programme
20
Conclusion
Despite a unilateral moratorium on ASAT testing declared in
August 1983, the Soviet continued work on a variety of ASAT
systems throughout the decade. Improvements were made to the
IS satellites that began flying in the 1960s, development continued
of the Skif and Kaskad projects started as part of a space
weapons programme in the 1970s and the air-launched Kontakt
system was conceived in the early 1980s in direct response to
the equivalent American ALMV project. In addition to that, two
new projects (Naryad-V and Kamin) got underway around 1985.
Although this considerable ASAT effort may have been justified
as being a critical part of the Soviet Union’s asymmetric response
to the US Strategic Defence Initiative, evidence suggests that
most of these systems would have been more effective against
conventional US military satellites than elements of America’s
missile shield. In the end, funding for these projects gradually
dried up as the Cold War drew to a close. A handful did manage to
survive into the early 1990s, the most significant being Naryad-V,
which left the Rokot/Briz-KM launch vehicle and the Proton
rocket’s Briz-M upper stage as an important legacy.
Acknowledgments
The author would like to thank O. Zamyatin for his help in
preparing this article.
that also included missile defence. See: Yu. Semyonov, “Raketno-
kosmicheskaya korporatsiya Energiya 1946-1996”, RKK Energiya,
Moscow, pp.419-420, 1996.
8. Ye. Velikhov, op. cit., pp.44-45; V. Gubarev, “Academician
Yevgeniy Velikhov: ‘Science is not like playing hide and seek’” (in
Russian), (interview with Velikhov), Pravda, 1 April 2014, online
at http://www.pravda.ru/science/academy/01-04-2014/1202663-
akademik_velikhov-0/. (Last Accessed 13 January 2016); N.
Bodrikhin, “Chelomei”, Molodaya Gvardia, Moscow, pp.173-176,
2014.
9. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.7.
10. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.8; D. Hoffman, “The Dead Hand: The Untold
Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy”,
Doubleday, New York, pp.214-215, 2009. The former chief of the
Missile and Space Defence Forces Yuriy Votintsev claims that the
Ministry of the Radio Industry had already been in charge of two
other major umbrella programmes (Fon-1 and Fon-2) for ground-
based and space-based missile defence in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. Fon-1, which mainly focused on theoretical research,
was reportedly started in the late 1970s but cancelled shortly
afterwards. Fon-2, said to be “closer to practice” and to require
“serious state funding”, was initiated in response to SDI in 1983.
See: D. Likhanov, “What if there is war tomorrow?” (in Russian)
(interview with Votintsev), “Sovershenno Sekretno”, nr. 2, 1993. It
has been speculated that the space-based missile shield proposed
by Chelomei in the late 1970s was part of Fon-1. See: A. Siddiqi,
“Cold War in Space: A Look Back at the Soviet Union”, Spaceflight,
40, p.66, 1998. The existence of Fon-1 and Fon-2 has not been
confirmed by other sources.
11. V. Favorskiy and I. Meshcheryakov, “Voyenno-kosmicheskiye
sily. Stanovleniye Voyenno-kosmicheskikh sil. Kniga II, Voyenno-
kosmicheskiye sily”, Moscow, pp.106-108, 147-148, 1998.
According to this source, the Ministry of Defence and the ministries

involved in the defence industry received an order in mid-1985
to prepare a government decree on a space-based anti-SDI
programme. The leading role was assigned to the NPO Energiya
design bureau. In order to co-ordinate this work with ongoing
efforts to create a multi-layered missile defence system, the Military
Industrial Commission set up a special commission headed by
Yevgeniy Velikhov, which appears to have been unrelated to the
Velikhov commission established by Andropov in 1983. The final
draft of the decree was drawn up on the basis of recommendations
made by the commission in December 1985. The estimated cost
of the programme between 1986 and 1990 was 30.7 billion rubles.
Possibly, the January 1986 decree outlined a more detailed plan
for the SK-1000 programme approved in July 1985. The Skif
space-based laser system is known to have been mentioned in a
government decree (nr. 135-45) issued on 27 January 1986, but it
is unclear if this was the “big” decree of January 1986 or another
one devoted specifically to Skif.
12. D. Hoffman, op. cit., pp.217-220.
13. P. Podvig, op. cit., pp.13-16; S. Oznobishchev, et al., “Kak
gotovilsya asimmetrichnyy otvet na Strategicheskuyu Oboronnuyu
Initsiativu R. Reagana”, Lenand, Moscow, 2008.
14. P. Podvig, op. cit., pp.15-16. “Kontseptsiya-R” was managed by
the Ministry of the Radio Industry and its main goal apparently
was to consolidate the ASAT projects run by that ministry (IS-M,
Kontakt, Amulet). “Protivodeistviye” was managed by the Ministry
of General Machine Building and was mainly focused on improving
the capabilities of ballistic missiles to defeat or penetrate space-
based defences. It may have been a follow-on to a much broader
programme known as SP-2000 aimed at modernizing strategic
offensive forces.
15. Yu. Semyonov, op. cit., pp.419-420, 1996. Several sources say the
decree was called “On the study of the possibility to create weapons
for combat operations in and from space”. See for instance: K.
Lantratov, “The Star Wars that never happened”, Quest, 14, p.6,
2007. One source claims NPO Energiya was assigned to the
space weapons programme by a government decree as early as
the summer of 1974 and that it was headed by Igor Sadovskiy.
See: V. Zavyalov, “O rabote v KBKhM im. A.I. Isayeva i ne tol’ko
ob etom”, chapter 10, http://zavjalov.okis.ru/glava6-10.html. (Last
Accessed 13 January 2016)
16. O. Zamyatin, “My stremilis’ k nebu. Vospominaniya rossiyskogo
aerokosmicheskogo inzhenera. Kniga vtoraya”, Alkor Publishers,
Moscow, p.24, 2015.
17. Ibid, p.46, 81.
18. V. Zavyalov, op. cit.
19. Since Naryad was mainly aimed at targets in high orbits, the “V”
presumably stands for vysotnyy (“high altitude”). The word “naryad”
has several meanings in Russian, the most commonly used being
“outfit” (in the meaning “a set of clothes worn together”). The others
are “order, warrant” and “detail” (in the meaning “a specific duty in
the army or the person or group who have that duty”). Since none
of these meanings bear any clear relation to the purpose of the
system, Naryad (like Kamin) may be a compound of two or more
words where “na” stands for nazemnyy (“ground-based”). Private
e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
20. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.24-25, 33-34; Private e-mail
correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
21. P. Stares, “The Militarization of Space: US Policy, 1945-1984”,
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1985; D. Day, “Arming for the
High Frontier”, Spaceflight, 46, pp.467-471, 2004.
22. C. Chun, “Shooting Down A Star: Program 437, the US Nuclear
ASAT System and Present-Day Copycat Killers”, CADRE Paper
No. 6, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama,
2000.
23. “The 30P6 Kontakt/MiG-31D/79M6 Complex (in Russian)”, online
at http://militaryrussia.ru/blog/topic-699.html (Last Accessed 13
January 2016); P. Podvig, op. cit., p.6; V. Lukashevich and I.
Afanasyev, “Kosmicheskiye kryl’ya”, OOO LenTa Stranstviy,
Moscow, pp.445-446, 2009.
24. V. Kavelkina et. al., “Poligon Kapustin Yar. 60 let v stroyu”, 2006.
25. P. Podvig, op. cit., p. 5.
Naryad-V and the Soviet Anti-Satellite Fleet
26. N. Johnson, op. cit., pp.155-156.
27. N. Johnson, op. cit., p.146, 155.
28. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.18.
29. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.34.
30. A. Andryushkov, “Polyoty, Almazy i Skify”, Vestnik aviatsii i
kosmonavtiki, 1/2002, p.149.
31. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.7.
32. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
33. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.21, 27, 34.
34. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.10.
35. M. Tarasenko, “Voennye aspekty sovetskoi kosmonavtiki”, Nikol,
Moscow, p.40, 1992.
36. The various war scenarios analyzed by KB Salyut are described in:
O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.27-36.
37. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.128-132; Yu. Semyonov, op. cit., p.420.
Research on the cloud of solid particles was reportedly led by
Nikolai Vetchinkin. The cloud would have extended to an altitude
of 3,000 km. See: V. Lukashevich, “Applications of Buran” (in
Russian), online at http://www.buran.ru/htm/spirit.htm. (Last
Accessed 13 January 2016)
38. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.41.
39. K. Lantratov, “The Star Wars that never happened”, Quest, 14,
p.16, 2007.
40. V. Lukashevich, I. Afanasyev, op. cit., pp.445-447.
41. V. Kavelkina, op. cit.
42. K. Vlasko-Vlasov, op. cit., p.130; M. Pervov, “Sistemy raketno-
kosmicheskoi oborony Rossii sozdavalis’ tak”, Aviarus XXI,
Moscow, pp.408-409, 2004; V. Misnik, “Kometa – 35 let”, Oruzhiye
i tekhnologii, Moscow, pp.58-60, 2008; RIA Novosti report, 5 March
2009.
43. P. Podvig, op. cit., p.10.
44. Personal e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
45. UTTKh stands for “Improved Tactical-Technical Characteristics”.
15A35 was the designator given by the GRAU (the Main Missile
and Artillery Directorate of the Ministry of Defence) and RS-18B
was the designator given to the missile in the START agreements.
46. A. Barsukov, I. Obukhov (ed.), “60 let samootverzhennogo truda
vo imya mira”, Oruzhiye i tekhnologii, Moscow, pp.166-167, 2004;
N. Pervov, op. cit., p.177.
47. Some sources say 360 missiles were manufactured, but only
about 300 actually deployed.
48. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
49. In its capacity as an upper stage, Briz had the GRAU designator
14S12. Several online sources also give either 14F10 or 14F11
as the GRAU designator for Naryad-V. The 14F designators are
satellite designators and therefore 14F10/14F11 would seem to
refer to Briz in its capacity as an anti-satellite vehicle outfitted with
space-to-space missiles. The GRAU designator for Rokot with the
original Briz upper stage is given as 14A01 or 14A01R. Rokot with
the modified Briz-KM upper stage is designated 14A05.
50. O.Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.43-44, 158.
51. Based on the archives of Vitaliy Katayev, this number was
discussed in meetings on 28 February and 3 March 1990. See: P.
Podvig, op. cit., p.18.
52. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
53. V. Zavyalov, op. cit.
54. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.162.
55. “Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV)”, online at http://www.
globalsecurity.org/space/systems/almv.htm. (Last Accessed 13
January 2016)
56. K. Lantratov, “The Star Wars that never happened”, Quest, 14, p.7,
2007.
57. S. Drell, G. Shultz, “Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its
Twentieth Anniversary”, Conference Report, Hoover Institution,
Stanford, p.55, 2006. This is from a document in the Katayev
papers that was written in preparation for the US-Soviet summit
between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachov in Reykjavik,
Iceland in October 1986. It was presumably prepared by the Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and discussed among other things the
implications of a proposed ban on nuclear weapon testing for the
Soviet Union’s strategic arms. One of the consequences would
21
Bart Hendrickx
be that “X-ray warheads will not be created for the Nariad-V anti-
space system and the A-135 Moscow ABM system”.
58. A. Perminov, op. cit., pp.492-493; L. Baranov (ed.), “Kosmodrom
Baikonur: 50 kosmicheskikh let”, PK Rekslaid, Karaganda, 2005;
“The 326th Independent Engineering and Testing Unit (Military
Unit 55056)” (in Russian), online at http://chast-26360.narod.
ru/olderfiles/2/55056_broshura.pdf (Last Accessed 13 January
2016); Online forum of Military Unit 55056 veterans at http://www.
slusili-baikonuru.ru/index.php?topic=7679.0. (Last Accessed 13
January 2016).
59. A. Zavalishin, “Baikonurskiye universitety”, Mashinostroyeniye,
Moscow, 1999.
60. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.38-39.
61. Ibid., pp.158-159, 162-163.
62. V. Mokhov, “Rokot starts from Plesetsk” (in Russian), Novosti
kosmonavtiki, 7/2000, p.42.
63. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.163.
64. Rokot User’s Guide, Eurockot Launch Services GmbH, pp.2-7 ,
2011.
65. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.198.
66. N. Kidger, “New Russian Space Launcher Tested”, Spaceflight, 34,
p.146, 1992. The suborbital launches were first reported in the 20
January 1992 evening edition of the Izvestiya newspaper and were
the subject of a TASS announcement the following day.
67. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.198.
68. Ibid, pp.169-171.
69. I. Chornyy, V. Mokhov, “15th anniversary of the first Rokot launch
from Plesetsk” (in Russian), Novosti kosmonavtiki, 7/2015, p.64.
70. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.198.
71. Personal e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
72. I. Chornyy, V. Mokhov, op. cit., p.65.
73. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., pp.308-309.
74. I. Yevteyev, Zolotoi fond akademika Chelomeia, Bioinformservis,
Moscow, p.194, 2004.
75. L. Baranov, op. cit.; Online forum of Military Unit 55056 veterans
at http://www.slusili-baikonuru.ru/index.php?topic=7679.0. (Last
Accessed 13 January 2016)
76. D. Whitlock, “History of On-Orbit Satellite Fragmentations”, 13th
* *
22
Edition, NASA, Houston, p. 342, 2004.
77. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.163; Private e-mail correspondence with O.
Zamyatin.
78. L. Baranov, op. cit., p.224.
79. V. Poroshkov, “Raketno-kosmicheskiy podvig Baikonura”, Patriot,
Moscow, p.224, 2007. Also see an article by Poroshkov on the
website of the Cosmonautics Federation of Russia: V. Poroshkov,
“60th anniversary of Baikonur” (in Russian), p.18, 20, 31, online at
http://www.fkrus.ru/images/b60a2.pdf. (Last Accessed 13 January
2016)
80. V. Yasyukevich, “50th anniversary of Baikonur’s Proton directorate”
(in Russian), Novosti kosmonavtiki, 4/2013, p.67.
81. O. Zamyatin, op. cit., p.249, 252.
82. Private e-mail correspondence with O. Zamyatin.
83. J. Lenorovitz, “Satellite Kill Vehicle Validated in Test Firing”,
Aviation Week & Space Technology, p.23, 26 September 1994.
84. I. Sarfonov, “President Putin has been given advice at Fili” (in
Russian), Kommersant, 22 January 2002; A. Garavskiy, “Space
council at Fili” (in Russian), Krasnaya zvezda, 23 January 2002.
85. Interfax report, 5 March 2009.
86. RIA Novosti report, 5 March 2009. It is not clear what the difference
is between Naryad-VN and Naryad-VR. The RIA Novosti report
was the first to use these designators.
87. ITAR-TASS report, 14 January 2010.
88. The suspected inspection satellites were Kosmos-2491,
Kosmos-2499 and Kosmos-2504. Only the last of these was
announced by the Russians shortly after launch.
89. B. Gertz, “Russia Flight Tests Anti-Satellite Missile”, online at http://
freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-conducts-successful-
flight-test-of-anti-satellite-missile/. (Last Accessed 13 January
2016)
90. H. Kristensen, R. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2015”, Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, p.88, May/June 2015.
91. B. Gertz, “Russia Tested Hypersonic Glide Vehicle in February”,
online at http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-tested-
hypersonic-glide-vehicle-in-february/. (Last Accessed 13 January
2016)
*