4 Recruitment and finance In this chapter we shall focus on the two elements chat contemporaries agreed to be the key co successfully waging war: recruitment and finance. We shall ask whether crusading, as ie wos reformulated and managed in the second half of the fifteenth century, was able o deliver dhese human and material resources in a way thar ofered the prospect of defeating the Turks, And we shall do so largely in sms ‘of a rension beoween the voluntary and the obligatory that was of long standing in ‘crusading ideology. Given the way war-making developed in medieval Europe, i i not surprising that this tension dominates our enquiry, justas ie shaped the debaces of contemporaries In ehe central Middle Ages the successful conduct of war by any state came to hinge on the ability ofits rulers to compel eheir subjects to sustain hostilities through taxation, And in the late Middle Ages and eatly modern period the process went a stage Fureher: success depended on the capacity to maintain standing armics.! How should we locate the atempt co deploy the crusade agains: the Turks in relation co these general developmental trends? 4,1 CRUCESIGNATI AND FIFTEENTH-CENTURY CRUSADING (On 20 May 1459, juse before the scheduled opening of the congress of Mantua, Cardinal John Bessarion wrote to his close asociate, the Franciscan Observant, Jacopo delle Marche, abouc'a truly weighty master, excellent and beneficial for the ‘Christian people’. He sought Jacopo’ asistance in assembling an expeditionary force to go to the aid of Thomas Palacologos in the Peloponnese. Following the “Turkish conquest ofthe region in 1458, in the early months of 1459 the despot hhad succeeded in recovering the lost lands, but now he faced a counter-attack. “There could be no question of waitin for decisions to be made at Mantua. Thomas had desperate need of miliary reinforcement by mid-July anc Pins I! had agreed that it should be provided “by way of crusaders (erucesignati’. Beeween 300 and 500 soldiers would be needed, and che men whom Jacopo succeeded in persuading 10 go chould be well armed and provided with enough money for a fill rar, AFy ot sixty ducats ‘either from their own goods or from the charity of others * Sox the eau in Tile and Thm, ed, Burpee Werf Steven Guna, David Gram, nd “Han Cool, ‘War and the Seat is Haiy Modern Ste Widening the Debt’, Wer in Hon 13 (2008), 371-88 Recruitment and france iol (Combatants and sponsors alike would receive the fll indulgence. The Pope would provide a sailing ship to cransport them from Ancona. Jacopo was therefore asked ‘o preach the cross inthe March of Ancona and to ensure tar the condition about ‘nancial support was mecin fll he should als brief Popeand cardinal on progress so that Pius could ger the ship ready. To help Jacopo car-y out this commission, Bessarion opened the letter witha detailed preamble abou: the cconomic and sta- tegic significance ofthe Peloponnese, and the threat posed thete by the Turks, %o inform you of all the specifies needed to exhort and encourage the Christians to undercake this matter in a spirited way? ‘As long ago as 1878 Bessarion’s biographer Henci Vast rcognized the incerest of this remarkable letet and the project that it was intended to make possible” First, and foremost, its testimony to Bessarion’s advocacy of Pslaeologan interests and to his sill as 2 lobbyist on behalf of che Greck lands that were threatened by ‘Mehmed. Buc ic is revealing also on the place that taking the cross to fight could still occupy in this period in the thinking of crusading enthusiast like Bessaion and Pius, Vast characterized the tas force as ‘une sorte de ctosade particule’, and its striking that ies participants should be crucesgna,Snancially supported either by themselves or by others. Working with a timstable of les than wo ‘months ro embarkation, why would Bessaron aim to recruit crusaders rather than hiring mercenaries? The answer may le precisely in the ciffculy of raising such numbers on the mercenary market at short notice and during the campaigning season, Timing was of the esence, and Besarion appears to have considered it viable proposition that in about fifty days up to 500 crusaders could be assembled at Ancona, Its possible that he was encouraged o believe chis by his encouater a few weeks euler with Gerard Déschamps. In January 1459 his cbullient crusad- ing enthusiast and entrepreneur had persuaded Bessarion o use his influence with Pius ro agree to sanction a soeitas lest oF up to 10,000 erucsignat? whom he would recruit in the Burgundian lands, Lorraine, Savoy, and in Fis home town of Litge Like the projected Peloponnese contingent, they would be sponsored by others in exchange for the full indulgence. Alchough Déschampe’s heme looks highly du bious, Pius gave him a warm reception at Mantua in September 1459 and there i some evidence that he did raise recruits, who took pact in the Hungacian siege of Jajce in the autumn of 1463. Bessario’s project certainly yielded results, Three hhundved well-equipped young men (che lowest figure deemed viable by Bessarion) were despatched in July, co-funded by the Pope and Bianca Masia Sforza, duchess ‘of Milan. ‘The idea of sponsorship was thus promoted on two separate occasions 2 Mohler, Astron, 3490-3, no 39, also in Ad, 13.119-20 2 Bent Vist Le cardinal evaron (1403-1872), Ee sor le Cher tla Rentaance vt le li di Xen Pas 1873), 256: sneer exrémement cree. ne sve de crocs poe ‘eule. Sete es clle dun homme aa gl expec ave ne nent pase tut ce ql Yes de * Roney ‘Malatca/Paleologh, pain 5 avg, La au, 1734s Wee, Laer, 2.1.3 & iI Corsmentar, Dl 3, ch. 3, 176-7 Ceqegie ana robust uve) Seton, Papa, aad102 Crusading and the Orseman Threat in 1459, and it may have rendered assistance to both of Christendom’ leading pressure points But this was nor exceptional. More than four decades later, in May 1502, Cardinal Raymond Peraule wrote confidently that well-of people in ‘Cologne, both men and women, could be persuaded so sponsor crusaders co fight against the Turks? And a year later the emperor-elect, Maximilian, oudined a scheme whereby the quasi-crusading members of his Society of St George would receive half of thei support from sponsors and the other half from Perault’sindul- gence money." The socieas sancti Georgi raises the same suspicions as Déschamps’s socets esu, and it isa telling reflection on Maximilians ack record as a crusader that even the elusive Déchamps has more credibility. ‘We mus infer that in 1459 the prospect of campaign whose combatants would be crucesignari was located in the real world, while even in 1502-3 such an ides could be Hoated with a degree of plausibility during the polemical exchanges over what should be done with Perauls collected money. ‘This is surprising for owo reasons. In che fist place, che period witnessed substantial advances in military professionalism. Such pace-secers as republican Venice and Sforza Milan were ‘moving in the direction of armed forces that were contracted, controlled, and re- warded in accordance with centralized and accountable bureaucratic systems? And in the second place it was apparent that confronting the Ottoman threat with any hope of succes called fora similar approach tobe applied to crusading. Dividing the operation of crusade between financial suppore and military action had been advocated by crusade lobbyists since the late thirteenth cencury, notably by the Venetian theorist, Marino Sanudo Torsello, in his Liber secretorum fdelium erucs (6. 1306-21)" One would expect this trend to be given fresh impetus by the developments of the mid- to late fifteenth century. Contemporaries were acutely aware of the need to avoid further disasters like the defeat at Varma in 1444." In the derailed treatie that he offered tothe papal curia during Nicholas V's reign, the Milanese humanist Lampo Birago argued that cis could best be done not solely by studying the way the Turks organized their armies but also by learning from past mistakes: though his insight was vitiated by his focus on che Genoese defeat at Solgat in the Crimea in 1434, where they had fought not the Turks but the Taars.* ‘Commentators like Birago were aware of how innovative European war-making hhad become, and the resulting optimism is sammed up by the words that Gio- ‘anni da Taglacozzo placed in Mehmed ITs mouth following the rout of the ‘Menger, 398-401, no 6 5 400. * Volumen 214-17, Se abo Eun von Feasenlos, Der Heer im er Ze dein Solder tums, ence Ts Heaeren de Riche in er Landsehset ani, 1987) 173-7 "Males and Hale Milzey Orgeniation Conn, Laer, Michad lie, ‘Condor and Capeaosin Renisance ya DB. Thm, of, The Chale bor end the Deselspens of Mary (leiden an Bonen, 2003), 67-88. The 161 edon by Jeger Bongats ll dhe only one for Sanudoé tex but we have x ll gl we by Bete Locke Marino emule Toole. The Baok of be Sere ofthe Pail ofthe Crs (Faephar, 2077), ing. coomentary on Bonguss edn 816-19, ‘The Cand of Vara, 1443-4, Coli be (Alert, 2006 luian Daman, "Le dics Sola (Crimea) et mule el wat are lear snacimen. tak, Ephoment orton Reeruitmens and finance 103 sulta’s troops at Belgrade in 1456, Mehmed laments in alarm that his janissaies hhave been crushed by mere peasants, IF chee villeins can chase me away. what will proper soldiers be able wo do?” ‘This set the tone for most retrospective commen- tary on the events of 1456: Capiserano’s army, which all agreed was rag-tag, unpro- fessional, and poorly armed, was seen as a model for fucure crusaders in terms not oftheir miliary profile but of their fith. They had beea ‘county folk, equipped not with weapons but with faith and devotion, as Calixtus expressed it in Novem ber 1456.!In his lengthy 1460 description of the Turkish army at Belgrade, Tagliacozzo drew a comparison berween Mehmed'’s clic janissaries and the prov= sionasihived by staves like Milan and Venice. And che debates that had been conducted some months eatlier at Mantua had centred on military professional- ‘sm, which would derive from state commitments ¢o invest in Piuss vencure.™ Yet the Peloponnese proposal of 1459, which originaed with one of the most original crusade lobbyists of the day and was sanctioned by another,” indicates that the place of volunteering within the crusade that they aspeed to was more Important than this trend might lead us to suppose. There are, of cours, a range ‘of possible explanations for this, including the continuing pull of the pilgrimage clement within crusading, the constraints imposed by circumstances, and the pos: sibility chat recruitment through crusade preaching might be reconciled with mili- cary prerequisites. The holy grail of crusading enthusiasts was an army whose ‘combatants would synergize the training and skills needed ro defeat their formida- ble opponeats with the devotion which had carried the day at Belgrade, Most of the analysis tha follows will late ro people who took the cross or were otherwise recruited to fightin field armies planned vo execure agreed plans of action, as ex- ‘emplified by the Mantua model. But a point that must be made beforchand is chat the papal euia was willing to respond to peticions by granting indulgences directly to the inhabitants of frontier areas that were under miliary cheat from the Mus- lims. This did nor only apply to the Turks, In 1449 Nicholas V allowed the arch- bishop of Seville ro raise a force of crusading volunteers in the city to combat Moorish aggression; as in 1459, both combatants and theie sponsors were brought ‘within che remit of the indulgence.* "The frontier inthe Balkans benefited ina similar way on a number of occasions. In June 1463 Pius II made a grant, valid for eight moaths, ofthe fll indulgence to all Hungarians who, ‘with o withouc assuming the sign ofthe life-giving cross, helped to defend the river crossings of the Danube and Sava at their own or others’ ‘expense, Volunteers were to join ‘the Catholic army’ and to stop the Turks from © Glovanat Batista Fats, ed ‘Cingular intorn all vin «ala morte oS. Giovani ds Capeseans, Balin dle Dopatacione Abate aa pari see 3,2 O91), 7-58, 55. Tapa ce Hin og ag eed by dot Can is wnt ba alot tthe Bre Counde, og Rater the Monle HiseriaIbersolimten, Dk, 2 WBE NSE18 19, n0 214, at 118, ' "Relais, 757: gues alc Pevisionat var BIT Comment, Bk 3, hs 34-3, 219-25. Though i is Comment (Dk 3, ch, 176) Pus elimed shat he had only doe oto hurnoue Begarion: Besarionl molt dengue, cul ers cord et West Gobi Cartmbide, Misra dee Bude le rua on Bia (Vitoria, 1958), 647-8.104 Crusading and the Ottoman Threat getting across the rivers, thus breaking into Hungary iterioe™ The specificity in ‘he sext leads us to suspect lobbying and ic is probable chat the grant wes indeed made in response to a request from Matthias Corvinuss envoy, Bishop Albert of \Vesuprém, because Pius made other concessions on the same day; one granted in- dalgences for donations rowards building work at Veszptm, anda second empow ‘ered commissioners to investigate the ilicie occupation of Albert’ lands.» So itis likely chat Matthias had judged it worthwhile to secure the indulgence to help mobilize local volunteers to hold the all-important river crossings agains the Turks. In 1469 Paul Tl avceded to a request from Frederick Il chat the inhabitants of the county of Mérding and cheir neighbours in Carniola (Krain, now Slovenia) could win «plenary indulgence for fighting for three months against Turkish raiders; the grant was necessary because these communities had enjeyed peace for so long that theit way of life had become thoroughly demilitarized, o they needed encourage meat to build up che military skills again. Similar ‘home guacd! style measutes| featured amid the endless discussions about the best way 0 deploy imperial resources against he Turks in the last quarter of the century. The author of one undated proposal in NUroberg’s archives entered into intricate detail on the sub- ject, outlining «system of coloused croses (red, whit, and yellow) corresponding to the severity of the threat. Militarizing frontier communities like Mottling was one way of securing border defences another was to give that responsibilty to groups of devout combatants ‘who had dedicated themselves to it It was this time-henoured practice that gave birch to chat remarkable chameleon of Habsburg crusading endeavous, the Onderlftatcrnigy of St George. Frederick Ill founded the Order of Se George in 1468/9 on the model ofthe Teutonic Odes, with its base at Millstat in Carinthia (Raeen, now southern Austra). Its fering progress is apparent from a papal grant of 1487 that allowed serving brethren from the Order of St John and the Teutonic Onder co ransfer to the Order of St George to improve its devotional life. The Order staggeted on to its dissolution in 1598 More successful, or at least more in evidence, was the associated fraternity or society of Sc George chat ‘Maximilian established in 1493 and which remained dose to his heact through- ‘out his reign, We have already sen it Functioning asthe showcase for his crusad- ing aspiradons, buc it is important ao to consider the military role that Maximilian intended i t play. These are most to the fore in the fracernity’s stat tures, which were ratified in September 1493, Maximilian became aware of the problems faced by his father’s Order when he recovered Wiener Neustad from the Hungarians in 1490 and on Christmas Day 1490 he received the insigaia of the English Order of che Garter before hearing mass in the Church of St George in Wiener Neustadt. This provided the chivalric contex for the 1493 statutes: the rnilitary background was the caastrophic defeats suffered by the Croatians in the summer of 1493. » YIM 2378, 00363. Td. 2378-80, non 565. 2 Thid, 2408-9: 0 583. Niner cree, ed ser, 88-108, a 89-90. 2 Kalle, Der Si, George Rlueronde, pein, Recruitment and finance 105 Josef Plésch argued that Maximilian’ plan was to use the fraternity to keep the situation in the east stable while he dealt with the French. This is plausible and is certainly reflected in the content of the statutes. They announced that the master and brethren of the Order had informed Maximilian that they desperately needed assistance, What was proposed was a fortress on the frontier (Brefice/Rann, in Carniola, not far from Métding) holding berween 2,000 and 3,000 armed. men, and reinforced by volunteers who would serve for shor: spells. There would be a register of members, who received a variety of secular privileges from Maxitalian and religious ones from Alexander VI. As Piosch put i, the faterity’s job was the well-defined one of providing frontier defence (eine Ar bewaffneven Grenaschut- 23). Br this prograrame made no more progress than the Order of St Geozge had done. In mid-November 1494, with characteristic volatility and perhaps under the spell of Burgundys chivalric uaditions, Maximilian stecred his fraternity in a wholly different direction. He now associated its members—vho he hoped would flock to his standards fiom the whole of Christendom—with plans for an offensive ‘eampaiga against the Tus (publicwm et apertum bell). I-would be coramanded by himself would begin in March 1495 and las for ewo yeas. In one sense noth ing had changed: in 1494 as in 1493 Maximilian’ first and main target was the French, and it was no coincidence that his printed manifesto of 15 November was followed exactly a week later by Charles VIII's own crusede manifesto, issued at Florence on his march to Naples. These were opening salvoes in a long war of propaganda. Thece is no evidence that potential dd exist for mobilizing chivalic ‘energies fora cost-effective defence of the Austrian fronties, but if there was, ie was never tapped." Tels Philip the Good's crusading programme that best demonstrates how asp tions for a more professionalzed crusade co-existed with diverse and sometimes discordant methods of delivery. Documents issued by Philips court reveal thatthe duke expected to play a central role in bringing the Burgundian contingent into being: cexs written in 1457 and 1463-4 spelled out the numbers of ‘lances (i.e ‘combat teams) 0 be recruited and how their personnel would be split between the two Burguncles and the Low Countries. Their costs, embarkation, provisioning, and equipment were similarly addcessed in detail, and the crucial issue of assem bling Philip’ aralery was entrusted in 1463 to the Lord of Morcui.® The force ‘envisaged in the ducal texts, around 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot, was the same as that promised at Mantua in 1459. Bue the extent and character of Philips concti- bution to the crusade was shaped by a range of other expectations and frees, some % See Pinch, ‘Der St. Georgtnerodei, pain. More bundy, se WieleckerPedbaber, ‘Maxima 44-7 Rey documents are A fot 42,215, 1135-6, 3772, 2982, 2984-5; Dawe Reihapabin.. 1495, 101-6, 108, 112, 114-16 © Noman Fiouey. Crussding and State Buin nthe Middle Age in Peter Hoppenbrouwers and others eds Power end Poston Egy onthe of Suc Buing i Hoearof WP Block: {Tagnhor, 2010), 291° 308, a 301 "Hi Stein, Un diplomat bowgiignon da XVe sce: Antone Hones’ Bibltyue de ‘Bae deere, 98 (1937), 282-948, 4315. In 3 despech enc in Febery 1435 2 Milanese aay refered tp te 10,000 combats, inching 6,000 scene Cerin ipbmei, 1 23-6, 902106 Crnsading and the Ortoman Threat external and some intemal. We shall see later that Philip's famed enthusiasm for the crusade caused his. to be pulled into Hunyad's fantasy plans of 1455 to the extent of providing 20.000 soldiers.” Rather more pressing were obligations that were agreed with Pope and empire. As noted above, Philip reached agreement with the Pope on what he would provide at Mantua, though his envoy argued that he had consented to only one year’s service, not three. And, as an imperial prince. Philip was party to the rather eccentric proposal (edule) passed at Regensburg in 1454 that reeruitment ‘or the crusade should be based on groups of hearths, each of which would provide combatants. The uke went through the motions of 2p- plying the seeduda to his lands, sending Simon of Lalaing to Charles VIL at the end fof November 1454 to get Charles permission ro enforce it in teitories that lay within che kingdom of France.” ‘A more important impact on recruitment was exerted by social forees chat were internal 10 Philip’ lands. Ae the Feast of che Pheasant in April 1454 Philip had deployed chivalric theatre to costal some of his leading nobles ino supporting his crusade, and thet assistance in the process of receuitment was expected and wel- comed: various texts written in December 1463 expected a high percentage ofthe combatants to accompany those who had sworn to help in 1454, ‘through devo- tion, tha i t0 say by those who made vows and who will want 0 go on the said don as volunteers (volunrairement.3* Then there was the urban culeure of| Philip's Flemish lands, which helped to shape their collective response to crusade preaching, just a it furnished the milieu for che preaching itself and the elaborate civic processions that often accompanied it. Ghent provided a contingent of eighty erucesignati under the command of Hector Hughes. Their names and equipment were carefully noted in the town's journal. The mea who set out from the licle town of Axel went through an elaborate ceremony of blessing before their deparvure. The fect that they sported the ctoss of St Andrew shows their pride in their political allegiance, but ie is questionable whether they made up an ‘verily ‘ducal’ body of recruits. Ghent and Axel were perhaps atypical in cheiz careful organization: Jacques du Cleee commented disparagingly on the groups of ten, ewenty, oF forty individuals who set off from Burgundian lands in 1464 ‘without captains, some of them with litte money or milicary equipment, and ‘on foor’. The result ofthese aristocratic and urban contributions was that the impressively streamlined force assembled through and by ducal authority, which ‘we-witness in documents issued by Philip's bureaucrats, was in various respects different from what came about in 1464. This in curn surely differed from the force that would have set out under ducal command, had Philip not yielded to French pressure 10 remain at home. F AM,12295. Sco, 'Un dplomate 315. 2 See Cidee diplomatic, 2193-5, no 260, for one contemporary’ perception of Pip ewofld songebaons at mpeil vas and ens "Spal Ls dep. 138 spectving one man-atarm for each acy heads and one archer for exch ire igter tes chan thse decreed st Repensbur, The plan may ave been co commute serge oa: Gare dpa, 29-6, no 2. Pao, Ler de, 528-3%, th qoote e331. Ibid 71-2 Recruitment and fnance 107 4.2. VOLUNTEERISM AND MILITARY SERVICE IN HUNGARY Both the eclectic character of the Burgundian dominions and Philip’ Giluce to carry through his programme act as constraints on what these sources can teach us. ‘A more revealing terrain for analysis is the kingdom of Hungary and ics satllice lands. Given their frontier status, it was inevitable that chese tecrcories would provide more evidence for military activity even though the erusading contribu- tion made by Matthias fll short of the hopes vested in him. Ic is impossible to avoid giving a good deal of arention to the most substantial army of cruceignaci raised in this period, the one recruited and led by Giovanai da Capistrano. But it rakes sense to set the sensational events of 1456 in a broader context, above all to ask how it was envisaged thatthe services of such eraceignar, whether Hungarians ‘oF foreigners, would mesh with plans o defend the kingdom by more established and familiar processes.™ The best starting point for such an enquiy i the imperial dliets that convened in 1454~5 ar Regensburg, Frankfurt, and Wiener Neustadt. ‘The three assemblies won fame forthe splendour of the oratory that was deployed by Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini and others erying to secure assent for at imperial army chat would assist the Hungarians in defending Chistendom’s acknowledged antemurale, By the time of the Wiener Neustadt diet (Febeuary-April 1455) chat project was patently foundering and, while the major impediments were the lack of commitment of Germanys princes and the camshackle imperial constitution, the turmoil of Hungary's domestic politics did not help: Hungary's envoys pleaded with good reason for German miliary might, though they were well aware ofthe fears of their kingdoms baronial elce that this could assist Laila V co ser royal authority more vigorously: But this ultimately sterile oratory was accompanied by ‘eusade preaching cartied out by Capiserano, Capicalizing on the fame that he had accumilated since arriving north of the Alps in 1451, Capistrano suspended his ‘conversion work in the Bohemian crown lands to preach the crusade in a number ‘of German cowns. He was urged by Piccolomini to attend che Frankfurt diet and preached there to good effect. Other religious assisted, for example the Francis ‘can, Bernhardin of Ingolstadr, at Legnica (Liegniez Silesia) in June 1454," and the Dominican, Heinrich Kaltesen, in the Rhineland.” But Capistaso was the sar. » Sec Gl ids, May Reforms ah lh Cony ni Vegan Ble K Kus ed 4 Alinta of Haein ay en a 1 942 ep “he Sate ap Mary Albin fee aps 1980-15800, 0 Wea Ti le seen Woe 96-10. A teal ew Bk Pd, 161-78. Lote ag pf ARE pts 3-8 0081013 46 bce tc heh colo had ge Cp ce oP, apn 35071 Drees ne Thoma it, "Wen ten, ede Tael.” Die Then In de splenic che Stone Nodal n Fn len of, uefa Be ‘in ner mcr, Et itech Fachang Boch Get 97 imate108 Crading and the Ortoman Threat Teis likely that the hundreds of erucesignati who eventually marched out of Nasa berg and Vienna had raken the cross in response co his preaching thete in the autumn and winter of 1454-5. The resule was that over the course of 1455 lange ‘numbers of Getman and Austrian cracesgnari were preparing for action. They may swell have asked themselves how they would discharge their vows if no imperial expedition took shape; and their dilemma would be resolved not by the strategic programmes that were debaced at the dies, but by the progiess of events in Hungary. ‘At Nmberg in November 1454 Capistrano was undecided whether ro recura to his work of conversion in central Europe, which was deat to his heart, oF carry ‘on with his preaching in the empire, proceeding onwards to Hungary to promote resistance to the imminent Turkish invasion. Responding to divine guidance, he chose the latter option and, following the frustrations of the Wiener Neustadt det, fttended the Hangazian assembly at Raab (Gy6r) in June 1455, Two lowers that he ‘wrote from Raab to Pope Calixtus III take us to the heart of his thinking in the DMtermath of imperial failure. In the frst, he urged the new Pope in excited but generalized terms ro be more proactive than his predecessor in driving the crusade Forward, and promised his own services to that end." In the other, he reported the cexttavagant undertakings made by che celebrated naivode (governor) of Transylva- nia, Janos Bunyadi, to expel Mehmed Il from all of his European provinces, and even to recover Jerusalem, if he were provided with an army 100,000 strong. This force would consist of 20,000 horsemen supplied by Calixtus, 10,000 by che king of Aragon, 10,000 by the rest of ltaly, and 20,000 troops (half hors, half foot) by Philip the Good. ‘The remaining 40,000 troops would derive from the despor of Serbia, George Brankovics (10,000), Hunyadi himself (10,000) and che rest of “Hungary (20,000), Alfonso of Aragon would also be expected to provide the indis- pensable naval support. The whole force muse be professtonal, ‘wartioss...1ot youths (puer), bat vigorous men, experienced inthe use of arms. They would only require wages for three months, and Calixeus should sead a cardinal 3s i were © preside over the army with sufficient money fo cis purpose fr the remainder of the campaiga, which was expected to last ‘for one or mote yeas, as the work de~ mands, they could live off goods and lands seed from che Turks. Indeed, beside recovering the lost lands of the southern Balkans and Palestine, and spreading che faith, the army would come into the possession of ce “riches ofthe infidels." Ieis tempting to dismiss Hunyadi’s ofer, made on 21 June ‘her, inthe presence ofall these lords and barons’, asa grandscanding attempt to seal a march on bis ‘val, Ulrich of Cll, and on the absentee king Ladislas.* The hero of Varna and the ‘long campaign’ of 1443 not only offered to defend the kingdom, but claimed Hole, Kopnnen, 2321-2, 324-5, 3304, 415. sgecaly ooteworhy ate the sever hundred sealents at the Uniertyof Vienna who took the eos (bid 2931 and note 79) ad the 800 or [fous eho eventually stout rm Nien (bid. 2413) Lodo Ciel endsed about the 600 ‘Eee wir he compara with Leonidas Spartans De expedition i papa. GZ, ISN 33,905, 56-3. Ait 120857. AD, 12.2924 1 For the langatan domes context ce Eng, Rely, 288-95 Recriment and finance 109 that he could achieve every possible item on che wish list of crusading enthusiass like Capistrano and Calista, and without che need for more than three months? financial backing. In ls way it was as cynical an exercise of showmanship as much of the debating at the rexent imperial debates had been. But it would be unwise simply to ignore Hunyad's proposal, because complacency was not an option for ‘Hungary asic was for che empire. In 1455 Hungary was threatened, Serbia alzeady under atack, and Flunyadi had spene much of his adult life fighting the Tarks ‘Most importantly, while most ofthe vaivedrs dream evaporated, over the course of ‘the yeas chat followed pacts of ic were realized in campaigns or resurfaced in plans that were led and hatched by Hunyadi and his son, Marthias. In its combination of altruistic aspiration, golitcal game-playing, and strategie good sense, the pro- pps is one of the periocs most interesting and emblematic texts. Inthe immedi ate context of recruitment, two points should be made. The fists that forall the proposals high-flying rhetoric, on miliary practicalities ie was sound: a its core there lay Hunyadis own ‘following’ (banderium) of approximately 10,000 expe ‘enced fighters, a clear emphasis on the need for trained combatants (nan puer), and a readiness address—albet ina rather sketchy fishion—the need adequately to fund such an army. The second pointis that when itbecame apparent that Fiun- gaty’s chronic politcal divisions were hindering the mobilization ofthe kingdoms resources by its governing elites, Capistrano reverted to preaching the erusade in the same inclusive manaer that he had practised hitherto. In his strenuous tour of Hungary's western counties in the summer of 1455 and of Transylvania during the winter of 1455-6, he seems to have ignored the practicalities highlighted by Hun- yadi at Raab, The outcome was that he brought to besieged Belgrade in the crisis summer of 1456, an army of erucergnati that Hunyadi, in despait, judged wholly unfi for purpose. “To assess how far this paradox was appreciated by leading contemporaric, itis important to examine their response to events as ehey unfolded in 1456, Calixtuss appoincment of Cardinal Juan Carvajal as his legate to Hungary in the summer of 1455 meant that papal policy was mediated within the kingdom and the dangers that flowed from Capistrano’ exuberance might be contained. The hierarchy that ‘vas established found visible expression at Buda on 14 February 1456 when Cap- istrano received from the legates hand the cross that Calixtus had sent, together ‘with the authority to preach ‘both by papal brief and by che commission ofthe said lord cardinal’. In a Jewer vo Capistrano written from Ladishs's court at Vienna, Carvajal had already made clea his aspiration to send on campaign an army that ‘would incegrae sizable contingents contributed by the various individuals identi- fied by Hunyadi ar Raab, with groups of volunceers who came ‘some out of devo- tion and others for honous. The danger was likly co be not insufficient recruits © Sethe deine sadly by Jann Hof, "De Ste on Bal 456, Hr ‘51 (1931), 163-212. “ 'e “ Seto Pipa 2.1656. 1 Fane, 790 aod i Captranos commeruy AM, 12.74, Navy he css became 2 cent Sako Andis The Mince of Job Cpunen Baap, 200), 6=-7-—_-Ro,~RORN, no Grusading and the Orman Threat ‘but a shortfall in che supplies necded to sustain them: a wise comment given the poor yield ofthe 1455 harvest! ‘Carajl mus have reaiod already hat gven the discord within the kingdoms ruling site, he would need the services ofthe volunteers, If he retained any ill- sions, they were dispelled by events at che Buda diet of February-Match 1456. Both the king and Hunyadi atrended, but the stivodeartived late and with astrong escort, The deere that was passed lewjing 2 speciied numberof fighting men on ‘groups of households” resembled the proposal adopted at che Regensbur dein 41454 and stood no more chance of success. On the other hand, Capistrano’ daily crusade preaching in the capital drew crows of adanirers and added to the rese= sir of eucaignai: The new recruits were mixed buach, ‘very many prelates and barons. -fand} a multitude of les folk as Capistrano informed the Pope They ‘were sent home with orders to await a surimons to the from; the plan was for an army to march southwards once supplies could be eelied upon, at the start of ‘August Then came the news of Mehmeds advance on Belgrade, Hunyadi was the abvious candidate to take charge ofthe kingdoms defences, Capistrano trav- clled south and preached in the deasely populated region around Pécs (Quingweec- Sten), from wheve recruits could most rapidly teach the combat zone. Carvajal ‘enained forthe most part at Bud, to organize the crusders gathering cher; in the ligh of the eri the eater plan co wait forthe 1456 harvest was seaside ‘We have a number of leers writen by Canal and Hunyadi from Apell dhuough to Jane and they show the two mien doing dei bes: wo work together and ‘vith Capistrano, ro spur onthe asembling of Hungary’ resources, The lassitude of che royal court was frustrating, and writing to Francesco Sforza on 17 April, Carvajal allowed his irtitation 10 show; behind his deployment of antemunale themes (this is not just a matter for this peat Kingdom) lay che harsh fact hat ‘Hungary's own defence mechanism was proving dysfunctional.” Inexorably the volunteer: moved from holding auiiary satus to comprising the main force. On 14 May Carvajal told Capistrano shez Huayadi was so dismayed by the calibre of che erusaders thar he witnesed when he met with che legate at Pecrovaradi, that he tol Carvajal to proceed no further les i demoralize de defenders and encour age the enemy. Delay and confoson ia Hungary might persuade capable Fzeign woluntets ro redirect chei energies ro Albania. Te legate reported a sighting of a French crusader a Venice making his way with fifty oxhers o ight with Iskandes- beg, and this could set a trend,” On 25 May he wrote from Buda to Capistrano about Hunyadis hopes thatthe preiche wotld stir up the southetn counties, and ant,12371 4 Festa oly Cingue esta 50: each 100 howstalds were 0 supply 10 men a arms and 2 For sald STAM, 123734. Resa ed "Relat, 752-3 © Coax dpbmatiu, 452-4, 90529. 2 Momameae tora Booniae od. Gelato Dobe, 6 ols Prague, 1764-85), 2419-17, Dovbis emalnel about te prospect of taiing + Inge force befor Angus Coder aplomatiow, 203, 20 2369 (8 jane spot oun Venice t Sora bid $62 90529. AM, 123RS-6, Recruitment and finance mL then join Carvajal in solciing help ftom Ladislas and Frederick. He was pessimis- sic: have said and suggested a lor of things here, bur got nowhere.” His gloom was not misplaced, Shortly afterwards Ladislas fled to Vienna, under cover of going hunting, and lingering hopes ofa general mobilization perished. Johannes Hofer believed chat those prelates and barons who had taken che cross notably at Buda in che spring, regarded the king’ fight as constiuting release from theit vows.” Canonically this made no sense, but he was right co sty that they took their cue from the king to retreat to thei fortified places, "Tagliacozzos comments were in- sightfil as well as judiciously balanced: “Many of the nobles and their retainers were signed with the cross, bur none, orto be more accurate, very few turned ups the reason being the Hungarian custom that they set out on campaign in their lords’ company, and the lords did not come.” It is 2 revealing passage, more so than Jénos Thurécey’s comment that they had fallen into a deep sleep.” What doonied Capistrano’ hopes of recruiting fighting men was not lethargy ofa lack ‘of devotion or patiotic feeling on theie part (a poinc ro which we shall recurn), but the breakdown of the hierarchical structure of obligation, stating atthe top. So pacuyzing was the kingdom’ factional division that che archbishop of Kalocs, ‘who was 2 bitter enemy of Hunyadi, refused to respond even when Capistrano went to se him.** Hence the defence of Belgrade was left to the three Johns, of whom one vociferously espoused a crusading approach, che second was through- cout sceptical about its viability” while the third, Carvajal, carried the burden of ‘making che volatile scenario work.® By the time Mehmed’s advance toops reached Belgrade on 3 July, ie was only the garrison under Michael Szilégyi (Hunyad’s brother-in-law), Capistrano's crusaders, and the troops avaiable co Hunyadll thar counted for anything.® Even Capistrano, who was normally discrete about Fiungary's internal afar, allowed his anger to surface in a letter written that day to his close colleague the bishop of Assisi, Francesco Oddi: ifthe king, princes, barons, and prelates did not sir themselves and come south, of at least send troops, the Turks would soon be paying them a visi Capistrano’ recruits arrived in two phases: the ist, com- prising those who had assembled at Peveovaradin over the course of June under the care of Oddi, marched or sailed down the Danube, their advance guard id 12.386.7. Hol, apo, 2.69; "Die Prlaten und Barone heen sid demaach niche mehr en the Kicaaupsele gebunden, Raat 757 > Jaane de Thus, Chronic Hengaorum, ed Hisabeah Gantt and Jus Kl, 2 vol, Bibliodses sedptouun medl recniaque sevoru, series nor, 7-9, Budapest, 1985-8), c. Prank Marto se Jinn Thorens Chronic of te Hangar, Tndang University Uric and Ala See 58 (Bloomington IN, 1991}, 250, eh 758-5; Hole, Kaptan, 2377. ° Though Hunyadi himself hed ken the cos, perhaps 0 encourage is ellon-barons to do wo: Cader diplomas, 199-200, no 265, eg IbL.S67-9, no 332, © Far anempts to estmate the umber commanded by Hanysd, se Hofer, Kaper, 2.384 Jonggh Hel, Had Lend and Reasy New York, 1983), 1667 des dpm, 865-7, n0 S31, eed in, Rela 753.m2 Crusading and the Ottoman Threat arciving one day ahead of the Turkish scouts, In response to Capistrano’ urgent ‘summonses to his brethren, the barons, and prelates other groups later joined them in the crusade encampment that was set up a few kilometses south-east of ‘Zemua (Semin), where the River Sava joined the Danube. Eventually reaching around 60,000," their numbers exceeded several times over the professionals commanded by Hunyadi and Suilégyi. The Turkish blockade of the Danube meant that Canajal’s earlier concerns about shortages of food were moze than justified, at least until the blockade was broken on 14 July: and even after that there was plague to concend with. It was a crusade of the poor, but moze im= portantly one of che ill-equipped and untrained,® a point on which the sources agree even when due allowance is made for exaggeration. Tagliacozz0 in partict- Jar is admirably precise: All chose who assembled wete commoners, country fll, poor people, press, secular ‘rics students, monks, flrs of various orders, mendicants, members of che third Seder af St Francs. and hermits. Among them you saw few weapons, except for thei eainen; we naw no horses, except thore carrying provisions, and no lances. Those ‘pho wore armour resembled David, armed by Saul sguinst Goliath. There were los of Treords, cudgel sling, stale of the type thar shepherds cazry and everybody had a shi [Naurally the crusaders possessed no artillery, though this mumed out to be less problematic than their lack of horses; this means that they could nox engage in che pursuit ofthe fecing Turks alter their viwory on 22 Jly:# Hunyadi remained the Teading sceptic. The doubs about their military capability, which Carvajal reported the uaivode expressing in mid-May, was frequently reicerated,”® to the extent of his ‘counsellingon 21 July that the defence of Belgrade should be abandoned, and then swithdeawing o his ship on che Sava.” Although this led the crusaders to despise him? ie was a thoroughly rational move. What he was working with at Belgrade ddd not deserve che name of an army; these were the very pueri against whom hhe had counselled at Raab a year earles”* “Thanks to Hofer’ painstaking reconsteuction of events at Belgrade, itis clear that viccory was achieved primarily by Capistrano’ crusaders, norwithstanding 8 758-5 ag a en gn ne “Terapia 2.37 ol e162) 7 ommend 2 Rt, 760,P-6 Geree pear of proce Fee been cand nde esi ora dnc sm inode by Sind, bur ae eBienceangi edn he tpace frie henry one in ans 159. Mie es fake Male Repl of nary Vbrne 14581090; e an. fon M Bak 0 Tet ace 1990 i fos yer sD ie Mite Por Haogcy lee 1064 I 6-00; Baa TTR sande he sual ead page on 782 © Fea ods Cngue een, 35 Ce plas 210-13, 5 Fed 758 ving te ston ober of he ee nme 2 ee Ne et i th set, 130-2, Gena pot sting 13) tate usd would evel aye hey ned hve ugh. °F ter ‘De Sega 198, isbn on di ve Recruitment and finance 13 [Hunyadi’s immediate campaign to marginalize them.” Thete success was extraot- dinary and severe problems on the Tuckish side must have contributed a good deal. But the tlie of Belgrade was only onc episode in the defence of Hungary, and Capistrano’ erusade preaching had repercussions that lasced well beyond July 1456, Tagliacozzo eelates that the crusaders who foughe at Belgrade were mainly Hungarians: chere were some (nonnull) Germans, Poles, Slavonians (ie, northern Croatians), and Bosnians, but itis evident that the majority of those who had taken the cross outside Hungary did not have time to reach Beigrade.”* On 23 July Capistrano dismissed the victorious crusaders, pardly because of the build-up of resentment against Hlunyadi, buc also because of continuing supply problems ands pethaps, concezns that the unburied corpses would spread infection. Tagliacozzos brusque comment on the event, ‘inthis way the crusade was dissolve i mislead- ing, Behind i ics his irritation atthe veto that had been imposed the previous day co pursuit, with the result that a precious opportunity was fst. But while he was surely mistaken in his view of whar the victors might have gone on to achieve, he was not alone in his disappointment, On 29 July Carvajal appeared with fresh and berer-equipped crusiders, including cavalry. Irwas the vanguard of the large force ‘thar was taking shape ac Buda and, in che leer that he wrote to forza on the same day, the legate could not cootain his chagrin thas, ifthe Turks had delayed their rack for just afew more days, this powerful Christian army would not just have defeated them but followed up its success with a determined pursuit.” What could they be given to do now, co get them away fom Zemur's inadequate and insan- tary facilities and food shortages?” In a leter to the Pope written on 17 August, Capiscrano revived Hunyads 1455 project for an advance into Tarkish-held ter tory that would press onwards tothe recovery of Jerusalem. For this, Calixtus was asked to send 12,000, or ar the very leat 10,000, cavalry ‘paid wages by you fol- lowing Italian practice’. These professionals would join forees with the crusaders and the Hungarians. The Ialian mercenaries would only requice pay for six months; thereafter they would be rewarded with plunder.” In his reply on 16 September CCalixtus embraced the idea with enthusiasm.” Such a project would of course rake ‘month to assemble; ie was no solution for she crusaders who were kicking cheir haels at Zemun, But by this point che plague was ateady intervening: Hunyadi fll viim on 11 August, and Capistrano followed on 23 October “The onus of esponsibility for organizing the contribution of the crusaders now fell largely wo Carvajal. Ie was a thankless task. Hofer commented that ‘Carvajal svat weder ein Hunyadi noch ein Kapiseran," but well-informed concemporaties % Momonensa historic, 2417-184 AS Or, 382-3; Codes diplomat, 208-9, 0 276. ° Reported ro sere fod shortage sche Tush camp, cuslag hwy loses of mien and hows demoiinason, and desertion: be 204-5, no 273, 463-71, a0 538 Clee, Det Siege 2s Reais 765 The Fecch crass whom Carajl metioned in hie M May leer seem thave beep ural La miking his way co he fon la Vee, * Cade diplomatic, 209-10 99273. Tid 217=18, 0 294 (cpa datd 12 Sepecmber: seals ibd 469-71, no 833. 7 ASO, S84 Tb 384-5, Hole, Kapono, 2.42114 Cousading and she Ottoman Treat admired the way he handled che Hungarian legaton," and in the absence of a ‘Turkish invasion co provide a focal point, coping with unpredictable numbers of German volunteets would have taxed the most brilliant of strategists. A returning. crusader wrote home to Salzburg from Vienna on 26 August 1496 that shere were still many crusaders both there and at Buda, but they were aot being given any inseeuctions2 This lly was « missed opportunity, because these arrivals were _mumerous, wel equipped, and enthusiastic. Castiglione, writing from Vienna three days later, wrote of no fewer than 6,000 ‘wellarmed men’ taking ship to Buda ‘within thece days An authoritaive report compiled at Buda a month ealiee Confirms this impression: even the 700 students from the University of Vienna ‘were ‘well equ'pped’.* A worsening ofthe kingdoms factional divisions soon made the situation yet mote problematic forthe volunteers, who got caught up In the strife, When King Ladisla finally made the journey southwards 10 Belgrade in caly November, he broughe many of the German crusaders with him. The king ‘and Ulrich of Cill exerted pressure on Ladislaus, Hunyad’s elder son, ro surrender fortresses and revenues that his facher had succeeded in holding onto when he sus- rendered the regency four yeas previously. In the citadel at Belgrade, which a few weeks previously had neatly been lost to the Turks thanks to iacernal disputes, che ‘ame disputes took a violent turn and Ladislaus had Cilli murdered. The king and the legate had to allow the Germans to leave for home and, according ve a report sent to Sforza from Venice in December, che message they took with them was ‘one too good: not only had they seen no action against the Turks, but they had been robbed and in some cases murdered by their hosts. Hence ‘they went home in the worst fame of mind, determined never to recutn, thanks to the awful way thar they had been treated by the Hungarians. ‘In asassinating Cli, Ladislaus had overstepped the mack; the king succeeded in gerting both him and his younger brother, Matthias, arrested and Ladislaus was executed at Buda in March 1457. The fortunes of the house of Hunyadi seemed ‘extinct, but in fice they soon enjoyed « phoenix-like revival. For in November 1457, the king died prematurely and without an heir, and in January 1458 Matthias suc cession was engineered by a party that included Michael Szilégyi and Cardinal Carvajal” Given sich turbulence we would expect the crussde to have stalled. But realty was more comps in particular, there are grounds for believing tbat in 1458 the presenge of causadcry om the southern frontier was fully at marked chad heen in 1456, Themain reason why the momentum, buile up in 1454-6, did not simply tail off was Calixtus II's resolve to continue bringing Hungary into the heart of his lmprsia cruiate® The thecat 9 Belgrade remained serious and one kingdoms problems could not be allowed to derail the mighty effor that Calixtus was plan- Ding, In Apri 1457 he wrote to Carvajal ro say that, notwithstanding che turbulent © Ammannat Piclomini, Commentar, 385, Hofer, Kapismen, 2412. % Coder dipomains 216, 00291. © Tbid 468-71, no 53, 1 bid. 226-17 no 300, CE Thomas Ehendore, Chronic repo Romanorn, ed ard Zi mernann, pt 2, GH SRG nova sero XVI (anne, 2003) 851; Hofer, Kaplan, 2821-2. Tg Red 296-9, VAMH, 2208-5, no 460, or he pase Recruitment and finance us situation, the legate was to persevere in promoting the crusade: ‘Work for unity, prac he cg with de cos bat Gl wih provided hat with yout asistance the king and his people oppose the enemy ofthe cross manfully.”” ‘Belling coum cae ilo pig ost hae sionable destination as Stephen Thomas, the king of Bosnia, and in the spring of 1457 he sent Jacopo delle Marche yo succeed Capistrano in preaching the crusade in Hungary.” Crusade preaching was promoted as vigorously as cirsumstances a- lowed not justin Hungary but also in Basnia, Serbia, and Dalmatia, nd volunteers ver aie sough” Calls asa fim ble Ina ned econ of ane tcees and donations: some front could always be found for crcesgnat 0 fight in eae ialeusellgg thy pdt hovel eins ro jusc the viewors of Belgrade but those of Mytilene were held up by th Pope 2s shin- ing examples of Christian devotion.” By the autumn of 1457 Calixas had hopes of act in Hangar Albania ad Bos: th son of hee fll nha be vi constantly dreamed of, even though ic meant splitting crusade subsdies (and pos- Shy volunteer) thee waja™ One month bere Lass deat, Poli ‘wrote on Calixcus’s behalf urging che king to maintain the momensim acquired a year earlier at Belgrade: ‘When the enemy fles, pursue him; when be falters, assall him; when his spirits Bag, atack him.” Like bis legate, Calintus warmly backed Marthis’s candidature and harboured great expeciations of this son of Hunyadi.™ “The Pope may have hoped for Jerusalem but in 1458, asin 1456, itwas the threat to Belgrade thar generated activity A renewed artack on the fortress was expected in the spring, and in March Saligy wrose to Carvajal asking him so ale all hose who sul had vows to full to avait Szlégyis summons to make thei way southwards.” In April che Venecian envoy, Petrus de Thomastis, wrote ro the doge from Buda that Carvajal had to persuade the new king to set aside his suspicions of Germans s0 as to renew the flow of crusaders from the empire; it was hard enough persuading them to come after the reception they had received in 1456." Through the summer and autumn of 1458 de Thomasis’s despatches yield 2 ewaling an, at times, col- ‘usful pierre of crusaders numbering several thousand assembling st Buda, and of «range of isues relating other southwards movement. [tis clear that the Hungar- ian army that mobilized in 1458 included a high proportion of crusaders, arly in July some 200 were caprured in a skirmish neat Belgrade?” A despatch written on 1 October. and reporting Hungarian victory, claimed that ‘they say that more than 25,000 erucesignati have artived in camp, with moze joining them each day; every hour they come dowa the Danube by boat from the north, in a way that seems © Bid, 2287-8, no 450, and ae too 2281-3, 0 445-6 > Ibid 2291-2, os 36-7, 294-6, non 450-2. 9 Ib. 7256-9, pos 464-8, and cf 2.327, no 501 (Pius elowing sme pole 1459) 7 6g AN 12.5767 (eign hog of Nap). BENSZ,181-5, no $59, D842, no 1272, 42D Foe Mylene sc Seton Papas, 2188-9. For women fhtiog t Belgrade sce Fo, a, Clogue lesen 53, Taglacomo, Ra, 774 MH, 2303, os 172-3 ane Se Pheclomind Ser opra nei, 130-3, 0 60, 133, 8 (ME, 230911, 90 479, CE MBE, 119-21; no Isat 2 Gael at Bud. P Ibis L1S-16,n0 10. bid 119-21, m0 14. Coder diplomat, 237, no 326ee 16 Chusading and the Ottoman Threat ‘miraculous. The queen was personally oversceing the puschase of horses and sup- plies (boweall, wine, which was in shoct supply, and ‘hese people do not male wat fwithout wine). Bighe days lave de Thomasiis wrote chat the Turks had retreated inuo Serbia. The excitement was remackable: che whole ream seemed to be on the move and ‘Ldo believe that there will be more than 80,000 people counting horse nd foot, above all ehanks ro the large number of crucsignati, who as peasants (vilen’) may not seem ro count for much, but possess some value against the Turks sho include alot ofthe same sor’. Ar the end of November the Milanese envoy Yc Venice reported to Sforza thatthe Turks had decided nor to engage in combat gains the king with s0 many people and crucesignari a Belgrade’ "The 1458 campaign lacked a Capistrano, a Tagliacozzo, and, above alla victory as exceptional as the celief of Belgrade. Because of this, it has rather more to cll us about how volunteer service meshed with standard processes of mobilization in Hungary, when factional disputes did not gec in the way-"* A despatch from de “Thomas writen on 25 August succinedy portrayed the system at works at the kings command the fighting lice were mobilized, wages for an anticipated thiee- month campaign were set, and Carvajal was requested so organize the eructig- part. "The Italian envoys despasces point vowards the large army that assembled, “G Barony come Zentilhomini et Cruct Segnati, as de Thomasis put i in Sepeem- ben) comprising people who responded partly oat of duty and partly for devo ‘ional reasons—‘some from love and some from fear’ to cite de Thomasils again “The fear may well have been as much of the king as of the Turks. Two years earlier the ‘barons and ‘genclemen’ had sought refuge in their castles and councry ears: jtwould have been ill advised co do so again, with a young kingon the throne who was mindful of the difcultes that his father had faced asa result. We might posit J overteaedon from some, coupled to a sense of excitement, even the hope of fanother 1456, inthe case of others. Bither way, ic made for an occasion that for diferent reasons turned out to be scarcely les arypical than the 1456 campaign. The army was C00 lange for its limiced purpose of driving the Turks aways is a sembly was too slow and unpredictable, and ic created major difficulties of supply: All problems traditionally associated with mobilization chrough crusade preaching, “They were not likely to rus, Because the conctibutory factors noted above would not and in any case, although successful preaching by Jacopo and Carvajal cannot be ruled out, 1 is more likely that the crucedgnas! of 1458 had taken the crose during Capisuano’s preaching in 1455-6, Buc iti not hard eo imagine che effect fon the young monarch. Irwas beter to ely on summonses, hiring troops, creating avcanding army.” or negotiating 2 trace with the Tucks all of which methods he jved, and the las of which he was suspected by the Talians of doing as his way out cof a troubling situation in the aurump of 1458." MDH, 136-7, 0025, Tid 136-9, 026. Hid. 199-40, n0 27, 2 Te 1-3, 4-3 rth decrees of ancy and June 1458. Cat rafts mesh, MDE, 135-6,0024. Thi 138-9, 1026 Sm Gyles “ihe Mesenaty Army of Keg Mahia Corvin ER, 125-40. Me MDE, 139-40, 9027. Tr Recruitment and finance uw Following the 1458 campaign Matthias had plenty of opportunity, over the course of his thiry-cwo-year reign to ponder on crusading and what its principal benefits were. We have witnessed the king expounding his stongly held views about his realmis antemunale satus and his entitlement 10 be supported by the Pope and the rest of Christendom. Thar support could usefully assume several forms financial backing, diplomatic leverage, the promotion and sustaining of aliances, But Mat- thias did not wane thousands of non-Hiungarian crusaders. In particular, as debates at numerous impetial diets and at the Mantua congress demonstrated, for the re mainder of te censuy the prospec of organized bands of German crusades making theie way through Hungary eo fight the Turks rised problems more troubling than those posed by their ancestors making their way to the Holy Land crusades. Ir was ‘more than just their need for guides, safe conducts, and fair prices." Might they not constitute a Habsburg fh column? The idea was nourished at Matthiass court that his brother, Ladistaus, had Cilli murdered at Belgrade in 1456 because his followers ‘convinced hire that the German crusaders inthe royal encourage formed che advance guard ofa plan to fil che kingeomi ofices with Germans." Iriseasy to see how the fear came about. After fleeing to Vienna King Ladisas had issued an appeal for vol- tuners in which he offered wages, one Hungarian florin a week fora horseman and. thirteen graschen fora footman.'” ies clear that many of those who responded {in- cluding no fewer than 800 at Breslau) were much beter equipped than Capistrano’s crusaders; and they took their orders from their paymasts, Ladisias.* And we have seen that Corvinian diserust of the Germans was reciprocated by the crusaders who hhad experienced Hungarian hospitality in 1456. ‘As for Hungarian erucesignari, there was at least one occasion afer 1458 when Matthias made use of their services, which was his spieited attempt to recover Bosnia in 1464. Inthe desperate leer that he wrote to Pius I in July 1464 plead- ing forthe campaign to gct off the ground, he included the preaching of the cru- sade among his demands."* When the campaign did start, Hungarian operations included a strong volunceer element: 2 Venetian report writen on 28 September referred to 7.000 eruceignas ina royal army 30,000-strong that crossed the Sava" Given the excitement generated by Ezechilir prophetae and Pinss ambitious plan- bing such a eugene of Hung volutes not ila, cough fenetian hopes that non-Flungarian erucsignasi coo might be packed off to hel Nae ee petted upon Reeds combat the Turks slipped down Macthias’ agenda, it may be questioned whether he placed much value on volunteer service, with the exception of border fighting, 1c was tse to have 1456 to refer to, because it advanced and exemplified Hungary's © Momiments Ksarica Boonie, 2413-15," Tauro, Chronic ch. 253, « Pear Bcheer Gabon der Sade Bren el. JG. Ranch, 2 vols Bnei, 1897-8), 1.28; Cade diplomatic, 2471, 0933 (Cis feof wages). rin a week or 4 per month, fort mune sli fom Geran nay ave been the saad ate (Comparing Evourbly withthe 3 ‘eted ote lighter oquipped Huntin, since rms quoted bythe din who wrote a rade Programmes 164; Maron, ‘La clsade en poets, sane TH Eandoeer, Chom uy, 850, 24K. 1 52-3, 0 40, ee Bore, 265: 17,000 hoe 6,000 Fos, 7.000 erase ° Ongedoucee Ae, 80-1, 0 18.18 CCrusading and the Ottoman Threat bulwark claims. Mathias made much of Capistrano and lobbied for his canonita- tion;!* and we have no reason ro doubt that he felt genuine devotion towards the preacher. But the 1456 relief had been anomalous in a number of respects and it fasta shadow over his father’ miliary record, [tis striking that inthe Olomouc fresco painced in 1468—which at 46 square mectes isthe largest surviving visual testimony to the battle of Belgrade—Capistrano is depicted more than life-size but the preacher’ famous banner, a symbol of command, has migrated into the hands of an armouced figure that almost cerainly represents Hunyadi. This divided but complementary leadership, with Capistrano providing spiritual inspiration and Hunyadi miliary command, probably represents the mature Corvinian interpreta ‘ion of 1456. It's exemplified by Jénos Thurécey’s account ofthe batt, in which “Hunyadi gives arousing speech to raise the spit ofthe garrison.” And it was not radically out of step with Rome’ view, in part because the curia wanced 10 nurture the erusading image of the gens corviniana. Te would be wrong to conclude from this that the Hungarian nobility were left cold by the idea of personally crusading, or that the king himself was nox susceptible co the image of the arblesa Christi There is evidence testifying to both. Recent Hungarian historians, such as Jeno Sais, bave played down the appeal of patriotic sentiment, and ic is true that the overall performance of Hungary’: fighting elite from this point through to the catastrophe at Mobées in 1526 docs not give much backing to the thesis of a ‘ational crusade? There was Hungarian catbusiasm for the crasade in 1443, a5 in 1458,"" As usual in crusading history, devotion jnterwove with other factors, such as line age and ambition, Tagliacozzo, an inquisitive and perceptive outsides, was under no illusions about he diversity of motivation that made Michael Szilagyi ight so tenaciovsly in 1456: ‘on account of the Christian faith, the kingdom, Lord Janos the vaivede, ro whom he was related...as well as by reason of his own honour and renown." Ocher Hungarian nobles may not have shared Suilégy?’s illustrious marital connection and high office, but they would certainly have been influenced by the atractions of honour fame, faith, and guaranteed wages. “There seems to have been a special kudos attached to fighting the Tutks. Admit- tedly, in provisions relating to military sesvice in legislation passed ia 1478 and 14865 they were listed alongside other likely enemies—Germans, Czechs, and Poles—vieh no atemps a diferetatin But Andi was surly correc in suggesting tha the popularity of Capistrano’s cult with che nobility detived i part fiom thelr revespetve honouring of what he had achieved fn 1456." 8 eg My 1-10-13, 90 8 lobbying In 1460, allegedly ax won as domestic creumseanecs permit i soce, Chance. ch, 250. ° eg, BF NS2.17, a0 210, 18-19, po 214, 161-5, no 383 Gnstuton of the Fas ofthe “Tapagurtion, Augas 457) 10 fend Sues Die Nation in ioc Non und Gece: Saudion = Cade of Varn, 113 La 3253, 41,67, 1 Sich und der nana Aspelt der Gschiche nis 9st), 1-160, a9. 88-5 ih 772 Andis The Miracles 392, eecting Tglcomo, Relais 795. Recratement and finance us Having said that, in this period's increasingly courtorientated culeure what counted for most was military service to the prince and, even in a universally accredited antemurale, this did not normaly entail taking the cross. Hungary does not appear to have had an equivalent to Philip che Good's Feast of the Pheasanc or Maximilian’ Society of St George. As for Matthias, the picture of the devout warrior that Andreas Pannonius drew of him in his Libelus de virew- sibus Marhiae was more or less what he wanted to believe, with is eelectie con- ation of dynastic, national, classical and scriptural exemplars and references." “The crusade was something to which he subscribed and aspired, but as in the ‘ase of his arch-enemies, the Habsburgs, it had «o compete for his artention ‘with much else 4.3 PIUS II, PERAULT, AND VOLUNTEER SERVICE ‘One of che contemporaries wito was most impressed by Capistrano’ achievement in 1456 was Piccolomini. When he became Pope cro yeas later he pressed on with Caliatus TI's crusading endeavours, moulding them in ways that sprang from his ‘own, distinctive views about the narute of crusading.” On volunteerism, these views seem to have developed overtime in parallel with changes tis everall pro- ‘gramme, His approach at Mantua in 1459 was that while an effective crusading response to the Turks had to be a collesive Christian enterprise the organization of individual contingents could be lef 9 states, each managing the contribution that it had agreed co make. To assist in funding these contingents, there would be a common levy of taxes and, writing o Philip of Burgundy in September 1459, the Pope made i clear thar he anccipated the proceeds being used to pay troops, with the help of chis measure the soldies’ wages can be paid’. This did nor rule out volunteers, and we have aleady observed duke and Pope alike making use of the services ofcrucesgnasi and responding positively tothe approaches of Gerard Dés- champs. It did, however, poine cowards state-managed systems of recruitment, ‘muster, payment, movement, and discipline, The First Crusade might be pressed inco service as an uplifting example but nor as military template and Pius’ read- ing of Capistrano's 1456 victory followed the ¢ fortiori model: if such a vierory could be won by an army of unteained and ill-equipped voluncers, how much ‘ore might be achieved by professionals, especially when they were supplemented by voluntecrs and inspired by ther religious conviction? As the Pope put it in Sep- timo iam exact mens, his closing address at Mantua on 14 January 1460, ‘there will be enormous contingents of Christians, and they wil be reinforced by bunds (cunei) of crucesignati, winose virtue, proved three years ago [sc in 1456] will uat- antee 2 great and byillan victory’ Ecelsiam Chris, the congresss summative crusading statement, issued on che same day, was therefore caditional in is treat ment of volunceers, addressing such essential issues as start date length of service ° Pamoniu, “bali pani, See Houle Pa I % Meas, ltd 4240017. Seroram cde, $8.119-20, 2116