Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal

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The balance of power in the governance of the

global maritime safety: the role of classification
societies from a habitus perspective

Raphael Lissillour & Dominique Bonet Fernandez

To cite this article: Raphael Lissillour & Dominique Bonet Fernandez (2020): The
balance of power in the governance of the global maritime safety: the role of classification
societies from a habitus perspective, Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal, DOI:
10.1080/16258312.2020.1824533

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/16258312.2020.1824533

Published online: 27 Sep 2020.

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SUPPLY CHAIN FORUM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
https://doi.org/10.1080/16258312.2020.1824533

The balance of power in the governance of the global maritime safety: the role
of classification societies from a habitus perspective
a,b a,c
Raphael Lissillour and Dominique Bonet Fernandez
a
Department Strategy and Management, IPAG Business School, Paris, France; bPost-doc at I3-CRG, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France;
c
CRET-LOG, Aix-Marseille Université, Marseille, France

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
In a context of growing risks and casualties, our objective is to understand the balance of Maritime safety; Bourdieu;
power in the governance of the global maritime chain. A Bourdieusian perspective on global theory of practice; habitus;
governance puts the stakes and conflicts of interest between actors and the domination classification societies; global
shipping chain governance
reproduction mechanisms at the centre of the analysis. We mobilise the four dimensions of
Bourdieu’s habitus concept to understand the importance of the classification societies in the
field of maritime supply chain governance: (1) shared tacit knowledge to safeguard their capital
endowment and reputation for quality, (2) a social disposition to enhance the value of
informational capital, (3) relational activities and lobbying, and (4) an historical position that
relies on close collaboration with national administration and with actors throughout the
industrial shipping chain. An exploratory field was led with major actors of the maritime safety
world to describe how classification societies benefit from the different forms of habitus to
sustain their leading role in the global maritime safety.

Introduction economy’ (Sang-Tae 2011). Shipowners may fail to

keep the ships in good condition or use ships for the
Over 80% of global trade is transported by sea and
longest time possible to maximise their profits at the
seaborne trade is historically increasing each year by
expense of safety. They may also negotiate low pur­
3% (Barki and Délèze-Black 2017). This strong growth
chase prices for new ships, leading shipyards to lower
in maritime traffic is not without causing incidents (Min
their construction standards. Shipyards may tend to
et al. 2014). According to the EMSA, over 20,000 mar­
deliver sub-standard ships in order to lower their
itime casualties and incident occurred between 2011
costs and optimise their margins. However, between
and 2017, among which 603 were considered very
shipowners and shipyards, a less visible actor could
serious (EMSA 2018). Mid-march 2019, The Grande
have a major influence: the classification societies.
America, an Italian cargo ship, sank in the Bay of
Classification societies are private companies, whose
Biscay in France, thus causing an oil spill onto the
mission is to certify the safety aspects of commercial
French coasts (Davies 2019).
ships all over the world.
Shipping, in the maritime context refers to ocean
The role of a classification society can be summed
transit, waterborne transport of goods through ships
up as follows: ‘a classification society sets standards for
from one port to another, including port approach and
the quality and integrity of vessels and performs surveys
departure (Munim 2019). Under these conditions, the
to determine whether vessels comply with the classifica­
industrial shipping chain comprises many different
tion society’s rules and regulations, national laws and
actors, including at least five main actors who may
international conventions’ (Walker 1996). Consequently,
play a role in maritime safety matters: shipowners,
they are involved in both standard setting and stan­
shipyards, charterers, insurance underwriters, and clas­
dard implementation. The standard setting function
sification societies (Lissillour, Fernandez, and Fulconis
occurs both internally, in the development of classifi­
2019). As their headquarters and physical assets are
cation society’s rules, and at the supranational level, as
movable across borders, these non-state actors chal­
they contribute to the development of international
lenge the states’ sovereignty by questioning their abil­
conventions.
ity to ensure maritime safety. Unlike industries located
Historically, the classification societies were created
on land, the shipping industry can easily bypass
to provide independent technical expertise about the
national regulations, as the doctrine of free trade
ships to insurance companies (Hormann 2006, 6).
gives them a substantial competitive advantage ‘in
Twelve classification societies cover more than 90%
an industry that is characterized as a single market
of the world’s cargo carrying tonnage and are
and that is intimately intertwined with the global

CONTACT Raphael Lissillour raphael.lissillour@outlook.com Post-doc at I3-CRG, École Polytechnique, Palaiseau, France
© 2020 Kedge Business School
2 R. LISSILLOUR AND D. B. FERNANDEZ
members of the prestigious International Association
of Classification Societies (IACS 2020). If they do not
provide a classification certificate, then the whole
industrial chain will condemn the ship, and the ship­
owners will not be able to operate it. Although they
seem to be a key institution of maritime safety, the
classification societies might be suspected of partiality
and of not providing an equal treatment to all ship­
owners, as they are engaged in a commercial relation­
ship with the shipowners at the same time as being
involved in their own highly competitive environment
(Goh and Yip 2014). Today, the classification societies
have become a key partner of both states and industry
because, ‘to insure their vessels or secure a charterer,
shipowners have no practical alternative to contracting
with a classification society to obtain and maintain
a classification’ (Belson 2002). This assertion confers
on the classification societies a considerable influence
in the maritime field. The question is: how is this power
constructed and constituted? How did the classifica­
tion societies reach such a prominent position at the
United Nations and become the symbol of maritime
safety? Indeed, just before their wreckage, both the
Amoco Cadiz and Prestige were ranked at the highest
quality standard by classification societies. According
to the 2000 International Commission on Shipping,
‘classification societies were variously described as inflex­
ible, unresponsive, incompetent, inept and, in some
cases, corrupt’ (ICS 2000, article 2.27). One of the main
concerns regarding the capacity of these classification
societies to provide an impartial judgement on the
maritime safety of ships is that both shipowners and
shipyards are their customers. Large shipowners have
strong bargaining power (Goh and Yip 2014) because
they have the possibility to change the classification
society and the flag of registry of a vessel if it is in their
interest (Cariou and Wolff 2011).
Among the different private actors within the mar­
itime industry chain, the case of the classification socie­
ties appears to be the most interesting. This actor is
paradoxically the one that is the most often blamed for
maritime casualties, and, at the same time, the one that
enjoys the highest legitimacy for maritime safety.
Nearly all the other actors involved in maritime safety
have filed lawsuits against classification societies, nota­
bly shipowners (United States Court of Appeals 1993),
insurance companies and the passengers (Soomer,
Ranta, and Penttilä 2001), cargo owners (Lloyd’s Law
Reports 1995), crew member families (S.D.N.Y 1996),
and states (for example the case of the Prestige, see
Reino de Espana v. American Bureau of Shipping 2012).
However, none of these lawsuits has affected the
dominant position of classification societies (Meredith
2016). Indeed, classification societies enjoy the highest
legitimacy recognition in the field of maritime safety at
the United Nations through recognition by the
International Maritime Organisation (IMO). This recog­
nition is achieved through the IACS, the umbrella non-
state organisation of the classification societies. IACS is
now acknowledged as being IMO’s ‘principal advisory
organisation in consultative status’ (NONSTOP 2005).
Classification societies are trusted by most govern­
ments, and it seems now ‘exceedingly difficult to
devise any alternative system’ (BIMCO 2002) or, more
radically, ‘there is no alternative to classification socie­
ties’ (Meredith 2016).
Are the classification societies a facilitator or
a hindrance to maritime safety? What theoretical per­
spective can help us understand this interorganisa­
tional issue between classification societies and the
maritime logistic ecosystem? To answer this question,
we mobilise Bourdieu theory of habitus. The aim of our
research is to contribute to the literature on the safety
of the maritime supply chain and its global governance
by proposing a bourdieusian approach based on habi­
tus. Our research question is as follows: to what extent
does the use of habitus theory allow us to highlight the
importance of the classification societies in the field of
maritime supply chain global governance?
Our paper is structured in 4 sections. First, we pre­
sent the context of research, the ecosystem of mari­
time safety. The supranational level and the close
association with the mission of the IMO are explained.
In the second section, the theoretical framework is
developed: theory of global governance and the four
dimensions of habitus: practical tacit knowledge, dis­
positions, temporality, social interactions. The third
section is dedicated to our methodological approach,
collection of data and analysis. In the fourth section,
we present our results and their discussion. We con­
clude on the limits and perspectives of this research.
Context of research: the ecosystem of maritime
safety
Until today, the insurance companies require ships to
be classified in order to insure them. From the 1970’s
onward, together with the development of the regula­
tory framework, the ships grew drastically in size and
number (Clarke 1999, 205), which increased the dimen­
sion and probability of eventual maritime disasters.
This new setting caused growing risk for insurance
companies as the liabilities of their clients, namely
the ship-owners, increased substantially (see the

Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime
Claims 1976). Consequently, the insurance companies
together with their representative Non-Governmental
Organisation, the International Union of Marine
Insurance, became more active at the international
level to ensure the development of regulations which
would minimise their risks. In the same way, the classi­
fication societies were threatened by the domestic
laws of states which were ‘edging more and more
towards acknowledging that there may be nothing pre­
venting a classification society from being held liable to
third parties’ (Barrows 2009). The ship inspections
which take place under the Port State Control regula­
tory regime would target the classification societies
with low standards and publish detention statistics
per classification society (Paris MOU 1999). Such inno­
vation put the classification societies at the forefront
for transparency and provided an incentive for them to
improve their standards and their application. Prior
research has shown that Port State Control inspections
have a positive effect on cost saving for the industry as
it reduces the risk of detention and loss of ships
(Knapp, Bijwaard, and Heij 2011).
The classification societies have been quick in
understanding the benefits that they can derive from
forming a Non-Governmental Organisation to facilitate
communication between the members and with the
different actors of the industry and of the supra-
national level. According to Paul Sadler, accredited
Observer at the IMO for the International Association
of Classification Societies, in the maritime milieu ‘it is
often stated that the International Maritime
Organization can be seen as the reason why IACS was
formed’, but arguably ‘SOLAS 60 with its new all-
embracing strength regulation, which entered into force
in 1965, was the main trigger for the formation of IACS’
(Hormann 2006, 11). This very phrase indicates the
early maturity of the classification societies and their
ability to develop in a complex global economy. But
the classification societies could rely on lobbying
efforts that were already set in motion during the
1930 Load Line Convention, as the second recommen­
dation issued at the conference mentioned: «As under
the Rules attached to this Convention, ships which com­
ply with the highest standard laid down in the rules of
a classification society recognised by the Administration
are regarded as having sufficient strength for the mini­
mum freeboards allowed under the rules, the Conference
recommends that each Administration should request
the Society or Societies which it has recognised to confer
from time to time with the Societies recognised by other
Administrations, with a view to securing as much uni­
formity as possible in the application of the standards of
strength on which freeboard is based” (Bevans 1968).
These early institutional efforts set the beginning of
the classification societies’ extension to the suprana­
tional level, conferring on them a recognised voice at
SUPPLY CHAIN FORUM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 3
the IMO, as it was granted consultative status by IMO
shortly after its creation in 1969. The classification
societies decided to establish a headquarters for the
IACS in London in order to strengthen the link with the
IMO. To enhance this inclusion at the supranational
level, the classification societies had to be able to
agree on how to uniformly implement the rising num­
ber of international instruments (Basedow and
Wurmnest 2006). This was indeed crucial if the classifi­
cation societies wanted the flag administrations to
trust the value of their certificates, ‘because evidently
they could not accept that the application of any regula­
tion to comparable ships was different, simply because
owners had chosen two different societies for the classi­
fication of these ships’ (Hormann 2006, 11).
For the classification societies, it seemed common­
sensical to strengthen the link between them and the
supranational level as the ‘IMO provides the opportunity
for classification societies to have a collective voice in
providing technical expertise, advice and feedback in the
development of the regulatory framework for the global
shipping industry’ (Sadler 2013). A strong incentive was
the possibility to harmonise the technical standards
and contribute to the formulation of policy for the
whole industry, thus contributing to the formation of
the international regime of maritime safety.
The creation of the umbrella organisation allowed
the classification societies to address structural pro­
blems. Indeed, the dramatic number of casualties that
occurred in the 1980s and 1990s damaged the reputa­
tion of the classification societies and put in question
the classification system. Consequently, the IACS
established in the early 1990s a quality control
mechanism, the QSCS, and the IACS Code of Ethics,
to which all members had then to comply. The IACS
also took numerous initiatives to develop research
(IACS 2011; ClassNK 2015), guidelines (IACS 2013,
2015), unified requirements and procedures (IACS
2013a) to solve the many issues that was facing the
member classification societies.
The classification societies could ensure the very
continuity of the classification system by enhancing
their legitimacy at the supranational level. They could
guarantee their existence and their role in the mari­
time safety regime. But their role was then limited to
their core profession, which is to provide a commercial
service to shipowners which allows them to operate
their ships in accordance with the rules of the industry.
According to IMO secretary general Koji Sekimizu,
‘safety must remain firmly at the center of IMO’s activ­
ities’ (IMO 2014), consequently, as IACS positions itself
as the expert of maritime safety, it benefits from
a legitimate and authoritative position at the IMO in
the issue-area of maritime safety. Unlike the ship­
owners and the shipyards, which are respectively the
operators and providers of ships, the classification
societies’ mission is reduced to that of controlling the
4 R. LISSILLOUR AND D. B. FERNANDEZ
safety of the ships. Indeed, ‘International Chamber of
Shipping (ICS), BIMCO, Intercargo, Intertanko have gen­
erally a very broad and active involvement at IMO dis­
cussions, not only in classification and statutory matters’
(SCC, 33). If the shipowners are involved in many
aspects at the IMO and have a general expertise, the
IACS focuses on the narrow issue-area of maritime
safety in which it has developed a high level of
competence.
To conclude on the context of research, the ecosys­
tem of maritime safety, we observe that the classifica­
tion societies operate at a supranational level and in
close association with the mission of the IMO. These
factors explain their importance in the governance of
the maritime safety. The next section allows to under­
stand the dynamic of power from a conceptual point of
view.
Theoretical framework: Bourdieu’s theory of
practice and habitus
We mobilise Bourdieu’s theory of practice, more speci­
fically the habitus concept. Our objective is to demon­
strate the classification societies habitus, namely
practical tacit knowledge, dispositions, temporality
and social interaction driven.
A theory of practice of global governance
How to better understand the central role of the clas­
sification societies in the interrelationship between
actors? Previous research studies have looked at sup­
ply chain management from Bourdieu’s practice per­
spective, but they mostly focused on one sole
theoretical concept from Bourdieu, namely the social
capital (Majumdar and Nishant 2008; Hung, Chen, and
Chung 2014; Min, Kim, and Chen 2008; Prasad, Tata,
and Guo 2012) with only two references to habitus
(Bakker and Kamann 2007; Lissillour and Bonet
Fernandez 2018). While going beyond the mere study
of field and capital, this theoretical framework focuses
on habitus and can thus provide a deep sociological
insight into the field of supply chain management.
Indeed, the theory of practice allows the researchers
of the supply chain management to approach their
research field without assuming the rationality of social
actors.
This section will be dedicated to start from
a Bourdieusian political sociology, which was originally
developed for a domestic setting, into an outline of
a theory of practice of maritime safety global govern­
ance. For Bourdieu, the social space provides agents
with an arena to struggle for domination over
resources, or capital, in given fields. The use of field
and capital as analytic units allows for a ‘topographical’
(Kauppi 2003) investigation (see Lissillour and Bonet
Fernandez (2018) for a Bourdieusian analysis of the
field with a focus on capital). The relative positions of
actors among themselves define the nature of their
relationships and their specific issues, (Kauppi 2003).
The notion of the field of global governance raises the
question of the limits of the field. This limit can be
conceptualised as the boundary beyond which the
effects and rules of the field are no longer effective,
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).
The field is characterised by implicit rules and norms
that are accepted without being written down by the
actors. the doxa. The doxa helps to reproduce the
domination of the most powerful actors in global gov­
ernance. The role of the United Nations is characterised
by a claim to impose the norms of collaborative gov­
ernance. The United Nations is able to create a doxa
through its symbolic capital (Bourdieu 1990b).
Symbolic capital is the ability to assign a value to
other types of capital and to impose a doxa on other
actors. The field of global governance is therefore an
arena in which the issues at stake are the definition of
principles of vision and division of the field according
to which actors are classified into categories, (Bourdieu
2000). The administration of global governance estab­
lishes codes and routines that recall and institutiona­
lise these categories and contribute to define the
structure of domination. Governance is thus not
a neutral field characterised by consensus among
equal actors, but a power struggle among actors with
unequal resources.
The main assumptions of the theory of practice is
that the social sphere is constituted of continuous
rivalry for power and for means to legitimise promi­
nence, and that a fundamental guide for social action
is practical knowledge or ‘bodily knowledge’ (Bourdieu
2000). Practical knowledge is ‘inarticulate’ (Pouliot
2008, 258) and leads practitioners to act intuitively
following their commonsense and instinct. Such prac­
tical knowledge allows researchers ‘to do justice to the
practical nature of action by rooting human activity in
a non-representational stratum’ (Schatzki 1997,
283–308). According to Hopf (2010), the repeated prac­
tice of a community creates a shared identity and
unreflective actions by a ‘logic of habit’ which is not
thought about but rather implemented pre-reflexively
by the agents. Prior to representation, intention, and
reflection, there are dispositions which lead actors to
act in a certain way when positioned in a given field. It
is argued here that practice, although inarticulate, con­
tributes to making sense of and to structuring interna­
tional politics.
Four dimensions of habitus
In order to allow for an analysis of the social world
which does not promote a specific ontological priority
to the structure or to the agent, Bourdieu provides an
innovative theoretical device, namely the habitus. The
notion of habitus provides a way to understand how
the hierarchy is reproduced by the inarticulate practice

of social agents. The agents of a given field share
a specific logic of social action which incline them
towards a specific practice. Consequently, habitus is
quite unlike the automatic expectation of actors’ beha­
viour as per the rational choice theory. Habitus is the
expression of ‘the result of an organizing action, with
a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it
also designates a way of being, a habitual state (espe­
cially of the body) and, in particular, a disposition,
tendency, propensity, or inclination’ (Bourdieu 1977,
214). We propose to look at habitus from four distinct
dimensions: it is composed of practical tacit knowl­
edge and dispositions; it is developed through time
and social interactions.
Habitus is composed of practical tacit knowledge
Though their tacit knowledge of the field, agents share
an intersubjective and unspoken sense of the game,
which internalises their history and guides their prac­
tice according to their position in the field. The social
game in Bourdieu’s thought presupposes a permanent
capacity of invention, indispensable if one is to be able
to adapt [to] indefinitely varied and never completely
identical situations. This is not ensured by mechanical
obedience to the explicit codified rules [. . .] But this
freedom of invention and improvisation, which
enables the infinity of moves allowed by the game to
be produced (as in chess), has the same limits as the
game (Bourdieu 1990a, 63). This practical knowledge is
the result of the agent’s continued and routinised
exercise of their functions. It is usually tacit since the
rules of the game are seldom written and agents
develop a feeling for what common-sense in the field.
Habitus as a set of dispositions
According to the Bourdieu’s wording, habitus is ‘the
generating principle enabling agents to cope with
unforeseen and ever-changing situations [. . .] a system
of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrat­
ing past experiences, functions at every moment as
a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and
makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified
tasks’ (Bourdieu 1977, 72). Habitus is a dynamic con­
cept which is field-specific and that can help us under­
stand how agents are inclined to act in given ways
without prior deliberation or rationale.
Habitus develops over time
The habitus of the actors is historically constructed
since they are socialised in a field that precedes them
and learn the existing rules of the game. Habitus may
change over time and from one field to another, as the
rules and the stakes change. Kauppi analysed the phe­
nomenon of habitus mutation as executives changed
their ways when they moved from the national field to
the European field and underwent an integration pro­
cess in the European Parliament: ‘spending time in
SUPPLY CHAIN FORUM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 5
Brussels changes the political habitus of politicians’
(Kauppi 2003, 775–89). Executives have to adapt their
behaviour to match their new environment, because
a successful practice in one field may not be as suc­
cessful in another. By putting the ontological priority
on field and habitus, the theory of practice allows
transcendence of the agent structure divide.
Habitus develops through social interactions
Social agents interact mostly through intersubjective
communication, thus developing an inarticulate sense
of appropriateness, that is what is reasonable and
adapted in a given situation. Consequently, habitus is
relational since it is a disposition that is socially con­
structed and is enacted socially.
Research methodology
In this section, we present our data collection
modes, namely interviews and focus group derived
from a rich and diversified panel. The case study
provides a method capable of examining
a particular case and capturing interactions with
a complex social environment. We argue that the
case study method is the most appropriate to
explain a real phenomenon in a complex interna­
tional context that requires the analysis of various
sources of information (Yin 2013). The use of
a multiple case study model allows for an in-depth
analysis of the main actors involved in the subject,
so that we can understand the underlying interac­
tion mechanism that informs their mutually consti­
tutive relationship. The study of a single actor
extracted from its social environment would lead
to a structural bias, since actors position themselves
socially on the ground according to their relative
capital. These interactions create social models
through a single case study model.
The unit of analysis is the selected actors involved in
maritime safety. The case study is not the actor itself
but rather the system of action that links the actor to
the research question, in our case the maritime ship­
ping chain. A multiple case study method offers differ­
ent perspectives, the issue is not only approached from
the point of view of the ‘dominant’ actor, but also from
the point of view of the ‘dominated’ actor. For exam­
ple, when the case of shipowners is addressed, we are
not looking at a ship owning company, but rather at
the system of action, or chain related to the ship own­
ing activity in general.
Our research focuses on the main actors of the
global governance of maritime safety identified by
Lissillour and Bonet Fernandez (2018), namely classifi­
cation societies, states, shipowners, and the IMO. The
case of each actor has been constructed using the
methodology that corresponds to the requirements
of theory and practice. The choice of cases can also
6 R. LISSILLOUR AND D. B. FERNANDEZ

be criticised for its lack of independence, whereas the were considered favourable in the selection of
importance of the need for independent cases is Shanghai as a main research location. On the other
a difficult question. In the context of this research, hand, interviews have also been conducted outside
these groups of actors are designed to understand Shanghai, notably with a shipowner in Hong-Kong
the variety of power struggles that drive maritime and the port authorities of Jiangsu.
safety, actors that are intertwined in networks of The interviewees were selected from the diverse
mutual interest. In order to construct interpretations actors and group of actors from the industrial chain,
of the daily practices of the practitioners, diverse not only from the four stakeholder groups which
research instruments were combined, such as textual emerged as those having major interest in maritime
analysis, interviews and focus groups. safety and being able to comment on the conflicts of
interest and the structure reproduction mechanism.
The interviews have been conducted with Maritime
Data collection
and Port Authority officials, shipyard officials, char­
Data were collected in one- to two-hours qualitative
terers, brokers, harbour administrators, shipowners,
semi-structured interviews during which the intervie­
classification societies and their representatives at the
wees were asked to reveal their daily practices.
IMO, based in London, UK. These actors allowed for
According to Kvale, interviews are ‘attempts to under­
a collection of various voices emerging from their
stand the world from the subjects’ point of view, to
unique position in the field. The multiple case study
unfold the meaning of peoples’ experiences, to uncover
includes the subcases of the IMO, the classification
their lived world to scientific explanations’ (Kvale
societies, the state and the shipowners. Interviews
1996, 1). Structured interviews have not been chosen
sometimes involved more than one interviewee.
as a relevant method because the interviewers played
A focus group has been constituted with ten
the role of ‘informant’ rather than ‘respondent’ (Yin
selected actors of the maritime industry in Shanghai.
2013). The interview guidelines have been constructed
The selection criterion was the relative involvement
around the theoretical framework and its key concep­
with maritime safety issues, indeed the aim was to
tual elements. The confrontation of the theory and the
gather contrasting opinion on the topic from agents
analytical concepts with the topic led to a number of
with different degree of involvement in maritime
conceptual issues (see Table 1) but the interviewer also
safety, consequently we have chosen agents from
provided the interviewee with a hypothetical scenario
three groups, namely the shipowners, logistic compa­
and a question, such as ‘what would you do if a flag
nies and harbour representatives. An open environ­
state which is previously delegating its statutory surveys
ment has been created around the same table to
to IACS members declare that he would stop doing so,
encourage participants to discuss openly the way in
and rather rely on its own Regional Organisation, or its
which they relate to the growing pre-eminence of the
own work-force?’
classification societies and to share their perceptions.
The interviews focused on personal perceptions of
Prior to the event, a guideline with ten questions had
the influence mechanism in maritime safety regula­
been drafted, but we intended to remain as open and
tions’ implementation and tactics. The 21 interviews
adaptable to the participant’s input as possible. In
took place in Europe and Asia, more specifically in
order to warm up the participants, the first questions
France and the United Kingdom, and in China and
were easy, general questions, while the following
Singapore (see Table 2). France has been chosen for
questions were gradually more specific and precise.
the easier access to the actors of the industry, namely
To ensure the dynamics of the session, open-ended
the shipyard of Saint-Nazaire, the port of Toulon, the
and closed questions have been used in turn.
classification society Bureau Veritas in Paris. In China,
Shanghai has been identified as a relevant location for
Data analysis
such research since it is among the world’s two biggest
The main interviews have been recorded, a transcript
port. An easier access to the industry and to academia
has been created and sent to the interviewee for ver­
ification, and finally the final document was ready for
Table 1. Interview guideline. analysis. Following Yin (2013) recommendation, the
# Questions transcript of the focus groups has been added to that
1 What are the main actors? of the interviews to create the research data base.
2 What are the specific conflicts of interest in the field?
3 What are the protocols of negotiation and location preference for Data analysis was based on open coding. We com­
such negotiations? pared each instance from the transcript for similarities
4 What actor does information retention? Is there any current change
in economic influence?
and differences to form themes which reflected infor­
5 Who has training capacity, and who can lead change, define policy mants’ practices regarding maritime safety. Our coding
and legitimate their power position? was refined so as to focus on themes specifically
6 Who do they usually meet and in what setting?
7 Who are the most important people to meet while working at related to the reproduction of practices. During the
a session at the IMO and why? axial coding phase, we put the coded data back
 SUPPLY CHAIN FORUM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 7

Table 2. Panel.
Category Position Organisation Country Code
Classification Society Permanent Representative at the IMO Bureau VERITAS France SCA
Classification Society Permanent Representative at the IMO International Association of Classification Societies UK SCC
Classification Society Business Development Manager RINA Italy Classification Society – Shanghai Office China SCB
Shipowner Vice General Manager Long Navigation Phoenix joint-stock company, China SOA
Maritime logistics Department
Shipowner Director China Merchants Energy Shipping Co., Ltd. Hong- SOB
Kong
Port Authorities President Jiangsu Jiangyin Port Group Co, Ltd. China MPAB
Port Authorities Executive Vice-President Jiangsu Jiangyin Port Group Co, Ltd. China MPAC
Port Authorities Pilot, French Professional Pilot Syndicate Harbour of Toulon France MPAD
Port Authorities Deputy Director of Shipping Division Maritime and Port Authority Singapore MPAA
Port Authorities Port master Port of Antwerp Belgium MPAE
Port Authorities Operations Director Port of Antwerp Belgium MPAF
Ministry of transport Policy Advisor Belgium state Belgium MPAG
Third party logistics Shanghai Branch Vice-President Zhongyuan Engineering and Logistic Ltd. China PSLA
Third party logistics General Manager Shanghai Pegasus logistics Co, Ltd. China PSLB
Third party logistics General Director Huyang International Logistics Co Ltd. China PSLC
Third party logistics General Manager Shanghai Winwell International Logistics Co. Ltd. China PSLD
PSL General Manager Huyang International Logistics Co. Ltd. China PSLE
Specialised Third General Manager Shanghai Tongyin China PSLF
party logistics Petrochemical Co. Ltd.
Specialised Third Chairman Shanghai Yunze Chemical Logistics Development Co. China PSLG
party logistics Ltd.
Shipyard Sales Manager Services STX France SA France SYA
Broker President and General Manager Join Ocean Shipbrokers Ltd. China BKA
Expert Former director of CRET-LOG, Research Centre on Aix-Marseille University France EXPA
Transport and Logistics
Expert Professor of logistics IPAG Business School France EXPB

together in new ways by considering theoretical per­
spectives that could shed additional insights on our
data. Whereas the authors were inspired by Bourdieu’s
theories and concepts before the beginning of this
investigation, the axial coding phase allowed to revisit
these theoretical concepts for the study of maritime
safety. Axial coding resulted in the reclassification of
data into four larger categories which correspond to
the four dimensions of habitus.
Field analysis
The routinised exercise of global governance can be
described as the habitual repetition of everyday prac­
tices. Indeed, actors’ practical sense is the outcome of
their habitus and positions in the field. In this section,
we provide an analysis of classification societies habi­
tus according to the four dimensions identified in the
theoretical framework and discuss it at the light of
previous research.
Shared tacit knowledge to safeguard classification
societies capital endowment and reputation for
quality
If the main interest of IACS is to develop symbolic
capital, that of the classification societies is to enhance
their economic capital and ensure sustainable growth
(Lissillour and Bonet Fernandez 2018). However, the
IACS has dual interest, ‘the first is technical expertise
and the second is quality reputation’ (SCC, 34). The
reputation for a high level of expertise and quality is
internalised by the actors of the field and is thus
converted in habitus which enhances the symbolic
capital of IACS. This reputation is enacted as actors
tacitly share a sense of respect towards the classifica­
tion societies.
With the classification societies more focused on
economic capital and the IACS more focused on sym­
bolic capital, if this difference of interest does not
translate into a conflict, this difference may lead to
problems as both actors establish their priorities differ­
ently. Through a continuous quality control on their
members for the sake of its reputation and that of the
members, the IACS constrains the behaviour of the
member societies. Moreover, the IACS represents
more than the collective will of the member societies
as it has a distinct impact on the supranational level
and on other global actors of the maritime industrial
chain.
Mechanisms emerged through the practice of the
classification societies for them to maintain their status
both at the supranational level and on the ground,
such as in the ports, shipyards, and so on. At the
supranational level, they ensure their visibility and
credibility as experts. They elect executives whose mis­
sion is to represent them at the IMO. According to one
such representative, ‘the goal is to know what happens
in order to have the newest information concerning the
new rules and regulations, so that we can use them
internally, either to inform people or to modify our rules
and work methods’ (SCA, 2). This illustrates two princi­
ples; the first is that the classification societies do not
rely entirely on the information provided by IACS, but
rather go themselves directly to the source for more
accuracy and rapidity. Indeed, the information flow
8 R. LISSILLOUR AND D. B. FERNANDEZ
within the organisation is easier as people know each
other and there are no linguistic and cultural barriers:
‘the people working in this building need to know if
anything new came up on this or that subject. It is a lot
easier to call me or write to me directly’ (SCA, 2).
The second principle is that the classification societies
compete for information, since information about
a new regulation can be a competitive advantage. If
they possess updated information, they can be more
reactive and avoid eventual deficiencies due to sur­
prise. By sending a representative, the French classifi­
cation society, in the case of this specific interview, also
fulfils another goal, namely to ‘support the IACS in its
role as an observer at the IMO, and the French
Administration as a member of the IMO’ (SCA, 2). To
support the IACS is a contractual obligation for the
members, but this support is also advantageous as
their representatives can be present in a delegation
and gather precious information for their own organi­
sation. Information capital is an important source of
power for the classification societies, consequently
there is a struggle among them to have more informa­
tion, and to have it more quickly. Nevertheless, the
creation of the IACS allows for a centralisation of infor­
mation and for the safeguard of a minimum quality
standard, which has a positive impact on the status of
the classification societies and their lobbying potential.
A social disposition to enhance the value of
informational capital
Previous research (Lissillour and Bonet Fernandez
2018) described the strong informational capital
endowed by the classification societies. This section
reveals the habitus which allows them to leverage
this capital to gain influence in the field. The classifica­
tion societies, and more so the IACS, put high value on
publications to make public the consensus reached by
the members, and eventually by the other actors of the
industrial chain. If the member states issue a new reg­
ulation which is not clear enough and has to be inter­
preted by the classification societies prior to any
implementation, the IACS will issue Unified
Interpretations. Indeed, according to a representative
of IACS at the IMO: ‘IACS does not have any power to
vote, but we are allowed to submit papers, so we submit
a lot of papers because we do 90% of the world tonnage
for statutory compliance, so we have a lot of experience.
Most of our papers are submitted to provide unified
interpretations, which is when the text of the IMO is
vague, and sometimes that happens because it is the
only way the IMO can reach an agreement because they
write the words so that everyone can agree to it, since it
satisfies their understanding, but then when we go to the
practical world and have to apply that, then we find that
wording is not good enough. It allows for too many
different kinds of understanding, so we write unified
interpretations, and we have hundreds of them, which
are all published on our website’ (SCC, 30).
They also publish chapters and articles in academic
and mainstream journals to explain their work favour­
ably (see for example Hormann 2006). Such practices
illustrate the way the classification societies proceed
for the other actors of the field to be socialised with
their vocabulary. Setting the official vocabulary is
a sign of where the power lies. With this publication
practice, their definition of maritime safety is made
available to a broader audience.
The IACS is dependent on the member states for
influencing the decision making or raising new items
to add to the agenda. As a practitioner explained, ‘IACS
can be a catalyst, but at the IMO we do not have the
authority to procedurally even raise a new item in the
discussion unless we have at least one member-state to
co-sponsor. We have to persuade a member state’.
Consequently, the IACS has to constantly maintain
close relationships with the delegates of the member
state delegations. Indeed, they depend on states to
officially sponsor their initiatives at the IMO. This
apparent weakness is balanced by the IACS ability to
build on its symbolic and informational capitals as they
provide authoritative and well-informed propositions
to the IMO and the member states. Such information
can be instrumental at the supranational level as they
possess ‘data, information and advice so vital for adop­
tion of various safety conventions’ (Chowdhury 2015).
The member states recognise the informational and
symbolic strengths of the IACS, which confer on them
an influence on the member states which tend to
accept the vast majority of the initiatives proposed
by the IACS. Indeed, according to a practitioner: ‘The
first time we write a unified interpretation, we have
about 80% of the unified interpretations get agreed by
the whole IMO (which means all the members who are
active, those who keep quiet just have to accept what
goes around them) the first time round we present them
at the IMO’ (SCC, 31).
This illustrates positively the fact that the informa­
tion and symbolic capital of the classification societies
have been internalised by the other agents, as this
international non-governmental organisation commu­
nicates its technical expertise in an authoritative man­
ner which command attention and respect. The next
section will reveal the practices through which the
classification societies institutionalise their close asso­
ciation with the supranational level.
Habitus is historical: close collaboration with
national administration and with actors throughout
the industrial shipping chain
Classification societies are implementing standards in
two ways, first, by classifying ships according to their
own standards, and, second, by surveying ships
according to the statutory requirements of states.

Consequently, the classification societies have close
cooperative connections with the states that delegate
their statutory obligations to the classification socie­
ties. According to the Charter of the IACS, the classifi­
cation society’s purpose ‘is to provide classification and
statutory services (when authorised by flag administra­
tions or other governmental organisations) and assis­
tance to the maritime industry and regulatory bodies as
regards maritime safety and pollution prevention, based
on the accumulation of maritime knowledge and tech­
nology’ (IACS 2019).
Consequently, the classification societies define
their purpose as bringing assistance to regulatory
bodies. By so doing they indicate that their interests
depend on the policy-making of regulations at the
supranational level, and ensure that they are recog­
nised and associated with the IMO. According to the
IACS website, the IACS has three main aims, the second
of is to ‘assist international regulatory bodies and stan­
dards organisations to develop, amend and interpret
regulations and industry standards in ship design, con­
struction and management’. So both the classification
societies and the IACS define themselves coherently as
contributors to the work of the IMO.
As the statutory surveys are a lucrative business, the
classification societies have processes to manage rela­
tions with their clients, in this case the maritime admin­
istrations, in order to expand and maintain their
clientele: ‘we seek out actively new partnerships with
a few countries, but we maintain close relations with
practically all flag states. Even if we have few delega­
tions, they operate regular follow-up as there are meet­
ings every six months, one year or two years with the flag
states’ (SCC, 31). The experts who join delegations at
the IMO also contribute to this work by meeting the
delegations from flag states, in particular their ambas­
sador, in order to promote their classification society.
The classification societies built a company struc­
ture, which enabled them, first, to react to new mar­
kets. Political factors can affect the shipping market
and new building market. For example, as the
embargo on Iran was removed by the USA, the classi­
fication societies rushed into the Iranian market. As an
observer from a classification society explains: ‘The
General Director of the Maritime department of RINA
consider this market as very important. The company
has a country manager for Iran and already sent
a delegation there to gather information about the ship
building projects in Iran. They haven’t been building any
new ships for years, so Iran only had an old fleet. All class
societies are active to pursue this business’ (SCB, 15).
The classification societies maintain commercial
relations with their clients, namely the shipowners,
and are devoted to staying competitive in the market.
Indeed, they partly depend on the international new
ship market to ensure their long-term turnover: as an
executive from a classification society explains, ‘if they
SUPPLY CHAIN FORUM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 9
don’t build new vessels, then there is no chance for us; if
there are new ships, then they can be classified’ (SCB,
15). If foreign shipowners order a ship from a Chinese
shipyard, then they will choose a classification com­
pany to classify the ship. ‘If the new shipbuilding price
is low, then shipowners may think that it is the bottom,
and that they have to order a ship, and two or three
years later, the price will be much higher. It also
depends if the owner can find the financial channels,
and then a calculation will be made with the interest
rate and operation cost’ (SCB, 16). If the financial plan
is secured, then they will choose the vessel type and
size, which shipyard, and how many units will be
ordered. At this level, the classification society can
intervene. From the point of view of a foreign classi­
fication in China, the ‘business is not much related to
the Chinese government or to the local Shanghai
government, it is rather to contact the shipyard, the
shipowner, to see any possibility, any rumour for
a new project, and they will rush in’ (SCB, 16).
The negotiation with the shipowners takes into con­
sideration different aspects, notably the human factor:
‘the classification fees certainly vary; if you come with
fifty ship, you want something good. It’s a business activ­
ity like any other’ (SCB, 16). The classification societies
have established offices in many coastal states in order
to keep close to the clients. The staff includes many
locals to ensure that the staff is culturally socialised
and benefits from a good network. The local offices do
the field work as ‘they maintain good relations with the
shipyards, they visit them and welcome delegations from
them; we calculate the plans together, etc’ (SCA, 12).
Consequently, the continuous collaboration of the
classification societies with all actors from the indus­
trial chain allows them to gather valuable data and
experience which they can leverage at the suprana­
tional level.
Habitus is relational: multiplicity of lobbying
options
The representatives of the industry contribute to policy
making by advising the ambassador of their national
delegation or the ambassador of other delegations, on
whether the content of a regulatory project is in line
with their interests. The industry warns the member
states ‘if the paper is not clear, as some flag states will
ask this, while some others will ask that. When the ships
will bump into each other in foreign ports, it will be an
awful muddle’ (SCA, 7) and according to the same
informant, experts from classification societies will con­
vey the idea of compliance with the directives of the
IACS to their national delegations: ‘you have to listen to
what IACS is saying’.
The classification societies benefit from multiple
channels of lobbying at the IMO. They can influence
new regulations projects, either by influencing
a member state or by having the IACS endorse the
10 R. LISSILLOUR AND D. B. FERNANDEZ
project. Both alternatives have advantages and
disadvantages.
They have a natural connection with their home
country, which is a member state at the IMO and thus
has voting power and can propose a new regulation or
amendment project on their behalf. In this case, the
classification society and the administration share
a common culture and values, which creates a natural
inclination to cooperate, which then allows for a co-
definition of the actions they may undertake collec­
tively. But to go through a European member state, for
example, is not always easier since ‘it has the burden of
Europe, so many things require prior agreement of the
European Union and of the European member states’. On
the other hand, if the European Union agrees on
a given motion, all 28 European states will follow,
which provides a great advantage during the formal
vote at the IMO. Even if going through one’s home
country seems more natural, an alternative may be to
go through non-European states, as classification
societies ‘may need the support from member states in
a specific discussion, in which we know that in the pre­
vious session, this or that delegate spoke about the sub­
ject, so they have an interest. Consequently, we have
interest in having a prior discussion with them before
the official one. From one session to another, we have an
idea of who is interested, to whom we have to explain
a given case. This occurs either informally earlier, or at
the end we can be co-sponsor of a proposal paper
together with other eventual members we may have
convinced as well. We can also be contacted to co-
sponsor other’s proposal papers. At the end, the final
agreements are formal’ (SCA, 7).
The choice of the member states to lobby may
depend on the potential for a fast or positive response,
which may not be forthcoming from the classification
societies’ home state. Alternatively, the classification
societies may choose to go through the IACS. Since
the IACS has strong symbolic capital at the suprana­
tional level, the member states will tend to believe and
endorse the IACS’ propositions. On the other hand, the
IACS itself does not have voting power, and will itself
require a member state to co-sponsor for their propo­
sal. To go through the IACS has one other disadvan­
tage: ‘it is a slow routine; you have to go slowly if you
want anything to come up because all member societies
have to agree’ (SCA, 2). Consequently, the classification
societies use various lobbying options to add their
issues to the agenda of the IMO’s meetings; each
option has its own advantages and disadvantages.
The IACS can operate outside the IMO and repre­
sent the members in other supranational organisations
such as the European Union. The liaison office of the
IACS in Brussels provides up-to-date information con­
cerning the new regulations. According to an observer,
it produces ‘lobbying to introduce people from the IACS
into the working groups that [the European Commission]
creates about given topics’ (SCA, 11). The International
Association of Classification Societies provides the clas­
sification societies with a structure for political com­
munication with both the whole industrial chain and
the supranational level of the IMO. The very existence
of this organisation on the chessboard creates power
relations and a social environment in which the stake­
holders struggle for power and influence.
Discussion
Actors intend to ‘impose the definition of the world that
is most congruent with their particular interests’
(Wacquant 1992, 14), thus contributing to the repro­
duction of the order. Some actors such as the classifi­
cation societies and the shipowners seem to be more
prominent in influence relative to the insurance under­
writers for example, who arguably ‘are not very active,
[. . .] and make less noise’ (SCA, 8). This can partly be
understood from an inquiry into the habitus of the
more powerful actors, but also from an analysis of
the capitals.
When asked which actors in the maritime industry
are trying to reinforce their domination in the policy
making of maritime safety, the actors of the industrial
chain may they be logistic companies or shipowners
(PSLD, 83; PSLE, 88), seem to agree on the classification
societies as actively involved in maintaining their
dominion. From the pragmatic perspective of the ship­
owners, the classification societies became more and
more influential, both from the certification point of
view since according to a ship-owning executive ‘you
have to listen [to the classification societies], otherwise
you cannot pass the certification’ (SOA, 61) and at the
supranational level where they can lobby effectively
and ‘make rules that benefit to their own’ (SOB, 78).
Consequently, in opposition to the findings of
Murphy (2006), this section does not indicate that the
features of the shipping industry inevitably lead to
a competition in laxity. The safety standards that are
reinforced by the shipowners depend on their position
in the field. It is a dynamic position which does not lead
to any unchangeable principles. In contrast to
Desombre (2006, 208), this study indicates that if
some the open registries did not enforce conventions,
they may change their approach in order to reposition
themselves dynamically in the field according to the
circumstances (OGSR 2020).
The study of the field (see synthesis in Table 3)
illustrates that the setting and definition of official
vocabulary of maritime safety is a key capacity in the
power struggle. The actors under study are all able to
mobilise this capacity at a different extent. The classi­
fication societies seem to be able to distinguish them­
selves and create relations of dependence with the
other actors.

Table 3. Habitus in the global governance of maritime safety.
Dimension Inertia mechanism
Habitus is Information retention: There is a shared understanding among “Data, information and advice so vital for adoption of various
composed of states and IMO that CS are the main agent to provide
practical tacit technical advice and expertise.
knowledge
Habitus as a set of Business process: states are predisposed to choose classification “flag states retain classification societies instead of creating their
dispositions societies to comply to their statutory duties without extra
investment in human resources.
Habitus develops Gate keeper: shipowners and classification societies gradually They “are [. . .] receiving additional and substantial consulting fees
over time developed a joint field of practice that goes beyond the
provision of classification services.
Habitus develops Political process: IMO’s policy making process involves
through social consensus which generally concludes in lowest standard
interactions agreeable by all member states, and a text that does not
reach the precision required for the industry to implement
the regulations. The IMO relies on the IACS to solve the
interpretation problems that arise.
The classification societies are able to categorise
ships between those that are classified and non-
classified. The IACS classifies classification societies
between members and non-members. Such an
assigned social category certainly contributes to struc­
ture reproduction. Indeed, according to Bourdieu:
‘knowledge of the social world and, more precisely, the
categories that make it possible, are the stakes, par
excellence, of political struggle, the inextricably theoreti­
cal and practical struggle for the power to conserve or
transform the social world by conserving or transforming
the categories through which it is perceived’ (Bourdieu
1985). Consequently, IACS members benefit from
a strong position as they are able to contribute to
category assignment for both the ships and the other
classification societies. Such a position of distinction
constitutes symbolic capital, especially ‘when perceived
by an agent endowed with categories of perception aris­
ing from the internalization (embodiment) of the struc­
ture of its distribution, i.e., when it is known and
recognized as self-evident’ (Bourdieu 1985). To con­
clude, our findings underline the positive and strategic
role of the classification societies concerning the mar­
itime supply chain safety and its governance at inter­
national level.
Conclusion
The industrial shipping chain comprises many different
actors, who may play a role in maritime safety matters:
shipowners, shipyards, charterers, insurance underwri­
ters, and classification societies. In a context of growing
number of reported shipping casualties or incidents
balanced by a decline in total losses (Allianz 2020, 5),
our objective is to understand the balance of power in
the governance of the global maritime chain.
A Bourdieusian perspective on global governance puts
SUPPLY CHAIN FORUM: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL 11
Representative quotations
safety conventions” (Chowdhury 2015).
own regulatory agency” (Maritime advocate, cited in Lissillour
and Bonet Fernandez 2018)
from their various clients” (Maritime advocate, cited in
Lissillour and Bonet Fernandez 2018)
‘IACS [. . .] submit a lot of papers because we do 90% of the world
tonnage for statutory compliance, so we have a lot of
experience. Most of our papers are submitted to provide unified
interpretations, which is when the text of the IMO is vague, and
sometimes that happens because it is the only way the IMO can
reach an agreement because they write the words so that
everyone can agree to it, because it satisfies their
understanding, but then when we go to the practical world,
and have to apply that; then we find that wording is not good
enough. It allows for too many kinds of understanding, so we
write unified interpretations’ (SCA, 6).
the stakes and conflicts of interest between actors at the
centre of the analysis. More specifically, we focus on
classification societies, and their habitus. The classifica­
tion societies have a dual role: setting the standards for
the quality and integrity of vessels and, acting as recog­
nised organisations, they perform surveys to determine
whether vessels comply with the classification society’s
rules and regulations, national laws and international
conventions. Consequently, they are involved in both
standard setting and standard implementation. Are the
classification societies a facilitator or a hindrance to
maritime safety? We have mobilised Bourdieu’s theory
of habitus to provide sociological insights into the sta­
keholders’ interests, their source of power in the field of
maritime safety, and how the dominion of the classifica­
tion societies is sustained and fuelled by the practices of
each actors. An exploratory field was led with major
actors of the maritime safety. We identified 4 different
dimensions of habitus which we used as analytical lens.
Habitus is composed of practical tacit knowledge.
Habitus is a set of dispositions, develops over time,
through social interactions. Our main results indicate
that classification societies maintain the different dimen­
sions of habitus. (1) Shared tacit knowledge to safeguard
their capital endowment and reputation for quality. (2)
A social disposition to enhance the value of informa­
tional capital. (3) Relational activities and lobbying (4) An
historical position that relies on close collaboration with
national administration and with actors throughout the
industrial shipping chain. To our best knowledge, our
findings are the only one in literature to enhance the
strategic and positive role of the classification societies
in the maritime supply chain safety.
To conclude, classification societies benefit from the
different forms of habitus to maintain their predomi­
nance in the global maritime safety. Our ongoing
research agenda leads us to study more in depth the
power dynamics at stake in the maritime safety
12 R. LISSILLOUR AND D. B. FERNANDEZ
ecosystem to follow its evolution in a fast-changing
international, institutional and technological
environment.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Raphael Lissillour is an Associate Professor of Strategy and
Management at IPAG Business School. He in charge of devel­
oping international academic partnerships and he is the
director of the Doctorate in Business Administration pro­
gramme at IPAG Business school. He holds a PhD degree
from Jilin University in China where he completed
a doctoral thesis on the global governance of maritime
safety. His research focuses on sociological approaches to
supply chain management and information systems.
Dominique Bonet Fernandez is a Full Professor of Strategy
and Management at IPAG Business School. She is
a researcher affiliated to CRET-LOG of Aix-Marseilles
University. Her work focuses on relationships between actors
in supply chains and their development. In 2017, she was co-
author of two books: ‘Circular economy and sustainable
territories: what principles and tools?’ which was edited at
the ‘Presses Universitaires de Provence’ and ‘Social
Entrepreneurship in the Non-Profit and Profit Sectors,
Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives’ edited at Springer.
ORCID
Raphael Lissillour http://orcid.org/0000-0001-6952-0774
Dominique Bonet Fernandez http://orcid.org/0000-0002-
1586-929X
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