Gender, Patriarchy and Power-Feminist View

Feminism explains the process of male domination of women in reality

and symbolically. It asserts that social and political structures of society
symbolise the power of men over women resulting in the latter's oppression
and subjugation. It highlights the causes for women's disadvantage and seeks
to remedy it. It emerges in the modern period adopting its foundational
ideas of equality, rational individualism, universal rights and abstract rights
while objecting to their inconsistent application, which marked women as an
oppressed class. Gender is to the feminist theory what class is to Marxism.
Gender is the differentia specified between feminist and 'male stream' theory.
Feminism has developed in three distinctive waves-the first wave of liberal
d
au socialist feminism (eighteenth century to the 1920s), the second wa~~ of
radical feminism (1960-1980) and the third wave of postmodemiS t fermm_sm
9
0 sos onwards). Liberal feminism and Marxist/socialist feminism, which
co~tinue to subscribe to their parent philosophies, apply the assumption~ of
lbei~ ~espe~tive parent doctrines to the woman's question. :8?we~er, radica~
feminism
0 differs from both liberal and Marxist/socialist fermmsm m ~e hop
~ m?difying it to include exclusively women's interests and ~ercepttons.
dismisses liberal initiatives of changing existing laws as cosmetic th at conce
and somet·1mes perpetuate the injustice that exists
. . h.m the structure of the
wit
 72 Political Theory: Ideas and Concepts ,

family itself, about which liberalism and liberal-feminism are silent. Simi]
the socialist and Marxist stress on the economic basis of women's oppre a~Jy,
. I" ss1on
ignores the non-economic aspects, especially the sexua ,orms (Benhahib
nd
Cornell 1987: 3, 5, 16-30). It criticises traditional political philosophy a
. 1· . I' . , as II
le~itimises male power. In claiming 'person_aJ '.s po 1tica , it wants to deny the
existence of a separate political realm and ms1sts that the concept of politi
is itself 'male' . The public sphere is the product of male imagi~ation reflecti~al
its competitive and inegalitarian values. This is with regard to its regulation 0~
the private sphere (through laws and customs and the personal power men exe
in their families) and in the hierarchical structuring of ~he political, social an~
economic status among men. Sexism and the assumpt10n of male superiorit
permeate the dominant culture and patriarchal power embodied in the politic:i
arena (Pateman 1988, Okin 1989). The first wave femini~~s defi~e patriarchy
as a situation of inequality which excludes women from c1t1zensh1p. However,
the second wave feminists understand patriarchy to denote male power and
politics, because it establishes the complete link between the domination of
women by men and the domination of men by other men (Randall 1987).
Patriarchy, according to Mitchell (1974), is an ideological phenomenon
that underpins the cultural construction of masculinity and femininity and it
is only with the psychic transformation of patriarchy that women will secure
liberation. Radical feminism accepts gender difference and criticises the earlier
generation of egalitarian feminists for demanding women's equality with men
by devaluing the feminine identity as something imposed by patriarchy and not
something that patriarchy justifies. Both Wollstonecraft and J .S. Mill contend
that if women appear irrational, it is due to inadequate education and training.
In conformity with the liberal presumption of human equality, they contend
that women are as rational as men and they ought to be equal participants in
the political process. In their view, women's identity is submerged under the
weight of this general equality. The womanly identity is confined to a powerless
and ineffectual domestic sphere placing women in an impossible situation. For,
in patriarchal societies where sex and gender are rigidly aligned, they have
only two choices-to acquire masculine qualities consonant with humanity and
citizenship but to be derided as aberrant because unfeminine, or to accede to
the feminine norm patriarchy decrees for women, only to be judged unsuited
for public life' (Coole 1993: 201).
Radical feminism considers women's oppression as a distinctive form of
oppression transcending other forms of oppression, which can be combated if
women unite with women against men as oppressors. Its importance to political
philosophy lies in its novel deconstruction of what constitutes the political arena.
Since the public space has left out female gender values both men and women
have to pay a heavy price in a distorted decision-making process. However.
their aim is not to emphasise only the public sphere, for that is tantamount to
reinforcing its dominance with the attendant danger of turning women into yet
another of its many 'out-groups' on the one hand and excluding the female
 Politics, Power and Authority 73

nd devalued in the private sphere on the other.

are linked_ to at·on movement tries to liberate women from male
,1ues tha i]Jet woJllen ,_s 1tbera
d r1 socialisation and also to overcome the barriers
stead. " and (]Jetr gen ete spheres by recreating society, culture and politics
,ppr
0 ess10.he pobhc and pova
1• •
f •rns women's disadvantages at the work place and
~ ween"' no -patr. rchal. d otwith . the status of domestic. work are md1cauve
. . . of a
13
n1new blefllS 0 assoc 1• 1~ exual subordination to men. Radical feminism tries
h~ pr<>problefll of their snder-based system of sexism and patriarchal power,
1v1der ·sclose the whole ..geal and economic · structures, m· language an d cu1tural
10 licit
, in socia • 1' po1,ucrnen· in the alienation of women from thetr . bodies,. the
d
.e;<.Pages ot• Illen and . wo ialitY ' and the male contro I of women ' s reproduct1on; ·
110 ression .° . f (]Jetr seXL
nee against women. It considers. . . to be a much
pohttcs
and int e 01ale v101e to be encompassed in the state, government or m . any
rep
bf03 er h heno01enon d for distributive justice. The rad.1caI f emm1sts
. . reJeCt
. ex1s11ng. .
d P deill~d. g a new definition of politics that emphasises the need to
centralised
p01tucs
. . by provti·t·calin world of non-hierarchical, unstructured poht1cal .. forms
but·1d a new . po,hips' which would reflect the complex network of parucular .
and .relattons · ··· m
h. and personal respons1b1lt11es · women ' s nurtunng · roe I . .Raa·1caI
relations
. . ipsa critique of political philosophy than bemg . a po 1·111ca
. 1 ph'l1osophy
fern1nislll,
. If everely criticises both the male dommate · d c1ass1ca
· 1 po1·111ca
. I d.15course
itse
and the' s early feminism's concern with · women ' s 1ack of po1·1t1ca· 1 power rather

than issues
If theaffecting
stress iswomen.
on women's traditional roles as alternatives to male
politics, then radical feminism perpetuates a male constn1cted difference. If the
feminists believe female alternatives as better, they construct another model
of gender dominance of women over men. Besides confusion about goals,
there are anxieties abotit how far they can go in projecting a separate sphere in
which women can act and interact autonomously outside the male-dominated
structures. For some this represents an organisational strategy, either as a
temporary measure till a more androgynous society emerges or one that allows
participation of both the sexes. For others who view men as enemy, separatism
,snot the means but ,the end, which is as final and total as it could be.
Feminists have faced divisions from within their ranks. In 1970s the
m enumsts contend that feminism must be subordinated to the socialist
Mamst f · · '
that a real while the rad'icals espouse the reverse point of view, emphasising
ovement
there is a fchdange m the nature of relations with men is impossible unless
values Theun . amental change m · the attttude
· of the society towards women's
oppressive
· syst nse of ·black fem1msm
· · identifying
· racism as yet another distinct
generalisations edm also added to the problem. It raises objection·s to the over-
movement It f ue to the dommance · of well-off white women in the women's
vie ws of wome
· orges, links wt·th the Thtrd-World
· feminists and provides new
ethnocentncity
. of n s experienc e an d aims
· to Western fem101sm · · revealtng
· the
cism makessometh of its. asSumpllons. The assumption of black feminism
th at ra · · '
e..expenenc~ l l ; w.11men unique and that only they
n
I

74 » Political Theory: Ideas and Concepts

could articulate them made them see white feminism as a form of rac·
As _a ~onsequence, black feminists insist that racism, like class relation."Z;
sociahsts, must be treated as a separate system of oppression from that of
gender and that black women must organise separately from the white. Th '
happens because of two divisive influences that the new waves of femini s;
e~ert on the women's movement. One is guilt, the result of which is to create a
h1erarc~y of oppression that judges the most oppressed as the most valued. The
second is that of relativism and 'difference' .
Most feminists readily admit and concede the uniqueness of every group
that needs to be expressed in view of 'deconstructionism', the central concern
of ~omen's Studies in the 1980s. The only way to liberation is deconstructing
a discourse_ and 'privileging' one's own oppressed identity. For a feminist,
~ec~nstructl?n of the dominant masculine discourse mean not only to expose
its hidden misogynist agenda but also to liberate all the women's voices and the
experiences they have been denied. The problem with relativism, if pushed to
~e extreme, is fragmentation. This is the same with deconstruction: no identity
is free from deconstruction. The consequence for feminism is a movement
of diverse and overlapping oppressed groups for whom feminism is the only
common factor but not the primary one. Furthennore, the removal of patriarchy
requires that women think as women and for women to think they need a
language and that in itself, is man-made. Therefore, the question as to whether
there is any such thing as 'thinking as a woman' or just different subjectivities
and no ·unified category of woman has arisen. If there is no certainty then what
is the status of women's oppression? By denying objectivity, postmodemism
robs feminism of its central axiom-its claim that women as a group suffer
systematic political disadvantage.
These contradictions have led Elshtain (1981) to criticise radical
feminism for failing to develop a theory of public-private relationship that is to
be integrated to the political process. Against the dreary interpretations of the
'personal is political', she wants to capture both the centrality of family and
the importance of politics. She objects to the over-politicisation of childrearing
that understates the importance of a permanent ·relationship between the child
and the caring adult. She also objects to the de-politicisation of 'politics' that
discourages feminists from addressing issues of citizenship or political authority.
Pateman (1983) and Okin (1991) have distanced themselves from the literal
interpretation of 'the personal is political' that radical feminism espouses. Many
contemporary feminists have begun to stress the fresh insights feminism can
bring to the political process by giving their input into it. Increasing attention is
paid to women's under-representation in decision-making bodies, to developi~g
legislations for sexual equality and re-theorising the notion of citizenship.
The political campaigns that women espouse are (a) gender free and equal
education, (b) equal employment opportunities with equal pay and conditions
along with the role of housework in the economy, the idea .of women's double
burden, safety measures and special care for working mothers, like day care
 Politics, Power and Authority 75

d fleXl"ble hours of work; (c) safe

. maternity, abortion , importance
. of
ntres
ce . g c 1an h"ld care and safe contraceptives;
h (d) sexual equality d
an steps to
tJteflO , al .olence and sexua1 arassment and (e) portrayal of
il10 · . exu vi . . . women and
ntatn s . rna literature, theatre, etc. m a d1gmfied manner
cO . art cine , ·
!llen JO '
as Consent
power . .
t and parsons, unlike the earher view, conceptualise power with reference
,A.rend . nd define it as fundamentally dependent on the consent of those
to erconflict,
whoill ait is exerc1s_e
. d. Wh"l .
I e some u~e power m a gener_ al sense, Arendt
ov. . being pubhc power and that 1t should be exclusively referred to
I1
.111s1sts onrnment . .
for it 1s an important feature of the modem state. She regards
the goveas that which' 'correspon s to the human ability not just to act but to
d
Po~erconcert. Power is never the property of an individual· it belongs to a
act tn , . . '
and remains 10 existence only so long as the group keeps together'
grouP .
(Arendt S?e
1973: 113). _clanfies that power_ should n~t _be confused with
strength or violence. Similar thoughts underpm Parsons idea that power is
a 'generalised medium of mobilising commitments or obligation for effective
collective action, a generalised facility of resource th~t rests on accepted forms
of legitimacy' (1967: 332). Parsons is concerned with the nature of power
and not with its specific effects. He is unwilling to treat power as anything
connected with compliance; power is a specific mechanism that operates to
bring about changes in the action of other.units, individual or collective, in the
processes of social interaction. Power is analogous to money in the economy
as a generalised capacity to secure common goals of a social system. Money
facilitates economic transactions and powe_r facilitates political transactions.
With money one could procure goods and services and with power one could
secure the performance of political obligations.
. More recently Foucault proposes a radical re-conceptualisation of power.
Till date, major concern of political thinkers has been to treat power in the
context of sovere1gnty · and legitimacy. As long as such power 1s · denve
· d from
actual or tact·t _consent of the people it was considered legitimate.
de .. Foucau1t

0
/;n8 fro~ th1 s tradition since he thinks the attributes of power are to be based
cut off th . very d"f'-'
oundattons 1 1 erent from sovereignty and· legitimacy. He w1s · hes 't0
To arn· e king's head in political theory that has still to be done' (1980: 2 l).
generalve at a ne w basis . of power, he makes a distinction between power 10 .
' on the one . hand, and domination .and government, on the other. His
theory of th
actions of~ower 18 based on 'structure of actions' which has an impact on e
be unstabl ree people. ·In such a conception, the power relationship will moStly
w·th1 the w
e and reversi"ble. His · concern is not with governmental 1egittmacy
·· but
th
\Veberian ;ys .a~d means by which the effect of power is felt. He follows e
than Just · lllakiaditton in c1a1mmg · · that the governmental funct10n · 1s · muc h more
ofthespec1· 1· ng and enforcmg · laws In Weber there is no total subord.mation ·
a ised and the tramed . . '
bureaucracy by the political top brass. Foucault
 76
Political Theo . l
ry. deas and Concepts
develops th.
• is argument b .
ambu of state b y statmg that gove . .
accounta ureaucracy in a variet rnment~l activity extends be
refonns ~? ~:nanc~, science and psy~h~:;ays, hke _specialised knowt:d the
substitute one sweatysf Incompatible with powe~ tcccaourd1~g to Foucault, Parti!:1of
f • 0 power b se m practic ar
oh umversalistic emancipat: y ;nother, rather than putting into m:t~uch reforms
t eory that resembles Fn' do~ hrom the effects of power itself H IOn a Proeess
of po · e nc Wilhel N' · owever su h
wer is inherently robI . m ietzsche' s ( 1844-1900) co ' . c_ a
for a universalistic disc~urs/:~1c as ~ou_cault categorically avoids
- . manc1pation free from effects of I tng
power.
AUTHORITY .
Authority is the right t . .
·· o exercise th
position that comes from havin b e power ~nd influence of a particular
regular, known and widely accepf d een placed m that position according to
?f. the acts and commands exerc. ed ~rocedures. It is the legitimisation process
It IS the legitimate power based ise 1m the name of those in authority In short
the constitution, which exp onh aw, whi~h in a democracy is derived frorr:
th 1 . . resses t e sovere1gnt f h
e egahty of laws It 1·s de . d f . y o t e people and guarantees
· nve rom notions f
mean producing invent1·ng or . fl . h o auctor and auctoritas which
' m uencmg t e sphe f · •.
command (Benn and Peters 1959· 18) B "d b . re o opm1on, counsel or
rule it also . . . es1 es emg understood as the right to
' means expertise. The first one means to be in authority while th
second u~age refers _to the theoretical knowledge (to be an authority). In bot:
t~e m~anm~s, there Is an acceptance of the fact that an individual subordinates
?Is will or Judgement to that of another person in a manner that is binding
mdependent of the particular content of what that person says or requires. If
pers~n'_s authority is justified then it is de Jure authority, and if it is. recognised
then It IS de facto authority. Authority is different from power, being a relation,
de Jure and not necessarily de facto: authority is a right to act rather than the
power (not coercive or naked) to act. Hobbes fuses the two together, for their
separation, in his view, is fatal. A tyrant or a despot is authoritarian, but cannot
be considered authority, for the latter in the true sense is derived from rules and
must be limited and restrained. Authoritarianism demands absolute obedience
of the individual as against individual freedom. Therefore, authority is used in
both de Jure and de facto senses. Hobbes uses authority in the de jure sense
meaning a set of proc~dural rules which determines who shall be the 'auctor' or
'in authority', 'the authorities' or 'an authority'. In its de facto sense as used ~y
de Jouvenel authority involves reference to a man whose word in fact goes m
some sphere-as when one says, 'He exercised authority over his me~• (Benn
and Peters 1959: 19). De facto authority can secure obedience without a rule
t
or entitlement and yet without threats, for obedience in many such inS a~ces
is out of fear of reappraisal. As long as the rule is generally respected de !u1~es
. ·11 b"d 'by officia
authority will also be de facto. This means that people w1 a 1 e . d 10
· · h. pointed and enut1e
suggestions because they recogmse m 1m a person ap