MAJESTIC PLUS HOLDING INTERNATIONAL, INC., petitioner, vs.

BULLION INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION ,

respondent.
Facts:
1. In a Resolution passed, the City Council of Manila authorized its Mayor to enter into a
contract with any reputable corporation for the long term lease and development of a
non-income generating property of the City located within Binondo, Manila.
2. Pursuant to such authority, the Office of the City Mayor issued an Invitation to Pre-
qualify and Bid for the said development project.
3. Subsequently, herein respondent company, Bullion Investment and Development
Corporation (Bullion) participated and won in the bidding.
4. Thus, the City of Manila, through then City Mayor Joselito Atienza, and Bullion,
represented by its President Roland Lautchang, entered into a Contract for the lease of
the said property for a period of 25 years. Under the Contract, Bullion, as lessee, agreed
to construct two 4-storey buildings, one of which shall be used as an extension office of
the Manila City Hall for its institutional services, while the other shall be used for
commercial purposes.
5. Bullion was unable to finish the construction of the commercial building. Bullion then
sought the help and was able to convince petitioner corporation, Majestic Plus Holding
International, Incorporation (Majestic), to invest in Bullion's business venture, particularly
the completion of the construction of its commercial building which was intended to be
used as a mall (Meisic Mall). CAIHTE
6. Bullion, represented by its President, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
with Majestic, which was represented by one Dionisio N. Yao.
7. Following the execution of the MOA, Majestic issued 5 checks, on various dates, for an
aggregate amount of P57,000,000.00 in favor of Bullion, as partial payment of the 80%
equity interest in the latter.
8. Bullion acknowledged such payment. However, it alleged that an additional 4 checks,
representing a total amount of P31,000,000.00, which were subsequently issued by
Majestic were dishonored because of "Stop Payment" orders.
9. Bullion sent letters to Majestic demanding payment in full of the latter's outstanding
obligations, otherwise the former would be constrained to rescind the MOA.
10. For Majestic's failure to heed Bullion's demands, the latter sent another letter to the
former informing it that Bullion had elected to rescind the MOA.
11. Meanwhile, Majestic took over the supervision and eventually finished the construction
of the Meisic Mall.
12. Based on the Summary of Payments Majestic claims that, aside from the
P57,000,000.00 it had earlier paid to Bullion, it also incurred expenses for the purpose of
sustaining the construction of Meisic Mall and the acquisition of various equipment for
use inside the mall in the sum of P134,522,803.22. Thus, the aggregate amount alleged
to have been invested by Majestic is P191,522,803.22.
13. With the completion of major construction works and the installation of the
aforementioned equipment, the Meisic Mall became operational. Majestic conducted
business therein by renting out the mall's leasable spaces to stallholders and by
employing personnel for the security, maintenance and upkeep of the mall's premises.
14. Respondent, aided by several police personnel and security guards, entered the
premises and took physical possession and control of Meisic Mall.
15. This prompted Majestic to file a Complaint for Specific Performance, Injunction and
Damages with a Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction against Bullion, together with several other persons.
16. Majestic alleged that it has become a majority shareholder of Bullion by reason of its
P191,522,803.22 investment, which comprises 95.76% of the agreed P200,000,000.00
authorized capital stock of Bullion. Majestic also claims that the subject MOA remains
valid and binding and that Bullion failed to comply with its undertakings thereunder.
17. In its Answer, Bullion denied the material allegations of Majestic's complaint alleging the
defense that it was the latter which, in fact, violated the provisions of the MOA causing
Bullion to rescind the said agreement.
18. Initially, the instant case was treated as an intra-corporate dispute and raffled to RTC of
Manila, a commercial court, wherein several Orders were issued against Bullion, and
eventually, a decision was rendered in favor of Majestic.
19. Bullion assailed the RTC Orders via a special civil action for certiorari filed with the CA,
while respondent's stockholders filed an appeal of the RTC Decision. These 2 actions
were subsequently consolidated by the CA and in its Decision via a special division of
five, unanimously set aside the Decision of the commercial court and remanded the case
to Branch 24, RTC of Manila to be tried as an ordinary specific performance case.
20. However, on Majestic's motion, the presiding judge of Branch 24 subsequently inhibited
himself from the case prompting the executive judge to assign the same to Branch 46,
RTC of Manila which is also a commercial court.
21. The parties did not question the jurisdiction of Branch 46.
22. In the ensuing proceedings before Branch 46, the parties jointly moved that the case be
submitted for summary judgment, to which the RTC acceded.
23. Branch 46, RTC of Manila rendered a Decision in favor of Petitioner.
24. Bullion and its directors appealed the above RTC Decision with the CA.
25. Majestic filed a Motion for Execution Pending Appeal which was granted by the RTC by
virtue of a Special Order and two other related orders.
26. Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was issued.
27. Per Sheriff's Return, the Writ was served on Bullion and was thereby immediately
implemented.
28. In accordance with the Writ, the Sheriff was able to completely and successfully remove
the physical possession and control of Meisic Mall from Bullion and deliver the same to
Majestic.
29. Bullion filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA seeking the nullification of the: (1)
Special Order granting the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal; (2) Order granting
police assistance to the implementing Sheriff; (3) Order granting the appointment of a
Special Sheriff; and (4) Writ of Execution Pending Appeal. Bullion also prayed for the
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Mandatory Injunction.
30. CA granted the aforesaid Petition and annulled and set aside the Special Order and the
two (2) other assailed Orders.
31. The CA basically ruled that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting
Majestic's motion for execution pending appeal since the "good reasons" required by
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are found to be absent in the instant case.
32. Majestic filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the CA, which was denied in its
Resolution.
33. During the pendency, the CA promulgated its Decision on Bullion's appeal of the July 28,
2011 Decision of the RTC. The CA essentially ruled that since there are genuine issues
of fact in the present case which require the presentation of evidence, the RTC should
have proceeded to conduct a full-blown trial and should have refrained from issuing a
summary judgment. Hence, directing defendant-appellant Bullion Investment and
 Development Corporation to maintain/restore plaintiff Majestic in the physical possession
and control of the entire Meisic Mall premises is declared to be of no force and effect.
The right of defendantappellant Bullion Investment and Development Corporation to
physically possess, manage and control the Meisic Mall is recognized. As to the other
aspects of the case, the case is REMANDED to the RTC of Manila, to be re-raffled to a
regular court and not to a special commercial court, for further proceedings and proper
disposition, according to regular procedure.
34. Aggrieved by the CA Decision, Majestic comes to this Court via the instant Petition.

Issue/s:
I. WON the RTC, Branch 46 of Manila has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
instant case.
II. WON the RTC was correct in considering the case appropriate for summary
judgment.
III. WON there was propriety of ordering the execution of such Decision pending appeal.

Ruling:
I.
1. Yes.
2. Bullion contends that neither Branch 24 nor Branch 46 of the RTC of Manila has
jurisdiction over the suit for specific performance filed by Majestic. Bullion argues that
having been designated as special commercial courts, the jurisdiction of Branches 24
and 46 is limited to trying and deciding special commercial cases only.
3. On the other hand, Majestic counters that the designation of RTCs as special
commercial courts has not, in any way, limited their jurisdiction to hear and decide cases
of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special proceedings.
4. As a basic premise, the Court reiterates the principle that a court's acquisition of
jurisdiction over a particular case's subject matter is different from incidents pertaining to
the exercise of its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred
by law, whereas a court's exercise of jurisdiction, unless provided by the law itself, is
governed by the Rules of Court or by the orders issued from time to time by the
Supreme Court.
5. The matter of whether the RTC resolves an issue in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court is only a matter of procedure
and has nothing to do with the question of jurisdiction.
6. Moreover, it should be noted that Special Commercial Courts (SCCs) are still considered
courts of general jurisdiction.
7. Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code,
directs merely the Supreme Court's designation of RTC branches that shall exercise
jurisdiction over intra-corporate disputes. The assignment of intra-corporate disputes to
SCCs is only for the purpose of streamlining the workload of the RTCs so that certain
branches thereof like the SCCs can focus only on a particular subject matter.
8. Nothing in the language of the law suggests the diminution of jurisdiction of those RTCs
to be designated as SCCs. The RTC exercising jurisdiction over an intra-corporate
dispute can be likened to an RTC exercising its probate jurisdiction or sitting as a special
agrarian court. The designation of the SCCs as such has not in any way limited their
 jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of all nature, whether civil, criminal or special
proceedings.
9. Stated differently, in the ruling case of Gonzales, et al. v. GJH Land, Inc., et al., the
Court held that: . . . the fact that a particular branch . . . has been designated as a
Special Commercial Court does not shed the RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary
civil cases under the imprimatur of statutory law, i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129.
To restate, the designation of Special Commercial Courts was merely intended as a
procedural tool to expedite the resolution of commercial cases in line with the court's
exercise of jurisdiction. This designation was not made by statute but only by an internal
Supreme Court rule under its authority to promulgate rules governing matters of
procedure and its constitutional mandate to supervise the administration of all courts and
the personnel thereof. An internal rule promulgated by the Court cannot go beyond the
commanding statute.
10. The designation of Special Commercial Courts is, to stress, merely an incident related to
the court's exercise of jurisdiction.
11. The RTC's general jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases is therefore not abdicated by an
internal rule streamlining court procedure.
12. It is clear that Branch 46, RTC of Manila, despite being designated as an SCC, has
jurisdiction to hear and decide Majestic's suit for specific performance.

II.
1. No.
2. Summary judgment is a procedural device resorted to in order to avoid long drawn out
litigations and useless delays.
3. Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dispose of cases where
the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and
affidavits.
4. Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the
court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to
any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
5. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by
the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment.
6. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a
summary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.
7. In Calubaquib, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines , the Court had the occasion to
discuss the nature of a summary judgment and to reiterate the conditions that should be
met before it can be resorted to, to wit: An examination of the Rules will readily show
that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. It assumes a scrutiny of facts in a
summary hearing after the filing of a motion fair summary judgment by one party
supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon
the adverse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affidavits,
depositions, or other documents . . . . In spite of its expediting character, relief by
summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement
of vigilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in
derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial of his case. At any rate, a party who
moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the
absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is
so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any
doubt as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant.
8. A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
9. The test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the existence of a
genuine issue of fact, as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim.
A factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its nature it is
evident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the same has
neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it. This usually
happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sake of having an issue
and thereby gaining delay, taking advantage of the fact that their answers are not
under oath anyway.
10. In determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a
summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or
contents of the pleadings.
11. A summary judgment is proper so long as "the affidavits, depositions, and
admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not
genuine."
12. The filing of a motion and the conduct of a hearing on the motion are, therefore,
important because these enable the court to determine if the parties' pleadings,
affidavits and exhibits in support of, or against, the motion are sufficient to overcome the
opposing papers and adequately justify the finding that, as a matter of law, the claim is
clearly meritorious or there is no defense to the action.
13. The non-observance of the procedural requirements of filing a motion and conducting a
hearing on the said motion warrants the setting aside of the summary judgment.
14. It is apparent that the RTC did not comply with the procedural guidelines when it
ordered that the case be submitted for summary judgment without first conducting a
hearing to determine if there are indeed no genuine issues of fact that would
necessitate trial.
15. Undoubtedly, the case at bar may not, even by the most liberal or strained
interpretation, be considered as one not involving genuine issues of fact which
necessitates presentation of evidence to determine which of the two conflicting
assertions is correct.
16. A careful examination of the pleadings will show that Majestic's causes of action in its
Complaint are anchored on Bullion's supposed violations of the provision of the
subject MOA. On the other hand, Majestic's allegations are controverted by Bullion
who, in a like manner, asserts that by virtue of Majestic's failure to comply with
the provisions of the said MOA, it decided to rescind the same. These diametrically
opposed and conflicting claims present a factual dispute which can be resolved and
settled only by means of evidence presented during trial.
17. The documents and memorandum submitted by the parties all the more show that the
facts pleaded are disputed or contested.
18. The main issue is the conflicting allegations coming from both parties.
19. These allegations tender genuine issues of fact necessitating the presentation of
evidence, thus, precluding the rendition of a summary judgment. Certainly, the
issue as to who violated the subject MOA, thus, raised by the parties and formulated by
the RTC in its Amended Pre-Trial Order, as well as the particular matters as to whether
or not the said MOA has been validly rescinded and whether or not Majestic has, in fact,
incurred P134,522,803.22 in completing the construction of and in maintaining the
operation of the Meisic Mall, are issues which may not be categorized as frivolous and
sham so as to dispense with the presentation of evidence in a formal trial. As to the
issue of rescission of the subject MOA, Bullion contends that it rescinded the MOA
because Majestic failed to pay several installments of its obligations which are due
 thereunder, which failure gives Bullion the right to rescind the same. On the other hand,
Majestic opposes the rescission insisting that the MOA remains valid and binding for
Bullion's failure to comply with the conditions of a valid rescission as set under the MOA.
Majestic likewise argues that it was, in fact, Bullion which violated the provisions of the
MOA. It is a settled rule that extrajudicial rescission has a legal effect where the other
party does not oppose it. Where it is objected to, a judicial determination of the issue is
still necessary. Thus, considering Majestic's strong opposition to Bullion's rescission of
the MOA, and since both parties allege that the other had violated the MOA, the Court
agrees with the CA that the issue of rescission necessitates judicial intervention which
entails examination by the trial court of evidence presented by the parties in a full-blown
trial. Also, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that the aggregate sum of
P134,522,803.22 alleged by Majestic as expenses it incurred in completing the
construction of the Meisic Mall, as well as in the acquisition of equipment and facilities
used therein, is yet to be substantiated by competent proof. The only evidence
presented by Majestic to support its claims is an Affidavit executed by the Finance
Comptroller of its allied corporation, accompanied by a summary of Payments Made to
Meisic Mall. Majestic has yet to present receipts or other competent documentary
evidence to prove the said payments. Moreover, these claims were specifically denied
by Bullion in its Answer to the Complaint. In view of such denial, Majestic's claims are,
thus, subject to confirmation and validation by proof during trial proper.
20. It is clear that the RTC erred in rendering its assailed summary judgment. Thus, the CA
did not commit error in setting aside the said summary judgment.

III.
1. Moot and academic.
2. In view of this Court's affirmance of the CA ruling which reversed and set aside the July
28, 2011 Decision of the RTC, there is no longer any RTC judgment that may be
executed. Hence, the issue as to whether or not there are "good reasons" to execute the
assailed Decision of the RTC has become moot and academic.
3. This is in accordance with our ruling in Osmeña III v. Social Security System of the
Philippines , where we defined a moot and academic case or issue as follows: A case or
issue is considered moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that an adjudication of the case or a
declaration on the issue would be of no practical value or use. In such instance, there is
no actual substantial relief which a petitioner would be entitled to, and which would be
negated by the dismissal of the petition. Courts generally decline jurisdiction over such
case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness — save when, among others, a compelling
constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public; or when the case is capable of repetition yet evading
judicial review.
4. This Court no longer finds any need to discuss and resolve the other issues raised. As to
who between the parties has the right of possession, control and operation of the Meisic
Mall, suffice it to say that the Court agrees with the disquisition of the CA in its October
23, 2013 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 97537, which sustains the restoration of
possession and control of the Meisic Mall in favor of Bullion, to wit: Basic is the rule in
corporation law that the business and affairs of a corporation [are] handled by a Board of
Directors and not the controlling stockholder. All corporate powers are exercised, all
business conducted and all properties controlled by the Board of Directors. Hence, [even
granting that] Majestic has become the controlling stockholder of the Bullion . . . by itself
alone, it cannot have the physical possession and operate the business of the Meisic
Mall.
 5. Finally, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA which ordered the remand of the case
to the RTC of Manila to be re-raffled to a non-commercial court for further proceedings
and proper disposition.

ATTY. MANGONTAWAR M. GUBAT , petitioner, vs . NATIONAL POWER

CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts:
1. Plaintiffs Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba, and Acur Macarampat separately filed civil suits
for damages against the NPC before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur in Marawi
City (RTC), respectively docketed as Civil Case Nos. 294-90, 295-90, and 296-90. In the
said complaint, plaintiffs were represented by Atty. Linang Mandangan (Atty.
Mandangan) and petitioner herein, whose services were engaged at an agreed
attorney's fees of P30,000.00 for each case and P600.00 for every appearance.
2. Petitioner was the one who signed the complaints on behalf of himself and Atty.
Mandangan.
3. During the course of the proceedings, the three complaints were consolidated because
the plaintiffs' causes of action are similar. They all arose from NPC's refusal to pay the
amounts demanded by the plaintiffs for the cost of the improvements on their respective
lands which were destroyed when the NPC constructed the Marawi- Malabang
Transmission Line.
4. On the day of the initial hearing on the merits, NPC and its counsel failed to appear.
5. Consequently, respondent was declared in default.
6. Despite the plea of NPC for the lifting of the default order, the RTC of Marawi City,
Branch 8, rendered in favor of the herein plaintiffs and against the defendant National
Power Corporation as represented by its President Ernesto Aboitiz, P.M. Durias and
Rodrigo P. Falcon, ordering the latter jointly and severally.
7. NPC appealed to the CA.
8. During the pendency of the appeal, Atty. Gubat filed an Entry and Notice of Charging
Lien to impose his attorney's lien of P30,000.00 and appearance fees of P2,000.00 on
each of the three civil cases he handled, totalling P96,000.00.
9. NPC moved to dismiss its appeal alleging that the parties had arrived at a settlement.
Attached to the motion were acknowledgment receipts signed by plaintiffs Acur
Macarampat, Ala Mambuay, and Norma Maba, who received P90,060.00, P90,000.00,
and P90,050.00 respectively, in full satisfaction of their claims against the NPC. The
motion stated that copies were furnished to Atty. Mandangan and herein petitioner,
although it was only Atty. Mandangan's signature which appeared therein.
10. CA rendered its Decision disposing thus: the Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration to Lift Order of Default dated January 25, 1991; and the Decision dated
April 24, 1991, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the records of Civil Case
Nos. 294-90, 295-90 and 296-90 are hereby ordered remanded to the court of origin for
new trial.
11. After the cases were remanded to the RTC, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on his attorney's fees. He claimed that the plaintiffs and the NPC deliberately
did not inform him about the execution of the compromise agreement, and that said
parties connived with each other in entering into the compromise agreement in order to
unjustly deprive him of his attorney's fees. Furthermore, he alleged:
 That, in view of such settlement, there are no more genuine issues between the parties
in the above-entitled cases except as to the attorney's fees; As such, this Honorable
Court may validly render a partial summary judgment on the claim for attorney's fees;
and
That the undersigned counsel hereby MOVES for a partial summary judgment on his
lawful attorney's fees based on the pleadings and documents on file with the records of
this case.
12. Petitioner thus prayed that a partial summary judgment be rendered on his attorney's
fees and that NPC be ordered to pay him directly his lawful attorney's fees of P32,000.00
in each of the above cases, for a total of P96,000.00.
13. NPC opposed the motion for partial summary of judgment. It alleged that a client may
compromise a suit without the intervention of the lawyer and that petitioner's claim for
attorney's fees should be made against the plaintiffs. NPC likewise claimed that it settled
the case in good faith and that plaintiffs were paid in full satisfaction of their claims which
included attorney's fees.
14. RTC issued an Order granting petitioner's motion for summary judgment. It found that
the parties to the compromise agreement connived to petitioner's prejudice which
amounts to a violation of the provisions of the Civil Code on Human Relations. The
Order reads: plaintiffs Ala Mambuay, Norma Maba and Acur Macarampat as well as
defendant National Power Corporation are hereby ordered to pay jointly and solidarily
Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat the sum of P96,000.00.
15. NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the motion was denied by the trial court.
16. NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the court a quo for granting petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. It prayed
that the subject order be set aside insofar as NPC is concerned.
17. NPC maintained that it acted in good faith in the execution of the compromise
settlement. It likewise averred that the lower court's award of attorney's fees amounting
to P96,000.00 was clearly based on the award of attorney's fees in the April 24, 1991
Decision of the trial court which had already been reversed and set aside by the CA.
18. Moreover, NPC contended that petitioner cannot enforce his charging lien because it
presupposes that he has secured a favorable money judgment for his clients. At any
rate, since petitioner is obviously pursuing the compensation for the services he
rendered to his clients, thus, recourse should only be against them, the payment being
their personal obligation and not of respondent.
19. NPC further alleged that even assuming that the subject attorney's fees are those that
fall under Article 2208 of the Civil Code which is in the concept of indemnity for damages
to be paid to the winning party in a litigation, such fees belong to the clients and not to
the lawyer, and this form of damages has already been paid directly to the plaintiffs.
20. On the other hand, petitioner claimed that he was not informed of the compromise
agreement or furnished a copy of NPC's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. He alleged that the
same was received only by Atty. Mandangan who neither signed any of the pleadings
nor appeared in any of the hearings before the RTC.
21. Petitioner clarified that his motion for a partial summary judgment was neither a request
for the revival of the vacated April 24, 1991 Decision nor an enforcement of the lien, but
a grant of his contingent fees by the trial court as indemnity for damages resulting
from the fraudulent act of NPC and of his clients who conspired to deprive him of
the fees due him.
22. He asserted that NPC cannot claim good faith because it knew of the existence of his
charging lien when it entered into a compromise with the plaintiffs.
23. Petitioner also alleged that NPC's remedy should have been an ordinary appeal and not
a petition for certiorari because the compromise agreement had settled the civil suits.
 Thus, when the trial court granted the motion for partial summary judgment on his fees, it
was a final disposition of the entire case.
24. He also argued that the issue of bad faith is factual which cannot be a subject of a
certiorari petition.
25. He also insisted that NPC's petition was defective for lack of a board resolution
authorizing Special Attorney Comie Doromal (Atty. Doromal) of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) to sign on NPC's behalf.
26. CA rendered the herein assailed Decision ruling that: The reasoning of Atty. Gubat is a
'crude palusot' (a sneaky fallacious reasoning) for how can one enforce a part of a
decision which has been declared void and vacated. In legal contemplation, there is no
more decision because, precisely, the case was remanded to the court a quo for further
proceeding… The Court issues the writ of certiorari and strikes down as void the Order
dated March 15, 2000 granting Atty. Mangontawar M. Gubat's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment as well as the Order dated June 27, 2000 denying petitioner
National Power Corporation's Motion for Reconsideration.
27. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the motion was denied by the CA.
28. Petitioner insists on the propriety of the trial court's order of summary judgment
on his attorney's fees. At the same time, he imputes grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the CA for entertaining
respondent's Petition for Certiorari. He maintains that the petition should have
been dismissed outright for being the wrong mode of appeal.

Issue/s:
I. WON the petitioner was right in resorting to Rule 65.
II. WON the petitioner's resort to summary judgment is proper.
III. WON a client may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of
the lawyer.
IV. WON the CA soundly exercised its discretion in resorting to a liberal application
of the rules.
Ruling:
I.
1. No.
2. At the outset, the petition should have been dismissed outright because petitioner resorted to
the wrong mode of appeal by filing the instant petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. Section 1 of the said Rule explicitly provides that a petition for certiorari
is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
3. In this case, the remedy of appeal by way of a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 is not only available but also the proper mode of appeal.
4. For all intents and purposes, we find that petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 as a substitute for a lost appeal.
5. Under Section 2 of Rule 45, petitioner has 15 days from notice of the said Resolution within
which to file his petition for review on certiorari. As such, he should have filed his appeal on or
before February 12, 2005. However, records show that the petition was posted on March 1,
2005, or long after the period to file the appeal has lapsed.
6. At any rate, even if we treat the instant petition as one filed under Rule 45, the same
should still be denied for failure on the part of the petitioner to show that the CA
committed a reversible error warranting the exercise of our discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.

II.
1. No.
2. Not entitled to an immediate relief as a matter of law, for the existence of bad faith is a
genuine issue of fact to be tried. AICHEc
3. A summary judgment is allowed only if, after hearing, the court finds that except as to
the amount of damages, the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and admissions
show no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.
4. The purpose of a summary judgment is to avoid drawn out litigations and useless
delays because the facts appear undisputed to the mind of the court.
5. Such judgment is generally based on the facts proven summarily by affidavits,
depositions, pleadings, or admissions of the parties.
6. For a full-blown trial to be dispensed with, the party who moves for summary judgment
has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of genuine issues of fact, or that
the issue posed is patently insubstantial as to constitute a genuine issue. "Genuine
issue" means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived.
7. Petitioner pleaded for a summary judgment on his fees on the claim that the parties
intentionally did not inform him of the settlement. He alleged that he never received a
copy of NPC's Motion to Withdraw Appeal before the CA and that instead, it was another
lawyer who was furnished and who acknowledged receipt of the motion.
8. When he confronted his clients, he was allegedly told that the NPC deceived them into
believing that what they received was only a partial payment exclusive of the attorney's
fees.
9. NPC contested these averments. It claimed good faith in the execution of the
compromise agreement. It stressed that the attorney's fees were already deemed
included in the monetary consideration given to the plaintiffs for the compromise.
10. The above averments clearly pose factual issues which make the rendition of summary
judgment not proper.
11. Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong. It is synonymous with fraud, in that it involves a design to mislead or deceive
another.
12. The trial court should have exercised prudence by requiring the presentation of evidence
in a formal trial to determine the veracity of the parties' respective assertions.
13. Whether NPC and the plaintiffs connived and acted in bad faith is a question of fact and
is evidentiary.
14. Bad faith has to be established by the claimant with clear and convincing evidence, and
this necessitates an examination of the evidence of all the parties.
15. As certain facts pleaded were being contested by the opposing parties, such would not
warrant a rendition of summary judgment.
16. Moreover, the validity or the correct interpretation of the alleged compromise
agreements is still in issue in view of the diverse interpretations of the parties thereto.
17. In its assailed Decision of September 9, 2002, the CA did not rule on the validity of the
alleged compromise agreements. There is still a factual issue on whether the NPC and
the plaintiffs had already validly entered into a compromise agreement.
18. According to the NPC, the amounts it paid to the plaintiffs were in full satisfaction of their
claims.
19. Plaintiffs claim otherwise. They insist that the amounts they received were exclusive of
attorney's claim. They also assert that NPC undertook to pay the said attorney's fees to
herein petitioner.

III.
1. Yes.
2. A client may enter into a compromise agreement without the intervention of the lawyer,
but the terms of the agreement should not deprive the counsel of his compensation for
the professional services he had rendered. If so, the compromise shall be subjected to
said fees. If the client and the adverse party who assented to the compromise are found
to have intentionally deprived the lawyer of his fees, the terms of the compromise,
insofar as they prejudice the lawyer, will be set aside, making both parties accountable
to pay the lawyer's fees. But in all cases, it is the client who is bound to pay his lawyer
for his legal representation.
3. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It is a consensual contract,
binding upon the signatories/privies, and it has the effect of res judicata. This cannot
however affect third persons who are not parties to the agreement.
4. Contrary to petitioner's contention, a client has an undoubted right to settle a suit without
the intervention of his lawyer, for he is generally conceded to have the exclusive control
over the subject-matter of the litigation and may, at any time before judgment, if acting in
good faith, compromise, settle, and adjust his cause of action out of court without his
attorney's intervention, knowledge, or consent, even though he has agreed with his
attorney not to do so.
5. Hence, a claim for attorney's fees does not void the compromise agreement and is no
obstacle to a court approval. However, counsel is not without remedy.
6. As the validity of a compromise agreement cannot be prejudiced, so should not be the
payment of a lawyer's adequate and reasonable compensation for his services should
the suit end by reason of the settlement.
7. The terms of the compromise subscribed to by the client should not be such that will
amount to an entire deprivation of his lawyer's fees, especially when the contract is on a
contingent fee basis. In this sense, the compromise settlement cannot bind the lawyer as
a third party. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice or
imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse on the part of
his counsel.
8. The duty of the court is not only to ensure that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful
manner, but also to see to it that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
9. Even if the compensation of a counsel is dependent only upon winning a case he himself
secured for his client, the subsequent withdrawal of the case on the client's own volition
should never completely deprive counsel of any legitimate compensation for his
professional services.
10. In all cases, a client is bound to pay his lawyer for his services.
11. The determination of bad faith only becomes significant and relevant if the adverse party
will likewise be held liable in shouldering the attorney's fees.
12. Petitioner's compensation is a personal obligation of his clients who have benefited from
his legal services prior to their execution of the compromise agreement. This is strictly a
contract between them.
13. NPC would only be made liable if it was shown that it has connived with the petitioner's
clients or acted in bad faith in the execution of the compromise agreement for the
purpose of depriving petitioner of his lawful claims for attorney's fees. In each case, NPC
should be held solidarily liable for the payment of the counsel's compensation.
IV.
1. Yes.
2. There are no vested right to technicalities.
3. Concededly, the NPC may have pursued the wrong remedy when it filed a petition for
certiorari instead of an appeal since the ruling on attorney's fees is already a ruling on
the merits.
4. RTC gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it
ordered NPC solidarily liable with the plaintiffs for the payment of the attorney's fees.
The rule that a petition for certiorari
is dismissible when the mode of appeal is available admits of exceptions, to wit: (a) when the
writs issued are null; and, (b) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of
judicial authority. Clearly, respondent has shown its
entitlement to the exceptions.
5. The same liberal application should also apply to the question of the alleged lack of
authority of Atty. Doromal to execute the certification of non-forum shopping for lack of a
board resolution from the NPC. True, only individuals vested with authority by a valid
board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of the
corporation, and proof of such authority must be attached to the petition, the failure of
which will be sufficient cause for dismissal. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that Atty.
Doromal does not enjoy the presumption that he is authorized to represent respondent in
filing the Petition for Certiorari before the CA. As Special Attorney, he is one of the
counsels of NPC in the proceedings before the trial court, and the NPC never
questioned his authority to sign the petition for its behalf.
6. In any case, the substantive issues we have already discussed are justifiable reasons to
relax the rules of procedure. We cannot allow a patently wrong judgment to be
implemented because of technical lapses. This ratiocination is in keeping with the policy
to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action or proceeding.