Tutorial 2 Criminal Law

Name: Nur Qistina Aisyah Binti Mohd Nazaro

Student Id: 2021488276
Class: LWB04I
Course Code: LAW555

On the day of the incident, Dato’ Mazra was about to leave his house when his wife
questioned his destination, in a quarrelsome language. An argument broke out between the
two when his wife brought up her suspicion that he is having an affair and is about to go
meet the woman in question. Dato’ Mazra denied this and it further angered his wife.

The argument continued as Dato’ Mazra proceeded to get out of the house. His wife
got a little aggressive and blocked the door way. Dato’ Mazra pushed her aside and got to
his car. When Dato’ Mazra started the engine, she held on to the right-hand side-mirror of
the car and pleaded for him not to go. Dato’ Mazra, out of anger, ignored her and proceeded
to reverse the car out of the porch. The force of the reversing car caused his wife to fall, out
of Dato’ Mazra’s sight. At this moment, his wife had actually fallen underneath the car. Dato’
Mazra, not seeing this, proceeded to reverse his car rather violently and dragged his wife
along, underneath the car. Then he moved the car forward and drove off.

When Dato’ Mazra drove off, he had actually driven over his wife’s body. His wife
died due to the injuries suffered. Dato’ Mazra, in his defense said that, he didn’t see his wife
fell under the car and didn’t hear anything, since the car is very well insulated
(sound-proofed) and he did not realize driving over her body since the car has very good
suspensions. He thought he was just driving over an undulation in the road surface.

Dato’ Mazra was arrested in connection with the incident.

As a prosecutor, suggest a suitable charge against Dato’ Mazra and your legal reasons for
the suggestion.
Issue

The issue is whether Dato' Mazra can be held accountable for his wife's death under
Section 304A of the Penal Code.

Law

According to Section 299 of the Penal Code, culpable murder is defined as

intentionally causing the death of a person. If the necessary degree of mens rea described in
Section 299 is present but not the special degrees of mens rea mentioned in Section 300 of
the Penal Code, or if the evidence is sufficient to establish murder but one or more
exceptions to Section 300 of the Penal Code can be established, the crime is considered
culpable homicide.

Contrarily, Section 300 of the Penal Code states that, with the following exceptions,
culpable homicide is considered murder if any of the following conditions are met: (a) the act
by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; (b) the act is done
with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause
the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or (c) the act is done with the intention
of

The court held in Nomezam Apandy that in order to establish a prima facie case of
murder, the prosecution must show that the deceased died, that those injuries caused the
deceased's death, that the accused was responsible for those injuries that led to the
deceased's death, and that the act was committed with the mens rea required by any
provision of Section 300. In contrast, it was determined in Mohan Dass Ganesan that the
presence of a distinct mens rea, which consists of four mental attitudes in the presence of
which the lesser sin becomes greater, is what distinguishes the crimes of culpable homicide
and murder. Although a killing act may fit into one or more of the four categories listed in
Section 300 of the Penal Code, only one of the four categories must be shown in order for
the conduct to be deemed a murder.

According to Penal Code Section 300(d), if someone knows something is harmful or

about to become dangerous, it will very certainly result in death. The limb imagines
performing an impendingly deadly deed on the broad populace rather than on a specific
person. In Public Prosecutor v. Mahfar bin Sairan, the court determined that it is suffice for
the accused to simply know that the deceased will suffer some serious harm. No less than
the knowledge that his actions would almost certainly result in death or serious bodily harm
that could result in death qualifies as the necessary information. The accused must have
known that his behaviour was so gravely reckless and imminently dangerous that it would
lead to death. The limb limits culpability to situations in which there is no justification for
taking the danger of killing someone. When the accused provides an explanation for taking
the risk, culpable homicide committed with awareness that the act is about to be risky will not
constitute murder. It refers to something that actually justifies the act rather than just making
it less offensive.

According to the facts of our current case, Dato' Marza and his wife were engaged in
a contentious disagreement as he was leaving the house. Dato' Mazra shoved his wife aside
and entered his car after she became a little combative and blocked the doorway. It was also
stated that as Dato Mazra started the engine, his wife was clutching the right side mirror of
the car and pleading with him not to go. However, Dato Mazra ignored her out of fury from
the dispute and continued to reverse the automobile out of the porch. His wife was thrown
from Dato Mazra's sight by the force of the reversing car. Dato Mazra failed to notice that his
wife had actually fallen underneath the car at that same moment, so he violently reversed
the vehicle while dragging his wife along underneath. He then drove off after moving the
automobile ahead. Dato Mazra's wife passed away from the injuries she sustained. In
contrast to Section 300(d) of the Penal Code and the other three sections under Section 300
of the Penal Code, Dato Mazra's awareness that moving the car backwards and forwards in
the manner he did was unsafe had to be established. The knowledge necessary is no less
than the awareness that his actions would almost certainly result in death or serious bodily
harm. Nothing less than that would do. According to the case's facts and the ruling in Public
Prosecutor v. Mahfar bin Sairan, which took into account Dato' Mazra's wife's position at the
time the car moved, Dato' Mazra could not have reasonably been expected to know that his
driving style would put others in immediate danger and result in death.

According to Penal Code Section 304A, whoever causes the death of another person
by engaging in any reckless or careless behaviour that does not constitute culpable murder
shall be punished with imprisonment for a time that may not exceed two years, a fine, or
both. Nidamarti Nagabhushanam defines the terms "rash" and "negligence" as the
disregarding of risks that the accused would have recognised if he had exercised proper
caution. Rash is defined as the offender having considered the possibility of the malicious
consequences occurring but having decided to run the risk. The deceased was gripping the
right wing mirror of the accused's car as he reversed, and this is also evident in Public
Prosecutor v. Mahfar Sairan. Shortly after the woman's scream was heard, the deceased
was discovered laying on the road outside, around 30 feet from the home. The accused's
lack of knowledge as to how his wife got hurt was cited as the defence. He asserted that he
was unaware that the deceased had followed his car after he had motioned for her not to
follow as he prepared to reverse. The accused would not have anticipated knowing that
starting the car off while his wife was clutching the right mirror was so immediately harmful,
the court found. There was no indication that the accused was aware that accelerating away
would probably result in her death. It was evident that the accused had not exercised due
caution by driving away in that direction.

In the case of Lee Kim Leng v. Regina, the dead pedestrian was murdered while
utilising the pedestrian crossing as a result of the appellant's car colliding with the taxi's rear
end, which had stopped abruptly while stationary. The appeal was granted because the court
determined that the taxi driver was also irresponsible and that the appellant was not alone or
mostly to blame. The death must be the direct result of an impulsive and negligent act of the
accused, must be the proximate and effective cause without the interference of another's
fault in order to impose criminal culpability under Section 304A of the Penal Code.

Application

In light of this, there are only a few requirements to be met in order to use Section
304A in the context of our current case and the case of Lee Kim Leng v. Regina. First and
foremost, a person's death must have been brought about. According to the information
provided, Dato's Mazra's driving was the cause of his wife's death. This is understood to
mean that his wife was thrown out of his sight when he forced his car to reverse out of the
porch. Dato' Mazra failed to notice that his wife had actually fallen underneath the vehicle,
and without stopping to investigate, he violently reversed his vehicle, dragging his wife along
with it. He then pushed the vehicle forward after running over his wife's body, and then he
took off. Because of the injuries she sustained, Dato' Mazra's wife died as a result of his
decision to reverse his car without first checking to see where she was. As a result, the first
requirement has been met.

Second, it had to be the result of a hasty or careless action. According to the

circumstances, Dato' Mazra should have taken responsibility for not acting in a hasty or
careless manner that could have hurt his wife when she gripped the car's right side mirror
and begged him not to drive. It has been established that Dato' Mazra neglected to take any
appropriate precautions before leaving to prevent seriously hurting her. As a result,
according to the case of Public Prosecutor v. Mahfar bin Sairan and Nidamarti
Nagabhushanam, Dato' Mazra's actions were hasty and careless since he didn't take the
necessary precautions to prevent hurting his wife. Although the facts indicate that Dato'
Marza's wife chased after his car and grabbed hold of its right wing mirror as he reversed out
of the porch, common sense tells us that Dato' Marza could not have been planning to kill his
deceased wife at the time she fled the house. In every sense of the term, it was an accident.
Because his wife suddenly swerved in front of the car, Dato' Mazra cannot be held legally
responsible in any manner. Additionally, it could not have been created in the single second
the wife was holding onto the wing mirror because, under normal circumstances, no one
could have had that intention. Dato' Mazra, however, was unable to control how seriously his
wife would be hurt once he pressed the accelerator to accelerate the automobile ahead and
knock his wife to the ground. This demonstrates that the injuries weren't an expression of his
aim, but rather the result of his behaviour. As a result, the second requirement has been
met.

Third, the act in question must not constitute culpable homicide. The two separate
offences of causing death by reckless act and causing death by negligent conduct are not
covered by Section 304A of the Penal Code. This provision establishes a single offence of
causing death by actions that fall short of culpable murder yet are reckless or negligent. In
Public Prosecutor v. Mahfar bin Sairan, this was upheld. Under the circumstances, Dato'
Mazra should have taken the necessary steps to prevent hurting his wife, but he didn't do so.
Dato' Mazra was thus hasty, careless, or both. Additionally, the fact that his wife was to
blame for him falling to the ground disrupted the chain of causality. Dato' Mazra did not
directly cause his wife's death; instead, his wife's carelessness played a role in it. The third
requirement has thus been met.

Conclusion

To conclude, since all three requirements were met, Dato' Mazra may be charged
under Section 304A of the Penal Code for the death of his wife even though he was not able
to be punished under Section 300(d) of the Penal Code.