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Best Team Memorial Petitioner Nlujaa Vox Anatolis National Navishaba1860 Hpnluacin 20230611 174944 1 19
Best Team Memorial Petitioner Nlujaa Vox Anatolis National Navishaba1860 Hpnluacin 20230611 174944 1 19
SCC 99
Election Commission of India v. St. Mary's School, (2008) 2 SCC 390 8
Francis Coralie v. Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 7
Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 2 SCC 148 17
H.S. Jain v. Union of India, (1997) 1 UPBLEC 594 10
Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 2
98 : AIR 1979 SC 1369
I.R. Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2007) 2 SCC 1 12
Jagdev Singh Sidhhanti v. Pratap Singh Dulta, 1964 6 SCR 750 11
Jaila Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 602 : AIR 1975 SC 1436 5
Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 : AIR 1993 SC 892 1
Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369 : AIR 2003 SC 3057 8
John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611 5
Joseph Shine v. Union of India, 2018 SCC Online SC 1676 14
Kangshari Haldar v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1960 SC 457 4
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 14,
12, 5,
4
Khadija v. Union of India (Crl WP No 658 17
Khudiram Chakma v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 615 : AIR 1994 SC 17
1461
KK Kouchunni v. State of Madra, AIR 1959 SC 725 3
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125 12
Louis De Radt v. Union of India, (1991) 3 SCC 554 : AIR 1991 SC 1886 17
M. Janardhan Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 SCC 324 3
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212 : AIR 2007 SC 71 4
M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 666 4
Madhu Limaye v. Superintendent, Tihar Jail, Delhi, (1975) 1 SCC 525 5
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 4, 7
Mohammed Sadiq v. Government of India, (Civil Rule Writ No 405/98) 17
Mohini v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666 : AIR 1992 SC 1858 3
Municipal Corporation v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, AIR 2012 9
SC 100
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 (800) 12
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438 14
Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, 2018 SCC Online SC 1350 14
Nilabati v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 : AIR 1993 SC 1960 16
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545 : AIR 1986 7
SC 180
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : AIR 2000 SC 3689 4
Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551 12
Rama Rao, V.R.V Sree v. Telegudesam Political Party, AIR 1983 AP 96 11
Razakbhai Issakbhai Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, 1993 Supp (2) SCC 659 19
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 3
S.P. Gupta v. President of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149 1
Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 : AIR 2005 SC 2, 9,
2920 11, 17
Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice 4
Sidhirajbhai Sabhai v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1963 SC 540 11
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It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that Pochinki can deport the
immigrants who have illegally entered the country because Pochinki is not a signatory
of the International Conventions of Refugees [4.1]. It is pertinent to note the Non-
Refoulement Policy with respect to Article 21 [4.2] and Article 51 of the Constitution.
[4.3] Moreover, customary international laws are incapable under the Non-
Refoulement policy [4.4] and Article 51 is not a mandatary law but a Directive
Principle. [4.5]
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE IN THE HON'BLE COURT.
1. A Public Interest Litigation is filed by on behalf of a section of the society which
complains of violation of fundamental rights is maintainable1 in their bona fide interest
for judicial redressal.2 It is humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Supreme Court that
the present petition filed before the bench is maintainable on the grounds that the
Petitioner has requisite Locus Standi and interest [1.1] Hon'ble Court is a “sentinel on
the qui vive”. [1.2] The instant matter involves substantial questions of law [1.3] for
which there is no alternate and efficacious remedy available. [1.4]
1.1. THE PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI AND SUFFICIENT INTEREST
2. It is most humbly submitted that this Hon'ble Court has held that a writ petition
under Article 32 as a Public Interest Litigation (hereinafter referred to as ‘PIL’) by a
public-spirited person on behalf of a section of the society which complains of violation
of fundamental rights is maintainable.3
3. All Kameshki Student's Union, a student body having roots across Kameshki4 has
the requisite locus standi to approach this court in the present matter. Locus Standi
means the right to bring an action, to be heard in court, or to address the court on a
matter before it.5 In other words, the term “locus standi” can be understood as legal
capacity to challenge legislation, an order or a decision.6
4. In the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India,7 this Hon'ble court had
held that legislation having the effect of giving shelter and protection to foreign
nationals illegally having entered and residing in India can be challenged by any
citizen.
5. Furthermore, a petitioner will be deemed to have sufficient interest to maintain a
petition under Article 32 as a member of the public because it is the right of the public
to be governed by laws made in accordance with the Constitution and not laws made
by the legislature in violation of the constitutional provisions.8 It is submitted that the
fundamental rights of the citizens of Pochinki guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 and 29
have been infringed by the impugned legislation. Detailed arguments with respect to
the same have been dealt with in the subsequent issues9 in the written submissions.
6. In the instant case, it is observed that the petitioner, All Kameshki Student's
Union is filing the aforesaid PIL for the pro bono interest10 of the general public and
general welfare of the people of Kameshki, and Pochinki in general. Therefore, in light
of this, each and every citizen of Pochinki has the right to question the same and
therefore, All Kameshki Student's Union by representing the people of Kameshki and
Pochinki, in general have the requisite locus standi and public interest in the present
case.
1.2. THE HON'BLE COURT IS A “SENTINEL ON THE QUI VIVE”
7. This Hon'ble Court has repeatedly assumed the role of the “sentinel on the qui
vive”11 to enforce fundamental rights of the people. It is humbly submitted that in
light of the prevailing circumstances in Kameshki, which are continuously depriving a
large section of the native population of their fundamental rights, the Court has the
constitutional duty and obligation12 to entertain this petition. The Right to Equality,13
the Right to Life and Personal Liberty,14 along with the Right to preserve one's
culture15 are fundamental rights. It is the duty of the Courts to examine the merits of
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each case with respect to the prevailing situation, ooking at the fundamental rights
violations alleged, and make a decision in view of the changing notions of life and
personal liberty of humans.16
1.3. THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL QUESTIONS OF LAW INVOLVED
8. The facts and the circumstances of the case must disclose a substantial question
of law for a petition to be maintainable.17 In the present case, three substantial
questions of law have been framed to be decided by this Hon'ble Court.18 Adjudication
on these pertinent issues necessitates the admission of the petition.
1.4. NO ALTERNATE AND EFFICACIOUS REMEDY IS AVAILABLE TO THE
PETITIONER
9. It is humbly submitted that, approaching the Supreme Court under Article 32 for
the protection of fundamental rights is itself a fundamental right.19 It is unnecessary
to first approach the High Court and exhaust the remedy under Article 226 before
approaching the Supreme Court.20 Hence, it was held before this Hon'ble court that
mere existence of an adequate alternative legal remedy cannot be per se be a good
and sufficient ground for dismissing a petition under Article 32.21
By the reason of the above holdings, the present petition stands maintainable in the
absence of an alternate and efficacious remedy.
2. THAT THE CITIZENSHIP (AMENDMENT) ACT , 2017 CONSTITUTIONALLY INVALID
10. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that the Citizenship
(Amendment) Act, 2017 is unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with Part III of the
Constitution. Article 13(2) states “The State shall not make any law which takes away
or abridges the rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contravention of this
clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void”22 Therefore, as per Article 13
(2) of the Constitution, the impugned Act is void and liable to be struck down.
Furthermore, as the impugned act also Article 14 [2.1] Article 21 [2.2] and Article 29
(1) [2.3] enshrined in Part III of the Constitution, it is unconstitutional and liable to
be struck down.
2.1. THE IMPUGNED ACT VIOLATES ARTICLE 14
11. It is humbly submitted that the Petitioner's right to equality under the law as
per Article 14 of the Constitution of Pochinki has been violated, by the classes created
under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2017. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in
State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment.23 The principle of
classification under Article 14 has been the subject of deliberation in a catena of
cases.24
2.1.1. That There Is An Unreasonable Classification
12. Article 14 is based on the rule of law and equality before law.25 It is humbly
submitted that the right to equality is a basic feature of the Constitution,26 and the
Parliament cannot transgress the principle of equality.27 Therefore, no action of the
State should be of an arbitrary and irrational nature which distinguishes among
individuals.28
13. While the State is permitted to exercise differentiation amongst certain
individuals who are differently situated, it must possess a rational nexus with the
object of the enactment and an intelligible differentia.29 This is called the Doctrine of
Reasonable Classification. To attract Article 14, it is necessary to show that the
selection or differentiation is unreasonable or arbitrary, and that it does not rest on
any rational basis with regard to the object which the Legislature has in view in
making the law in question.30
14. It is humbly submitted that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2017 creates a
classification, which is unreasonable and thus fails to satisfy the Doctrine of
Reasonable Classification. The words “Ralivs and Galivs from Mylta and Gatka” in
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Livelihood49 and Right to Work50 are an integral part of the Right to Life and dignity of
an individual.51 . In the case of Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar
R. Nandkarni,52 this court held that, “An equally important facet of right to life is the
right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the
means of livelihood. If there is an obligation upon the state to secure to its citizens an
adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it would be sheer pedantry to
exclude the right to life from the content of the right to life”
21. The impugned Act grants citizenship to Ralivs and Tsalivs, who have illegally
entered Pochinki. It is pertinent to note that the resources are scarce in Kameshki53
and the unabated influx of illegal immigrants which are granted citizenship by the
impugned act would deprive them of employment and livelihood in their own native
land. Thus, the influx of immigrants would lead to depletion of natural resources and
the natives will have to bear the brunt of unemployed. Therefore, this would violate
the Right to Livelihood and the Right to Work of the citizens of Pochinki, guaranteed by
Article 21 of the Constitution.
22. According to Article 38,54 it is the duty of the state to secure a social order for
the promotion of welfare of the people. According to Article 39(a),55 the citizens, men
and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to livelihood. Furthermore,
Article 4156 of the Constitution clearly states that the State shall make effective
provision for securing the Right to Work for the citizens of Pochinki. The impugned Act
will therefore cause failure of the State to perform its duty under Articles 38, 39 and
41.
23. Since it is also the duty of Courts to honour the laudable objectives of the
Directive Principles of State Policy,57 it is humbly submitted that the right to livelihood
and right to work as guaranteed under the umbrella of Articles 21, 38 and 39(a) and
41 is being violated by the impugned Act.
2.2.2. That There is a Violation of the Right to Development
24. It is most humbly submitted before the Hon'ble Court that the Right to
Development is a basic human right.58 It includes a spectrum of civil, cultural,
economic, political and social progress for wellbeing and realization of peoples'
potential.59 The influx of immigrants violated the Right to Development of the citizens.
25. It is contended that if the Act in question remains constitutional, it will mean
that the aggregate population of Kameshki and Pochinki will substantially increase and
the Government shall have to spend even more on the well-being of migrants, which
could rather have been used for development purposes. Due to this, they shall also
have lesser access to resources which were meant exclusively for them. Depriving one
section of the population of their Right to Life simply because another intervening
party's right can be enforced is not a valid ground for constitutionality.60 Therefore, the
Act in question violates the Right to development.
2.2.3. That There is a Violation of the Right to Public Safety
26. The main task of any legislation is to ensure public security.61 The illegal
migration of people from Gylta and Mylta poses major challenges to Kameshki in terms
of life, property and employment destruction.62 The immigration and protests began
threatening national security and the democratic fabric of Kameshki.
27. All in all, through a violation of these allied rights, the overall right of the
citizens of Pochinki to live a life with dignity is being violated, and thus there is a
violation of Article 21. Thus, it is humbly contended that the Citizenship (Amendment)
Act, 2017 is unconstitutional.
2.2.4. The Impugned Act is violative of Article 355
28. Article 355 of the Pochinki Constitution talks about the duty of the Union to
protect States against “external aggression” and “internal disturbance”. It shall hence
be the duty of the Union to ensure that the government of every State is carried on in
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37. This declaration also states that indigenous people have a right to live in
freedom, peace and security. It also goes on to posit that they should not be subjected
to forced assimilation and destruction of their culture. However, the incessant flow of
illegal migrants into the State of Kameshki has disrupted the traditional socio fabric of
the state and the rights of the indigenous people.
3. THAT THE AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
38. It is humbly submitted that the impugned Act, by virtue of violating Articles
14, 21 and 29(1) of the Constitution [3.1] and the constitutionally enshrined principle
of secularism, [3.2] does not follow the Basic Structure of the Constitution and hence
must be declared null and void.
3.1. THE IMPUGNED ACT VIOLATES THE PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION
39. It is humbly submitted that the supremacy of the Constitution mandates all
constitutional bodies to comply with the provisions of the Constitution. It also
mandates a mechanism for testing the validity of legislative acts through an
independent organ, viz. the judiciary.76 This power of judicial review is an essential
feature of the Constitution and part of its basic structure.77
40. Part III of the Constitution contains the Fundamental rights and thus protects
substantive as well as procedural rights.78 These fundamental rights act as a fetter on
plenary legislative powers79 and uphold the dignity of every individual.80 These
fundamental rights mentioned in Part III are a part of the basic structure of the
Constitution of Pochinki81 . Therefore, any law that abrogates or abridges such rights
would be violative of the doctrine of basic structure.82
41. It is humbly submitted that The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2017 violates
the fundamental rights enshrined in the Articles 14, 21 and 29(1), as established by
the petitioner. Thus, the impugned act violates the basic structure of the Constitution.
3.2. THAT THE ACT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF SECULARISM ENSHRINED IN THE
PREAMBLE OF THE CONSTITUTION
42. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala83 the Supreme Court reiterated that
secularism was a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Enumerating the basic
features of the Constitution, Sikri, C.J. named “secular character of the Constitution”84
as one of them. Shelat and Grover, JJ. stated that “secular and federal character of the
Constitution” were among the main ingredients of the basic structure enumerated
therein.85 This was reiterated by the Hon'ble Court in the case of S.R. Bommai v. Union
of India.86
43. In Ziyauddin Burhanuddin Bukhari v. Brijmohan Ram Das Mehra87 the Supreme
Court went on to define the concept of secularism in the realm of philosophy and in
utilitarian terms. The Court set the role of the State to be neutral or impartial in
extending its benefit to citizens of all castes and creeds and cast a duty on the State
to ensure through its laws that disabilities are not imposed based on persons
practising or professing any particular religion. This hon'ble court has further declared
that secularism is a part of fundamental law and an unalienable segment of the basic
structure of the country's political system.88
44. In the present case, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2017 provides immunity
of citizenship to people belonging to minority communities, namely, Ralivs and Tsalivs
of neighbouring areas of Mylta and Gatka and not to Ralivs. It is submitted by the
petitioners that the amendment of the act is unprecedented, in the sense that never
before has religion been specifically identified in the citizenship law as the ground for
distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens. The present Act has introduced
religion as a new principle into the citizenship law and can be conveniently branded as
“communally motivated humanitarianism”. The illegal immigrants who are to be
granted the benefit of this legislation are to qualify for citizenship only on the basis of
religion; requirement that goes against one of the basic tenets of the Constitution,
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secularism.
45. It is humbly submitted that while religious persecution may in the given facts
and circumstances could be a reasonable principle for differentiation, it cannot be
articulated in a manner that dilutes the republican and secular foundations of
citizenship, and goes against constitutional morality.
46. Submitting but not conceding, if the motive of the government is to protect
religiously persecuted people in the neighbourhood, the question of why they are
ignoring the Galiv community is inevitable. The said Act, does not provide the same
treatment and availment of rights to Galivs of the neighbouring countries. Exclusion of
a community from those who can avail relaxed norms for legal residency and eventual
citizenship of Pochinki, infringes the essence of secularism and integrity that the
Constitution promotes as mentioned above.
3.3. THE ACT MUST BE DECLARED INVALID DUE TO VIOLATION OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE
OF THE CONSTITUTION
47. It is humbly submitted that the Parliament does not have the power to damage
or destroy the basic structure or basic features of the Constitution.89 In Smt. Indira
Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain90 , the Hon'ble Court concluded that the test of
meeting the basic structure “can be and have to be used to test the validity of
ordinary laws just as other parts of the constitution.”. Further, in B.R. Kapoor v. State
of Tamil Nadu91 envisaged the extension of power of judicial review to executive
actions and/or ordinary laws impugned qua basic structure doctrine, which are on the
lines of the law laid down in State of Karnataka v. Union of India &Anr.92
In light of the above observations, it is humbly submitted that the impugned Act,
which is violative of the basic structure of the Constitution must be struck down.
3.4. THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM MUST BE USED AS AN
INTERPRETATIVE MECHANISM
48. So as to acknowledge changing times93 and conceptions on the notions of
citizenship, there is a need to apply transformative constitutionalism when interpreting
constitutional principles. Since equality is part of the morality guiding rule of law,94 it
is necessary to think of the Constitution as a living, ever-involving organism that
reduces the gap between legislative tyranny and progressing times.95 Fundamental
rights, therefore, do not change with time, but the underlying concepts behind them
do.96 Provisions such as the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, which have generated
considerable debate owing to recent ramifications, agitations and declining culture of
Kameshki must therefore be examined in a manner that abandons traditional notions
and considers current problems faced by Pochinki.
4. THAT THE POCHINKI GOVERNMENT CAN DEPORT ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS
49. It is humbly submitted before this Hon'ble Court that Pochinki can deport the
immigrants who have illegally entered the country because Pochinki is not a signatory
of the International Conventions of Refugees [4.1]. It is pertinent to note the Non-
Refoulement Policy with respect to Article 21 [4.2] and Article 51 of the Constitution.
[4.3] Moreover, customary international laws are incapable under the Non-
Refoulement policy [4.4] and Article 51 is not a mandatary law but a Directive
Principle. [4.5]
4.1. POCHINKI IS NOT A SIGNATORY OF ANY INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION RELATING TO
THE RIGHTS OF REFUGES
50. In the present case, the Government of Pochinki while having an informal
conversation among themselves were of the view that at no cost can Pochinki deport
the non Galiv immigrants, who were persecuted in Gatka and Mylta on the basis of
their religion , because Pochinki followed the policy of non-refoulment.97 However, it is
pertinent to note that there exists no refugee laws in Pochinki. Furthermore, Pochinki
has not signed any non-refoulement international agreements. Pochinki has signed
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neither the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention nor its 1967 Protocol. Therefore,
the Government of Pochinki has the authority to deport the illegal migrants as it is not
bound to follow the policy of non-refoulment.
51. Though Pochinki has followed the international norms, there have been
exceptions to the rule, especially in matters ‘national security’, where Pochinki
deviated from its traditional hospitality. For instance, asylum seekers from Burma were
jailed and approximately 5000 Burmese refugees were pushed back home from 1995
to 1997.98
52. Further, the two primary governmental organisations dealing with refugees in
India are the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the
National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). It is pertinent to note that UNHCR's
presence in Pochinki is not guaranteed by law and it maintains operations in Pochinki
due to a purely political agreement between the government of India and the UN.
Further, no statute or constitutional provision guarantees that the government will
continue to honour the participation of the UN. Also, due to lack or resources the NHRC
does not provides any guarantee that bona fide refugees will stay safely within the
borders of India.
4.2. NON-REFOULEMENT UNDER ARTICLE 21
53. Article 21's Right to life which is the most fundamental of all is also the most
difficult to define.99 It is pertinent to note that the fundamental right of a foreigner is
confined to Article 21 for life and liberty and does not include the right to reside and
stay in this country.100 It is contended that article 21 provides less protection when
applied to aliens rather than citizens and it provides lesser protection when it conflicts
with the state's interests in immigration or national security.101 While Article 21 has
broadened in recent decades to encompass vast substantive rights, it apparently fails
to guarantee non-refoulement to each and every refugee. The historical development
of Article 21 reveals that substantive rights may not exist for aliens under the
Constitution. Non-citizens' claims to non-refoulement, which is ultimately a
substantive right, are therefore called into doubt by the historical development of
substantive due process under Article 21.
54. Even assuming that aliens retain some substantive rights under Article 21,102
those substantive rights are minimal when important matters of state are
concerned.103 In a recent case involving a tourist's (non-citizen's) right to ‘life and
personal liberty’, the Supreme Court stated the following: The primacy of the interest
of the nation and the security of the State will have to be read into every article
dealing with Fundamental Rights including Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.104
55. Therefore, the state's interest must be weighed against the interest in
individual rights. It is contended that State interest is of such paramount importance
that it would justify an infringement of the right.105 In this process of weighing
interests, the nation and security assume the highest priorities, and rules regarding
the treatment of refugees are inextricably intertwined with national security and
internal order.
50. Further, the Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court have both confirmed that
state interests in national security and criminal matters outweigh the refugee's life and
personal liberty. In at least two different cases, the nation's highest courts have found
that refugees could be returned home when their continued presence interfered with
the national security of India.106 Therefore, the Ralivs and Tsalvis should be deported.
57. Furthermore, it is submitted that the rights under Article 21 are entitled to
those who are lawfully admitted to a country.107 In the case of Louis De Radt v. Union
of India,108 this Hon'ble Court held that the State has the right to expel aliens.
Therefore, the Ralivs and Tsalivs who have illegally crossed the border and have
trespassed into Kameshki or are living in other parts of the country have no legal right
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3. DECLARE, that the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2017 is in violation of the Basic
Structure of the Constitution and therefore liable to be struck down as
unconstitutional.
&
4. DECLARE, that the Pochinki Government can deport all the Illegal Immigrants
who came after 24th March, 1971.
AND/OR
PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT IT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE BEST
I NTERESTS OF JUSTICE, FAIRNESS, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE
FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE PETITIONER SHALL DUTY BOUND FOREVER PRAY.
1
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 : AIR 1984 SC 802.
2 Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary, (1992) 4 SCC 305 : AIR 1993 SC 892.
3 Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161 : AIR 1984 SC 802.
4
Moot Proposition 10
5 S.P. Gupta v. President of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 : AIR 1982 SC 149.
6 V.G. Ramchandran, Law of Writs, 26 (6th ed., 2006).
7
Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 : AIR 2005 SC 2920.
8 D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (1987) 1 SCC 378 : AIR 1987 SC 579.
9 Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner.
10
Upendra Baxi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1986) 4 SCC 106 : AIR 1987 SC 191.
11 State of Madras v. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196.
12 Hussainara Khatoon & Ors. v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 98 : AIR 1979 SC 1369.
13
Article 14, Constitution of India.
14 Article 21, Constitution of India.
15 Article 29(1), Constitution of India.
16
Assam Sanmilta Mahasangha & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 1.
17 M. Janardhan Rao v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, (2005) 2 SCC 324.
18
Memorandum on behalf of the Petitioner.
19
Mohini v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 3 SCC 666 : AIR 1992 SC 1858.
20 Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
21 K.K. Kouchunni v. State of Madras, AIR 1959 SC 725
22
Article 13(2), Constitution of India.
23 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597.
24Budhan Choudhry and Ors v. The State of Bihar, AIR 1955 SC 191; Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice
S.R. Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538; The State of Gujarat and Anr. v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., Ahmedabad, (1974) 4
SCC 656 : AIR 1974 SC 1300.
25
M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212 : AIR 2007 SC 71.
26 M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 666.
27 Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461.
28
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : AIR 2000 SC 3689.
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53 Moot Proposition 9
54 Article 38, Constitution of India.
55 Article 39(a), Constitution of India.
56
Article 41, Constitution of India.
57 Unnikrishnan v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1993) 1 SCC 645 : AIR 1993 SC 2178.
58
Election Commission of India v. St. Mary's School, (2008) 2 SCC 390.
59 D.D. Basu, Shorter Constitution of India, 393 (15th ed., 2018).
60 Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369 : AIR 2003 SC 3057.
61 Municipal Corporation v. Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy, AIR 2012 SC 100.
62 Moot Proposition 9
63
Article 355, the Constitution of India.
64
Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India & Anr, (2005) 5 SCC 665 : AIR 2005 SC 2920.
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65
Id.
66 Moot Proposition 9
67 H.S. Jain v. Union of India, (1997) 1 UPBLEC 594.
77 L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125.
78 Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2005) 3 SCC 551.
79 Society for Unaided Private Schools of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (2012) 6 SCC 1 : AIR 2012 SC 3445.
101
Omar Chaudhary, Turning Back: An Assessment of Non-Refoulement under Indian Law, 39 Economic and
Political Weekly, 3257 (2004), https://www.jstor.org/stable/4415288 last seen on 15/02/2019.
102
Durga Das Basu, Constitutional Law of India 39-40 (1991).
103 Nilabati v. State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746 : AIR 1993 SC 1960
104
The Chairman, Railway Board & Ors v. Mrs. Chandrima Das & Ors, (2002) 2 SCC 465
105
Gobind v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1975) 2 SCC 148.
106Mohammed Sadiq v. Government of India, (Civil Rule Writ No 405/98); Khadija v. Union of India (Crl WP No
658
Sarbonanda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665 : AIR 2005 SC 2920; State of Arunchal Pradesh v.
107