It is unimaginable to think of Australia without the ANZUS alliance.

It has been the foundation of

Australian foreign policy and national security after the end of World War Two (WW2). However,
there is an uncertainty whether the alliance is still relevant in the contemporary period. This essay
will argue that after five decades, the ANZUS alliance is still relevant as it is still critical to Australia’s
foreign policy. Moreover, it has enhanced Australia’s military capabilities over the decades and its
access to critical intelligence in the light of emerging threats to not only national but also regional
security. This essay will shed light on the context in which the ANZUS alliance was created. This essay
will first discuss the how the alliance is still pertinent to Australia in reference to its geostrategic sub-
imperial reflex.1 Secondly, it will explore the different benefits that the alliance has made available
for Australia. Further, this essay will also discuss the different commentaries that are against the
alliance. This essay will maintain that although the alliance has seen great controversy for dragging
Australia into conflicts that seem to be insignificant to the Australian public, the ANZUS alliance has
still so far proven to be robust. 2

Australia came into existence as a British colony. It was a settled by the British empire and served as
a dominion until the Australian parliament ratified the Statute of Westminster in 1942 effectively
granting international autonomy for Australia. Australia before WWII relied on Britain’s ability to
project its power overseas through the Royal Navy for security. 3 Australia’s organising principle is to
align itself with the winning side of the global conflict. 4 The international order that the United
States led, which gave birth to the United Nations, effectively shunned colonialism. 5. Moreover,
there was an upsurge of nationalist sentiment in the colonies calling for immediate independence.
Thus, it was apparent to Australia that the might of the British Empire was all but gone and it quickly
looked for another great ally. The passing of the torch to the United States was marked by Prime
Minister Curtin’s well-known “look to America” speech in 1941. 6 This signalled the end of Australia’s
dependence to Britain and the start of its strategic relationship with the United States.

Australia’s actions reflect its belief of an amoral world guided by the principle of realpolitik. It acts
under a geostrategic sub-imperial reflex. 7 The Australia struggled to make its region in the globe
particularly relevant to Washington after the end of the Second World War. As Rosenau says, “the
ANZUS countries are as far removed from perceptually from the US as they are geographically.” 8 In
order to rejuvenate the global economy in line with its interests, the US intended to create engines
of capitalism in the major regions of the globe. 9 Australia became increasingly concerned of the
resurgence of Japan, ironically under the auspices of the US. This was under the assumption that

1
Clinton Fernandes, Island off the Coast of Asia: Instruments of Statecraft of Australian Foreign (Monash
University Publishing, 2008), 12-14.
2
Kevin Rudd, ‘ANZUS and the 21st Century, Australian Journal of International Affairs’, 55:2 (2001), 301.
3
Malcolm Fraser, ‘Australia’s Role in the Pacific, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies’, vol. 1, no. 1, (May 2014),
431.
4
Fernandes, Island, 46.
5
See Chapter XI of Charter of United Nations especially Articles 73 and 74 which establishes principles to guide
decolonisation efforts. Likewise, in 1960 UN General Assembly adopted Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (UN General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) 14 December
1960)
6
John Curtin, The Task Ahead, (The Herald, Melbourne, 27 December 1941).
7
Fernandes, Island, 12-14.
8
J.N. Rosenau, ‘Peripheral international relationships in a more benign world: Reflections on American
Orientation towards ANZUS’, paper presented to the conference on Australia, New Zealand and the United
States: National Evolution and Alliance Relations, phase 1, Socio-Political Change and National Images, East-
West Center, Honolulu, Hawaii, 24-26 Aug 1988, 2. Cited in Michael McKinley, ‘Critical reflections’, in ANZAC’s
Dirty Dozen, ed. Craig Stockings, (UNSW Press, Sydney, 2012), 242.
9
Fernandes, Island, 22.
Japan will return to its expansionist tendencies. However, despite Percy Spender’s, Australia’s
foreign minister at the time, efforts to make a mark in Washington’s policy after pledging troops to
Korea, the US was not interested in a treaty in the Pacific that reciprocates NATO. Australia intended
to continue to provide troops to the Middle East in order to secure NATO and the US’ interests in
that region.10 Thus in order to explain to the Australian public the counterintuitive action of sending
troops away, it needed an excuse. Moreover, Australia’s signature was needed in the San Francisco
Treaty.1112 Spender negotiated ANZUS under these circumstances. This was the context in which
ANZUS was formulated and signed. It was created at the height of the Cold War where there was
fear of Soviet invasion of Europe, as well as communist influence in Asia. ANZUS was created in
order to appease the Australian public in justifying the sending of troops away to the Middle East.
Moreover, it was to guarantee the Australian public that the US will come and help if Australia would
be the subject of an armed attack. The alliance still serves as a clear representation of Australia’s
sub-imperial reflex that could only be satisfied by the US.

Spender envisioned a treaty like NATO where it clearly stipulates and obligates all members to
respond to any attacks on any of the members. Article 5 of the NATO Pact states that, “an armed
attack against one or more… shall be considered an attack against them all.” 13 However, when
ANZUS was created in 1951, the wording in ANZUS presents a vaguer assurance of protection and
retaliation after attack from the US. Article III of ANZUS says that the consignees would “consult
whenever… territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened
in the Pacific.”14 Further, the following article states that any armed attack on any of the parties
would result in actions in accordance to its “constitutional processes.” 15 It is clear that there is
trouble with the language of the ANZUS treaty in comparison to NATO. In this light, pundits have
come to question whether the US would indeed come to Australia’s help in the event of an armed
attack. Moreover, there is a worry from the experts and policy makers whether Australia is covered
by the US’s extended nuclear deterrence.

Despite the reality of the vagueness of the assurance of retaliation and protection from the US,
there still is ample evidence that proves that the alliance is still beneficial to Australia. Moreover, as
Beazley proports, the quest of Australia to clarify US extended deterrence has been replaced by the
former’s assumption that none of its enemies would dare attack it without any guarantee of the
latter’s ambivalent or decisive response. 16 Although there has been no official statement if Australia
is covered by the US’ extended deterrence, there has been numerous communication from US
officials in government and military that says otherwise. For example, in 2007 a group of US security
officials stated that there were 31 states covered by its extended deterrence; namely, the 26
member-states of NATO, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and NATO. Thus, it is clear that ANZUS
provides a clear deterrence role that is vital in maintaining Australian security.

10
“NATO defense ministers support U.S. oil protecting ‘vital interests’ in the Mideast”, (14 May 1981) The
Washington Post (1974-Current File)
11
See San Francisco Treaty 28 April 1951.
12
Henry Albinski and William Tow, ‘ANZUS – Alive and Well after Fifty Years’, Australian Journal of Politics and
History, vol. 48, no. 2 (2 November 2002), 157.
13
See Article V of NATO Treaty
14
See Article IV and V of ANZUS Treaty
15
Ibid
16
Kim Beazely, ‘Whither the San Francisco alliance system?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 57-2
(July 2003), 325-338. Cited in Richard Tanter, ‘Just in Case; Extended Nuclear Deterrence in the Defence of
Australia’, Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies, (Inha University: 2011), 120..
The ANZUS treaty paved way for the development of the Australian Defence Force’s (ADF) capability
in line with the US military technology. In the 2016 Defence White paper, it states that ANZUS gives
the ADF access to the most advanced military technology from the US. 17 It is not difficult to provide
proof for this assumption. Indeed, Australia has gained access to advance military hardware from
the US through equipment purchases since the end of WWII. In the contemporary period, the Royal
Australian Navy’s frigates boast having state of the art Aegis combat system. 18 Likewise, the
Australia’s air force operates the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and F-18 Super Hornets. These are
tangible evidence of Australia’s access to the US military industry. Yet, it must also be mentioned
that Australia does not rely exclusively on US military hardware due to its excellence. The ADF puts a
premium on the interoperability of its equipment to that of the US. Jones points out how Australia’s
procurement of the JSF revolved around its interoperability with the US. 19 This, again, links into
Australia’s organising principle, that is its geostrategic sub-imperial reflex. The ADF desires to
operate freely with its US counterpart. To put into perspective, other partner countries placed other
consideration in their procurement approach toward the JSF. For example, Norway was only going to
buy the JSF if its homegrown missile can be fitted on it. 20 Likewise, Turkey’s precondition for
procurement was the participation of its local industries in the building of the aircraft. 21
Interoperability with the US, underpinned by the alliance, is crucial to avoiding ‘a technology gap’
between the US and ADF. Moreover, through the alliance, there is improved cooperation between
the US and Australia’s defence industries formalised in the Australia-United States Defence Trade
Cooperation Treaty. This give the both industries opportunity to improve technology which will be
beneficial to both Parties. Indeed, the alliance will continue to provide the ADF with concrete
benefits which reinforces its centrality to Australia’s security.

Australia acknowledges that only the US has the ability to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific region.
Recent events in the region proves that the alliance is becoming more relevant. Australia is not alone
in acknowledging the criticality of the US role in maintaining the stability in the region. In the last five
years, the US has strengthened its strategic presence in the region. Further, along with expanding its
bases in Australia, it has also reasserted its commitment to Japan and South Korea. 22 Furthermore, it
has enhanced its defence relationships with the Philippines, and Thailand. It is clear that the US in
much more interested in the region. Moreover, in Trump’s National Security Strategy 2017, it
mentions how China and Russia are developing conventional and nuclear weapons in order to
undermine US strategic presence. 23 Likewise, China has unilaterally engaged in building artificial
islands in the South China Sea which enraged the international community. These are only few of the
significant changes that the world has seen which reinforces the importance of Australia’s alliance
with the US. To take the argument into the extreme, Japan has now reinterpreted Article 9 of its
constitution overturning its pacifist posture. 24 All of these underscores the importance of ANZUS in

17
See 5.20 Chapter Five of 2016 Defence White Paper
18
Geoffrey Barker, ‘The Politics of Defence Acquisition’, Growth 57, (Committee for Economic Development of
Australia, Melbourne, Aug 2006) 81.
19
Steven L. Jones, ‘Politics, procurement, and policy: Australia’s procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter’, UNSW
School of Humanities and Social Sciences Canberra, accessed through UNSWorks – UNSW Library, (March
2016) 294.
20
Robert Wall, ‘JSF – Norway Signs Up’, Aviation Week (15 June 2012) cited in Ibid, 184.
21
Serbat Guvenc, and Lerna K. Yanuk, ‘Turkey’s involvement in the F-35 program: One step forward, two steps
backward?’, International Journal 68:1 (Winter 2012-13), 111. Cited in Ibid, 199.
22
Richard Heydarian, Asia’s new Battlefield: The USA, China and the struggle for the Western Pacific, (Zen
Books Ltd, London, 2015), 207.
23
See National Security Strategy 2017 pp. 2,8.
24
Matt Ford, ‘Will Japan Abandon Pacifism?’, The Atlantic, (23 Jan 2014).
the contemporary period. As Dibb mentions, “Asia without the U.S. would be a much more
dangerous place for Australia.”25

The alliance emphasizes Australia’s struggle for survival in the international arena. It believes that
the only way for it to achieve security is to ally itself with a stronger power. This can be explained by
its history of being a British colony and its reliance on Britain for security. ANZUS was signed after
WWII with the aim of securing the homeland in the event of an armed attack whilst Australian
troops are expected to be overseas. Although, there is a lack in clarity of the language in the treaty
when compared to that of NATO, it still serves as an effective deterrence against any adversary who
ponders about attacking Australia or challenging its interest. Moreover, the alliance benefits the ADF
through its access to US military equipment which improves its interoperability with that of the US
military. Likewise, continued cooperation between the Parties through the defence industry
solidifies sustained mutual benefits. Recent events and actions of states that want to challenge US
strategic presence and influence in Australia’s backyard make the alliance increasingly relevant.
Throughout this essay it has been made clear that the alliance is essential to Australia’s national
security. It has been the backbone of Australian policy in the last five decades and any change to the
status quo would, indeed, be detrimental.

25
Paul Dibb, Australia’s Alliance with America, 7.