Introduction

Wireless services and apps have grown pervasive in many aspects of people's life. Wireless
technologies are used not just for smart phones, but also for telemetry, surveillance, emitter
location, radio navigation, jamming, anti-jamming, radar detection, Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle (UAV) surveillance, navigation, and location tracking. With such widespread
reliance on the radio frequency (RF) spectrum, it is critical that people manage and use the
limited available spectrum as efficiently as possible. At the same time, electromagnetic
spectrum has become very congested because to the rising domain and widespread usage of
RF transmitters.
Electronic warfare is a military activity that uses the electromagnetic spectrum to attack an
enemy or impede enemy assaults, and jamming is a form of electronic warfare where
jammers radiate interference signals toward an enemy RF signal such as communication,
self-attacking drones, surveillance drones and etc. in order to disrupt the receiver. Airborne
drone detection is critical for interdiction. This is divided into four sections: Radio Detection
and Ranging (RADAR), optical sensors such as day and night vision cameras, acoustic
sensors and RF analysis [1]. RF analysis is not yet being employed by Sri Lankan armed
personnel; instead, only optical sensors and RADAR are being used to detect drones.
However, in a situation where an aerial assault is possible, analytical decision-making is
crucial. Hence, RF analysis are very much important because it keeps an eye on the RF
spectrum and finds the signals used to operate drones.
To combat security vulnerabilities posed by rogue or unknown transmitters, RF transmitters
should be detected not only by the data content of broadcasts but also by the basic physical
properties of the transmitters. Due to the extraordinarily high data rates involved and the
potential for several transmitters to share a channel in one area, RF wave forms pose a unique
difficulty [2]. These characteristics highlight the necessity for faster fingerprinting and
identifying procedures that go beyond traditional hand-engineered methods [3]. In this work,
RF data from the drone remote is identified and collected using Software Defined Radio
(SDR), a radio that employs software to do signal-processing tasks that were previously
accomplished by hardware. Then, as a counter-attack, a machine learning model will be
provided to train and classify modulation strategies utilized in drone communication, as well
as a suitable jamming strategy.
Many research investigations have been undertaken in recent years in the fields of UAV
neutralization, communication signals, and machine and deep learning applications.
However, none of the recent research have linked all of these topics. As a result, the goal of
this research is to present an overview of the aforementioned domains and to connect them.
There is potential for the development of more sophisticated UAV neutralization techniques,
and the use of machine learning methods for these applications appears to be a promising
research topic. Therefore, in this research, an intelligent system is proposed for modulation
classification and jamming of drones based on SDR. The rest of the proposal has been
structured with background and motivation, research problem, proposed solution, resource
requirement and the summary.

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Literature Review
Software-Defined Radio (SDR) has emerged as a promising technology for various
applications in wireless communication systems, including modulation classification and
jamming of drones. In this literature survey, the state of the art in SDR-based modulation
classification and jamming of drones is reviewed, highlighting the different approaches that
have been proposed and the challenges that remain to be addressed.
The UAVs have recently been popular in a variety of military, civil, agriculture and scientific
applications such as climate monitoring, crisis management, item/food delivery, search and
rescue operations, space exploration, and animal tracking [4]–[7]. According to [8], the UAV
industry would rise from USD 27.4 billion in 2021 to USD 58.4 billion by 2026. This
anticipated rise is mostly due to rising demand for automation and quick developments in
supporting technology. However, such technology is also employed in acts of damage like
hostile attacks in addition to being used for human advancement.
Several case studies have been identified as per [1], regarding drone attacks around the world
and consequences are discussed as follows. The sarin gas, one of the most lethal chemical
warfare weapons known, was intended to be sprayed using a remote-controlled helicopter by
Aum Shinrikyo in 1994, but testing failed when the chopper crashed. A planned Al-Qaeda
assault in Pakistan employing many drones was foiled by local law enforcement in 2013. At
the same year in 2013, a targeted attack on a power distribution plant in California nearly
knocked out electricity to a large area of the state. The damage suffered by the attack on this
unmanned plant was estimated to be $15 million USD. By 2014, the Islamic State has begun
to use commercial and homemade aerial drones against the troops in Iraq and Syria. A swarm
of 13 homemade aerial drones assaulted two Russian military outposts in Syria in January
2018. Furthermore, Russia claims that its Black Sea navy headquarters in Sevastopol was
targeted by a Ukrainian drone strike, injuring five people and forcing authorities to cancel
Navy Day celebrations [9]. Terrorist organizations have employed airborne drones for a
variety of operations, including information gathering, the delivery of explosives (either by
dropping explosives or using a drone outfitted with a rocket launcher), and the delivery of
chemical weapons. The deployment of chemical and biological weapons is a particularly
ominous use for drones. Hence, the awareness by detection as well as analysis will be much
more important when it comes to the decision making during such scenarios.
When considering the detection mechanisms, Optical detection refers to the employment of
video cameras and computer algorithms in drone detecting systems. These systems have
limits due to low light conditions or weather interference, as well as a high rate of false
alarms. Low-flying and tiny drones can be found using RADAR, although high levels of
clutter can make this challenging. The majority of radar systems are unable to distinguish
between tiny drones and birds. Built-in software restrictions, such as geofencing for drones
with GPS capabilities, are the primary point of failure for the majority of commercially
available systems [9]. But still, it is possible to bypass the geofencing with some skillful
personal. Therefore, in these circumstances, RF analysis and the introduction of defense
mechanisms such supporting effective RF jamming techniques would be crucial.

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Modulation classification is the process of identifying the type of modulation used by a
signal. In the context of drones, modulation classification is important because different types
of modulation are used for different types of communication, and being able to identify the
modulation can provide valuable information about the nature and purpose of the
communication. Skilled specialists execute the majority of the manual operations required in
early signal modulation identification work. The final judgment result is more discretionary,
and guaranteeing the accuracy rate is difficult. In this case, the development of automated
modulation identification technology served as the key to resolving the aforementioned
issues. Summary of advantages and disadvantages of traditional methods for automatic
modulation identification are as follows [14].The benefits of the likelihood ratio-based
modulation identification approach include a thorough theoretical foundation and a very
good classification result at low signal-to-noise ratios. Disadvantages consist with the
derivation of the likelihood function is complicated, and the amount of calculation is large,
Poor applicability an Requires a lot of prior knowledge. Furthermore, the benefits of feature-
based modulation identification include simple theoretical analysis and straightforward
extraction of features when the signal-to-noise ratio is high. Disadvantages consist with the
identification system is complex and There is no complete theoretical basis.

The software defined radio is usually regarded as having been invented by Joe Mitola of
Mitre. Although the SDR's history may be traced back to the middle of the 1980s. The
SpeakEasy, a transceiver platform created by Hazeltine and Motorola based on SDR
technology for Rome Griffiss Air Force Base, was one of the first significant advancements
for SDR in literature. The SpeakEasy was primarily created to support interoperability across
the various air interface standards used by the various branches of the armed services as well
as tactical military communications from 2 MHz to 2 GHz. The SpeakEasy technology
provided multi-band, multi-modes of operations by utilizing several wireless techniques and
concepts. From then to now, many people have made significant contributions to the growth
of SDR.

There are several approaches to SDR-based modulation classification. One approach is to use
machine learning algorithms to classify modulations based on features extracted from the
signal. Machine learning algorithms can be trained on a dataset of known modulations and
their corresponding features to learn the characteristics of different modulations. Once
trained, the algorithm can then be used to classify new signals based on their features. One
advantage of using machine learning for modulation classification is that it can be robust to
changes in the signal characteristics, such as noise or fading. However, a major challenge in
using machine learning for modulation classification is the need for a large dataset of known
modulations to train the algorithm.
Another approach to SDR-based modulation classification is to use known reference signals
to determine the modulation type. This can be done using techniques such as correlation or
matched filtering. In this approach, a reference signal with known modulation is transmitted
and the received signal is compared to the reference signal using a correlation or matched
filtering technique. If the correlation or matched filter output is above a certain threshold, it

2
 can be determined that the received signal has the same modulation as the reference signal.
One advantage of using known reference signals for modulation classification is that it does
not require a large dataset of known modulations. However, this approach is sensitive to
changes in the signal characteristics, such as noise or fading, and may not be robust in these
conditions. The following table shows recent surveys and reviews focusing on highly
accurate basic modulation classification based on machine learning and deep learning
approaches.

Summary of modulation recognition algorithms in past research activities

Research Advantages Limitations Input Technology Modulation Recognition

Signal Signal Accuracy
Type Type

Siyang Accuracy Accuracy Amplitude CNN 2ASK, 90% under

Zhou [15] increases when decreases with vs sample 4ASK, −10 dB
number of layers the low SNR signal 8ASK, SNR
increase in CNN graph 2FSK,
model 4FSK,
8FSK,
2PSK,
4PSK,
8PSK,
4QAM,
16QAM,
64QAM,
OFDM,
LFM,
MSK
Sowjanya Accuracy high-order Frequency CNN BPSK, 98.9% at 20 dB
Ponnaluru increase with the modulations Vs Time QPSK, SNR
[3] number of data require higher Spectrogra 8PSK,
set SNRs m 16QAM,
for robust 4PAM,
efficiency 32QAM,
64QAM,
128QAM,
256QAM,
GFSK,
CPFSK
Jithin Estimated SNR probability of Features ANN BPSK, 98% at 15
Jagannath value correct includes QPSK, dB SNR
[16] improves the classification amplitude, 8PSK,
performance of decrese when phase, 16QAM,

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 the classifier number of layers frequency, CPFSK,
regardless of the increses Various GFSK,
ANN signal GMSK
configuration, statistics
Classification such as
performance of moments
different and
configurations cumulants
Improves with the
addition of
feature, Less
processing power
Hui Han Training time of Supervised Welch SAE (stacked 2PSK, 99.8% at 0
[17] PNN is less than learning may power auto-encoder), 4PSK, dB SNR
SAE, ANN, cause feature spectrum PNN 2ASK,
Accuracy is high confusion, (probabilistic 4ASK,
in low SNR Accuracy neural 8ASK,
compare to SAE, decrese with low network) 2FSK,
SVM and ANN SNR 4FSK,
8FSK,
32QAM,
64QAM
Feng Hybrid ML Correct Time- PCA, SVM BPSK, 94% at
Wang [18] network improves recognition rate frequency QPSK, 10dB SNR
the classification decreases when spectrum 16QAM,
of modulation low SNR LFM,
techniques 2FSK,
4FSK
Yilin Sun In high SNR Detection Constellati CNN, BPSK, Near 100%
[19] scenarios, the accuracy decrese on SqueezeNet, QPSK, for SNRs
Inception-v3 with with low SNR diagram GoogleNet, 8PSK, greater than
constellation Inception- QAM16 10 dB SNR
model reaches the v3
highest accuracy,
for low SNR
levels, the GRF
(Graphical
representation of
features) provides
the superior
accuracy
Peng Wu classification Training Time- Inception- 8PSK, 93.76% at
[20] accuracy time(s)/epoch is frequency ResNet BPSK, 14 dB SNR
increases high spectrum CPFSK,
gradually GFSK,
and remains PAM4,

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 stable with the QAM1,
increase of SNR QAM64,
QPSK
Ruolin Training the CNN In the complex Time- CNN, 64-QAM, 96.25%
Zhou [21] with an additional communication frequency LSTM 16-QAM,
layer increase the environment, the spectrum 8-PSK,
accuracy quality of BPSK,
communication CPFSK,
is often too GFSK,
difficult to be PAM4,
guaranteed. QPSK
Shenglian Larger Data conversion Constellati AlexNet QPSK, 79.6%~100
g Peng amount of data procedure from on 8PSK, % at 8 dB
[22] for training is also complex samples diagrams 16QAM, SNR
beneficial for to images indeed 64 QAM
performance incur
improvement. information loss
due to the
limited
resolution of
images.
Venkatesh Performance of Phase sensitive Time- ResNet 8PSK, 80%
Sathyanar neural networks modulation types frequency B-FM,
ayanan for the are most spectrum BPSK,
[23] modulation vulnerable CPFSK,
classification task to frequency DSB-AM,
can achieve very errors GFSK,
high PAM4,
levels of accuracy QPSK,
over a large range SSB-AM
of modulation
types
under nominal
channel
distortions.

There are many research studies have been conducted in recent years across the areas of
drone neutralization, communication signals analysis such as modulation classification as in
above table based on machine and deep learning methods separately. However, none of these
recent studies are identified drone RF signals in real-time using object detection method and
connect all of these areas together as commercial product and still in research level due to
various challenges such as requirement of large number of data sets and etc.

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Spread Spectrum & protocols of Drone RF Signals

Modern commercial drones often use the regular Wi-Fi spectrum for manual control (2.4
GHz and 5 GHz). Even the most basic commercial drones typically contain a number of
automated preprogrammed features, such tracking the drone's location or the "go home"
function. If the control signal is lost, the "go home" feature directs the drone back to the
takeoff place using the GPS (Global Positioning System). For these purposes, the Global
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is employed. The drones' operating frequencies for the
GPS band are 1574.42 MHz and 1227.60 MHz. 900 MHz and 1.3 GHz are two more
potential drone remote control bands, however they are in close proximity to the GPS
frequency and may cause interference. For lower frequencies, bigger antennas are required at
the same time. This is yet another drawback while using these bands.

When sending RF communication signals in the past, a number of fundamental analog

modulations (AM, FM, PM—amplitude, frequency, and phase modulation) or data
modulations (ASK, FSK, PSK—amplitude, frequency, and phase shift keying) were utilized.
These signals have a fixed carrier signal frequency, hence they are not appropriate for drone
control. Although some of these modulations (FSK, PSK) exhibit some resilience to
interference, such signals may be easily located and jammed in the spectrum. Anyone with
the right tools can, however, readily demodulate these signals to determine the information
being delivered. Spread spectrum signals are therefore employed. These types of signals
show good resistance to interferences, whether natural (noise) or intentional (jamming). The
basis of spectrum spreading is the modulation of an information-carrying narrowband signal
by a pseudorandom broadband wave. The spread spectrum signal is produced by this
modulation.

It is used in many applications, including drones, to improve the reliability and robustness of
the communication link. In the case of drones, spread spectrum technology is often used in
the radio transmitter and receiver systems to transmit control and telemetry information
between the drone and its controller. Spread spectrum techniques can be used to reduce
interference and improve the range of the communication link, making it more resistant to
interference from other wireless devices and enabling the drone to operate over longer
distances. There are several different types of spread spectrum techniques, including
frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS) and direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS). In
FHSS, the transmitter hops between different frequencies in a predetermined pattern, while in
DSSS, the transmitted signal is spread over a wide frequency band using a pseudorandom
code. Overall, the use of spread spectrum technology in drone transmitters helps to improve
the performance and reliability of the communication link between the drone and its
controller, enabling the drone to operate more safely and effectively.
There are several protocols that are used for wireless communication between a transmitter
(controller) and a receiver (drone). These transmission methods may be identified by the way
their data packets are structured, how they are encrypted, and how they spread out throughout
the spectrum.

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Manufacturers often utilize one or two different types of protocols, so if the right one is
identified, the right drone may be attributed to the specific manufacturer. The knowledge of
the protocols may then be utilized to create jamming methods that can be used to interfere
with such drones.
Jamming of the drone
Drone jamming is a technique for neutralizing these devices. Jamming is one class of drone
neutralization techniques. Other examples of drone neutralization techniques are weapons
with directional energy or laser weapons, which also use electromagnetic energy.
Additionally, we may classify physical attacks on the target made using nets, focused fire, or
even trained birds as part of these approaches (usable only for small drones). The drone is
often destroyed when the aforementioned neutralization is used. It appears most suited to
utilize various sorts of jamming if the aim is to "capture" the drone (forcing it to land) or
even take control of it and manage it. The communication between the drone and the pilot or
GPS is hindered by RF jamming. Response jamming and noise jamming are the two most
fundamental categories of jamming. Both kinds have diverse applications and subcategories,
which are further covered in this review. It is important to note that we always jam the
receiver, as we need lower jamming power to ensure a sufficient J/S ratio (jamming to signal
ratio). This statement is based on the beacon, or radar equations.
The jamming techniques are further classified as noise jamming, range deception jamming,
velocity deception jamming, and angle deception jamming [10]. Because the effect of
jamming varies based on the parameters of the received drone transmitter signal, an effective
jamming approach for the threat signal must be used. When a threat signal is received, the
traditional approach for determining a jamming strategy is based on information stored in a
library that maintains the suitable jamming method for signal kinds. There is a restriction to
the usage of a library when a threat signal of a new type or one that has been changed
differently from existing kinds is received. While a jamming technique can be simply chosen
and implemented when the type and value of a received threat signal exist in the library.
Therefore, it is required to use a machine learning model that, by learning the characteristics
of the received drone transmitter signal, can select the suitable jamming approach [11] .
When considering the jamming strategies, noise jamming is the main technique used to
disrupt communication by transmitting a signal that generates noise or interference in the
frequency band used by the communication system. In the context of drones, noise jamming
can be used to prevent the drone from receiving commands or to disrupt the communication
between the drone and its controller. There are several approaches to noise jamming of
drones. One approach is to use a wideband noise jamming signal that covers the entire
frequency band used by the drone's communication system. This type of jamming signal can
be effective in disrupting the communication of the drone, but it may also interfere with other
communication systems in the same frequency band. Another approach to noise jamming of
drones is to use a narrowband noise jamming signal that is specifically tuned to the frequency
of the drone's communication system. This type of jamming signal can be more targeted in
its disruption of the drone's communication, but it may be more susceptible to interference
from other signals in the same frequency band. One major challenge in noise jamming of
drones is the need to accurately locate the drone in order to direct the jamming signal towards
it. This can be difficult due to the small size and mobility of drones, as well as the potential
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for them to be equipped with anti-jamming measures. Furthermore, jamming techniques such
as barrage jamming may be utilized by a single jammer to jam numerous frequencies at the
same time [12]. The primary disadvantage of this strategy is that the jammer spreads its
strength across numerous frequencies, making it less strong at a single frequency and
potentially disrupting other military communications [13].

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