The American Evolution:

The Development of a Distinct American Identity during the

Colonial Period
And the Consequent Inevitability of a Rupture with Britain

John Ruf, MA, RA

American Military University
May 24th, 2003
 The cause of the American Revolution is most often

placed squarely on the actions of the British government. In

essence, the break is seen as the consequence of inept and

heavy-handed administration of the colonies by George III‘s

ministers. This viewpoint implies a belief that somehow the split

was not inevitable; that either with a more benevolent

management, or even parliamentary representation, or,

conversely, with the use of overwhelming force from the outset,

the North American colonies could have been kept within the

empire.1 While the acts of the British government certainly were

the trigger that brought matters to a head, the cause of the

American Revolution was the gradual evolution of an American

1
Prominent sources with this point of view include, chronologically,
David Ramsey, The History of the American Revolution, Two Volumes
(Philadelphia: R. Aitken and Son, 1789), I: 41-87, Paul Allen, History of the
American Revolution, Two Volumes (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1819), I: 5-
19, Sir George O. Trevelyan. The American Revolution, VI Volumes (New
York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1898), I: 1-35, Elroy M. Avery, A History of
the United States and its People, VII Volumes (Cleveland: The Burrows
Brothers Company, 1907), V: 46-210, and Don Cook, The Long Fuse: How
England Lost the American Colonies, 1760-1785. (New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 1995), 51-146.
1
identity, one at odds with the British society from which it had

sprung.2

This paper is an exploration of the American evolution

that saw the formation of a distinct colonial identity in the period

of the Seven Years‘ War, through the American Revolution.

This evolution was the result of many factors. From the outset,

America was populated by those who were set apart from the

typical British subject.3 Religion certainly played a predominant

role as an initial causal factor in the development of this

identity. Countless colonial records show the settlers‘ belief in

predestination – that they were God‘s people.4 There was a

2
John Adams wrote of this evolution in a February 13, 1818 letter to
editor Hezekiah Niles, ―But what do we mean by the American Revolution?
Do we mean the American War? The Revolution was effected before the
war commenced. The Revolution was in the minds and hearts of the people;
a change in their religious sentiments, of their duties and obligations...This
radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments and affections of the
people was the real American Revolution.‖ Niles published the letter in the
Niles Weekly Register, March 7, 1818.
3
This view of an essential colonial difference is expressed in Ned
Landsman, From Colonials to Provincials: American Thought and Culture,
1680-1760 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 10-11, and in Andrew
Burnaby, Burnaby’s Travels Through North America (London: T. Payne,
1798), 53-58, 96-98.
4
Examples of colonial religious Providentialism are found in
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967). 31-34, 140, and in
Fred Anderson, A People’s Army (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1984), 196-222.
2
common rejection of the Church of England, and thus of

placemen and sinecured clergy. Similarly, colonial accounts

abound with references to the godless nature of the British,

especially of the regulars who served in America and were one

of the few visible signs of Royal authority.5 Caleb Rea, a

provincial surgeon serving during the Seven Year‘s War, wrote

―I can‘t but remark, and that with regret, the horrid cursing and

swearing there is in camp, more especially among the regulars.

And as a moral cause I can‘t but charge our defeat on this sin.‖ 6

Further reasons for the colonial migration included a

quest for economic opportunity, freedom from oppression, and

an escape from the existing British caste system that limited

advancement. Any attempt to further a reintegration of the

wayward colonies and Britain, no matter how benevolent, would

be anathema to the provincials‘ original reasons for emigration.

5
References to regulars‘ lack of religion are found in Anderson,
117-118, and in Douglas Edward Leach, Roots of Conflict (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 127-128.
6
F. M. Ray, ed. The Journal of Dr. Caleb Rea. (Salem: Essex
th
Institute, 1881), July 10 , 1758.
3
 The nature of the colonists, willing and eager to take

risks by establishing themselves in the new world, was another

measure that set them apart from their brethren in the mother

country. This difference was nurtured by the frontier struggles

for survival that forced Americans to fend for themselves in a

hostile environment through universal military service and

mutual assistance in self-defense. The militia ideal that evolved

in a society where every able bodied man must fight or die was

very different from the British reality, where the army ranks

were filled with the dregs of society, and voters were precluded

from enlisting to avoid empowering the lower classes. While the

provincial Militia system has been attacked as flawed, it served

America well. The criticism fails to recognize that there was no

viable alternative. The colonies lacked the resources to support

a standing army. Even though the American militia system was

based on the British model, it had become an anachronism in

the mother country, where it was bypassed in favor of a regular

4
army, whereas in America it served its purpose, albeit

imperfectly.7

An American evolution is also seen in the composition of

the provincial legislatures and officer corps where communities

selected leaders based on merit, or in the very least on

popularity, with little regard to social standing. This was in

contrast to Britain, where a mostly aristocratic officer corps had

purchased its commissions, which peevishly lamented the

uncouth tradesmen who officered provincial armies.8 In the

case of colonial elected officials of the common or ―middling‖

sort, it represents the trend towards a more representative

American democracy, as opposed to the corruption and limited

enfranchisement of the British Parliamentary system.

America thus evolved as a meritocracy. It was too poor

and inhospitable an environment to attract much interest from

7
Studies on the efficiency of colonial militia are found in John Shy,
―A New Look at Colonial Militia‖, William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 20
(1963), 175-185, and in Jack S. Radabaugh, ―The Militia of Colonial
Massachusetts‖, Military Affairs, 18 (1954), 1-18.
8
British General John Forbes was typical in his condemnation of
provincial officers as ―an extream bad collection of broken Innkeepers,
Horse Jockeys, and Indian traders.‖ This quote, and further examples of
British regulars contempt for provincials can be found in Leach, 128-133.
5
placemen and aristocrats. While Englishmen often sought to

advance by currying favor with the elite, the colonists saw

success come through their own labor and ingenuity.

Americans developed a society governed by contractual

obligations among equals, entirely at odds with the British

sense of obligation and fealty to one‘s king. This contrast is

seen starkly in the interactions of provincial troops with British

officers in the Seven Years‘ War.

Further differences were already quite apparent. British

officers and officials often complained often of the Yankee

attitudes that made New Englanders poor soldiers.9

Conversely, the colonists saw the British officers and officials

as arrogant and unfair. The victory over New France made

Americans realize that they could fight well, a viewpoint not

shared by the British, and also left a lingering bitterness

between the colonies and the motherland. The removal of the

French threat also served to weaken the ties between the

9
An exploration of this phenomena is found in Fred Anderson, ―Why
Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad Soldiers?‖ William and Mary
Quarterly, 3d ser., 38 (1981), 395-401.
6
colonies and Britain. The newfound security gave the

provincials the confidence to bridle at British measures they

once might have accepted as a trade-off for British protection.

The Comte de Vergennes, an acute observer, recognized as

much when he commented that the loss of New France would

cost Britain her North American colonies.10

The colonies were receptive to radical Whig ideology.

While the republican concepts were often of foreign origination,

they took root more fervently, and with a much broader

audience, in the British colonies of North America. It is ironic

that a British philosophy should be so embraced by colonists

who would soon use it to reason their separation from the

mother country.

This evolution of an American identity is also visible in

the economic measures that the specie-poor colonies, and later

the Continental Congress, adopted to finance war. Too often

10
The Comte de Vergennes wrote, ―The colonies will no longer
need Britain‘s protection. She will call on them to contribute toward
supporting the burdens they have helped to bring on her, and they will
answer by striking off their chains.‖ Quoted in Benson Bobrick, Angel in the
Whirlwind: The Triumph of the American Revolution (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1997), 29.
7
the Congress has been lambasted for printing money and

causing rampant inflation, but these attacks overlook that there

was no viable option. Americans were ingenious and visionary

in adopting a monetary system based on public trust in the

government, in place of a gold and silver standard.

A seldom-discussed effect of the revolutionary

hyperinflation was that it served as a leavening agent in the

nascent American society, as many poor became rich, and the

rich lost much of that wealth in the war. Day laborers saw their

wages increase in keeping with the cost of living, and thus

suffered little from the effects of devaluation. Of course, the

soldiers of the Continental Army were victimized, in that they

could not renegotiate their pay, and they suffered accordingly.

It is important to remember that this evolution was not

universal among the colonists. This is seen clearly in the King's

Friends who maintained allegiance to the crown. 11 In a look at

11
The classic pioneering studies of Loyalism remain Moses Coit
Tyler, ―The Party of the Loyalists in the American Revolution‖ American
Historical Review, I (1895), 24-49, Claude Halstead Van Tyne, The Loyalists
in the American Revolution (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1902), 1-26, and
Lorenzo Sabine, Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the American
8
what made Loyalists reject the Americanization that many of

their fellow inhabitants embraced, the instinct is to conclude

that they were the elite, with something to lose in a rebellion.

However, this stereotype does not hold true. It is more

appropriate to say that they had remained British in outlook and

wished to prosper within the empire.12 Similarly, many feared

the republicanism of the rebels, and sincerely believed that

independence would be disastrous to the colonies. Their

viewpoints are important, as a benchmark of the gulf between

the American ideals that had evolved and the British order that

they struggled to uphold.13

Even if Britain had enfranchised the colonists with full

parliamentary representation and suffrage based on the British

Revolution, Two Volumes (Boston: ---, 1864), 1-152. Sabine‘s biographies

give a sense of the Tory commitment.
12
As early as 1819, Paul Allen wrote, ―The loyalists...might be
forgiven—many of them acted from principle, from a conscientious regard to
their duty, from affection to their sovereign, and however mistaken they may
have been, they deserve no censure‖, Allen, I: 483.
13
Primary accounts of Loyalists motivations are found in Catherine
S. Crary, Tory Writings from the Revolutionary Era (New York: McGraw Hill,
1973), 1-54, and a sound analysis of Tory sentiment exists in Wallace
Brown, The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the American Revolution
(New York: William Morrow and Co., 1969), 122-123, 222-258, and Paul H.
Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1964), 120-174, Appendix.
9
system, the colonies would still have, inevitably, demanded

autonomy. Colonial democracy was typically much more

representative than that of the mother country, with greater

enfranchisement and virile legislative bodies that well

represented their constituents. Colonials perceived as corrupt

both British society and government that they reviled and

feared.14 Likewise, the overbearing influence of the King in

Parliament, through his ministers, had only a pale imitation in

the colonies, as the Royal governors and Kings officials proved

no match for the provincial legislatures that controlled the purse

strings.

14
Paul Allen wrote of the ―wicked and corrupt Ministry‖, Allen, I: 7.
Charles Royster wrote that the colonists ―saw an advanced stage of
contagious corruption in the society and government of Britain.‖ Charles
Royster. A Revolutionary People at War (New York: W. W. Norton, 1979), 4.
Jonathan Trumbell wrote, ―Remember the corrupt, putrefied, state of that
nation (Britain), and the virtuous, sound, healthy state of your own young
constitution.‖ Royster, 15. The strongest attacks on British society came
from Thomas Paine, most notably in his pamphlet ―Common Sense‖,
Philadelphia: R. Bell, January 10, 1776. Reprinted in William M. Van Der
Wende, editor. The Life and Works of Thomas Paine, Ten Volumes (New
Rochelle, Thomas Paine National Historical Association, 1925) II: 93-182.
Richard Price wrote of the ―Gross Corruptions‖ of the House of Commons in
Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Government,
and the Justice and Policy of the War with America (London: T. Cadell,
1776), 1-128. The Reverend Andrew Eliot wrote of ―corrupt ministers intent
on spreading that corruption through America‖, Quoted in Bailyn, 130. David
Ramsey wrote of America as ―remote from the seat of power and
corruption‖, Ramsey, I: 31.
10
 American independence was neither the consequence of

British meddling and incompetence, nor of colonial radical Whig

intransigence. The break was an inevitable result of the

evolution of an American identity during the colonial period, an

identity that was not only incompatible with second-class

provincial status within a mercantilist economy, but also had

evolved a concept of representative government that surpassed

that of Britain.

As early as Paul Allen‘s 1819 History of the American

Revolution an awareness that ―the revolution was finished

before the war commenced‖15 was appearing in histories of the

era. Allen is referring to the evolution in thought, which changed

the way provincials viewed themselves, each other, and the

mother country.

This evolution in thought is seen in one of its earliest

forms in 1747, when Benjamin Franklin wrote Plain Truth. In

this pamphlet, Franklin made an appeal to the ―middling people,

15
Allen, I: 2. (Allen plagiarized this line from Adam‘s famous letter to
Niles)
11
the farmers, shopkeepers and tradesmen,‖16 as he encouraged

self-empowerment in the face of a common threat. The

resulting Association was formed without official sanction,

indeed in the face of opposition from the Quaker establishment.

The overwhelming positive response to Plain Truth, among the

middling sorts of the Philadelphia population, is a reflection of

the evolution of the collective power of the colonials, even at

this early date.17

The importance of The Association is in the

independence demonstrated by the common colonials. They

sought redress for issues not through petitions to Britain, but

through their own collective power. In doing so, they were

affirming an innate right to that most dominant of American

traits, self-determination.18

As Gary Nash wrote in The Urban Crucible, the French

and Indian War ―convinced the American colonies of their

16
Leonard Labaree, ed. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1959-1976), III: 200-201.
17
Gary B. Nash explored the phenomenon of ―the Association‖ in
Gary B. Nash. The Urban Crucible (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1979), 143-146.
18
Ibid., 146.
12
growing strength and maturity . . . A sense of their own power

grew as their trust in those above them diminished and as they

acquired experience in making decisions, exercising leadership

roles, and refuting those who were supposed to be wise

because they were wealthier.‖19 Americans had broken with the

habits of blind obedience to authority and were expressing a

strong desire for representative government with their interests

at heart. Their loyalty was to their own self-interest; they

opposed any authority that did not serve their ends.20

A distinctly American worldview evolved in the North

American British colonies, one that was certain to bridle at

perceived or actual imperial transgressions, and one that was

bound to embrace independence in the end. Bernard Bailyn

explores this view in The Ideological Origins of the American

Revolution.21

19
Ibid., 149-150.
20
Charles Royster wrote of this evolution in A Revolutionary People
at War, 4-6.
21
Bernard Bailyn wrote of the transformation of the colonials in The
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Bailyn, 160-229.
13
 This American viewpoint evolved under the influence of

radical Whig political ideology, and was thoroughly

disseminated by colonial printers to a population that was

widely literate and passionate about keeping up with events. It

owed much also to the widely read classics of the Roman

Republic, with colonists gradually seeing themselves as

inheritors of the moral superiority and virtue of the republicans

of ancient Rome.22 It was inevitable that the prevalent colonial

view of the mother country would soon find analogies in

colonial eyes with the decadence of the Roman emperors, and

the collapse of the Roman Empire.23

22
The Reverend Andrew Burnaby wrote of George Wythe, ―Such
philanthropy for mankind...would have dignified a Roman senator‖, Burnaby,
53. Josiah Quincy Jr. wrote that Britain was to its colonies ―what Caesar was
to Rome‖, John Dickinson contrasted the virtuous colonists to England,
which, like Imperial Rome, was ―easy to be bought if there was but a
purchaser‖, Quoted in Bailyn, 26. William Hooper wrote in a letter to James
Iradell on April 26, 1774, ―From the fate of Rome, Britain may trace the
cause of its present degeneracy‖, Quoted in W. L. Saunders, editor. Colonial
Records of North Carolina (Raleigh: ---, 1886-1890), V: 985. John Alman
wrote, ―in no age except that which produced the destruction of Roman
liberty were venality and corruption so prevalent as at this time in Britain.‖
Quoted in Ian Christie. Wilkes, Wyvil and Reform (London, ---, 1962), 38.
23
The Reverend Andrew Eliot wrote a comparison of Britain and
Imperial Rome in a 1770 letter ―The English seem to have arrived to that
degree of ...servitude Galba ascribes to the Roman people in his speech to
Piso.‖ He also wrote of ―corrupt ministers intent on spreading that corruption
through America‖, William Bollan wrote of ―the great mischief and danger of
corruption...proved from its operations in Greece and Rome.‖ Quoted in
14
 The age of enlightenment made its mark on the

American colonists, especially with the writings of Locke, along

with those of Voltaire and Rousseau. The colonists absorbed

enlightenment attitudes, in regard to representative

government, as completely as they embraced British common

law as a guide to their actions and interactions. Colonial works

abound with references to Coke and Blackstone.24 Colonial

concepts of justice, equality, and human rights evolved from the

absorption of enlightenment philosophy, in synthesis with

British common law, and tempered with New England

Puritanism. Protestant covenant theology gave Americans,

even leaders of deist or agnostic principles, the idea that

―America had a special place, as yet not fully revealed, in the

Architecture of God‘s intent.‖25

Bailyn, 130, 133. ―Analogies to the decline and fall of Rome sprang to the
lips of almost every commentator as the crisis in Anglo-American affairs
deepened.‖ Bailyn, 137.
24
Both James Otis, Jr. and Thomas Hutchinson quoted Sir Edward
Coke often. Notable is Otis‘ Rights of the British Colonies”. Coke‘s opinion in
the Bonham Case particularly appealed to colonial intellectuals, Bailyn, 30-
31.Sir William Blackstone‘s Commentaries are alluded to often in Arthur
Lee‘s ―Monitor‖ letters. Arthur Lee. ―Monitor IV‖ Virginia Gazette (R), March
17, 1768.
25
Bailyn, 33.
15
 The concept of a moral superiority and predestined

greatness greatly influenced the evolution of an American

identity. It is a characteristic that remains as virile in the

dawning years of the 21st century as it was in the 17th.

Bailyn identifies universal but incongruous influences

among the colonists. While British common law is shown to

have provided a desire for continuity and precedent,

enlightenment philosophy was motivated by reason and the

upheaval of the past, and covenant theology spoke of a

preordained divine mission. These discordant components

were molded together by American radical Whig ideology.

Gradually, a uniquely American identity emerged.26 John Alden

wrote that the colonists were ―moving steadily in the latter part

of the colonial period toward that community of sentiment which

has been the basis of the modern national state.‖27 Dave

Palmer noted that ―they were different than their European

26
Ibid., 32-34.
27
Dave Richard Palmer. The Way of the Fox (Westport: Greenwood
Press, 1975), 28.
16
relatives--and they thought of themselves as different.‖28 While

many of the concepts embraced by American Whigs were

foreign in origin, they took root in America with greater

enthusiasm and wider dissemination: America proved very

fertile ground for radical Whig ideology.

The colonial electoral franchise was much more

widespread than in Britain. This resulted from the fact that the

vast majority of colonists were engaged in agricultural pursuits;

and therefore, a high percentage of the population met the

qualifications, whether real estate, or property based. Dr. J.

Franklin Jameson wrote of colonial suffrage in The American

Revolution Considered as a Social Movement:

Social democracy and political democracy

progressed together. In colonial times the right to

vote had nowhere been narrowly restricted, but in

all the colonies there had been a property

qualification, usually amounting to $150 or $250.

28
Ibid., 29.
17
 In a country so given up to agriculture a real –

estate qualification excluded few men.29

Thus, it is shown that even where the laws for enfranchisement

were similar to those of Britain, democracy was de facto more

widespread and more representative in the colonies.

As a result of this wider franchise, another evolutionary

difference between the mother country and the colonies was

that, as the Duc de la Rochefoucauld noted, ―all the people

busy themselves with politics, and from the landlord down to

the housemaid they all read two newspapers a day.‖ 30

American papers such as Bradford‘s American Magazine and

Franklin‘s General Magazine allowed quick dissemination of

opposition views and created an awareness of an inter-colonial

identity.31

Opposition views often focused on the curbs on the

colonial economy that were a reality of a provincial status in a

mercantilist economy. Independence was inevitable, and

29
J. Franklin Jameson. The American Revolution Considered as a
Social Movement (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1926), 39.
30
Ibid., 58.
31
Landsman, 34-35.
18
necessary in that it ―swept away an obsolete economic and

social system, (and) set free the economic life of America.‖32

Just as the colonial economy was straining to expand,

the varied colonial religious beliefs tended to exhibit a vibrancy

absent in the Church of England. Despite the presence of

established churches, ―in all the colonies a practical toleration

had been secured.‖ 33 America had evolved a system of

coexistence that brought with it great religious freedom and

vitality. Of tremendous import to the evolution of the American

identity were the commonly held beliefs, among the dissenting

orders, in the ―natural equality of all men‖, and in hostility to

privilege.34 In religion, America was able to evolve a plurality of

faiths, and where religious intolerance did exist, relief was

usually readily available just over a border into an adjacent

colony.

Ned Landsman has written that ―provincials viewed

themselves as embodying both the moral center and the most

32
Jameson, 72.
33
Ibid., 84-85.
34
Ibid., 100.
19
dynamic sector of the British world.‖35 This reflects a sense of

spiritual superiority among the colonists and a belief that the

British were immoral. These beliefs had become particularly

prevalent during the interaction between pious new Englanders

and worldly British regulars during the French and Indian War.

In seeing themselves as the chosen people, New Englanders

provided a strong sense of predestination in to the emerging

American identity. The Quakers, with an obsession with

individuality and a strong tradition of religious toleration also

strongly affected that identity.

It is a paradox that as provincial confidence increased,

concerned imperial authorities responded by clamping down.

This only served in ―encouraging provincials to insist on their

rights and privileges as British citizens.‖36 Also ironic is that the

Glorious Revolution and Union brought many Scottish and Irish

gentlemen to America to make their fortunes. The result was a

further erosion of an English identity, a strengthening of a

strong commercial identity in the American psyche, and most

35
Landsman, 7.
36
Ibid.
20
import, the introduction of radical Whig ideology to the shores

of the New World.

The colonies were experiencing a westward movement,

as land-hungry immigrants, abetted by land speculators, sought

out their homesteads. Jameson wrote that due to this

movement, ―Restless change, (and) unceasing adaptation to

new conditions will be the characteristic of such a nation.‖37

Dave Palmer said ―the western wilderness had quite evidently

etched itself indelibly on the American minds long before the

rebellion erupted. It was the traditional source of danger as well

as promise, of horror as much as hope.‖ 38

The Reverend Andrew Burnaby, in 1760, wrote that ―An

idea strange as it is visionary, has entered into the minds of the

generality of mankind, that empire is traveling westward, and

everyone is looking forward with eager and impatient

expectation to that destined moment when America is to give

law to the rest of the world.‖39 It is ironic that Burnaby disagreed

37
Jameson, 46.
38
Palmer, 86.
39
Burnaby, 149.
21
with this prophetic sentiment, while all the same, feeling

compelled to record it in his journals.

Dave Palmer wrote ―many farsighted Englishmen were

growing increasingly concerned over the independent bent long

in evidence in the several American colonies. Robust, blessed

with a bountiful land, hard working, unusually prolific, and too

far away to be closely watched, Americans possessed the

potential to outstrip the mother country in time.‖40

Burnaby exposes the voracious appetite for land among

colonists. British attempts to curb that colonial expansion were

antithetical to a fundamental need among the settlers to ―roll

back the frontier.‖41 America was set on an expansionist course

centuries before the American Revolution began; manifest

destiny has very deep roots.

Burnaby witnessed, with pleasure, ―a rich and opulent

state arising out of a small settlement.‖42 He realized that, as

40
Palmer, 90-91.
41
Ibid., 79.
42
Burnaby, 91.
22
early as 1760, the colonists were ―jealous of their liberties,‖43

and that they were ―great republicans.‖44 He lamented that

when ―restrained by act of Parliament...they are extremely

dissatisfied.‖45 In this anger at being constrained, and in

testifying to the tremendous growth of the colonies, Burnaby

records the evolution of the colonies from fledgling

dependencies into nascent states that could not flourish to their

full potential within a provincial, mercantilist system.

Burnaby‘s most telling quote remains, ―men removed

beyond the reach of power will (not) be subordinate to it.‖46

Britain had left the colonies to their own devices for so long, in

the mercantilist belief that they must not drain the mother

country‘s resources, that she had forfeited not only the right,

but the means of enforcing her will upon the colonists. Laissez

faire British policy had effected an evolution in her colonials into

a self-sufficient, independent and unique people. This

43
Ibid., 55.
44
Ibid., 96.
45
Ibid., 115.
46
Ibid., 155.
23
longstanding social reality evolved decades before the

revolution made it a political fact.

Perhaps the most critical part of the American evolution

was the phenomenal growth of the middling sort. The

emergence of a strong colonial middle class was a crucial

component of a nascent American identity. Burnaby‘s

observations of America are representative of the era, in which

numerous writers noted British America‘s explosive growth and

tremendous potential. This potential owed much to the ability of

the colonies to evolve free from the constraints of both the

corrupt British aristocracy, and the stringent restrictions of

metropolitan trade groups, both of which tended to retard the

growth of a middle class in Britain. Thus, a concession was

enacted in order to spur volunteer recruitment within England

whereby volunteers to the British Army ―were allowed to set up

(and) exercise any trade in any place in Great Britain, a

concession the value of which can only be appreciated when it

is realized that almost every city and corporation then

possessed an exclusive system of customs and by-laws,

24
regulating industrial pursuits within its limits in such a way as to

debar any but the properly initiated.‖47 Not only do such

inducements reflect the closed class hierarchy and limited

opportunity for advancement that characterized British society,

they also are in stark contrast to the boundless opportunities

available to the industrious in the American colonies.

Dave Palmer, in Way of the Fox, made some astute

observations on the Ability of America, from its earliest colonial

beginnings, to absorb disparate immigrant groups and rapidly

assimilate them, turning them into Americans in the process.

He wrote:

The people themselves were at once diverse and

alike...they were certainly not cast in a common

mold. Among those...were rakes and adventurers,

the politically persecuted and the politically

ambitious, the well affected and the disaffected,

the penniless and the pious. Despite the diversity

among immigrants, and dissimilarities between

47
Edward E. Curtis. The Organization of the British Army in the
American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1926), 66.
25
 them and old settlers, assimilation was rapid. The

annual flow of newcomers blended smoothly with

those folk already established. All...became

united by the ties of English language, law, and

culture. They came to share like values derived

from similar colonial experiences and

expectations. They had known common fears,

had overcome common dangers...most citizens

enjoyed a long tradition of self-government. Slave

or settler, planter or preacher, the colonists

proudly called themselves Americans.48

This trait continues to this day, and is in many ways uniquely

American.

David Ramsey, writing in 1789, in his The History of the

American Revolution, made some penetrating observations on

colonial and revolutionary finances. Ramsey saw the

depreciation of paper money, and the widespread inflation of

the era as a positive influence in the evolution of an American

48
Palmer, 28.
26
identity. He wrote, ―the experience (of depreciation and

inflation) inculcated...two salutary lessons, the impolity of

depending on paternal acquisitions, and the necessity of their

own exertions.‖ 49 He saw the middling class as immune from

the financial collapse of the currency, in that ―the active and

industrious indemnified themselves, by conforming the price of

their services to the present state of depreciation.‖ 50

Ramsey saw the financial techniques of his time as

providing a favorable leveling in American society. He argues

that the very rich lost much of their wealth to the very poor: ―To

that class of people, whose daily labor was their support, the

depreciation was no disadvantage, expending money as fast as

they received it, they always got its full value. The reverse was

the case for the rich...no agrarian law ever had a more

extensive operation than continental money.‖51

Ramsey also spoke in favor of the capitalist meritocracy

that had evolved in America: ―men exert themselves unless

49
Ramsey, II: 462.
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid., II: 461.
27
they have the fruit of their exertions secure to them, and at their

disposal.‖52 The History of the American Revolution is a

celebration of the unique American identity that had evolved

and was readily apparent, even as early as 1789. Ramsey

understood how and why Americans were different, and further

knew that independence had been a necessary event due to

that American evolution.

The same British rigid class system revealed in the

above referenced inducement to enlisted recruitment is also

seen in the British officer corps. Not only were commissions

purchased, but also the low officer pay ensured that only the

wealthy could aspire to high rank, while middle class officers

were doomed to a penurious existence at company grade level.

The ranks of the elite guards were the de facto preserve of the

aristocratic elite, and ―in 1769 out of every twelve

commissioned officers, one was a Guardsman; while out of

every three men commanding regiments, one had been a

52
Ibid.
28
Guardsman.―53 These figures reflect that in the army, as in all of

British society, the plum pickings were reserved for the

emolument of the wealthy, usually aristocratic, elite.

F. W. Anderson‘s profound article, Why Did Colonial

New Englanders Make Bad Soldiers, is packed with

provocative insight into the evolution of a unique American

identity. Anderson begins with the premise that the poor

behavior of Provincial troops in the Seven Years‘ War was not

unreasoned or self-interested. He further explains that the poor

view that British officers had of Provincial troops was justified,

but that it should be attributed to the new England practice of

viewing their service as a contractual obligation, one with

responsibilities for both parties.

Anderson proceeds to back up his theory with many

examples of the contractual nature of the provincial view of

military service. In his second footnote, Anderson recognizes

his debt to John Shy‗s essay on the militia system as having

inspired his research. However, he differs in that he does not

53
Curtis, 23.
29
attribute the ineffectiveness of provincial troops to their being

drawn from the fringes of the society, but rather on the

aforementioned contractual view of obligations.

Anderson highlights the struggle between General

Winslow and Lord Loudoun to illustrate the fundamental

differences between the colonials and the British. Winslow‘s

refusal to subordinate himself and his army to the command of

regulars, even in the face of a common enemy, is explained as

the colonial rejection of service as an obligation to the King.

The colonial rejection of the concept of subordination to every

whim of a superior highlights the evolution of an American view,

quite in contrast to that which governed the life of a British

soldier. Americans had evolved a meritocracy, with contracts to

bind them. Contracts implied mutual consent and mutual

benefits, in addition to the potential for a termination of the

contractual relationship. Totally absent from the colonial

persona is the sense of fealty to a sovereign in the feudal

sense.

30
 Anderson views provincial officers as Executors in Trust,

who had an obligation to uphold the terms under which the

army had been recruited. This is contrasted to the British view,

in which the provincials, as Royal subjects, must conform to the

King‘s edicts without question. In an excellent insight into the

New England mentality, Anderson writes that ―the idea of the

king‘s interfering, by virtue of his sovereign authority, to alter

the terms of an agreement to which he was not a party made

no sense: no contract could be changed without the mutual

consent of the parties involved.‖54

Anderson continues with a study of the nature of the

provincial soldiers‘ disobedience in the face of violations of their

recruitment agreements. He explains that the mutinies were

invariably open, with no attempt to hide identities, that the

troops acted in large groups, and that they did not threaten their

officers; they simply presented grievances, and then went on

strike if not mollified. He further explains that desertion tended

to be a group affair, sometimes even involving junior officers. In

54
Fred Anderson. ―Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make Bad
Soldiers?‖ William and Mary Quarterly. 3d ser.,38 (1981): 402.
31
a discussion of the monetary nature of provincial service,

Anderson notes ―that ideas of duty and loyalty mattered less to

provincial soldiers than equity.‖55 The provincial soldiers‘ view

of the erosion of their own rights under the conditions of regular

service are revealed in a quote from Gibson Clough: ―although

we be Englishmen Born we are debarred Englishmen‘s

Liberty…(regulars) are but little better than slaves to their

Officers.‖56

Anderson concludes by noting that colonials and

regulars ―were operating from contradictory premises about

society, warfare, and military service.‖57 Colonial society was

bound by contractual obligations at all levels, in stark contrast

to British society, with a society bound by royal authority and a

rigid social hierarchy.

Colonial interrelationships were based on the need for

mutual support in a hostile environment and shaped by

contractual obligation. The colonists objected to Britain

55
Ibid., 406.
56
Ibid.
57
Ibid., 413
32
unilaterally changing the rules (in effect, violating the terms of

the contract between colonies and mother country). Thus, they

fought for their rights. Only when it was clear that Britain would

not be swayed to recognize what colonists saw as basic rights

owed to them, was independence considered and embraced,

not as an end in itself, but as a means of fulfilling the

contractual obligation of government to respect the rights and

wishes of its citizens. If Britain could not stay within the bounds

of the contract, then the colonists would institute their own

government that could.

The evolution of an American meritocracy often made

the colonists indignant of privilege. Whereas an Englishman

might accept established perquisites of the aristocracy without

comment, Americans tended to be much more concerned with

fair play. The evolution of the American identity, free of the

placemen and hangers-on of England, and free also of the

blatant corruption of the Parliamentary system, was a critical

component in its development.

33
 Jameson noted that ―the very conditions of life, the

intense struggle for existence which every individual had

usually to go through, tended of themselves to equalize men

and draw them together in the bonds of mutual sympathy‖58 this

points to an environmental and social inducement to

democracy in the colonies, in conditions radically different than

in England. He refers to the inventiveness born of necessity

that evolved into an American character trait. Elaborating on

this colonial ingenuity, he notes, ―the industry and grit were

already present which were in time to make this the greatest

manufacturing country in the world.‖59

The shared experiences of survival in an often-hostile

environment proved to make American colonists aggressive in

defending their liberties. ―In the New World...because survival

had demanded it, nearly every citizen, not just the shiftless and

ne‘er-do- wells, could be expected to wield a musket.‖60 In a

sentiment that reappears as a common thread in American

58
Jameson, 46.
59
Ibid., 61.
60
Palmer, 22.
34
foreign policy to the present day, George Washington wrote in

A General View of the American and British Force, the

Disposition of Each, and (the) Different Enterprises in which the

Former (under certain circumstances) may be Employed in the

Campaign of 1782, in support of an offensive war and against

static defense:

An expedition into that Country (Canada), if

undertaken with sufficient means, and in a proper

season and manner, will cost really little more

than the expensive, but ineffectual modes which

are now pursuing by the Continent aggregately,

and the States individually, for defense of them;

while the latter is an annual expense under all the

disadvantages and evils here enumerated; and

the other, by putting the axe to the root, would

remove the cause; and make a radical cure.‖61

61
John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. The Writings of George Washington
(Washington, D.C.: United States George Washington Bicentennial
Commission, 1931-1944), XXIV: 194-215.
35
 A further quote from one of the founders that likewise

expresses the American infatuation with military prowess is

seen from Benjamin Franklin, speaking of those who were

against strong national defense. He wrote to Robert Morris, ―It

is absurd the pretending to be lovers of liberty while they

grudge paying for the defense of it.‖62

Washington revealed his aggressiveness in a 1757 letter

to the Earl of Loudoun: ―I have endeavored to demonstrate, that

it would require fewer men to remove the cause, than to

prevent the effects, while the cause subsists.‖63 In this French

and Indian War era letter is seen the recurring theme for

Washington: concentrate on the cause, and remove the cause,

don‘t be bogged down with effects, or symptoms. He

maintained this philosophy, throughout his life, leading him first

to rebellion, then to his grand strategy of the war, and finally he

allowed it to guide his presidency. Always couching his

arguments in economical terms, he consistently argued that it

62
Albert Henry Smyth, ed. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1905-07) VIII: 645.
63
Jared Sparks, ed. The Writings of Washington (Boston: Ferdinand
Andrews, 1838), II: 222.
36
was cheaper to attack the roots, than to prune away at the

branches of American problems.

The other founders, including Thomas Jefferson, echo

these words from Washington and Franklin. They reflect that

Americans had evolved an aggressive concept of maintaining

not peace, but their own freedoms, through the use of force,

even in a preemptive or offensive manner. For the American

colonists, it was not peace at any cost, but liberty at any cost.

Washington wrote of Thomas Paine, ―The sound

doctrine and unanswerable reasoning contained in the

pamphlet Common Sense will not leave numbers at a loss to

decide upon the propriety of a separation.‖64 Paine resonates to

this day because he recognized the absurdity of a distant

monarchy ruling the evolved colonies, recognized the rights

that colonists held dear, and recognized the innate American

need to expand. In his passionate defense of the Revolution,

Paine was putting the reality of the colonial evolution before his

readership. Rather than instigating revolution he was attesting

64
Palmer, 113.
37
to the fact that one had already occurred, rendering the colonial

relationship untenable.

The reality of an American identity comes into focus,

with some quotes from Washington well before the first blows

of the war: ―The British... are trampling upon the valuable rights

of Americans.‖65 That a man as reserved and conservative as

Washington could write ―the Americans will fight for their liberty

and property...the once happy and peaceful plains of America

will either be drenched with blood, or inhabited by slaves‖66

shows to what extent British subjects had become independent

Americans, even prior to the commencement of the Revolution.

The colonial characteristic of audacity, evolved from the

dire obstacles that the early settlers had faced in the day-to-day

struggle to survive, is well reflected in the actions of the

founders, such as in setting expansionist territorial boundaries

while the outcome of the war was still very much in doubt.

For an audacious people, the Proclamation of 1763,

which removed all advantages for colonial westward expansion

65
Sparks, II: 398.
66
Ibid., II: 406-407.
38
hard-won in the French and Indian War was impossible to

accept. Any limits on American growth were inherently

unacceptable to the colonists. Likewise, the Quebec Act of

1774 was seen as violating innate colonial rights and restricting

an unspoken manifest destiny.

The American colonies had evolved economically,

politically, and socially beyond their mother country roots.

Economically, the colonies enjoyed three percent annual

population growth, attended by a .3 to .5% productivity increase

per capita. Alan Taylor has written that ―this growth rate was

impressive for a pre-industrial economy...indeed the colonies

grew more rapidly than any other economy in the eighteenth

century, including the mother country.‖67 The gross domestic

product of the colonies in 1700 was only 4% of England‘s, but

by 1770 it was 40%. Annual per capita income in 1774 was

greater for a free American than for the English or the French.
68

67
Alan Taylor. American Colonies (New York: Penguin Group,
2001), 306.
68
Ibid., 306-307.
39
 Colonial buying power increased, as prices for colonial

produce rose, while the price of British manufactures remained

stable. The result was an improvement in the balance of trade,

with credit being easier to obtain for an American colonist than

an Englishman. The result was, while Americans consumed

10% of British exports in 1700, that figure had jumped to 37%

by 1772. Moreover, the volume of imports increased by 50% in

that same period.69 Thus is demonstrated the phenomenal

evolution of the American economy, at rates higher than even

England could hope to match.

The economic evolution of the colonies saw not only the

beginnings of an American identity, but also of an economy that

proved to be superior, with more inherent potential than that of

the mother country.

In that they were able to evolve a meritocracy, free of the

corrupting influences of the placemen so prevalent in British

society, Americans proved to be unrestrained in their ambitions.

While, in England restricted land ownership would make tenant

69
Ibid., 310-311.
40
farmers deferential to the local squire, in America a farmer had

only to move to the next valley to escape a burdensome

landlord. Indeed, a farmer was likely to own his farm outright,

dispensing with any form of tenancy, no matter how benign.

In the trades, whereas in England restrictive guilds could

prohibit entry into a field, in America a tradesman had only to

hang out his shingle, and he would stand or fall on the merits of

his product alone. In the field of manufacture, colonists were

poised to open factories to meet colonial needs; only artificial

British restrictions retarded American industrial growth, such as

in the repressed iron industry.

Politically, Americans also had evolved a model superior

to their British antecedents. The American system tended to

provide a much broader franchise. Local representatives owed

allegiance squarely to their neighbors who had elected them,

and the party politics of Britain, with members beholden to a

sponsor, were refreshingly absent.

Colonial assemblies were often likely to vote in

opposition to the wishes of the Governor. They, early on,

41
evolved a sense that they were contractually obligated to

protect the rights of their constituents, not those of the crown.

The corruption of Parliament, with votes bought and sold

and members currying favor and advancement from the crown,

found little place in the colonial assemblies. The natural result

was that the American political system had evolved into a

superior democratic instrument of self-government.

Socially, as well, the Americans developed a society that

surpassed the mother country‘s. The virtual absence of an

aristocracy in the colonies was due to the harsh environment,

devoid of comforts, and at a distance from the throne, with all

its attendant possibilities for emolument. As regards the lack of

wealth, it can be said bluntly that the slim pickings for placemen

and hangers-on guaranteed that the colonies could avoid much

of the pervading inequity and corruption found in Britain.

The almost boundless availability of rich farmland, and

the great need for every article of trade and manufacture

ensured that a farmer or craftsman would succeed or fail based

on merit, free from unfair restrictions of landlords or guilds. In

42
this environment, a meritocracy developed in a large part free

of the stultifying caste system of England.

The militia system, while admittedly inefficient and a

poor instrument with which to prosecute a war against any but

disjointed Indian attacks, reflected the evolution of an American

society distinct from the British model. While a source of

amusement and exasperation to British regulars, the tinkers

and merchants who served as many of the militia officers

constituted the natural leaders of their communities. The militia

private soldier was usually a man of property serving to defend

his family, neighbors and homestead. This ideal of the citizen

soldier is still apparent in America‘s National Guard and

Reserve system.

The colonial social model for the composition of military

forces was superior to the British system, not, of course, in

fighting ability, but in that America was free of that bogeyman of

all good Whigs, a standing army. Most importantly, America

avoided an army composed of surplus aristocrats as officers,

and society‘s dregs as the enlisted. From the beginning,

43
American armies were representative of a cross section of

society, with troops motivated by a desire to protect the

community, more so than out of any fierce discipline.

One of the most striking examples of the evolution of an

American identity, in opposition to and inconsistent with colonial

status, is seen in the evolution of the American military ideal of

an armed citizenry, fighting for freedom. This ideal is in sharp

contrast to the socially stratified professional armies of the Old

World. The realization of this ideal in the combination of both

the militia and continental forces is worthy of exploration. It is of

note that standing forces, so often feared in colonial and

Revolutionary Whig ideology, came to prove indispensable to

the achievement of ideals that the American people had

believed were only attainable through a citizens‘ militia. As

General Nathanael Greene told Virginia Governor Thomas

Jefferson, ―the army is all that the States have to depend on for

their political existence.‖70 General George Washington told his

continental troops that ―now the peace and safety of his

70
Robert Middlekauff. The Glorious Cause (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1982), 463.
44
Country depends (under God) solely on the success of our

arms.‖71 The truth of this observation was made evident

repeatedly during the course of the war, and the message was

not lost on the Whig hierarchy. ―An army raised in America

would be mostly a citizen army of volunteers rather than a

conglomeration of generally unwilling wretches serving no

cause higher than regimental pride and discipline.‖72

Whig ideologies, with their preconceived biased notions

against a standing army, and with all their inherent prejudices

and predilections for a citizen‘s militia, were stronger in the

American colonies than in Britain. The reason for this was that

the British saw their standing army as actively protecting their

freedoms and as well controlled by Parliament. The colonists

felt threatened by the British regulars and were not confident in

Parliament‘s designs towards them. ―Armies of the eighteenth

century, while officered by the aristocracy, filled their ranks by

scouring the social gutters for human flotsam. Neither extreme

of person existed in any significant number in America. There

71
Sparks, IV: 119.
72
Palmer, 23.
45
were neither blue bloods from which to recruit officers nor

heaps of social sawdust from which to impress troops. That left

room at the top for natural leadership to rise, while it means

that sons of guild members and landowners---men with a stake

in victory---would comprise the bulk of the Continental Army.‖73

Whig notions of a standing army aside, American troops

were motivated by a sense of liberty; the discipline, while stern,

was much more in keeping with a citizen‘s army. This reflected

the representative nature of American armies, versus the

composition of British forces, which were consciously limited to

the unproductive members of society. In fact, the British

government precluded voters from serving in the forces in order

to guarantee the subordination of their soldiers. Conversely,

General George Washington understood that an army of

citizens required a different manner of leadership:

―Be strict in your discipline; that is, to require

nothing unreasonable of your officers and men,

but see that whatever is required be punctually

73
Ibid., 29.
46
 complied with. Reward and punish every man

according to his merit, without partiality or

prejudice; hear his complaints; if well founded,

redress them; if otherwise, discourage them in

order to prevent frivolous ones. Discourage vice

in every shape, and impress upon the mind of

every man, from the first to the lowest, the

importance of the cause, and what it is they are

contesting for.‖74

Inspector General Friedrich Wilhelm, Baron Von

Steuben understood the nature of the republicans who

constituted the Continental Army; he wrote an old European

comrade: ―you say to your soldier, ‗Do this‘ and he doeth it, but

I am obliged to say ‗This is the reason why you ought to do

that,‘ and he does it.‖75

For Americans, the Revolution was a total war pursued

by the entire American society with the liberty of all citizens in

74
Don Higginbotham. The War of American Independence (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1983), 119.
75
Middlekauff, 419.
47
the balance. But for the British, the war was a limited war with

lines that would not be crossed in terms of hurting the economy

or enfranchising the lower orders. In fact, the American total

effort across all segments of society, with a standing army

fighting for the rights of all citizens, was a new phenomenon in

stark contrast with the European conceptions of limited war - for

the benefit of the monarch only. ―In some ways, a citizen force

would be inferior, in others much superior. But, most

importantly, it would be different.‖76

The Whigs rapidly realized that the continental troops

were ―their‖ army, an army protecting them from virtual slavery.

Patriots were engaged in a ―most just and holy war, in defense

of our country, our wives, children, parents, and sisters, and to

secure to ourselves and our posterity the inestimable blessings

of Liberty.‖77

A lesson of the War of Revolution that is often

overlooked, or worse yet, misinterpreted, is that the success of

American arms was not due to either continental or militia, but

76
Palmer, 23.
77
Higginbotham, 262.
48
to the combination of the two in an effective fighting force. Far

from being mutually exclusive, they proved that each was

necessary to the success of the other. Continentals could never

have been enlisted in numbers sufficient to preclude the use of

militia in many crucial areas. Had the continentals been brought

up to strength, the resulting loss of civilian labor available to the

nation would have led to an even greater disjunction of the

American economy than the Revolution proved to be, perhaps

even a fatal one. Conversely, the idea of a force made up

exclusively of militia was equally not viable; militia was most

effective acting in areas free of enemy regulars. This could only

occur when the British were forced to concentrate their troops

against the threat of continental regulars. When militia was

effective in the field against regulars, it was usually due to the

presence of a stiffening of continentals, in conjunction with

inspired leadership to show the way.

Thus, it is shown that the American military ideal was

realized neither in sole reliance on militia nor in continentals,

but in the skillful combination of the two. This understanding of

49
the interdependence of both forces has been difficult to achieve

for many American leaders and scholars. Countless tracts and

speeches have alternately warned of the threat of regular

forces to liberty, or conversely, of the inability of militia to

defend that liberty. Were it not for the enlightened intervention

of Governeur Morris, who was opposed to ―setting a

dishonorable mark of distinction on the military class of

Citizens,‖78 the Constitution might have prefaced Article I,

Section 8 by stating that militias would exist so ―that the

liberties of the people may be better secured against danger of

standing armies in time of peace.‖79 This sort of prejudice

against a standing army, as late as 1787, dishonors the

sacrifice of the continentals of the Revolution, and seriously

misjudges the motivation of American regulars. More

importantly, however, it fails to recognize the recurring need for

a cadre of regulars to guide the transition to full mobilization of

civilian soldiers in times of danger. The truth is that a

78
Robert W. Coakley. The Role of Federal Military Forces in
Domestic Disorders 1789-1878 (Washington, D.C. Center of Military History,
1988), 14.
79
Ibid.
50
compromise exists and that this compromise has allowed the

nation to mobilize fully when threatened, while allowing society

to enjoy the fruits of the labor of our civilian soldiers in time of

peace. This nation would not exist in a recognizable form were

it not for the existence of this compromise.

The combined continental and militia forces proved to be

an appropriate instrument in establishing and defending

American liberties, in their combined effectiveness as well as in

their revolutionary fervor.

The regulars in the regiments of the crown forces were

often poverty-stricken volunteers, likely to serve for life.

Pardoned convicts and pressed men rounded out the ranks.

They served under extreme discipline, enforced with corporal

and capital punishment. Their meager wages were usually

further reduced by ―gross off-reckonings‖80 to pay for their food,

medical contributions, uniforms, and the like.

The British regular fought well because of his strict drill

and discipline, and, to a lesser extent, because of unit loyalty.

80
W. J. Wood. Battles of the American Revolutionary War, 1775-
1781 (Chapel Hill: Algonquin Books, 1990), XXVIII.
51
He was not likely to be particularly religious, nor patriotic.81 The

harsh existence of a regular led to rampant alcoholism as well.

Alcohol abuse was a common feature among the rank and file

and, in fact, it is seen as a component of much volunteer

recruitment: ―boys and men made drunk by the recruiting

sergeant and persuaded to take ‗the King‘s shilling‘ while hardly

aware of what they were doing made up a considerable part of

the army.‖82

British recruiting was in sharp contrast to the motivations

of colonial troops to take up arms and, more importantly, to

remain under arms. Greene always knew, and Washington

came to understand, that the rebel troops were inspired by the

sense that they were fighting for themselves and their families.

They sincerely believed that their rights had been infringed

upon. Furthermore, they knew that the consequence of failure

would be catastrophic: defeated rebels are branded traitors by

81
Stephen Brumwell. Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in the
Americas, 1755-1763 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 117.
82
Christopher Ward. The War of the Revolution, 2 Volumes (New
York: The Macmillan Company, 1952), 25.
52
posterity and the term patriot only applies to victorious

revolutionaries.83

Both the British and colonial soldiers suffered great

hardships and endured terrible conditions in the pursuit of

victory in the American Revolution. The British were motivated

through fierce discipline and professional pride. The nascent

Americans were moved to endure and persevere by a sense of

patriotism, a belief that they were defending their rights, and the

knowledge that failure would mean disaster for themselves and

their families.

The American military tradition of an armed citizenry

united in defense of their freedoms was realized during the

Revolutionary War, and set the example for France and the rest

of Europe in the next century. That tradition, while occasionally

inefficient in the opening stages of our nation‘s conflicts, has

survived, and indeed thrived, with modification to meet new

challenges, to this day. It has been shown that it is a mistake to

83
George F. Scheer et al. Rebels and Redcoats: The American
Revolution Through the Eyes of Those Who Fought and Lived It (New York:
Da Capo Press, 1957), 215-216.
53
separate the militia from the continental, or the guardsman from

the regular. The relationship was then and remains now a

symbiotic one, in which neither component can be effective

without the other. The lasting success of America‘s arms is in

that the people‘s army is a force of civilian soldiers around a

cadre of professional defenders of freedom. This

conglomeration of citizen soldiers, both professional and part-

time, not only works, but it is now, as it was during the

Revolution, the only means of mobilizing the full might of the

nation without causing a degeneration into a military state.

Yet another example of the evolution of a separate

American identity is seen in the convention, begun by

Washington, whereby American military officers stayed clear of

politics. This is different from the British officer class, where a

seat of Parliament, with the consequent political embroilments

was a common situation for many of the crown‘s general

officers.

Similar to their rebel enemies, but in contrast to the other

British forces, the Loyalists fought passionately for their

54
country. They believed not only in their own cause, but they

also despised the republican enemy. This fight for a cause,

rather than professional pride, is best seen in the statement of

a condemned Loyalist recruiter, Jacobus Rose, ―he would die

with an easy conscience…for…he had not taken the part he did

from any lucrative motive, or the sake of gaining any

preferment, but that he thought his country would not again be

happy till reduced to a proper obedience to its former state of

government…which induced him to prevail on as many

neighbors to join the King‘s forces as he could.‖84

For the British government, the suppression of the

rebellion was a limited war with lines that would not be crossed

in terms of hurting the economy or enfranchising the lower

orders. British regular forces traditionally were consciously

limited to the unproductive members of society. In fact, the

British government had precluded voters from serving in the

ranks in order to guarantee the subordination of their soldiers.

The American total effort across all segments of society with a

84
Crary, 227. (capitalization modernized)
55
standing army fighting for the rights of all citizens was a new

phenomenon in stark contrast with the European conceptions

of limited war--for the benefit of the monarch only. For

Americans, the Revolution was a war pursued by the entire

rebellious American society with the liberty of all citizens in the

balance.

Loyalist troops often served with equal fervor and

enthusiasm as their rebel neighbors. Loyalists‘ accounts are full

of references to the cause, of sacrifices to be made for the

good of their country.

Loyalist recruitment to the King‘s standard began very

slowly. This is partially explained by the fact that Loyalists,

conservative by nature, and wishing to remain within the

established system, were hesitant to arm themselves without

―proper commissions from the king.‖85 The Whigs, in contrast,

by their revolutionary and republican nature, had armed much

more rapidly and effectively than the Loyalists.

85
Van Tyne, 165.
56
 A further obstacle to effective Loyalist recruitment was

the widespread American aversion to serving in regular forces

and under British officers. This reticence dated back beyond

the Seven Years‘ War and reflected the poor view of regulars

common to Americans, as well as the understanding that British

Officers tended to look at provincial troops with disdain.

Loyalist uprisings in Virginia, North Carolina, New

Jersey, Maryland and Delaware had failed in the absence of

British support. The evacuation of New Jersey had left Loyalists

at the mercy of their Whig neighbors. In light of these failures,

more effective method of Loyalist recruitment was called for.

The British realized that they had failed in their efforts ―towards

engaging, employing and retaining the well-disposed

inhabitants.‖86 One important change was the offer of half pay

for life to Loyalist officers who met recruitment quotas. This,

combined with provincial rank being made equal, albeit junior,

to regular rank, and provincial officers enjoying the same

disability provisions as regular officers, went far to spur Loyalist

86
Ibid., 168.
57
recruitment. The rank issue had been a point of contention

back to the Seven Years‘ War, with provincial officers being

forced to defer to the most junior British officer whom they

encountered.

Through the use of bounties and more liberal pay,

Governor Tryon, as the Major General of Provincial forces,

managed to raise substantial troops. Still, many Loyalists

refused to serve as regulars and resented being unable to

serve under their own officers. Thus, volunteer militia

companies were formed, to serve under American officers.

They were supplied with arms by Britain. Three such Loyalist

bands were raised under the auspices of William Franklin‘s

Honorable Board of Associated Loyalists. These groups

operated independently of the British command.

Lieutenant James Moody‘s Narrative is very informative

of the motivations of a Loyalist to take arms in defense of the

British empire. Moody writes:

―The situation of a man who…wishes to do

right, is trying and difficult. In following the

58
 multitude, he was sure of popular

applause; this is always pleasing; and it is

too dearly bought only when a man gives

up for it the approbation of his own

conscience. He foresaw, in its fullest force,

that torrent of reproach, insult, and injury,

which he was sure to draw down on

himself and his family, by a contrary

conduct.‖ 87

Moody not only recorded his thoughts on the

decision to remain loyal, he also judged his rebel

neighbors, ―rebellion is the foulest of all crimes; and that

which is begun in wickedness must end in ruin.‖88 Moody

resolved that ―there was no difficulty, danger or distress

which, as an honest man…he ought not to undergo,

87
James Moody. Lieutenant Moody’s Narrative (London:
Richardson and Urquhart, 1783), 2-3.
88
Ibid., 3.
59
rather than see his country thus disgraced and

undone.‖89

Lieutenant Colonel John Graves Simcoe‘s Military

Journal chronicles the actions of the Loyalist Queen‘s Rangers.

Simcoe noted that his provincial troops proved to be

―disciplined enthusiasts in the cause of their country.‖90 These

Tory troops most closely resembled their counterparts in the

rebel army, in that they were more likely to be fighting out of

strongly held convictions, as opposed to either the Hessian

mercenaries or the common British regular. This enthusiasm

that Simcoe alluded to was the root of the ferocious nature of

the fighting when Loyalist met Patriot in the civil war that ran

concurrent with the Revolution. Simcoe is brutally honest in

noting, of Lord Cornwallis‘ army, that their ―general intelligence

he knew to be very bad; the slightest reliance was not to be

placed on any patroles (sic) from his Lordship‘s army.‖91 Poor

reconnaissance is an unpardonable omission for an army such

89
Ibid.
90
James Graves Simcoe. Simcoe’s Military Journal (Toronto: Baxter
Publishing Company, 1962), 133.
91
Ibid., 130.
60
as Cornwallis‘, operating independently, far from any support,

in the midst of the enemy‘s territory.

It is of note that Moody sought Loyalist recruits with

some success in the rebel country. When recruits were sought

in the prison hulks, the results were quite different. Captain

Thomas Dring, in Recollections of the Jersey Prison Ship,

wrote:

―A regiment of Refugees, with a green uniform,

was then quartered at Brooklyn. We were invited

to join this Royal Band, and to partake of his

Majesty‘s pardon and bounty. But the prisoners,

in the midst of their unbounded suffering, of their

dreadful privation and consuming anguish,

spurned the insulting offer. They preferred to

linger and die, rather than desert their country‘s

cause. During the whole period of my

confinement, I never knew a single instance of

61
 enlistment from among the prisoners of the

Jersey.‖92

This passage illustrates the passion that drove the rebel

prisoners to adhere to their cause. It is, ironically, very similar to

the sentiments expressed by Lieutenant Moody when he was

himself a prisoner. Thus, the Loyalists and rebels shared the

trait of serving out of a sense of personal obligation to their

country, as opposed to the British and Hessian regulars.

The Loyalists dedicated themselves to a dying cause:

the subordination of a people to the whims and caprices of a

monarch. They desired to remain subjects in a world where

citizen was soon to be the catchword. Their brave but futile

and, in retrospect, misguided fight to stem the tide of

republicanism made them the true victims of the revolution.

Now that it has been shown that the American colonists

had been evolving a separate identity, it is of value to review

the nature of the relationship with Britain in order to understand

the incongruity of it.

92
Thomas Dring. Recollections of the Jersey Prison Ship
(Providence: H. H. Brown, 1829), 71.
62
 Eighteenth century Britain subscribed to mercantilist

theory to govern her imperialist relations. Under mercantilism,

the colonies existed to produce raw materials for the mother

country to transform into manufactured products, and then to

act as a ready market for the Britain‘s manufactured goods.

Mercantilism also fostered a strong merchant fleet with its

restrictions on transportation, import and export. The Laws of

Trade and Navigation were the corner stone of British

mercantilism. Seventeen hundred saw the Navigation Acts in

mature form, as the colonies were required to sell enumerated

goods only to Britain and could ship only in vessels belonging

to the British Empire. Foreign merchants were banned from the

colonies and most foreign products had to pass through Britain,

with the inevitable duties, prior to being dispatched to the

Americas. Paradoxically, mercantilism and the Navigation Acts

precluded the colonists from developing a hard money

economy that could satisfy Britain‘s later demands for taxes to

defray the expenses of the Great War.

63
 Britain‘s commercial imperialism was so effective that by

1774 one third of British shipping was engaged in the American

trade. Liberal credit, necessary to the cash poor colonists, kept

the system running, but it also ensured that British capitalists

had much to lose should the system be upset. Increasingly, the

colonists came to see the Acts as restrictive of their success.

Planters in the South resented their indebtedness to British

merchants, and New England merchants resented the legal

advantages held by British merchants. The system continued

to work partially because of lax enforcement, smuggling and

loopholes that left colonists still able to thrive, despite the

restrictions.93

Acts in 1751 and 1764 forbade paper money as legal

tender in the colonies, thus further aggravating the paucity of

cash, but allaying the fears of British merchants burned by

devaluation. On account of the export of specie to the colonies

not being allowed, these restrictions were bound to be

burdensome. A reactionary parliament recognized the money

93
Avery, 1-44.
64
shortage, and yet still proceeded to demand new taxes from

her colonists. Whenever the colonists thrived in manufactories,

the mother country moved quickly to curb the success. Thus,

for example, the sale of woolens, wool and hats was forbidden

in inter-colonial trade; these acts were bearable, so long as

they remained un-enforced. The enumeration of iron in 1767

was a tough blow that bankrupted many American ironmasters.

The restrictions served to make the colonists realize that

Parliament was more responsive to a few British merchants

than to the needs of the millions of colonists. All said, the

stricter enforcement of the Trade Acts after 1764 was not

sufficient to drive the Americans to opposition. The Revenue

Acts were the cause of American outrage.

The colonists linked their liberties with their colonial

assemblies. In light of this, it is obvious that any infringement of

cherished legislative liberties would meet strong opposition

within the colonies. The isolation of the colonies and the years

of salutary neglect had made the colonial assemblies very

independent of Parliament. Solicitor General Yorke had, in

65
1724, decreed that the colonies could only be taxed by their

own assemblies or by Parliament. However, Parliament chose

not to exercise this right until 1764. Thus, in 1765, many

colonists believed that Parliament had no right to tax them. By

converting most of the colonies to a Royal government, the

British attempted to use a Royal Governor and Council to rule

by the King‘s prerogative. The assemblies very effectively

blocked all attempts to curb their authority. This was done

through control of colonial finances. British attempts to create a

civil list, and thus make her appointees financially independent

of the assemblies, were likewise strongly resisted.

During the Seven Years‘ War, the colonial assemblies

stood on their rights, and in doing so seriously alienated the

mother country. The assemblies went so far as to usurp many

executive privileges held by the governors. By holding the war

effort hostage to their demands for control, the assemblies

greatly increased their strength, weakened crown authority, and

alienated the British government. In 1763, Patrick Henry‘s

attack on the disavowal of the two-penny act, and the

66
accompanying attack on British tyranny, set the stage for an

escalation of the tensions between colonists and motherland.

The rejection of the Albany Plan of Union of 1754 removed an

opportunity for both Britain and the colonies to radically modify

their relationship. Under Pitt, Britain gave up on colonial

contributions to the war effort, and offered to reimburse colonial

expenses in prosecuting the war. This huge infusion of British

capital, coupled with a huge increase in regular forces,

combined to win the war in short order. The victory was not

without a price; however, as it burdened the mother country

with an immense debt.

Frustrated by colonial smuggling with her enemies in the

West Indies, Britain, in 1755, authorized writs of assistance,

which allowed customs officers to search private property. This

new enforcement threatened the smuggling that was necessary

to New England‘s prosperity.

The conclusion of the Seven Years‘ War removed the

threat of the French from both the colonies and Britain; thus,

Britain was no longer constrained by the need to confront

67
France to deal lightly with her colonies. The colonies, similarly,

had seen the French threat removed from their continent, and

with it the need of Britain‘s armies to defend their very

existence. It was inevitable that the peace dividend from the

Great War would actually be a further erosion of the bonds

between Britain and the colonies.

British frustration with the failure of the requisition

system during the Great War

led Parliament to implement direct taxation as a substitute. The

Proclamation of 1763, while helping Britain to avoid further

Indian troubles on the frontier, also restricted colonial growth to

the westward, thus curtailing opportunity, especially among the

young and the poor of ambition. This restriction of the colonists

to the eastern seaboard served also to concentrate the

Americans in areas where Britain could more easily enforce her

will.

The establishment of a permanent British army in the

colonies only served to further arouse a growing opposition

who saw the regulars as more of a threat to American liberties

68
and moralities, than a defensive force. A Britain saddled with a

140,000,000-pound national debt in 1763 was desperate to find

new revenue sources. The British colonial customs service ran

at a deficit of 6,000 pounds a year, three times more than it was

able to bring in. The customs posts were sinecures, with absent

appointees, and their agents were susceptible to bribery.

Smuggling continued to be wide spread, most of it in violation

of the Molasses Act of 1733. The hated Admiralty Courts were

further strengthened in 1764. The lack of a trial by jury was

particularly galling to New England merchants. As enforcement

was tightened, with more naval vessels patrolling the coast and

more officials patrolling the ports, duties were likewise

increased.94

British landed interests in Parliament, eager to

ameliorate their heavy tax load, were very willing to endorse the

stamp act for the colonies. ―At the end of the war it was

calculated that the public debt in the colonies was eighteen

shillings per person; that of Great Britain stood at eighteen

94
John C. Miller. Origins of the American Revolution (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 1943), 120-121.
69
pounds per person.‖95 The Molasses Act of 1733 had set the

precedent for revenue measures; however, it had been so

prohibitively high, at sixpence per gallon, that its effect was to

end the legal trade and engender smuggling rather than that of

raising revenue. Likewise, the strong Rhode Island protest

against it should have given warning to Parliament of the

American reaction to new revenues.

With the failed Molasses Act set to expire in 1763,

Grenville proposed the Sugar Act of 1764. The duty was

reduced to three pence a gallon for foreign molasses, but it

would be rigidly enforced. The Sugar Act united the colonists as

not even the Great War had. They presented a unified front in

denouncing the act as ruinous to their economies. The

immediate effect of the Sugar Act was to drive the colonies

further into depression, by upsetting the balance of trade with

the West Indies. Radical colonists began to see the struggle as

one over the doctrine of no taxation without representation,

95
Ibid., 89.
70
rather than over a trade restriction. The stage was set for the

intense opposition to the Stamp Act that would come in 1765.

Grenville proposed the Stamp Act for the colonies, while

at the same time challenging them to propose a reasonable

alternative. The colonial proposal to retain the requisition

system was rejected, and the Stamp Act became law. The law

was seen by Grenville as cheap to enforce and equitable; he

did not predict any opposition. The Act was predicted to raise

60,000 pounds, only a fraction of the 350,000 pounds to

maintain the British army in America, and in no way a method

of reducing the British national debt. In a rare miscalculation,

Benjamin Franklin supported the Act, and led many of his

friends to serve as Stamp masters.

The Stamp Act was enacted in a period of severe

economic hardship in the colonies. The initial colonial response

was to point out that with the foreign islands of the West Indies

removed from colonial trade, the specie to pay the tax simply

did not exist. The colonists protested that their bankruptcy

would likewise bankrupt the British merchants to whom they

71
were indebted. The initial colonial petitions were rejected, and

the opposition became more vitriolic. The fact that stamp

violations would be tried in Admiralty courts only further

inflamed the issue. The Stamp Act inflamed many influential

sectors of colonial society. Tavern keepers, printers, and

lawyers would all feel its impact, and they helped ferment

popular opposition. The view of the Stamp Act as an assault

not just on colonial prosperity, but on colonial freedoms began

to gain wider acceptance. Resistance to the Act became a

question of preserving their liberties.

Patrick Henry‘s speech in support of his Resolves

delineated the differences between the old guard of colonial

leaders, and the rise of a new radical class of republican

minded patriots. The resolves were widely disseminated and

greatly influenced public opinion. The abject failure of the

Stamp Act, and the violent opposition it engendered in the

colonies led to its repeal. The organized colonial opposition, as

represented by the Stamp Act Congress of 1765,

72
foreshadowed further problems. The boycotts of British goods

warned of dire consequences for the British economy.

Unfortunately, the palliative value of the repeal of the

Stamp Act was overshadowed by the Declaratory Act, which

reiterated parliament‘s authority over the colonies. The Sons of

Liberty had felt their own power, and had seen the weakness of

Britain‘s hold on the colonies. Britain attempted to pacify the

colonies by dropping the duty on molasses further to one penny

per gallon, albeit applied to British molasses as well, and by

reopening certain foreign ports in the West Indies to American

trade. The Mutiny Act of 1765 rekindled grievances, as

colonists objected to quartering of troops in private homes and

resented the requirement to provision them. The Townshend

duties would not only tax imports of tea, colors, glass and

paper, they would effectively wrest control of the colonial purse

strings from the assemblies. This, in conjunction with the

pending suspension of the New York Legislature for its

opposition to the Mutiny Act, reinvigorated the colonial

opposition. The use of Circular Letters united the most of the

73
colonies in effective opposition to the duties. The ultimate

outrage that colonists resented was the creation of new

commissioners of the Customs to tighten up on smugglers.

Once again, a boycott proved most effective in influencing the

British government. The Townshend Acts were repealed, with

the exception of the Tea Act, retained not only to uphold

Parliament‘s right to tax the colonies, but also because it paid.

The continuation of the Tea Act in 1773 led radical patriots to

respond with the Boston Tea Party, frustrated at the weakening

of the non-importation agreements.

News of the Boston Tea Party caused an enraged

Parliament to answer with the Coercive Acts. The Port Act

caused a reunification of the divided colonies, in support of

oppressed Boston. Ultimately, the Coercive Acts caused the

colonists to call a Continental Congress to debate the issue. It

was during this time of great agitation that Britain made the

Quebec Act law, further alienating the colonists by expanding

Quebec‘s boundaries to seal off American expansion and

protecting the feared Catholic faith. Furthermore, the non-

74
representative government of the Quebec Act boded ill for

Americans still reeling from the Coercive Acts against

Massachusetts.

With these Acts, over the whole of the 1700‘s, Britain

managed to alienate her American colonists and ensure that

her rule would be opposed. While the prevailing view is that

here were so many missed opportunities for reconciliation that

the wonder is not that independence was inevitable, but that

Britain managed to make it appear necessary to her colonists:

the reality is that the colonies had evolved to a stage where any

form of dependency could only serve to stifle their further

growth.

When speaking of the American Revolution, it is

important to grasp that it involved much more than the military

events of 1775-1781. It was an evolution in colonists‘ attitudes

that began with the French and Indian War, and continued

through the ratification of the Constitution. The end result was

the establishment of a republican form of government that has

75
remained viable to this day, an inspiration to countless millions

the world over to seize their own freedom.

Ironically, the very success of British arms in the Seven

Years‘ War ensured the eventual estrangement of Britain‘s

North American Empire. With the removal of the French threat

from the American continent, the colonists no longer were

obliged to remain under British dominion in order to ensure

their survival. British attitudes of contempt towards the

American colonists had crystallized during the conflict against

the French, and the colonists‘ status as second-class citizens of

the empire had never been clearer. Conversely, the colonies

had taken the first tentative steps at cooperation, and had a

newfound self-respect in the accomplishment of their arms,

such as in the capture of Louisburg. British failures, especially

the massacre of Braddock‘s force likewise reduced the stature

of the British army in colonial eyes.

Just when Britain should have acted magnanimously

towards her colonies, and allowed more latitude in self-

government, George III proved himself a rigid monarch and

76
clamped down on many of the traditional prerogatives his

American subjects had long enjoyed. America‘s growth was

beginning to be stifled by Britain‘s restrictions on trade and

manufacture. Worse yet, the proposed new taxes would

significantly effect an already cash-poor economy. Ironically,

Britain‘s restrictive trade policies were the cause of the paucity

of hard currency in the colonies, but, despite this, the crown

sought cash from the colonies in unprecedented amounts.

Otherwise loyal colonists were forced into opposition to

the crown. Their decision was in many ways an economic one,

in that Britain‘s demands could bankrupt them. More

importantly, however, the British demands were seen as

erosive of established liberties. As the conflict evolved and

attitudes hardened, the opposition focused on the lack of

representation in Parliament, and the weakening of colonial

representative assemblies. Once this occurred, the only

resolution could be in either allowing meaningful colonial

representation in Parliament or allowing for the continuation

and indeed the strengthening of colonial self-government.

77
 The American colonies had always been receptive to

Whig ideology. The high literacy rate and many small printing

presses ensured that Whig pamphlets were well distributed and

well read. The colonists did not see the Parliament as

representing their interests, and, by extension, did not see the

British army, under Parliamentary control in the same light that

a native Briton might. To an American Whig, the British army,

indeed any standing army, was a threat to liberty.

Much blame for the ultimate rupture can be squarely

placed on Britain, especially on her monarch and his ministers.

George III was rigid and unyielding when the reality of the

situation called for tact and accommodation. Likewise, the

King‘s ministers proved unable and unwilling to seek

conciliation. In their defense, mercantile theory was still in

vogue, and in it the loss of the colonies would mean the ruin of

Britain. Men, swelled by the importance of the victory over

France, were unable to see what Vergennes had seen: that

these colonies were no longer tied to their motherland by a

78
common enemy, and would begin to gravitate to some degree

of independence.

The irony of the Revolution is that Britain believed she

must hold the colonies or be ruined, but the reality was that in

trying to hold the colonies she imperiled herself. It was clear

early in the conflict that military victory would carry an

enormous cost, both in manpower and money. The war caused

a drain on the British economy she could ill afford. Likewise, it

should have been readily apparent that a military victory would

not have brought the colonists back into the fold; matters were

not going to return to normal in regard to pre-war British-

colonial relations.

Britain‘s attempts at reconciliation were always too little,

too late. In the case of the repeal of offensive laws, Parliament

insisted on retaining the right to tax, thus ensuring a continued,

albeit simmering, American opposition. Britain attempted to

address symptoms of America‘s discontent without

understanding the root cause; America‘s colonists were ready

for self-government. Americans had a repugnance for Britain‘s

79
corrupt political system. They had experienced the placemen,

awarded sinecures from the crown, who leeched off society.

They had little respect for the reality of British government.

Colonists did, however, have a healthy respect for British

common law and for the rights they traced to the Magna Carta.

Britain‘s tentative first steps in the war only served to

embolden colonial opponents. Parliaments actions against

Boston served to further unite the colonies in sympathy with

that town. Gage‘s disaster at Concord and Lexington brought

matters to a head, but by that time the revolution in colonial

thinking had already occurred. This revolution in American

thought is seen in the Continental Congress, when it overcame

its fears, and adopted the army outside of Boston. It is also

seen in Congressional sensitivity to make the fight an American

one, by choosing a Virginian to lead that New England army.

They were acting as Americans first, proclaiming their unity to

the world. The Declaration of Independence served to codify

the evolution that had already occurred among the colonists.

Not only were they claiming their right to self-government, they

80
were further embarking on a great experiment to establish a

republican government for the benefit of the governed.

One of the most remarkable occurrences of the

Revolutionary War is the strict adherence to republican

principles by the founders. Washington is seen repeatedly

subordinating himself to Congressional authority, even when he

had been granted near dictatorial powers. Likewise, we see

Congress and the various state governments jealously

guarding their rights, even when America‘s fortunes were at

their lowest ebb. An example of this is the outraged

condemnation of Washington‘s demand for a loyalty oath from

suspected loyalists. Even in a war for their very existence,

Revolutionary leaders opposed the act as an infringement on

both personal freedoms and civil authority.

In social composition, the Revolution was a total war for

the Americans. Washington expressed it best when he told his

troops they were fighting to determine if their children would be

free men or slaves. The composition of the American forces

represented a cross section of the entire society, with

81
opportunity for advancement based on merit. A bookseller

could lead the artillery, just as a Quaker could evolve as the

foremost of Washington‘s generals. A Greene or a Knox would

never have been tolerated to succeed in Britain‘s strict social

hierarchy. The British army ensured that the common soldiers

remained powerless in society, and that high command

remained the prerogative of the nobility and upper class. Thus,

for Britain, the war was never a total war, in that the ruling class

was not willing to endure the erosion of their power that a wider

war effort would have entailed. The American war effort, across

the entire society and with grave repercussions for all

Americans, is in contrast to the traditional European method of

war. It would be seen again in the mass levees of revolutionary

France. This shows the American Revolution as not only an

evolution in attitudes, nor only an evolution in government, but

also as an evolution in the very nature of warfare.

Britain‘s generals sought to win the war through holding

territory, as seen in Howe‘s meaningless control of New York

and Philadelphia. This was not a war that would be determined

82
by conquered capitols and seized territory. Latter, men such as

Cornwallis sought victory by winning battles. The Revolution

could not be extinguished by British tactical victories.

Washington, and the Revolution‘s great military thinker,

Nathanael Greene, realized that the Army was the Revolution.

As long as the Continental Army was preserved, the war would

continue. Thus, Washington learned early on to protect his

army from annihilation at all costs. He would strike when the

British made mistakes and presented an opportunity for a

victory. This strategy is readily apparent in the attack on the

Hessians at Trenton and in the assault against Princeton. After

both successes, Washington wisely withdrew his troops rather

than risk defeat in the British response.

Technically, the victory at Yorktown allowed America to

prevail in the American Revolution; however, Yorktown was a

tactical victory, one battle. It is a mistake to say that the

outcome of the war was solely determined by tactical victory.

This was the illusion that brought Cornwallis to Virginia in the

first place. Britain failed because she had no viable strategy for

83
victory, and changed what strategy she did have as often as

she changed her commanding generals or her ministers.

Conversely, America had a sound strategy for ultimate victory,

pursued with unrelenting determination by one man.

Washington ensured that America would prevail by enabling

the Continental Army to survive and remain a threat throughout

the war.

Yorktown was a symptom, this time too spectacular for

even the ministry or the King to ignore. Americans were not

going to give up the fight, and Britain was draining her

resources in the long struggle. It was clear, also, that France,

and Spain posed threats to British interests around the world,

even in the British Isles. Thus Parliament and the King‘s

ministers conceded American independence. It was the right

decision for Britain, in that it freed her to confront the threat

from France without the distraction of the American war

impeding her efforts. As an added bonus, trade between Britain

and the United States rapidly reestablished itself, to the benefit

of both nations.

84
 The peace treaty with Britain in 1783 may have ended

the fighting, but it did not end the ongoing American political

evolution. The Articles of Confederation had produced a weak

general government. This had been the intention of states

jealous of their individual sovereignty. Unfortunately, the

Confederation proved too weak to defend the United States

form assault, both internally and externally. Realizing that the

nation might not survive, and would definitely not thrive under

the Confederation, a convention was called. Originally limited to

revisions with the framework of the Articles of Confederation,

the convention initiated what amounted to a second, bloodless,

American Revolution when it proposed ratification of the

Constitution. The ensuing debates between federalists and

anti-federalists led to the inclusion of the first ten amendments

as a Bill of Rights, and to the foundations of a two-party

system, eventually to become the Federalists and the

Republicans. The ratification of the Constitution, which gave the

United States a viable and energetic central government, is the

actual logical conclusion of the American Revolution. Without

85
this event, the legacy of the Revolution would likely have been

a footnote in the history books, detailing the failure of the

American experiment, as the Confederation collapsed, and the

states went their separate ways, either to fall once more under

European domination, or possibly even into civil war. The

Constitution guaranteed that the amazing gains of the

Revolution would survive to the present with a national

government of sufficient vigor.

Thus, the repercussions of the American Revolution

continue to affect the world into the present day. America

remains an example to the world‘s oppressed, and a target for

the world‘s oppressors. The United States continues to rise to

its global challenges, inspired by the self-sacrifice and

principles of her founders in the American Revolution.

The American Revolution is noteworthy for having been

an uprising among a significant portion of the colonial elite. As

such it is often said to have been an effort to preserve the

existing system. As such, it is viewed not as a struggle for

change, but for continuity. This view fails to recognize that

86
colonial elite participation notwithstanding, the Revolution was

indeed aiming for a profound change in the American situation.

While of course we know that the ―haves‖ were motivated by a

desire to keep their wealth, be they Virginia plantation owners

or New England merchants, what is of greater relevance is that

the revolutionaries realized that the only way to maintain their

position and to see the continued growth of America, was in

escaping the restrictions of subordination under the mercantilist

British empire. This reflects the fact that the evolution of a

unique American Identity, in conflict with second-class colonial

status had already occurred.

Thus, the supposed incongruity of an established elite

fermenting revolution is revealed to have actually been the

reasoned measures of a people who realized that the existing

system threatened their way of life and rights to such a degree

that they were willing to risk everything to set their liberties on

a more secure foundation. Even though the leading rebels, the

founding fathers, had made their fortunes within the colonial

system, they had the ability to realize that the game had run its

87
course. No longer would America be able to evolve within the

relationship, and henceforth colonial status would only serve to

hinder their further evolution. Even more importantly, they

realized that Britain‘s attempts to tighten the screws on her

colonies would eventually deprive them of both their hard

earned liberties and fortunes.

The American Revolution fits the standard mold of a

desperate people who felt they had nothing to lose, and

everything to gain, by rising up in arms. Once New England

Middling Sort merchants were convinced that British policy

would leave them destitute, they embraced revolution.

Likewise, once Virginia gentlemen planters were convinced that

British policy would remove their political power, they also

joined the struggle. Both diverse groups had everything to lose,

but were convinced they would lose it all in any case if they

remained passive. The ―haves‖ risked their lives and fortunes to

maintain their way of life in the face of a gradual but inexorable

challenge to their wealth and power.

88
 Mercantilism and a subordinate status under British

protection no longer was advantageous to America. With the

elimination of the French threat, British presumptions about

American pliability had to be discarded.

Colonists who had previously accepted British slights as

necessary to their survival in a hostile environment gradually

became more assertive once the French threat was eliminated,

and they were better able to defend themselves. New England

merchants would now bristle at artificial restrictions that served

only to enrich the mother country at colonial expense; an

outstanding example was the elimination of the nascent

colonial iron industry to appease British merchants jealous of

their monopoly.

Furthermore, the Virginia upper class saw mercantilism as a

system to maintain them in perpetual debt to British creditors.

Restrictions on currency also illustrate the artificial

nature of the mercantilist relationship, one that the colonies had

evolved beyond. The, by pre-industrial standards, phenomenal

growth of the colonial American economy and population, in

89
contrast to that of the home country, further underscores the

incongruity of the relationship.

Inevitably, America must throw off the bonds of its

colonial servitude to Britain in order to continue its inexorable

evolution to greatness. No matter how benevolent British rule

may have been, it was incompatible with American growth, and

it must end in order that America fulfill its potential.

Ironically, British insistence that the colonies not be a

financial drain on the mother country greatly abetted the

evolution of the distinct American identity. Britain set the stage

for the colonists to develop strong sense of self-reliance. The

colonies learned to adapt and overcome, as they persevered

over great adversity, with little British support. The one instance

of overwhelming British involvement, during the conclusion of

the Seven Years‘ War, only served to plant the seeds of

American independence. The French threat was eliminated,

and the colonists shown they could successfully interact in their

own defense and prosecute a war: ―differences abounded from

colony to colony...between them all...there existed an evident

90
degree of competition, of jealousy, even animosity. But there

had also been occasions of cooperation. Common threats had

provided impetus to lay aside internal disputes.‖96 Friction was

caused between Britain and the colonies, with both feeling

unappreciated in their sacrifices for victory. With the peace,

Britain sought to constrain colonial westward expansion, and as

―territorial appetite had been a recognized force motivating

colonists almost from the very first founding of settlements in

the New World ... (and) generation after generation dreamed of

and worked at rolling back the frontier,‖97 the colonists were

outraged. Another source of friction was that Britain sought

funds from the colonies to pay for the maintenance of forces

that the colonists considered oppressive.

By the 1750‘s, colonists had evolved political and

economic systems that no longer relied on the mother country.

Militarily the colonies had evolved forces sufficient to their

defense, especially in the absence of a French threat. The

96
Palmer, 29.
97
Ibid., 79.
91
colonies had evolved beyond the need to remain in a provincial

relationship.

To focus on British oppressive measures is to

concentrate on the symptoms of the inevitable estrangement,

and should not be mistaken with the study of the root cause of

the rebellion. British actions between 1750 and 1783 could only

serve to hasten or delay the impending separation. The real

root cause of the struggle for independence was that America

had evolved into a vibrant, nascent nation, and a continued

colonial status could only serve to stifle her potential. America

was destined to independence.

92
 BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Primary Sources

Burnaby, Andrew. Burnaby‘s Travels Through North America.

London: T. Payne, 1798.

Crary, Catherine S., Editor. The Price of Loyalty: Tory Writings

from the Revolutionary Era. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Co., 1973.

Dring, Thomas. Recollections of the Jersey Prison Ship.

Providence: H.H. Brown, 1829, reprinted, Bedford:
Applewood Books, 1992.

Ewald, Johann. Diary of the American War: A Hessian Journal.

New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979.

Franklin, Benjamin. The Autobiography and Other Writings.

Peter Shaw, Editor. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.

________. The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, Eighteen

Volumes. Leonard Labaree, Editor. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1959-1976.

________. The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, Ten Volumes.

Albert Henry Smith, Editor. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1905-1907.

Greene, Nathanael. The Papers of General Nathanael Greene,

1766-29 March 18, 1781, Volume 7. Richard K.
Showman, et al, Editors. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1976-1994.

93
Huntington, Joshua and Jedediah. Huntington Papers:
Correspondence of the Brothers Joshua and Jedediah
Huntington During the Period of the American
Revolution. Albert C. Bates, Editor. Hartford: Connecticut
Historical Society, 1923.

Jefferson, Thomas. In His Own Words. Maureen Harrison and

Steve Gilbert, Editors. New York: Barnes and Noble
Books, 1993.

Moody, James. Lieutenant James Moody’s Narrative. London:

Richardson and Urqhart,1783, Reprinted, New York: The
New York Times and Arno Press, 1968.

Paine, Thomas. The Life and Works of Thomas Paine, 10

Volumes. William Van de Weyde, Editor. New Rochelle:
Thomas Paine National Historical Association, 1925.

Price, Richard. Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the

Principles of Government, and the Justice and Policy of
the War with America. London: T. Cadell, 1776.

Rea, Caleb. The Journal of Dr. Caleb Rea. F. M. Ray, Editor.

Salem: Essex Institute, 1881.

Saunders, W. L., Editor. Colonial Records of North Carolina,

Volume V. Raleigh: ---, 1886-1890.

Simcoe, John Graves. Simcoe’s Military Journal. London: ---,

1784, Reprinted, Toronto: Baxter Publishing Company,
1962.

Washington , George. The Writings of George Washington,

Thirty-nine Volumes. John C. Fitzpatrick, Editor.
Washington, D.C.: U.S. George Washington
Bicentennial Commission, 1931-1944.

94
________. The Writings of George Washington, Twelve
Volumes. Jared Sparks, Editor. Boston: American
Stationers‘ Company, 1833-1837.

Secondary Sources

Allen, Paul. History of the American Revolution, Two Volumes.

Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1819.

Anderson, Fred. A People’s Army: Massachusetts Soldiers and

Society in the Seven Years War. Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 1984.

Avery, Elroy M. A History of the United States and its People,

Seven Volumes. Cleveland: The Burrows Brothers Co.,
1904-1910.

Bailyn, Bernard. The Ideological Origins of the American

Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1967.

Bobrick, Benson. Angel in the Whirlwind: The Triumph of the

American Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster,
1997.

Brown, Wallace. The Good Americans: The Loyalists in the

American Revolution. New York: William Morrow and
Co., 1969.

Brown, Weldon A. Empire or Independence: A Study in the

Failure of Reconciliation, 1774-1783. University:
Louisiana State University Press, 1941.

Brumwell, Stephen. Redcoats: The British Soldier and War in

the Americas, 1755-1763. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.

95
Coakley, Robert W. The Role of Federal Military Forces in
Domestic Disorders, 1789-1878. Washington, D.C.:
Center of Military History, 1988.

Cook, Don. The Long Fuse: How England Lost the American
Colonies, 1760-1785. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press,
1995.

Christie, Ian. Wilkes, Wyvil and Reform. London, ---, 1962.

Curtis, Edward E. The Organization of the British Army in the

American Revolution. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1926.

Evans, G. N. D. Allegiance in America: The Case of the

Loyalists. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1969.

Ferling, John. Struggle for a Continent: The Wars of Early

America. Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, 1993.

Greene, Jack P. and J. R. Pole, Editors. Colonial British

America: Essays in the New History of the Early Modern
Era. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press,
1984.

Hibbert, Christopher. Redcoats and Rebels: The American

Revolution Through British Eyes. New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, 1990.

Higginbotham, Don. George Washington and the American

Military Tradition. Athens: The University of Georgia
Press, 1985.

________. The War of American Independence: Military

Attitudes, Policies and Practice, 1763-1789. Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 1971.

96
Jameson, J. Franklin. The American Revolution Considered as
a Social Movement. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1926.

Keegan, John. Fields of Battle: The Wars for North America.

New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996.

Landsman, Ned B. From Colonials to Provincials: American

Thought and Culture, 1680-1760. Ithica: Cornell
University Press, 1997.

Launitz-Schurer, Jr., Leopold S. Loyal Whigs and

Revolutionaries: The Making of the Revolution in New
York, 1765-1776. New York: New York University Press,
1980.

Leach, Douglas Edward. Roots of Conflict: British Armed

Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1986.

Lepore, Jill. The Name of War: King Philip’s War and the
Origins of an American Identity. New York: Knopf, 1998.

Mackesy, Piers. The War for America, 1775-1783. Lincoln:

University of Nebraska Press, 1993.

Middlekauff, Robert. The Glorious Cause: The American

Revolution, 1763-1789. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1982.

Miller, John C. Origins of the American Revolution. Boston:

Little, Brown and Co., 1943.

Nash, Gary B. The Urban Crucible. Cambridge: Harvard

University Press, 1979.

97
Palmer, Dave Richard. The Way of the Fox: American Strategy
in the War for America, 1775-1783. Westport:
Greenwood Press, 1975.

Pearson, Michael. Those Damned Rebels: The American

Revolution as Seen Through British Eyes. ---: Da Capo
Press, 1972.

Peckham, Howard H. The Colonial Wars: 1689-1762. Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Ramsey, David. The History of the American Revolution, Two

Volumes. Philadelphia: Aitken & Son, 1789, Reprinted,
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1990.

Royster, Charles. A Revolutionary People at War: The

Continental Army and American Character, 1775-1783.
New York: W. W. Norton, 1979.

Sabine, Lorenzo. Biographical Sketches of Loyalists of the

American Revolution, Two Volumes. Boston: ---, 1864.

________.The Loyalists of the American Revolution.

Springfield: The Walden Press, 1957.

Scheer, George F. and Hugh F. Rankin. Rebels and Redcoats:

The American Revolution Through the Eyes of Those
Who Fought and Lived It. New York: Da Capo Press,
1957.

Shy, John. Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in

the Coming of the American Revolution. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1965.

Smith, Paul H. Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British

Revolutionary Policy. Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1964.

98
Taylor, Alan. American Colonies. New York: Penguin Group,
2001.

Trevelyan, Sir George Otto. The American Revolution, Six

Volumes. New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1899-
1914.

Van Tyne, Claude Halstead. The Loyalists in the American

Revolution. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1902,
Reprinted, Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1959.

Ward, Christopher. The War of the Revolution, 2 Volumes. New

York: The Macmillan Company, 1952.

Webb, Stephen Saunders. 1676: The End of American

Independence. New York: Knopf, 1984.

Williams, Noel St. John Williams. Redcoats Along the Hudson:

The Struggle for North America,1754-63. London:
Brassey‘s, 1997.

Wood, Gordon S. The American Revolution: A History. New

York: The Modern Library, 2002.

Wood, W. J. Battles of the Revolutionary War, 1775-1781.

Chapel Hill: Da Capo Press, 1995.

Periodicals

Anderson, Fred W. ―Why Did Colonial New Englanders Make

Bad Soldiers? Contractual Principles and Military
Conduct During the Seven Years‘ War.‖ William and
Mary Quarterly 3d ser.,38 (1981): 395-417.

________. ―Wolfe‘s Prophetic Victory.‖ The Quarterly Journal of

Military History. Volume 8, Number 2 (Winter, 1996): 98-
107.

99
Lee, Arthur. ―Monitor IV‖ Virginia Gazette (R), March 17, 1768.

Mahon, John K. ―Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare,

1676-1794.‖ The Mississippi Valley Historical Review. 45
(1958): 254-275.

Niles, Hezekiah, Editor. ―John Adams Letter to Hezekiah Niles

of February 13, 1818‖ Niles Weekly Register. March 7,
1818.

Radabaugh, Jack S. ―The Militia of Colonial Massachusetts‖

Military Affairs. 18 (1954): 1-18.

Russell, Peter E. ―Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers

and Irregular in Europe and America, 1740-1760.‖
William and Mary Quarterly. 3d ser., 35 (1978): 629-652.

Shy, John. ―A New Look at Colonial Militia‖ William and Mary

Quarterly. 3d ser., 20 (1963), 175-185.

Tyler, Moses Coit. ―The Party of the Loyalists in the American

Revolution‖ American Historical Review, I (1895), 24-49.

100