Tollison Public Choice and Legislation

Virginia Law Review
Public Choice and Legislation

Author(s): Robert D. Tollison
Source: Virginia Law Review, Vol. 74, No. 2, Symposium on the Theory of Public Choice (Mar.,
1988), pp. 339-371
Published by: Virginia Law Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1073146
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PUBLIC CHOICE AND LEGISLATION
RobertD. Tollison*
THE purposeofthisessayis to surveywhatmightlooselybe

called the economictheoryof legislation.Its emphasisis on
elucidatingmainprinciplesand resultsand not on the copiousci-
tationand reviewof literature.Moreover,the piece is primarily
concernedwiththe positive,and not the normative, economicsof
legislation.Thus the essayemphasizestestablepropositions at the
expense of normativeevaluationsof democraticdecisionmaking
processes.The issuesconsideredare therefore not whethera given
law is "good" or "bad," but rathersuch questionsas whythe law
was passed, how the law was passed, or why it has not been
repealed.
The economictheoryof legislationrefersto the awakeningof
economiststo the importance of understandingthe legislativepro-
cess. Politicalscientistshave longrecognizedthatthe legislatureis
an importantinstitution in a democraticsocietyand have done a
greatdeal of usefulresearchon legislatures. The comparativead-
vantageof economistsin thisendeavorconsistsof theirabilityto
formalizeand to test theoriesabout legislatures.(Politicalscien-
tistswould say, perhapswithsome justification, that economists
are good at reinventing certainwheels.)Economistshave worked
on a varietyof issuesin thisarea thatare surveyedin thisArticle.
A briefreviewoftheclassiccontributions to publicchoicetheoryis
usefulat the outsetbecause theseformthe fountainhead of later
contributions to the economictheoryof legislation.
I. BASIC RESEARCH IN PUBLIC CHOICE
Duncan Black's early researchon committeedecisionmaking'

was the genesisof modernpublic choice research.Black formu-
*Professorof Economics and Directorof the Center forStudy of Public Choice at George
Mason University.Thanks go to W. Mark Crain and William F. Shughart II for helpful
comments.The usual disclaimer applies.
1 See D. Black & R. Newing,CommitteeDecisions with ComplementaryValuation (1951);
Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. Pol. Econ. 23 (1948). This work
339
340 VirginiaLaw Review [Vol. 74:339
lated the medianvotertheory(presentedas a descendentof that

firstproposedby Harold Hotelling2)and a rich,microanalytic
framework forstudyingthe behaviorof committees and of candi-
dates in elections.KennethArrow'sfamousbook on social choice
and democracy3 evaluatedmajorityruleinstitutionsin a socialwel-
faresetting.To the extentthat one can drawa positiveprinciple
fromArrow,it is that democracyshouldyieldcapriciousand un-
stableoutcomes.
Nextin the lineageis AnthonyDowns'sAn EconomicTheoryof
Democracy.4In this book Downs applied the Hotelling-Black
and settings(suchas
modelto a widerscale ofpoliticalinstitutions
proportional and the evolutionofthe BritishLabor
representation
Party).5Moreover,he was the firstscholarto articulatethe incho-
ate roleof the voterin publicchoicetheoryby presenting a testa-
ble theoryof voterchoice and voterparticipationin elections.6
FromDowns and laterwriters, such as GordonTullock,the indi-
vidual'sdecisionto vote has come to be viewedas an act of con-
sumptionratherthanas rationally investment-type
self-interested,
behavior.7Tullock also made an importantearlycontribution to
thetheoryoflegislationwhenhe presenteda theoryoflogrolling or
vote tradingin the contextof geographicrepresentation,8 which
formsthe basis fora predictionthat democraticstructureswill
tendto exhibitan overexpansion of publicspending.9
In 1962,The Theoryof Political Coalitionsby WilliamRiker'0
and The Calculus of Consentby JamesBuchananand Tullock"
made fundamental to the economictheoryof legisla-
contributions
tion.Rikerpostulatedand offeredevidenceforhis famousmini-
was later extended and summarizedin D. Black, The Theory of Committeesand Elections
(1958).
2 See Hotelling,Stability in Competition,39 Econ. J. 41 (1929).
See K. Arrow,Social Choice and Individual Values (1951).

See A. Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957).
See id. at 114-41.
6 See id. at 295-300.
7 See, e.g., G. Tullock, The Vote Motive (1976).
8 See Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting,67 J. Pol. Econ. 571 (1959). Logrollingis the
tradingof votes on one issue fordesired votes on other issues. It usually occurs in situations
where individual votes representa significantpercentage of the total electorate and where
compliance with trading arrangementscan be observed easily. Id. at 571.
9 See id. at 571-79.
10 W. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962).

" J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962).
1988] Public Choice and Legislation 341
mumwinningcoalitionprinciple."2 Buchananand Tullock ranged
overvarioustopicsfromlogrolling'3 to differentstructuresand ba-
ses of representation"in a tourde forceof publicchoiceanalysis.
Finally,1971 saw the appearanceof WilliamNiskanen'sBureau-
cracyand RepresentativeGovernment,'5 whichpresentedan eco-
nomictheoryof bureaucraticbehaviorsuggesting the domination
of bureausover the legislaturein the budgetaryprocess,and of
GeorgeStigler'spaper on The Theoryof EconomicRegulation,',
whichformalized thelongstanding captureor interest-group theory
of regulation.
These booksand papersrepresentthe bedrockcontributions to
the economictheoryof legislation, and theyare all, in one wayor
another,intimately connectedwithmoderndevelopmentsin this
area ofpublicchoiceresearch.The qualityand importance ofthese
contributions is highlightedby the fact that Arrow,Stigler,and
Buchananwonthe Nobel Prize in Economicspartlyfortheirwork
in publicchoicetheory.The remainderof thisArticlesurveysthe
literatureon legislationand legislaturesthat has been stimulated
by thesebasic booksand papers.
II. THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF LEGISLATION: AN OVERVIEW
One way to thinkabout legislationis in termsof the interest-

grouptheoryofgovernment.17 Keep in mindthattheuse of"inter-
est group"as a modifier in thiscontextis not meantto be pejora-
tive. Individualcitizenscan want or demand laws for any rea-
son-e.g., thelaw makestheworlda betterplace,thelaw promotes
theproduction ofa publicgood,and so forth-buttheywillgener-
ally act in some groupcontextto obtainthe passage of a desired
law or the defeatof an undesiredlaw.
A basic principleas wellas a basic conundrumunderliesthe de-
mandforlegislation. The principleis thatgroupswhocan organize
forless than one dollar in orderto obtainone dollar of benefits
12 See W.
Riker,supra note 10, at 40, 47-76. A minimumwinningcoalition is one that can
be rendered not large enough to win by the subtractionof any member.
13 See J. Buchanan & G.
Tullock, supra note 11, at 265-81.
14 See id. at 43-62.
1b W. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and RepresentativeGovernment(1971).
16
Stigler,The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 3 (1971).
17
See, e.g., R. McCormick & R. Tollison, Politicians, Legislation, and the Economy: An
Inquiry into the Interest-GroupTheory of Government(1981).
fromlegislationwill be the effective demandersof laws. The co-

nundrumis thateconomists havelittleidea ofhowsuccessful, cost-
effective interestgroupsare formed.That is, how do groupsover-
comefreeriderproblems"8 and organizeforcollectiveactionso as
to be able to seek one dollarforless than one dollar?The plain
truthis that economistsknowverylittleabout the dynamicsof
groupformation and action.
One theorythat attemptsto answerthe conundrumis the by-
producttheoryof groupcollectiveaction.'9Accordingto thisthe-
ory,an associationprovidesa privateserviceto its membersthat
cannotbe purchasedcompetitively elsewhere.By pricingthe ser-
vice in a monopolistic fashion,the associationcan raisemoneyfor
lobbying.20 Politicalactionbecomesa cost-effective by-product of
the organization becausestart-upcostshave alreadybeen bornein
forming the associationforsome otherpurpose.Stiglersuggested
thatan asymmetry of firmsizes,products,and interestsin an "in-
dustry"tends to promotemoreeffectivecollectiveaction by the
industry(e.g.,a largerassociationbudget).2'He arguedthatparti-
cipationis mandatedby the desireto protectspecializedindustry
interests.22These are interesting and usefularguments, but they
onlybeginto solvethedifficult analyticalproblemofgroupforma-
tion and the demand for legislation.At best, one can take the
existingarrayofinterestgroupsand associationsin theeconomyas
an expressionof such a demandfunction.Somehow,thesegroups
havebecomeorganizedas demandersoflegislationand othertypes
of government action.23
Indeed,forwhateverreasonorganization is undertaken,
lobbying
forspecial legislationbecomesa relativelylow-costby-product of
18 The free rider problem

refersto the issue of why an individual should join the group
seeking governmentbenefits if he cannot be excluded from the benefits once the law is
passed. If all group membersreason this way, no group action would be forthcoming; there-
fore,one object of the group is to spend resources to deter such behavior.
19 See M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action 132-41 (1971);
Moore, The Purpose of
Licensing,4 J.L. & Econ. 93, 114 (1961).
20 This analysis, however,ignoresa potentiallytroublingquestion: What
about rival as-
sociations with lower prices?
21 See Stigler,Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 359 (1974).

22 See id. at 362.
23This discussion masks importantissues. For example, to how many interest groups
does an individual belong? How do interestgroups compete? How do they cooperate?
beingorganized.For example,a firmis an exampleofan organiza-

tionthatcan be used forlobbyingpurposes(not necessarilyin the
contextof an industrylobbyingeffort).Laborersmay organizeto
bargaincollectivelyand then findit relativelyeasy to set up a
Washington officeto advocateincreasedminimumwages.Lawyers
mayagreecollectively to a code of ethicsto addresssuch matters
as attorney-clientprivilegeand thenproceedto adoptprovisionsin
theircode thatrestrictcompetition amonglawyers.Thus the term
"interestgroup"refersto the use of any organizationalformto
lobbyforor againstlegislationand notsimplyto registered groups
and associations.
In the interest-grouptheory,the supplyof legislationis an in-
versedemandcurve.Those who"supply"wealthtransfers are indi-
viduals who do not find it cost effectiveto resist havingtheir
wealthtakenaway. In otherwords,it costs themmorethan one
dollarto resisthavingone dollartakenaway.24This conceptof a
supplycurveof legislationor regulationsuggeststhatthe costs of
politicalactivityto someindividualsexceedthe potentialgains(or
avoidedlosses).The supplyoflegislationis, therefore, groundedin
the unorganizedor relativelyless-organized membersof society.
Who runs this supply-demandprocess? The individualswho
monitorthe supply-demand processare politicians,bureaucrats,
and otherpoliticalactors.These individualsmay be conceivedof
as brokersof legislation,and theyessentiallyact like brokersin a
privatecontext-theypair demandersand suppliersof legislation.
That is, theyseek to pair thosewho wanta law or a transfer the
mostwiththosewho objectthe least. In the usual logicof the in-
terest-group theory, brokerswillconcentrate on legalarrangements
thatbenefitwell-organized and concentrated groupsforwhomthe
pro rata benefitsare highat the expenseof diffuseinterests, each
of whichis taxed a littlebit to fundthe transfer or legislation.By
efficientlypairingdemandersand suppliersof legislation,the po-
liticalbrokersestablishan equilibriumin the marketforlegisla-
tion. Obviously,mistakescan be made in this process.If "too
much"legislationis passed,somepartieswillfindit cost effective
24
"Supply" as used in this context is not the ordinaryconcept of voluntarysupply at
higherprices. It is voluntaryin the sense that givingup $1 is cheaper than spending $10 to
resist givingup $1. It is not voluntaryin the sense that the state is a coercive mechanism.
to organizeand to removeinefficient and overreaching brokersin

the nextelection.Equilibriumnow!
The politicalbrokersare at the heartof the studyof legislation
and legislativeprocesses,and the remainderof thisArticlefocuses
a great deal of attentionon their behaviorand characteristics.
Also,dependingon the particularstructure ofthelegislature(total
size,numberofcommittees, votingrules,and so on), the brokerage
processwilloperateat different levelsof "costs."25Strictervoting
rules,forexample,raise the cost to legislatorsof findingdiffuse
minorities to "supply"taxes and transfers. In effect,a legislative
productionfunctionwill impacton the rate of passage of legisla-
tion. This productionfunctionundergirdsthe processby which
legislationis suppliedand is itselfan integralpartof the studyof
the supplyof legislation.
Finally,the linkagebetweenthe legislativeproductionfunction
and the supplyof legislationshouldbe clear. Different combina-
tionsoflegislativeinputs-minority size,lengthofsession,bases of
representation, and so on-will translateintodifferent ratesofleg-
islativeoutput.This process,in turn,explainswhytherewillbe a
differentsupplycurveoflegislationforeach configuration of legis-
lative inputs.This point partiallyexplains what some scholars
mean by "constitutional economics." Different rulesof the game
(read legislativeproductionfunctions)lead to different outcomes
in the supplyoflegislation, bothin the aggregateand withrespect
to whattypeof legislationis passed. The relevantsupplycurveof
laws,then,is a function ofhowthepoliticalprocessis governedby
explicitand implicitconstitutional constraints.27
III. THE DEMAND FOR LEGISLATION
Perhapsthe mostbasic issue relatedto the demandforlegisla-

tionis howto explainwhylaws persistovertime.That is, whyis
the workof one legislaturenot overturned
by the nextlegislature?
WilliamLandes and RichardPosner soughtto answerthis ques-
25 Crain, Cost and Output in the Legislative Firm, 8 J. Legal Stud. 607, 608-16 (1979).
26 See, e.g., Buchanan, Sources of Opposition to ConstitutionalReform,in Constitutional
Economics 21, 23 (R. McKenzie ed. 1984).
27 The demand
curve for legislation can also shiftas changes in the costs of organizing
interestgroups occur. Lower organizationcosts, forexample, will shiftthe demand curve for
legislationto the right.
1988] Public Choiceand Legislation 345
tionbyaddressingtheroleoftheindependent judiciaryin promot-
ingdurablelegislation.28 In the processtheyofferedan interesting
and empirically richtheoryof the demandforlegislation.
Theiranalysisis framedin termsofthe interest-group theoryof
government. Obviously, an interestgroupwouldnotbid verymuch
fora protectivestatuteif it lasted onlyforthe currentlegislative
sessionand was repealedin the next.To be worthanything to the
interestgroup,a law mustbe durable-that is, it musthave a pre-
sentvalue of benefitsthatexceedsthe costsof obtainingit. Inter-
est groupsand legislatures thushave an incentiveto promoteinsti-
tutionalarrangements that enhancethe durabilityof laws.29
Landes and Posnerfocusedon the roleof the independent judi-
ciaryin thisregard.30 They positedthatthe institutional arrange-
mentssurrounding judgeshipslead judges to behave so as to re-
solve legal disputesin termsof whatthe propoundinglegislature
actuallyintended.3'Giventhatindependent judgesactuallybehave
in thismanner,the presentvalue demandcurveforlegislationro-
tates to the right,and laws becomemorevaluable because they
endurelonger.The actinglegislature's intentis upheldin thisthe-
oryof the independent judiciary,makingeach legislature'sactions
moredurableand worthmoreto interestgroups.As I shortlyshow,
thisis a testabletheory.32
Why do judges behave as enforcers of long-term contractsbe-
tweenlegislatorsand interestgroups?Landes and Posnerdid not
addressthis issue. They discussedthe institutional arrangements
surrounding judges,such as lifetenure, but theyneverspecified
in a testablefashionwhyjudges promotemoredurablelaws. In-
deed, it is hard to explainthe behaviorof any workerswithlife
tenurecontracts,judges being no exception.They should shirk
theirresponsibilitiesand play a lot of golf.
The answeris relatively straightforward, but it has yetto be ad-
dressedin the literature.Namely,the judicial branchreceivesits
budgetfromthe legislativebranch.Wherethejudicial branchacts
28 See Landes
& Posner,The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-Group 18
Perspective,
J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975).
29 See id. at 877-82.
30 See id. at
877-79.
31 See id. at 885-87.
32 See infra textaccompanying notes38-42.
33 See Landes &
Posner,supranote28, at 885-87.
to increaseand sustainthe durability of legislation,

its budgetand
judicialsalariesincrease.This is the linkthatis missingin Landes
and Posner.Moreover,thetheoryis a testableproposition, and the
data do notrefuteits implications forjudicialsalariesand judicial
budgetsacrossstates.34So, basically,judges behave in a Landes-
Posnerfashionbecause to do so is in theirself-interest.
Landes and Posner suggesteda second route or marginalong
whichthe durabilityof legislationcan be increased.The constitu-
tive rules of the legislatureitself(regardingcommittees, voting
rules,rulesof order,and so forth)can restrainsubsequentlegisla-
turesfromundoingthe workof the presentone.36Moreover,legis-
latorsserveformorethan one term;hence,as membersof subse-
quent legislatures,they can keep legislativebenefitsflowingto
theirinterestgroups.So the legislatureitselfcan promotethe du-
rability of legislationand long-termcontracts with interest
groups.36
Landes and Posnersaw constitutional provisionsas legislationof
a higherorder.37Constitutionalprovisionsare worthmore than
normallegislationto interestgroupsbecausetheyare moredurable
(i.e.,harderto repeal),but theyare also morecostlyto obtainbe-
cause of stricterproceduresrequiredforpassage (e.g.,highervot-
ingrulesand a publicreferendum).
This differencebetweennormaland constitutionallegislation
providedthebasis forthefirstempiricaltestofthe Landes-Posner
theory.Mark Crain and RobertTollison put the Landes-Posner
theoryintothe following context.38Wherejudicialindependenceis
higher,interestgroupsneed onlyprocurenormallegislation;inde-
pendentjudgeswillmaintainthe long-term securityof such deals.
Wherejudgesare less independent, themorecostlyrouteofconsti-
tutionalprotection is moreworthwhile. Thus,at the margin,inter-
est groupswill demandnormalor constitutional legislationas a
functionof the degreeof judicial independence,all otherfactors
beingequal.
34 See G. Anderson,W. Shughart & R.

Tollison, There's No Such Thing as a Free Judge
(Aug. 1987) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association).
36 See Landes & Posner, supra note 28, at 877-79.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 876.
38 See Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group

Perspective, 8 J.
Legal Stud. 165, 168-75 (1979).
The states,offering a rangeof settingsin whichsuch behavior

can be observed,representa naturalcross-sectional laboratoryfor
testingthistheory.State constitutions are changedand amended
at different rates,and state judicial systemsexhibitvaryingde-
greesof independence(measured,forexample,in termsof judge
tenureand pay). The Landes-Posnertheorysuggeststhat these
two processeswill trade offin a predictableway. Holdingother
factorsconstant,thisis preciselywhatCrainand Tollisonfound.39
The rateof constitutional amendmentis higherwherejudicial in-
dependenceis lower,ceterisparibus. Later researchon morere-
centstate-by-state data showedthe same pattern.40
Othervariablesworkin a predictabledirectionas well.For ex-
ample, as legislatortenureincreases,demand for constitutional
protectiondecreases because legislatorsare membersof subse-
quentlegislatures and can protectnormallegislation.The Landes-
Posnertheoryhas also been applied to executivevetoes41and to
the sizes of legislativemajorities.42
The Landes-Posnertheoryofdurablelegislationis an important
contribution to the economictheoryof legislation.It explainswhy
laws persistover time and how legal environments differacross
jurisdictions. Althoughoriginallyaddressedto issues of an inde-
pendentjudiciary,it is also a generaltheoryof the demand for
legislation.43
IV. THE PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY OF LEGISLATION
There are variouswaysto approachthe issues surrounding the

productionand supplyof legislation.As such, the public choice
literature
has mingledconsiderations
ofproduction withconsidera-
39 Id. at 172-75.
40 See G. Anderson,D. Martin,W. Shughart& R. Tollison, Behind the Veil: The Political
Economy of ConstitutionalChange 13-15 (July 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on
file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
41 See Crain & Tollison, The Executive Branch in the Interest-GroupTheory of Govern-
ment,8 J. Legal Stud. 555 (1979).

42 See W. Crain, W. Shughart & R. Tollison, Legislative Majorities as Nonsalvageable
Assets (Sept. 1986) (unpublished manuscript) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association).
43 Some readers will be put off by thinkingof constitutionsas repositoriesof interest-
group protection.A way to overcomethese qualms is forthe reader to obtain a copy of his
or her state constitutionand read it.
tionsof supplyin whatmightlooselybe called a "reduced-form"

approach.This meansthat aspectsof the legislature'sproductive
process,such as legislaturesize, are commingledwithaspects of
the politicaland economicenvironment, such as populationand
income,that reflectfactorsunderlying the supplyof legislation,
transfers,and regulation.This reduced-form approachis adopted
in thisPart. It shouldbe remembered, however,that the slope of
the supplycurveof legislationis a functionof the organizational
costsfacingvoters,whereasthe positionofthesupplycurveofleg-
islationis a functionof the "technicalproficiency" of any given
legislativeprocess.A givensupplycurvewill shiftdependingon
the degreeof technicalproficiency.
Considerthe following stylizedmodelof legislation:
L = [(POP, INC, ASSOC, SIZE, RATIO, MAJ),
whereL is legislationpassed persession(a function(f) ofthe other

variables);PoP is population;INC is real income;ASSOC is the num-
beroftradeassociations;SIZE is legislativesize; RATIO is theratioof
the size ofthe House to the size ofthe Senate; and MAJ is the size
of the legislativemajority.Suppose that this model is set to the
task of explainingthe cross-sectional differences in legislativeac-
tivitiesacross the states.What would one expect?L is simplya
measureofthe outputoflegislationovertime,the objectto be ex-
plained.Whydoes one state pass morelaws than another?"
PoP and INC are independentvariablesthat proxythe potential
supplyoflegislation.A highervalue forPop meansthateach voter
has less incentiveto be concernedabout legislationthat transfers
wealthawayfromhim.A largerPopleads to moreacquiescenceby
votersin legislationbecausetheper capita costsoflaws and trans-
fersare lower.INC, in contrast,is ambiguousin that it cannotbe
signedas positiveor negative;in otherwords,it cannotbe charac-
terizedas havinga clear positiveor negativeimpacton legislative
output.As INC goesup, the opportunity coststo votersofmonitor-
ingand controlling the politicalprocessrise (i.e., markettimebe-
comesvaluable);hence,transfers and legislationshouldrise.This
is a substitutioneffect.On theotherhand,politicalparticipation is
44 Laws are by no means homogeneous like

grades of wheat. Presumably, this problem
could be overcomein principleby denominatinglaws in termsof dollars of transfersor some
such metric.The difficultiesforempirical work are apparent.
generally foundto be an income-elastic consumption good.This in-

come effectpredictsthat higherINC leads to less and less legisla-
tion because greaterpoliticalparticipationleads to less acquies-
cence.Thus, eithera positiveor negativesignis possiblehere.46
ASSOC controls forthedemandfortransfers. This is an imperfect
measureofgroupswhohave organizedto seek legislation.It is im-
perfectbecause,as notedabove,registeredgroupsunderstatethe
numberof relevantinterestgroups.In any event,havingmorein-
terestgroupsresultsin morelegislation.46
SIZE, RATIO, and MAJ are technicalaspectsofthe legislature'spro-
ductiveprocess.SIZE is ambiguous.A largerlegislaturegenerally
meansthatreachingdecisionsabout passinglaws is harder.How-
ever,largerlegislatures also meanthateach vote in the legislature
is worthless; for a given expenditurea lobbyinggroup can
purchasemoreinfluence(that is, votes).SIZE thuscuts bothways
and can be eitherpositively or negativelyrelatedto the passageof
laws.
RATIO is an interestingvariable.For a givenvalueofSIZE, a larger
value forRATIO of House to Senate size willreducethe passage of
legislation.In otherwords,a largerRATIO leads to a morecostly
lobbyingenvironment. Supposethata law requiresa simplemajor-
ity in two houses that have 100 legislatorsin total. If they are
equallysplit,House and Senate size will equal 50. Passing a law
requiresthe agreementof 26 votersin each house.Let the House
expand to 64 and the Senate contractto 36. Passing a law now
requires33, or 7 more,votesin the House, and 19, or 7 less,votes
in the Senate.
If the costsofpurchasing votesriseat an increasingratein each
house,the fall in costs of purchasing7 morevotes in the Senate
willbe morethan offsetby the rise in costsof purchasing7 more
The substitutioneffectnormallydominates in empirical tests.

46 This statementoversimplifiesinterest-groupcompetition.Some interestgroups are or-
ganized to compete withothergroups in strugglesover legislation,transfers,and taxes. This
appears to be what one theoristmeant by "pressure-groupcompetition."See Becker, A The-
ory of CompetitionAmong Pressure Groups for Political Influence,98 Q.J. Econ. 371, 395
(1983). Presumably, then, for Becker more associations (ASSOC) imply less legislation and
regulation.Unfortunately,most empiricalresultsin this area show that havingmore associa-
tions-a higher value for ASsoc-causes more legislation. McCormick & Tollison, Wealth
Transfersin a RepresentativeDemocracy,in Toward a Theory of the Rent-SeekingSociety
293, 306-07 (J. Buchanan, R. Tollison & G. Tullock eds. 1980). In the aggregate,at least,
more interestgroups are related to more transfers.
350 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 74:339
votesin the House. An important resultemerges-otherthingsthe

same,moreunequal chambersizes willreducethe supplyof legis-
lationbecausethecostsofpurchasing votesor,moregenerally, leg-
islativeinfluence,are higher.
A higherMAJwilllead to morelegislativeoutput,and thisis gen-
erallywhat one would expect.Nonetheless,otherconsiderations
operatehere. Largermajoritiesare more difficult to organizeas
teamproduction processes;47hence,an "optimal"majoritysize will
existbeyondwhichorganization and passageof legislationbecome
morecumbersome and costly.This assumes,ofcourse,thatthereis
notstraightpartylinevoting,makinga larger-than-minimum win-
ningcoalitionunnecessary.
This "reducedform"supplyof legislationfunctionis forpur-
poses of illustration.Several studies have used this generalap-
proachand illustratedits explanatorypower.Crain presenteda
theoryand testoflegislativeproduction in whichhe foundan early
versionof the RATIO effect.48 RobertMcCormickand Tollisonap-
plied the basic skeletalmodel givenabove to explainthe differ-
ences acrossstatesin regulation, transfers,and legislation.49
They
foundthatvariablessuchas INC, POP, RATIO, and SIZE (witha nega-
tivesign)offera robustand predictableexplanationfortheselegis-
lativeoutputsacrossstates.50 WilliamShughartand Tollisonused
this basic frameworkto explain the time-seriesof legislation
passed by the UnitedStates Congressfrom1789 to 1980.51Vari-
ables such as RATIO and SIZE (witha positivesign)playeda strong
role in explainingthe behaviorof the time-series.52
4 See infratext accompanyingnotes 84-90.

48 See Crain, supra note 25, at 616. Crain posited the followingtestable theories: (1) in-
creases in majorityproportionsshould have a positive but diminishingeffecton rates of
legislativeoutput; (2) longerlegislativesessions should be positivelyassociated with legisla-
tive output,assumingthe decline in startup costs dominates the costs resultingfromlegisla-
tor shirkingand outside earnings,but longer sessions should be negativelyassociated with
output if the reverseis true; and (3) the absolute size of a legislatureshould reduce output
rates, assuming the impact of size on decisionmakingcosts dominates the gains from in-
creased labor specialization, but absolute size should increase output rates if the reverse is
true. Id.
49 See R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 17; McCormick & Tollison, supra note 46.
50 See R. McCormick & R. Tollison, supra note 17, at 123-25; McCormick &
Tollison,
supra note 46, at 305-11.
6' See Shughart & Tollison, On the Growthof Governmentand the Political Economy of
Legislation, 9 Res. L. & Econ. 111 (1986).
52 See id. at 120-24.
Finally,Shughartand Tollisonadaptedthe supplyof legislation

modelto a unique historicalproblem-theliberalizationof corpo-
ratechartering lawsacrossstatesin thenineteenth and earlytwen-
tiethcenturies.53The idea was simple:liberalizedcharteringshould
be passed firstwherethe benefitsof passage exceed the cost of
passage by the largestamount.Measuringthe benefitsof passage
by local manufacturing characteristics
and the cost of passage by
such factorsas contemporaneous SIZE and RATIO, Shughartand
Tollisonencountered a robustand interesting demonstration ofthe
way liberalizedchartering emergedover time.54For example,in
states whereRATIO was larger,liberalchartering laws came later
because the cost of legislativechange was higher,all else the
same.55In stateswithmoreconcentrated manufacturing interests,
liberalchartering came sooner,all else the same.56
The basic pointis thatthesupply-demand modeloflegislationis
usefuland relevant.The modelworks,and it offersinsightsinto
theprocessby whichlegislationis producedacrosslegislatures and
overtime.Moreover,it can be employedto explainspecificepi-
sodes of legislativechange.
V. ISSUES RELATED TO THE SUPPLY-DEMAND PROCESS
The precedingframework forthe discussionof the demandand

supply of legislationomits certainspecializedtopics that build
uponand strengthen theconclusionsofthe economicmodelofleg-
islativeproduction.A non-exhaustivelist of thesetopicsis briefly
consideredin thisPart.
A. BrokerPreferences
The publicchoiceliteraturecontainsa greatdeal of discussion
about the degreeto whichideologyaffectsthe votingbehaviorof
electedrepresentatives.In simpleterms,does the politicianexer-
cise his or her personalvalue judgmentsin voting,as opposedto
votingstrictlyin termsof constituents'interests?The answeris
obviouslyyes to some degree,and the debate in the literatureis
overthe degree.
53 See Shughart &

Tollison, Corporate Chartering:An Exploration in the Economics of
Legal Change, 23 Econ. Inquiry 585, 592 (1985).
64 See id. at 590-98.
" Id. at 593.
56 Id. at 594.
The generalformof the debategoes as follows.A modelof rep-

resentativevotingbehavioris specified,includingconstituentin-
terestand ideologicalmeasures(such as the AmericansforDemo-
craticAction(ADA) or the AmericanConservativeUnion (ACU)
ratings).If the ideologicalmeasuresproveto have a statistically
significant impacton the test, ideologyis held to influencethe
behaviorofpoliticians(at the margin).57 Sam Peltzmanchallenged
thisconclusionwiththeargument thattheinclusionofbettermea-
suresof the "economic"variablesaffecting votingbehaviorin the
modelsthat are beingtestedwould reducethe statisticalsignifi-
cance of the ideologicalvariables.58
The wholeissue is miredin difficulties. A simpleexamplesuf-
ficesto illustrate.Representative A is froman oil districtand yet
votes"no" on an oil importfeebill.The "no" votegivesthe repre-
sentativea higherACU rating.Did the representative expresshis
ideologicalpreferences in thiscase? Yes if he voted"no" forfree;
no if he did not vote"no" forfree.Because his voting"no" in ex-
changeforvoteson otherissuesis entirelyprobable,it is notat all
clear that he voted "no" on ideologicalgrounds.Vote tradingor
logrolling obscuresthe role of ideologicalvotingon single issues.
Many post officesand dams are built on such principles,and, in
somecases,the post officeor the dam generatesmorelocal politi-
cal benefitsforthe representative thanthe oil importfee.
On thebroaderscale ofvotingacrossall issues,it seemsreasona-
ble to predictthat ideologyplaysan economically rationalrole in
such behavior.Douglas Nelson and Eugene Silberbergput the
matternicely.59 Narrowlyfocusedbills wherethe finaldestination
and distribution of fundsare well knownmake ideologicalvoting
morecostly;hence,less is observed.More generalbills whereef-
fectsare unknownor unpredictablemake ideologicalvotingless
costly;hence,moresuch behavioris observed.60 Ideologicalvoting
6 The studies most representativeof this approach are presented in Kalt & Zupan, Cap-
ture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 Am. Econ. Rev. 279 (1984), and
Kau & Rubin, Self-Interest,Ideology, and Logrolling in Congressional Voting, 22 J.L. &
Econ. 365 (1979).
58 See Peltzman, An Economic Interpretationof the History of
CongressionalVoting in
the Twentieth Century,75 Am. Econ. Rev. 656, 674-75 (1985).
"I See Nelson & Silberberg,Ideology and
Legislator Shirking,25 Econ. Inquiry 15 (1987).
60
Id. at 16-17.
obeys the law of demand-more is observedwhereengagingin

such behavioris cheaper.Nelson and Silberbergpresentedevi-
dence fromvotingon defenseappropriations bills to suggestthat
thisapproachto ideologyand votingis a usefulone.6'
Brokerpreferences also play a role in votingbehavior.The de-
greeto whichtheyplaya rolewillbe a function oftheinstitutional
arrangements that bind politicalagentsto theirconstituents: the
tighterthe arrangements, the less pronouncedthe ideologicalvot-
ing.For example,supposevoterserectresidencerequirements for
local representativesto ensurethat onlyindividualswithsignifi-
cant local propertyholdingswill be elected.62Legislatorshirking
will be less of a problemin this settingfor an obvious rea-
son-votingforlocal benefitsincreasesthe value ofthe legislator's
local propertyholdings.The issue, then,is not whetherideology
mattersat all to politicalbehavior,but howmuchand underwhat
conditions.
B. Seniority
Representatives are not homogeneous, whichmeans that their
influence is nothomogeneous either.Theywilldifferin theirnatu-
ral abilitiesas politicians,and theywilldifferin termsof theirin-
stitutionalstatus in the legislature.A measurableway in which
representatives are differentis in theirlengthof serviceor tenure
in the legislature.Seniorityleads to heterogeneous politicalinflu-
ence.Seniorityassumesthisrolebecauserankand influencein the
legislature(e.g., committeeassignments)increasewith legislator
tenure.
Of course,thiswholediscussionis just a hypothesis. Stiglerwas
amongthe firstto showempirically thatrepresentation in termsof
rawnumbersof representatives mattersto politicaloutcomes(e.g.,
federalspendingin a state or congressional district).63
Crain and
61 See id. at 18-21. Nelson and Silberbergused ADA

ratings,as well as several othervari-
ables, includingthe per capita value of defense contracts,as indicatorsof legislatorideology
and measurementsof constituentinterests.The authors compared individual senators' vot-
ing recordsto their constituents'interestsfor 12 roll call votes in the United States Senate
during the 97th Congress. See id.
62 See Faith & Tollison, Voter Search forEfficientRepresentation,5 Res. L. & Econ. 211,
215-23 (1983).
63 See Stigler,The Sizes of Legislatures,5 J. Legal Stud. 17, 26-31 (1976)
(political influ-
ence is positivelycorrelated to the number of representatives,based on comparisons be-
Tollisonadded seniorityweightsto Stigler'sempiricsand found

thatthe seniorityof a state'sHouse and Senate delegateswas an
important variablein explainingthe state'sreceiptof federalpro-
gramsand expenditures.6f4
The reasonsforthis conclusionare mostlya prioriat present,
but nonethelessconvincing. The legislatureis organized,in many
dimensions,likea prototype laborunionwitha strongformofmo-
nopolypower.f65 The increaseof legislatorinfluenceover political
outcomesas a functionof seniorityis just one part of the union
analogy,but it sufficesto illustratethe basic point.""To predict
policyoutcomessuch as the economicimpactof government pro-
gramsacrossrepresentative districts,
one mustcontrolforseniority
and relateddifferences of legislators;all representativesare not
createdequal.
C. GeographicRepresentationand Logrolling
Since the publicationof Tullock's Problemsof Majority Vot-
economists
ingff7 havebetterunderstoodthe problemofvote-trad-
ingor logrolling.
At first,analogiesweredrawnto normaleconomic
exchangesin whichtradingclearlymakesall relevantpartiesbet-
ter off.88Vote-trading,
however,takes place withinthe institu-
tween the number of representativesand the percent of federal grants,the percent of fed-
eral nondefenseexpenditures,and federal employmentfor the 50 states in 1970).
84 Crain & Tollison, The Influence of Representationon Public Policy, 6 J. Legal Stud.
355, 355-61 (1977). Kenneth Greene and Vincent Munley later questioned this result.They
argued that the conclusionsof the Crain and Tollison model were flawedbecause the model
failed to account for several importantfactors,including relative population. When these
factorsare considered,the correlationbetween seniorityand political influenceis nominal.
Greene & Munley,The Productivityof Legislators' Tenure: A Case of Lacking Evidence, 10
J. Legal Stud. 207 (1981). The driftof the literature,however,is to treat seniorityas beget-
ting more political influence.
65 See McCormick &
Tollison, Legislatures as Unions, 86 J. Pol. Econ. 63, 67-68 (1978).
66 The literatureon agenda control and
structure-inducedequilibrium provides a strong
theoreticalrationale for the importanceof institutionalfeaturesof the legislaturesuch as
seniorityin predictinglegislativeoutcomes. See, e.g., Plott & Levine, A Model of Agenda
Influenceon CommitteeDecisions, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 146 (1978) (withina range of circum-
stances, controllinga group's decisions by controllingonly the agenda appears possible);
Shepsle & Weingast,Structure-InducedEquilibrium and Legislative Choice, 37 Pub. Choice
503 (1981) (stabilityof legislativeoutcomes is stronglyinfluencedby institutionalfeatures
such as the committeesystem).
67 See supra
note 8 and accompanyingtext.
68 Coleman,
The Possibilityof a Social Welfare Function, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 1105, 1106
(1966).
tionalcontextof the legislature, and thiscontextwillhave a pow-

erfuleffecton the impactof vote-trading on the economy.
Combine,forexample,geographicrepresentation and vote-trad-
ing. The resultis that representatives who are proficientat ob-
tainingprogramsand benefitsfortheirdistrictswilltendto be re-
elected.The revenueside of the budgetis roughlytakenas given;
hence,the tax consequencesof a particularprogramfora particu-
lar districtare borne mostlyby individualsoutsidethe district.
Obviously,if all representatives behave in this way,the expendi-
ture side of the budgetwill becomebloated withlocal programs
("youvoteformydam,I'll voteforyourport"),which,takento an
extreme,willpromoteinefficient publicinvestments89and govern-
mentdeficits.70 As positivepredictions,thesedo notseemfarfrom
the realityof Americanpoliticstoday.In effect,vote-trading be-
comesa giganticnegative-sum gameforthe wholeeconomy, fueled
bylocal and geographically concentrated economicinterests.Legis-
lative historyand governmentbudgets are replete with such
results.
Not all districtsnecessarilywinin thiscompetition,as thevoting
rule in the legislaturewill precludesome clearlyinefficientdeals.
The stricter thevotingrule,themorethesenegative-sum deals will
failto pass muster.The importantlessonfrompublicchoicethe-
oryis thattheproverbialporkbarrelis notsomething thatis inde-
pendent of the institutionalincentivesfacing vote-maximizing
legislators.71
D. Committees
Economistshaveproduceda significant amountofworkon legis-
lativecommittees in termsoftheoretical studiesofvotingbehavior
a la Black.72Less workhas been done on the positiveproblemof
whycommittees existin a legislatureand whattheirfunctionsare.
One body of literature, pioneeredby KennethShepsle,focuses
on the roleof committees in determining "structure-induced
equi-
69 See J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 11, at 276-77.

70 See J. Buchanan & R. Wagner, Democracy in Deficit 93-105 (1977).
7 The point is a general one. In the contextof comparativelegislatures,systemsof repre-
sentation not based on geographyare perhaps not so loaded toward local programs.
72 See supra text
accompanyingnotes 1-2.
libria."73In otherwords,ratherthan cyclingabout endlesslyas

predictedbyArrow,74 actuallyreachdecisionsand pro-
legislatures
duce laws. In Shepsle's approach,outcomesare induced,indeed
predictedand controlled, of the
by the structuralcharacteristics
legislature,
includingcommittees, committeeassignments, and so
forth.75
Shepsle focusedespeciallyon the committeeappointmentpro-
cess,arguingthatfarmcommittees are dominatedby farmdistrict
representatives and urbancommittees are dominatedby cityrep-
resentatives.76This seemslike an obviousdivisionof labor in the
legislature,
withrepresentatives specializingin the economicbase
of theirdistricts.The algorithm of committeeassignmentis more
complexthan this,however;for example,thereare not enough
farmseats to go around.Moreover,the Shepsleviewof committee
assignmentomitssome interesting featuresof the process.77 The
mostimportant committees (Waysand Means,Rules,and Appro-
priations)are notissue-specificor largeenoughto accommodateall
thefarmers or urbantypesin the legislature. Thus, suchfactorsas
partyloyaltyin priorvotingtrialsare an alternative wayto under-
standthe committee assignment process.78
A secondmajorissue in the literature is the controlby the com-
mitteeoveritsrelevantbureaucratic dominion.WilliamNiskanen's
theoryofbureaucracy set thestageforthisdebate.In Bureaucracy
and Representative Government, Niskanenarguedthatbecauseof
its superiorinformation, a bureau had greaterbargainingpower
withregardto its budgetthandid the bureau'soversight commit-
tee.79Subsequentworkon the economictheoryof bureaucracy has
been largelyin this tradition.Recently,however,BarryWeingast
and Mark Moran offeredan alternativeprincipal-agent theory,
whichpredictsthat the oversightcommittee(the principal)has
mostof the relevantbargaining power,includingthe abilityto re-
73 See K. Shepsle, The

Giant Jigsaw Puzzle: Democratic CommitteeAssignmentsin the
Modern House 107-12 (1978).
74 See K. Arrow,supra note 3, at 46-60.
71 See K. Shepsle,
supra note 73, at 231-61.
76 See id. at 63-93.
77 See W. Crain,
Legislative Committees: A Filtering Theory (July 1986) (unpublished
manuscript) (copy on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
78 See id. at 4-7.
79 See W. Niskanen, supra note 15, at 24-35.
move or to hamperthe careerof the bureau head (the agent).80

They testedthis theorywithdata concerningthe Federal Trade
Commission(FTC).81
The issue raisedin thisdebate is an important one. Aregovern-
mentbureausout of controlor are theymerelydocile agentsfol-
lowingthe commandsof votersas expressedthroughtheirelected
representatives on the relevantcommittees?The Weingastap-
proachsuggeststhat politicalincentivesshouldbe compatibleas
betweenthelegislatureand thebureaucrat.The legislatorobserves
a particularpoliticaltradeoffin the election.Imposingthattrade
offon his bureaucraticagent is in the legislator'sself-interest.
That is, the bureaucrat'sroleis to transfer wealthor to implement
legislationand policyin the directionof the legislator'spreferred
tradeoff.In thisapproachbureaucracy is notout of controlbut is
closelymonitoredand controlledby Congress.Bureaucratswho
cannot be made to behave in accordancewith the legislature's
wishesare movedout of power.82
A finalissueconcerning committees is thequestionwhycommit-
tees existin a legislature.
They do not existin all legislatures,
but
theypredominatein UnitedStates legislatures.A naturalway to
thinkabout legislativecommitteesis that theyrepresentan effi-
cientdivisionof legislativelabor.83Each legislaturefaces certain
constraints.It mustsearchforefficient pairingsof demandersand
80 See Weingast &

Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or CongressionalControl? Regulatory
Policymakingby the Federal Trade Commission,91 J. Pol. Econ. 765 (1983).
81 See id. at 775-92. Using ADA
ratingsforthe individual senators on the FTC oversight
committees(the Committeeon Commerceand the Subcommitteeon Consumer Affairs),the
authors compared changes in the senators' preferencesto changes in FTC policy.
82 The Weingast approach has recentlybeen extended by William Shugart, Robert Tol-
lison, and Brian Goff.See Shugart, Tollison & Goff,Bureaucratic Structureand Congres-
sional Control, 52 S. Econ. J. 962 (1986). In their article, they compared and contrasted
independentagencies or commissionswith bureaus that are headed by a single actor (e.g.,
the FTC versus the AntitrustDivision of the Department of Justice). They derived the
result that the formertype of agency headed by a committeeshould exhibit less variability
of output (e.g., the numberof cases brought)over time than the single-actorcase. Id. at 968.
Their empirical results stronglysupport this hypothesis.See id. at 965-68.
One way to view this point is that independentagencies are oftenset up with broad man-
dates in unchartedpolitical waters. In the principal-agentapproach, less variabilitymeans
more control by the oversightcommitteeand less chance for things to get out of hand. A
commission-typebureaucracycan be seen, therefore,as derivingfromthe problem of legis-
lative control over bureaucraticbehavior.
83 See Leibowitz & Tollison, A Theory of Legislative Organization: Making the Most of
Your Majority,94 Q.J. Econ. 261, 261-64, 268 (1980).
suppliersof legislation, i.e.,whatdo peoplewantand whowillpay

forit? It faces a time constraint.It cannotmeet forever, and it
mustdecidewhatto voteon withina givensessionlength.More-
over,in the United States, legislatorsdo not always vote along
straightpartylines.
To controlforthesevariousmatters,the legislaturecan special-
ize by forming committeesthat hold both hearingsto determine
whatto do and votingtrials.If the fullHouse acceptsthe voting
trialresultofthe committee(a verycommonpatternof behavior),
committees will act like Adam Smith'spin factory-theywill ex-
pand theamountofa party'sagendathatcan be passed in a given
legislativesession.For a givenpartymajorityin the overalllegisla-
ture,whichis mappedintocommittee majoritiesby a ruleof pro-
portionalrepresentation, the legislativeproductivityof a partyis
enhancedby committees.
Committees have otherfunctions and rolesthanthosediscussed
here.But in theeconomictheoryoflegislation, theirroleis seen as
promoting the passageof legislation.They are enginesforfinding
out whatlaws peoplewantand whowillpay forthem,conducting
preliminary votes,screeningand controlling bureaucratic appoint-
ments,and so on.
E. Team Production
A featureof legislativeproductionthat has not receivedmuch
attentionuntilrecentlyis team production.84 The termrefersto a
situationwherethe combinedcosts of identifying the marginal
productsofindividualworkersand compensating themaccordingly
are high.The workeffort is joint,as on an assemblyline,and team
membersworkas a unit to achieveproductiveoutcomes.In this
settingproblemsof individualteammembershirking willbe para-
mountbecause shirkingmemberscan freeride on the workof
othersand not be penalizedappropriately. To the extentthat all
team membersbehave similarly,team productivity falls. Armen
Alchianand Harold Demsetz expositthe team productionargu-
mentin thesettingofa privatefirmwheretheroleofthemanager
84 See, e.g., Crain, Leavens & Tollison, Final Voting in

Legislatures, 76 Am. Econ. Rev.
833 (1986).
is invoked to monitorand to disciplinethe team production

process.85
Votingin a legislatureis exactlyanalogousto team production.
A majority voteon a billrequiresthecooperationofat least N/2 +
1 legislators.Thus, the team productiontheorycan be applied to
analyzelegislativebehavior.
Crain,Donald Leavens,and Tollisonproposeda theoryof party
controland disciplinebased on teamproductionprinciples.86 They
appliedthetheoryto thefollowing issue:in finalvoteson billsin a
legislature,whose bills get voted on first?They arguedthat the
bills of moreseniorlegislatorswillbe votedon firstbecausethese
legislatorscan be countedon to participatein subsequentvoteson
the party'sbills to carryout theirlegislativequid pro quos and
becausethisarrangement is a rewardforpartyloyaltyin previous
votingtrials.87Essentially,less seniorand less testedlegislatorsare
less trustworthy withregardto theirvotingbehavior,so theirbills
are votedon last.88
Crain,Leavens,and Tollisonthenconducteda testof votingon
finalbillson an extensivedata set forthe UnitedStates House of
Representatives.89 Their findingsstrongly supportthe application
of the team productiontheoryto legislatures.Indeed, theywere
able to explain and to predictthe queue of final votes in the
House, that is, the orderin whichfinalbills werevotedon.90
The team productiontheoryis a totallynew way of thinking
aboutlegislativebehavior.It has thepotentialforintegrating many
of
aspects legislativebehavior,such as partyleadershipand the
processby whichcoalitionsare formedand managedin votingtri-
als. Indeed,othertheoriesofthe legislaturethatemphasizethe in-
dependenceand powerof committees, forexample,can be seen as
specialcases of the moregeneralteam productiontheory.
F. Legislators
The literatureon legislatorsrevealsseveralbasic results.First,
Crainmodeledthetenureoflegislators as a functionofthetypeof
8 See Alchian & Demsetz, Production,InformationCosts, and Economic Organization,62

Am. Econ. Rev. 777, 779-81 (1972).
86 See Crain, Leavens & Tollison, supra note 84, at 833-35.
87
Id. at 834.
88
Id.
89 See id. at 835,836.
90 See id. at 838-40.
districttheyrepresent, all else the same.91His argumentfocused

on entrybarriersin politics.At-largedistrictsare viewedas repre-
sentingthe case of competitive entryintopolitics,whereassingle-
memberdistrictsare seen as analogous to barred or more re-
strictedentryconditions.92 Legislatorturnover is thushigherin at-
largedistricts.93This researchsuggeststhe structuralimportance
of bases of representation in politicsand casts new lighton the
incentives ofaspiringpoliticianswhoseek to erectvariousbases of
representation as a wayto gain entryintothe politicalarena and
to holdontotheirseats.Shouldminorities, forexample,prefersin-
gle-member or at-largedistricts?
Second, McCormickand Tollison wroteabout legislatorpay.94
Withregardto the legalpay of legislators, theyanalyzedthe legis-
latureas analogousto a unionor wagecartel.In somestateslegis-
latorpay is set by the stateconstitution; in othersit is set by the
legislature.The lattercase amountsto a verystrongformofwage-
settingpowerbecausefew,ifany,substitutes forlegislatorservices
existin a givenstate.McCormickand Tollisonfoundthat legisla-
torwagesin the "union"states(wagesset by the legislatures)are
muchhigher(100 to 200%) thanin the "non-union"states(wages
set by the state constitutions),all else the same.95
Not all legislatorpay is above the table. Outside-the-legislature
pay comesin a varietyof legal,quasi-legal,and illegalforms.Mc-
Cormickand Tollisondevelopeda theoryof outsidelegislatorpay
thatis based upon the occupationalcomposition of a legislature.96
Imaginethe following scenario:an auctioneerstartsto call out leg-
islatorwagesto elicita laborsupplycurveforlegislators. The first
groupto volunteer to runforand to servein thelegislatureis com-
posed oflawyers.They are the mosteffective at combining service
in the legislaturewithmakingoutsideincome.The lawyerwho is
also a legislatorhas a particularappeal forcertainpotentialcli-
ents:in effect,thederiveddemandforthe servicesofa lawyerqua
9' See Crain, On the Structureand Stability of Political Markets, 85 J. Pol. Econ. 829
(1977).
92 Id. at 831, 832.
93 Id. at 836,838.
94 See R. McCormick& R. Tollison, supra note 17, at 61-75; McCormick& Tollison, supra
note 65, at 71-74.
95 McCormick &
Tollison, supra note 65, at 73-74.
96 See id. at 77.
legislatoris moreinelasticthan the deriveddemandforplain old

lawyers.Thus, low pay resultsin a greaternumberof lawyersin
the legislature.As legislatorpay rises,businesspeoplewillsignup
next forlegislativeservice.They sign up forthe same reasonas
lawyers,only they are not as proficientas lawyersat earning
outsideincome.Finally,at highlevelsof legislatorpay,people are
drawnto runforofficewhoare attractedby the highlevel of pay
per se because theyare not adept at combininglegislativeservice
withprocuring outsideincome.
McCormickand Tollisontestedthistheoryusingdata on the oc-
cupationalcomposition of statelegislaturesand foundits implica-
tions stronglysupported.97 Lawyersand business-types dominate
low-paylegislatures; farmersdominatehigh-paylegislatures.
Finally,Fred McChesneyrecentlyexpandedthe conceptof the
politician'srole in the interest-group theoryof government in a
sensibleand significant way.98He stressedthat in the traditional
interest-group theory,the role of the politicianis to createrents
and returnsthat interestgroupsin turncompeteto capture.In
thiscase thepoliticianis a passivebroker.99McChesneywenton to
arguethatthe politiciancannotonlycreaterents,he can also ex-
tractthem.100 Individualsand firmsin the economydevelopspe-
cificand expropriable capitalin certainlinesofendeavor.101 Politi-
cians can force side payments from these individuals by
threatening themwithtaxes and/orregulationdesignedto expro-
priatetheirspecificcapital.
Buildingon this insight,McChesneydevelopeda veryinterest-
ingtheoryof rentextractionby politicians:legislatorsintroducea
billthatthreatensan industry's returnon capitalunlessthe indus-
trycontributesto theirlegislativecampaigns.102 His theorypro-
videsinsightsintoa rangeof government gesturesin the direction
of industry:forexample,committeeinvestigations and hearings,
politicalspeechesmappingout new legislativeproposals,and gov-
ernmentalcommissionsto study"problems."In effect,his work
9 See id. at 75-76.

98 See McChesney,Rent Extractionand Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regu-
lation, 16 J. Legal Stud. 101 (1987).
99 Id. at 102-04.
100 Id. at 102-06.
101 Id. at 106-09.
102 Id. at 106-08.
explainshowgovernment "trolls"the economylookingforwaysto

proposeregulationsand taxation,not so much to correctsocial
problemsbut to fillup the campaigncoffers.
All of thesepapersexaminespecificaspectsof legislatorbehav-
ior.As such,theyare piecesof a largerpuzzle.Lookingat the eco-
nomicincentives thatfuelthesupplyofpoliticallaborpromotesan
understanding ofthe politicalprocessas a rational,self-interested
environment. Moreover,it helps to dampen romanticnotionsof
politiciansas servantsofthepublicinterest. Politiciansare likethe
restof us; theirpersonal,privateinterestsare theirfundamental
concerns.
G. CampaignSpending
The literatureon campaignspendingcan be easily summa-
rized-campaignspendingis a meansofentryintopolitics.A chal-
lenger'sadvertising expendituresperformthe importantfunction
ofintroducing theunknowncandidateto theelectorate;the incum-
bent'scannotdo muchmorethan remindhis constituency of his
virtues.The empiricalliterature thatexaminesthe impactof cam-
paignspendingshowsthat the advertising elasticityof challenger
spendingwithrespectto votes is largerthan that forincumbent
spending.103The moralof this bodyof workis simple-campaign
spendinglaws are incumbentprotectionlaws.
In a largercontext,campaignspendinglawsmayhave an impact
on thesize and composition ofgovernment budgets.104If individual
representatives seek to tax votersin otherdistrictsto financeben-
efits for their district,unfetteredcampaign financewill send
moneyacrosspoliticalgeography to defeatsuch politicians.Unfet-
tered campaignfinanceshould,therefore, yield feweron-budget
transfers-i.e.,transfers thatare specificallyset out in the legisla-
103
See K. Grier,CampaignSpendingand Senate Elections,1978-1984,at 9-11 (April
1987)(unpublished manuscript) (copyon filewiththeVirginiaLaw ReviewAssociation). At
low expenditure levels,challengerspendinghas a relativelylargereffecton gainingvotes
thanincumbent spending;therefore, incumbents mustsignificantly
outspendchallengers to
winelections.This explainsincumbent resistanceto campaignfinancelimitations.See id.
104 Crain,Tollison& Leavens,Laissez-Fairein CampaignFinance6-12 (1987) (prepubli-
cationcopyof articleforthcoming in Public Choice;on filewiththe VirginiaLaw Review
Association)(campaignfinanceregulation willyielda substantialnetincreasein on-budget
legislative
activitybecause,at themargin, passinglawswillbecomea lessproductive toolfor
reelection).
ture'sbudgetitself.On the otherhand, unfettered campaignfi-

nancemeansthatoff-budget government actions,suchas favorable
regulation,are up forbid; thus,such an environment should be
relatedto moreoff-budgetactionsbythe legislature. Empiricalev-
idence suggeststhat unfetteredcampaignfinanceis associated
with such a pattern-feweron-budgettransfersand more off-
budgetregulation-acrossstate legislatures.'05
The important pointhere,however, is thatthe economicissueof
campaignspendinggoes beyondthe usual incumbentprotection
result.Campaignfinanceregulationhas an impacton the market
forpoliticianson boththe demandand supplysides,and thus,in-
directly,
affectsgovernment programsand policies.
H. Voters
Votersin the economictheoryof legislationhave been discussed
previously.'06Theyare suppliersand demandersoflegislation, reg-
ulation,and transfers. Their behavior,as such,is alwayscouched
in termsofbeingorganizedor unorganized. This contrastswiththe
conventional treatment of votersin publicchoicetheory.
Economistscustomarily discussvotingbehaviorin termsof the
paradoxof voting.107 That is, on straighteconomicgroundsvoting
is not worthwhile; yet turnoutsin most electionsare nontrivial.
Hence,votingbehavioris rationalizedas consumption-type, rather
than investment-type, behavior.People vote,forexample,to ex-
presstheirpatrioticdutyratherthanto expresstheirself-interest
in legislation.In contrastwithotherpartsof publicchoicetheory
in which behavioris modeled with maximizing,self-interested
agentsat the helm,the role of votersis comparatively unarticu-
lated in the conventional wisdomof publicchoicetheory.
Stigler,in particular,questionedthisapproachto understanding
voterbehavior.l08 He arguedthatin politicsa littlemoreor a little
less pluralitymatters.In thisworldvoteswillmatterto politicians
and partiesat the margin,and theywillinvestrationallyin a sup-
ply of votes to have an impacton politicaland legislativeout-
106 See id. at 12-16.

108 See supra text accompanyingnotes 6-9.
107 A. Downs, supra note 4, at 36-50, 260-76.
108 See Stigler,
Economic Competition and Political Competition, 13 Pub. Choice 91
(1972).
comes.'"9In suchan instancetheparadoxofvotingis a mootissue.

Interestgroupswill investin a supplyof votes forpoliticiansin
exchangefora higherprobabilityof seeinga favoritebill passed.
Such investments willbe made on cost-benefit
grounds-e.g.,if it
takesone percentmorepluralityto ensurethe powerto put a bill
through, the interestgroupwill comparethe costs of turningout
votersin thisamountwiththe benefitsof the legislation.110
In sucha wayvotingbehaviorcan be incorporated intothe inter-
est-grouptheoryof government. In otherwords,the management
ofvotessuppliedby interestgroupsprovidesan alternative wayto
viewthe votingprocess,a way thatis consistentwiththe general
driftof the economictheoryof legislation.
I. Legislationand the Growthof Government

Few doubt that at least since WorldWar I, government at all
levelshas absorbedincreasing proportions ofdomesticwealth.The
causes and consequencesof this trend,whichacceleratedin the
post-WorldWar II era, have been the subjectof much scholarly
debate.Severalhypothesesabout governmental growthhave been
advancedin thepublicchoiceliterature.111 First,exogenousevents,
such as war,are offered as the causes of once-and-for-allincreases
in the size of the publicsector.Second,some versionof Wagner's
"Law"-that the demandforgovernment servicesis an increasing
functionof income-is supposedto operatein the contextof an
explicitor implicitmarketforpublic goods whereindemandand
cost conditionsdeterminethe level of spending.112Otherexplana-
tionscenteron the expansionist motivesofpoliticiansand bureau-
crats,on "unbalancedgrowth"by a labor-intensive public sector,
and on the information costsfacedby voters.113
109 See id. at 100-04.

11O Crain, Shughart & Tollison, Voters as Investors 10-11 (1987) (forthcomingessay)
(copy on file with the VirginiaLaw Review Association), in The Political Economy of Rent
Seeking (C. Rowley, R. Tollison & G. Tullock eds. forthcoming).
"I See, e.g., J. Bennett & M. Johnson,The
Political Economy of Federal Government
Growth:1959-1978 (1980).
112 See J. Buchanan & R. Wagner, supra note 70, at 69-71, 93-124 (criticizing
Keynesian
theoryforfuelingconstantgovernmentexpansion by failingto recognizethe disincentivesof
politicians to restrainspending during periods of budget surpluses).
113 See, e.g., J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 11,
at 97-116 (delegation of decision-
making power to the governmentbureaucracyreduces the informationcosts to citizens); A.
Downs, supra note 4, at 201-04 (same); G. Tullock, The Politics of Bureaucracy 134-36
Recent contributions emphasizethe redistributive elementsin

governmental activity.For example,Peltzmanfoundwide empiri-
cal supportforthe proposition that"the levelingof incomediffer-
ences across a large part of the population-the growthof the
'middleclass'-has in factbeen a majorsourceof the growthof
government in the developedworldoverthe last fifty years.""'4In
contrast,Allan Meltzerand Scott Richarddevelopeda theoretical
modelthatsuggeststhatan increasein incomedifferences, because
of the extensionof votingpowerto groupswithrelativelylow in-
comes,raised the demand for redistribution and, hence, led to
moregovernment.11l
In the main, the growth-of-government literatureused either
public employment or government spendingas a percentageof
grossdomesticproductas a proxyforthe size of the publicsector.
This approachdoes not,however,capturethe fullscope ofgovern-
mentalactivity.Many of the government's intrusionsinto eco-
nomiclife(e.g.,minimumwagelaws,nonpricetradebarriers, anti-
trustexemptions, and price-entryregulations, to name a few)are
off-budget.That is, taxingand spendingactivitiesare just the tip
of the government iceberg.
In a recentpaper Shughartand Tollisonattemptedto linkthe
growthof government to the supply of legislationover time.'",
They investigatedthe growthof government by examiningthe
eventnecessaryto generatea publicsectorofa givensize-the en-
actmentof a bodyof laws. Specifically, theyanalyzedthe legisla-
tive outputof the Congressfromits firstsessionin 1789 through
its ninety-sixthassembly,whichended in 1980.1"7
In relatingthe legislativeoutputseriesto the growthof govern-
mentspendingper capita,theyfoundthatthe factorsthattendto
raise the outputof laws also tend to increasethe size of govern-
(1967) (bureaucracies expand because governmentleaders reward politicians for increasing

the number of people that they supervise); Baumol, Macroeconomics of Unbalanced
Growth:The Anatomy of Urban Crisis, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 415, 415-20 (1967) (attributing
governmentgrowthto a labor-intensivepublic sector that is not responsive to cost-saving
technologies).
114 Peltzman, The
Growthof Government,23 J.L. & Econ. 209, 285 (1980).
11 See Meltzer & Richard,A Rational Theory of the Size of Government,89 J. Pol. Econ.
914, 920-25 (1981).
"' See Shughart & Tollison, supra note 51, at 114-20.
117 See id. at 114-24.
ment,and vice versa."8 More importantly, however,theyfound

thatnotall governmental activitiesare a monotonetransformation
of budgetaryexpenditures.""A significantcategoryof wealth
transfers-thoseput into operationby the passage of private
bills-are off-budget, and theselaws apparentlysubstituteforon-
budgetspending.'20 Explanationsofthegrowthofgovernment that
focussolelyon taxingand spendingthus tell only a part of the
story.
Shughartand Tollisonthenwentbehindthe legislativeoutput
seriesto estimatea production function forenactedlaws.'2'Basing
thisworkon the interest-group of
theory government, theyfound
evidencethatthe enactmentof bills overtimedependson factors
influencing the demandforand supplyof legislation.'22 For exam-
ple, an increasein the degreeof bicameralism reducedthe output
of laws.That is, as the sizes of the House of Representativesand
Senate becamemoredisparate,the cost to individualsand groups
of obtaininga majorityin bothchambersrose.'23
These results,in total,carrya messageforgrowth-of-government
theorists.First,government does not growuniformly across the
board.An effective constrainton wealthtransfers makespolitical
trade offsimperative.To arguethat one capturesthe essenceof
off-budget developmentsby lookingonly at on-budgetempirical
proxiesis to commita fallacyof composition. Second,government
in a democracygrowsbecause the legislaturepasses laws and the
executivesignsthem.Spendingand taxes are ultimatelya reflec-
tionoflegislation.A theoryofwhatdriveslegislationovertimeis a
theoryof the growthof government. Thus the properfocusof a
theoryof governmental growthis one stageremovedfroma focus
on spendingand taxes. Moreover,the abilityof individualsand
groupsto use the legislativeprocessto attaintheirends,noble or
otherwise, causes government to growor decline.
118 See id. at 120-25.

119 Id. at 120.
120 Private legislationincludes those measures passed forthe reliefof individual persons
or firms.Illustrativeprivatebill categoriesare refundsof paymentsmade to the government
or waivers of such indebtedness,the payment of tort claims, and private immigrationand
naturalizationbills.
121 See
Shughart & Tollison, supra note 51, at 120-24.
122 Id. at 124-25.
123 Id. at 121.
VI. Two CLARIFICATIONS

At thispoint,two clarificationsshouldbe made. First,the eco-
nomictheoryoflegislationis not a Marxisttheoryin the following
sense. Simple Marxismpits Capital against Labor. An interest-
grouptheoryjust stressesthe relativecostsof organizingforeffec-
tive politicalaction.Anygroupfromany part of societycan be a
demander or supplier of legislation under the postulated
conditions.
Indeed, one of the more interesting examplesof the interest-
grouptheoryin the literaturepits high-costfirmsagainstlow-cost
firmsin an industry. The latterfirmsseek cost-increasing
regula-
tionsthatdrivesomeofthe former firmsout ofthe industry,
raise
industryprice,and increasethe quasi-rentsaccruingto the low-
cost firms.Such a modelhas been used to analyzeenvironmental
regulation,'24 the British factoryacts,'25and industrialsafety
regulation.126
Second,one shouldnot thinkof the economictheoryof legisla-
tionstrictly
in termsofthelegislature passingmorelawsand regu-
lations.The processcan operatein the oppositedirection,and the
theoryis generalso thatit can explainthe repealof laws and de-
regulation.As discussedabove, Shughartand Tollison used the
theoryto explainthe deregulation of corporatechartering laws in
the UnitedStates.'27Moreover,GaryAndersonand Tollisonused
a similarapproachto explainthe repealof the CornLaws in mid-
nineteenth-centuryEngland.128
VII. CONCLUDINGREMARKS
This Articleis not writtenfromthe arroganceof a finishedre-

search agenda. Rather,the generalsketchinessof much of the
pieceis sufficient
in itselfto suggestthatmoreworkremainsto be
124 See Buchanan &

Tullock, Polluters' Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls
Versus Taxes, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 139 (1975).
126 See Marvel, Factory Regulation: A Reinterpretationof Early English Experience, 20
J.L. & Econ. 379 (1977).

126 See Maloney & McCormick,A Positive Theory of EnvironmentalQuality Regulation,
25 J.L. & Econ. 99 (1982).

127 See supra text
accompanyingnotes 53-56.
128 See Anderson&
Tollison, Ideology,InterestGroups, and the Repeal of the Corn Laws,
141 J. Institutional& Theoretical Econ. 197 (1985).
368 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 74:339
done beforethe roleofthe legislatureand all its attendantinstitu-

tionsin the economyand societyis well understood.
An approachbased on an economictheoryof legislationnone-
thelessoffersrichscientificand empiricalopportunities to study
legislatures.It is by no means the onlyapproachto legislatures,
but it is provocativeto thinkof the legislatureas an institution
guidedby privateinterests. Afterall, no man is safewhenthe leg-
islatureis in session.Of course,notwithstanding the capacityof
the approachdescribedhereto puncturecomplacencyor conven-
tionalpieties,democracyis stillbetterthanthe alternatives.
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Alchian,ArmenA., HaroldDemsetz,Production,Information Costs,and

EconomicOrganization, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777 (1972).
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Tollison,Behindthe Veil: The PoliticalEconomyof Constitutional
Change(July1986) (unpublishedmanuscript)(copyon filewiththe
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Anderson,GaryM., WilliamF. ShughartII, RobertD. Tollison,There's
No Such Thing as a Free Judge(Aug. 1987) (unpublishedmanu-
script)(copyon filewiththe VirginiaLaw ReviewAssociation).
Anderson,GaryM., RobertD. Tollison,Ideology,InterestGroups,and
theRepeal oftheCornLaws, 141J. Institutional & TheoreticalEcon.
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UrbanCrisis,57 Am. Econ. Rev. 415 (1967).
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_ , On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. Pol. Econ.
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Valuation(1951).
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ConstitutionalEconomics21 (R.B. McKenzieed. 1984).
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sus Taxes, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 139 (1975).
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Legislatures,76 Am. Econ. Rev. 833 (1986).
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Investors(1987) (unpublishedmanuscript)(copyon filewiththeVir-
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est-GroupTheoryof Government, 8 J. Legal Stud. 555 (1979).
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CampaignFinance(1987) (articleforthcoming in Pub. Choice).
Downs,Anthony, An EconomicTheoryof Democracy(1957).
Faith,RogerL., RobertD. Tollison,VoterSearchforEfficient Represen-
tation,5 Res. L. & Econ. 211 (1983).
Greene,KennethV., VincentG. Munley,The Productivity ofLegislators'
Tenure:A Case Lackingin Evidence,10 J. Legal Stud. 207 (1981).
Grier,Kevin,CampaignSpendingand Senate Elections,1978-1984(Apr.
1987) (unpublishedmanuscript)(copyon filewiththe VirginiaLaw
ReviewAssociation).
Hotelling,Harold,Stabilityin Competition, 39 Econ. J. 41 (1929).
Kalt, JosephP., MarkA. Zupan,Captureand Ideologyin the Economic
Theoryof Politics,74 Am. Econ. Rev. 279 (1984).
Kau, JamesB., Paul H. Rubin,Self-Interest, Ideologyand Logrollingin
Congressional Voting,22 J.L. & Econ. 365 (1979).
Landes, William,RichardA. Posner,The IndependentJudiciaryin an
Interest-Group Perspective,18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975).
Leibowitz,Arleen,RobertD. Tollison,A Theoryof LegislativeOrganiza-
tion:Makingthe Most of Your Majority,94 Q.J. Econ. 261 (1980).
Maloney,MichaelT., RobertE. McCormick, A PositiveTheoryof Envi-
ronmental QualityRegulation,25 J.L. & Econ. 99 (1982).
Marvel,HowardP., FactoryRegulation:A Reinterpretation ofEarlyEng-
lish Experience,20 J.L. & Econ. 329 (1977).
McChesney, FredS., RentExtractionand RentCreationin theEconomic
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the Economy:An Inquiryintothe Interest-Group Theoryof Govern-
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Tullockeds. 1980).
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Government, 89 J. Pol. Econ. 914 (1981).
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Shepsle,KennethA., BarryR. Weingast,Structure-Induced Equilibrium
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THE purposeofthisessayis to surveywhatmightlooselybe

I. BASIC RESEARCH IN PUBLIC CHOICE

Duncan Black's early researchon committeedecisionmaking'

lated the medianvotertheory(presentedas a descendentof that

See K. Arrow,Social Choice and Individual Values (1951).

10 W. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (1962).

II. THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF LEGISLATION: AN OVERVIEW

One way to thinkabout legislationis in termsof the interest-

fromlegislationwill be the effective demandersof laws. The co-

18 The free rider problem

Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 359 (1974).

beingorganized.For example,a firmis an exampleofan organiza-

to organizeand to removeinefficient and overreaching brokersin

III. THE DEMAND FOR LEGISLATION

Perhapsthe mostbasic issue relatedto the demandforlegisla-

to increaseand sustainthe durability of legislation,

34 See G. Anderson,W. Shughart & R.

37 See id. at 876.

38 See Crain & Tollison, Constitutional Change in an Interest-Group

The states,offering a rangeof settingsin whichsuch behavior

IV. THE PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY OF LEGISLATION

There are variouswaysto approachthe issues surrounding the

ment,8 J. Legal Stud. 555 (1979).

tionsof supplyin whatmightlooselybe called a "reduced-form"

whereL is legislationpassed persession(a function(f) ofthe other

44 Laws are by no means homogeneous like

generally foundto be an income-elastic consumption good.This in-

The substitutioneffectnormallydominates in empirical tests.

votesin the House. An important resultemerges-otherthingsthe

4 See infratext accompanyingnotes 84-90.

Finally,Shughartand Tollisonadaptedthe supplyof legislation

V. ISSUES RELATED TO THE SUPPLY-DEMAND PROCESS

The precedingframework forthe discussionof the demandand

53 See Shughart &

The generalformof the debategoes as follows.A modelof rep-

obeys the law of demand-more is observedwhereengagingin

61 See id. at 18-21. Nelson and Silberbergused ADA

Tollisonadded seniorityweightsto Stigler'sempiricsand found

tionalcontextof the legislature, and thiscontextwillhave a pow-

69 See J. Buchanan & G. Tullock, supra note 11, at 276-77.

libria."73In otherwords,ratherthan cyclingabout endlesslyas

73 See K. Shepsle, The

79 See W. Niskanen, supra note 15, at 24-35.

move or to hamperthe careerof the bureau head (the agent).80

80 See Weingast &

Your Majority,94 Q.J. Econ. 261, 261-64, 268 (1980).

suppliersof legislation, i.e.,whatdo peoplewantand whowillpay

84 See, e.g., Crain, Leavens & Tollison, Final Voting in

is invoked to monitorand to disciplinethe team production

8 See Alchian & Demsetz, Production,InformationCosts, and Economic Organization,62

districttheyrepresent, all else the same.91His argumentfocused

legislatoris moreinelasticthan the deriveddemandforplain old

9 See id. at 75-76.

explainshowgovernment "trolls"the economylookingforwaysto

ture'sbudgetitself.On the otherhand, unfettered campaignfi-

106 See id. at 12-16.

comes.'"9In suchan instancetheparadoxofvotingis a mootissue.

I. Legislationand the Growthof Government

109 See id. at 100-04.

Recent contributions emphasizethe redistributive elementsin