Date: 18 March 2016

For: RAR
From: PAA
Re: Conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate proceeding

REYNOSO v. SANTIAGO, G.R. No. L-3039, 29 December 1949

The conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate one is entirely a
matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court.

FACTS: On April 29, 1947, Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora
Obispo presented an application in the Court of the First Instance of Quezon
for the administration of the property of the deceased, application which was
docketed as intestate proceeding No. 2914. Victorio Reynoso and Juan
Reynoso, Salvadora Obispo's surviving spouse and eldest son respectively,
opposed the application and filed a document, which purported to be the last
will and testament of Salvadora Obispo, with a counter petition for its
probate. Victorio and Juan also filed another petition with a different title
(Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo). This time they prayed
that the estate be administered and settled in special proceeding No. 3107
and that Victorio Reynoso be appointed executor of Salvadora Obispo's last
will and testament. The two petitions were decided separately by Judge
Santiago on April 20,1949.

ISSUE: Whether or not another petition for the settlement of testate estate of
the deceased should have been filed.

HELD: No. His Honor believed that the proposed change or substitution was
"not only unnecessary but inconvenient and expensive." An intestate
proceeding, like special proceeding No. 2914, he said, could and should be
converted into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente without
the necessity of changing its number, name or title.

The petition has no merit. Whether the intestate proceeding already

commenced should be discontinued and a new proceeding under a separate
number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies
within the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the
substantial rights of any heirs or creditors. is perhaps the only thing is at
stake on this phase of the controversy

RODRIGUEZ V. DE BORJA, G.R. No. L-21993, 21 June 1966

The court may act on the mere deposit of the will even before a petition for
probate is filed. When the petition for probate is filed after the deposit, the
petition is deemed to be filed on the day it was delivered. HENCE, the mere
delivery of the will to the clerk of court granted such court jurisdiction, to
the exclusion of all other courts.

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan

delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Meanwhile, the petitioners filed a Petition before
the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn.
Subsequently, a Petition for the Settlement of the Intestate Estate of Fr.
Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners
now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the
decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate
proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan

became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father
Rodriguez, even if no Petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by Section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof

to be published. — When a will is delivered to, or a petition for
the allowance of a will is filed in, the Court having jurisdiction,
such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will when
all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and
shall cause notice of such time and place to be published three
(3) weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition

for probate has been filed by the testator himself.

Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts, intestate succession is only subsidiary or
subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a
valid operative will.

URIARTE v. CFI, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, 29 May 1970

In this case, notwithstanding the fact that intestate proceedings were first
initiated in CFI Negros and testate proceedings were subsequently initiated
in CFI Manila, the SC held that CFI Manila nevertheless acquired
jurisdiction to the exclusion of CFI Negros. This is because of the priority of
probate proceedings over intestate proceedings.
FACTS: Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Goite, a non-resident alien, in CFI
Negros Oriental, alleging that he is the acknowledged natural son of the
decedent and his sole heir. Petitioner had previously initiated an action
before the same court for compulsory acknowledgment as natural son but
there "was no final &judgment yet. Private respondents, nephews of the
decedent, filed an opposition alleging that the decedent had left a will in
Spain. Later, the same respondents filed a petition for probate in CFI
Manila using the alleged last will of the decedent, and then filed a
motion to dismiss the special proceedings in CFI Negros Oriental. The
CFI Manila allowed the petition for probate, and the CFI Negros dismissed
the intestate proceeding. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration in
CFI Negros which was denied. He also filed an omnibus motion in CFI
Manila asking for the dismissal of the probate proceeding on the ground that
it was the CFI Negros that took first cognizance of the case. Said motion
was denied by CFI Manila. Hence this petition for certiorari on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion of the two courts.

ISSUES: Whether or not the dismissal of the special proceedings in CFI

Negros was proper; and whether or not CFI Manila has jurisdiction to
probate the alleged will.

HELD: On the first issue, it was proper that the intestate proceeding in
Negros CFI be discontinued because of the fact that the decedent had left a
will. It is well-settled that testacy is favored over intestacy, and that any
intestate proceeding may be terminated at any time when it discovered that
the deceased had left a will. However, the proper thing the private
respondents should have done was to file the petition for probate in CFI
Negros which was already hearing the intestate proceeding. The issue now is
improper venue, not jurisdiction. Unfortunately for petitioner, he is now
guilty of laches for failing to timely object to the filing of the petition for
probate in CFI Manila. It is settled that questions of venue may be waived
when not timely objected to. Hence, the CFI Manila may continue with the
probate case, without prejudice to petitioner’s successful action for his
compulsory recognition as heir. Petition for certiorari was denied.

GRIMM v. LEONIDAS, G.R. No. L-55509, 27 April 1984

FACTS: Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died in 1977. He was

survived by his second wife (Maxine), their two children (Pete and Linda),
and by his two children by a first marriage (Juanita and Ethel) which ended
by divorce.
Grimm executed two wills in San Francisco, California on January 23, 1959.
One will disposed of his Philippine estate described as conjugal property of
himself and his second wife. The second will disposed of his estate outside
the Philippines. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate in
Utah by Maxine on March 1978.

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in
Manila by Ethel in January 1978. The Utah Court admitted the two wills and
codicil to probate on April 1978 and was issued upon consideration of the
stipulation between the attorneys for Maxine and Ethel.

Also in April 1978, Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah
regarding the estate.

As mentioned, in January 1978, an intestate proceeding was instituted by

Ethel. On March 1978, Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss
the intestate proceeding on the ground of pendency of the Utah probate
proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will.
However, pursuant to the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the
opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the
record. The estate was partitioned.

In 1980, Maxine filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills
(already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate
court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine
be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine
alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the
compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void
because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge
Leonidas for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.

HELD: We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel’s motion to
dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two
wills and “no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed” (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a

person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding.
Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate
proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue
hearing the two cases.