2022-12-09 Watt - Watt's Original Petition and App For Declaratory Relief and Mandatory Injunction

Filed 12/9/2022 5:35 PM
Janie Macias
Combination Clerk
Crane County, Texas
By Andrea Flores
22-052-DCCV-00075
CAUSE NO. _____________________
ASHLEY W. WATT, INDIVIDUALLY AND § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

AS TRUSTEE OF THE ASHLEY W. WATT §
2012 RANCH TRUST AND TRUSTEE OF THE§
CHRISTINA W. WATT 2012 RANCH TRUST §
Plaintiff, § CRANE COUNTY, TEXAS
vs. §
§
CHEVRON U.S.A., INC.; WALSH AND §
WATTS, INC.; PITTS ENERGY CO.; AND § 109th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
WILLIAMS OIL COMPANY, §
Defendants §
§
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR

DECLARATORY RELIEF AND MANDATORY INJUNCTION
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT:
COMES NOW Ashley W. Watt, Individually, and as Trustee of the Ashley W. Watt 2012
Ranch Trust and Trustee of the Christina W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust (collectively, “Plaintiff”) in
the above-styled cause and file this Original Petition and Application for Declaratory Relief and
Mandatory Injunction against Defendants Chevron U.S.A. (“Chevron”), Walsh and Watts, Inc.
(“Walsh and Watts”), Pitts Energy Co. (“Pitts”), and Williams Oil Company (“Williams”)
(collectively “Defendants”) and in support thereof, respectfully shows the Court as follows:
I. Background and Facts
1. The Antina Ranch is an approximately 22,000 acre ranch located in Crane and
Ward Counties, Texas. The ranch was purchased by the Watt family in 1995, and remains under
the control of the Watt family through the Ashley W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust and the Christina W.
Watt 2012 Ranch Trust, which are the current surface estate owners of Antina Ranch. Plaintiff
Ashley W. Watt is the Trustee of both of these trusts.
PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION

FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF AND MANDATORY INJUNCTION Page 1 of 25
Copy from re:SearchTX

2. The Watt family are the surface owners of the Antina Ranch. The mineral estate is
subject to various mineral leases, including Oil and Gas Lease dated October 11th, 1924 from W.A.
Estes, and wife Dollie A. Estes, as lessor, to J.W. Grant, as lessee, recorded at Volume 10, Page
135 of the Deed Records of Crane County, Texas, covering 20,614 acres of land, more or less,
described therein (the “Estes Lease”); and Oil and Gas Lease dated October 14th, 1924, from
Wristen Brothers et al, as lessor, to J.W. Grant, as lessee, recorded at Volume 10, Page 548 of the
Deed Records of Crane County, Texas, covering 9,088 acres of land, more or less, described
therein (the “Wristen Lease”). Multiple wells exist on the Antina Ranch, including allegedly
plugged and abandoned wells, injection wells, inactive wells, and wells currently in production.
Current ownership, responsibility, and/or current operators of wells on the Antina Ranch include
but are not limited to the Defendants named in this lawsuit.
3. In approximately Spring 2021, apparent leaks at certain wells on the Antina Ranch
were observed. These leaks were previously unknown and undisclosed to Plaintiff. In the same
time period, dying vegetation was observed. These matters were initially raised to Defendant
Chevron, who had responsibility for and/or operated the impacted wells. During these initial
notifications, Chevron failed to provide substantive details as to the causes of the observed leaks
or dying vegetation, and failed to provide material information related to its efforts to address the
issues.
4. On information and belief, Chevron farmed out portions of the original Wristen and
Estes Leases to other operators, including but not limited to the named co-Defendants. In April
2021, Chevron assigned an interest in the Estes Lease—which included the wells with observed
impacts discussed above—to Defendant Pitts Energy. Based on information and belief, Pitts paid
no money for Chevron’s interest in the Estes Lease. Furthermore, based on information and belief,


Chevron failed to disclose to Pitts material information related to the condition of the wells
included in the assignment.
5. In June 2021, an uncontrolled flow of heavy brine water was discovered at a well
on the Antina Ranch identified as the Estes 24 (API No. 42-103-00781), (the “blowout”). The
Estes 24 well was allegedly plugged and abandoned in 1995. At the time the blowout was
discovered, salt crusting, and dying vegetation were visible in the vicinity of the Estes 24. Chevron
initiated work to address the blowout and encountered numerous problems, ultimately requiring
over twelve weeks to control. Chevron failed to disclose material information related to the leak
to Plaintiff. Based on information and belief, significant amounts of produced water (including
benzene and radioactive signatures) were discharged, including both to the surface and subsurface.
This surface blowout was a violation of Railroad Commission of Texas (“RRC”) Statewide Rule
8.
6. Plaintiff’s multiple attempts to substantively engage Defendant Chevron to
determine the extent and causes of the various observed events were largely rebuffed, with
Chevron failing to respond to requests for basic information, much less a systematic, scientifically-
based investigation and groundwater monitoring.
7. On information and belief, numerous additional wells appear to be compromised
and are actively leaking brine, hydrocarbons, and/or other contaminants or exhibit indications of
imminent failure. The impacted wells include those owned and/or operated by each of the
Defendants herein or for which Defendants are responsible.
8. On information and belief, Chevron’s failure to disclose material information
related to the leak at the Estes 24 was not an isolated incident. Chevron’s nondisclosure also
included an intentional failure to notify Plaintiff of plugging occurring at the Estes 27 well (API


No. 42-475-01250) in early 2021, which Chevron was required to do under RRC Statewide Rule
14. Additionally, Chevron intentionally failed to disclose a 1999 amendment to a waterflood
application, requesting a significant increase in injection at the Estes 31W (API No. 42-103-
00785). Instead, in its application to the RRC, Chevron misrepresented that it was the surface
owner—which is false—in what appears to be a calculated effort to conceal the application from
the Antina Ranch landowners.
9. Defendant Chevron also made affirmative misrepresentations to Plaintiff, including
a misrepresentation related to a blowout at the Estes 20 (API No. 42-103-00791) that occurred in
December 2020. Not only did Chevron fail to disclose the extent of the blowout, it affirmatively
misrepresented to Plaintiff that only 31.69 bbls of brine were leaked, which is demonstrably false.
Aside from these affirmative misrepresentations, based on information and belief, Chevron has
failed to notify the RRC of certain of these leaks, in violation of RRC Statewide Rule 20.
10. Additionally, other anomalies including unexpectedly high pressure readings at
various wells and sustained casing pressure on Bradenheads have been observed by Plaintiff.
11. Despite notice, Chevron and the other Defendants in this case have failed to conduct
an investigation into these matters to determine if there is a link between the leaks, deteriorating
wells, and their activities conducted pursuant to the Estes Lease and Wristen Lease. With or
without a link, Chevron and the other Defendants remain responsible for these failing wells and
their damage to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s property, including groundwater resources.
12. These events have had a substantial impact on Plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of the
Antina Ranch. Further, the toll of the worry and frustration about the future of the Antina Ranch
on Plaintiff is significant and has been exponentially compounded by the failure of Defendants —
principally Chevron—to take these concerns seriously. Defendants have failed to disclose even


basic information to Plaintiff, the landowner, about the incidents occurring on the land.
Defendants have taken no apparent steps to develop a comprehensive and scientific approach to
investigate the property, and have either ignored or dismissed concerns raised by Plaintiff or
frequent requests to address the problems on the ranch.
13. Plaintiff Ashley W. Watt is a Marine Corps combat veteran and suffers from post-
traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). Her disorder has been aggravated by the injuries to the Antina
Ranch and by the actions of Defendants.
14. Plaintiff brings this lawsuit against Chevron, Walsh and Watts, Pitts, and Williams
for the impacts to the Antina Ranch. Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment regarding liability for
the pollution or contamination, monetary damages, and all other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled
under the law, including site investigation costs and attorneys’ fees.
15. The Plaintiff also seeks a mandatory injunction requiring (1) the immediate
cessation of the flow of pollution and/or contamination from compromised wells onto Plaintiff’s
surface and subsurface, (2) a site investigation resulting in full vertical and horizontal delineation
of impacted groundwater and soils, (3) cleanup and restoration of the property that results, at a
minimum, in the complete removal of chemical constituents released, no impact to surface or
groundwater, and the land returned to the condition prior to any pollution or contamination, (4) re-
entering and properly plugging all allegedly plugged wells on the Antina Ranch for which
Defendants are responsible; and (5) provision of an alternate source of water for the Antina Ranch.
II. Discovery Control Plan
16. Plaintiff intends to conduct discovery under Level 3 of Rule 190.3 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure and affirmatively pleads that this suit is not governed by the expedited-


actions process in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 169 because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief in
excess of $100,000.
III. Relief Sought
17. The extent of the damage to Plaintiff’s properties has not been fully characterized
as of the date of the filing of the petition. Plaintiff seeks non-monetary relief and monetary relief
over $1,000,000. TEX. R. CIV. P. 47(c)(5). The damages sought herein are within the
jurisdictional limits of this Court. Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this allegation: (1) pre-trial,
should discovery show this number to be too low or too high; (2) during trial, should the evidence
admitted at trial reveal this number to be too low or too high; and/or, (3) post-trial, to conform the
pleadings to the verdict in the event that the jury determines Plaintiffs are entitled to damages in
excess of $1,000,000.00. See, e.g., Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.
1990).
IV. Parties
18. Plaintiff Ashley W. Watt is an individual residing at 1912 W. McKinney St.,
Houston, Texas 77019. Ms. Watt brings this case Individually, as Trustee of the Ashley W. Watt
2012 Ranch Trust, and as Trustee of the Christina W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust. The last three digits
of Ms. Watt’s driver’s license number are 767. The last three digits of her Social Security number
are 677.
19. Defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc. is a foreign for-profit corporation licensed to do
business in the State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 6001 Bollinger Canyon Rd., San
Ramon, CA 94583-2324. It may be served with process through its registered agent, Prentice Hall
Corp System, Inc., 211 E. 7th Street, Suite 620, Austin, TX 78701-3218.


20. Defendant Walsh and Watts, Inc. is a Texas corporation licensed to do business in
the State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 155 Walsh Drive, Aledo, TX 76008. It may
be served with process through its registered agent, CT Corporation System, 1999 Bryan St., Suite
900, Dallas, TX 75201.
21. Defendant Pitts Energy Co. is a Texas corporation licensed to do business in the
State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 3313 Caldera Blvd., Midland, TX 79707. It may
be served with process through its registered agent, Steven L. Pitts, 3313 Caldera Blvd., Midland,
TX 79707.
22. Defendant Williams Oil Company is a Texas corporation licensed to do business in
the State of Texas. Its principal place of business is 3300 N. A Street, Bldg 2-215, Midland, TX
79705. It may be served with process through its registered agent, Tom W. Williams, 3300 N. A
Street, Bldg 2-215, Midland, TX 79705.
V. Jurisdiction and Venue
23. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit because the controversy
exceeds this Court’s minimum jurisdictional requirements.
24. Venue is mandatory in Crane County under TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§15.011 because this suit is, in part, for damages to real property, and Crane County is where the
property at issue is located.
VI. Background Facts
25. The Antina Ranch is owned by the Ashley W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust and the
Christina W. Watt 2012 Ranch Trust. Ashley Watt resides on the Antina Ranch. In addition to
homesite, the Antina Ranch is a working ranch. Well water has been the exclusive source of water
for agricultural, consumption, and household uses.


26. Situated in the Monahans Sandhills of the Permian Basin, the Antina Ranch is rich
in natural resources. These include, but are not limited to, large deposits of sands, which can be
mined and used in the oil and gas industry, and land areas suitable for solar power development.
27. Beginning in approximately the 1940s, Gulf Oil, a predecessor to Chevron, began
developing the Estes Lease. Gulf/Chevron were the sole operator of the Estes Lease until the
transfer of certain of these wells to Pitts. Many wells were productive for decades, and
Gulf/Chevron employed techniques to extend production, including water flooding for late-stage
recovery, beginning as early the 1960s.
28. In approximately the 1990s, Chevron began plugging a substantial portion of the
wells under the Estes Lease. This included the Estes 24, which was allegedly plugged and
abandoned in 1995. Based on information and belief, many of the wells originally drilled under
the control of Gulf/Chevron were drilled using the same or similar construction methods and
techniques. Similarly, based on information and belief, many of the wells allegedly plugged under
the control of Chevron were allegedly plugged using similar plugging methods and techniques.
29. As referenced above, in June 2021, a blowout manifested at surface near the Estes
24, a well for which Chevron was responsible—as admitted by both Chevron and the RRC. The
blowout resulted in damages to the Antina Ranch, both on the surface and on the subsurface.
30. On information and belief, there are numerous additional wells that appear to be
compromised and are actively leaking brine, hydrocarbons, and/or other contaminants or exhibit
indications of imminent failure. These include active wells for which named Defendants are the
responsible operators, and allegedly plugged wells for which Defendants are responsible pursuant
to RRC Statewide Rule 14. Importantly, Plaintiff’s investigation efforts continue and at the time
of the filing of this petition, dozens of failing wells have been observed.


31. Chevron has attempted to transfer ownership of certain wells that, based on
information and relief, Chevron knows or should know to be compromised by way of poor cement
bonds, corroded casing, inadequate plugging, active leaking, indications of past discharges or
indications of imminent failure to Pitts, without disclosing such information to Pitts, in violation
of RRC Statewide Rule 15. Based on information and belief, Pitts lacks adequate resources to
address such issues.
32. The transfers of ownership, from Chevron to Pitts, of these wells appears to be an
attempt – either by Chevron or Pitts, or both – to avoid potentially millions of dollars of liabilities
related to asset retirement obligations, including the adequate plugging of wells, or the financial
responsibilities which arise from the failure to do so. This fraudulent scheme, if allowed to stand,
would permit an asset-rich corporation such as Chevron, which presumably has the financial
resources to fulfill the obligations of being a well owner or operator, to transfer those obligations
to an undercapitalized entity, i.e., Pitts, which either may not have the same resources or would
not have entered into these well ownership transactions under the same terms had it known the
facts. Plaintiff, as a creditor, therefore asserts that these transactions are actionable under the Texas
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §24.001, et seq.
33. As set forth below, Plaintiff has been severely damaged by the pollution or
contamination caused by Defendants.
VII. Causes of Action
34. The preceding paragraphs are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set forth
below.
A. Count 1 – Trespass to Real Property (as to All Defendants).
35. Defendants Chevron, Walsh and Watts, Pitts, and Williams entered and/or continue


to enter property owned by Plaintiff without Plaintiff’s consent or authorization by releasing
contaminants to subsurface pore space, groundwater, and soil as a result of the leaks from wells
on the Antina Ranch for which these Defendants are responsible. Further, Defendants have and
continue to exceed the scope of the implied easement granted by the Estes and Wristen Leases,
and held by Defendants, to reasonably access the surface of the premises for purposes of mineral
development, by unreasonably and unlawfully releasing contaminants to groundwater and soil on
Plaintiff’s property.
36. Defendants’ entry was physical, intentional, and voluntary, and caused injury to
Plaintiff’s right of possession.
37. Defendants took no action and have taken no action to ensure that the contaminants
would not migrate or continue to migrate, unauthorized, onto Plaintiff’s property. Defendants’
failure to take action to prevent the contaminants from migrating or continuing to migrate on to
Plaintiff’s property was and is grossly negligent or done with malice and deliberate and willful and
caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.
38. Defendants’ trespass is continuing because contaminants continue to flow onto
Plaintiff’s surface and subsurface from numerous compromised wells and to migrate through
Plaintiff’s property.
39. Defendants’ trespass is temporary because it can be repaired, fixed, or restored, and
any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular, intermittent, and not reasonably
predictable, such that future injury could not be estimated with reasonable certainty.
40. In the alternative, Defendants’ trespass is permanent because either (a) the damage
is not capable of being repaired, fixed, or restored, or (b) even if capable of repair, there is


substantial certainty the injury will repeatedly, continually, and regularly recur, such that future
injury can be reasonable evaluated.
41. Defendants’ unauthorized entry onto Plaintiffs’ properties resulted in the following
damages:
a. Loss of market value;
b. Fair rental value;
c. Cost of repairs, including development of a replacement water source;
d. Loss of use and enjoyment of the property;
e. Diminution in market value damages after repair, including stigma
damages;
f. Mental anguish for intentional conduct;
g. Expenses;
h. Exemplary damages; and
i. Court costs.
42. In addition, to remedy Defendants’ continuing unauthorized entry to Plaintiff’s
property, Plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction requiring the immediate cessation of the
continuing trespass of pollution and/or contamination, site investigation and cleanup of the site
including re-entering and plugging the failing wells and an alternate water source, as described
below.
B. Count 2 – Private Nuisance (as to All Defendants).
43. Defendants substantially interfered with, and continue to substantially interfere
with, Plaintiff’s interests in the use and enjoyment of the property by:
a. failing to ensure plugged and abandoned wells remain plugged;


b. allowing the release of pollution or contamination onto Plaintiff’s property
and through the soil and groundwater; and/or
b. taking no action to ensure that contaminants would not migrate or
continue to migrate onto Plaintiff’s property.
44. Defendants’ substantial interference with Plaintiff’s interest in the use and
enjoyment of the property has caused Plaintiff unreasonable discomfort, annoyance, and
inconvenience.
45. Defendants have caused physical damage to Plaintiff’s property, economic harm to
the property’s market value, and psychological harm to Plaintiff’s “peace of mind” in the use and
enjoyment of the property.
46. Defendants negligently interfered with Plaintiff’s interests. Defendants owed a
legal duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to prevent injury to Plaintiff and the property.
Defendants were aware, or should have been aware of the compromised wells for which they are
responsible and the resulting leaks which have resulted in pollution or contamination to the
property. Defendants created a dangerous condition by failing to exercise reasonable care in
installing, monitoring, plugging, repairing the wells, or a combination of these actions. Further,
once Defendants became aware of the compromised wells and resulting leaks, Defendants failed
to take affirmative action to control or avoid increasing the danger to Plaintiff.
47. Defendants intentionally and unreasonably interfered with Plaintiff’s interests by
failing to take action once Defendants became aware of the compromised wells and resulting leaks.
Defendants’ deliberate inaction allowed the pollution or contamination to migrate through
Plaintiff’s property. To date, Defendants have intentionally failed to take any action to contain or
ameliorate the pollution or contamination to prevent continued pollution or contamination to


Plaintiff’s property. Defendants continue to maintain the conditions wherein contaminants are
migrating onto Plaintiff’s property.
48. Defendants’ interference with Plaintiff’s interests is temporary because it can be
repaired, fixed, or restored and any anticipated recurrence would be only occasional, irregular,
intermittent, and not reasonably predictable, such that future injury could not be estimated with
reasonable certainty.
49. In the alternative, Defendants’ interference with Plaintiff’s interests is permanent
because either (a) the damage is not capable of being repaired, fixed, or restored, or (b) even if
capable of repair, there is substantial certainty the injury will repeatedly, continually, and regularly
recur, such that future injury can be reasonable evaluated.
50. Defendants’ interference with Plaintiff’s interests caused injury to Plaintiff, which
resulted in the following damages:
damages;
f. Personal discomfort, annoyance, frustration, and inconvenience;
g. Mental anguish for intentional conduct;
h. Expenses;
i. Exemplary damages; and
j. Court costs.


51. In addition, to remedy Defendants’ continuing interference with Plaintiff’s interests
in the use and enjoyment of Plaintiff’s property, Plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction requiring
the immediate abatement of the nuisance, site investigation and cleanup of the site including re-
entering and plugging the failing wells and an alternate water source, as described below.
C. Count 3 – Negligence (as to All Defendants).
52. Defendants owed a legal duty to Plaintiff to exercise reasonable care to prevent
injury to Plaintiff and the property.
53. Defendants were aware, or should have been aware, of the compromised wells for
which they are responsible and the resulting leaks which have resulted in pollution or
contamination to the property.
54. Defendants created a dangerous condition by failing to exercise reasonable care in
installing, monitoring, plugging, repairing the wells or a combination of these actions. Further,
once Defendants became aware of the compromised wells and resulting leaks, Defendants failed
to take reasonable affirmative action to control or avoid increasing the danger to Plaintiff. In
particular, Defendants’ deliberate inaction allowed the pollution or contamination to migrate
through Plaintiff’s property. To date, Defendants have intentionally failed to take any action to
contain or ameliorate the pollution or contamination to prevent continued pollution or
contamination to Plaintiff’s property. Stated differently, Defendants’ negligence includes, but is
not limited to: (1) the installation of wells, including but not limited to the construction method,
engineering and choice of construction materials; (2) the monitoring of active, inactive and
plugged wells; (3) the plugging of wells; (4) the repair of compromised and leaking wells,
including the repair method; (5) the failure to determine the cause of any leaks including the cause
of any casing failures or the cause of any abnormal pressurization in the wells or both; and (6) the


failure to adequately characterize the extent of any damages from any compromised and leaking
wells, and (7) the failure to implement an adequate groundwater monitoring plan.
55. Defendant’s negligence proximately caused injury to Plaintiff, which resulted in
the following damages:
damages;
g. Expenses;
i. Court costs.
D. Count 4 – Negligence Per Se (as to All Defendants).
56. Defendants’ actions violate RRC Statewide Rule 8, which provides that, “No
person conducting activities subject to regulation by the [RRC] may cause or allow pollution of
surface or subsurface water in the state,” 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(b). It also provides that,
No person may dispose of any oil and gas wastes by any method without obtaining
a permit to dispose of such wastes. The disposal methods prohibited by this
paragraph include, but are not limited to, the unpermitted discharge of oil field
brines, geothermal resource waters, or any other mineralized waters, or drilling
fluids into any watercourse or drainageway, including any drainage ditch, dry
creek, flowing creek, river, or any other body of surface water.
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d).


57. Plaintiff is included in the class of persons that RRC Statewide Rule 8 is designed
to protect, and the injury to Plaintiff is of the type the statute was designed to prevent.
58. Defendants’ violation of Statewide Rule 8 is without legal excuse.
59. Additionally, Defendant Chevron’s actions violated RRC Statewide Rule 14, which
provides that,
The operator of a well shall serve notice on the surface owner of the well site tract,
or the resident if the owner is absent, before the scheduled date for beginning the
plugging operations. A representative of the surface owner may be present to
witness the plugging of the well. Plugging shall not be delayed because of the lack
of actual notice to the surface owner or resident if the operator has served notice as
required by this paragraph. The district director or the director’s delegate may grant
exceptions to the requirements of this paragraph concerning the timing of notices
when a workover or drilling rig is already at work on location and ready to
commence plugging operations.
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(a)(5).
60. Plaintiff is included in the class of persons that RRC Statewide Rule 14 is designed
to protect, and the injury to Plaintiff is of the type the statute was designed to prevent.
61. Defendants’ violation of Statewide Rule 14 is without legal excuse.
62. Defendants’ violation of Statewide Rule 8, Defendant Chevron’s violation of
Statewide Rule 14, and all Defendants’ negligence per se proximately caused injury to Plaintiff,
which resulted in the following damages:
damages;


g. Expenses;
i. Court costs.
E. Count 5 – Texas Natural Resource Code Section 85.321 (as to All Defendants).
63. A landowner harmed by a violation of Chapter 85 of the Texas Natural Resources
Code or “another law of this state prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order of the [RRC] may sue
for and recover damages and have any other relief to which he may be entitled at law or equity.”
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 85.321.
64. Plaintiff’s property was damaged by Defendants’ violations of provisions of RRC
Statewide Rule 8, which provides that, “No person conducting activities subject to regulation by
the [RRC] may cause or allow pollution of surface or subsurface water in the state,” 16 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(b). It also provides that,
No person may dispose of any oil and gas wastes by any method without obtaining
a permit to dispose of such wastes. The disposal methods prohibited by this
paragraph include, but are not limited to, the unpermitted discharge of oil field
brines, geothermal resource waters, or any other mineralized waters, or drilling
fluids into any watercourse or drainageway, including any drainage ditch, dry
creek, flowing creek, river, or any other body of surface water.
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.8(d).
65. Additionally, Plaintiff’s property was damaged by Defendant Chevron’s violations
of RRC Statewide Rule 14, , which provides that,
The operator of a well shall serve notice on the surface owner of the well site tract,
or the resident if the owner is absent, before the scheduled date for beginning the
plugging operations. A representative of the surface owner may be present to
witness the plugging of the well. Plugging shall not be delayed because of the lack
of actual notice to the surface owner or resident if the operator has served notice as


required by this paragraph. The district director or the director’s delegate may grant
exceptions to the requirements of this paragraph concerning the timing of notices
when a workover or drilling rig is already at work on location and ready to
commence plugging operations.
16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.14(a)(5).
66. Defendants’ violations of RRC Statewide Rule 8 and Defendant Chevron’s
violation of Statewide Rule 14 caused injury to Plaintiff, which resulted in the following damages:
c. Cost of investigation and repairs;
damages;
g. Expenses;
h. Exemplary damages;
i. Attorneys’ fees; and
j. Court costs.
67. In addition, to remedy Defendants’ continuing unauthorized entry to Plaintiff’s
property, Plaintiff requests a mandatory injunction requiring immediate cessation of the discharge
of pollution and/or contamination onto Plaintiff’s surface and subsurface, site investigation and
cleanup of the site including re-entering and plugging the failing wells and an alternate water
source, as described below.
F. Count 6 – Fraud by Nondisclosure (as to Defendant Chevron)


68. Defendant Chevron concealed or failed to disclose certain facts to the Plaintiff,
including but not limited to the plugging occurring at the Estes 27, the waterflood increase
application related to the Estes 31W, and the extent of the blowout at the Estes 20.
69. Defendant Chevron had a duty to disclose these material facts to Plaintiff who is
the surface owner whose property was impacted by these incidents. Further, Chevron had a duty
to disclose the plugging at Estes 27 pursuant to RRC Statewide Rule 14. Defendant Chevron knew
that Plaintiff was ignorant of these facts, and that Plaintiff did not have an equal opportunity to
discover these facts, yet Chevron was deliberately silent when it had a duty to speak.
70. By failing to disclose these facts, Chevron intended to induce Plaintiff to take some
action or refrain from acting, and Plaintiff relied on Chevron’s nondisclosure.
71. Plaintiff was injured as a result of acting without the knowledge of the undisclosed
facts, which resulted in damages, including:
a. Actual damages;
b. Cost of investigation and repairs;
c. Mental anguish for intentional conduct;
d. Expenses;
e. Exemplary damages;
f. Attorneys’ fees; and
g. Court costs.
G. Count 7—Common Law Fraud (as to Defendant Chevron)
72. Defendant Chevron made material, false representations to Plaintiff including
misrepresenting the extent of a blowout at the Estes 20 that occurred in December 2020. Not only


did Chevron fail to disclose the extent of the blowout, it affirmatively misrepresented to Plaintiff
that only 31.69 bbls of brine were leaked, which is demonstrably false.
73. At the time Chevron made the representation, it knew it was false, or it made the
misrepresentation recklessly, as a positive assertion, and without knowledge of its truth.
74. Chevron intended to induce Plaintiff to take some action or refrain from acting, and
Plaintiff relied on Chevron’s representation.
75. Plaintiff was injured as a result of acting without the knowledge of the undisclosed
facts, which resulted in damages, including:
a. Actual damages;
b. Cost of investigation and repairs;
c. Mental anguish for intentional conduct;
d. Expenses;
f. Attorneys’ fees; and
g. Court costs.
H. Count 8—Fraudulent Transfer (as to Defendants Chevron and Pitts)
76. Upon information and belief, Chevron has attempted to transfer ownership of
certain wells that it knows or should have known to be compromised by way of inadequate
plugging, active leaking, indications of past discharges or indications of imminent failure to Pitts,
without adequately disclosing such information to Pitts. Based on information and belief, Pitts
lacks adequate resources to address such issues, nor would it have acquired these liabilities for the
price paid to Chevron had it known the truth. This transfer of ownership – from Chevron to Pitts


-- could potentially allow both these Defendants avoid the liabilities related to adequate plugging
of wells, or the financial responsibilities which arise from the failure to do so.
77. Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks relief from Defendants pursuant to the Texas Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA). See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §24.001, et seq.
78. Plaintiff is a “creditor” because she has a valid claim against Defendants, including
the theories of trespass to real property, nuisance, negligence per se, etc., set forth above. TEX.
BUS. & COMM. CODE §§24.002(3),(4). Plaintiff’s claim arose either prior to, or within a reasonable
time after, the transfer was made or Pitts incurred the obligation related to these wells. See id. at
§§24.005 (transfer fraudulent as to present and future creditors), 24.006 (transfer fraudulent as to
present creditors).
79. Plaintiff alleges that the transfer of ownership of the wells at issue in this case, from
Chevron to Pitts, were fraudulent under Texas law. These transfers were made with Defendants’
actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors, including Plaintiff, whose property was
damaged, is being damaged, and will be damaged in the future by inadequately plugged or leaking
wells, or wells for which failure is likely in the future. See TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §§24.005
(a)(1).
80. Alternatively, Plaintiff alleges the transfer was made between Defendants, or
obligation incurred by Pitts, without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the
transfer or obligation, and that Pitts “was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a
transaction for which its remaining assets were unreasonably small in relation to the business or
transaction; or intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that it would
incur, debts beyond the its ability to pay as they became due.” Id. at §24.005(a)(2).


81. Plaintiff further alleges that the facts surrounding the fraudulent transactions
between Chevron and Pitts meet the criteria of several of the “badges of fraud,” enumerated in the
non-exhaustive list identified by the Texas Legislature. See id. at §24.005(b).
82. Plaintiff seeks all relief available to her under TUFTA, including, but not limited
to, the following:
a. avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent necessary to satisfy

Plaintiff’s claim; i.e., voiding the transfer of the wells from Chevron to Pitts,
thereby placing the liability back to Chevron for damages arising from the
wells at issue; [TEX. BUS. & COMM. CODE §§24.008 (a)(1)]
b. “an attachment or other provisional remedy […] in accordance with the

applicable Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Civil Practice and
Remedies Code relating to ancillary proceedings;” [Id. at §§24.008 (a)(2)]
c. subject to applicable principles of equity and in accordance with applicable

rules of civil procedure: “(1) an injunction against further disposition by
Defendants, of asset transferred or of other property; (2) appointment of a
receiver to take charge of the asset transferred or of other property of the
transferee; or (3) any other relief the circumstances may require.” [Id. at
§§24.008 (a)(3)], and
d. Costs and reasonable attorney fees as are equitable and just. [Id. at
§§24.013].
VIII. Application for Mandatory Injunctive Relief
83. Plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction requiring the immediate cessation of the flow
of pollution and/or contamination from compromised wells onto Plaintiff’s surface and subsurface,
a site investigation resulting in full horizontal and vertical delineation of chemical constituents
related to the leaks from the compromised wells, cleanup of the pollution or contamination, and
restoration of the property that results, at a minimum, in the complete removal of all chemical
constituents released, no impact to surface or groundwater, and the land returned to the condition
prior to any pollution or contamination. Further, Plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction requiring


Defendants to re-enter each and every allegedly plugged well for which they are responsible on
the Antina Ranch, conduct full cement and casing logs in order to confirm structural integrity and
protection of groundwater resources, and properly plug the wells. Plaintiff also seeks a mandatory
injunction requiring Defendants to provide the Antina Ranch with an alternate source of water as
a result of the pollution or contamination since the groundwater on which the Antina Ranch relies
for all purposes can no longer be used, and Plantiff is without a reliable, clean source of water due
to Defendants’ activities.
IX. Application for Declaratory Relief
84. Pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.003, Plaintiff seeks a finding and
determination that Defendants, and not Plaintiff, are liable for all response costs or damages
resulting from Defendants’ acts as described herein.
85. An owner of contaminated property may be a potentially responsible party for
response costs or damages under certain authorities. The Texas Commission for Environmental
Quality (TCEQ), however, “may not name a person as a responsible party for an enforcement
action or require a person to reimburse remediation costs for a site owned or operated by the
person” if the contaminants that are the subject of the investigation “appear to originate from an
up-gradient, offsite source that is not owned or operated by the person,” reflecting an intention by
the state to protect innocent landowners from liability for pollution or contamination. TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.1875.
86. Plaintiff also seek costs and reasonable and necessary attorney's fees, as are
equitable and just, pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 37.009.
X. Jury Demand
87. Plaintiff demands a jury trial and herewith tenders the appropriate fee.


XI. Conditions Precedent
88. All conditions precedent have been performed or have occurred.
XII. Required Rule 194 Disclosures
89. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 194, Defendants are required to provide
the information or materials described in Rule 194.2, 194.3, and 194.4 without awaiting a
discovery request from Plaintiff.
XIII. Statement Regarding Use of Documents
90. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.7, Plaintiff hereby gives notice to
Defendants that any and all documents produced by Defendants in this matter may be used against
Defendants at any pre-trial proceeding or at trial without the necessity of authenticating the
produced documents.
XIV. Prayer
For these reasons, Plaintiff asks that the Court issue citation for Defendants to appear and
answer, and that Plaintiff be awarded a judgment against Defendants for the following:
a. Actual, special, and consequential damages;
b. Mandatory injunction requiring (1) the immediate cessation of the flow of pollution
and/or contamination from compromised wells onto Plaintiff’s surface and/or
subsurface; (2) a site investigation resulting in full horizontal and vertical
delineation of chemical constituents related to the leaks from the compromised
wells; (3) cleanup of Plaintiff’s property that results, at a minimum, in the
groundwater, surface water and land returned to the condition prior to any pollution
or contamination; (4) re-entering and properly plugging all allegedly plugged wells
on the Antina Ranch; and (5) the provision of an alternate source of water;


c. Declaratory judgment in favor of the Plaintiff pursuant to TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE § 37.003, finding and determining that Defendants are liable for all response
costs or damages resulting from the pollution or contamination;
d. Mental anguish damages;
f. Prejudgment and postjudgment interest;
g. Court costs;
h. Attorneys’ fees; and
i. All other relief to which Plaintiff is entitled.
DATE: December 9, 2022
Respectfully submitted,
GUERRERO & WHITTLE, PLLC
By: /s/ Mary Whittle

Mary Whittle
Texas Bar No. 24033336
Mark Guerrero
Texas Bar No. 24032377
2630 Exposition Blvd. Suite 102
Austin, Texas 78703
(512) 605-2300 phone
(512) 222-5280 fax
mary@gwjustice.com
mark@gwjustice.com
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF


2022-12-09 Watt - Watt's Original Petition and App For Declaratory Relief and Mandatory Injunction

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2022-12-09 Watt - Watt's Original Petition and App For Declaratory Relief and Mandatory Injunction

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Filed 12/9/2022 5:35 PM

ASHLEY W. WATT, INDIVIDUALLY AND § IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION FOR

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF THIS COURT:

I. Background and Facts

Ashley W. Watt is the Trustee of both of these trusts.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION

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but are not limited to the Defendants named in this lawsuit.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION

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included in the assignment.

6. Plaintiff’s multiple attempts to substantively engage Defendant Chevron to

based investigation and groundwater monitoring.

7. On information and belief, numerous additional wells appear to be compromised

Defendants herein or for which Defendants are responsible.

8. On information and belief, Chevron’s failure to disclose material information

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION

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14. Additionally, Chevron intentionally failed to disclose a 1999 amendment to a waterflood

the Antina Ranch landowners.

9. Defendant Chevron also made affirmative misrepresentations to Plaintiff, including

10. Additionally, other anomalies including unexpectedly high pressure readings at

their damage to Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s property, including groundwater resources.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION

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frequent requests to address the problems on the ranch.

Ranch and by the actions of Defendants.

minimum, in the complete removal of chemical constituents released, no impact to surface or

II. Discovery Control Plan

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III. Relief Sought

18. Plaintiff Ashley W. Watt is an individual residing at 1912 W. McKinney St.,

19. Defendant Chevron U.S.A., Inc. is a foreign for-profit corporation licensed to do

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900, Dallas, TX 75201.

22. Defendant Williams Oil Company is a Texas corporation licensed to do business in

Street, Bldg 2-215, Midland, TX 79705.

V. Jurisdiction and Venue

exceeds this Court’s minimum jurisdictional requirements.

property at issue is located.

VI. Background Facts

for agricultural, consumption, and household uses.

PLAINTIFF’S ORIGINAL PETITION AND APPLICATION

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recovery, beginning as early the 1960s.

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address such issues.

contamination caused by Defendants.

VII. Causes of Action

A. Count 1 – Trespass to Real Property (as to All Defendants).

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development, by unreasonably and unlawfully releasing contaminants to groundwater and soil on

Plaintiff’s right of possession.

caused Plaintiffs’ injuries.

38. Defendants’ trespass is continuing because contaminants continue to flow onto

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injury can be reasonable evaluated.