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No More Need for Snobbism: Highbrow Cultural Participation in a

Taste Democracy

Article  in  European Sociological Review · July 2005

DOI: 10.1093/esr/jci038

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 European Sociological Review VOLUME 21 NUMBER 5 DECEMBER 2005 513–528 513
DOI:10.1093/esr/jci038, available online at www.esr.oxfordjournals.org
Online publication 1 November 2005

No More Need for Snobbism:

Highbrow Cultural Participation
in a Taste Democracy
Koen van Eijck and Wim Knulst

In the Netherlands, we are witnessing a process of cultural divergence between generations.

While the older generations have extended their participation in traditional highbrow
culture, the younger generations increasingly focus on popular culture. Using cross-sectional
data covering the 1983–1999 period, four potential explanations for this trend were
tested. It was found, firstly, that this divergence cannot be attributed to changes in the
relation between people’s stage of life and their cultural consumption. Secondly, the
observed shift is not the result of the emergence of the cultural omnivore. The proportion
of omnivores did not increase and they are not to be found especially among the younger
generations. Thirdly, upward social mobility cannot account for the decreasing interest in
highbrow culture among the younger generations either. Differences in socialization
between generations (fourthly), offer the best explanation for the divergence in cultural
participation.

Introduction and Problem diminished. Among those aged 40 and over, however,
participation increased, resulting in a slightly increasing
Definition number of cultural visits for the population as a whole
(De Haan and Knulst, 2000).
For a long time, cultivated citizens have been oriented
This trend among the younger segments of the Dutch
towards a classical ideal of civilization (Bildungsideal).
population is different from what might be expected.
They were supposed to cultivate their mind by reading
Until recently, level of education proved to have a large
literary novels and poetry, visiting museums and attend-
effect on participation in highbrow culture. To a lesser
ing classical music, opera, plays, and dance. Participa-
extent, the same held for degree of prosperity. Both people’s
tion in such serious culture was encouraged for evoking
average schooling level and their average prosperity have
reflection. Even if this remained an unpracticed ideal for
increased significantly during the last decades. As a
many, numerous surveys conducted during the last cen-
result, we might have expected the number of cultural
tury have demonstrated that subsequent generations
participants to increase, perhaps especially among
with intermediate or higher schooling levels did put
younger people1 who profited most from the extended
these ideals into practice often. However, in the Netherlands
post-war educational opportunities. However, the actual
this pattern has been disturbed since the last quarter of
trend in cultural participation is the opposite of what
the previous century. Among the higher educated aged
was expected, as Figure 1 demonstrates.
between 20 and 40, participation in highbrow culture has

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514 VAN EIJCK AND KNULST
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
15-24 25-34 35-44
Figure 1 Divergence in highbrow cultural participation by age between 1979 and 1999. Highbrow cultural participation
was calculated as the summed frequency of attending classical concerts, plays (included since 1983), ballet, galleries,
museums, and monumental sites (Cronbach’s α = 0.74)
In 1979, those aged 15 to 44 were the most active
highbrow cultural participants. After the age of 45, par-
ticipation gradually declined. In 1991, participation
increased among all age groups except the 15–24 year
old respondents. By then, the most active group con-
sisted of the 45–54 year olds. Finally, in 1999 we see that
the peak in participation has moved further to the right
again, towards the 55–64 age group, whereas respon-
dents aged up to 44 have seriously reduced their cultural
activities. Comparing the lines between cohorts within
the age groups, we see how the older generations have
become more culturally active while the younger cohorts
increasingly lag behind.
This clear trend of generational divergence may
reflect either diverging interests between generations or
a changing relation between stage of life and cultural
participation due to, for example, changing family con-
stellations and the concomitant shifts in the distribu-
tion of care- and work-related obligations over the life
course. If the interest in highbrow culture is indeed
declining over birth cohorts, we expect to find a declining
participation rate among the younger cohorts as they
grow older, and an increasing rate for the older cohorts.
Although it is typically argued that cohort differences
due to differential socialization experiences should
remain stable during the life course, we consider cultural
participation as the result of a person’s accumulated
1979
1991
1999
45-54 55-64 65-74 75-80
cultural capital. Those who invest in a ‘career’ of high-
brow cultural participation build up cultural capital and
will become more active as their cultural capital grows,
whereas those who do not are expected to show a declin-
ing interest during the course of their lives (Bourdieu,
1984: 283–291).
In this article, we will attempt to explain why the
expected increase in cultural participation among
younger cohorts has not come true. Although we will
include tests of potential changes in the impact of life
stage, our focus will be on the generational divergence in
interests. To this end, we will build on the work of Peterson
and Kern (1996), who observed a similar divergence in
the US between 1982 and 1992, albeit with regard to
musical preferences. Younger people’s tastes were found
to have become more omnivorous than the tastes of the
elderly, as the former more often reported to appreciate
both highbrow (classical) and lowbrow (folk, pop)
musical genres. Peterson and Kern largely attributed this
divergence to differences between birth cohorts and sug-
gested a number of possible explanations for their findings,
but these were not explicitly tested. Borrowing from
hypotheses by Groenman (1961) and De Jager (1967),
we have translated Peterson and Kern’s suppositions
regarding the possible causes of this divergence into test-
able statements and analysed them using a series of
cross-sectional data.
 HIGHBROW CULTURAL PARTICIPATION IN A TASTE DEMOCRACY
Before we can analyse the increase in omnivorousness
as a possible explanation for the observed generational
divergence, we will have to analyse to what extent the
proportion of omnivores increased in the Netherlands.
To that end, we have defined omnivores as people who
engaged in both highbrow and lowbrow cultural activi-
ties during the year covered by the survey. Secondly, like
Peterson and Kern, we examined whether the observed
divergence is due to diverging interests of generations,
or whether cultural differences between people in differ-
ent stages of the life cycle are increasing. For example, if
the interest in highbrow culture has increasingly become
something to be pursued only at a later age, the latter
explanation is likely to be more valid than generational
divergence. Thirdly, we tested Peterson and Kern’s sug-
gestion that the increasing proportion of higher edu-
cated people from low socio-economic backgrounds has
led to a blending of tastes that has brought the domi-
nance of highbrow culture to an end. Finally, the possible
impact of being socialized under different cultural circum-
stances has been analysed. To what extent can the declin-
ing interest in highbrow culture among younger people
be attributed to a more permissive cultural-pedagogic
regime that came to the fore in secondary education at
the end of the 1960s?
We attempted to answer these questions using sec-
ondary data from the Amenities and Social Services
Utilization Survey (AVO). This survey has been repeated
every four years since 1979 among a sample of about
15,000 respondents by the Dutch Social Cultural Plan-
ning Office (SCP). Household members aged six and
over have been surveyed, but in this study we only
used information on respondents aged at least 16. The
AVO offers detailed information on both passive and
active cultural participation. Since some of the rele-
vant items have only been included since 1983, our
analyses will be based on the surveys collected between
1983 and 1999. For these five measurement waves
together, the total number of respondents aged 16 and
over is 59,137.2
Trends in Cultural Participation
In the Netherlands, cultural participation has been mon-
itored for quite some time. Cross-sectional surveys have
been repeated every four years since 1979 (AVO). These
data show that the proportion of the Dutch population
visiting museums or attending performing arts has been
relatively stable. However, this overall mean conceals the
fact that participation rates have declined among people
515
aged under 40, especially since 1991, while they have
gradually increased among those aged 40 and over.
As will be demonstrated shortly, the interest in popular
culture increased rapidly among the younger, higher
educated cohorts. To a lesser extent, this is also true of
the older generations, since the number of people with a
fastidious interest in highbrow culture is very small. But
nowadays3 the interest in highbrow culture does not
seem to suffer a lot from this lack of highbrow purists.
The observed divergence is not restricted to arts atten-
dance. A similar pattern of rising participation of those
aged 40+ and a simultaneous decline among people
younger than 40 was also present for active participation
in organized amateur arts (De Haan and Knulst, 2000;
for museums, see De Haan, 1997). In fact, this diver-
gence was first witnessed for reading, where it resulted
from a strong decline among younger generations and
stable reading habits among the older ones. Overall, leisure
reading declined, and it continues to do so (Knulst and
Kraaykamp, 1998). These shifts in amateur arts and
reading have been observed using other longitudinal
survey data as well, so we seem to be dealing with true
generational divergence rather than artifacts of the data.
We cannot be sure whether this divergence in cultural
participation is also going on in countries surrounding
the Netherlands. Rates of museum visits and performing
arts attendance are lower for younger generations than
older ones in the UK and France as well (SCP, 2000:
541), but longitudinal observations are not available.
These comparative findings do indicate, however, that
Dutch youngsters show a stronger negative deviation
from the mean participation rates than most of their
European counterparts when it comes to classical music,
theatre attendance, and museum visits. But when con-
sidering data on trends, we have at best indications from
other studies pointing towards divergence (Savage et al.,
1992; Schulze, 1995). Peterson and Kern (1996), how-
ever, do provide an analysis of shifting cultural prefer-
ences in the US based on repeated cross-sectional survey
data, so we have some comparative information. They
found that, between 1982 and 1992, the preferences for
folk and popular music had increased most rapidly for
people who were also lovers of classical musical genres.
This change was stronger for younger generations. They
analysed tastes and preferences rather than behaviour,
but in this case opinions are at least as relevant as con-
sumption. Mixing highbrow and lowbrow musical tastes
had already been labelled ‘omnivorous’ by Peterson
(Peterson and Simkus, 1992; cf. Van Eijck, 2000).
Peterson and Kern offer several possible explana-
tions for the observed shift from purist to omnivorous
516 VAN EIJCK AND KNULST
preferences. For one thing, they point to the fact that
taste patterns that used to be restricted to class or region
are blending because of the increasing social and geo-
graphical mobility rates of the twentieth century. The
concomitant increase in tolerance and the explicit prohi-
bition of discrimination are thought to have pushed
away the belief in the supremacy of white elite culture.
They also mention the impact of the pop generations
that embraced Afro-American dance music by the end
of the 1960s, not as a music to get them through adoles-
cence but as a music for life. Furthermore, knowledge of
a broad range of musical styles is probably more helpful
than being a highbrow initiate for getting ahead and
taking part in the heterogeneous social networks typical
of the new middle class in today’s globalised world. In this
article, we will attempt to build on the hypotheses put
forward by Peterson and Kern. Note that we will use
terms such as ‘highbrow’ and ‘lowbrow’ or ‘popular’
in their traditional meaning, referring to cultural prod-
ucts that have been regarded for long as ‘highbrow’ (or
classical, elitist, legitimate, conventional) and ‘lowbrow’
(pop, mass, folk).
Specific Research Questions
We set out to test possible explanations for the diver-
gence that has been observed in the Netherlands.
Firstly, we will investigate to what extent the shifts
under consideration are related to increasingly omniv-
orous patterns of cultural consumption, especially
among the younger, higher educated segments of the
Dutch population. Their cultural repertoire may not
have become more restricted, because highbrow cul-
ture may have had to move over and make room for
popular culture.
Secondly, like Peterson and Kern, we will test whether
the observed divergence between age groups is due to
diverging interests between generations, or rather to
growing differences in cultural activities between subse-
quent stages of life. In the case of the latter, highbrow
culture is becoming, more than before, an interest to
indulge in only later in life. Some argue that this might
be the case as a result of time pressure among the
increasing number of dual-earning couples.
Thirdly, we have examined the possible impact of
social mobility. Does social mobility in itself have a neg-
ative effect on the interest in highbrow culture? This
might explain part of the declining highbrow participa-
tion among the higher educated who, because of the
increased social mobility, have been socialized less often
in families where highbrow culture makes up a signifi-
cant part of the family’s leisure activities.
Finally, we analysed the potential impact of the period
in which people were socialized. The question here is: to
what extent can the waning interest in highbrow culture
among younger generations be attributed to the increas-
ingly permissive pedagogical regime (or more general
context of cultural relativity) that emerged around the
end of the 1960s and no longer preached the supremacy
of western elite culture?
These questions will be dealt with one by one in the
following paragraphs. The available data do not hold
information on people’s opinions or tastes, nor do we
have details on the exact cultural content of the activities
people engage in, either directly or via media. A number
of possible explanatory variables, such as specifics on
people’s cultural socialization, are not available either.
Therefore, we have to work with proxies in most cases.
More Omnivorous Patterns in
Cultural Consumption?
Combinations of Highbrow and Lowbrow
We will consider a pattern of cultural consumption as
omnivorous if respondents indicate that they have par-
ticipated, either through media or directly, in both high-
brow and lowbrow culture in the year preceding the
survey. The numbers of highbrow and lowbrow activities
need not be balanced. As indicators of highbrow culture
we reckoned visiting museums (1), galleries (2) and
monumental architecture (3), attending professional
plays (4), ballet (5) and classical music (6). To demon-
strate that these six items all refer to a single highbrow
concept, we calculated Cronbach’s α, which reached a
satisfactory 0.74. Indicators of popular culture were pop
concerts and musicals (1), cinema (2), attending soccer
games (3), visiting amusement parks (4), watching movies
on TV (5), and watching movies on videotape (6). These
items were more diverse than the highbrow indicators:
Cronbach’s α was 0.51. We only considered whether or
not respondents belonged to the group of participants
for each item, regardless of frequencies of participation.
Including the null scores on both dimensions, there are
(72=) 49 possible combination scores. These have been
recoded as follows into eight main patterns of cultural
participation: only highbrow culture (1); only popular
culture (2); omnivorous pattern with great (3) or small
(4) prevalence of highbrow culture; omnivorous pattern
with highbrow and popular culture balanced (5);
 HIGHBROW CULTURAL PARTICIPATION IN A TASTE DEMOCRACY 517

omnivorous pattern with great (6) or small (7) prevalence
of popular culture; and no participation whatsoever in
the year preceding the survey (8). Unlike Peterson and
Kern, who focused on the frequency of omnivorous
combinations among respondents who were at least
engaged in highbrow culture, we will look at each of
these main patterns separately. Unfortunately, we can-
not include middlebrow culture like Peterson and Kern
did, because our data lack proper indicators.
Results
Table 1 shows how the respondents from the 1983 to
1999 samples are divided across the eight main patterns.
In addition to the percentages pertaining to the entire
sample, we also calculated proportions separately for
respondents with intermediate or higher education (i.e.
at least secondary general schooling), again divided
into the age groups of 16–39 year olds and those aged
at least 40.
The number of purists that only engage in highbrow
culture is very small in both 1983 and 1999 with two and
three per cent, respectively. Among the higher educated,
this proportion is somewhat higher among the 40–80
year olds (four or five per cent) than among the 16–39
year olds (zero or one per cent). Thus, exclusive partici-
pation in highbrow culture is rather exceptional. The pro-
portion of respondents limiting themselves to popular
culture is much larger and increasing further from 28
to 37 per cent among the 16–39 year olds with higher
education. Contrary to common expectations, the pro-
portion of omnivores did not increase. With a share of
53 per cent in the 1999 sample, their overall numbers
remained unchanged since 1983. We might even say that
the older respondents, among whom omnivorousness is
a widespread characteristic, are responsible for the fact
that this percentage has not declined. The 10 percentage
points decline in the proportion of omnivores among
the higher educated members of the younger age groups,
putting them well below the level of the older respon-
dents, contrasts with the observations by Peterson and
Kern. In fact, many scholars believed that omnivorous
consumer behaviour would emerge mostly from the
younger generations (Schulze, 1995; Wynne and O’Connor,
1998). A Dutch study of musical taste patterns showed
that musical omnivores were younger than the lovers of
classical or folk music, but older than those with a musi-
cal preference that was limited to pop music (Van Eijck,
2001). Also if we look at patterns of cultural consump-
tion conceived more broadly, the Dutch omnivores are
most prevalent within the 1950–1969 birth cohort
(De Haan and Knulst, 2000). The main reason for this is
that the number of people with a balanced or prevailing
portion of highbrow culture in their leisure repertoire
declined sharply, mostly among the younger segments of
the higher educated. The difference between our results
and those on musical taste patterns may be due to the
fact that we are looking at actual participation rates,
whereas the studies on musical omnivores focused on
preferences, which are less subject to practical constraints.

Table 1 The content of cultural repertoires in 1983 and 1999, for the whole sample (A) and for respondents with interme-
diate and higher schooling levels, differentiated between ages 16–39 and 40+ (B). Figures in percentages

(A) Whole sample (B) At least higher secondary education

16–39 years 40–80 years
1983 1999 1983 1999 1983 1999

Only highbrow culture 2 3 1 0 5 4

Only popular culture 39 38 28 37 20 20
Combining popular and highbrow culture 53 53 71 61 73 73
Of which:
Great majority of highbrow culture 5 4 4 1 16 11
Small majority of highbrow culture 8 6 11 3 18 14
Popular and high culture balanced 12 9 13 6 19 16
Small majority of popular culture 14 13 20 16 14 17
Great majority of popular culture 14 21 24 35 7 15
No participation at all 6 6 1 1 3 2
Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100
Total respondents 11,994 11,222 3054 3357 1445 2290
Source: AVO 1983–1999.
518 VAN EIJCK AND KNULST
5.0
popular
conventional
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1983 1999 1983 1999 1983
1925 - 1934 1935 - 1944 1945 - 1954
Figure 2 Composition of the cultural repertoire divided into popular and highbrow elements by birth cohort. Entire sample
aged 16 and older, comparing 1983 to 1999
In Figure 2, the sample is divided into birth cohorts
(10-year classes, all schooling levels together), showing the
shares of highbrow and popular culture in respondents’
repertoires (including repertoires consisting of highbrow
or popular culture only) for both 1983 and 1999.
Figure 2 clearly depicts the generational divergence:
moving from older to younger cohorts, the average pro-
portion of popular culture in people’s repertoire increases
while the proportion of highbrow culture declines. Fur-
thermore, among the cohorts born before 1955, the high-
brow share increased and the popular share decreased
between 1983 and 1999. The opposite trend occurred
among respondents born after 1955: their already modest
proportion of highbrow culture declined and the already
substantial participation in popular culture increased even
further. We do not see an abrupt change, but a gradual
transition into a more dominant role of popular culture
(also visible from the higher absolute levels of popular cul-
tural participation among younger respondents). This
transition seems to take place through cohort replacement.
Only those born before 1955 do not want to give in yet.
In sum, it is safe to conclude that the rise of the cul-
tural omnivore does not account for the generational
divergence we have observed, because of the fact that we
do not find an increase in the proportion of cultural
omnivores in our data.
1999 1983 1999 1983 1999 1991 1999
1955 - 1964 1965 - 1974 after 1974
Stage of Life or Socialization?
Hypotheses
Based on the findings presented so far, we cannot assess
whether the observed divergence is a matter of age (stage
of life) or birth period (socialization). In the first case,
cultural preferences change as people age, i.e. when they
move on to the next stage of life. In case birth period or
socialization is crucial, generations hold on to the cul-
tural preferences once acquired.
The life cycle perspective might offer an explanation
for the observed divergence if the relation between stage
of life and cultural consumption has changed through-
out the years (Rapoport and Rapoport, 1978). It is con-
ceivable that, today, the interest in highbrow culture
does not appear until people are prepared to acknowl-
edge that their younger, wilder years are over, or until
their children have left the parental home. Also, the tra-
ditional sequence of stages of life has blurred and signifi-
cant steps (marriage, having a first child) are being
postponed until a later age. If the link between cultural
participation and stage of life was weaker at the time of
our first cross-sectional surveys, or if people tended
to settle down or start a family at an earlier age back
then, this might explain at least part of the observed
generational divergence.
 HIGHBROW CULTURAL PARTICIPATION IN A TASTE DEMOCRACY 519

Data on the situation of 1962 are interesting in this
respect. Some 40 years ago, the cohort aged between
18 and 39 had a larger share of people going to museums,
classical concerts, and plays than the cohorts aged
40 and over (CBS, 1964: 47). People aged between 18
and 39 in those days were born between 1923 and 1944.
Figure 2 showed that those cohorts are still very much
interested in museums and conventional performing
arts today. These are probably the cohorts that have
been raised with the Bildungsideal mentioned above and
remained faithful to it. In that case, the interest in high-
brow is not so much determined by stage of life as it is by
socialization period, which can be inferred from people’s
year of birth. Recent findings from Voorpostel and
Van der Lippe (2001) point in this direction. They find
that young people’s participation in highbrow culture is
largely determined by socialization, while individual
characteristics such as schooling level, other leisure
activities engaged in, and time budget are important
additional determinants only for participation in popular
culture.
Before actually testing the effects of age, or life cycle
stage, versus cohort, we have calculated composition
effects under two assumptions: stable participations
rates per age group and stable participation rates per
birth cohort. The results are shown in Table 2.
Assuming a constant participation rate per age group
over the years, we found that the ageing of the Dutch
population would have yielded a rate of highbrow par-
ticipation in 1999 that was about similar to that of 1979
(1981 versus 1978 visits per 1000 respondents). The
observed participation is, however, 10.3 per cent higher
(2182 visits per 1000 respondents). The right-hand column
in the upper half of Table 2 shows that the observed
portion in the total participation is much lower than the
predicted portion among respondents aged up to 44, while
the respondents aged 45 and older show observed portions
that are much higher than the predicted portions.

Table 2 Composition effects on highbrow cultural participationa

1979 1999 1999 Prediction

Observed portion Predicted portionb Observed portion 1999=100
(%) (%) (%)

Age
15–24 22 16 11 66
25–34 24 22 17 78
35–44 18 23 19 83
45–54 15 18 22 121
55–64 12 12 17 144
65–74 7 8 11 150
75–80 2 2 3 171
All visits per 1000 respondents 1981 1978 2182 110
in sample (=100%) (=100%) (=100%)
Year of birth
1975—1984 15c 11 70
1965—1974 21c 17 82
1955—1964 22 20 19 92
1945—1954 24 18 22 123
1935—1944 18 13 17 128
1925—1934 15 9 11 123
1915—1924 12 3 3 100
Before 1915 9 0 0
All visits per 1000 respondents 1981 2101 2182 104
in sample (=100%) (=100%) (=100%)
a
Percentages indicate the proportion of respondents who participated at least once in any of the six highbrow indicators (museums, art galleries, plays, classical
concerts, ballet, monuments).
b
Accounted for composition effects, assuming a stable participation rate per age/birth cohort since 1979.
c
Assuming the participation rate of the 1965–1974 cohort at its entrance in 1991.
Source: AVO 1983–1999.
520 VAN EIJCK AND KNULST
The prediction based on composition effects of birth
cohorts is more accurate. In the lower panel of Table 2,
we see that the predicted participation rate in 1999
(2101) is much closer to the observed rate of 2182 visits
per 1000 respondents. Assuming continuous participa-
tion rates per cohort thus leads to a better reconstruction
of the observed trend. The differences between observed
and predicted portions per birth cohort are also smaller
than they were for the age groups. However, this does
not yet explain why cohorts born before 1955 diverge
from those born later.
Operationalization
We have tested whether birth cohort or stage of life
affects the interest in highbrow culture using multiple
regression analysis. Data gathered in 1983, 1987, 1991,
1995, and 1999 have been pooled in order to assess to
what extent the decline in the average participation in
highbrow culture can be attributed to behavioural
changes within groups in a similar stage of life or within
groups with similar birth years. Behavioural change
through time has been estimated using interaction terms.
The dependent variable is the sum of attendance fre-
quencies for the six types of highbrow culture: museums,
art galleries, professional plays, classical concerts, ballet,
and monuments. Participation rates have been included
in such a manner as to make sure that the diversity of
highbrow participation weighs just as much as frequency
of visits. For example, four museum visits amount to
score 4, as do four one-time visits to four different per-
formances or exhibitions.
The independent variables are: survey year, stage of
life, birth cohort, schooling level, and participation in
popular culture. The latter is included in order to test
whether popular culture crowds out highbrow culture.
Given the prevalence of omnivorous patterns of cultural
participation, we expect the opposite, i.e. a positive
effect of popular cultural participation on highbrow par-
ticipation. Survey year has been scored between 1 (1983)
and 5 (1999). In order to make a clear distinction
between the overlapping concepts of stage of life and
birth cohort, stage of life has been operationalized as:
living with parents, living single, and living together with
a partner, the latter both with and without children. But
this is not yet specific enough, because people can be
single during early adulthood, but also at old age when
the spouse has deceased. The same holds for living
together with or without children. We therefore refined
the specification of the stage of life by adding one more
division: being under or over 40 years of age. We can
accept this somewhat crude division, also because it only
coincides with a division between birth cohorts once, in
1995. Birth years have been divided into classes spanning
10 years. Six out of the seven birth cohorts we con-
structed have been included in the analysis spanning the
1983–1999 period: the 1915–1924 cohort up to the
cohort born after 1964.4 All variables pertaining to birth
cohort and stage of life have been included as dummies.
Schooling level, our indicator of cultural compe-
tence, has been scored on a five-point scale: primary
school (1); junior vocational training (2); junior general
secondary education (3); senior vocational training or
senior general secondary education or pre-university
education (4); vocational colleges or university (5).
Additional control variables were gender, family
income, whether or not one depended on an allow-
ance, whether or not one was a student, urbanization
of the place of residence, and whether or not one was
religiously affiliated.
Results (Table 3)
The analysis has been carried out twice: once with, and
once without the interaction terms. In the first model
(a), the estimated effects of socialization period
(through birth cohort) are not strong enough to cancel
out the effects of stage of life and vice versa. Relative to
couples aged under 40 living together with children (the
reference category), singles of all ages and older couples
without children attend highbrow culture more often.
Children living with their parents and older couples with
children do so significantly less.
The 1935–1944 birth cohort, which was the reference
category in this analysis, holds the largest proportion of
highbrow participants. Members from other birth
cohorts, except those born in the 1925–1934 period, lag
behind, mostly the members of the 1955–1964 cohort
and those born after 1964. Thus, both birth cohort and
stage of life are highly relevant, with the youngest gener-
ation sticking out most negatively (B = –1.598) and
younger singles most positively (B = 1.400). The largest
main effect is that of schooling level (Beta = 0.345). The
effect of popular culture participation is also signifi-
cantly positive (B = 0.171), suggesting that pop culture
does not crowd out highbrow culture.
If we estimate the effects again in model b, this time
including the interaction terms, the explanatory power
hardly increases. Relative to the reference category of
younger couples with children, children living with their
parents became more culturally active over the years,
thus catching up with this reference category. All other
 HIGHBROW CULTURAL PARTICIPATION IN A TASTE DEMOCRACY 521

Table 3 OLS regression analysis of the participation rates for highbrow culture, including interaction effects of birth cohort
and stage of life, 1983–1999

B Beta B Beta

(Constant) −2.031 −2.198

Control variables
Gender: female 0.532 0.098 ** 0.527 0.097 **
Family income 0.085 0.130 ** 0.085 0.131 **
Receiving an allowance 0.190 0.029 ** 0.126 0.019 **
Being a student 0.518 0.058 ** 0.403 0.045 **
Urbanization place of residence 0.189 0.085 ** 0.192 0.086 **
Religious affiliation −0.144 −0.026 ** −0.148 −0.027 **
Main effects ‘
Schooling level 0.656 0.345 ** 0.659 0.347 **
Popular culture participation index 0.171 0.186 ** 0.172 0.187 **
Birth cohort (ref.: 1935–1944)
Born 1915–1924 −0.207 −0.021 ** 0.245 0.025 **
Born 1925–1934 −0.047 −0.006 0.084 0.010
Born 1945–1954 −0.293 −0.044 ** −0.092 −0.014
Born 1955–1964 −0.924 −0.143 ** −0.625 −0.096 **
Born after 1964 −1.598 −0.247 ** −0.766 −0.118 **
Stage of life (ref.: living together, aged < 40, with children)
Living with parents, aged < 40 −0.439 −0.058 ** −0.715 −0.094 **
Single, aged < 40 1.400 0.125 ** 1.604 0.143 **
Living together, aged < 40, no children 0.059 0.007 −0.093 −0.011
Living together, aged > 40, with children −0.358 −0.051 ** −0.472 −0.067 **
Single, aged > 40 1.199 0.115 ** 1.098 0.105 **
Living together, aged > 40, no children 0.457 0.074 ** 0.262 0.042 **
Year of measurement 1983–1999 −0.047 −0.025 ** 0.079 0.041 **
Interaction effects
Year * living with parents, aged < 40 0.099 *
Year * single, aged < 40 −0.097 *
Year * living together, aged < 40, no children 0.073
Year * living together, aged > 40, with children 0.067
Year * single, aged > 40 0.001
Year * living together, aged > 40, no children 0.034
Year * born 1915–1924 −0.198 **
Year * born 1925–1934 −0.034
Year * born 1945–1954 −0.122 **
Year * born 1955–1964 −0.185 **
Year * born after 1964 −0.366 **
Adjusted R Square (%) 26.6 26.9
*
P ≤ 0.05; **P ≤ 0.01.
Source: AVO 1983–1999.

significant interaction effects are negative. Relative to
the reference category, the cultural participation of sin-
gles aged under 40 has declined significantly between
1983 and 1999. This means that differences between
respondents in different life stages remained essentially
the same, with the exception of in-living children and
younger singles.
The other significant changes concern the birth
cohorts. Compared to the 1935–1944 reference cohort,
highbrow cultural participation declined between 1983
and 1999 for birth cohorts 1915–1924, 1945–1954,
1955–1964 and those born after 1964. For the 1915–1924
cohort, aged between 75 and 84 in 1999, this decline is
probably due to increasing impediments because of old
age. For the post-1945 cohorts it is likely to reflect a
dwindling interest within cohorts across their life span.
Since this decrease in participation is largest for the
younger cohorts, we might argue that these cohorts leave
522 VAN EIJCK AND KNULST
the cultural arena when they get older. As cultural par-
ticipation is thought to be enhanced by cultural capital
and in turn leads to the accumulation of cultural capital,
it seems that the younger cohorts do not develop their
cultural capital during their life and thereby show a
declining participation rate as they mature. This interac-
tion effect increases for each subsequent cohort born
after the Second World War. In this sense, we do believe
that socialization is important even though the cohort
effects are not stable across the years.
The assumption that differential socialization – as
reflected in birth cohort effects – affects differences in
highbrow interest as well as the observed generational
divergence, is not refuted by our findings. However,
the cohort differences (model a) or the decline over
time observed for the younger cohorts, do not cancel
out the effects of stage of life. In addition to the dis-
proportionate decline among the cohorts born after
1945, there was a significant decrease among singles
aged up to 40.
Social Mobility
Hypotheses
Is it true that upward social mobility in itself has nega-
tive consequences for people’s individual interest in
highbrow culture? Peterson and Kern (1996) argue that
social mobility and migration caused a large-scale min-
gling of tastes that were initially linked to certain classes
or regions, leading to the replacement of an exclusively
highbrow cultural repertoire by an omnivorous taste
pattern among the upper middle classes.
A similar assumption has been described in some
detail in an earlier Dutch study into social mobility. De
Jager (1967), who, like Peterson, studied musical prefer-
ences, believed that the interest in classical music is
firmly embedded through a double socialization process:
through the parents and through education. Schooling’s
so-called secondary socialization would be most benefi-
cial if it built upon the primary socialization in the fam-
ily, which would be more fruitful if the family
environment better matched the school climate. Accord-
ing to De Jager, social climbers, or people with higher
schooling levels than their parents, are not properly
socialized for the status they have attained and will
therefore have to put extra effort into their secondary
socialization. Anticipatory socialization was the term
coined for the efforts of social climbers to familiarize
themselves with the tastes of the social strata they
intended to join. Whether social climbers are prepared
to take such social precautionary measures was thought
to depend on the homogeneity of the taste pattern that
they would find at their new destination (Groenman,
1961; see also Ultee and De Graaf, 1991). If social mobil-
ity is massive, the examples and standards set by the
established weaken, which diminishes the social pressure
to adapt. As a result, taste and consumption patterns of
the social climbers gain the upper hand. Upward mobil-
ity, especially educational mobility, was an important
characteristic of the twentieth century. Could this have
interrupted the continuity of the transmission of an
interest in highbrow culture among the higher classes?
Van Eijck (1999) demonstrated that, indeed, social
climbers entering the higher classes participated less in
traditional highbrow culture than people who had been
socialized in those classes from childhood on. These
differences were largely due to differences in socio-
economic family background. The independent effect of
social climbing or declining (degree and direction of the
schooling difference between respondents and parents)
added little to the explanation of the taste differences
within the higher classes.
Social Mobility by Schooling Level
and Birth Cohort
Table 4 shows the difference between (average) parents’
and respondents’ schooling levels for people who finished
intermediate and higher education from the 1935–1944
cohort onwards.
For both the intermediate and higher educated, we
see a sharp rise in schooling level relative to the parents,
albeit more so for the older cohorts, where low parental
schooling levels left plenty of opportunity for upward
mobility, than for the younger ones, whose parents had
already experienced some degree of upward mobility
themselves. From the respondents with vocational
colleges or an academic degree and born between 1935
and 1944, no less than 86 per cent have higher schooling
levels than their parents; 69 per cent have climbed at
least two levels on the schooling scale. For the youngest
cohort (people born after 1974), 66 per cent have
climbed, and 38 per cent did so with at least two school-
ing levels.
These numbers make it very implausible that social
mobility has harmed the interest in highbrow culture, as
the cohort with the highest average mobility rate is also
the group with the greatest interest in highbrow culture.
We will therefore not carry out a more explicit test of
this hypothesis and conclude that this explanation does
not hold.
 HIGHBROW CULTURAL PARTICIPATION IN A TASTE DEMOCRACY 523

Table 4 Educational mobility of respondents with at least senior general secondary education, born after 1934; 1995 and
1999 samples taken together. Figures in percentages

Downward or stable Upwardly mobile Total

One level up Two and more levels up

Senior vocational training to

pre-university education
1935–1944 18 17 65 100
1945–1954 17 22 61 100
1955–1964 22 25 53 100
1965–1974 30 30 40 100
After 1974 44 29 27 100
Vocational colleges and university
1935–1944 14 17 69 100
1945–1954 14 21 66 100
1955–1964 17 24 59 100
1965–1974 23 28 48 100
After 1974 34 28 38 100
Source: AVO 1995–1999.

Impact of a Permissive
Socialization Climate
Hypothesis
A fourth potential explanation for the generational
divergence in highbrow participation considers chang-
ing circumstances regarding the socialization climate.
We will focus on changes in secondary socialization
through education, without implying that the impact of
what happens at school is paramount. What is being
taught, and how, is always subject to ideological changes
in the rest of society (and vice versa). Peterson and Kern
(1996) argue that omnivorous taste patterns indicate
that tolerance and openness for a diversity of cultural
products are highly valued. Today, people who argue in
favour of the superiority of white elite culture are seen as
discriminating against other cultures. During the last
quarter of the twentieth century, socializing agents such
as schools, newspapers, or broadcast companies have
renounced this belief in the supremacy of Western elite
culture. They no longer step into the breach for the ini-
tial Bildungsideal, because an exclusive preference for
traditional highbrow culture no longer represents the
current ideal. We can therefore ask the question to what
extent the waning interest in highbrow culture among
the younger generations can be attributed to an attitude
of cultural relativism within the socializing institutions
during their formative life stage. We assume that those
who were enrolled in intermediate and higher education
from the late 1960s onwards, were no longer socialized
with a firm belief in the supremacy of Western elite cul-
ture, and therefore felt little inclination to participate in
this area.
A Changing Educational Regime
In order to test this hypothesis, we would need specific
information on the content of the curriculum and the
teacher’s attitude towards cultural subjects (see Ver-
boord and Van Rees 2003). Unfortunately, such infor-
mation is not available to us, so we will have to use a
proxy. Although we assume that the socialization cli-
mate changed gradually, the enactment of the Mam-
moth Law in Dutch secondary education in 1968 was an
important first step in this respect. This law reinforced
the integration of the Dutch educational system, making
it easier to move from one type of education to another,
in an attempt to equalize educational opportunities for
pupils from different socio-economic backgrounds. At
the same time, the change in the cultural-pedagogic
regime in higher education became noticeable.5 One
example is the shift towards a more student-centred
approach in literature classes (Verboord 2003). The
Mammoth Law led to a socio-economically more heter-
ogeneous influx in higher and academic education;
although the effects of parents’ schooling levels and
pupils’ scholastic achievement remained virtually
unchanged, the effect of father’s occupational status
diminished (Bakker and Cremers, 1994). We assume
that all cohorts that pursued intermediate and higher
education since 1968 have been subject to this new
524 VAN EIJCK AND KNULST
regime. Therefore, we consider birth year 1955 as a turn-
ing point in this respect.
In Figure 3, we have blown up the process of cultural
divergence by specifying cohorts with a width of only
two years in order to take a closer look at the changes
that took place.6
The graph shows that the reversal in the participation
trend between 1983–1999 took place gradually between the
1950–1951, 1952–1953 and 1954–1955 cohorts, but that
the decline starts with the 1954–1955 cohort. For each sub-
sequent cohort, the interest in highbrow culture declined
between 1983 and 1999. This confirms our expectation that
birth years 1954 and 1955 represent a significant turning
point in the observed process of divergence.
In order to estimate the effects of the period in which
one was educated on highbrow participation, we have
split up the impact of schooling levels according to
whether respondents were born before or after 1954 for
schooling levels ranging from junior general secondary
education to (post-) academic. These new specifications
have been included in the regression model as dummies
(the reference category is born before 1955 and having a
schooling level ranging from senior vocational training
to pre-university education), replacing the single, ordi-
nal schooling variable that was used in Table 3. In the
second model (b), interaction terms of these variables
and survey year have been included. A significant nega-
tive interaction effect for the cohorts born after 1954
indicates that their highbrow participation has declined
over the years and thus supports the hypothesis that the
4,0
3,5
3,0
2,5
2,0
1,5
1,0
0,5
0,0
46-47 48-49 50-51 52-53 54-55
Figure 3 Number of highbrow cultural visits in 1983 and 1999 by year of birth for subsample of respondents with at least
intermediate schooling levels and born between 1946 and 1965
changing socialization climate since the late 1960s has
led to a declining interest in highbrow culture. Note that
we argue that this decline should not only take place
between cohorts, but also within cohorts, the latter pro-
cess moving at a faster rate as the cohort is younger. This
hypothesis would gain an even stronger foothold if the
new interaction terms would explain the initial interac-
tions of birth cohort and survey year, making these
effects disappear. Apart from that, the model is similar
to the one tested in Table 3, that is including the vari-
ables pertaining to birth cohort and stage of life. Again,
we analysed the data ranging from 1983 to 1999. For edu-
cational level, we only looked at interactions for the
highest schooling levels, as our hypothesis is only about
the diminishing impact of higher education after 1954.
Therefore, the lower educated are subsumed under the
reference category as well.7
Results (Table 5)
Although the relation between schooling level and high-
brow cultural participation remains strong, the period in
which respondents were enrolled in higher education
makes a substantial difference. Within each schooling
level, highbrow participation is higher for those who
were enrolled in secondary education before the late
1960s. For those with higher general secondary education
up to pre-university education, the difference is 0.973 on
the scale for highbrow participation, while for respondents
with at least vocational colleges it is 1.048 (1.446 – 0.398).
1983 1999
56-57 58-59 60-61 62-63 64-65
 HIGHBROW CULTURAL PARTICIPATION IN A TASTE DEMOCRACY 525

Table 5 OLS regression analysis of participation rates for highbrow culture, including effects of stage of life, birth cohort,
and period during which respondents were enrolled in schooling, 1983–1999

B Beta B Beta

(Constant) 0.385 0.210

Control variables
Gender: female 0.575 0.106 ** 0.571 0.105 **
Family income 0.081 0.124 ** 0.083 0.126 **
Receiving an allowance 0.159 0.024 ** 0.098 0.015 **
Being a student 0.505 0.056 ** 0.343 0.038 **
Urbanization place of residence 0.170 0.076 ** 0.172 0.077 **
Religious affiliation −0.109 −0.019 ** −0.114 −0.020 **
Main effects
Birth cohort (ref.: born 1935–1944)
Born 1915–1924 −0.243 −0.025 ** 0.173 0.018 *
Born 1925–1934 −0.065 −0.008 0.046 0.005
Born 1945–1954 −0.310 −0.046 ** −0.179 −0.027 *
Born 1955–1964 −0.287 −0.044 ** −0.253 −0.039 *
Born after 1964 −0.940 −0.145 ** −0.342 −0.053 **
Stage of life (ref.: living together, aged > 40, with children)
Living with parents, aged < 40 −0.332 −0.044 ** −0.441 −0.058 **
Single, aged < 40 1.378 0.123 ** 1.630 0.146 **
Living together, aged < 40, no children 0.119 0.014 * 0.117 0.014
Living together, aged < 40, with children −0.329 −0.046 ** −0.299 −0.042 **
Single, aged > 40 1.158 0.111 ** 1.048 0.100 **
Living together, aged > 40, no children 0.467 0.075 ** 0.335 0.054 **
Popular culture participation index 0.177 0.191 ** 0.178 0.192 **
Year of birth and educational level (ref.: born before 1955,
higher secondary education)
Schooling level: primary and junior vocational training −1.574 −0.285 ** −1.568 −0.284 **
Born after 1954: junior general secondary education −1.452 −0.117 ** −1.454 −0.118 **
Born before 1955: junior general secondary education −0.550 −0.051 ** −0.547 −0.051 **
Born after 1954: higher secondary education −0.973 −0.136 ** −0.858 −0.120 **
Born after 1954: vocational colleges, university 0.398 0.045 ** 0.904 0.102 **
Born before 1955: vocational colleges, university 1.446 0.152 ** 1.289 0.135 **
Year of measurement 1983–1999 −0.048 −0.025 ** 0.087 0.045 **
Interaction effects
Year * living with parents, aged < 40 0.026
Year * single, aged < 40 −0.121 **
Year * born 1915–1924 −0.185 **
Year * born 1925–1934 −0.027
Year * born 1945–1954 −0.106 **
Year * born 1955–1964 −0.086 **
Year * born after 1964 −0.263 **
Year * born after 1954: higher secondary education −0.042
Year * born after 1954: vocational colleges, university −0.187 **
Year * born before 1954: vocational colleges, university 0.081 **
Adjusted R Square (%) 28.0 28.3
*P ≤ 0.05; **P ≤ 0.01.
Source: AVO 1983–1999.

The additional specification of schooling period increases 1955–1964 and born after 1964 diminish substantially,
the explanatory power of the model by 1.4 per cent but they remain significant.
(cf. Table 3). The negative effects for the cohorts born
526 VAN EIJCK AND KNULST
In model b, where the interaction effects are included,
the main effects of the schooling variables are estimated
for the 1983 situation. Compared to those numbers, the
participation rate of people with at least vocational
colleges and born after 1954 decreased by 0.187 per sur-
vey year (i.e. every four years) up to 1999, whereas the
rates for those born before 1955 increased by 0.081 per
survey year. The overall declines (interaction effects) for
the cohorts born after 1954 have diminished substan-
tially compared to Table 3, although they are still signifi-
cant. Thus, the declining participation rate among the
younger cohorts can be partly attributed to the changing
behaviour of the higher educated. The idea that the period
during which one pursued secondary education affects the
interest in highbrow culture is corroborated for the
higher educated. Assuming that it is therefore warranted
to relate the interest in highbrow culture to socialization
period, it seems that differences in socialization among
the higher educated are to a substantial extent responsi-
ble for the observed shifts in participation rates.
It must be noted that we cannot entirely rule out
potential changes in the impact of family background or
declining returns of education. Given the vast influx of
students into higher education, credential inflation has
occurred, which has further increased the need to pur-
sue higher education for large groups of students. As a
result, the group of higher educated has become more
and more heterogeneous with regard to socio-economic
background. Because the relation between cultural par-
ticipation and schooling level is partly spurious due to
the fact that both characteristics are affected by family
background (Van Eijck, 1996), and because this spuri-
ousness has probably declined as a consequence of the
increasing social mobility of the past decades, it is only
to be expected that the measured effect of schooling on
cultural participation has diminished.8
Conclusions and Discussion
We set out to explain an observed divergence in cultural
consumption. Between 1979 and 1999, the interest in
highbrow culture increased among the older generations,
while it declined among the younger. We have tested
four potential explanations for this generational diver-
gence. Firstly, this divergence might be attributable to
the increasing proportion of cultural omnivores among
the younger, higher educated segments of the Dutch
population. The term omnivore, referring to cultural
consumers who enjoy both highbrow and popular
culture, is useful to the extent that it makes clear that
highbrow participants do not generally tend to shun
popular culture. The fact that this omnivore concept has
been used only since the 1990s, does not imply, however,
that the phenomenon itself is equally new, as indications
from the 1950s and 1960s make clear. Our analyses dem-
onstrated that a potential increase in the number of
(young) highly educated omnivores cannot explain the
observed cultural divergence. Contrary to what Peterson
and Kern (1996) found for music between 1982 and
1992 in the USA, the proportion of cultural omnivores
did not increase in the Netherlands. A possible explana-
tion for this difference with earlier findings may be that
we have analysed actual cultural behaviour rather than
stated preferences. We found that the omnivorous
cultural consumption pattern was more prevalent
among highly educated older generations than among
the highly educated younger people. The proportion
of omnivores among the higher educated younger
segments of the population even declined because the
number of young people with little or no highbrow
culture in their repertoires increased. The omnivore thus
seems to be losing terrain to the group that largely sticks
to lowbrow, or popular, culture. For an explanation of
the observed divergence, the concept of the cultural
omnivore is not very helpful. If the worst-case scenario
of highbrow lovers comes true, the cultural omnivore is
a temporary phenomenon halfway a process from
a reverence for elite culture among the upper classes to
a situation where everybody is happy with popular
culture.
Secondly, we tested whether the increasing gap
between the generations is due to differences in the
degree to which subsequent cohorts engage in highbrow
culture during the different stages of their lives. This
explanation was not valid either. There were only two
exceptions: singles aged under 40 participated signifi-
cantly less in 1999 than in 1983, while people still living
with their parents did so more often than the reference
group. However, this does not sufficiently explain the
behavioural divergence between birth cohorts.
A third explanation for the diminishing interest in
highbrow culture among the younger generations might
have been the strong upward social mobility of the last
decades. This explanation was not tenable either. Social
mobility was much more marked among the cohorts
who were seriously interested in highbrow culture than
among the younger cohorts whose interest is declining
rapidly. It is conceivable, however, that the upwardly
mobile generation did not attach much importance to
imparting an interest in – let alone reverence for – highbrow
culture when raising their children (De Haan and
 HIGHBROW CULTURAL PARTICIPATION IN A TASTE DEMOCRACY
Knulst, 2000). Nevertheless, social mobility cannot be
held directly responsible for the decline in highbrow
participation among younger generations.
If the three suspects mentioned above (omnivorous-
ness, changing relations between cultural behaviour and
subsequent stages of life, and social mobility) cannot
explain the observed generational divergence, we are
forced to turn towards an explanation that rests on broad
socialization differences between generations. Highbrow
culture has always been subject to the competition of
other, less legitimate, types of culture. There is little rea-
son to believe that this competition, either in the home or
outdoors, has suddenly intensified at the end of the twen-
tieth century. Therefore, changes in the supply of culture
cannot account for our observations either. On the con-
trary: we found positive effects of popular culture partici-
pation on highbrow activities. That is why we analysed
differences between subsequent birth cohorts, focusing
on the difference between people born before and after
1955. It was argued that people who had been enrolled in
intermediate and higher education in or after the late
1960s were no longer socialized with a firm belief in the
supremacy of Western elite culture. This expectation was
confirmed for those born after 1955 who attained higher
education. Although the positive effect of schooling level
on cultural participation remains, it makes a difference
when people were enrolled. The effect of higher educa-
tion has seriously diminished for the cohorts born after
1954. If no transmission of respect for traditional high-
brow culture takes place, people apparently lose the incli-
nation to participate.
Clearly, the matter needs further study. One question
that remains is whether the circumstances under which
the subsequent cohorts were socialized were as homoge-
neous as we implicitly assumed. Also, the effects of
socialization conditions and credential inflation need to
be better separated. Another interesting follow-up might
be to distinguish between people’s stated preferences
and their actual consumption. Meanwhile, it is doubtful
whether a preference for highbrow culture renders much
prestige today. Since such a taste no longer seems to ade-
quately represent academic prestige, people might be
less inclined to present themselves as such. There is, in
other words, no more need for snobbism.
Notes
1. We did not observe this decline among people aged 16
or under, because they are still enrolled in compulsory
education and commended to parental care.
527
2. These respondents are divided across the surveys as
follows: 11,993 (1983); 13,291 (1987); 10,916
(1991); 11,716 (1995); 11,221 (1999).
3. Going out, attending performing arts, and reading
had already declined earlier, during the rise of TV in
the 1960s (Knulst, 1989), but going out and per-
forming arts visits managed to recuperate from this
temporary retroversion.
4. In order to get a reasonable number of representa-
tives of the youngest generations in 1984 as well,
defining one cohort as ‘born after 1964’ was the best
we could do. The cohorts born before 1915, who
were hardly represented in the 1999 sample, have
been set aside.
5. For many academic disciplines, having a gymnasium
diploma (and thus knowledge of classical languages
and cultures) was no longer a requirement.
6. Due to the large sample sizes of AVO, even if we
limit the analysis to respondents with intermediate
and higher education, each two-year cohort in 1983
and 1999 consists of about 200 respondents.
7. Although changes in the cultural content of higher
secondary education were discussed, the schooling
variable pertains to highest schooling level attained
or current enrolment. Those who leave school after
completing this level can be seen as having left
school early, making up a small and a-typical group.
Those who are young and still enrolled are very
much in the process of being culturally socialized
through school and thus provide an unsatisfactory
group for testing the impact of higher secondary
schooling as well.
8. Of course this is only true if no extensive controls
for family background are added. Wolbers (1998)
shows that the overestimation of the schooling
effects on occupational status declines due to the
decreasing impact of the family of origin on both
characteristics.
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Analysis of the Impact of Family Background on Edu-
cation, Occupation, and Consumption. Tilburg: TUP.
Van Eijck, K. (1999). Socialization, Education, and Life-
style: How Social Mobility Increases the Cultural
Heterogeneity of Status Groups. Poetics, 26, 309–328.
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Authors’ Addresses
Koen van Eijck (corresponding author), Department of
Socio-Cultural Studies, Tilburg University, PO Box
90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands. Tel.: +31
13 466 3386; Fax: +31 13 4663002; E-mail
c.j.m.veijck@uvt.nl
Wim Knulst, Department of Socio-Cultural Studies,
Tilburg University, PO Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg,
The Netherlands. Tel.: +31 13 466 2222; Fax: +31 13
466 3002; E-mail w.p.knulst@uvt.nl
Manuscript received: March 2003