ALinob, J, JPEROY oneh U. WETTSTEN Hannes from Ve qlea RY oxpecel agocol UP. 1584 3 Time and Thisness Robert Merrihew Adams! have argued elsewhere that there ate facts, aad pomibilitics, that are not purely qualitative? Ta a second paper, however, I have argued that all pestis are purely qualitative excopt insofar as they invlve individuals that actuslly ext. In partculag, Ihave argued that there steno thiseses of nonatual individuals (where the thisness of xs the property of being 2, orof being identical with x), and that there are to singular propositions about nonactua individuals (where a singular Dropostion about an individual za preposition tha involves or refers tox dcetly, perhaps by having zor the thse of ae constituent, and not merely by way of 's qualitative properties or relations to other indvidvals)?1 am also inclined to Believe that there are not yet any {hisneses of individuals that wil exist but do not yet, nor any singular propositions about future inividual—and, hence, that all pomsiilities ae purely qualitaive except insofar at they involve individuals that TESS oe me op edo ern o the hh of Ded HUM. Adam, Printive Thos and Prinive Let." The Jour! of Pi ap 7 (1072) Se SRR am, Aca ad Ten,” Sten 5 (1061) 9-42< 24 Robert Meribew Adams ately do exit of have exited (counting mele individual if tS reuy casting). The thes about Un ration of ime to hin Terabe athe vent pape im with Ue contains of my previous peel be premppored 1. Some Arguments for the Thesis A sina view hs be mney A Po. “Dato Cas ee inn cle dill eta ine tg soe But bef in ine te po ota tl wes eee ‘SSR inde te sttings-nt of hi nia” Wh they Jaki ar he nity tat the should be a india brn tr nh moa hve he gata rope tht Cas see We ny begin y comings gmc Pir fe for appee there some pron ving before the existence of Carta or Aniony mo pope that cere wll begin to bee pewon who wll be called “Casa” who willbe m= ered ce and nother pevon who lb alle *Anton. Sito wi daly wit Chop, ete "And then wuppore tie Frophet to any eNo, Tm not roe thai wif be ke at shape tthe secod ofthe people mentioned aie who bel Cao an il marr ad the mt no wil be bo Inte and alld “Aatony’ ee” This, Fanny wool te sprint a er Coca and Auton had actualy come ino bing and eed ‘SiTragered a prophesied, woud be ule esc oak “re thes, I wenden ely the wo people he mean and if oobi ne ena ill tan, “loiter of them — Sarma’ Ret prophecy, of his soggeted alleralive that te now comet pas" hn tat itu eveyone wil lh intitve appa of Pir ‘chittte qysens te nar tte feof the ag ion et ob npc, ers eaplanios of why he questions ae absurd, tbe yi that he rp enna have ade te pedis abo ier te ig Ghihe ston invidas caus he ean ave peeled te ha TAR Pir, Tae ial” Review of Meta ‘Time and Thisnese 25 Caesar would be celled *Cacsat™ and be murdered or that Antony would be called “Caesar” and be murdered. le cannot have predicted either of ‘hose things because to predict them would have been to eset certain ‘singulae propositions about Cacaat and. Antouy, and those propositions didnot yet exist and, therefore, were not available to be woeried by him a te Kno the suppowed prophecy. Here we ea ditingaih wo (1) The prophet could not yet assert any singular proposition about Caesar or Antony. (2) No singular proposition about Cacsr or Antony existed yt Itis (1) that provides an explanation ofthe absurdity f the question ‘mentioned by Prior and that fact wll oun a evidence for (1), untae ‘eter explanation canbe found. [think that Prior's imple aegument is that (1) i explained in turn by (2), and, therfore, the example is ‘evidence for (2) aswell as (1). ‘This is ot a very powerfl argument for (2). Ifthe prophet was ‘unable to aset any sngulaspropenitons about Caesar or Antony, the nonexistence of such propositions would surly not be the only plasble ‘explanation ofthe fact. Ther already were sich propositions, it might be aid, but the prophet was eut of fom them because no causal chain ‘could have run fom the then fatre Individuals to his thought and tleranon at that ati time; Pro's argument has no fore agin his hypothe = - Other ists could be raised about the atgument. 16 (1) trae? Or, ‘more generally are singular propositions about fucure individuals eee alle tous to be aserted, believed, or known now?” Dow (2) provide an explanation of (1)? Or, conversely, i we can now assert or aleve Singule propositions about future indviduns, dows it follow Ut there ropesition already exist? These questions are of interest to hee own Fight, and we will urn to them in section IV, but out fst onder a bsines is to look at another, and I think better, argument for the the. si that thinesses of fature individuals, and singular propositions ‘hen, do ot yet ext Tras born in 1987. Among the many mtaphysically possible con- ‘inuatons ofthe actual story ef the word up unis, 1985, there are surely some in which T would never have existed. It flauile to come lade that I ould have led o exist even given everything that ested in 1935, or tht had existed before thes, or tht exis tile = and conversely, that all ofthese things could have existed even i had bout26 Robert Metibow Adame ever exited. But at [have argued, neither my thiaess nor any [fula: proposition about me exists in any metaphysically posible work i ehlch T never exe; they are not among the things that eould have trite even iI had never existed, Fe follows tht they are not among he things that existed in 1095, or before, ofthat exist timelesly. My ‘hisneas and singulae propositions aboat me, cannot have preexstd me bch itthey had it would have been poarbe for them to have existed ‘even iT had never existed, and that i not possible T ind this argument persunsive, but I do not want to exaggerate its force, I employs the principe, (9). For any beings «and y and time tf» existed before ¢ oF ‘vita timelenly, and y exists contngently and comes ito Cistene af en i would be metephysiclly possible for 2 to have existed even ify had never existed “This principle ia plausible, Tt natural to think, for example, that its ‘quite open and dered what peopl will come into existence in the {ture even given everything that har existed upto now, and evrything that exits imeleay; but thie principle isnot uncontroversial, nd there fe points al which me may want to rae questions about it Tn 1036, there existed millon of people who were bor before 1 was, but that woul not have Been true iFT had never existed, It may there form, be objected against (3) that in 1905, there existed something that ‘ould ot logically, have exist fed tot later come into existence— famely person thst was born before Twas. The correct reply to this hjetion i that person that was born before I wae isnot, in the rl Chant sens, something that could nt have existed iT never did, Such f peteon (Montgomery Purth, for example) could perfectly well have fxbsted without my coming along sferward—although in that case, of Te could not have ad the propery of being bora before Iwas ‘What is tru inthe objection is thatthe existential generalization "There vated in 1826 peron that was Born before | was is in fact true but that it could not hve been (rue (indeed, could not even have existed) itT had never exited. Bot principle (8) i not concerned with auch gem traliatons, Iti concerned, rather, with posites de re about the ‘Rstence of beings that instantiate such generalizations in some pombe trelde and notin others. “An inventive objoter will not be topped by thi reply. I may be suggested for example, that Parth's lining before Adame was born ie Something thot did ist in 1995 bat that could not have existed iT ‘Time and Thisness 27 ser ha. Some may debt, ofc, hte hi i emting that i rope aid to “eis” at all. Ba her than ug mo ee ‘boat the eitrin fr sdiing perf en Ke at “tI lw ht Pay 9 en sh hat coneion dors tot andre prince), Fuss vce 3805 cold have exited even hadnt cone dongle. And pe For ing on 105) Wr ater wating tore ee has Fh living 142, carci nem a neon ht ia Sb ht it cul ve ned 1 Fos ving 1985) ble ss er ang mo tet ana eed view iy cntated om Put ving in 198 andy ia 2H, ad fo sy that il tex red A ve aie ees ef the tine a wich teaaemporl late exist about wich Ca Saver ty ea in ve mentioned incase a (3) teat tines nd ing: popetions might be cane! a alto set a many Fophe hn that shat jee nent rte thes {ny ime ay be sotonrl fo spl apne sth sa) tie atin tet yo to ay non ina it ome orn nv ang dpe meapigial forks exinene on smebing that sears a Ste in ht theo a an ht i oop eared ‘nene Sopa you recoding ne oar lunar eas aust tnt youre den yr ue ‘in which it is no longer true that you may never exist. Ifyou agree with te about the metaphia dependenct othe on inidl ou “ia ne ha th ny fot en ay Sve ‘Sin in ses in hich tw no ng re our te ay beret et Woeld fot be of esl a tines sa ‘hh i fst ue an te fe at tay ee es = hi depend no oon the mao ay The ein hich our fare ies and ct knees nay nvr ext 9 fot tte ae poste ween wich hyo ct. Tort il oe {in thee re pote weer ich you sd our hs dost cst shoe fe no il gn he at eset yo td your tsar my never exit Thowe he ae meat sony el {oteject (By and lo old tat sneces and singular ropettons eat Sty may think tht th ats fy eve sat be toying pin or ago fnew, yori cna he nes ny meer x,t You know ta ou a ou eSyn il 28 Robert Meritew Adams exist 1 Usink, however, Ut thete i more to it—that when we aay that {your future children and Ubi Usneses may never exe, we (ora 289 ‘ate 1) meaa that itis not merely unknown, but metaphyscally open ‘and unsettled, whether they wil exis. The merely epistemie diference ‘would Kady keep from thing of thianomes ax exiting elesly, but something that is fist open and later setled, metaphysical, does not seem timeless, I emerge quite cleaely here that my poston, ike Pri’, reat on| 2 intuition that the fature, or an importa pat ofits metaphysialy fopen in a way that the present and the past are not” This is e widely shared, but controversial, intuition, Principle (3) ean be sen axa pa. tial speciation of the way in which the fare isto be thought of a rmetaphysialy open, I suspect, myself that iis too strong a species tion. Maybe there ar stronger bond of metaphysical necessity between lier and later things thaa it allows, Pethaps deed, there mut be, iTcausl determination of later event by eacir events i to be under. ‘ood. The thers am defending, however, none that appeals mainly to indeterinisis, who think that many events, presumably including the coming into exntence of most persons are not causally determined by farlier events, For auch events we wan to exchde the 20%t of bonds of ‘metaphysial necessity that (3) exlades. And to individuals coming into boeing in such event, the argument based on (3), tht thie thinesss lo not exist unt they do, may be seen as applying ‘Cruaienienyeae air Stee anes se nr Ey pisbenns tecemeervenaaes See tease eter rer Dirt ts Siete ie Dearie eee SO i orem Ate racy sans Panini Seaienere rapes meta Seralsitn, faleramateoracaeag a ey) escrito acetate Reese ee iene Rect anpieivitnane Geteaecter ne ‘Time and Thien 20 II. Thisnesses of Past Individuals “The question naturally aries, whether the same things 1 am saying bout future things that do not Yet exist should ot alee be eid sbout past things that no longer exist. Think not; Chere ina better cae for thisneses of past thas of future individual ‘Peshape an objector wil fer me the mirror image ofthe argument tha find persuasive againet thisnens of ftte individuals, Any exarr ple we choos of an individual that exists no longer may be abject. to ‘doubte—that itis really immortal, or that it was not rally a individ ‘al choowe an example that I believe was an individual thot no longer. ‘xsi: the frst pain that Ifelton the one oceasion when Iwas sung by ‘a wasp. Let 1 be that pain (or aything gou believe was an individual that no longer exists). Now the cbjector will say, “Surely everything {hat now exists ould stil hae existed—numericaly, and not Just qval {atively the aame—even if the history ofthe world before now had been very diferent—in particular, even i+ had never existed. So ifthe thie. ‘ea of is among the thing that exist ow, it could have exised even if ‘had never existed. Since you deny the late, you sould alo deny the former." This argument dos not persuade me, because Ido not believe ‘thatthe same things could, logically and metaphysialy, have existed ‘ow no matter what had existed earlier. Thee isa temporal tyewetry in our modal intuitions here. Iti very plausible to ay thatthe ox tence and identity of anything that existe now cannot depend logically ‘or metaphyscally on anything oceurring Ite, but rch lee plaible tosay that it cannot depend on what occured estller. Indeed, theses ‘making the ideality of individuals depend logically or metaphysially fn vatious facts about their origins or antecedents have great intuitive ‘appeal to many of ws. Hence, I have no strong objection to saying that the thisnes of exists now without existing now, but thet if had not fxntd earlier, that would have been impossible ‘Whatever tay be the case regarding ture individuals, it ser that thisneses of paat individuals, and more particularly singular propos tions about them, ee till acailable to ue an object of propositional ‘titudes. We think that we can entertain, assert, and belive singular propositions about individuals that no longer exit. ‘The possibility of tur aserting and believing singular propositions about George Wash ington and Abraham Lincoln, for example snot thought to depend in Any way oa the Leah of immortality —Tpspe aloo ve foilsre 0, Robert Meniew Adams 1s tempting to argue from the prevent avalability of thisnesses of past individuals and singular propeltions about them to their preset Cistence, If we can eles azert, and believe singular propositions ‘bout individuals that no longer exist, must not these propositions ex int? But T think we must be ee cautious about this gument from present svilbiliy to preset existence ax we wete about Prior's im Plicitinference from prewent anavallbiity to present nonexistence, For {here certainly ae relations that can obtain between things that exist for occu only ot ferent tines, For example, «brush ie in Septem Ter tay conse ad slide the following January. Perhaps entertaining, believing are rlatona that ean obtain between thoughts ce occuring a onetime and prepositions that exist only at lies time. "Thete sa dificuly inthis hypothesis of continued availability with cout continued existence, however. Suppose I am sitting inthe dentist’ ‘Ghai, isa partiulor pain I fl fve inate go, and fsa particular pain am feling now. Sutely Lean entertain, and indeed believe, the Singuse proposition about ¢ and ?, tht i isiore intense than But frien does this proposition exist? If singular propositions ean exis after Individuals they aze about have ceased to exit, then tht proposition Can exis as oon a #” begins to exist, although i no longer exit then, But if singuler propositions about an individual exist only when that individual ext, the proposition that i is more intense than # cannot stat any ime since Chere no tae at which both # and i exis “Tobe sue, this dificaly is analogous to difficulties we eannot escape in any event ia bru fie in September causes a mad sie in January, ‘then docs the ena relation between them exist? If relation cannot Tent t's tine when one of the terme it relates doce not exist then ‘hi causal elation cannot exist at any time. Pechape I is a mistake to think of ranstemporal relations ax existing a ate at all; perhaps they do not need tine to exist at. On the other hand, they seem poor candidates for timeless, since they depend for thet existence En things that occur only at certain Gime, aud they mast therefore wait inl tows tte to be arured ofexistone, ae have pat it® Maybe they txist~whce nthe whole, but not whole in the part—in an extended ‘evi of time, om this view, the eataal relation between the Brosh fre Sale at eames ince) {i pencil cen or ‘Time and Thisnese 31 gd th md ide wld ex inthe pid tom Septet assy, no at any inant of om anyday drag the pero, Sierly es could may tht singular propositions about viduals that eta oly dint times exis ia an extended period, but ott ny ane ‘hin the period. It would be simply however, to js allow that Ainglar propositions continue Lo est fer ndiviuals they ae shout fave ceed lo ene ‘The one conpeling reason or denying that ties of pat ind viduals and gular propositions about them, sll exat would be the Inlet that the tines and the singular proponitons here the ind ‘uns theives as ene contin One heats to bad its "nie hata ait oo cea ine when oe i tren! contents doe not exits perormaner ofa symphony it cccuing wile the second movenent being performed, eve thovgh theta pate the eroanc ene ering tat i Jat we would ot expect thsnenes and nguletpropodtion tobe te Indole the sameway armel peroranc Hf indidaas oe constituents of thir thisnen, then presumably thre ct thes neither of pst nor of future individu Ty that case, te difrence Betneen thane of pst and of are fdvidalsw hot the ex itence bu, at retin heir valli, If thins do ot hare te {ndidl themselice na constituent, howevet, Ie to caning sment fer denying that ates of pan Individuals sil ey and Some advantage in hlding that they do. ‘This is natural point a which to pause fot an examination of one of ‘he central concepts ofthe present disesssion, the concept of existing 4 & particular time.” My previous eaaye in actuals heve produced ho divergence from Quine’ dictum, "To be isto be a value of bound vatiable” “(ly)iy = 2)’ is equivalent to the oneplace propositional function "z exists. For actuals, the two place propositional function 7 exiata in wy where wis a posible world, se mot primitive, but is understood as meaning that “(GuN(y = 2), or “= exists i cluded in the worldtory” of w, or that 2 would have existed i had been ‘actual. (Ile ‘would hate exist’ tes fort of the ondary on-ploce "The waar oe ple wot woah thet fl82. Robert Merihew Adams pei ‘xis Bat ei awe ine was Fropotna fncton for wich staal Yandetnd i, ries tec ction ‘dons ey ase tt insti ae "pata by tslgy nih acolo hate staat i ht three 12 ena nb ngs, at ly hing ht ato ex he Prec hl tha te reno nse pst oar things, bt ser thing tno For greta, xh ets pte site's one pare prt suet toasty etn mo nd Te rents pine anton rnge cl over hinge tht aly Sie Rath stn py ny ht ee ain the nee Seis" printve fa tf ld ave een he ee tat 7 Tenaga no monet things nt ahve cate 0 {hep may ey a tre mo, pve ct of the orm “agen op) tthe tht Serger mo) wl eect at ren tough Uae en nog things tat Silo eilet Ou th von seated io 1 canbe derstood Steguen to ln IN, th ese thay) ==) Viet ote ructon ee ccna complacent of aatempoa eto Let wep tnt sas anton ie od yen times od (0) eine ee” 9) sec ob re bt he presenti cannot sep a tad Foe thr ening oF cas” ena be ve unas le ants rang ve things tn ees St tna nb the evn qannier ange oly oer things that exit a he preset Tine” Prowatom's mart quale of (3) wl be something ike (5) Te was i oF wil be the cage that (3))34)(~132)Ly is o- curring Because it was the care that ()] ey is occuring Uecanse it wa the ease that (32}(6(2) ‘his cpoiaton feng eons ih be acl supported ty stong enough oetaphysiclintiins. Actuals reuites tfoeut comptes i the Went of motay But acto fate Telieve,on song intuition othe eet that modal fats mu, ive tee mboteootloiel basin in the actual wri, sad that the 1 the fact hat tere could have Been, fo example, © fought a Atal, lini, on 18 June 178, not something ‘Time and Thisnese 33 that is ot could have boon battle. The cotteponding metaphysical basis for presentism would be the view that facte bout the pest and future mast have their whole ontological basa inthe present, aad that the ontologeal basis of the fact that an important battle was fought at Waterloo on 18 June 1815, is not something that i or wo a battle ‘This view about time, however, unlike the corresponding view about ossblity, seems strongly counteritutive, Surely the ontological basis ‘ofthe fact I mentioned about Waterloo i, ot includes, something thot wats battle and that dows not exist now and isnot occuring no. Tam therefore inclined to rect presenti and to suppose that out ‘quantifiers should be understood as ranging, a leat, ver pat a well as ‘Present things. This leaves us, however, with "zens at (a time)? as 4 primitive two-place propositional function that must be ditingished from “Geta = 2) IV. Names for Puture Individuals 1 promised to return to the question whether we can aset, belive, ‘or know singular propositions about fature individuals that do not yet. ‘exit I has recently been suggested that we can; and the suggestion ia ‘couched in terms ofthe technlal concept ofa rigid designator” which ‘st first be explained, In explaining it, wll make use of» distinction The, developed elsswhere between tath af and truth in a posible World® A singular proposition about an individual 2 cannot be teue in 8 world in which + would not exist because the proposition also would not exist there. But we can aay that itis true al tach a world if it ‘correctly characterizes that world from our vantage point in the actual world, For instance, the singular proposition that {do not exist i true at, but not in, posible words ia which I would not exist A name of other expression » rigidly designates an object « if and ‘only ifm designates 2 at (though not necetally sn) every possible world? ‘Robert Mertihew Adams for example, rigily designates me. 1 fam what it designates at every posible world, including words in which would aot have existed” It door this designating, however, in the ac taal world, and indeed, only ina certain “language or “ialoet.” There ould possibly, and may actualy, be people who ase Robert Mectihew Adama’ at name of some oer person, or perhaps ofa lake oF ver "erg ena da Sal Kp bt he nerpvtain presente te dosnt lan perc cforms with Sy hate pros‘4 Robert Meritew Adams the teh te caigpn ofthe UCLA pil ep sot este, but not rigidly, There are poole worlds ‘ou preaae Setrinton alae “ “ear ao indexicland deontaive expen, sch ao and": heh iy Signe ier idan ile om {Ea ‘Ou any hen ves they deigeate the sane ni ‘Calo elton er onc ey eign eet Ines scting to em vin roast etc expres depend on wht ie terms dent Tin bce ete Mare Aa sts tht er Merten Asn doo 20 ori express spbpmton hts tural sad ol hose poe werd hich TUG tn oder to ss spl poponon sot an nia ete ne xm oth 8 deigtr or that ini a ie he that once nave gpd the concep fd ei sn ean me dane ayy me tare {hat tated by eacyone thing and sling that (be wane we eda nts dette iy th hing hem ft tiie tht seeptn, nou cyt dtn ta ote ene’ Tichome, Bet tory isnot slyly equle! to the nae se ligne ts cj even st wes nich te obec oa read ey he spin “Tings soe ie it prealycncrw ee, whichis hat sy ween intoace proper neta iy eine Jerre nto in David Kaplan slgan wal, we node {inne Nevina ty dsating ot herely dabei human being th tenn cry Nernan 2 By amet seing Newman I wil be ba for tance, we em expres, ahd “Sse singe propostin abet New nt bor abe ml be Satie hee ben dame" Hew we face wo enter eta adel expe, srs and aleve saga propstony about Toca ins way and whee ste ea that shoe tha (ise a exs inlr propos ast tie naa WR ho shy aed cron of a xampt etintodcd by Kap “ning in Syatee 3 (1508-03) 2, tht per, Kaplan eed gona (rai tune ome) eae ng Prepare Puce Cale (New Yeas Acaicalc Pr, 178), 2, ‘Time and Thinness 25 Let ue begin withthe second ime, the one sbout existence, Wehave already observed that there are relations that obtain between things thet ‘exit ab ison times. Iwas this that kept os fom regarding the resent ‘existence of singular proportions about past intivideete ws eure Oy the fact that we entertain, asrt, and believe such propeditions aed aiek it should also keep us from inferring the presen caiatence of slngulat propositions about future inividune fromm the fac (if fat) thas ve can entertain, assert, or believe them, For perhaps the relations of terlaining,aserting, and believing can obtain between thoughte and utterances occuring at onetime and propositions existing nly at 8 Inter ime. Maybe an utterance curring in 1085 could expres, aud be fan assertion of, a proposition that will bot exist wntil 2001 Likewise, ‘thas not been shown Ut the utterance of erg designator in 198 ‘could not express thisness that will ot come into being unl the next I by wlering ‘Newman 1 willbe bald? now, we expres proposi- ion that will not come into being until fifteen years or fromm now, i follows that what proposition, i any, me expres now depends on what ‘happens much later. But thet is exaliy ait should bein tht example ‘Thowe who think that utterance of ‘Newman 1 will be bald in 1086 express «singular proposition about Newman 1 would certainly agree ‘hat what proposition that is depends on abletieal event at the turn ofthe twenty-first century ‘Those who believe that we can assert and believe singular proposi- tons about future individeals in this way an answer Prior's argument ‘gaint thei opinion. For they have an alternative explanation of why it would be absurd for Prior's prophet to atk whether “pethepe it ie the second of the people I mentioned who willbe called *Caces' and sill be murdered, ee, and th Frat who willbe bots Iaer and be ealled ‘Antony’ el” If we are to make sense of the question at all f Prin’ argument, we must take it that ‘the second of the people { mentioned” ‘and ‘the frst” are meant to be vgid designator (ale ike demonstta- tives) designating the mentioned individuale both at worlds in which ‘hey satisfy the descriptions inthe oder in which they mere origially sven, and at worlds in which thei roles ate reversed. Indeed they pte~ ‘umably designate the same individuals at more widely variant more swell for surely the prophet would be prepare to ay, It could have bean, hough it won't be, that both the stand the second ef the people mentioned die of natural causes. the actual word, therefore, se. ‘coring tothe prophets intention, “the seeond ofthe people mentionedoe a 38 Robert Mesbew Adame Aesignaten the sme individual at wotds in which e satis either of the two descriptions, or neither of them Tt doesnot follow, however, ‘thatthe actual world say turn out to be one in which he satis the fiat description intend ofthe neon, For ifthe wcond of the people L ‘mentioned isa rig designator here, its elerence is fixed by the second ‘eacipton the prophet gave, According ta the convention by mhich it ie introdvced, “the second ofthe people | mentioned” designates at all ‘Possible welds the individual (if tere wil be exactly one) who satistes the prophet’s second description in the actual world. ‘That is why the ‘sggration that perhaps he (actully) wil fl towne iti senseless, {hough itis comet to tay that he could have failed to satity i. This, at auy rte is the answer that ought to be given to Prior by any thinks we ea ase iid designators Co tert singular propasitio {tue individual, Sila thingy ean be said about ‘Newman 1". Because the reference of ‘Newnan Tis fixed by Une daseription ‘the fst human child born in the teeny. century’, it maker no sense to ask wheter perhaps [Newman I wil really be born in the twentieth century. We ean know on purely semaatial grounds (and, hence, pehaps a prior) that (6) Newman 1 will be the frst human child bom in the twenty- fist century cexpreses a true proposition, if it expresso any proposition at all, and ‘hat (7) Newman 1 wil be bora inthe twentieth century expreses flee proposition if it expresses any proposition ata. But (8) (Newman 1 wil be born inthe twentieth century) expreses a ruth ft expreses any proposition at all for i thete wil be ‘exactly one ist eld of the twenty-first century, eo ae wll doubles be bora only few seconds afer midnight on the fst morning ofthe enkury, and could surly have been bors ve minutes sooner. Keith Donnella has cently presented sbeltr argument than Price's ‘againet the view that we can azsert, baie, of know sngslar propo ‘Stons about future individuals, Dontellan dale explicitly withthe ‘Newman 1° example, fearing on the lain that (0) expreaen truth that we can Know a prior. le agrees, in effect, that we could intso- duce the mane "Newsman 1 by stipulating that it rghly designates the ‘Time and Thianese 37 first human being born inthe tweaty-fest century, and that if we di it would designate that individual, f there turns cut to be exactly one such person. Let us now imagine that just ater midnight on New Cen- tury’ Eve child is bora who is rly established tobe the fiat born ofthe century, He is baptized “Joh,” but those of us who ae stil around, remembering ovr etipulation also call this child "Newnan I.” Now it seems to me that it ‘would be outrageous to any that some twenty-five year o 0 before his birth, we knew that John would be the fist child bora in the twenty-finat century. Suppose one of ts, living to.a ripe old age, were to meat Job after he has grown ‘bit. Would it be tre to any to John, “Leall you ‘Newnan and Newman 1, I knew soine twenty-five years or 80 be- fore your birth that you would be the Ret eid born inthe twentyfint century"? Donnellan's view ofthis cate i that by virtue of having introduced ‘the name ‘Newman lin the way described, we can know (perhaps even prin), that if thee wil be exaelly one fs child born inthe twenty first century, the sentence “Newoan 1 wil be the fs child born in the Aorenig-fit century’ expresses a truth, but that we cannot know the ‘rath of what i expressed by the sentence. He aoggrss that we ae in the somewhat odd postion of postessing mechaniom fer introducing ‘name that rigidly designates something, bot a mechani tha ie not Powerful enough to allow us to use Use hatmel"”® We cannot ase the ‘name in the seas tat having the name in ovt language does ot pst {sina position to have deve proponitionalatitudes towatd the entity igily designated” by it. It doesnot enable sto know ot believe, not ‘ven to assert, any proposition expressed by means of it. For it would be Hust as incorrect to say to the fst child born in the twenty ‘eantury, ‘belived about you some twent)-fve Years before your birth "pete, ag to my to hi Know abost you some twenty-five years ietoe your birth 2 think itis clea, intuitively, that Donnellan is igh in boing that it would not be tre to say any of thee things to the st eld of “Tiga Dopean, “The Contingent Frio and Rigi Dagar in Md npn Bisrty sonar Coy tN Pa, 7) 3.38 Robert Mecrihew Adams the twenty-first century, om the Base of our “use” of Newman 1". But Several explanations could be oflered of why he is right about this, We ‘Shall consider fou (i) Donnella own explanation—or patil explanation, ashe him self suggets—is that in order for an entity to be am objet ofa de re propositional attitude, “the entity most enter into the genetic’ account chow the speaker [ot thinker] eame to acquit the name, the beliefs he fould expres using the name, ete"™™ Since future entities that do not Jet erint cannot ener nto ch genetic counts of our present thoughts {nd utterances, such enitie cannot be objets af present propositional AUtiudes de re. Singular propositions about them cannot now be as ferted or belived. Donnellan ads, Hoving indicated the ditetion in which Yam inclined to go, find myself wanting to ask the question, why, if indeed it is true none in positon to asert and know de re things ‘boat entity when the etity becomes (inthe right way) {part of the history of one's use of the name? What does {ht accomplish tha allows fr thi posbility? But perhaps that iva miseoeeived question Perhaps the only answer is that that i Just when we do ascribe de re propositional stitaden™ Su) in pail oof an explanation that content wth tue tn ht nent knoe nd elder, ad ean ake ‘Seon dr aoa fatare nia Seppo there wl exactly Sects sabe ten ft entry and tot a mont before et ‘iar peta wilfogn toc bern” having Seed ol et “faa! eer hr sx tury st tobe. Suppo fre thot at 11:30 PM on thelist gi fhe twetth entry. her patente believe (9) dan will be born inthe twentieth contry [At hat time, if these supponitons are correct, (8) wil certainly expres ingar proposition, and one thatthe parent can believe and aster. As {til urn ou Gf our suppoitions are erect, this singular proposition til alan be the proposition expressed by (1) Newman 1 will be boon in the twentieth contry ‘Time and Thisnewr 30 Wit Jans pants terre blee (2)? Carty not. Beng know gable (an we may rppote) Abul the analyte phloopl othe 100 and 180s, they wll know on putly ena groua tht (7) ‘xpree afaleood ft expene any propesiion ata. 1A idee fr ato, eh ant aes in tobe fatre individuals. To take the most backaeyed example, where ‘Phosphorus gly degnating) tame forthe Morning Star; end “sper for the Being Star, it seems that many people have known (10) Hesper without knowing esperar (11) Phosphorus = Hesperus eventhough (10) and (11) express the ame singular proposition, Here iti sumed that a singular proposition constituted by one or mone individuals, or their thisneses, together with one or more qualities oF ‘elation, and logical connectives, in such & way that there could not be ‘wo distinct singular propositions of exactly the same logieal srweture in which exactly the sare qualities or elatone are held to be satised by exactly the samne ordered n-tupes of individuals In onder to provide plausible solution for problems of this sort, 1 beieve we must say that the objcta of proportional attitudes dere fre not always singular propositions in this vente. ‘There are several philsophial theories inthe feld that could provide us with alternative bjects for the attitudes. They ar all too complicated to be developed her; perhaps the simplest to mention isthe view thatthe objects of ay- seston and belie are sentences” Whatever theory is adopted, i ought, Think, to accommodate the fllowing: In some contexts, what people and lo have believed or aserted de re depends only on what singular 5s to watt diferent ondesipine cnmeaticn” to se eens ha ier sci mete aren on ee eg = hard ooh ete pe oer eeneieciemt need {Gov sense) tha cantieaes is “ontont the datineton a denen there Seibel meat eg40 Robert Metihew Adame ‘proposition (in my sense) io exptested by their thought of utterance, If Tony, 'f was born in Piadeiphin” for instance, andl you sa, “Hebert [Mest Adda wes born in Philadephia," we wil comsoaly be held oave acerted the ame thing. But in other contexts, what prope ate Sid to know or believe or asett depend also on other features oftheir Hite of mind or utterance or is contest. IFT were suring fom amnesi “Ind bad tend a biogeephy of myself without eealiing i was about me, Tight know that Robert Mersihew’ Adams was born in Piladelhis without knowing that was born in Philadelphia. ‘Whatever thor) adopted, ieee Likely that i could be used to explain ou intuitive data consistently with the docsine that de re [soertons, belie, and knowledge about future individuals are pessible ue fet chil ofthe twenty-firat entury wil be named *San* why trouldat it be corect for ue to say, afer er birth, “We knew twenty Soars ago that Newman 1 would be the fst child ofthe twenty-first ‘We did ot know twenty years ago that you EOL be he fat child of the twenty. Ree century”? And iit would be Tree for to say these thing, why weld’ the thre tha” causes il'expess the ame singular proposition? Afterall there have been Devote who did wot know that Phosphorus = Hesperus, although they Knew that Hesperus = Hesperas, and hove two sentences express the thins Angular propsition (im ny snae of singulae proposition’). Tid) Doth Donnellan and the postion ast dlscwsed gree that ‘New: oat T-can now be used Lo expres iagular propositions about che fst id to be bor in the twenty-first century, if there wil be exactly one ‘Schild ‘Te other two views to be consited here deny thin. One of Them regards ‘Newman I? ax expeesing not che thisness ofan individ- talbut em essence ofan individual I the fst cil ofthe twenty-first ‘ntury willbe Jan then om this view, ‘Newman 1" will express not the roperty of being idential with Jan but some other property never Jy cowntenive with i-pethaps the property of being the ist human ‘hia borin he twenty fst centry in a where “a rgidly designates the actual world, ‘This of cours, will ot Keep ‘Newman 1 from nigily designating Jan "Fis altcrantive treatment would be metaphysially interesting if we could suppose that ‘Newrnan, 1 expresses a purely qualitative ence, bo that fe doubtful Tei far Grom clear that ‘human’, twenty-first etn ‘Time and Thienene 41 cena and bone aly! bv ply ual ny its wore pole thay "Newien TA ee thee be a ie when wil be seed il be ated whic vidual, if dtignte, bat fe pil tee ever but if the actal werd wil oon oer, il here ees be Mine a which i settled which a ith psa wold designates? {) 1s pee to rgd “Newman a vrable ‘existential quantifier that in most contexts is ot Or tis cei not expe. On this (9) (Ser isan informal abbreviation of 1 will be born inthe twentieth century) (22) Ie wl be cas that (3(e i the Rest ham child born inte eet centay te Bam inthe tet And, in general, % (Newinan 1° wi Andi (Newman 1) wll be regarded as an informa abbee- (2) We he ee a wile hae ht (eth it an hil born in the twenty-first century & ¢ (2)). “7 1D is a rigid designator, for it is well vrarable aspen Sy within any one owe Tn (1) exp neac e ‘hc dl le tial iia letersi wr i in which that individual is born in different century. But {reposition that the fest child of the twenty-first contu a express tying I igh bave een bon inn tenth entry Fam oc sure which iyo ts tan Veco vt tint bv senate tee thee ea issue For not metaphya there wile exactly oe est ‘ea singular proposition a con pha Ait of the went etary th ll jt him her, tata she inte ae “08 Wi Rape pia a % Eee of Neo iy asinine of ope nana ‘sated igh The Naar of Waco tOnknk Cha42, Robert Merrihow Adam tld ofthe twenty fetcetuy. Allo tha ne aleadyhaow; and tere is othing mor formative thatthe te of Newman T'can enable sto ow reve ow. try to expen oar Kote fm tht te ore infratve (gst pow mel be the ft cid of i tent st entry) becomes clear tha in 2015, we oul not ighly {hima that form fo hve bnown now. Reverie, fom the perspec: tent be eft tr or ros towing sd aking wi ‘ihly be sen a standing in some Uantempora lations to the ste falar pepestion hat will exit then, Wether ore of hee vlatons ould te sgardt a cxpeson, aston, belt, and/or knowledges uestion tht canbe tated amram without, ne, fein {ae tmetaphytal pte vey ch ‘Soon "fture contingents” a worthy af consideration (I do oot mean that Tah ‘trl etn) We cb ink the eng ef the foto ome ne ‘Sehnert the way in whch 8 daemons taaenpora lone in shah Spr ym hy te et ‘Mincimpatitn wih » ucapysicaly open are 4 Logic and the World Joseph Almog! L Almighty and subline, puried of any worldly infestation, ou ea of logics laden with allsions to the divine. This Tusel™ 1 logic aims at being tru, in Lebnisian phesscolog, in ll poarble worlds, not oul in thi higaledly-pigeledy job lot ofa world in which chance fas imprisoned us. There is certain loedlinese which the logician should preserves be ist nt condescend to derive arguments fom the things he teen aout hi And indeed that ie how most of us, “professional” have come to ‘conceive of ogi: nothing chains it to the banaitis of wht things there axe and how things are. Logic fee AAs agsnst this lordly vision, a minotity of thinkers have felt that nothing could be that. fie, nat even loge. In the very raze yearn which Rell articulated the lordly vision, Wittgenstein wae already ashing us pointedly “its ith wack drton oe plilopler and much eto the ma Das ope ie pep wit Maya eto Aiton ie Beran Ral, Ierdacion te Mahematie Peep (London: Alen ‘Von 91918 4s