064 - ENGLISH OIL AND GAS RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR Establishing AREA PREPARATIONS

22.05.
2017 064 ENGLISH OIL AND GAS RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR Establishing AREA PREPARATIONS
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064 NORWAY OIL AND GAS
RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES
FOR
ESTABLISHMENT OF
AREA EMERGENCY
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22.05.2017 064 ENGLISH OIL AND GAS RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES FOR Establishing AREA PREPARATIONS
Original version
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Norwegian oil and gas, Recommended guidelines for the establishment of area preparedness
Nr .: 064 Established: 14.06.00 Revision No: 3 Fox. Date: 12.08.15 Page: 2

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Preface
This guideline is recommended by the Norwegian oil and gas working group area preparedness, Norwegian oil and
Gas' HSE Managers Forum and by the Operations Committee. Furthermore, it is approved by Norwegian oil and gas'
CEO.
The working group consisted of the following members:
WilhelmMagne Austevoll, Leaderne
Roy Erling Furre, SAFE
Erik Hamremoen, Statoil
Tor Greger Hansen, Statoil
Ketil Karlsen, IndustriEnergi
Life Quake, ConocoPhillips
Jan Vidar Markmanrud, Lundin
Bjarne Nerlandsrem, Marathon
Per Saltrø, (until 1.12.2010) Bjørn Lauvstad, (1.12.1030.4.11), Even Rønes (from 1.5.11), Norwegian Shell
Aud Nistov, Norwegian oil and gas
Jan Risberg, Norwegian oil and gas
Contact person for the guideline is Fagsjef HMS, which can be contacted via the Norwegian oil and gas switchboard
+47 51 84 65 00.
This Norwegian oil and gas policy has been developed with broad industry participation from interested parties in
The Norwegian petroleum industry and is owned by the Norwegian petroleum industry represented by Norwegian oil
And gas. The administration has been added to Norwegian oil and gas.
Norwegian oil and gas
Vassbotnen 1, Sandnes
Mailbox 8065
4068 Stavanger
Phone: + 47 51 84 65 00
Fax: + 47 51 84 65 01
homepage: www.norskoljeoggass.no
Email: firmapost@norog.no
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CONTENTS
1. Introduction ................................................. .................................................. ................................... 5
1.1 Purpose ................................................. .................................................. ................................................ 5
1.2 Definitions and abbreviations ............................................... .................................................. .................. 5
1.2.1 Definitions ................................................. .................................................. .................................................. ... 5
1.2.2 Abbreviations ................................................. .................................................. .................................................. ... 6
1.3 References ................................................. .................................................. ........................................... 7
2. Visibility of changes to the guideline ............................................. .................................. 7
3. Overview of Content and Policy Usage ........................................... .......................... 9
3.1 Requirements for area preparedness ............................................... .................................................. ..................... 9
3.2 Requirements for facilities preparedness .............................................. .................................................. ......... 9
3.3 Need for changes to DFUs ............................................. .................................................. ............... 9
3.4 Need for change of requirements for DFUs ........................................... .................................................. ...... 10
3.5 Updating analyzes for existing DFUs ............................................ .................................... 11
3.6 What is not included in area preparedness ............................................. .................................................. ..... 11
3.7 Use within established areas .............................................. .................................................. .......... 11
3.8 Use where there are no established areas ........................................... .................................................. ... 11
3.9 Use in the Barents Sea and similar areas ............................................ ............................................ 12
3.10 Removable facilities in established areas ............................................. .............................................. 12
3.11 Interaction between emergency preparedness resources ............................................... ..................................................
3.12 Training of Emergency Resources ............................................... .................................................. .......... 12
12
3.13 Cost allocation ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 13
4. Restrictions on the definition of an area ............................................ ................................. 14
4.1 Geographical Extension Helicopter Resources .............................................. ........................................ 14
4.2 Geographical extent common preparedness vessels ............................................. ................................ 14
4.3 Concurrent events ................................................ .................................................. ........................... 14
4.4 Number of units and persons .............................................. .................................................. ................... 15
4.5 Limitations when resource availability is lower than normal .......................................... ........ 15
4.6 Access to maritime competence .............................................. .................................................. .......... 15
4.7 Requirements for contingency vessels ............................................... .................................................. .................... 15
5. DFU1: Manoverboard for work over the sea ....................................... ..................................... 16
5.1 Validity range ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 16
5.2 Requirements for standby capacity ............................................... .................................................. ............... 16
5.3 Efficiency requirements ................................................. .................................................. ............................... 16
6. DFU2: Personnel in the sea as a result of a helicopter accident ......................................... ................. 17
6.1 Validity range ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 17
7. DFU3: Personnel in the sea at emergency evacuation .............................................. .................................. 19
7.1 Validity range ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 19
7.2.1 Overview ................................................. .................................................. .................................................. ... 19
7.2.2 Steps for riskbased rescue capacity rescue ............................................ ............ 19
7.2.3 Other contingency requirements ................................................ ..................................................
.................................... 22
8. DFU4: Risk of collision ............................................. .................................................. ............. 24
8.1 Validity range ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 24
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8.3.1 Skip on a collision course ............................................... .................................................. ..................................... 24
8.3.2 Driving vessel / object .............................................. .................................................. ................................ 24
9. DFU5: Acute oil spill .............................................. .................................................. ............. 25
10. DFU6: Fire in need of external assistance ........................................ .............................. 26
10.1 Validity range ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 26
11. DFU7: Personal injury / illness in need of external assistance ...................................... ....... 27
11.1 Validity range ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 27
12. DFU8: Helicopter accident on the facility ........................................... ..................................... 28
12.1 Validity range ................................................. .................................................. ............................. 28
13. Verification that requirements meet ........................................... .................................................. ....... 29
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1 Introduction
1.1 purpose
The purpose of the guidelines is to express a standard of preparedness, especially in relation to marine
And airborne resources. The preparedness standard is based on marine and airborne resources such as
Will normally be part of an area cooperation on emergency preparedness.
It will be a prerequisite that the solutions that are set up provide a total preparedness that is at least
At the height of what will apply if any device has its own emergency response solutions
Without any kind of cooperation.
Norwegian oil and gas 064 is based on society's expectations of preparedness for life and
health. In 2011, society's expectations are somewhat sharpened and significantly more explicitly expressed
Compared to what was the case when Norwegian oil and gas 064: 2000 was prepared. That applies to
Rescue of personnel in the sea, through investigation of public requirements
Rescue helicopter service, and in relation to emergency medical assistance and transport to hospitals
In serious illness and injury.
1.2 Definitions and abbreviations
1.2.1 Definitions
Definitions used are in accordance with NORSOK Z013, where applicable.
Acute medicine See thrombolytic treatment
ALARP (As Low as Rea ALARP states that the risk level has been reduced through a document
Sonably practicable) Mented and systematic evaluation process so far as not
Longer measures can be identified which do not have a serious mismatch
Between costs and benefits which can reduce the risk
expensive.
Contingency Analysis Analysis involving the establishment of defined hazard and accident
Situations including dimensional accident situations, etable
Call of contingency strategies and functional requirements for preparedness and
Identification of measures to measure preparedness.
Establishment of emergency preparedness
Systematic process of planning and implementing
Appropriate emergency preparedness measures for the particular business, based
Of completed risk and preparedness analysis.
Defined hazard and accident A range of possible events that the company's preparedness will be
Situations (DFU) Could handle, based on the company's dimensioning
Keshendelser, as well as danger and accident situations associated with one
Temporary increase in risk and accident events of lesser
scope.
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Efficacy requirements for prepared
Verifiable requirements for the effectiveness of safety and emergency
cabinet Measures to ensure that security objectives, risk
Authorities, minimum requirements and established standards
Be made during engineering and operation. (NORSOK's definition is
"Functional requirements")
Survivors capacity The capacity of the vessel for the number of rescued by rules
acc. Norwegian Maritime Directorate's Regulations for Emergency Planning, §19
Risk Analysis Analysis that includes systematic identification and description
At risk of human, environmental and / or economic values.
Significant wave height Significant wave height is the mean of the 1st largest wave
(H s) The heights observed (measured) in a given weather situation. With 1/3
Largest wave heights is meant the mean of the waves one
Replies when one has taken 1/3 of the total amount
Wave heights, after falling wave height.
It is emphasized that significant wave height is either termed "signi
Fig. Wave height »or .... m Hs. In all other cases where the wave
Elevated angis, this should be understood to be the maximum wave height.
Thrombolytic treatment The treatment involves the injection of enzymes for dissolution
Of blood clot in the heart. It assumes that exact diagnosis can
Is made in advance by contact with cardiac medicines based on
Transferred ECG. It is also required with considerable competence in
To stop any lifethreatening bleeding that may occur.
accident Incident Event or chain of events that may cause loss of men
Personal injury, damage to the environment and loss of economic
suckling.
1.2.2 Abbreviations
AIS Automatic Identification System
ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable
AWSAR All Weather Search and Rescue
DFU Defined Hazards and Accidents
Hs Significant wave height
JD Ministry of Justice and Police
MOB Man overboard
nm nautical mile
NAWSARH Norwegian All Weather Search and Rescue Helicopter
NLA Norsk Luftambulanse
NOFO Norwegian Oil Conservation Association for Operations
NORSOK Norsk Sokkel's Competition Position
PLB Personal Distributor Beacon (Personal Locator Beacon)
POB People on board
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis (Quantitative Risk Analysis)
WOUND «Search and Rescue»
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SBV «Standby Vessel»
TRA Total Risk Analysis
1.3 References
Regulations on health, safety and environment in the petroleum activities and at certain land facilities
(Framework Regulations), PSA / Klif / Htil
Regulations on the design and equipment of facilities and more in the petroleum activities
(Facility Regulations), PSA / Cliff / Htil
Regulations on carrying out activities in the petroleum activities (Activity Regulations),
PSA / CPA / Htil
Regulations on preparedness vessels, Norwegian Maritime Directorate
Norwegian Oil and Gas 094: Recommended Guideline for Requirements for Rescue Suits for
Use on the Norwegian continental shelf
Norwegian oil and gas 095: Recommended Guidelines for Restriction in Flight by Helicopter on
Norwegian continental shelf
NSEN ISO 150271: 2002 Immersion suits; Part 1 Constant wear suits, requirements including
safety
NSEN ISO 150272: 2002 Immersion suits; Part 2 Abandonment suits, requirements including
safety
Preventor AS: Area preparedness on the Norwegian continental shelf. Survey report with documentation of
Prerequisites and professional assessments in Norwegian oil and gas 064: 2012 , Report No. 201110002,
Rev.1g, 07.05.2012
2. Visibility of changes to the guideline
The following changes have been made to revision 2:
The guidelines for area preparedness have been substantially revised structurally from the previous edition
(Norwegian oil and gas 064: 2000) and it is impossible to specify the changes in relation to chapters, figures
And tables. The main changes are as follows:
• Scope:
O No changes.
• Requirements for DSHAs:
O No significant changes.
• Other changes:
O Significant editorial changes.
When it comes to DFUs, it's added a new one; DFU8: Helicopter controlled on the device, see chapter
tel 12 . This is included primarily from the need to standardize the requirements that are used.
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The following changes have been made to revision 3:
Only minor administrative changes have been made to the policy;
The reference to guideline 096 Norwegian Oil Industry Association recommended guidelines for man over
table preparedness is taken out, then this policy is withdrawn.
Furthermore, the links to the Basis Report are reentered.
There is also a minor adjustment in the design of the guideline.
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3. Overview of Content and Policy Usage
3.1 Requirements for area preparedness
Requirements in Norwegian oil and gas 064 apply to all defined areas (above normal
Field preparedness) where there is emergency preparedness between the operating organization for the individual
Facilities, with their own area resources, regardless of whether the collaboration includes one or more
operating companies. Vessels can also be included when they perform businesses that fall in
Under the term "petroleum activities". Interpretation of when business falls under the term
"Petroleum activities" must be based on general guidelines and the specific conditions, such as
Then also apply to area preparedness.
3.2 Requirements for facilities preparedness
The facilities' own preparedness must meet regulatory requirements and accepted standards
Depend on whether or not it has been introduced.
Establishment of area preparedness does not release operator or owner / operator for responsibility for
Own preparedness for all DFUs on the device or vessel. Area preparedness covers the danger
And emergency situations that depend on external resources or where area preparedness provides one
Better preparedness solution. The guidelines also cover the manoverboard accident situation,
Primarily aimed at setting a common standard for response time. In many cases, the responsibility for
Satisfying the requirement of rapid rescue had to be met from the facility because of the area resources
Often can not react quickly enough.
There will be a significant number of hazard and accident situations that must be covered by the operator's own
Preparedness for the facility, where the operator himself has total responsibility for emergency preparedness. This
Is not covered by area preparedness.
3.3 Need for changes to DFUs
The update on Norwegian oil and gas 064 has included a review and
Assessment of the need for any new DFUs, possibly also about any of the existing ones
DFUs can be deleted. The DFUs that were assessed in Norwegian oil and gas 064: 2000 are:
• DFU1: Man overboard during work over sea
• DFU2: Personnel in the sea as a result of helicopter crash
• DFU3: Personnel in the sea at emergency evacuation
• DFU4: Risk of collision
• DFU5: Acute oil spills
• DFU6: Fire in need of external assistance (primarily in relation to the requirements for response time)
• DFU7: Personal injury / illness requiring external assistance
DFU5, acute oil spill was not included in Norwegian oil and gas 064: 2000, nor is it
Included in Norwegian oil and gas 064: 2012.
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The assessment conducted by the need for new DFUs (if any) should be deleted
Resulted in:
• DFU8: Helicopter Accident at the facility are included because. Need to standardize
claim
• There is no identified need for some existing DSHAs shall be deleted.
DFU8, like DFU1, is primarily based on the need to standardize the requirements used,
Not because it's the area resources to be used.
The other potential new DFU that has been considered is a flight ban on ash clouds (equivalent
As with longterm fog). It has been concluded that this should not be treated as DFU, but that
Provisions must be made for alternative medical evacuation Prolongedfly, see Chapter 11.
3.4 Need for change of requirements for DFUs
A thorough professional process has been conducted to identify possible needs for changes
Of the requirements of individual DFUs, both in relation to capacity requirements and time requirements. It is retrieved
Experience data, views and academic input from members of the working group, authorities
And external academic environments.
In terms of rescue of personnel in the sea (DFU2 and DFU3), there has been a question of
The time requirement, both in relation to the fact that drowning could not be sufficiently weighted
Of hypothermia, and about the level of safety factor (which is the way other requirements beyond hypo
Termi is taken care of) is appropriate. This has also been considered separately against activity in
Barents Sea. It has not been found that the requirement should be changed from the current level, 120 minutes. IN
Relative to Norwegian oil and gas 094 Recommended guidelines for requirements specifications for
Rescue suit for use on the Norwegian continental shelf and NSEN ISO 15027 has a test against
Cooling (core temperature) for a period of six hours implies the unchanged requirement
120 minutes a clear increase in the safety factor.
At the same time, there are several factors that indicate that the increase of the claim is not sound, not least from
Relationships related to a variety of conditions that can lead to drowning, to the extreme conditions one can have
In the Barents Sea and the premises underlying the requirements for new rescue helicopters
(NAWSARH).
The capacity for rescuing personnel in the sea must at least always equal one
Full helicopter (DFU2), here are no changes. Requirements for capacity in connection with
Emergency evacuation (DFU3) can be determined by a simplified procedure and a more nuanced
Procedure based on highly detailed quantitative risk analyzes. The levels used in it
The simplified procedure has been assessed, but no significant reasons have been found
change. With regard to the use of risk analysis, this has been considered separately. The requirements are discussed
in Section 7.2 .
There have been questions about the assumptions that have been common in the industry about the number
Severely injured (7 people) by helicopter accident on helidekk could be compatible with the pre
Sentence of 12 seriously ill or severely injured in need of acute medical competence and
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Fast transportation to the hospital. Therefore, a separate DFU8 has been introduced to meet the need for one
General requirements. See Chapter 12 .
3.5 Update analyzes for existing DFUs
No significant changes have been made to the requirements of these guidelines that will normally result
A need to update preparedness analyzes conducted on the basis of Norwegian oil and gas
064: 2000 for the facilities included in the established areas.
Changes have been made regarding the conditions for the preparation of preparedness related to
Helicopter accident on helidekk. However, this does not affect the area preparedness requirements
explicitly, see Chapter 12 .
3.6 What is not included in area preparedness
The facilities' own preparedness is not included in area preparedness. Some of the time requirements included
The DFU list in these guidelines must be met by the facility's own preparedness, if any
Field preparedness, such as the 8minute requirement for DFU1. The purpose of Norwegian oil and gas 064
Is to ensure that there is a common requirement in the industry, as a prerequisite for area preparedness.
Organization of emergency preparedness on the facilities is also not included, including the dimensioning of
Emergency preparedness on the facilities. For example, dimensioning of first aid stroke does not include
Related to emergency situations on the facility, but emergency medical emergency preparedness for serious
Accidents are included, including transport of seriously injured persons to country houses.
Oil protection is also not included in area preparedness, but area rescue vessels usually have
oil recovery equipment.
The national rescue helicopter service is not required to contribute any capacity in the
Scenarios included in this guideline.
3.7 Use within established areas
Use of guidelines within established areas must be based on readiness analysis for
Area, as well as action plan and cooperation agreement for the entire area. Moreover, copper
Documentation on the contingency plans of each facility.
When placing permanent facilities within an area, it is assumed that the
Shall be included in the cooperation in the area, provided that the same assumptions are based on
For mobile devices (see below).
It seems appropriate to coordinate the common resources. It's good experience
With it from the southern fields (Ekofisk area).
3.8 Use where there are no established areas
The guidelines do not require preparedness for facilities that are not included in established
areas.
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3.9 Use in the Barents Sea and similar areas
Climatic conditions and environmental vulnerability in the High North (Barents Sea and corresponding
Areas) have justified special attention to the efficiency requirements of area
Hood solutions that are established there. However, there is no scientific basis for establishing
Separate efficiency requirements in these areas.
It is especially the requirements of DFU2, DFU3 and DFU7 as it is essential to fulfill, possibly in
Combined with compensatory measures and / or measures in cooperation with other actors,
Such as the Navy.
3.10 Removable facilities in established areas
It is assumed that removable devices that will operate temporarily within an area should
Could normally be part of the cooperation, provided that there is an appropriate emergency
Analysis that the requirements are compatible with the capacities in the area, that a bridge document is prepared
and entering into a commercial agreement 1.
The emergency preparedness for the facility must also be reviewed by the responsible operator to ensure that
The DFUs are adequate for those involved in regional preparedness and that the requirements are compatible
The capabilities offered by the area preparedness solutions. Possibly, the preparedness analysis (and
Action plans) are updated to be adapted to the current capacities, and one must be prepared
brodokument. Often this means that DFU1, manoverboard preparedness, must be safeguarded
The device itself.
If all relevant conditions are met, a cooperation agreement is entered into before the facilities become
Incorporated into the area solution.
3.11 Interaction between emergency preparedness resources
In an area, there will normally be area resources in the form of emergency vessels and SAR helicopters
Ter, and to a greater or lesser degree facility and field resources. For solution of
Concrete emergency situations, the interaction between the various resources will be crucial
To get the best response with available resources. The role of individual resources
Ha will vary significantly between individual DFUs.
3.12 Training of emergency preparedness resources
Additionally, exercises and training must be added that also involves area emergency response
Late so that the crews are competent and that they are comfortable with their own situation. risk
During exercise should be considered. Efforts should be made to conduct training even under marginal
Weather conditions, taking into account the safety of crew and boat.
Training related to DFU2 is often training on taking up exercise puppets from the sea. It's come
Some feedback from SAR crew that it may be advisable to rather bet on fewer
Exercises under the most realistic conditions, including possibly using live markers
(Not recommended).
1 Commercial terms are not part of the Norwegian oil and gass064: 2012.
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Agreements with suppliers of SAR services must also contain requirements for selftraining of
crew, and there must be a system to verify that the requirements are met.
3.13 Cost Allocation
In Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2000, it was proposed a model for cost allocation.
The revision work has not included the revision of the principles that were developed and taken into
Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2000, but the text as it appeared in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2000
Included in Substrate report (Chapter 15).
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4. Limitations in defining an area
4.1 Geographical extent helicopter resources
Geographical extent of an area based on helicopter resources deployed from
longest mobilization on fixed station, flying time and time requirements to the rescue of 21 persons in the water.
Time Requirements for rescue and design time that will be the basis for rescue per person
stated in Subsection 6.3. This is not an obstacle to devices with requirements for survival of
more than 21 people (DFU3) may be included in an area, if it is possible to satisfy all requirements
by combining regional, and device resources, possibly also with operational
limitations. Maximum extent based nevertheless on production installations with freefall
lifeboats and DFU2 (21) composed of dimensioning.
The amendments to the Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2012 involves some minor changes from Norwegian oil and
gas 064: 2000. This may involve a need for updating the emergency analysis and
plans.
4.2 Geographical extent joint standby vessels
Geographical extent of an area based on the standby vessel may be different
from the area defined by the helicopter. Geographical extent of a region of
Based on standby vessels set out from travel time requirements for response and time to rescue
the devices to be borne by the vessel.
The response time of DFU5, oil spills, considered normal in hours acc. NOFO requirements and demands from
Norwegian Pollution Control Authority (CPA). This means that the area as a standby vessel
shall cover in relation to DFU5 may be different from other area definitions.
4.3 simultaneous events
It is a fundamental principle in government regulations that do not need to dimension resources
for two simultaneous accidents.
It was assumed in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2000 that one does not need a dimensioning
resources simultaneous events in a region. This has been considered in detail in connection with
update and conclusion remains fixed; there is no need to dimension for simultaneous
events. See Subsection 4.1 of Substrates report for Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2012.
There are some situations where one must take into account the changed circumstances. Such a situation is
if the standby vessel in an area mobilized example nærstandby for a heater
lift. Then it may get increased response times to other devices. If it matters to up
maintain a security level, it must be taken into account.
In general also revealed that if an event happens that emergency resources mobilized
ed (possibly from other areas if there is a major event) can not be the same resources
while filling requirements nærstandby and the like, so that it will result in operational limitations
readings. By expected prolonged outputting a joint standby resource, the resource owner provide
that replacement resource is available within 24 hours.
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4.4 Number of units and individuals
It has to some extent been different practices when it comes to any limitations on the number innret
solutions and / or people can be included in an area of given resources in emergency, e.g.
a SAR helicopter. This relationship also has a connection to the simultaneity of events, see
Subsection 4.3 . It is particularly relevant in relation to serious illness and ambulance flight with
helicopter.
It is in chapter sections 3.4 and 3.5 of the Substrates report for Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2012
documented that a theoretical upper limit will be so high that in practice there are some
limitations on the number of devices and / or persons that may be included in an area of given
emergency resources, as long as the time demands of DFUs satisfied.
4.5 Limitations when the resource availability is below normal
It shall, after considering the needs, normally introduced operational limitations on relevant
means in an area, if the emergency resources have lower availability than
is foreseen in the plans. Examples would be where the helicopter is on land due. weather conditions,
and if it is longer mobilization or response time for various reasons. Scope of limitations
readings and duration shall be documented.
When transporting seriously ill or injured to country, it is assumed that the SAR Nurse (or most similar
rendering skilled) in helicopters follow the patient when needed.
4.6 Access to maritime expertise
It is assumed that where there are separate standby vessel on the field, it is sufficient supply of
maritime skills.
Where the devices themselves using their own rescue boat (s) have substantial emergency duties, are
it is essential to ensure that it has the crew of a rescue boat with good maritime skills available
the facility.
4.7 Requirements for standby vessels
Vessels must satisfy minimum NMD Regulations on standby vessels
(FOR 19911016 no. 853). Moreover, the requirements for standby vessels until come of emergency
analyzes and plans for the individual devices, fields and areas.
It should be a longterm intention that most emergency vehicles have a high cruising speed
as well as skid or the equivalent of taking up the man overboard (MOB) boats or lifeboats.
Where standby vessels is associated with means in positions very far out from the coast and from
other petroleum activities (Norwegian Sea or the Barents Sea), it may be appropriate to ask
additional requirements for standby vessel, for it to be able to fill several emergency functions
and / or compensating solutions based on current EPA.
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5. DFU1: Man overboard during work over sea
5.1 Scope
DFU1 applies to any device on the shelf falling under petroleum regulations,
including vessels when they fall under the petroleum regulations. DFU1 included occasion. need
standardized requirements. Preparedness is usually ensured by the facility's own readiness,
Fields if emergency, in some cases also with the area resources.
5.2 Requirements for emergency response capacity
The required capacity is set to a person. Past events shows that they mainly involve
that a person can fall into the sea. It should be emphasized that any person no. 2 normally
will be able to be rescued immediately after that first person is saved, time to rescue two people
will not be significantly longer than for an individual.
5.3 efficiency Requirements
The following efficiency requirements are made for emergency preparedness in connection with man overboard at work
above sea:
• A person who falls into the sea should be able to be picked up within eight minutes after the incident
warned.
If persons are to work over sea Ifor an insulating suit, can theoretically increase the
acceptable response time to some extent. Eight minutes is still recommended that current levels of response
because of. other aspects than just hypothermia that can be crucial to survival. For example,
the actual drop cause damage that can make the person unconscious.
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6. DFU2: Personnel in the sea as a result of helicopter accident
6.1 Scope
DFU2 applies to all devices within an established area, within the safety zone around
devices, including vessels when they fall under the petroleum regulations.
Capacity for rescuing persons from the sea by helicopter accident is set to a full helicopter (21
persons, including 2 pilots) which is the maximum number of current types of helicopter.
Efficiency Requirements for rescue of personnel in connection with the helicopter accident in the sea:
• By helicopter accident in the sea within the safety zone, the capacity will be sufficient to
to save all people in a full helicopter (currently 21 persons) over 120 minutes.
If the suit has been tested according. Norwegian Oil Industry Association / EN ISO 15027, to obtain a safety
factor critical cooling clearly exceeding 1.5. It is emphasized that the safety factor takes
Based on timecritical hypothermia since this is the only relationship that can
documented by objective tests. Drowning and other lifethreatening events, secondary to
fall into the water, can hardly be mapped with objective tests. These conditions are therefore covered
of the safety factor.
Outside the safety zone is assumed that the requirements stated in the needs analysis (Deldoku
ment 1 of 5, Preliminary study for new rescue helicopter capacity, published by JD 08/06/2010) are imple
mented.
For dimensioning of emergency be 3 minutes per person to rescue a basis, pre
that AWSAR helicopter (the term also night vision goggles) are used, and that everyone on board has per
sonal emergency beacon (PLB). The requirement covers all weather conditions where one can fly transport service,
ref. Norwegian Oil Industry Association 095, Recommended Guidelines for Limiting the helicopter flights
on the Norwegian continental shelf.
If two SAR helicopters are expected to reach these requirements, it must be recent additions
helicopter only considered to have 50% efficiency in the period in which both helicopters parallel
Driver rescue operations. Subsection 6.5.2 in Substrates report provides the substrate for 50% and
shows how such scenarios should be interpreted.
When helicopter optionally placed on land temporarily (e.g. caused by poor
weather), one should take into account what this means for mobilization and response time, and eventually put
restrictions on the number of passengers in the helicopter, so that the time requirement of 120 minutes still can
fulfilled for all on board. It shall be possible to document changes in assumptions and the
restrictions introduced.
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If AWSAR helicopter is not available, a rescue boat and / or standby vessel
used, with the weather limitations that this entails. The same weather limitations will also
apply when transport service with helicopter must be stopped. When standby vessel to be used,
assumed that it is equipped with rescue agents (rescue net / cone with cone or equivalent)
can effectively get people out of the sea in a gentle way. Subsection 6.4
Substrates The report provides an overview of data about the effectiveness of such a rescue helicopter and
standby vessel / rescue boat, with emphasis on helicopter.
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7. DFU3: Personnel in the sea at emergency evacuation
7.1 Scope
DFU3 applies to all devices within an established area, including vessels when they fall
under the petroleum regulations.
7.2.1 Overview
The possibility that a larger or smaller number of people end up in the sea or in such
condition that they need fast rescue in connection with the emergency evacuation, is strongly influenced by
circumstances and device characteristics, including evakueringsmidlenes robustness and approved
het.
The basis for the dimensioning of emergency should be twofold:
• The capacity must reflect the any assumptions as to the quantitative risk
analysis, often related to the number of people will not reach primary evacuation, and
rescue capacity that is required in these situations, that the RAC should be
satisfied.
• The capacity must secondly dimensioning the likely number of people who need fast
rescue / survival after an emergency evacuation with primary evacuation to sea.
To obtain a logic distinguish requirements for different devices that reflect such differences,
it is assumed that emergency preparedness is dimensioned based on the likelihood that emergency evacuation
to provide a larger or smaller number of persons in the water. The probability must be determined from the input
directional characteristics, including evakueringsmidlenes robustness and goodness. This implies
also that there must be established a limit for the probability that must be applied in this
dimensioning.
7.2.2 Method for riskbased sizing of rescue capacity
It is assumed that one has carried out a detailed, quantitative evacuation analysis, either as a
independent analysis or as part of a full quantitative risk analysis (QRA / TRA) in order to
use a riskbased approach.
This is a level of detail contained in the detailed QRA / TRA for production facilities, while per
currently it is not normal to do so detailed risk analysis of evacuation for mobile
devices. Such a level of detail that is prescribed here, will be required if the acceptance of
authorities to be expected. If not, the analysis of this level of detail
available, the deterministic approach is used, see Figure 1 .
To conduct a riskbased sizing of rescue capacity the following steps:
1. Assumptions, assumptions and results of quantitative risk analysis be reviewed to
determine the need for rescue personnel who are required to meet the acceptance criteria for
risk.
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2. The maximum number of people coming out of the scenarios in step 1, the minimum capacity
for the rescue of persons in the water.
3. In addition, established a probable number of people (based on quantitative risk analysis) that can
need rescue from a classification of devices, with respect to goodness of escape routes and
evacuation.
4. If the number of persons in the step 3 is higher than the minimum capacity of Step 2, the
number of step 3 which is dimensioned, otherwise retained the number of step 2.
As an alternative to the riskbased approach can be simplified, deterministic approach
selected. The method is illustrated by a flow chart as shown in Figure 1. It is assumed that
riskbased approach always be taken into sufficient detail escape, evaku
Grading and rescue analysis (EER) is present. There may also be other reasons why a voter
deterministic method in accordance with Table 1.
There is established a deterministic process based on a categorization of the devices in
a small number of categories that reflect the goodness of evacuation of the device.
In principle, these categories represent determination of the probable number of people
who may need rescue from rafts, sea or lifeboats . Table 1 gives rules for dimensioning
readiness for the deterministic method.
For manufacturing devices by a bridge, it is primarily intended to be a bridge to other
fixed base. It is not possible to give a clear indication of how the table should be used,
if permanently stationed accommodation unit included in the field concept used. If there is a very low
frequency (<10 4 per year) to a major accident while the bridge is not available, for example due.
weather conditions, flotell considered to correspond to a fixed housing platform respect. using Table 1 for
dimensioning capacity for rescue personnel at sea. When this frequency is not negli
sjerbar, one of the other tabs is selected, acc. the facility's characteristics.
It is emphasized that the four categories in Table 1 is relatively coarse and can therefore not be expected
to cover any situation or any concept. Where there are very specific circumstances, it should be done
a dedicated analysis, or may choose to add more conservative assumptions basis of dimensions
tions no.
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Yes no
Detailed quantitative EER
analysis available?
riskbased Deterministic
sizing sizing
of capacity, of capacity,
DFU3 DFU3, see Table 1
Step 3.
Step 1. Determine the probable number of
Assumptions etc. from EER people will need Use Table 1
analyzes people who are not rescue from risk analysis
when the lifeboat station (W / focus on EER), to meet
risk acceptance criteria
Step 2.
Establish the maximum number that does not
when the lifeboat station
Step 4.
Maximum number becomes
design for
device
Capacity
Capacity
DFU3 determined
DFU3 determined
with
with riskbased
deterministically
sizing
sizing
Figure 1 Basis for dimensioning the capacity for rescue of people in the sea at
emergency evacuation
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Table 1 Simplified rules for sizing the capacity for rescue of persons at sea
Device characteristics Functional requirements for capacity red
solution of survivors nødeva
kuering (survival suits)
• Production facility with freefall lifeboats, regardless 5% of POB as injured persons in
staffing levels: intact lifeboat or sea
• Production ship with well protected escape tunnel and 5% of POB as injured persons in
refuge area provided for all hydrocarbon areas, and intact lifeboat or sea
freefall lifeboats:
• Production Facilities with a bridge connection to another Rescue Capacity dimensioned
fixed base, regardless evacuation possibilities: not 2 .
• A device with conventional lifeboats, without 25% of POB as injured people
gangway, regardless of staffing levels (Not higher than 1 full lifeboat) in
sea / damaged lifeboat
For documentation of the requirements in Table 1, see Substrate report , Subsection 7.1. riskbased
sizing is discussed in Substrates report , Subsection 7.2.
7.2.3 Other emergency requirements
There are usually requirements for survivor capacity (see subsection 1.2. 1) on standby vessels,
often in the range from 200 to 300. The review made by the emergency response requirements in
connection with the emergency evacuation of the greater number of people, shows that it is not probable scena
matters which may require such survivor capacity.
This presupposes that the other emergency requirements defined in this chapter are carried out,
and the relevant probability reducing measures are implemented to limit the probability of
major accidents.
Efficiency Requirements for rescue of personnel in connection with the evacuation of personnel to the sea
is based on the similarity between it ending up in the sea after an emergency evacuation and it ending up in
sea after a helicopter accident. Performance requirements for DFU3 is therefore similar to
DFU2:
• It must be possible to save the number of people who are determined based on risk analysis during
120 minutes, assuming that all have access to a survival suit, whether when primary evacuation
agents, or must get directly to the fleet or to the sea.
2 For devices with a gangway will kindness and protection of escape routes must be highly critical of the
there will be people who have to be rescued from the sea or not. This will come directly from the risk analysis or his
assumptions, step 1 in Figure 1.
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This requirement means that immersion suits must be deployed so that they any groups acc. risk
analysis can be prevented now muster stations can access the suits during escape.
If it is not possible to achieve this requirement, the requirement for rescue personnel groups without
immersion suit be much stricter.
The assumptions that are discussed for the time requirement of 120 minutes in relation to DFU2 (see Subsection
6.3) also apply here.
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8. DFU4: Risk of collision
8.1 Scope
Emergency preparedness capacity is not relevant for DFUs danger of collision. Two categories events
included, related to ship collisions and drifting and / object. Dimensioning
capacity is therefore relatively trivial for this DFU.
AIS shall be included in the monitoring system, and detecting AIS signals from ships at a distance of
minimum of 20 nautical mil in 360 degree coverage around the installation.
8.3.1 Ships on collision course
The required response time that is set up based on the requirements as set forth herein, are:
• The unit shall be notified of ships on a potential collision course (ie the nearest passerings
point within the safety zone) as early as possible, and at least 50 min. before possible collision
point.
• Decision on evacuation be taken so early that it can be completed by a certain time
margin relative to estimated results date. Normally this would imply at least 25 min. before likely
meet.
It should be noted that the monitoring of maritime traffic can be carried out from land or from the facilities themselves,
as long as one meets the overall time requirements and can achieve continuous monitoring. Best
practice, the monitoring of a traffic, either Ekofisk Sandsli (Statoil Marin) or
cooperation with the NCA.
The requirement to implement evacuation 25 minutes before possible hit point, in some to
Traps need to be extended. An example of such a situation, if the full lifeboat evacuation requires
that a number of free fall lifeboats (more than 3) is to be launched with the same orientation.
It must then be carried out independent studies to determine the required time separation between
launching of lifeboats, to ensure against collision engine failure and other failure.
8.3.2 drifting and / object
Efficiency requirements related to the detection of the drifting vessel, article or device:
• Larger vessels / installations: Detected at ca. 20 nm distance
• Small craft: Detected at least 12 nm distance
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9. DFU5: Acute oil spills
Dimensioning of combating acute oil spills are not included in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064.
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10. DFU6: Fire in need of external assistance
10.1 Scope
Capacity of external cooling by fire on the platform shall be designed in accordance. assumptions
is made in the risk analysis. This will generally be described rescue vessel with reference
to class 2 or 3 acc. NMD regulations.
10.3 Efficiency Requirements
Response time requirements for external assistance for fire device must be determined
from assumptions and / or requirements in quantitative risk analysis. In this context, the following should
priorities apply:
• Requirements for response times for remote firefighting made only in cases where the protection of
personal safety / main safety requires rapid mobilization of such capacity.
• It is assumed that the rapid mobilization of external firefighters are required to to
satisfy facility's acceptance criteria for personnel risks.
• Where there is only safeguarding property values that indicate the need for external brannbe
fight solution, it is assumed that in regard to the risk analysis is carried out costbenefit
analysis, to determine whether the requirements beyond those justified by the personal risk to be set.
In determining the Norwegian Oil Industry Association 064: 2012 is the only one production facility in Norwegian
Continental Shelf acc. risk require external brannbekjempning sake of safeguarding
personal safety.
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11. DFU7: Personal injury / illness requiring external
assistance
11.1 Scope
With the available substrate material is drawn following conclusions regard. necessary
capacity in relation to emergency medical response and transport:
• Disease: The capacity dimensioned from 1 person with serious illness
• Damage: The capacity dimensioned out of 2 people, one with serious injuries and
with less serious injuries 3
When it comes to harm, it must also be given to how to solve a situation with helicopter
terhavari on the helideck; latest injury picture suggests three serious injuries and four minor injuries,
see Subsection 12 .
The requirements for emergency medical assistance by injury / illness is the following:
• Acute medical response:
• This is defined as the time from when the need for emergency medical assistance is identi
fied and so help arrives patient. Prior to this, there will be a period of time
with initial diagnosis and needs clarification.
• Acute medical response may include resources that are already on the device,
For example, drugs for thrombolysis and expertise to such treatment. when this
not the case, the requirement for emergency medical response include also external resources.
• Acute medical response with the use of external resources should normally not exceed
1 hour.
• Acute medical transport time:
• Defined as the time from the decision to send ashore are taken to date hospital.
• The transport time should not exceed 3 hours.
• The requirement for emergency medical transportation is relevant both for serious illness and injury.
3 The most recent SAR machines (EC225) can take up to four stretcher patients.
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12. DFU8: Helicopter accident on device
12.1 Scope
DFU8 applies to all devices, including vessels that fall under the petroleum regulations
and which has a helicopter deck. DFU8 must normally be handled by the facility's own preparedness
resources. It is included in the Norwegian oil and gas 064 to ensure that it becomes common and realistic
requirements in the industry, also outside the established areas.
The contingency plan for each installation must define what level of ambition should be for
treating injured by helicopter accident on the facility, and describe how this is solved
with available resources.
Number of severely injured in helicopter crash on helideck has primary importance for dimensioning
of the facility's capacity to first aid.
It has previously been established practice in many companies to base 7 severely injured by
helicopter crash on helideck. Statoil has changed his practice from 2010/11, and now assume
on most devices 4 a damaging image with 1 fatality, 3 seriously injured and four minor injuries,
corresponding to a dimensioning injury image with overturned helicopter deck subsequent
fire. The same assumption is assumed in this guideline for helicopter accident
means as follows:
• 1 dead, 3 seriously injured and four slightly injured basis for all devices.
Although the number of injuries is considerably reduced compared to what has been suggested previously (7/7/7)
it is still a nonnegligible degree of conservatism in the design values that are
provided herein, when held up against data from relevant AEs from the North Sea and
worldwide. This is discussed in Section 12.1 in substrates report , Which is also to some extent
documents the basis for the requirement for emergency capacity.
It is furthermore found that the need to send a number of serious injuries to the land will be done
with the common resources areas. It may be necessary to use the winch to take on board stretchers
in SAR helicopter, since a damaged helicopter must be expected to block the use of the helideck
normally.
It is not applicable with efficiency requirements related to external resources DFU8, since this
DFU should be handled with the facility's own resources. Efficiency requirements for DFU7 (see
Subsection 11.3 ) are also relevant.
4 Except for devices with low staffing, and few landings per week.
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13. Verification of the requirements meet
It is essential for goodness of area contingency arrangements that such verifications
of the requirements for emergency response can meet. All DSHAs in connection with area emergency preparedness (with
except DFU7) are rare events, which means that verification must be done through exercises
and to some extent analyzes. When planning the exercises, there are two overriding considerations to be
safeguarded; Firstly, the verification is done under the most realistic circumstances. But
simultaneously can not expose the crew and any markers to unnecessary risks during
exercises. Risk for everyone involved must always be considered in connection with planning
exercises. For matters related to the training of emergency response resources, see Subsection 12.3 in Norwegian oil
and gas 064.
Each device is responsible for verification of the emergency requirements can be met. a realis
athletic, running verification plan must include verification of all requirements related to DSHAs that
are appropriate for the device, including inter alia helicopters and rescue vessels, as well as those of
DFUs 1.8 are appropriate, see Subsection 3.3. Verification plan must specifically focus on
how to verify that the requirements are met under marginal conditions.
When it comes to exercises related to rescue personnel at sea, the former to some extent been
primarily focus on high volume of exercises, perhaps with insufficient focus on verification of claim
under marginal conditions, see also Subsection 12.3 . It is essential that exercises also carried
under marginal conditions, i.e., waves, wind, temperature, light, etc., but with focus on avoiding
unnecessary risk for all involved as specified above.

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