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    Fitzgerald

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    Luciano

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    Dame Poche) Ladin Urmence un he TDP's . Ubon amd Protucar Drona hin Dy Uns newnly q lad porn Pues, 1°94 4 ECLA and the Formation of Latin American Economic Doctrine EV.K, FitzGerald Introduction The foundation ofthe United Nations S:onomie Commission for Latin Amer= fea (ECLA) in 1948 was recognized atthe time asa crucial step ia the postwar construction of a regional doctrine of trade and industrialization. More recently, significant scholarly reassessmeats have related the body of ¢co- nomic ideas associated with ECLA to the wider tradi sion ideology and subsequent Latin American debates on structuralism and ependency theory." However, these ideas are stil generally regarded as autochthonous critique of orthodex trade theory arising from the Latin ‘American experlence of the Great Depression, tn this chapter | “relocate eatly ECLA theory in the specific context of the international debate on the Organization of the world economy In the aftermath of World War It Technical accounts of ceplino (from CEPAL, Comisién Econémica para ms of lae-industrializa- América Latina, the Spanish name for the commision) economic propos. tlons, and the institutional history of ECLA itself can be fourud elsewhere, Drawing on those accounts inthis chapter Ife thre propositions on the history of Lain American thought, Fits, the intiuional context within Which ECLA and its doctrine wer established is best understood in terms of ‘he stated Latin American aspiration to move tua dt feripnery to the snlstalized center of the worl economy. Second, the issue of unequal change and late Indusrsizaon developed by BCLA had along intele- ‘ual history that was well known in Latin America bythe 1940s, to which ‘he Peebtch model was an addon rather than a depart. Thi, a reread ing of the early cpatin publications i the light of these ewe propositions » 90 FV. FitzGerald fin American perception of the world econ- provides new evidence ofthe Ls ‘omy inthe immediate postwar period, This historical and theoretical contex- tualiztion is not intended to question the originality of the “center-periph- ‘ery model” of trade and industrlalization, Locating early ECLA thought in the appropriate inellectual and practical context can only emphasize the sigolficance of economic doctsine at this crucial moment in modern Latin ‘American history.” “The Postwar Reinsertion of Latin America in the World Feonomy ‘The concern in Latin Amerkea over the region's role in postwar economic arrangements formed patt of wider international debate chroughout the decade about the organization ofthe world economy.* In 1942 the United Sates and Brien ache 4 peliminaryagyveryar on she need to reshape soba trade and payments systems that sensed from a shared interpreta tion of the dangers of a return tothe protectionism of the iterwar years: between 1929 and 1933 world trade haul declined by 65 percent in value and 25 percent in volume * To complement free trade in manufactures, Keyes and others pointed out the yeed to avoid disastrous fluctuations in ase Inaterials prices and to coordinate national macroeconomic policies, afore World War il European views on the economic development of Africa and Asia weve, quite naturally, derived fom colonial policy. Unt the 19205 the United States held similar views about its southern neighbors “which, slong with the Monroe Docteine, had tationaly generated consid- erable resentment in Latin America. lndeed, between the wats Latin Ametica average incomes were well above could not be considered “poor” si subsistence Jevels anal comparable with those obtained it Southern and astern Europe, Industry ia the region was viewed by outside observers as relatively dynamic, even if much of the impetus was considered to come from foreign corporations and immigrants rather than frotn the local elites, who were characterized a8 traditional landlords and buseaucrats.” ‘After the Great Depression views on world economic development Inegan to change ard found reflection within the United States inthe influ cemtial books by Eugene Staley published in 1939 and 1944, Staley called for ‘support for the industralization of the so-calied noncolonial South fo en sre its integration with the intemationa} division of labor.* For this pur~ pose he classified Argentina and Chile with France an Australia, and Mex: ECLA and Economic Doctrine — fot ico, Peru, and Colombia with Spain, Portugal, and the USSR.” He also. aed ta ate mterveaton a wl at ncmatona ap mer eed the Suh cing Jaan. TrkyMeccoané fap hedng seg Fe oan of eee of at he tere ame devon of wor Eran ne dy leo Ln ness) as manifested n+ epor daw up by Say Bes he walan deat the Lp in 93. pln for wl eter sevens sony influenced the ccaton othe United noon rod Sol Conse mn ® ln fac mor tan «decade et, n 1975, the Confrence of Aiea Sues avs aay ese rete OS ple ee Latin Aer and the Cabo Atte Seve Fame Colo in Monti n 1993, Corde al moaned the Sesto sls icy" wha th new “od Neg mn hw “od Wt” ay al ore of Puerto Rico, Latin Ameti ‘ents now begen to per n stem now bgen to prsve pease chang in ther esther stat nd this outlook seemed to be confirmed atthe Panama Conference in 1939 when the United States announced its commitment to industial invest 4 Latin America and the establishment ofthe Export-Import Bank to provide federal fun for capa equipment exports to he ein in 194 At Breton ods im 1944 arenes was reich to establish the eatin nde Orsuotaton, the nematonl Notary Fund, and be nenational Sank for Rerticion and Development in onder to stables primary ody prices, promote workl rade in manufoetures, and plan tavere tment. The Latin American delegations at Bretion Woods seemed justified in ‘ssuming that although the Ales were commited 0 the US. postion thet th pavar worl onomy would be bated on fie tae ich a sy ‘would both provide for Latin American access « US. markets and for sistance in their own industralization 2 fies we Ltn Aeris le new invest hed eon netken dig ihe Soot ec fel sep of cpt goods rm the Ue fut scp thse srs prodeig atepeepont fo the Ales ss indus ployment had expanded ply, ad the hcorpo fain of whan group within the piel system ceed new pressre fr indsial expansion andthe provision of social Inasauctire. Mowever, tin American govemnments could no longer rely on the suppl p tt A on the supply of ches lal wage gods, party peasant pedced fod, to roe te 92) VK. FasGeralt ‘comes of urban industrial workers during adjustment to export decine, at Inad been the case in the 1930s." Latin American governments legally anticipated that the strategy of increased industrial investment and manufac ‘ured exports necessary to ensure both economie development and social stability would receive strong support from the United States. Although the Latin American shate of world trade had risen from 8 percent in 1938 t0 13 percent in 1946, much of this was due to the growth In commerce between the republics during the war and the collipse of European trade. To the general arguments for a new international economic order was added the alarming fact that Latin America's terms oftade 1 1940 stood at 33 percent below their 1928 level and by 1946 had fallen by afurther 23 percent (se table 13).'4 ‘The per capita purchasing power of export, taking into account volume changes, from Latin America in 1940-1944 was litle more than half what it had been in 1925-1929. The considerable accumulation of dollar veserves uring the war reflected the contvaction of import valumes far below those ‘experienced during the Great Dopression."? In consequence, the fect that ‘gross domestic product had grown by 3.4 percent annually between 1539 and 1945 was seen a the time as a rearguard action against trading odds and not, as later interpretations would suggest, esa positive result of import substite- tion, Moreover, as Carlos Diaz-Alefaniro has pointed out, the expansion- ary macroeconomic monetary policy that supported demand for the ouput ‘of domestic industry duving the 1940 was essentially the unintended conse- ‘Table 13. Latin America: External Trade, 1925-1949 1925-29 940-346 1855-99 HHO Export volume oo s 4 » us Price mex: Expose 7 ° a6 0 4 Imports ae o ” ps is Teens of wade 140 5 » ~ to4 Inport capac: “Tual % 6 ue n 1 Per capes ne n u wa 96 Suc: Une Nalons, Eno Comeniin fr Latin Ameria, Ea Serf ath Ana, 184 We Yor Unted Natl, SEL” PLLA end Economic Doctrine 98 quence of the abandonment of the gold standaed and the collapse of fiscal revenues ftom trade,” At the inter-Ametican conference at Chapultepee in early 1945 dhe Latin American governments expressed strong views on the organization of mat- kets for aw materials, particularly the issues of price stability and access to the United States for manufactured exports, especially from those industries Se up to support the Allied war efor."* Washington, however, refused to ‘commit itself to aid or tariff preferences and condemned Latin American proposals for development planning. The United Staes now appeared to ‘egand the economic problens ofthe region a essentially internal rather than 48 bound up with the international trade system and seemed mainly iner- ‘ted the allegiance of Latin America in the emerging struggle ageinst communis," Eventhough this major shift in the US. position evidently reflected now strategic priors, twas still widely assumed in Latin Ameica {hat industrial investment would be supported by the resumption of the concessionary credits required to purchase technology from the United ‘States. A regional version of the Marshall Plan for Europe was even proposed at the 1948 Inter-American Conference in Bogota, albeit without success. Nonetheless, there was still some expectation that new internatlonat ar zangements would be more favorable to the region. The establishment ofthe Intemational Trade Organization (TO) was confirmed in Havana in 1948, although U.S, support tuened out to be one ofthe last manifestations ofthe "Freedom from Want” policies of the Roosevelt-Truman era. The Latin Americans regarded the “Havana Charter” 38 legtimicing thei aspirations 1o the satus of membership in the “North” that was accorded to Central Europe between the wars and was now being granted tothe dominions ofthe British Commonwealth, The Havana mesting aso seemed to the Latin Ameri- «ans to imply the continuation of the wartime export stabilization schemes and technology transfers that had been denied at Chapultepec, However, the U.S. Congress subsequenty refused to ratify the ITO and the initiation ofthe Cold War transformed the international agenda for the 1950s. The fallure of the Hevana Charter was perceived by Latin American governments as representing rejection by the United States and the regon’s unwilling inclusion in a “Thicd World” emerging from decolonization. ‘The nature and objectives of inter-American economic cooperation as set out by Staley were aniong the fst victims of the Cold War. The failure of the Havana Chatter was thus seen as « profound politcal rebuff, a “shift that 98) VK FitaGerad ‘was regarded as a betrayal by Latin America” and that was to have a radical cffect on regional economic doctrine. Contemporary Theories of Trade and Development ‘The growth of the Latin American economies was in the 1940s, and sil is, {riven by the income from saw materials exports and dependect upon imported capital goods for investment. The terms of trade were seen as exogenously determined and inevitably became the central Focus of eco- nomic debate i te region. The idea thatthe prices of primary commesities, both minerals and agriculture. were i some sense unfairly depressed relative to imported manufactures went back as far asthe era of the viceroyalties during the eighteenth cenary. Equally, the concept of “unequal exchange tn the broad sense of the "North" seting prices so shat the rewin on its own) resources is higher than that of the “South,” had a long history in economic thought extending back to Ricardo and Mill? Ricardo had based the clasi- cal concept of comparative advantage on the technial conditions governing the labor inputs to traded coramodities, which permit the product ofa days ‘work in one country to be exchanged for that of several days’ work tn another. Neoclassical trade theory broke away from the labor theory of value through the introduction ofthe concept of “reciprocal demand” in which the market fr the products deterasines their price. Both Variants were to reappear in the postwar debates jitated by ECLA, “he onc of unequal exchange had een wiey employed in Cent urope during the 1920s to justify planned industrislization, although the seed for tariff protection in order to “catch up" with technologically more advanced industrial nations had been advanced in the mid-nineteenth een tury by Friedrich tist The Central European theorists regarded unequal ‘exchange as the key feature of trade betwcen groups of nations atthe “center” and the "periphery" of the world economy. This specific terminology was apparently frst used by the German economic historian Wemer Sombart ‘whose analysis of European history published in 1928 described a domsinant cener—Great Britain supported by the United States—swrrounded hy an exploited and dominated pesiphery consisting of Central. Eastern, and South cen Lurope.** The economists of the Frankfurt School hotly contested this ‘view on the orthodox Marxist grounds that exploitation by one proletariat {and thus one “country” by another was theoretically impossible. >” None- theless, Sombant’s theory enjoyed considerable support among Central Furo- ECLA and Economic Dnetrine 95 pean nationalists promoting ststeled industrialization and economic au tarky to overcome technological disadvantage. Another strand of Ricardo's ‘model was taken up in 1929 by iffe Romanian economist Mihail Mancileseu ‘who argued that sarplus labor and low productivity in the agricultural sector resulted in depressed export prices and thatthe substantial urban-tural wage siiferenial was a handicap to the expansion of industrial demand. By the carly 1930s the debate in Europe on cenerperiphery relations was well known and widely discussed in Latin America including Argentina, ‘although there was no formal theory for Latin Ameria as such,” Sombart ‘was initally readin German but was translated and published io Mexico in 1946, He defined the “center” and “periphery” as follows; "To find our way “brough the chaos of events fin the world economy). we should distinguish between the central capitalist countries and a mass of peripheral countries, ‘The former are active directive nations, the latter are passive and directed." Ernest Friedrich Wagemann, a Chilean who had studied in Germany tn the 1920s, published bis Evolcin y ritmo deta econonia mundial in 1953, which ‘was based onthe ideas of Sombart and widely read in Latin Amerie atthe time; a Portuguese translation of Manoilesea’s Theory was published in Sto Paulo in 1931.2" It Uhrefore appears most unlikely that Prebisch himself ‘who was not only of German origin and a profesor of economics but ale sctively involved i debates on international trade, was unaware of the origins of the contemporary center-periphery concept Nationalist views on niequal exchange wie an integral part of Argentine political discourse at the time. it was also common to make comparisons between Argentina and the British dowsinions, and Prebisch visited Australia during the 1930s. 2 The influence of List is explicit in the writing of Alejandro Bunge and his Revista de Economia Argentina stoup that thea went on to Influence the early stages of Peronism, Indced throughout thie period there ‘was constant discusston in Argentina about stateled industalization that involved both military figures and “ingeniers like Bunge and Adolfo Dort- san. Peebsch himself scems to have remained more interested in interna onal monetary issues during this period although after 1940 he did come lander the more liberal politcal influence of Federico Pinedo, who as finance minister pressed for proindustrial policies based on market mechanisms, * During the 19405 major European and North American debates took place om issues of world trade, monetary policy, and economic development, with 9) BVA. Pier Particular artention being paid tothe coiseguences of the mismanagement of intermatonal economic relations barween the wars. Much ofthe most tenportanc contemporary workin economic theory was rapidly trenlated by EL TrimastreEeonmic andthe Fondo de Cultura Econdmica from the ely thirtes onward 28 were significant local eontibutons on postwar economic prospects. The deat of Keynes on both macroeconomic management and intemational economic organization were aso wellknown in the region by the id-1940s, and in fact Prebisch himsel published a short summary of the General Theory in 1987.” tn this way. despite the comparative olan of Jatin America from Europe during the Second Work! War, young economists were well aware of contemporary Furopean economics and social teary." The combination of these prewar debates on indusralization ia the South” end the emergence of new theories of trade and macroeconomic management inthe “Noni” provided th intellectal context within which latin American economists reacted 0 the flle of the Havana Char in 1948, The establishment of the United Nations Economie Commision for Latin America (ECLA) inthe same year provided an ideal veiele for thet ‘Views, The United Nations Economic and Soctal Council founded ECLA, with strong support from Secretary-General Ti.,7= Lie two years after had been proposed st the fist session ofthe United Naslons General Assembly ‘n 1946,” Ac that time Latin America accounted for swenty out ofthe tol UN. membership of ifiy-one nations and having been allies of the vistors during the war logically expec considerable external support for thet ‘egional organization. However, the industalized counties led by the United States resisted the idea from the stat on the grounds that ECLA might become a platform for international trade clams, which were better eon- tained witia the more docile Organization of American States. As a rel, after some hard bargaining ECLA was orginally founded for a three-year probationary period and only became a permanent body within the UN system in 1951. ‘The View from Santiago ‘The fist product ofthe newly founded ECLA was the Economic Survey of Latin America, 1948, which appeased before Prebisch became a member of the commission." The report presented a structuralist interpretation of the evelopment of the main Latin. American! economies since 1937. The m CLA and Economie Dostrine 97 difference from subsequent Surveys was the relatively uncritical evaluation of Coreign trade Prebsch was In charge ofthe 1949 Survey, but before this was released he published his celebrated essay The Economie Devclopment of Latin Americ and its Principal Problems. ® The propositions put forwatd i this essay, and their subsequent incorporation into the 1949 Survey, geneated ‘considerable discussion and much bist ei fied witk the ECLA positon as a whole.® The 1948 Survey was overshadowed by the political impact of the 1949 ‘Survey but presented valuable insights on the origins of ECLA doctsine. Past Li"Growth, Disuilbciam, and Disparities: An Interpretation of the Process of Economic Development") of the 1948 Survey brought together valuable data on the main economies of the region for the frst time. Inthe analysis ‘of foreign trade and industry considerable use was made ofthe earlier League ‘of Nations methodology, particularly the effect ofthe lower income elasticity ‘of demand for primary conunodities as compared with Industrial goods, in ‘order to explain the deterioration ofthe terms of rade (for which date since 1870 is presented. The text also shows that many of the premises of the industraitzation strategy that ECLA was to develop in the 1950s were al ready widely ace3pied, 9) 2s tht nee for Fla ang ad the attribution of low manufacturing productivity to the lack of private investment and the availablity of cheap fabor. * Past 2 of the 1948 Survey, entitled “Economic Development of Selected Latin American Counties." contained much excellent data desived from detaled appendixes on industralization in the larger countries of the re- gion. The data substantiated empirically the negative ellect on growth of changing world trade conditions. These studies, which were partly based on research carried out by the authors before the foundation of ECLA ite, helped to define cepaling ideas on industeialization, The aggregate data (see "able 14) ilustrate the rapid expansion of “import capacity” (a statlstical concept apparently invented by ECLA) immediately after the outbreak of peace, followed by stagnation: actual imports ose rapidly between 1945 and 1947 a3 accumulated reserves were spent and then dropped back asthe terms of trade effect and profit outflows squeezed liquidity.” ‘The effect of this import constraint was reflected more in the stagnation ‘of consumption than in investment (ee table 15), therefore implying that ‘unequal exchange was lealing o severe social tensions. The country studies ‘were also the prelude not only 10 4 number of important ECLA ideas abo 3m, rapidly becoming identi 98 BY. K. FizGerolt ‘Table U4 Latin America: The External Constraint, 1 cof constant 1950 USS. dollars) 1949 (in bilions Soc: ted Nats, Fanon Common or ain Ameria, noe Srey of ain Amer Testc1ese New York Ued Stow 195416 "tos dt detrital deie 15 Strate, iere, an ception of etal sechaogy Self bt ao an epson af the dome ont pled he expusion ck mee dy by on” owner tome nso sch ple try ste Ve Havana meg ECLA conned oe foal verona e196 Su. ih sinned give ube ote Giga saseat htt pseaton of eee The pra Sting Pei a cet Dankarhe psbsiy ben crcl ming these tener scan Conece t Havana hot the aaj international trade. By the same token, however, his conservative views om fiscal and mone-ary tnaties weve also ev ide in *h: final version that was presented atthe meeting of ECLA at Montevideo in 1950. The 1949 Survey ‘Table 15. Latin America: Production and Accunsuation, 1945-1949 (in bilions of constant 1930 U.S. dolats) 7 1945 19451947194 1949 cor ba mo ye Me? treat on ae Comampon ag. mst fons apeeenyeofcoh i) ns Poca cs some Se of at mere Sune Vine Nass, one Comes fr Lata Aer, 1951-1952 New Tee’ Une Nation, 1934 5 aol 9, CLA und Ecouomle Doctrine — 99 ess mostly made up of the expanded version ofthe Prebisch mod of trade relations and a cltique ofthe then orthodox monetary approach to bance of payments theory. His view inipled not only «radial analyis of the économie problens ofthe periphery but also an outpoken etiam ofthe behavior ofthe center in setting high prices. wages, and prot for tself on the one hand and tetrding the spread of technology and industry onthe othe. The 1949 Survey suggested an industrial polly based om domestic matkets not aan optional solution. however, but ather ae the only alterna lve o the expansion of manufactired exports an thus moxe import open, ness on the part of the cote." The “center-priphery” model stout i the 1949 Sarsey contained four key points: 1 The terms of trade teflet a combination of collusive behavior by labor and business at the center, which cait “make” prices because of ite market control, and of surplus labor at the periphery, which must "take Prices because of competition between suppliers. The result i a builtin balance of payments disequilibrium. 2 2 The difusion of technology from the center to the periphery is retarded by Institutional constraints, lack of investment, atd poor labor ‘mobility. The control of world market prices by the central economies means that any increase in productivity atthe periphery leads only to increased profits atthe center a export prices fll 3. Impor substitution is a “second best alternative to fale prices for Primary commodities and access (0 center markets for manufactured ex- ports, but it may be necessary in order to create employment. 2? 4. National planning isle ievted by the experience of state interven: Hon atthe center during the war ana the aced to ensure that domestic profit re used for industrial investment rather than kuxury consumption The cricial step in the argument, upon whit the force of the ECLA critique depended, was thas the lack of competition atthe center “he theory also refutes the classical assumption of competition... both the factor and product markets of the Center fare] operating under monopolistic markets, utile competitive markets prevail atthe periphery." A Fesnano Hen, wwe Cardoso has pointed out, Prebisch’s position was therefore not a repudiation of Ricaido—as neoclasical sities incorrectly. sated—-but rather a protest thatthe mutual Ricardian beneis from trade wre being ‘nequitably distributed because of northern protectionism. Indeed Furtado states that Prebisch himself was initially no interested in an ECLA post but Hoof EV K PieGerald rather was engaged as a consultant and produced the “polemical text” for Havana atthe last moment. The text di nor eitcize neoclassical theory as such but rather the lack of diffusion of technological progress du to intemna- onal arrangements, Furtado defines Prebisch’s postion as follows: “to ‘escape the constrains of the existing international onder, the peripheral countries had to adopt the road of industralization, the high road for access to the fruits of technical progress. [although in proposing ths, Prebsch] ‘exposed his lank to an easy counter-attack from the academic world, ‘which demanded a conceptual rigor he did not possess" In the wake of the international furor that followed the 1949 Survey, the ‘official ECLA view of intemational trade was considerably modified for the 1950-1951 Survey.” This document marked a major statistical advance on tis predecessor by using a series of national accounts, which permited {international comparisons. However, che centerperiphery model was drat cally changed, The radical Ricardian critique of terms of trade deterioration "8 4 reflection of world power was replaced by an interpretation based on the diference between the income elasticity of demand for imports of raw ‘materiis and that for manufactures. In other words, the problem sas ‘contingent on the nature of the commodities and consumer demand rather than on the process of capital accumulation aud state power. The 1950-1951 Survey was essentially a more elaborate version of the trade model gives in ‘he 1948 Survey, even though the structuralist analysis of supply determna- tion and Income distribution at the periphery was retained Even this modified ECLA view on the historical trend in the terms of trade was mercilessly atacked by neoclassical economists as being both empin «ally and theoretically untenable. * The surveys of the early 1950s eontinied With the essentially Keynesian approach, and although the managemen: of international finance and the tack of development aid were sll erticized, che center was no longer lckd to be exploling the periphery through unequal exchange.” This domesticated version of cpaline doctrine rapidly became an integral part of governmental discourse in the reglon—and ECLA sur vived its probation to became a permanent part ofthe U.N. system. ECLA Doctrine in Retrospect Although the systematic exposition of the center periphery model and the statlstical support provided by the surveys'were very welcome, ECLA theory ECLA and Economie Doctrine — 101 4id not come 28a grea surprise to Latin American economists, The reaction against the theory came from neoclassical economists atthe centr, patiew- larly because the critique came ftom a U.N. institution ed by a respected ‘eral banker. It is probably inaccurate to regard the origins of the center- periphery model as essentially autochthonous and based on the expcence of the interwar years. Nor can ECLA thought be reduced to an expresiion of regional nationaliin inthe tradition of earlier thinkers such a josé Carlos Maridtegui and Victor Rail Haya de la Torre because ECLA economists, with the exception of Juan Noyola, seem to have been laygely innocent of Mara ism." Prebisch himself, abetted by his biographers, claimed to have thought up the idea of the center-periphery model by himself in his account the pathogenesis was due to his experience ofthe forced deinking of America Siow the world economy during the interwar period, an interpretation tt has been extended to the origins of Latin American dependency theory as a whole. Cardoso and Anibal Pinto ate rather mote circumspect: they atab tte the centerperiphery model to Prebisch but view it as a technical critique of neoclassical trade theory. The most comprehensive study of ECLA economics, by Octavio Rodriguer, discreetly avoids the whale question of theoretical antecedents, referring only to the influence on Prebisch of the ‘experience of central banking in Argentina between the wars. Furtado, probably the outstanding Latin American economist of his gen plies that she essence of the modet was based on nether theory nor expe ‘ence but rather was a natlonatist statement. 1Uis perhaps omderstandsble that in the immediate postwar period Pre- bisch preferred to overiook the Central Furopean antecedents of his model Somat had become a convert to National Socialism, to which Prbisch was particularly antipatheti and Manoilscu had been a member of the Iron ‘Guard. To the untstored eye, tike that of businesspeople in the United States, the centerperiphery model appeared if anything to reflect Leninist theories of impetialism. an error subsequently compounded by dependency theo- ¥ists, This confusion was exacerbated by the statements of Prebich himaelf ‘concerning his intellectual formation, For example, he dismissed the “rst. stage of hi thought, before ECLA, in a few words: “important theoretical Problems emerged in my mind,” he remarked vaguely. ** He acknowledged bo itelectual mentors, even for the subject of his doctoral dissertation on Pareto, and omitted his 1947 book on Keynes from his bibliographical ‘curriculum vite, Above al, Prebisch continually clalmed the sole author. woz JB VK, FitzGeralt tary policy remained unrepentantly orthodox.” The theory of unequal the North.”* However, the ordinal “ECLA model” of international trade in quences for world prices ofthe eligopoiste postion of the center as & provlacer of not only manufactures but also raw materials Conclusion “The Intemational Trade Oxganization was never established. The General ‘Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) setup in 1947 protected the interests ECLA and Economic Doe mf 10 of the indasealized counties. The United Nations Conference on Trade, Aid, and Development (UNCTAD) was created in 1964 with Prebisch ay ity sectetary-gencral but without the power to counterbalance unequal ex. ange: In recent years the United States has attempted to extend to world eae in services the same protectionist measures I reset lit on goods at the Havana conference neatly half a cemury ago, * We can draw only tentative conclusions a3 tothe formation of modem Lavin American economic doctrine from the argument presented io thie chapter, particularly because so much research on a In the postwar period remains to be done. Yet it <épalino theory is best understood as part of a wi world order ional economic debstes les seem clear that eatly ider postwar debate on the nd not as a delayed reaction to the Great Depression or @ Precuror of Thisd World developmentalism. fn the even, by promoting haport substitution, ECLA may even have contributed to the {allure re

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