Scope of the Series Contemporary Philosophies and Theories in Education signifies new directions and possibilities out of a traditional field of philosophy and education. Around the globe, exciting scholarship that breaks down and reformulates traditions in the humanities and social sciences is being created in the field of education scholarship. This series provides a venue for publication by education scholars whose work reflect the ‘An Age of Counter-Hegemonic Distrust: The Emergence of Critical Human Rights 25 fh. Human rights and human suffering, from this perspective, have become a regu- industry. (0 the analyses of human rights markets, considerations of power 2001) treatise on the of Human Rights highlights the centrality of polities and power in human talks within the context of the post-Cold War era and in the age of globalisa- tion, and it exposes the possibilities for understanding rights “as both sustaining existing forms of dominance and providing a powerful tool with which to challenge those forms” (Evans, 2001, p. 34). He further articulates the shortcomings ofa fixa- tion with international human rights law (Evans, 2001, p. 55) and demonstrates that ‘people who stand in the way of trade-related self-determination and to “freely pursue their econo ries, respectively, with the discourse of modern human rights, Hami shts provided both an overarching ideological framework of contemporary capi ike... they can emancipat suggests. He also asserts and dominate, protect and control”, Douzinas (2010, p. that human rights “have become a means for regulating human life, and so have anew configu- ). These tary po , 2007, rights facilitate the expansion and I logics; contribute to the reproduction of inequalities and unequal te the exercise of bio-power and the over- regulation of bodies. iques of human rights come together in Hopgood’s (2013) provocative ‘contemporary treatise on The Endtimes of Human Rights. Hopgood dismisses rights as imperialism in the guise of moralism’ (Gearty, 2013). He, according to Landman (2014), argues that the ‘sacred metanarrative” of Human rights (United Nations codes and conventions) ignores human rights (the daily ‘organic, localised and self styled’ strugsles against oppression). In the wake of its dectining moral authority, Hopgood (2013, p. 2) suggests that human rights function as an “ideological alibi toIts Time: Critical Human Rights Education in an Age of Counter Hegemonic jose governance structures sustain persistent unfaimess and bla reveals that human rights and liberal capitalism were 'y. Keet has tried to demonstrate this sets of analyses post the adoption of ly arguing that HRE should inte- instream understanding of human rights as introductory chapter, to argue and advocate for a CHRE that can regenerate the radical transformative potential of human rights and RE. In the upcoming chapters of this book, we pursue various interpretive schemes, | more or less associated with Crical Theory and Critical Pedagogy to assert that HRE, in its declarationist format, is incapable of supporting a socially just human, rights discourse, To the contrary, i is anti-educational., Critical Human Rights Education |A variety of definitions and provisions are compiled in the Office of the High fR) booklet on The Right to Human Rights nature. This is confirmed by Article 4 of tates that HRE ‘should be based on the cof Human Rights and relevant treaties and 2 ‘awareness, understanding and acceptance of ‘universal human rights standards and principles, as well as guarantees at the inter- national, regional and national levels for the protection of human rights and funda- is beginning, where the definitional transformation of, in this case, HRE (see Keet, 2014). We view critique in two ways, as per Delanty's (2011, pp. 88-89) insights: "Firstly, critique takes as its starting. point a sense of a problem or crisis in the objective order of society. The second level of critique has a stronger interpretative dimension to it but may be termed reconstructive critique in that its aim is to reconstruct the immanent possibilities in a given situation” ‘There are different ways in which scholars and practitioners have tried to make sense of human rights ee ‘The first substantive exploration on HRE models was presented by 1002) work on Emerging Models of Human al Human Rights Edacation n ishes between the values and awareness, account ing the intellectual trend set by Tibbitts, logical orientations that give rise to three @ HRE for ‘Transformative Action. Bajaj (2011, p. 489) links her categories to Dembour's (2010, p. 1) useful model for distinguishing between four schools of thought: “‘nat~ tural scholars’ conceive of human rights as given; ‘deliberative scholars’ as agreed ‘protest scholars’ as foughe for; and “discourse scholars’ as talked about”. “protest” scholars may be more likely to align with HRE for Transformative ‘deliberative’ and ‘natural’ scholars may be more inclined towards HRE for Global Citizenship” (Bajaj, 2011, p. 489). itizenship, presents emphasising rights framework, ... creat . 492). In the third model, “HE for Transform: ships are 1at might effectively result in greater respect is unclear what kind of is safe to ‘human rights standards. a logical impossibility. Rather, ques in mind, Bajaj frames her orientations on the canvas of human rights ‘and thus cannot escape the declarationism that has, for the past 15 yeas ‘hampered substantive pro the HRE field. In Baja’s model, itis the orienta- tion to human rights thet fluctuates, while human rights universals are the fixed reference points. “CoysH(2014, p. 89) provides a productive critique of HRE, which “illustrates how the United Nations (UN) has enabled a narrow and manufactured type of human rights education discourse to take shape in practice by validating certain forms of knowledge (institutional, expert, technical) while burying and discounting others (cultural, indigenous, community)” Ina carefully crafted analysis, she sug- est “construction of a global human rights education discourse ha: fore relied upon the subjugation of particular types of knowledge i rights education, so that historical knowledges are buried or masked"; second, “it occurred by subjugating a whole range of different forms of knowledge that were discounted or disqualified as non- have a place” (Coysh, 201 89). In the “transformation” and “transformative turns authority to human rights universals, while ignorin the standard generating ppveses elf Coysh COLd,p 108) pues at rather “than widening he scopeFirst, human rights education eannot be detached from is na ment lates ina society of difference rather than as a homogeno : diferent context everyday experi concepts While Coysh’s (20 justrious, her assumptions for a radical peda gogy are surprsi .e assumptions have been reflected in ‘many HRE formulations and practices from 1995 onwards. Elsewhere, Keet (20102, pp. 36-37), in an underdeveloped argument, presented five approaches as part of his, conceptual analysis of HRE: compliance; political literacy; social cohesion; resis is was meant to provide the basis on which to argue for Critical postmodem pedagogy as far as HRE is concerned (Keet, 2010b). ‘Admittedly, Keet’s arguments (2010b) lacked sophistication and given the weak~ nesses of his own framings (2012, 2014), he subsequently started framing, tionist framing that has brought human rights insignificance, we define CHRE as a pedagosi struggles) and Human Second, ethics should be seen as a central c issue of difference in an THRE needs a language that ies that do not reduce the issues of power, justice, struggle, and inequality toa single script. Fifth, CHRE creates new forms of human rights knowledge thar is produced in the space between Human Rights and human rights. Sixth, CHRE should develop alternatives by combining the languages of ‘human rights critiques and human rights possibilities. Seventh, CHRE nee develop a theory of human rights prac and educators as formative tuals who occupy specifiable political and social locations. Eighth, CHRE merges the polities of voice with the primacy of the political. Human Rights Education 2» Giroux’s (1997) formulations, if taken up, can contribute to developing a praxis that is engaged with both Critical Social Theory and Critical Pedagogy, but con- ive as Critical Human Rights Education (CHRE) because it takes the critiques of human rights and a critical relationship with human rights universals as its starting points. The way in which rights bearers and human rights subjects are consiructed, the power relations that are central tothe constitution of these subjects, and the interpretive schemes that make the notion of difference take shape in trans- formative ways, would be central to CHRE. Additionally, it would be an under- standing of buman rights as a language of eritical hope and possibilities (Keet, 2014), as argued in Chap. 7, where new knowledges and political strategies are generated in the space between Human Rights and human rights. More than any- ‘where els, the development of a disciplinary knowledge-base on which basis the autonomy and professionali human rights practitioners rights educators) as form: In alignment with Girow ide the conceptual directives for HRE, but rather be viewed as part of all the discourses that are subjected to critical analyses within HRE, Such an approach would open up the conceptual spaces so that the 1d the micro-politics ‘An HREE that is grounded in dclaratonism must forfeit its claims to being “exper ental, ‘pacar’ or ‘manciaton” and relinuish the pos fix of ‘education’ ‘Third, CHRE requires an alternat regurgitation of international, regional and national human rights provisions. Thi language must be rooted in the notion of human wrongs. There is a conceptual dif- ference between a human wrong’ and a ‘human rights: the Donnelly Gibb exchange in Egendorf (2003): Human Rights: Opposing View30. 2 It Ts Time: Critical Human Rights Education in an Age of Counter Hegemonic Distrust rights violations’ are composed on the basis of non-compliance with stated regula- tions or laws, a technical or administrative deviation, inaction, or professional. Conclusion An alternative confi; ion of HRE as a Critical Human Rights Educatior ‘GeanEOTEETEeo, Chap. 11. ks perpen incompleteness and it “is on this perspective of the ‘objectives’ of HIRE, in the United Nations dis- View and summon HRE endeavours to beyond their discourse should be summoned to and beyond its own untruth; through which the falsehoods of a declarationist HRE is called to account by HRE itself. Baxi, in a sense, had, at the time, already formulated the founding principle of a CHRE. In an uncanny way, he (1994, p. 30) framed the “critiques of against ‘market- friendly’ and HRE a rational critique of capi been forestalled by a declarati practical principles specified e hich are rooted in an analysis of the unjust fhuman-rights-related arrangements on local and global level is areal chance for Critical Human Rights Education to contribute to des ‘counter-hegemonic project and contribute more product ‘broader purposes of education. References 31 Bas, U. (1994). Human rights education: The promise ofthe third mallenniamn? Papex presented 10 = LUNN, Member States and Non-Governmental Organisation in the occasion ofthe launching of ‘A. 2001). Getting it right: Exploring the conception and presentation of human ‘education. Unpublished paper. Retieved from hup/www_umn.eduhumans! RA. (2002). Human rights horizons. The pursuit of justice in a globalising world. London: Routledge. Fine, R. (2010), Political argument andthe legitimacy of inernational law: A case of distorted ‘modernisation {PDF file]. Retrieved fom hitp:/www2.warwick a ukfacso/sociology! staffemerituslobertinefomelteachingmatriaVbumanrghtsfpfeadings/ine_poltical_argu- rment_and_the_Jegitimacy_of intemational_law pdf Ford, P, Johosion, B., Mitchell, R, & Myles, F. (2008), Social work education and criticality Foucault. M. (2003). Society must be defended: Lectres tthe college de France (pp. 1995-1916). ‘New York: Picador. France: Declaration of the Right of Man and the Citizen. (1789, August 26). Retrieved ftom32 2. Iels Time: Critical Homan Rights Education in an Age of Counter-egemonic Distrust | Goodale, M, (2006), Towards a eitical anthropology of human eights. Current Anthropology 73), 485-50. Gundogdu, A. 20 Hannah Arendt and the contemporary les of migrants. New York: Oxford Univesity Press. LA. (2003). The political philosophy of needs, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Keet, A. (20106). Hunan rights education: 4 conceptual analysis. Ssavricken, Germany: [Lambert Academie Publishers. eet, 2012), Discourse, betrayal, critique: The renewal of human nights education. In C. Roux pe and the regeneration of human rights education. In 3), Discerning erica! hope in educa Penns Rudd, K. (2009, Feteuary 20-29). The global financial crises. The Monthly (Australian Pot Society & Culture) “Tibbitts, F. (2002), Understanding what we do: Emerging models for human rights education Intemational Review of Education, 483-4), 159-171 fs a human right or as traded service? Chapter 3 The Political and Pedagogical Renewal of Human Rights Education Introduction ‘The last few decades, as we outlined in the previous chapter, have witnessed the evolution of human rights education (HRE) into a field that sources its currency of human rights and their moral ted Nations Universal Declaration legitimation and delesi features” (p. 1).AS does not have a dys rights. Consequen productive opposite becomes dominant [...] Thus, now more than ever, HRE need of critique and renewal” (2012, p. 8). The basis of this renew. ity to articulate human rights and human rights education along the lines of acitical engagement that is neither caught up in human rights idolatry, nor is conservative and uncritical. Thus, this chapter begins our exploration of various possibilities for responding to the challenges outlined in the fist two chapters by engaging ina crti- cal consideration of human rights and its implications for BRE. In particular, this chapter takes up Foucault's polities of human rights and sug- gests that it may constitute a valuable point of departure for the renewal of HRE nat only because it rejects the moral superiority of humanism—the grounding for the sn rights—but also because it le and as strategic tools