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SCC Online Web Edition, © 2023 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
Page 1 Friday, April 28, 2023

Printed For: Balaji kannan, The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar Law University
SCC Online Web Edition: http://www.scconline.com
© 2023 EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd., Lucknow.
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2nd MAIMS National Moot, 2021

Best Team Memorial - Respondent
Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of IDEE

Petition Under Article 136 & 32 of the Constitution of IDEE, 1950
In the Matter of
Appellate Jurisdiction
SLP No. of 2021
Mr. Moore … Appellant;
Versus
State of Thor … Respondent.
Clubbed With
Writ Jurisdiction
W.P. No. of 2021
Mr. Reader & Pait (NGO) … Petitioner;
Versus
Union of Idee … Respondent.
W.P. No. of 2021
Susan (NGO) … Petitioner;
Versus
Union of Idee … Respondent;
W.P. No. of 2021
Ms. Lacid & Ms. Bond … Petitioner;
Versus
Union of Idee … Respondent.
Upon Submission to the Hon'ble Chief Justice and his Companion
Justices of Supreme Court of IDEE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVATIONS 5
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 6
• Legislation Referred
• Cases Referred
• Books Referred
• Web Sources
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 9
STATEMENT OF FACTS 10
• Background
• Relevant Facts
• Judicial Treatment
ISSUES RAISED 11
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 12
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 13
1. The Petitions filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court are 13
not maintainable
1.1. The Petition filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of 13
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IDEE under Article 136 of the constitution of IDEE is not

maintainable
1.1.1. Socio economic offence requires different approach 14
1.1.2. Article. 136 only after exhausting alternative 14
remedies
1.2. The petition filed before the Hon'ble supreme court of 15
IDEE under Article 32 of the constitution of IDEE is
maintainable or not
1.2.1. No fundamental right violation 15
2. Mr. Moore is not entitled to bail in criminal case 16
registered vide FIR No. 96/2020
2.1. Monetary position of the accused and amount involved in 16
criminal case
2.2. Presumption of Prima facia case special laws 17
2.3. Interest of public interest over individual right 17
2.4. Economic offences affecting the country as a whole 17
3. Sex workers have no inherent right to trade and 18
occupation
3.1. The law does not explicitly legalize prostitution 18
3.2. Sex-workers have no right under article 19(1)g 19
3.3. Sex-work is restricted under article 19(6) 20
4. There already exist enforcement/implementation
mechanism against child porn content
4.1. Legal standing of child pornography 21
4.1.1. Child pornography under it act 21
4.1.2. Child pornography under other statutes 22
4.2. Position of Intermediaries 23
4.3. Soft wares for the purpose of detection 24
5. Ms. Laid and Ms. Bond have no inherent right of privacy 24
against media trials
5.1 Freedom of press under art. 19 24
5.1. Existing protection against media trial 25
5.1.2 Exceptional circumstances 25
5.2 Inherent right to privacy against media 26
5.2.1 Excessive restriction on art.19 detrimental 26
5.2.2 Blanket ban in the name of privacy unconstitutional 27
PRAYER 28
LIST OF ABBREVATIONS
S. No ABBREVATIONS FULL FORM
1. § Section
2. ¶ Paragraph
3. & And
4. AIR All India Reporter
5. All Allahabad High Court
6. Bom CR(Cri) Bombay Cases Reporter (Criminal)
7. Crim. LR Criminal Law Review
8. DRJ Delhi Reported Journal
9. ECHR European Court Of Human Rights
10. Hon'ble Honourable
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11. i.e., That Is

12. Ltd. Limited
13. M.L.J Madras Law Journal
14. Mad. Madras
15. MANU Manupatra
16. No. Number
17. Ors. Others
18. SC Supreme Court
19. SCC Supreme Court Cases
20. U/§ Under Section
21. v. Versus
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
LEGISLATIONS REFERRED
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
• Constitution of India
• Penal Code, 1860
• The Information Technology Act, 2000
• Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956
• Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
• Protection of Child from Sexual Offence Act, 2012
CASES REFERRED
S. No CASES CITATION
1 A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC (1988) 2 SCC 602 : AIR
602 : AIR 1988 SC 1531. 1988 SC 1531.
2 Pritam Singh v. State AIR 1950 SC 169.
3 D.C Mills v. Commisssioner of Income Tax, AIR 1955 SC 55.
West Bengal
4 Haripada Dey v. State of West Bengal, AIR AIR 1956 SC 757
1956 SC 757.
5 State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar (2017) 13 SCC 751
6 Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of (2004) 3 SCC 214.
Trustees, Port of Mumbai
7 R.J Singh Ahluwalia v. Delhi, (1970) 3 SCC 451
8 Ballabhdas v. State of Bihar, (1962) 2 SCR 967
9 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parent of (1982) 2 SCC 583 : AIR
Student Medical College 1983 SC 339.
10 Sanjeev Coke v. Bharat Cooking, (1983) 1 SCC 147 : AIR
1983 SC 239.
11 Naresh Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR AIR 1967 SC 1.
1967 SC 1.
12 State of Rajasthan v. Balchand alias Baliya AIR 1966 SC 2447
13 State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar, (2017) 13 SCC 751.
14 Himanshu Chandravadan Desai v. State of (2006) 1 Cri LJ 186 (SC)
Gujrat,
15 Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. C.B.I., (2013) 7 SCC 439
16 Naresh Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1
17 Yassin Mohammad v. Town Area Committee, AIR 1952 SC 115.
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18 Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1995) 1 SCC 574.

19 State of Bihar v. Project UchchaVidya, (2006) 2 SCC 545.
Sikshak Sangh,
20 Minerva Mills v. Union of India (1980) 2 SCC 591 : AIR
1980 SC 1789.
21 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR
1973 SC 1461.
22 M. Nagaraj v. Union of India (2006) 8 SCC 212.
23 Buddhadeb Bhattacharya v. State of West (2011) 1 SCC 216 : AIR
Bengal 2011 SC 538.
24 Chandra Bhavan v. State of Mysore (1969) 3 SCC 84 : (1970) 2
SCR 600
25 Garg R.K. v. Union of India AIR 1981 SC 2318.
26 Kamlesh Vaswani v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 592.
27 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015) 5 SCC 1 : AIR 2015
SC 1523.
28 P.G. Sam Infant Jones v. State Rep. by the 2021 SCC Online Mad 2241
Inspector of Police
29 Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh (2008) 5 SCC 117 : AIR
Anand 2008 SC 2234.
30 Sakal papers v. Union of India AIR 1962 SC 305.
31 Virender v. State of Punjab AIR 1958 SC 986.
32 Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124.
33 Siddhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1
34 Santosh Kumar Singh v. State (2010) 9 SCC 747.
35 Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P. (2016) 9 SCC 541.
36 Siddhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1.
37 Santosh Kumar Singh v. State (2010) 9 SCC 747.
38 Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P., (2016) 9 SCC 541.
39 Mukesh v. State of NCT (2013) 2 SCC 587.
40 Sahara India Real Estate Corporation. Ltd. v. AIR 2012 SC 3829.
Securities and exchange Board of India
41 Subramanian Swami v. Union of India (2016) 7 SCC 221 : AIR
2016 SC 2728.
42 Sushil Sharma v. The State (Delhi 1996 Cri LJ 3944.
Administration)
43 Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641.
44 L.I.C. v. Manu Bhai Shah, (1992) 3 SCC 637
45 Manu Sharma v. State, (2010) 6 SCC 1
46 Sanjeev Nanda v. State, 2007 Cri LJ 3786.
47 Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124.
48 Raja Gopal v. State of T.N. (1994) 6 SCC 632.
49 People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of (1997) 1 SCC 301.
India
50 State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal (2008) 13 SCC 5.
Shah
51 Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 : AIR
2017 SC 4161.
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52 Harijai Singh v. In re : Vijayakumar (1996) 6 SCC 466 : AIR

1997 SC 73.
53 Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi AIR 1950 SC 129.
54 Indian Express Newspaper v. Union of India (1985) 1 SCC 641.
JOURNALS
• AIR - All India Reporter
• SCC - Supreme Court Cases
COMMENTARIES
AUTHOR TITLE EDITION
M.V. Pylee Constitutional 3rd ed. 2010
Amendments in India
Aravindh P. Datar Commentary on the 22nd ed. reprint 2010
Constitution of India, Vol 2
Durga Das Basu Commentary on the 8th ed. 2007
Constitution of India, Vol 2
P.S.A Pillai Criminal Law 12th ed. 2014
Hari Singh Gour The Penal Law of India 11th ed. 1998
WEB SOURCES
• http://www.scconline.com
• http://www.manupatra.com
• http://www.heinonline.com
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Appellant/Petitioners have herein approached the Supreme Court of IDEE. The
court cannot hear the petition since it is not maintainable before this Hon'ble Supreme
Court of IDEE because
1 Appellant : Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of
IDEE cannot be filed because there is no substantial question of law.
2. Petitioners : Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of IDEE
cannot be filed as there is no violation of fundamental rights
So, Supreme Court of IDEE do not have jurisdiction to conduct the case.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
BACKGROUND
Digital Revolution is flourishing in IDEE as a result need for stricter law was also
felt.
IDEE is following the constitution and laws which are Pari Materia to the Union of
India.
RELEVANT FACTS
Mr. Moore launched an app called “Rose”. This app explicitly showcases 18+ content
for its premium subscribers and further, it connects the users to the service provider
who will do anything as per the customers’ demand.
Mr. Reader who is a notable journalist in his meeting with an NGO namely
“Protection against Immoral Trafficking” (PAIT) conversed about the negative side of
the Rose app. On 28th September 2020, Mr. Reader wrote an article named “Rose App
certainly has a lot of thorns in it”. In which he revealed all the dark sides of the Rose
app. On 19th November 2020, a special investigation team was constituted under the
Federal Unit of Investigation (FUI) and 09.12.2020 they arrested Mr. Moore and lodged
FIR under
1. IDEE Penal Code- U/s 293, 294, 317, 339, 340, 341, 342, 354, 361, 362, 363,
365, 366, 366B, 367, 368, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 506, 509 and 511
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2. The Information Technology Act, 2000- § 67

3. Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956- § 7, 8, 10, 10A, 18, 20
4. Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.- § 4
JUDICIAL TREATMENT
Mr. Moore applied for bail in the Sessions and High court of Thor but it was rejected.
Hence, he approached this Hon'ble Supreme Court of IDEE to grant him bail.
Besides two actresses, namely Ms. Lacid and Ms. Bond have filed a petition before
this Hon'ble Supreme Court for seeking protection as their privacy is violated because
of media trial which portrays them to be the part of the app.
Meantime, Mr. Reader and PAIT filed a petition before Supreme Court to recognize
the right of Sex workers as it is not an immoral act
Another NGO namely Susan petitioned before the Supreme Court stating that they
need stringent directions for child pornography and regulations over digital media and
apps.
ISSUES RAISED
THE FOLLOWING ISSUES ARE PRESENTED BEFORE THE COURT IN THE
INSTANT MANNER
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE Hon'ble SUPREME COURT ARE
MAINTAINABLE OR NOT
ISSUE II
WHETHER MR MOORE IS ENTITLED TO BAIL IN CRIMINAL CASE REGISTERED VIDE
FIR NO. 96/2020?
ISSUE III
WHETHER SEX WORKERS HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT OF TRADE AND OCCUPATION?
ISSUE IV
WHETHER THERE EXISTS ANY ENFORCEMENT/IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM
AGAINST CHILD PORN CONTENT?
ISSUE V
WHETHER MS. LAID AND MS. BOND HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT OF PRIVACY AGAINST
MEDIA TRIALS?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. WHETHER THE PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE Hon'ble SUPREME COURT ARE
MAINTAINABLE OR NOT
It is humbly submitted that Petition under Article 136 and Article 32 is not
maintainable since there is no substantial question of law regarding bail and there is
no violation of fundamental rights
II. WHETHER MR MOORE IS ENTITLED TO BAIL IN CRIMINAL CASE
REGISTERED VIDE FIR NO. 96/2020?
It is humbly submitted that the economic offence committed by the appellant is a
class apart and a grave offence against the whole of country. To protect the interest of
the public the counsel craves to refuse the bail appealed by the appellant/accused Mr.
Moore.
III. WHETHER SEX WORKERS HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT OF TRADE AND
OCCUPATION?
It is humbly submitted that sex workers have no inherent right to trade and
occupation since it is restricted under Article 19(6) because it is against public interest
due to its immorality.
IV. WHETHER THERE EXISTS ANY ENFORCEMENT/IMPLEMENTATION
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MECHANISM AGAINST CHILD PORN CONTENT?

It is humbly submitted that there exists proper enforcement/implementation
mechanism against child porn content. For instance intermediaries are regulated,
proper software exists for detection of child porn content.
V. WHETHER MS. LAID AND MS. BOND HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT OF PRIVACY
AGAINST MEDIA TRIALS?
It is humbly submitted that right to privacy under Article.21 cannot be inherent
against another fundamental right. New restrictions cannot be imposed upon
Article.19 which fall outside the purview of Article 19(2).
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. WHETHER THE PETITIONS FILED BEFORE THE Hon'ble SUPREME COURT ARE
MAINTAINABLE OR NOT
1.1. THE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE Hon'ble SUPREME COURT OF IDEE
UNDER ART. 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IDEE IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.
The Council for the Respondents Humbly submits that the present special leave
petition filed under Art. 136 of the IDEE Constitution is not maintainable as there has
been no miscarriage of justice and reasonable procedural adherence has indeed been
followed. This Hon'ble Court in the case of A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak1 this Hon'ble
court held the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit, i.e. the act of any court, will not
prejudice any man, is founded on the principle of justice and good conscience. Gross
miscarriage of justice or departure of legal procedure
This Hon'ble Court in a plethora of cases held that the ambit of Art.136 should only
be exercised in granting to exceptional cases2 and it must involve a substantial
question of law which it has not dealt with before/The council for the respondents
humbly submit that the present petition does not arise of an extraordinary situation
nor does it seek to address any substantial question of law and hence cannot be
maintainable3 .
In the Haripada Dey v. State of West Bengal4 this Hon'ble Court held that special
leave will be granted only if there has been a gross miscarriage of justice or departure
from the legal procedure, such as, which vitiates the whole trial or if the finding of fact
were such as shocking to the judicial conscience of the Court. The council humbly
submit that there has been no such injustice in the instant case and thee Hon'ble
Supreme Court with reasonable procedural adherence denied the grant of bail.
1.1.1. SOCIO ECONOMIC OFFENCE REQUIRES DIFFERENT APPROACH
In the case of State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar5 , The Supreme Court observed that
there is no straight-jacket formula for consideration of grant of bail to an accused.
Granting of bail depends on fact and circumstances of each case. Socio-economic
offences need application of different approach in the matter of bail and should be
considered seriously.
The respondents submit that the power conferred under Art. 136 has been utilized
increasingly to determine individual controversies because a case has “failed to receive
the needed care, attention and approach…and the conscience of this Court pricks it or
its heart bleeds for imparting justice or undoing injustice”.6 This Hon'ble Court in a
catena of cases established the principle that it is extremely reluctant to entertain an
entirely new plea, not raised earlier before the subordinate courts, but being raised for
the first time in appeal before it, especially when the new plea is founded on facts7 .
1.1.2. ART. 136 ONLY AFTER EXHAUSTING ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES
Another limitation imposed by this Hon'ble Court on itself is that it does not usually
entertain appeals against an order of a subordinate court unless the appellant has
exhausted the alternative remedies provided by the relevant law8 . In the present
appeal, the appellant had the option of approaching the Supreme Court under Article
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134 of the Constitution of IDEE, however, they have hastily sought the discretion of
this Hon'ble court. This Court has repeatedly stressed that Article 136 is not intended
to permit direct access to this Court where another equally efficacious remedy is
available and the question involved is not of any public importance; and that this
Court will not ordinarily exercise its jurisdiction under Article 136 unless the appellant
has exhausted all other remedies open to him.
Thus the respondent humbly submits that the present Special leave petition before
this Hon'ble court is not maintainable.
1.2. THE PETITION FILED BEFORE THE Hon'ble SUPREME COURT OF IDEE
UNDER ART. 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF IDEE IS NOT MAINTAINABLE
It is most humbly submitted that the present writ petition is not maintainable
before this Hon'ble Court. The petitioners have filed a writ petition under Art. 32 of the
IDEE Constitution and have approached this Hon'ble Court for violation the
Fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the Constitution. The Council for the
respondents submits that the Hon'ble High Court of Thor exercised due diligence and
passed the impugned order which does not violate the fundamental rights of any
person, but on the contrary, seeks to protect the rights.
It is humbly submitted by the respondents that, PIL means public interest litigation
is a not publicity seeking litigation. Plethora of PIL's have been filed for publicity
seeking purposes this court has held that PIL is a weapon in the armoury of law that
should be used for the purposes beneficial to the public.9 It is submitted that the
instant petition does not satisfy the ingredients of a PIL. At the very first juncture, this
petition raises frivolous and baseless questions which need not be answered by the
Supreme Court under any circumstance10 .
1.2.1. NO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT VIOLATION
It is further most respectfully submitted by the respondents that there is no
violation of Fundamental Rights in the instant case. Art : 32 is a mere remedy
available only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, it is followed that no
question other than that relating to a fundamental right will be determined in a
proceeding under Art. 325 . If the validity of other provisions of the statute is
challenged on grounds other than the violation of fundamental rights, the court would
not entertain that challenge in a proceeding under Art. 32 of the constitution of Grand-
line6
In other words even where the Supreme Court finds that a law must be held to be
void, being in contravention of some provision of the constitution, a 5 judge bench of
this court held that it cannot give a relief under Article 32 unless and until it is
satisfied that the right of infringement complained of by the petitioner, is a
fundamental right 7 , it cannot be dependent on determination of question of law or
fact but must be a clear breach of a fundamental right 8 .
The right to speech and expression under Art. 19(1) (a)11 of the constitution is not
absolute in nature and comes with certain restrictions enshrined under Art. 19 (2) and
it is most respectfully submitted that the impugned orders fall under the ambit of this
clause and hence does not violate any Fundamental rights as contended by the
Petitioner. Hence this petition is not maintainable before this Hon'ble Court.
Thus the writ petitions filed by the petitioners are not maintainable before this
Hon'ble Supreme Court of IDEE.
2 WHETHER MR MOORE IS ENTITLED TO BAIL IN CRIMINAL CASE REGISTERED
VIDE FIR NO. 96/2020?
The counsel for respondents humbly submits that in the present case the decision
of High court of Thor is valid. Socio-economic offences need application of different
approach in the matter of bail and should be considered seriously. The Supreme Court
observed that no doubt “bail is rule and jail is an exception12 ” is well established rule
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of our criminal; jurisprudence but there is no straight-jacket formula for consideration

of grant of bail to an accused. Granting of bail depends on fact and circumstances of
each case13 .
2.1. MONETARY POSITION OF THE ACCUSED AND AMOUNT INVOLVED IN
CRIMINAL CASE
In socioeconomic offences always the court considers monetary position of the
accused and amount involved in criminal case. The counsel humbly craves that in the
present case the monetary position of the accused and amount involved in criminal
case has been well established by the FBI through its investigation. More the accused
is economically sound and more the amount involved in criminal case; it cause more
the chance of affecting the requirements of criminal justice, more the accused is unfit
for bail, thereby, more the chance of refusal to grant bail14 .
2.2. PRESUMPTION OF PRIMA FACIA CASE SPECIAL LAWS
In socio-economic offences when prohibited act is proved, presumption is made
regarding mens rea thereby about commission of crime and in such case naturally
burden of proof for mens rea will not be of prosecution but sifts on the accused. When
accusation is made for commission of socioeconomic crime and some materials are
available regarding actus reus then presumption is made regarding crime commission.
Hereby case is prima facie established and in such situation normally bail is rejected.
2.3. INTEREST OF PUBLIC INTEREST OVER INDIVIDUAL RIGHT
In the case of Ashwini Kumar Patra v. Republic of India, The Court observed that it
appears that the crime was committed in a cool, calculated and organized manner
causing wrongful loss of crores to the Bank. There are prima facie materials showing
involvement of the petitioner in the deep-rooted conspiracy with other co-accused
persons to cause such a huge loss to the Bank.
The Court thus held:“granting bail to the petitioner in economic offences of this
nature would be against the larger interest of public and State as it involves criminal
misappropriation and cheating of huge amount of public money and there is also
reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses.”
2.4. ECONOMIC OFFENCES AFFECTING THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE
Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different
approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep rooted conspiracies
and involving huge loss of public funds need to be viewed seriously and considered as
grave offences affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing
serious threat to the financial health of the country15 .
Thus the counsel for respondent humbly craves before this Hon'ble Supreme court
to treat this deep rooted conspired economic offence committed by Mr. Moore as a
class apart and a grave offence against the whole of country and refuse the bail
petition.
3. WHETHER SEX WORKERS HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT OF TRADE AND
OCCUPATION?
Our society does not attain a level of thinking where it will be ready to accept a
situation that cannot be avoided but can be regulated. Furthermore, we are living in a
society where we couldn’t converse frankly about sex. In such a situation legalizing
prostitution, and granting rights for sex workers to practice their occupation will be
against the public interest. Countries that have legalized or decriminalized commercial
sex and which has given the right to practice sex work often undergo a surge in
human trafficking, pimping, and other related crimes
3.1. THAT THE LAW DOE NOT EXPLICITYL LEGALIZE PROSTITUION
In India, the principal law which talks about sex workers is “the Immoral Trafficking
(Prevention) Act (ITPA) of 1986”. Under § 2 (f) of ITPA 1986 defines “Prostitution” as
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the sexual exploitation or abuse of persons for commercial purposes, and the
expression “prostitute” shall be construed accordingly. There is huge ambiguity in this
act i.e., pimping, owning and managing a brothel, living on the earnings of a
prostitute's money, inducing or kidnapping a girl for prostitution, detaining girls in
brothels, seducing a person under custody for prostitution and carrying out
prostitution within 200 meters of any public place like schools, colleges, temples,
hospitals, etc. is considered illegal but nowhere in the section does it says that
prostitution is legal. Because legalizing prostitution will lead to several problems.
Though it is an ancient practice, from the beginning it is considered immoral and
against the public system. Not only is this against the Indian culture, but this will also
further promote this heinous act more and more. People who now refrain from it will
do it openly. Decriminalization will lead to an increase in the number of sex workers
because sex workers from other countries would migrate here. The choice of legalizing
won’t just reinforce the human trafficking nexus in the nation, but will likewise push
more hindered ladies into prostitution. It is a general assumption that a prostitute is
usually a female but in fact it applies even to male and transgender. The law is silent
on this aspect.
3.2. THAT SEX WORKERS HAVE NO RIGHT UNDER ARTICLE 19(1) g
Prostitution, regardless of whether it's legal or not, involves so much harm and
trauma it cannot be seen as a conventional business. The promoters of sanctioning see
sex work as “work” and its criminalization as an infringement of rights. However,
prostitution goes against even the International Labour Organization's definition of
work as it causes bodily harm and is usually undertaken only under financial or some
other form of distress. The definition of prostitution in Immoral Trafficking (Prevention)
Act (ITPA) of 1986 itself says that this work is regarding sexual exploitation or abuse
of persons for commercial purposes.
Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution entails freedom of profession, trade, business
but this is subject to restrictions under Article 19(6). Any imposition, which restricts a
citizen's right to carry on an occupation, trade or business must, accordingly, be held
to be invalid16 . Restrictions can be imposed by subordinate legislation executive
order,17 such as a circular or policy decision in terms of Art. 162 of the Constitution or
otherwise. Such a law must be one enacted by the legislation18 . For any wok to come
under the purview of Article 19(1) (g), it is necessary that it is not excluded by the
restrictions given under Article 19(6) of the Indian Constitution.
The trend in the Supreme Court is that when constitutionality of a statute is
challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable, the Court has to test its validity on the anvil
of Arts. 14, 19 and 21, read together.19 The Constitution is wedded to the concept of
equality20 . The basic principle underlying Article 14 is that law must operate equally on
all persons under like circumstances.21 . They should be treated equal like other human
beings when they decided to come out of the sex work. They should not be harassed
based on their previous work. The article 21 mandates that no person shall be
deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to the procedure established
by law. It would include the right to live with human dignity22 . But performing sex
work doesn’t come under dignity since we live in the society where practicing sex work
is considered against morality
Likewise sex work will not come under article 19(1) g because the work is not
legalized explicitly. Illegal works cannot be practiced under the term of trade,
occupation, business and profession.
3.3. THAT SEXWORK IS RESTRICTED UNDER ARTICLE 19(6)
The main objective of the restriction is to protect and safeguard the citizens. In the
case of Chandra Bhavan v. State of Mysore23 , it is said that fundamental rights are
like empty vessels and do not themselves have some fixed content. Thus when
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fundamental rights are to be interpreted then it must be parallel to the DPSP's.

The effects of considering prostitution under Article 19(1) (g) is not corresponding
to the provisions of directive principle of state policy. Thus the restriction on taking
into account, prostitution under Article 19(1) (g) is legitimate for the interest and
welfare of the general public. Thus, even though “Sex Industry” consider prostitution
as trade but prostitution as a career, trade or business is not valid under Article 19(1)
(g) subjected to restriction under clause 6 of the Indian Constitution. The
reasonableness of a restriction was that it should be in the interests of the general
public, which is probably the best test. Any restriction which to maintain public order,
in the sense, public peace, safety, tranquility, public health, morals are in the interests
of the public. The reasonableness is to be judged with reference to the object of the
legislation and not moral considerations,24 of course, there may be cases where gross
immorality of measure may condemn the legislation as arbitrary or irrational.
Prostitution was considered as an oldest profession but it does not have dignity,
decency and humanity. It is selling of one's modesty and exploitation of one sect of
the society. There are some form of works which are not acceptable in human society.
It seems clear that prostitution cannot meet standards for acceptable work and cannot
be made to meet such standards by improving the working condition. As long as the
poverty, child sexual abuse and racisms are the determents of entry into prostitution,
it cannot be accepted as freely chosen work. Thus it is reasonable to refuse to
recognize prostitutions as “work”. Thus it is clear that prostitution cannot come under
the purview of Article 19(1)(g) and no one can claim pursuing prostitution as their
work as their fundamental right as it is not in the interest of general public.
4. WHETHER THERE EXISTS ANY ENFORCEMENT/IMPLEMENTATION
MECHANISM AGAINST CHILD PORN CONTENT?
According to § 2(da)25 , child pornography is any kind of visual display of overt
sexual activity that engages a child. Such content may be an image, a video or any
computer-generated picture which cannot easily be differentiated from a real child. It
includes all those images which shows a child to be involved in such activities whether
it is created, adapted or modified. Child pornography is one of the most heinous
crimes in existence because it encourages sexual abuse of children, sex tourism,
human trafficking etc.26
4.1. LEGAL STANDING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
The Hon'ble Supreme Court rose to the occasion when the menace of child
pornography in internet was brought to its notice. Websites showing child pornography
had mushroomed in thousands and assumed menacing proportions. The Supreme
Court took cognizance of the matter in Kamlesh Vaswani v. Union of India.27 The
Government of India directed all the Internet Service Providers to disable as many as
9 URLs issued under § 79 (3) (b) of Information Technology Act, 2000 as the content
hosted on the said website related to morality and decency, as dealt with in Article 19
(2)of the Constitution of India.
4.1.1. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER IT ACT
As cybercrimes knows no geographic barriers28 and it could be carried out from
anywhere in the World. Countries including India ought to remain prepared with
adequate legislative measures to combat the same. Information Technology Act, 2000
(Hereinafter referred as IT Act, 2000) being parent legislation to govern information
technology related issues and being a ‘long arm statute is empowered with jurisdiction
to apply against violators in other jurisdictions,’29 also prescribes punishment for those
who abet30 or attempt31 cybercrimes regulated by IT Act, 2000. The IT Act, 2000 does
not prevent from seeking remedy under other laws and even they may be relied upon
as part of legislative response.32
§ 79 of the Act relating to intermediaries is sustained by reading down § 79(3) (b)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
of the Act. The IT (intermediary guide lines) Rules 2011 are also upheld in the same
manner by reading down Rule 3(4).33 Intermediaries ought to exercise due diligence
while dealing with obscene, pornographic, pedophilic content as per the new
guidelines. There is specific provision to punish child pornography and law against
child porn is much stricter than the law governing online pornography in general.34 As
viewing porn per se is not a crime but certain acts have been explicitly made
punishable by law.35 Therefore, even viewing child pornography constitutes an
offence.36
4.1.2. CHILD PORNOGRAPHY UNDER OTHER STATUTES
According to Article 2 of Optional Protocol on the sale of children says that child
pornography includes the depiction of a child involved in either real or simulated
explicit sexual conduct as well as revealing of sexual body parts of a child mainly with
sexual motives. Acts that constitute to be usage of a child for pornographic purposes
have been explained in Sec. 1337 of the Act. Sec 1438 makes it a crime to “use a child
or children for pornographic purposes”, prescribing a punishment of at least five years
jail term with fine. In case of a second or subsequent conviction, it provides for a
minimum sentence of seven years along with fine. § 15 of POSCO also provides for an
enhanced punishment of three to five years imprisonment for anyone who stores or
possesses child pornography for commercial purposes.
Pornography of any form is covered under IPC.39 § 293 of the IPC makes it illegal to
sell, distribute, and exhibit or circular obscene objects to anyone under the age of 20
years, and § 294 makes it a crime to do any obscene act or sing obscene songs in any
public place.
To be very specific, § 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines a ‘child’ to be any person who
has not attained the age of eighteen years. POSCO is gender neutral.40 § 2(14) of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 defines a sexually abused
child as “child in need of care and protection” and recognizes child pornography as
sexual abuse
Chapter III of POSCO deals with using a child for pornographic purposes and
punishment thereof. The Special Court upon receipt of information as to commission of
any offence under the Act by registration of FIR shall on his own or on the application
of the victim make enquiry as to the immediate needs of the child for relief or
rehabilitation and upon giving an opportunity of hearing to the State and other
affected parties including the victim pass appropriate order for interim compensation
and/or rehabilitation of the child.
4.2. POSITION OF INTERMEDIATORIES
ISPs being the intermediaries as defined in § 2(1) (w) of the IT Act has also been
brought under the ambit of § 79. In this context, it is important to note that the
Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology vide OrderNo.1(3)/2016-CLFE,
required ISP in India shall be to adopt and implement Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF) to prevent the distribution and transmission of Online CSAM (Child Sexual
Abuse Material) into India. All such ISPs in India, since then, due diligence exemption
in Sec 79. The due diligence is an obligation to exercise reasonable care.41
Government blocks the websites containing extreme Child sexual Abuse Material
(CSAM) based on INTERPOL's “Worst-of-list” shared periodically by Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) which is the National Nodal Agency for Interpol. The list is shared
with Department of Telecommunications (DoT), who then directs major ISPs to block
such websites.42
4.3. SOFTWARES FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETECTION
The Ministry of Home Affairs has identified the keywords for child pornography/rape
and gang rape content search and circulated to content providers for further action.
There is an international NGO called NCMEC (National Center for Missing & Exploited
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Children) and it maintains a Cyber Tipline. There is a Memorandum of Understanding

between National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB), India and NCMEC, USA and that
provides access to the material available with NCMEC. Indian stated are adopting
software given by Interpol for domestic screening of child pornography. Based on
these filters, the software ‘crawler’ scans the net looking for such images, videos and
text. If they find any such media, it is added to the database after which officers
identify cases that could fall under child pornography.
Hence it is humbly submitted that there are effective legislations, enforcement and
implementation techniques present against child porn content.
5. WHETHER MS. LAID AND MS. BOND HAVE AN INHERENT RIGHT OF PRIVACY
AGAINST MEDIA TRIALS?
The constitutional question is whether freedom of speech can be restricted on
grounds of ‘constitutional sensitivity’ and ‘constitutional compassion’ under Article 19
(2) and by other fundamental rights, specifically Article 21. In the instant case the
petitioners have generalized media without any specifications. A blanket ban on media
solely based on privacy facet of public figures will jeopardize the fourth estate and
defeat the purpose of Art.19(2) if such broadened sense of restriction is granted on a
fundamental right.
5.1. FREEDOM OF PRESS UNDER ART.19
The Media in India stands on the pillar of the Constitution of India, its freedom an
intrinsic fundamental right implied in the Art.19 (1) (a).43 There is no separate
guarantee of freedom of the press and the same is included in the freedom of
expression, which is conferred on all citizens.44 To create a constructive check on the
smooth functioning of democracy, media implicitly claims the right to investigate,
reveal, expose and criticize and thereby give a fair account of the events.45 The media
has played a commendable role by taking an activist stance in a plethora of cases by
pulling in the accused to the hook. Media is the heart of social and political
intercourse. Hence the media has inherent rights to publish the facts and opinions on
a pending case.46
5.1.1. EXISTING PROTECTION AGAINST MEDIA TRIAL
The media has been constantly toiling to unearth the truth in most cases and has
played a central role in delivering justice in the infamous Jessica Lal case47 , Matoo
case48 , Nitish Kataria case49 and the Nirbhaya case50 . The aforementioned cases
explicitly highlight the proactive role played by media which would have otherwise
resulted in a substantial downfall of administration of justice. In Sahara India Real
Estate Corporation. Ltd. v. Securities and Exchange Board of India51 popularly known as
the “Media Guidelines Case”, the Supreme Court carved out a specific exception to the
rule against restraint of media that such orders have to be passed only in cases in
which there is real and substantial risk of prejudice to fairness of the trial. Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech.52 There is no risk of
prejudice as the media was merely performing its duty. Moreover conviction, if any,
would be based not on media's report but what facts are placed on record53 .
5.1.2. EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
The ‘direct and inevitable effect test’ was established in the Express Newspaper
Case54 wherein the Court held that a restriction cannot be imposed on the press which
would amount to a have a direct impact on its freedom of circulation. In LIC v.
Manubhai D. Shah55 , it was held that it is important to extend to the media the right
to freely express its views, sans which would result in a dictatorship and would defeat
the whole purpose of a democracy.
More often than not, truth evolves from the opposing opinions and its suppression
would amount to detrimental growth which the freedom of speech aims at fostering.56
In various cases, the media made a special effort in public interest to get the haughty
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
crooks penalized for their blameworthy activities.57 In the instant case no exceptional
circumstance has been made out by the petitioners. As public figures their image has
been shared. A case cannot be held as a characteristic of media trial as the right to
circulate also includes the right to determine the volume of circulation58 .
5.2. INHERENT RIGHT TO PRIVACY AGAINST MEDIA
It is humbly submitted that one fundamental right cannot be held superior over the
other in a rigid nature. Right to privacy is a fundamental right emanating from Article
21 of the Constitution of India.59
5.2.1. EXCESSIVE RESTRICTION ON ART.19 DETRIMENTAL
The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has observed that the freedom of press is
regarded as the mother of all liberties in a democratic society.60 The Inter-American
Court has also indicated that the media plays an essential role as a vehicle or
instrument for the exercise of freedom of expression and information, in its individual
and collective aspects, in a democratic society. Freedom of Press is sanctified by our
Constitution, validated by four decades of freedom and indispensable to our future as
a Nation. This cannot be diluted based on baseless allegations. Such contentions of
violation of right to free trial being infringed by freedom of press based on mere
publishing of reports must not be entertained.
The freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1) (a) is already subjected
to restrictions by Article 19(2). Making efforts to strengthen these restrictions by other
fundamental rights like Article 21 is slowly chipping away the right to free speech that
is guaranteed to all citizens. The usage of words like constitutional sensitivity is highly
unnecessary. Today the restriction to free speech is on the basis of dignity read under
Article 21, tomorrow there can be something else that shall be considered to limit the
freedom of the citizens.
5.2.2. BLANKET BAN IN THE NAME OF PRIVACY UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The media can be temporarily restrained from reporting only in cases of ongoing
criminal trials, and not for every case pending before a trial court or a superior court.
Prior restraint on the press is presumptively unconstitutional, as the US Supreme
Court held in the Nebraska Press Association case which was upheld in the Brij
Bhushan case.61
Hence in the instant case the media had only discharged its duties and rights
conferred by the constitution. The media had a fundamental right to debate and
discuss on a case. It has taken the responsibility to inform the public of the various
events that take place. This includes all other matters in which public have a right to
know. Right to discussion and criticize forms an active part of this right. The purpose
of press is to promote and advance public interest by publishing facts and opinions
without which a democratic mass of people cannot make an informed judgment. It is
the primary duty of the courts to uphold the freedom of press and invalidate any laws
which interferes with it contrary to constitutional mandate.62 Thus the reports of media
cannot be said to have violated the right to privacy implied in Art. 21 of the accused.
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of issues raised, arguments advanced and the authorities
cited, it is humbly prayed that this Hon'ble court may be pleased to hold, adjudge and
declare that:
• The petitions filed before the Hon'ble Supreme Court are not maintainable.
• Mr. Moore is not entitled to bail in criminal case registered vide fir no. 96/2020.
• Sex workers have no inherent right of trade and occupation.
• There already exist enforcement/implementation mechanism against child porn
content.
• Ms. Laid and Ms. Bond have no inherent right of privacy against media trials.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
and pass any other order or decree that the Hon'ble court may deem fit in interest of
justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is humbly prayed,
Counsel for the Respondents
———
1 A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : AIR 1988 SC 1531.
2 Pritam Singh v. State, AIR 1950 SC 169.
3 D.C. Mills v. Commisssioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, AIR 1955 SC 55.
4 Haripada Dey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1956 SC 757.

5 State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar, (2017) 13 SCC 751
6 Jamshed Hormusji Wadia v. Board of Trustees, Port of Mumbai, (2004) 3 SCC 214.
7 R.J Singh Ahluwalia v. Delhi, (1970) 3 SCC 451.

8 Ballabhdas v. State of Bihar, (1962) 2 SCR 967.
9 State of Himachal Pradesh v. Parent of student Medical College, (1982) 2 SCC 583 : AIR 1983 SC 339.
10 Sanjeev Coke v. Bharat Cooking, (1983) 1 SCC 147 : AIR 1983 SC 239.
11 Naresh Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1.
12 State of Rajasthan v. Balchand alias Baliya, AIR 1966 SC 2447.
13 State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar, (2017) 13 SCC 751.

14 Himanshu Chandravadan Desai v. State of Gujrat, (2006) 1 Cri LJ 186 (SC)
15 Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy v. C.B.I., (2013) 7 SCC 439
16 Yassin Mohammad v. Town Area Committee, AIR 1952 SC 115.

17
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 1 SCC 574.
18 State of Bihar v. Project UchchaVidya, SikshakSangh, (2006) 2 SCC 545.
19
Minerva Mills v. Union of India, (1980) 2 SCC 591 : AIR 1980 SC 1789.
20 Keshavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461.
21 M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212.
22 Buddhadeb Bhattacharya v. State of West Bengal, (2011) 1 SCC 216 : AIR 2011 SC 538.
23 Chandra Bhavan v. State of Mysore, (1969) 3 SCC 84 : (1970) 2 SCR 600
24 Garg R.K. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2318.
25 The Protection of Child from Sexual Offence Act, 2012, § 2 (da), No. 32, Acts of parliament, 2012 (India).
26 Milind Rajarathnam, Combating Child Pornography in India, https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/05/milind-
rajratnam-combating-child-pornography/, last visited November 11, 2021.
27
Kamlesh Vaswani v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 592.
28 Jack Goldsmith Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World 65-84 (2008).
29 Information Technology Act, 2000, §. 75, No. 21, Acts of parliament, 2000 (India).
30 Information Technology Act, 2000, §. 84-B, No. 21, Acts of parliament, 2000 (India).
31 Information Technology Act, 2000, §. 84-C, No. 21, Acts of parliament, 2000 (India).
32 Information Technology Act, 2000, §. 77, No. 21, Acts of parliament, 2000 (India).
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
33 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : AIR 2015 SC 1523.

34Anand Raut, Law to Tackle Select Cybercrimes Amid Covid 19 Pandemic : Indian Legal Perspective (2021) 11
GJLDP (April) 120.
35 Information Technology Act, 2020, S. 67-B, No. 21, Acts of parliament, 2000 (India).
36
P.G. Sam Infant Jones v. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, 2021 SCC Online Mad 2241.
37 The Protection of Child from Sexual Offence Act, 2012, § 13, No. 32, Acts of parliament, 2012 (India).
38 The Protection of Child from Sexual Offence Act, 2012, §14, No. 32, Acts of parliament, 2012 (India).
39 Penal Code, 1860, §. 292 & §. 293, No. 45, Acts of parliament, 1860 (India).
40 Eera v. State of NCT Delhi, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 787.

41 Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand, (2008) 5 SCC 117 : AIR 2008 SC 2234.
42Ministry of Women and Child Development, Controlling Child-Porn Related Crimes, Controlling Child-Porn Related
Crimes, last visited November 12
43
Sakal papers v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 305.
44 Virender v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 986.
45 Neha Das, A Critical Analysis of Trial by Media, CNLU LJ (9) [2020] 22.
46
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
47 Siddhartha Vashisht v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1.
48 Santosh Kumar Singh v. State, (2010) 9 SCC 747.
49
Vikas Yadav v. State of U.P., (2016) 9 SCC 541.
50 Mukesh v. State of NCT, (2013) 2 SCC 587.
51 Sahara India Real Estate Corporation. Ltd. v. Securities and exchange Board of India, AIR 2012 SC 3829.
52
Subramanian Swami v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221 : AIR 2016 SC 2728.
53 Sushil Sharma v. The State (Delhi Administration), 1996 Cri LJ 3944.
54
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
55
L.I.C. v. Manu Bhai Shah, (1992) 3 SCC 637.
56Gregg Barak, Mediatizing Law and Order, Applying Cottles's Architecture of Communicative Frames to the
Social Construction of Crime and Justice, Crime Media Culture, (2007).
57
Manu Sharma v. State, (2010) 6 SCC 1, Sanjeev Nanda v. State, 2007 Cri LJ 3786.
58
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124.
59Raja Gopal v. State of T.N., (1994) 6 SCC 632, People's Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (1997) 1 SCC
301, State of Maharashtra v. Bharat Shanti Lal Shah, (2008) 13 SCC 5, Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 : AIR 2017 SC 4161.
60 Harijai Singh v. In re : Vijayakumar, (1996) 6 SCC 466 : AIR 1997 SC 73.
61
Brij Bhushan v. State of Delhi, AIR 1950 SC 129.
62 Indian Express Newspaper v. Union of India, (1985) 1 SCC 641.
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/
notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be liable in any manner by reason of any mistake
or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/
rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The
authenticity of this text must be verified from the original source.

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Page 1 Friday, April 28, 2023

2nd MAIMS National Moot, 2021

Before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of IDEE

IDEE under Article 136 of the constitution of IDEE is not

11. i.e., That Is

18 Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (1995) 1 SCC 574.

52 Harijai Singh v. In re : Vijayakumar (1996) 6 SCC 466 : AIR

2. The Information Technology Act, 2000- § 67

MECHANISM AGAINST CHILD PORN CONTENT?

of our criminal; jurisprudence but there is no straight-jacket formula for consideration

fundamental rights are to be interpreted then it must be parallel to the DPSP's.

Children) and it maintains a Cyber Tipline. There is a Memorandum of Understanding

4 Haripada Dey v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1956 SC 757.

7 R.J Singh Ahluwalia v. Delhi, (1970) 3 SCC 451.

13 State of Bihar v. Amit Kumar, (2017) 13 SCC 751.

16 Yassin Mohammad v. Town Area Committee, AIR 1952 SC 115.

33 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 : AIR 2015 SC 1523.

40 Eera v. State of NCT Delhi, 2017 SCC OnLine SC 787.

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