1.

FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

People of the Philippines vs Glenn De Los Santos

G.R. No. 131588, March 27, 2001
DAVIDE, JR., J:

FACTS:
Defendant Glenn Delos Santos and his 3 friends went to Bukidnon on
his Isuzu Elf Truck. On their way, they decided to pass by a restaurant where
he had 3 bottles of beer. On their way to Cagayan de Oro City from Bukidnon,
his truck hit, bumped, seriously wounded and claimed the lives of several PNP
members who were undergoing an endurance run on a highway wearing black
shirts and shorts and green combat shoes. Twelve (12) trainees were killed on
the spot, 12 were seriously wounded, one of whom eventually died and 10
sustained minor injuries.
At the time of the occurrence, the place of the incident was very dark as
there was no moon. Neither were there lamp posts that illuminated the
highway. The trial court convicted Glenn of the complex crimes of multiple
murders, multiple frustrated murders and multiple attempted murders, with
the use of a motor vehicle as a qualifying circumstance.

ISSUE:
Was there an intentional killing or attempt to kill the policemen, or a
mere reckless imprudence?

RULING:
The Court held that the tragic event was more of a product of reckless
imprudence.
The test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act
whereby injury or damage results to the person or property of another is this:
Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of
the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to
refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence.
Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born
of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Glenn showed an inexcusable lack of precaution. Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but
without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration (1) his
employment or occupation; (2) his degree of intelligence; (4) his physical
condition; and (3) other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
 Glenn, being then a young college graduate and an experienced driver,
should have known to apply the brakes or swerve to a safe place immediately
upon hearing the first bumping thuds to avoid further hitting the other
trainees. He should have observed due care in accordance with the conduct of
a reasonably prudent man, such as by slackening his speed, applying his
brakes, or turning to the left side even if it would mean entering the opposite
lane (there being no evidence that a vehicle was coming from the opposite
direction).
Considering that the incident was not a product of malicious intent but
rather the result of a single act of reckless driving, Glenn should be held guilty
of the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides
with serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries. The slight
physical injuries caused by Glenn to the ten other victims through reckless
imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light felonies.
Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be treated
and punished as separate offenses.

2. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Jarco Marketing Corporation, Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo
vs Honorable Court of Appeals, Conrado C. Aguilar and Criselda R. Aguilar
G.R. No. 129792, December 21, 1999
DAVIDE, JR., J:

FACTS:
Respondent Criselda was signing her credit card slip at payment and
verification counter in Syvels Department Store in Makati, when she felt a
sudden gust of wind a heard a loud sound. She looked behind her and saw her
daughter Zhieneth (6 years old) on the floor pinned by the bulk of the stores
gift-wrapping counter.
She was rushed to the hospital but died after 14 days. Private
respondents filed a complaint for damages. Petitioners on the other hand,
denied any liability imputing the negligence to Criselda for allowing her
daughter to roam freely in the department store. Alleging further, that the
deceased committed contributory negligence when she climbed the counter.
Also herein petitioners defense is that they have exercised due diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of their
employees.
The RTC favored petitioners, contemplating that Zhieneth’s action is the
proximate cause of the accident. CA favored respondents on it declared that
Zhieneth, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of the incident, was
absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child
under nine (9) years could not be held liable even for an intentional wrong,
then the six-year old Zhieneth could not be made to account for a mere
mischief or reckless act. It also absolved Criselda of any negligence, finding
nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing Zhieneth to walk
while she signed the document at the nearby counter.

ISSUE:
1. Was Zhieneth guilty of contributory negligence.
2. Was the death of Zhieneth accidental or attributable to negligence.

RULING:
1. No. Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are
incapable of contributory negligence.
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively
presumed to have acted without discernment, and is, on that account, exempt
from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from
criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years
of age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment.

2. The death was due to negligence.

An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or
negligence attaches to the defendant. Negligence is the omission to do
something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do. The tragedy
which befell Zhieneth was no accident and that Zhieneth’s death could only be
attributed to negligence.
Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

3. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN QUASI-DELICT

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company & Armando Pon vs Intermediate

Appellate Court, The Heirs of Paz Vda. De Pamfilo, The Heirs of Norma
Neri, and Baylon Sales and Nena Vda. De Rosales
G.R. No. 74387-90, November 14, 1988
PARAS, J:

FACTS:
 A bus owned by petitioner BLTB and driven by petitioner Pon collided
with a bus owned by Superlines, when the former tried to overtake a car just
as the Superlines' Bus was coming from the opposite direction. The collision
resulted in the death of Rosales, Pamfilo and Neri, as well as injuries to the
wife of Rosales, and Sales. These people were passengers of the petitioner's
bus.
Rosales and Sales, as well as the surviving heirs of Pamfilo, Rosales and
Neri instituted separate cases ih the CFI against BLTB and Superlines,
together with their drivers. Criminal cases against the drivers were also filed in
a different CFI. CFI ruled that only BLTB and Pon should be liable, and they
were ordered jointly and severally to pay damages. On appeal, the IAC affirmed
the CFI's ruling.
Petitioners contended that the CFI erred in ruling that the actions of
private respondents are based on culpa contractual, since if it were private
respondents' intention to file an action based on culap contractual, they could
have done so by merely impleading BLTB and Pon. Instead the respondents
filed an action against all defendants based on culpa aquiliana or tort.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners negligent?

RULING:
Yes. IAC anchored its decision on both culpa contractual and culpa
aquiliana. The proximate cause of the death and injuries of the passengers was
the negligence of the bus driver Pon, who recklessly overtook a car despite
knowing that that the bend of highway he was negotiating on had a continuous
yellow line signifying a “no-overtaking” zone.
It is presumed that a a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent
if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In the instant case, the driver of the BLTB bus failed to act with diligence
demanded by the circumstances. Pon should have remembered that when a
motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is special necessity for
keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right to drive on
the left hand side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is
approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.
As to the liability of the petitioners, Pon is primarily liable for his
negligence in driving recklessly the truck owned by BLTB. The liability of the
BLTB itself is also primary, direct and immediate in view of the fact that the
death of or injuries to its passengers was through the negligence of its
employee.
The common carrier's liability for the death of or injuries to its
passengers is based on its contractual obligation to carry its passengers safely
to their destination. They are presumed to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they have observed extraordinary diligence. In the case at bar, the
appellants acted negligently.
 BLTB is also solidarily liable with its driver even though the liability of
the driver springs from quasi delict while that of the bus company from
contract. By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the express
obligation to transport the passengers to their destination safely and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any
injury that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to the
fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code).

4. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN QUASI-DELICT

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs Intermediate Apellate

Court (First Civil Cases Division) and Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc.
G.R. No. 74761, November 6, 1990
FERNAN, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner spouses Andamo owned a parcel of land situated in Biga
Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent corporation,
Missionaries of Our lady of La Salette, Inc. Within the land of the latter, water
paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioner’s land, caused a young man to
drown, damaged petitioner’s crops and plants, washed away costly fences,
endangered the lives of the petitioners and their laborers and some other
destructions. This prompted petitioner spouses to file a criminal action for
destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the RPC and a civil
action for damages.

ISSUE:
Can the petitioner spouses claim damages for destruction caused by
respondent’s water paths and contrivances based on quasi-delict?

RULING:
Yes. A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the
civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-
delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages
suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other
person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages
incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from petitioner’s complaint, the waterpaths
and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated
the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the damage sustained by
petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be
the basis for the recovery of damages. It must be stressed that the use of one’s
property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code provides that
“the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to injure
the rights of a third person.” Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and
reciprocal duties which require that each must use his own land in a
reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of
others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his
land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all
reasonable care so that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and
can withstand the usual and expected forces of nature. If the structures cause
injury or damage to an adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.

5. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN ABSOLVING A RENT-A-CAR

COMPANY FOR FAULT OR NEGLIGENCE OF THE CAR LESSEE
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

FGU Insurance Corporation vs Court of Appeals, Filcar Transport, Inc.,

and Fortune Insurance Corporation
G.R. No. 118889, March 23, 1998
BELLOSILLO, J:

FACTS:
A car owned by private respondent FILCAR Transport Inc., rented to and
driven by Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, who swerved into the right and hit
the car owned by Lydia Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone. Dahl-
Jensen did not possess a Philippine driver’s license. Petitioner, as the insurer
of Soriano’s car, paid the latter P25,382.20 and, by way of subrogation, sued
FILCAR, Dahl-Jensen, and Fortune Insurance Corporation, FILCAR’s insurer,
for quasi-delict. Summons was not served on Dahl-Jensen since he was no
longer staying at his given address; in fact, upon motion of the petitioner, he
was dropped from the complaint.
The trial court dismissed the petition for failure to substantiate the claim
for subrogation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, but on the ground
that only Dahl-Jensen’s negligence was proven, not that of FILCAR. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Will an action based on quasi-delict prosper against a rent-a-car
company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car lessee
in driving the rented vehicle?

RULING:
 No, the Court held that to sustain a claim on quasi-delict, the following
requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or
negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the
fault or negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
Petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault
or negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of
Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established.
The liability imposed by Art. 2180 arises by virtue of a presumption juris
tantum of negligence on the part of the persons made responsible thereunder,
derived from their failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of
subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Yet, as correctly observed
by respondent court, Art. 2180 is hardly applicable because none of the
circumstances mentioned therein obtains in the case under consideration.
Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car business was only the owner
of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there was no vinculum juris between
them as employer and employee. Respondent FILCAR cannot in any way be
responsible for the negligent act of Dahl-Jensen, the former not being an
employer of the latter.
The provision of Art. 2184 is neither applicable because of the absence of
master-driver relationship between respondent FILCAR and Dahl-Jensen.
Clearly, petitioner has no cause of action against respondent FILCAR on the
basis of quasi-delict; logically, its claim against respondent FORTUNE can
neither prosper.

6. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN THAT THE ACT THAT BREAKS THE
CONTRACT MAY BE ALSO A TORT
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso and the Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. L-21438, September 28, 1966
SANCHEZ, J:

FACTS:
The defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from
Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but
at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a
"better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his
seat would be taken over his dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff
reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. The lower court decided with
the respondent to pay that appropriate amount of refund on respondent’s plane
ticket. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court but slightly reduced the
amount of refund. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?

RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right
to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto
has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad
faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law.
For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says: ART. 21. Any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with
a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely
for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper. 

7. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN RECOVERABLE MORAL DAMAGES

IN BREACH OF CONTRACT
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Nancy Go and Alex Go vs The Honorable Court of Appeals, Hermogenes

Ong and Jane C. Ong
G.R. No. 114791, May 29, 1997
ROMERO, J:

FACTS:
 The parties in the case entered into a contract of service, wherein
petitioner Nancy Go will do video coverage of the wedding of herein respondents
for a contract price of P1,650.00. Despite several attempts of the newlyweds to
claim the video tape of their wedding, the failed because the tape was not yet
processed. The parties then agreed that the tape would be ready upon private
respondents’ return from their honeymoon. When they tried to re-claim it after
the honeymoon, they found out that it had been erased by the petitioner and
could no longer be delivered. This prompted the spouses to file a complaint for
specific performance and damages against petitioner before the RTC. The lower
court ordered the rescission of the agreement entered into between the parties
pay specific sums for damages. Petitioner elevated the case to the CA which
affirmed the trial court’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner liable for damages?

RULING:
Yes, the Court held that the petitioner contention with regards to her
acting as an agent of one Lim, who is responsible on employing the camera
man and the owner of the video equipment that was used, is untenable. In the
instant case, the contract entered into is one of service, that is, for the video
coverage of the wedding. Consequently, it can hardly be said that the object of
the contract was the video equipment used. The use by petitioners of the video
equipment of another person is of no consequence.
Petitioners and private respondents entered into a contract whereby, for
a fee, the former undertook to cover the latter's wedding and deliver to them a
video copy of said event. For whatever reason, petitioners failed to provide
private respondents with their tape. Clearly, petitioners are guilty of
contravening their obligation to said private respondents and are thus liable for
damages. Generally, moral damages cannot be recovered in an action for
breach of contract because this case is not among those enumerated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code. However, it is also accepted in this jurisdiction that
liability for a quasi-delict may still exist despite the presence of contractual
relations, that is, the act which violates the contract may also constitute
a quasi-delict. 7 Consequently, moral damages are recoverable for the breach of
contract which was palpably wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive. Petitioner’s act or omission in recklessly erasing the
video coverage of private respondents’ wedding was precisely the cause of
suffering private respondents had to undergo.

8. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE AND

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Professional Services, Inc. vs Natividad and Enrique Agana

G.R. No. 126297, January 31, 2007

Natividad (Substituted by her children Marcelino Agana III, Enrigue Agana,

Jr., Emma Agana Andaya, Jesus Agana and Raymund Agana) and Enrique
Agana vs Juan Fuentes
G.R. No. 126467, January 31, 2007

Miguel Ampil vs Natividad Agana and Enrique Agana

G.R. No. 127590, January 31, 2007
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Natividad Agana complained about her bowel movement and
bloody anal discharge and upon being rushed to the Medical City General
Hospital Dr. Ampil conducted series of medical examinations. It was found out
that petitioner Natividad is suffering from “cancer of the sigmoid.”
Dr. Ampil assisted by the medical staff of the Medical City performed a
resection surgery but after confirming that the malignancy in her sigmoid area
had spread on her left ovary, he asked Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy,
after obtaining permission from Natividad’s husband. After Dr. Fuentes had
completed the surgery, which Dr. Ampil had the liberty to check his work,
permitted Dr. Fuentes to leave the operating room. He took over the operation
and prepared for closing the incision. However, the attending nurses informed
him of the missing 2 sponges after a “diligent search” but to no avail they did
not found the said sponges. Nevertheless, Dr. Ampil proceeded with the closing
of the incision.
Couple days after Natividad’s discharged, she complained of excruciating
pain in her anal region. She consulted both doctors who attended her surgery
but both Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes assured her that it was just the natural
consequence of the operation done to her. Natividad and her husband went to
the United States to seek further treatment on her cancer, after a couple of
months, she’s now free of cancer but still suffering from the said pains. Weeks
after, her daughter found a gauze protruding from her vagina. Dr. Ampil then
extract it by hand but the pain intensified. This prompted her to seek
treatment at the Polymedic General Hospital, Dr. Ramon Gutierrez detected the
presence of another foreign object in her vagina – a foul smelling gauze badly
infecting her vagina vault. A recto-vaginal fistula had formed in her
reproductive organs which forced stool to excrete through the vagina, thus,
another surgical operation was needed to remedy it.
Thereafter, Natividad and her husband filed with the RTC, a complaint
for damages against Professional Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical City
Hospital, Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. They alleged that the latter are liable for
negligence for leaving two pieces of gauze inside Natividad’s body and
malpractice for concealing their acts of negligence. They also filed with the
Professional Regulation Commision (PRC) an administrative complaint for gross
negligence and malpractice against Dr. Ampil and Dr. Fuentes. But the PRC
Board of Medicine heard the case only with respect to Dr. Fuentes because it
failed to acquire jurisdiction over Dr. Ampil who was then in the United States.
During the pendency of the case, Natividad died and was substituted by
her heirs. RTC favored the Aganas finding herein respondents liable for
negligence and malpractice.
The aggrieved parties then interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
PRC Board of Medicine dismissed the case against Dr. Fuentes because of
failure to prove that he was the one who left the two pieces of gauze inside
Natividad’s body and concealed such fact from her. Likewise, the CA dismissed
the case against Dr. Fuentes.
Hence, the consolidated petitions.

ISSUE:
1. Is Dr. Fuentes liable for negligence?
2. Is Dr. Ampil liable for negligence?
3. Is the Professional Services, Inc. can be held liable for the negligence of their
doctors, whom they regard as independent contractors?

RULING:
1. No, Dr. Fuentes is not negligent.
The Court held that the asserted doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or “the
thing speaks for itself” does not apply to hold Dr. Fuentes liability. In this rule,
where the thing which caused the injury, without fault of the injured, is under
the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such that it should not
have occurred if he, having such control used proper care, it affords reasonable
evidence, in the absence of explanation that the injury arose from the
defendant’s want of care, and the burden of proof is shifted to him to establish
that he has observed due care and diligence. Anchoring the very same rule to
the “Captain of the Ship” rule which states that the operating surgeon is the
person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected
with the operation. As stated before, Dr. Ampil is the lead surgeon, he was the
“Captain of the Ship.” This is mirrored from the surrounding events of calling
Dr. Fuentes to perform hysterectomy and examining his work thereafter. Dr.
Ampil’s order of closing the incision happened after Dr. Fuentes left the room,
thus, it was beyond Dr. Fuentes when the former decided to leave the two
pieces of gauze in Natividad’s body.

2. Yes, Dr. Ampil is negligent.

To successfully pursue medical negligence, a patient must only prove
that a health care provider either failed to do something which a reasonably
prudent health care provider would have done, or that he did something that a
reasonably prudent provider would not have done; and that failure or action
caused injury to the patient. Simply put, the elements are duty, breach, injury
and proximate causation. Dr, Ampil, as the lead surgeon, had the duty to
remove all foreign objects, such as gauzes, from Natividad’s body before closure
of the incision. When he failed to do so, it was his duty to inform Natividad
about it. Dr. Ampil breached both duties. Such breach caused injury to
Natividad, necessitating her further examination by American doctors and
another surgery. That Dr. Ampil’s negligence is the proximate cause of
Natividad’s injury could be traced from his act of closing the incision despite
the information given by the attending nurses that two pieces of gauze were
still missing. That they were later on extracted from Natividad’s vagina
established the causal link between Dr. Ampil’s negligence and the injury. And
what further aggravated such injury was his deliberate concealment of the
missing gauzes from the knowledge of Natividad and her family.

3. Yes, PSI is accountable for the negligence of their doctors abandon the
Schloendorff doctrine that physicians employed by hospitals are independent
contractors because of the skill they exercise and the lack of control exerted
over their work.
The Court cited the pronouncement in Ramos v. Court of Appeals that
for purposes of apportioning responsibility in medical negligence cases, an
employer-employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their
attending and visiting physicians. Hospitals exercise significant control in the
hiring and firing of consultants and in the conduct of their work within the
hospital premises. Doctors who apply for ‘consultant’ slots, visiting or
attending, are required to submit proof of completion of residency, their
educational qualifications, generally, evidence of accreditation by the
appropriate board (diplomate), evidence of fellowship in most cases, and
references. These requirements are carefully scrutinized by members of the
hospital administration or by a review committee set up by the hospital who
either accept or reject the application.
But the Ramos pronouncement is not our only basis in sustaining PSI’s
liability. Its liability is also anchored upon the agency principle of apparent
authority or agency by estoppel and the doctrine of corporate negligence which
have gained acceptance in the determination of a hospital’s liability for
negligent acts of health professionals. The present case serves as a perfect
platform to test the applicability of these doctrines, thus, enriching our
jurisprudence. Apparent authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the
"holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by
estoppel, has its origin from the law of agency. It imposes liability, not as the
result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but rather because of the
actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public into
believing that the relationship or the authority exists. ART. 1869. Agency may
be express, or implied from the acts of the principal, from his silence or lack of
action, or his failure to repudiate the agency, knowing that another person is
acting on his behalf without authority.
On the basis of Darling, other jurisdictions held that a hospital’s
corporate negligence extends to permitting a physician known to be
incompetent to practice at the hospital. With the passage of time, more duties
were expected from hospitals, among them: (1) the use of reasonable care in
the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) the
selection and retention of competent physicians; (3) the overseeing or
supervision of all persons who practice medicine within its walls; and (4) the
formulation, adoption and enforcement of adequate rules and policies that
ensure quality care for its patients. Thus, in Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v.
Misevich, it was held that a hospital, following the doctrine of corporate
responsibility, has the duty to see that it meets the standards of
responsibilities for the care of patients. Such duty includes the proper
supervision of the members of its medical staff.
In the present case, it was duly established that PSI operates the Medical
City Hospital for the purpose and under the concept of providing
comprehensive medical services to the public. Accordingly, it has the duty to
exercise reasonable care to protect from harm all patients admitted into its
facility for medical treatment. Unfortunately, PSI failed to perform such duty.
PSI’s liability is traceable to its failure to conduct an investigation of the matter
reported in the nota bene of the count nurse. Such failure established PSI’s
part in the dark conspiracy of silence and concealment about the gauzes.

9. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN RES IPSA LOQUITUR

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Rogelio E. Ramos and Erlinda Ramos, in their own behalf and as natural
guardians of the minors, Rommel Ramos, Roy Roderick Ramos and Ron
Raymond Ramos vs Court of Appeals, Delos Santos Medical Center, Dr.
Orlino Hosaka and Dra. Perfecta Guttierrez
G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999
KAPUNAN, J:

FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos had occasional complaints of discomfort due to pains
allegedly caused by the presence of a stone in her gall bladder. She was
advised to undergo an operation to remove it, after series of medical
examinations she was cleared and was fit for surgery. Dr. Olino Hozaka was
recommended to them and upon meeting him for the first time, they were able
to set the date for the “cholecystectomy” operation in the Delos Santos Medical
Center (DLSMC). At the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos met Dra. Perfect
Guttierrez for the first time, who was the one to administer the anesthesia.
Herminda Cruz, the Dean of the College of Nursing at the Capitol Medical
Center stayed with Erlinda in the operating room and saw what transpired that
day.
According to her, Dra. Gutierrez called Dr. Hosaka who is not yet in and
had been informed that there would be prospect of a delay in the arrival of the
latter, which ultimately be 3 hours late. Upon the arrival of Dr. Hosaka, Dra.
Gutierrez tried to intubate Erlinda but she met with difficulty caused by the
possible restricted airway. Herminda then noticed bluish discoloration of the
nailbeds of the left hand of the hapless Erlinda, this is also confirmed by Dr.
Hosaka upon approaching the patient. She then heard Dr. Hosaka ordered to
call another anesthesiologist in the person of Dr. Calderon, who then tried to
intubate her as well. Soon after, they placed the patient in a Trendelenburg
position – a position where the head of the patient is placed in a position lower
than her feet which is an indication that there is a decrease of blood supply to
the patient’s brain. The patient was then taken to the Intensive Care Unit
(ICU).
After one month from the ICU and four months from the Hospital,
Erlinda was finally released but since that day of the operation, she has been
comatose and is been living on mechanical means. She suffered brain damage
as a result of the absence of oxygen in her brain for four to five minutes.
Petitioners filed a civil case with the RTC against the private respondents
alleging negligence in the management and care of Erlinda Ramos. They
presented witnesses to prove that Erlinda’s condition was due to lack of oxygen
in her brain caused by the faulty management of her airway by private
respondents during the anesthesia phase.
Respondent then relied on the expert testimony of Dr. Eduardo Jamora,
a pulmonologist, to the effect that the cause of brain damage was Erlinda’s
allergic reaction to the anesthetic agent.
RTC sided with the petitioners, upon appeal to the CA, it reversed the
findings of the trial court. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applicable and ultimately can hold the
defendants liable?

RULING:
Yes, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in the case.
Res ipsa loquitur is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the
transaction speaks for itself." The phrase "res ipsa loquitur'' is a maxim for the
rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with the surrounding
circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence,
or make out a plaintiff's prima facie case, and present a question of fact for
defendant to meet with an explanation. Where the thing which caused the
injury complained of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or
his servants and the accident is such as in ordinary course of things does not
happen if those who have its management or control use proper care, it affords
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from or was caused by the defendant's want of care.
We find the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur appropriate in the case at bar. As
will hereinafter be explained, the damage sustained by Erlinda in her brain
prior to a scheduled gall bladder operation presents a case for the application
of res ipsa loquitur.
In the present case, Erlinda submitted herself for cholecystectomy and
expected a routine general surgery to be performed on her gall bladder. On that
fateful day she delivered her person over to the care, custody and control of
private respondents who exercised complete and exclusive control over her. At
the time of submission, Erlinda was neurologically sound and, except for a few
minor discomforts, was likewise physically fit in mind and body. However,
during the administration of anesthesia and prior to the performance of
cholecystectomy she suffered irreparable damage to her brain. Thus, without
undergoing surgery, she went out of the operating room already decerebrate
and totally incapacitated. Obviously, brain damage, which Erlinda sustained, is
an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder
operation. In fact, this kind of situation does not in the absence of negligence of
someone in the administration of anesthesia and in the use of endotracheal
tube. Normally, a person being put under anesthesia is not rendered
decerebrate as a consequence of administering such anesthesia if the proper
procedure was followed. Furthermore, the instruments used in the
administration of anesthesia, including the endotracheal tube, were all under
the exclusive control of private respondents, who are the physicians-in-charge.
Likewise, petitioner Erlinda could not have been guilty of contributory
negligence because she was under the influence of anesthetics which rendered
her unconscious. With regard to Dra. Gutierrez, we find her negligent in the
care of Erlinda during the anesthesia phase. As borne by the records,
respondent Dra. Gutierrez failed to properly intubate the patient.
Although witness Cruz is not an anesthesiologist, she can very well
testify upon matters on which she is capable of observing such as, the
statements and acts of the physician and surgeon, external appearances, and
manifest conditions which are observable by any one. This is precisely allowed
under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur where the testimony of expert witnesses
is not required. It is the accepted rule that expert testimony is not necessary
for the proof of negligence in non-technical matters or those of which an
ordinary person may be expected to have knowledge, or where the lack of skill
or want of care is so obvious as to render expert testimony unnecessary. We
take judicial notice of the fact that anesthesia procedures have become so
common, that even an ordinary person can tell if it was administered properly.
As such, it would not be too difficult to tell if the tube was properly inserted.
This kind of observation, we believe, does not require a medical degree to be
acceptable.
On the basis of the foregoing transcript, in which the pulmonologist
himself admitted that he could not testify about the drug with medical
authority, it is clear that the appellate court erred in giving weight to Dr.
Jamora's testimony as an expert in the administration of Thiopental Sodium.
Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces
injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or
damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears
from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the
injury or damage was either a direct result of a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission. The faulty intubation is undeniably the
proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to Erlinda’s brain
damage, and, ultimately, her comatose condition.
Dr. Hosaka’s liability is anchored in the “captain of the ship” rule, which
is the surgeon’s responsibility to see to it that those under him perform their
task in the proper manner. But Dr. Hosaka failed to exercise such proper
authority in not determining his anesthesiologist observed proper anesthesia
protocols and intubation of the patient.
Private hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending
and visiting "consultant" staff. While "consultants" are not, technically
employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all
responsibility for the patient's condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and
the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an
employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is
determining. Accordingly, on the basis of the foregoing, we rule that for the
purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending
and visiting physicians. This being the case, the question now arises as to
whether or not respondent hospital is solidarily liable with respondent doctors
for petitioner's condition.
The basis for holding an employer solidarily responsible for the
negligence of its employee is found in Article 2180 of the Civil Code which
considers a person accountable not only for his own acts but also for those of
others based on the former's responsibility under a relationship of patria
potestas. Respondent hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it
exercised diligence of a good father of a family in the hiring and supervision of
the respondent physicians.

10. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR

CHANCE
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. and Andres Ilagan vs Court
of Appeals, Sotero Cardema, Eufrocina Alcalde Cardema, Melquisedec P.
Elizondo and Maxima T. Alcalde
G.R. No. L-33138-39, June 27, 1975
FERNANDO, J:
FACTS:
Petitioner Ilagan was a bus driver of his co-defendant Batangas
Transportation Company, now BLTBCo who according to the lower court, drove
the bus without regard to existing traffic rules regulations, and without due
attention to the welfare and safety of his passengers and those oncoming
vehicles, resulting to the death of the owner – driver of the Chevrolet car,
Ricardo de los Reyes, and some of his companions. The collision was due to the
act of petitioner Ilagan in overtaking a big cargo truck. This was corroborated
by the defendant himself on his admission that he was travelling on the inner
lane of the highway. However, he denied the allegation that he was running at
a high speed and in a reckless manner. But evidence showed that after the
impact, the bus ran for another 30 feet and would have run farther if it had not
fallen into a canal.

ISSUE:
Can the defendant use the doctrine of last clear chance to absolve
himself from liability?

RULING:
No, the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in the case.
The Court held that “to say that the accident was due to the negligence of
Ricardo de los Reyes, who under the doctrine of the last clear chance, should
have avoided the accident, or, that at least De los Reyes was guilty of
contributory negligence, is to add insult to injury, and to desecrate the memory
of one who can no longer defend himself. De los Reyes was in his proper lane
and where he had a right to be. Nevertheless, he did what he could do under
the circumstances to avoid the accident. He swerved to the right to avoid the
onrushing bus, but the appellant was running so fast and his act was so
sudden that all his efforts to avoid the bus were rendered futile. We cannot
understand how de los Reyes could be charged with negligence, or even
contributory negligence, when there is absolutely no evidence that de los
Reyes, who was where he had a right to be, had seen the bus in time to avoid
the accident. Contributory negligence cannot be presumed, and the appellants
are as much duty-bound to prove this defense as it was the duty of the
plaintiffs to prove defendant's negligence. By the way, there is absolutely no
evidence in the record that de los Reyes was trying to overtake another vehicle
before the accident."

11. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN EXTRAORDINARY DILIGENCE OF

COMMON CARRIERS
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan and the minors Norma, Luzviminda,
Elenita, Oscar and Alfredo Bataclan, represented by their Natural guardian,
Salud Villanueva Vda. De Bataclan vs Mariano Medina
G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957
MONTEMAYOR, J:

FACTS:
Herein defendant Conrado Saylon, is the regular chauffeur of Mariano
Medina - the operator and owner, of bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation,
which left Amadeo, Cavite shortly after midnight. There were about 18
passengers, including the driver and the conductor. At around 2 o’clock in the
morning, while the bus was running within the jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite,
one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a
canal trapping some of its passengers. After half an hour and through their call
of help, about 10 men came and one of them is carrying a lighted torch. These
men approach the overturned bus and a fierce fire started, consuming the bus
including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus
overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the
side and spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
under and around it. One of the passengers is Juan Bataclan, his widow Salud
instituted a suit to recover from the driver compensatory, moral, and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The RTC favored Salud and the heirs
of Jose Bataclan. On appeal, the CA endorsed the case to the SC. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Is the defendant negligent?

RULING:
Yes, defendant Saylon is liable to the respondents.
The Court held that there was negligence on the part of the defendant,
through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to show that at the time
of the blow out, the bus was speeding, as testified to by one of the passengers,
and as shown by the fact that according to the testimony of the witnesses,
including that of the defense, from the point where one of the front tires burst
up to the canal where the bus overturned after zig-zag-ing, there was a
distance of about 150 meters. The chauffeur, after the blow-out, must have
applied the brakes in order to stop the bus, but because of the velocity at
which the bus must have been running, its momentum carried it over a
distance of 150 meters before it fell into the canal and turned turtle.
Proximate cause is 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred.' And more
comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause
which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury
to some person might probably result therefrom. But in the present case under
the circumstances obtaining in the same, the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus, this for the reason that when the vehicle turned not
only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the
tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the
passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves,
and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to
carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural area where
lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural than
that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid
and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the
men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the
overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is driver and its conductor.
According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road
walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have
known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could
and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and
around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken
steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
12. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN PROXIMATE AND REMOTE CAUSE
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Filomeno Urbano vs Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court and People of the

Philippines
G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Urbano went to his ricefield but found the place where he
stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal. Upon
inquiring with Javier, the latter admitted that he was responsible for such
occurrence. A quarrel between them ensued, Urbano then hacked Javier with
his bolo, the latter being hit on the right palm of his hand. He was further
hacked on his left leg. There was an amicable settlement with Urbano and
Javier in which Urbano promised to pay for the medical expenses of Javier.
From the amicable settlement, the 22 nd day, Javier was rushed to the hospital
and had experienced lockjaw and convulsions. The attendant doctor found that
it was caused by tetanus toxin. The next day Javier died.
Urbano was then charged with the crime of homicide but pleaded “not
guilty.” Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found him guilty as
charged. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Is Urbano guilty?

RULING:
No, the Court held that the hacking was not the proximate cause of the
death of Javier.
The Court held that, it is clear that Javier was hacked by the petitioner
who used a bolo as a result of which Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on
his right palm. And that on November 14, 1981, which was the 22 nd day after
the incident, Javier was rushed to the hospital in a very serious condition and
that on the following day, he died from tetanus.
The RTC held that the allegation of Urbano is untenable, that the
proximate cause of the victim's death was due to his own negligence in going
back to work without his wound being properly healed, and lately, that he went
to catch fish in dirty irrigation canals in the first week of November, 1980, is an
afterthought, and a desperate attempt by appellant to wiggle out of the
predicament he found himself in. If the wound had not yet healed, it is
impossible to conceive that the deceased would be reckless enough to work
with a disabled hand.
The Court does not agree, the evidence on record does not clearly show
that the wound inflicted by Urbano was infected with tetanus at the time of the
infliction of the wound. The evidence merely confirms that the wound, which
was already healing at the time Javier suffered the symptoms of the fatal
ailment, somehow got infected with tetanus However, as to when the wound
was infected is not clear from the record. If, therefore, the wound of Javier
inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at the time, it
is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a
mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
day after the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the
wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible
conclusion is that at the time Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the
severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present. Consequently,
Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking
incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound
could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days
before he died. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct,
natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the
accused. Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but
the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary
precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's
death with which the petitioner had nothing to do.
At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical
injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped
out by the victim's own act. After the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used
the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise agreement where
Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier.

13: FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

National Power Corporation vs Heirs of Noble Casionan

G.R. No. 165969, November 27, 2008
REYES, R.T., J:

FACTS:
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, who worked as a pocket
miner and was electrocuted by the transmission lines of the petitioner NPC.
Petitioner NPC in the 1970s installed high-tension electrical transmission lines
traversing a trail which is regularly used by members of the community in
Dalicno. Eventually, some of the transmission lines sagged and dangled
reducing the standard distance of 18 to 20 feet long to 8 to 10 feet long, this
posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of
electrocution. Despite the pleads of the elders for NPC to conduct appropriate
repairs of the high tension wires, it remained unheeded. They only did so after
the death of Noble Casionan.
Melchor Jimenez witnessed the tragic incident and narrated it in this
manner: that Noble and Melchor each holding a bamboo pole, one was 18 to 19
feet long and the other was 14 feet long. Noble carried the shorter pole while
Melchor the remaining and longer pole. Melchor was following Noble when he
heard a buzzing sound and saw Noble fall to the ground. It so happened that
when Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo
pole he was carrying touched one of the dangling high tension wires.
Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim for damages against
the NPC before the RTC. NPC denied being negligent. RTC decided in favor of
respondents. On appeal, NPC averred that RTC erred in not finding that the
deceased was guilty of contributory negligence and in awarding excessive
damages. The CA sustained the findings of fact of the trial court but reduced
the award of moral damages. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is there a contributory negligence on the part of the injured that would
warrant the reduction of amount of damages?

RULING:
No, there was no contributory negligence and the liability of petitioner
must stay.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of
another person, that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. On
the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured
party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls
below the standard which he is required to conform for his own
protection. There is contributory negligence when the party’s act showed lack
of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause him harm or put his
life in danger. It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on
the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendant’s
negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury. The underlying precept on
contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own
injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the
consequences of his own negligence.
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by
members of the community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby
of the impending danger to their lives should they accidentally touch the high
tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from Dalicon to Itogon.
Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine
to other workers in the area.

14. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

David Taylor vs The Magnetic Electric Railroad and Light Company

G.R. No. L-4977, March 22, 1910
CARSON, J:

FACTS:
 Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years of age when he received his injuries,
he’s the son of a mechanical engineer. At such a young age, he’s more mature
than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude and training
in mechanics. The plaintiff was with a boy, about 12 years of age, they crossed
a footbridge for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the
defendant. Upon learning that Murphy was not in his quarters, the boys,
caused by youthful curiosity, proceeded to wander around the company’s
premises. They found some 20 to 30 brass fulminating caps scattered on the
ground. They brought the caps with them out of the company’s premises,
without knowing that these are in fact intended for use in the explosion of
blasting charges of dynamite and have in themselves a considerable explosive
power.
They went to the other boy’s home and upon opening one of the caps,
they saw that it was filled with a yellowish substance and applied a lighted
match to the contents. An explosion followed causing injuries to the them, the
boy Manuel had his hand burned and wounded while David was struck in the
face by several particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye
to such an extent as to the necessitate its removal by the surgeons.

ISSUE:
Can the defendant company be held liable?

RULING:
No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows: (1) Damages
to the plaintiff. (2)  Negligence by act or omission of which defendant
personally, or some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty. (3)  The
connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in
disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps
caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the
company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in
fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even,
in various experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is
from said acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had
been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical
draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence
of record leaves no room for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of
the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by
him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors
brought about by the applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.

15. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE

SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc. vs Guillermo Balandan, Anselma Anila and the

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-3422, June 13, 1952
BENGZON, J:

FACTS:
Petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises, Inc., was the owner of an ice plant
factory, in whose premises were installed 2 tanks full of water, 9 feet deep, for
cooling purposes of its engine. While the factory compound was surrounded
with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided with any kind of fence or
top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely foot high from the surface of the
ground. The respondents’ son, Mariano Balandan, a boy barely 8 years old,
while playing entered the factory premises and took a bath in one of said
tanks. Mario then sank to the bottom of the tank only to be fished out later,
already a cadaver, having been died of “asphyxia secondary to drowning.”
Both the RTC and the CA viewed that petitioner maintained an attractive
nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to
avoid accidents to persons entering its premises, applying the doctrine of
attractive nuisance.

ISSUE:
Are the tanks considered an attractive nuisance?

RULING:
No, The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies
of water, artificial as well as natural, in the absence of some unusual condition
or artificial feature other than the mere water and its location. There are
numerous cases in which the attractive nuisance doctrine has not been held
not to be applicable to ponds or reservoirs, pools of water, streams, canals,
dams, ditches, culverts, drains, cesspools or sewer pools.
The reason why a swimming pool or pond or reservoir of water is not
considered an attractive nuisance was lucidly explained by the Indiana
Appellate Court as follows: “nature has created streams, lakes and pools which
attract children. Lurking in their waters is always the danger of drowning.
Against this danger children are early instructed so that they are sufficiently
presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private property creates an
artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature
without adding any new danger, he is not liable because of having created an
"attractive nuisance."
Therefore, as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance,
the question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes
immaterial.

16. FACTS WHICH MUST BE SHOWN IN LIABILITY OF PROPRIETOR OF A

BUILDING AND LAST CLEAR CHANCE
SUBJECT: Torts and Damages

Feliza P. De Roy and Virgilio Ramos vs Court of Appeals and Luis Bermal,
Sr., Glenia Bernal, Luis Bernal, Jr., Heirs of Marissa Bernal, namely:
Gliceria Dela Cruz Bernal and Luis Bernal, Sr.
G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988
CORTES, J:

FACTS:
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in
view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
The RTC adjudged that petitioners are guilty of gross negligence, the
same was affirmed in toto by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Are the petitioners liable for damages?

RULING:
Yes, the Court ruled that petitioners are liable under Article 2190 of the
Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it
should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
The argument of the petitioner is also misplaced; according to them,
private respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last
clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to
this case.