Incidents involving

PV array and battery

energy storage
systems

GUIDELINE
Version 2.0
4 November 2020
PROCEDURAL Doctrine ID: 3020
Copyright © 2020 Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council Limited
All rights reserved. Copyright in this publication is subject to the operation of the Copyright Act 1968 and its subsequent
amendments. Any material contained in this document can be reproduced, providing the source is acknowledged and it is
not used for any commercialisation purpose whatsoever without the permission of the copyright owner.
Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council Limited (ABN 52 060 049 327)
Level 1, 340 Albert Street
East Melbourne Victoria 3002
Telephone: 03 9419 2388
Facsimile: 03 9419 2389
afac@afac.com.au
afac.com.au

Disclaimer
This document has been developed from consultation and research between the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service
Authorities Council Limited (AFAC), its members and stakeholders. It is intended to address matters relevant to fire, land
management and emergency services across Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific region.
The information in this document is for general purposes only and is not intended to be used by the general public or
untrained persons. Use of this document by AFAC Member agencies, organisations and public bodies does not derogate
from their statutory obligations. It is important that individuals, agencies, organisations and public bodies make their own
enquiries as to the currency of this document and its suitability to their own particular circumstances prior to its use.
AFAC does not accept any responsibility for the accuracy, completeness or relevance of this document or the information
contained in it, or any liability caused directly or indirectly by any error or omission or actions taken by any person in
reliance upon it.
You should seek advice from the appropriate fire or emergency services agencies and obtain independent legal advice
before using this document of the information contained herein.

Citation
Australasian Fire and Emergency Services Authorities Council. (2020) Incidents involving PV array and battery energy
storage systems (AFAC Publication No. 3020). AFAC, Melbourne, Australia.

Review period
Five‐year period after approval by AFAC Council.

INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS i

Contents
Acknowledgements........................................................................................................................................................... iii

About AFAC and AFAC Doctrine......................................................................................................................................... iii

About this document.........................................................................................................................................................1

Source of authority.......................................................................................................................................................1

Purpose........................................................................................................................................................................1

Scope............................................................................................................................................................................1

Statement of Engagement............................................................................................................................................1

Audience.......................................................................................................................................................................1

Definitions, acronyms and key terms...........................................................................................................................2

Introduction........................................................................................................................................................................2

Doctrine concepts..............................................................................................................................................................2

PV array systems...........................................................................................................................................................2

Battery energy storage systems....................................................................................................................................3

Identification......................................................................................................................................................................3

PV array systems...........................................................................................................................................................3

Grid-connect...........................................................................................................................................................4

Stand-alone.............................................................................................................................................................4

Battery energy storage systems....................................................................................................................................4

Shut down .........................................................................................................................................................................4

Risk management ..............................................................................................................................................................4

Operational Considerations: Fire........................................................................................................................................6

Operational Considerations: Bushfire ................................................................................................................................7

Operational Considerations: Rescue..................................................................................................................................7

Operational Considerations: Storm recovery.....................................................................................................................7

Operational Considerations: Flood response ....................................................................................................................7

Training...............................................................................................................................................................................7

Commercial systems...........................................................................................................................................................8

References..........................................................................................................................................................................8

INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS ii

Acknowledgements
Specific acknowledgement of the contribution of the
Country Fire Authority VIC, Metropolitan Fire and Emergency
Services Board Melbourne, SA Metropolitan Fire Service, SA
Country Fire Service, SA State Emergency Service, QLD Fire
and Emergency Services, Fire and Rescue NSW, NSW Rural
Fire Service, Department of Fire and Emergency Services
WA, ACT Fire and Rescue, Fire and Emergency New Zealand
and the Clean Energy Council.
About AFAC and
AFAC Doctrine
AFAC
The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities
Council (AFAC) is the Australian and New Zealand National
Council for fire, emergency services and land management.
It is a collaborative network of fire, emergency services
and land management agencies that supports the sector to
make communities safer and more resilient.
AFAC Doctrine
AFAC develops doctrine to support the practice of
emergency management. The information in doctrine
publications is evidence-based and drawn from academic
research and the collective expert knowledge of member
agencies. Doctrine is regularly reviewed and represents the
official AFAC view on a range of topics.
Doctrine does not mandate action; rather, it sets
aspirational measures. Publishing nationally agreed views,
shared approaches and common terminology enhances
cooperation and collaboration within and between
agencies and jurisdictions.
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
Types of AFAC Doctrine
AFAC Doctrine is classified as follows:
Capstone doctrine – includes publications, such as
'strategic intents', that are high-level accounts of the
concepts of emergency management operations and
service delivery. They describe the principles of what is
practical, realistic and possible in terms of protecting life,
property and the environment.
Fundamental doctrine – includes 'positions', which AFAC
members are expected to support, as well as 'approaches'
and some 'frameworks'. Fundamental doctrine may
become agency or jurisdictional policy on a matter if
adopted by individual services or jurisdictions.
Procedural doctrine – includes 'guidelines', some
'frameworks', and 'specifications'. AFAC members are
expected to be aware of procedural doctrine. A guideline
is an advisable course of action, a framework provides a
linking of elements to create a supporting structure to a
system, and specifications are a detailed description of a
precise requirement to do something or build something.
Technical doctrine – includes 'technical notes', 'training
material' and the Australasian Inter-Service Incident
Management System (AIIMS). Technical doctrine provides
guidance of a technical nature: the how to do something,
or the technical meaning relative to a situation.
iii
About this document
This publication is a Procedural Guideline. At the time of
publishing it is supported by the following:
• Firefighter Safety and Photovoltaic Installations
Research Project (Backstrom and Dini, Underwriters
Laboratories Inc. 2011)
• Fire Fighter Safety and Emergency Response for
Solar Power Systems (Casey C. Grant, Fire Protection
Research Foundation 2010)
• Unpublished research carried out by the Metropolitan
Fire Brigade, Melbourne and ACT Fire and Rescue
• Solar Electric Systems –Safety for Firefighters, Ted
Spooner, September 2011
• AS/NZS 5033 Installation and Safety Requirements for
Photovoltaic (PV) Arrays
• South Australia Metropolitan Fire Service Alternative
Energy Procedures (draft), 2020
• Fire and Rescue NSW SOG Battery Energy Storage
Systems (draft), 2020
• Country Fire Authority Safety Alert No. 49 Photovoltaic
(PV) Solar Systems and Battery Storages, 2017
• Country Fire Authority Operations Bulletin Alternative
Electrical Supplies – Photovoltaic Arrays (Solar Panels),
2010
• AFAC CEO Bulletin – Battery Energy Storage Systems,
April 2020
• Queensland State Emergency Service. PV Systems-
Impacts on SES Storm Operations, 2019.
Other relevant standards and Best Practice Guides in use in
Australia include:
• AS/NZS 5139 - Electrical installations - Safety of battery
systems for use with power conversion equipment
• AS/IEC 62619 - Safety requirements for lithium cells
and batteries
• UL 1973 - Standard for batteries for use in stationary,
vehicle auxiliary power and light electric rail
• The Battery Best Practice Guide – A best practice guide
for safety of lithium-based battery storage equipment,
which draws upon AS/IEC 62619, UL 1973 and other
Australian and international standards
• CEC Approved Product List – A publicly available list of
battery systems and battery energy storage systems
(BESSs) that have demonstrated compliance with the
Battery Best Practice Guide.
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
Source of authority
AFAC National Council endorsed this Incidents involving PV
array and battery energy storage systems Guideline on
04 November 2020.
Purpose
This Guideline is to assist and support agencies when
responding to incidents involving Photovoltaic Systems (PV)
and Battery Energy Storage Systems (BESS). It is intended to
record a consensus on best practice for dealing with such
incidents as at the date of publication.
Scope
This Guideline applies to domestic PV systems and Battery
Energy Storage Systems that have been installed at or
adjacent to a structure where an emergency incident is
taking place. Commercial PV systems are discussed in this
Guideline.
It does not cover the general safety implications of other
alternative energy systems or the installation of PV arrays in
vehicles such as recreational vehicles.
Statement of Engagement
This Guideline was reviewed by the PV Array and BESS
Working Group reporting to the Urban Operations Group.
Consultation was undertaken with the AFAC Urban
Operations Group, Built Environment and Planning Technical
Group, SES Operations Group, Hazardous Materials (CBRN)
Technical Group and the Fire Investigation Network.
Audience
This Guideline is intended for personnel who have the
responsibility within their organisation for developing
doctrine for policies, procedures, practices and training.
Other senior managers, trainers and fire and emergency
responders should refer to their agency doctrine for
information specifically tailored to their legal jurisdiction
and operational and environmental conditions.
1
Definitions, acronyms and key
terms
In this guideline, the following terms have specific meanings:
AC: Alternating current, the type of current found in the
electricity grid.
Alternative energy systems: A broad classification of
energy producing systems other than power. stations
supplying the electricity grid. Common systems include PV,
wind turbine, co-generation, geo-thermal, and micro-hydro.
BESS: Battery Energy Storage System.
Charge controller: A device found typically in stand-alone
systems that regulates the charging of batteries associated
with the system.
DC: Direct current, the type of current generated by PV
panels.
Dangerous voltage: Voltage which carries an appreciable risk
of electric shock to a human that comes into contact with
it, with associated risks of ‘locking on’ to live conductors or
‘startle’ reactions such as involuntary body movements.
Disconnection switches: Switches included in DC
circuits installed to AS/NZS 5033 Installation and safety
requirements for photovoltaic (PV) arrays that prevent DC
power from reaching the inverter from the PV panels.
Electrical exclusion zone: A zone, demarcated around an
object that is or may be electrically ‘live’, which is not to be
entered except with permission of the incident controller.
Grid-connect system: A PV system that is connected to the
electricity grid allowing the associated premises to draw
grid power where necessary, and for surplus power from
the PV array to be fed back into the grid.
Inverter: A device that converts DC output from PV systems
to AC electricity, typically for use in domestic premises or
for feeding back into the grid.
Isolation: The process of removing an electrical hazard
by turning off all switches, creating mechanical breaks
between the power source and other system components,
earthing and testing to confirm the system is de-energised.
Lethal voltage: Voltage which carries an appreciable risk
of killing by electrocution a human that comes into contact
with it.
Photovoltaic: Generating electricity from light.
Photovoltaic array: An assembly including photovoltaic
panels and associated wiring designed to generate
electricity from sunlight. The part of a PV system commonly
found on the roof of premises.
PV: Photovoltaic.
Risk assessment: A process of risk identification, risk
analysis and risk evaluation consistent with the principles
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
set out in ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles
and Guidelines aimed at ensuring the benefits from actions
always outweigh the risks involved.
Shut down: Opening of switches/circuit breakers to
prevent power being fed from a PV system into a property.
Shut down of DC should render ordinary domestic circuits
safe (subject to the presence of undetected alternative
power supplies) but does not de-energise the DC system in
its entirety.
Stand-alone system: A PV system that is not connected
to the electricity grid so that the circuits it powers rely on
battery storage to provide current when PV electricity is
not being generated.
Introduction
AFAC Guidelines are a preferred or advisable course
of action. Member agencies are expected to be aware
of Guidelines and to have considered how best they
apply to relevant circumstances faced by the agency.
Guidelines are addressed to AFAC member agencies, and
agency personnel should refer to their agency operating
procedures for further information.
This Guideline is to assist and support agencies responding
to incidents involving Photovoltaic Systems (PV) and Battery
Energy Storage Systems (BESS). It is intended to record a
consensus on best practice for dealing with such incidents
as at the date of publication.
This Guideline supersedes the previous version “Safety
Considerations for Photovoltaic Arrays (2013)”.
Doctrine concepts
PV array systems
There are a broad range of alternative energy systems available
in the market and being used at domestic and commercial
premises across Australia and New Zealand. The likelihood of
encountering a PV system at an emergency incident is, however,
significantly greater than that of other systems.
Domestic PV systems can generate voltages up to 650V
DC and high amperages. Non-contact voltage detectors,
commonly used by agencies, do not have the ability to
detect DC voltages. The energy produced by a PV system is
sufficient to kill emergency workers.
The regulatory systems surrounding the design, installation
and testing of PV systems will change given local
considerations and improvements in technology. It therefore
needs to be understood that systems will differ, and the
experience from working with one system at an incident will
not necessarily translate to the next incident.
2
The publication of AS/NZS 5033 Installation and Safety
Requirements for Photovoltaic (PV) Arrays should become
a driver toward standardisation in PV arrays, including
those provisions covering signage for fire and emergency
services. Systems installed before the publication of the
2012 standard may not meet the requirements set out in
it and such systems number hundreds of thousands across
Australia and New Zealand combined.
Electricity supply providers do not, in most jurisdictions,
provide support to emergency services in relation to
alternative energy systems. It is generally accepted that the
owner of the alternative energy system is responsible for
its management. However, at the time of the incident, the
owner or occupier may not be available or if they are, may
not have the ability to isolate the system.
Persons that install PV systems are required to hold the
appropriate qualifications for this task. However, once the
system has been affected by fire or other incident conditions,
their skills and knowledge to safely isolate the system may
be insufficient. Incident controllers have a responsibility
to satisfy themselves as to the capability of third parties
before allowing them to undertake isolation functions on the
incident ground.
As per the AFAC Position on PV Array Systems (2019), it
is recommended that agencies allow for their incident
reporting systems to capture data on events that either
involve PV system components such as DC isolators, panels
or inverters as the source of ignition, or where components
have been damaged by storm activity. Where appropriate,
fire investigators are to identify if the component was ignited
by an external source, equipment failure or poor installation
practice.
It is also recommended that incidents are reported to
the respective jurisdictional electrical regulator to enable
regulators to gain an understanding of the issue and
emerging trends.
Battery energy storage systems
Battery Energy Storage System installation rates across
Australia and New Zealand are starting to increase. There
are several government rebate and stimulus initiatives that
are making energy storage systems accessible, resulting
in an increased rate of both residential and commercial
installations.
There are numerous brands and chemistries of batteries on
the market, providing varying levels of risks to emergency
service personnel. These chemistries may not be identifiable
at an incident, requiring responders to take the highest
precautions available.
It is recommended that agencies allow for their incident
reporting systems to capture data on events that either
involve lithium-ion batteries or have identified a lithium-ion
battery as the source of ignition.
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
Identification
Intelligence gathering in the initial size-up and risk assessment
processes for any incident where battery systems may be
involved should include:
• Questioning occupants
• Visual 360 degree walk around of the structure
• Identification of signage to indicate PV Arrays (PV) or
Energy Storage (ES).
A lack of signage does not guarantee that a PV Array
System or BESS is not present.
PV ES
Signage indicating presence Signage indicating
of a PV Array System presence of a BESS
PV array systems
There are two main types of PV systems: Grid-connect
and Stand-alone. Generally, there is only one type of PV
system at a site; however other alternative energy systems
may also be present. Consideration of the presence of a
PV system should always form part of the size up of any
emergency incident involving a structure.
The most obvious visual indicators of a PV system being
present at a site include
• Visible PV panels (either roof mounted or ground
mounted)
• Presence of an inverter or charge controller
• Signage at the main switchboard or connection point
for other power supply (for example a grid supply
service fuse) advising of the presence of an alternate
energy power source.
Personnel working at an incident must not assume that
the absence of one or more of these indicators excludes
the possibility of a PV system being present. For example,
PV panels on a roof may be invisible from street level.
Inverters may be mounted on interior walls or in garages
and not be visible from outside a building, or mounted with
PV Panels at ground level a distance away from buildings.
Micro-inverter technology means there will not be an
inverter in place as each panel has a micro-inverter
installed that converts the DC to AC at the panel and
supplies the AC to the building via a common AC feed.
3
Grid-connect
A PV system that is connected to the electricity grid allowing
the associated premises to draw grid power where necessary,
and for surplus power from the PV array to be fed back into
the grid.
The key components are:
• PV panels connected together to form PV arrays
• DC cabling
• Inverter
• Main Switchboard
• Disconnection switches (also referred to as ‘DC
isolation’ switches, these switches disconnect the
PV array from the inverter, but do not isolate the PV
system as defined in this Guideline because the panels
and associated wiring up to the first disconnection
switch remain live).
Stand-alone
A PV system that is not connected to the electricity grid so
that the circuits it powers rely on battery storage to provide
current when insufficient PV electricity is being generated.
Other alternative energy systems may also be present at
premises with standalone PV systems.
The key components are:
• PV panels connected together to form PV arrays
• DC cabling
• Charge controller and storage batteries
•
•
Inverter (in some systems)
Main Switchboard
• Disconnection switches.
Battery energy storage systems
Battery Energy Storage Systems may be present regardless
of the presence of a PV Array System. These systems can be
used to store energy directly from the grid.
Where appropriate and in compliance with the Risk
Assessment, identification of the type and manufacturer
of the battery system will inform responding crews of the
battery chemistry and associated hazards that are present.
Shut down
Shutting down of a PV and/or Battery Energy Storage System
should be considered, if safe to do so, at the same time and
for the same reasons as turning off AC (grid) supply to the
premises. Following the shut down procedure will stop the
system from supplying power to the domestic circuits within
the building. Shut down procedures will often be set out
on signage at the switchboard or inverter. Note that ‘shut
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
down’ of a system does not stop the panels from generating
electricity during daylight hours.
In the absence of shut down procedures being advised
carry out the following steps in sequence:
• turn off AC power to the premises at the switchboard
• turn off the AC ‘solar supply main switch’ at the
switchboard
• turn off the AC power supply switch next to the inverter
• operate the disconnection switch(es) in the DC system.
First switch off the DC switch(es) next to the inverter;
then (if there is one, and it can be accessed safely)
switch off the DC switch(es) next to the panels. Not all
systems will have this last switch.
If AC power is not reaching the inverter, because of a
power cut, or because it has been turned off, the inverter
will not produce AC voltage and therefore will not be
feeding power to the premises.
When isolating mains power and the ES main battery
disconnect, crews should don full Structural PPE, look away
when shutting down the power being wary of arc flash
that can cause burn injuries, and use the back of the hand
when possible to isolate power.
Regardless of shut down procedures being followed, any
DC cabling in a PV system remains live between the PV
panels and the disconnection switch closest to them. This
cabling may have been routed internally e.g. through the
roof space of a property.
Risk management
PV systems and Battery Energy Storage Systems can pose
significant risks to firefighters and emergency workers if
the risks are not adequately controlled. Management of
these risks must be embedded within the broader risk
management for the incident.
Because of system variations, it cannot be assumed that
standard risk controls will adequately control hazards posed
by a specific system. A risk assessment must always be
carried out based on the situation and the characteristics
of the individual system under consideration. Before
making decisions about objectives, strategies and tactics,
the risk assessment must ensure that risk to personnel is
outweighed by the potential benefit of operations.
1. Incident controllers must consider the possibility of
a PV system, Battery Energy Storage System, or other
alternative power source, being present by including
it as part of the size-up process. All other emergency
services workers must maintain situational awareness
around the potential presence of PV systems at an
incident and report information about a PV system to
the Incident Controller, as the PV system may not be
immediately obvious on arrival.
4
2. Due to the potential for rapid escalation of incidents,
structural PPC and Self-Contained Breathing
Apparatus/Compressed Air Breathing Apparatus must
be donned for all incidents involving BESS and/or PV
Array Systems.
3. Electrical Exclusion Zone
– As soon as the presence of a PV system or BESS
is suspected or confirmed, an electrical exclusion
zone must be considered. Personnel must be
restricted, as far as reasonably practicable, from
entering an electrical exclusion zone unless
required to save life or prevent the dangerous
expansion of the incident.
– Personnel must assume that systems are
hazardous (live) unless they are deemed safe by
an agency approved solar qualified technician.
– An electrical exclusion zone should be established
for a minimum of six (6) metres from any
components considered ‘live’ or conductive
material in contact with potentially ‘live’
components.
– An electrical exclusion zone should apply to any
damaged or potentially damaged components
of the PV system including panels, wiring and
inverters, and any conductive materials that
are in contact with damaged components of a
PV system. The exclusion zone should be large
enough to prevent inadvertent contact with these
components or materials.
4. If no visible damage has occurred to the PV array
or the supporting structure and access to the roof
is required, a thorough risk assessment is to be
performed by the IC. This risk assessment should
take into consideration possible conductivity of the
construction materials of the roofing surface and
supporting structure. Consideration should also
include access to roof mounted isolation switches.
5. If the PV array has been involved in fire or has been
visibly damaged, subjected to hail, strong winds
or impact by flying debris the attending crew must
not access the roof until an agency approved solar
technician has deemed the roof safe.
6. During daylight hours the PV system will continue to
generate electricity even if:
a. the system is shut down; or
b. the PV panels are damaged.
There is potiential for the PV system to enliven metal
roof components
7. Keep bystanders and other emergency service
personnel out of the area of smoke travel. Note: White
smoke or vapour that is a product of combustion
needs to be avoided by all personnel as this is where
hazardous chemicals are identified at the highest levels
and is immediately dangerous to life or health.
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
8. If smoke is present, ensure that atmospheric
monitoring is being undertaken and that control zones
(hot, warm and cold) have been clearly identified.
9. A potentially lethal voltage may be present:
a. at the panels
b. in DC cabling on the array side of the
disconnection switch, or
c. in any other conducting material in contact with
damaged system components
d. in any cabling leading to or from a battery or
inverter.
10. Where internal DC cable may have been impinged
by fire or mechanical damage, a risk assessment of
internal operations must take into account the fact
that lethal voltages may be present in the internal
cables or conductive materials touching them and that
AC detection equipment will not detect DC voltage.
11. If the BESS is found to be at ambient temperature,
and there is no increase in temperature then thermal
runaway is unlikely. If temperature is rising, apply
a broken stream (fog pattern) of water to cool the
battery.
12. If lithium-ion batteries are impinged on by heat, fire
or mechanical damage, it may start a thermal runaway
process leading to an explosion. Lithium-ion batteries
will produce toxic, explosive gases if affected. This may
include Hydrogen Fluoride, Hydrochloric acid, and
Hydrogen Cyanide.
13. The lithium-ion battery may contain electrolyte, made
up of a volatile hydrocarbon-based liquid and a dissolved
lithium salt such as lithium hexofluorophosphate.
Leaked electrolyte is colourless and characterised by a
sweet odour. If an odour is obvious, evacuate or clear
surrounding area and ventilate. It is flammable and
corrosive/irritating to the eyes and skin.
14. Use extreme caution when making initial entry to
any compartment suspected of housing any battery
system to avoid the potential for backdraught induced
ignition of any excessive smoke reservoir within the
compartment.
15. At night, PV arrays will not generate dangerous
voltages unless exposed to intense light such as
emergency vehicle floodlights or flames shining
directly on the PV array.
16. A PV array that is not generating electricity at night
will start producing electricity once daylight returns.
This is particularly relevant for relief crews or incident
investigators who may not have been present at the
onset of an incident. Such personnel must look for the
presence of PV arrays and receive confirmation that
the PV system has been isolated. This reinforces the
need for safety handovers when briefing personnel.
5
17. Commencement of electricity generation once daylight
returns has the potential to cause arcing in damaged
DC cabling – a known ignition source. Where a PV
system is present and has been damaged, personnel
working at an incident should be alert to any issues
arising at daybreak.
18. Additional to the electrical hazards, PV systems also
pose the following hazards:
a. Working at heights,with slip and trip hazards
when personnel access or work on a roof
b. Inhalation hazards, from glass or other system
materials following mechanical or other damage.
Be aware that the smoke produced by PV arrays
that are burning is carcinogenic
c. Collapse hazard, when weakened roof or support
structures fail to hold the system components,
allowing them to fall on personnel below.
19. The use of in-service tarps by attending crews to cover
PV panels to shut down the production of energy is
not advisable. The opaque nature of many tarps only
has varying degrees of success in limiting or preventing
energy production.
20. Incident controllers using non-operational personnel
(for example an agency approved solar or battery
installer) must carefully assess whether the person can
undertake the task in a safe manner to assist with:
a. the assessment of the safety of a PV system
following an incident, or
b. the isolation of a PV system.
21. Fire Investigation personnel should be appropriately
briefed by the Incident Controller on any potential
hazards still present post-incident, don appropriate
PPE/C and consider any requirement to be in close
proximity to any potential hazard.
22. Incident Controllers should seek specialist scientific
advice and consider the upgrade of the incident
to a HAZMAT incident in compliance with agency
procedures.
23. Full decontamination measures should be undertaken
by crews that have been involved in an incident
involving smoke from PV Arrays and/or BESS. This
should be performed on a hazard assessment basis.
a. If the incident has been escalated to a HAZMAT
response, then personnel who have been involved
in smoke from the PV Array/BESS should consider
chemical decontamination measures.
b. If the incident has not involved smoke from the PV
Array/BESS, the Incident Controller should perform
a risk assessment for appropriate decontamination
measures in line with agency policy.
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
24. At termination of operations, scene handover to
the recipient should be include information of the
potential presence of an electrical hazard.
25. Ensure at handover that third parties are aware of
the hazards and requirements for correct storage
of damaged batteries, in line with jurisdictional
arrangements. It has been recommended by
manufacturers that batteries should be submerged in
a volume of water for an extended period to mitigate
the risk of a secondary ignition.
Operational
Considerations: Fire
• In case of fire, extinguishing media suitable for
electrical fires may be applied to PV system or BESS
components or fires in close proximity to them. A risk
assessment should be carried out before approaching
systems closely, for example to use an extinguisher.
BESS should never be approached from in front of the
system due to the explosive risk.
• It is safe to use fresh water, with or without Class A foam,
as an extinguishing medium for direct application to a PV
or BESS system, regardless of whether it is live or not. A
broken spray pattern should be used from a distance of at
least six (6) metres from system components or adjoining
conductive material.
• Salt water is electrically conductive and must not be
used as an extinguishing medium on fires involving PV
systems or BESS.
• Knockdown of a battery fire can require an extensive
amount of appropriate extinguishing media. This can
take an extended period of time.
• Any contaminated run off should be controlled as per
agency procedures.
• Secondary ignitions are a significant risk and
temperature monitoring is needed immediately after
knockdown and should continue until the battery
temperature has reduced to ambient and is stable for
at least 45 minutes.
• The use of chemical gloves and appropriate PPC is
recommended in any post-fire handling of batteries
due to the risk of corrosive/caustic substances.
Further technical information and supporting data can be
obtained from Firefighter Safety and Photovoltaic Installations
Research Project (Backstrom and Dini, Underwriters
Laboratories Inc. 2011) and reference to that document
is recommended when developing detailed Standard
Operating Procedures for fire suppression in PV systems.
6
Operational
Considerations: Bushfire
• Structures involved in bushfire response can pose a
significant risk to crews before, during and after the
structure has been impacted.
• Crews performing a dampdown of a structure should
always consider the presence of PV Arrays or BESS,
and therefore a shock hazard may be present. If these
systems are identified, the above Risk Management
considerations should be implemented.
Operational
Considerations: Rescue
• Incidents involving the rescue of person(s) in the
vicinity of a PV system, such as from a roof or other
structure, pose a significant risk to both the rescuers
and the person being rescued. There is a possibility
that the person(s) to be rescued is in contact with
material energised by the PV array.
• Rescuers should take the same precautions in relation
to electrical hazard as they would do if live AC
electrical apparatus was present. This should include
consideration of whether damaged DC components
could be energising adjacent conductive material such
as roof coverings.
• Due to the high voltage,explosive potential and
electrocution risks, never cut into a sealed battery
product enclosure. Stranded energy is stored electrical
energy that remains in a battery without an effective
means to detect or remove it. This typically happens
when the battery is damaged by force, a coolant leakage,
heat, or water intrusion and normal function ceases.
Operational
Considerations: Storm
recovery
• Storm damaged PV systems may still generate
electricity during daylight hours. Conductive materials
in contact with the damaged PV system components
may also be electrified. The PV system should be
isolated by an agency approved and qualified person
prior to emergency workers commencing recovery
operations at the location.
• If the operation can be delayed, night operations
should be considered. Crews conducting night
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
operations should consider the use of flashing beacons
and light towers due to the ability of a PV Array System
to generate electricity from these sources.
Operational
Considerations: Flood
response
• A risk assessment of internal operations including
hose-outs must take into account the fact that lethal
voltages may be present in the internal cables or
conductive materials touching them.
• PV Arrays will not shutdown in daylight hours,
regardless of the status of the electricity distribution
network. Identification of key system components
including inverters, metering/switchboards and BESS
may be difficult due to the presence of material and
water. These components can electrify the immediate
water body, posing a risk to responders in boats or
wading through waters. This should be considered in a
risk assessment.
• If submerged, BESS can produce toxic, explosive gases.
• It may not be possible to identify the presence of a PV
Array System or BESS, or associated signageon electrical
components, extra care should be undertaken.
Training
Emergency services workers should be trained:
• To understand the difference between grid connect
and stand-alone PV systems.
• To understand the difference between AC and DC
electricity, where these different types of electricity
is found within PV systems, and difficulties with
detection of DC electricity using agency equipment.
• To identify, and explain the purpose of key PV system
components and their likely location within a typical
•
PV system.
To understand the hazards likely to be present at any
•
incident involving PV systems.
To understand the generic shut down procedure for PV
systems likely to be found within their response area
and the limitations of this procedure on making the
system safe.
• To identify the presence and types of Battery Energy
Storage Systems.
• To understand the hazards presented by BESS
chemistry including thermal runaway and secondary
ignitions.
7
Commercial systems
A detailed consideration of commercial PV and Energy
Storage systems is outside the scope of this Guideline.
Commercial premises may have more substantial PV or
other alternative electricity generation systems installed.
Specialist advice should always be obtained when dealing
with these systems. Shut down of power to commercial
premises may have knock-on effects in terms of disabling
essential building services, and before arranging for shut
down of power to commercial premises incident controllers
will need to have identified the consequences of doing so
and carried out a risk assessment.
Generally, commercial-scale PV systems will be more
complex than domestic ones and may have multiple points
of supply to the building’s main switchboard. Where the
incident controller has confirmed a requirement to shut
down DC power to the premises, specialist advice from
building management will be required to ensure that all
sources of DC power have been located.
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS
References
Firefighter Safety and Photovoltaic Installations Research
Project (Backstrom and Dini, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.
2011)
Fire Fighter Safety and Emergency Response for Solar
Power Systems (Casey C. Grant, Fire Protection Research
Foundation 2010)
Unpublished research carried out by the Metropolitan Fire
Brigade, Melbourne and ACT Fire and Rescue
Solar Electric Systems –Safety for Firefighters, Ted Spooner,
September 2011
AS/NZS 5033 Installation and Safety Requirements for
Photovoltaic (PV) Arrays
South Australia Metropolitan Fire Service Alternative
Energy Procedures (draft), 2020
Fire and Rescue NSW SOG Battery Energy Storage Systems
(draft), 2020
Country Fire Authority Safety Alert No. 49 Photovoltaic (PV)
Solar Systems and Battery Storages, 2017
Country Fire Authority Operations Bulletin Alternative
Electrical Supplies – Photovoltaic Arrays (Solar Panels),
2010
AFAC CEO Bulletin – Battery Energy Storage Systems, April
2020
Queensland State Emergency Service. PV Systems-Impacts
on SES Storm Operations, 2019
8
INCIDENTS INVOLVING PV ARRAY AND BATTERY ENERGY STORAGE SYSTEMS 9