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Missing in action: aircraft maintenance and the recent ‘HRM in the airlines’
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The International Journal of Human Resource Management,
Vol. 23, No. 12, June 2012, 2561–2575

Missing in action: aircraft maintenance and the recent ‘HRM in the

airlines’ literature
Ian Hampsona*, Anne Junorb and Sarah Gregsona
a
School of Organisation and Management, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia;
b
Industrial Relations Research Centre, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
Several recent publications and a special issue of the International Journal of Human
Resource Management have addressed airline employment relations since deregula-
tion. In these, the crucial role of aircraft maintenance is largely unexamined. Human
Resource Management (HRM) prescriptions for airline success, particularly a
‘commitment’ model entailing increased trust and employee initiative, may be in
tension with the heavily regulated nature of the aircraft maintenance labour process.
The airline HRM literature with its emphasis on discretion-based definitions of skill sits
uneasily beside a safety literature that commonly stresses procedural compliance. Safe
aircraft maintenance depends on appropriate work organisation, along with utilisation
and development of maintenance workers’ skills and recognition of their collective
voice. Proposals to reshape or bypass any of these in the interest of cost containment
call for cautious evaluation. Although addressing international debates, we examine
these issues in the Australian context.
Keywords: airline deregulation; aviation safety; human factors; maintenance and
repair; work organisation

Introduction
Aircraft maintenance is a crucial component of aviation safety and, in the context of
increasing airline deregulation and restructuring, it becomes even more critical.
Surprisingly, however, some recent significant contributions to the literature examining
industrial relations (IR) and human resource management (HRM) in the aviation industry
mention aircraft maintenance, if at all, only in passing (Bamber, Gittell, Kochan and
Nordenflycht 2009a,b; Belobaba, Odoni and Barnhart 2009; Gittell, von Nordenflycht,
Kochan, McKersie and Bamber 2009; special issue of International Human Resource
Management 2010). Nor is aircraft maintenance work studied in the more critical
academic literature on employment relations in the airline industry (e.g. Blyton, Martinez
Lucio, McGurk and Turnbull 2001, 2003; Harvey and Turnbull nd; Turnbull, Blyton and
Harvey 2004; Harvey 2008; O’Sullivan and Gunnigle 2009; Oxenbridge, Wallace,
White, Tiernan and Lansbury 2010). While the ‘human factors’ affecting the safety of
aircraft maintenance are studied extensively in the discipline of safety science (e.g. see
special issue of Ergonomics 2010), this literature is abstracted from workplace relations’
factors, involving power, competition, budgets and conflict. The fact that aircraft
maintenance is ‘missing in action’ from the recent literature on IR and HRM of airline
deregulation has serious public policy implications.

*Corresponding author. Email: i.hampson@unsw.edu.au

ISSN 0958-5192 print/ISSN 1466-4399 online

q 2012 Taylor & Francis
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2011.633278
http://www.tandfonline.com
2562 I. Hampson et al.

The lack of cross-disciplinary communication between key aviation industry literatures

highlights a risk that airline industry reorganisation may proceed without a clear
understanding of maintenance practices, with adverse safety consequences. Aircraft
maintenance work is ‘safety critical’ and thus, while highly skilled, is heavily regulated.
Departure from the procedures specified in maintenance manuals is liable to disciplinary
and even criminal sanctions. This level of control is inconsistent with the emphasis
in much recent HRM literature on relaxing job descriptions and encouraging initiative
and discretionary effort to ‘do whatever is needed to ensure a successful operation’
(Bamber et al. 2009a, p. 180; Belobaba et al. 2009, p. 302). Whatever their role is in other
sections of the aviation industry, high-trust prescriptions cannot easily be applied in aircraft
maintenance. Thus, while HRM is commonly portrayed as critical for airlines’
competitiveness, applying such HRM prescriptions to airline maintenance may be
ill-advised, even dangerous. It is therefore important to explore the conceptual shifts
required to comprehend work that is high in skill but ostensibly low in discretion, carried out
in a context of competing demands for excellent safety outcomes, regulatory compliance
and cost sensitivity.
While this article is primarily a critical engagement with the literature at an early stage
of an empirical research project, it is informed by examination of policy and archival
material; transcribed interviews with maintenance employers, employees and retired
employees; and workshop and site visits. It begins with examinations of the two non-
communicating literatures – on airlines and the new HRM and on aircraft maintenance
and safety. The purpose is to establish that while low-quality aircraft maintenance is a
leading cause of accidents, as well as delays, turnbacks and in-flight diversions, the
‘new airlines HRM’ literature provides few tools for addressing the fact that maintenance
work involves the exercise of a sort of unauthorised autonomy which is encouraged and
discouraged at the same time. The following section explores the aircraft maintenance
labour process, using the Australian context, to highlight the crucial role of the supervisory
engineers known locally as Licensed Aircraft Maintenance Engineers (LAMEs,
pronounced lay-mees). This section establishes the tensions within a work process that
is circumscribed by regulation prohibiting departures from procedure, but where LAME
judgement is vital for safe and profitable airline operation. In deciding when maintenance
has been performed to a satisfactory standard and an aircraft is safe to return to service, the
LAME must apply skill and discretion, especially when there are managerial pressures to
sign off on work to avoid disrupting flight schedules. Paradoxically, within the latent
tension between speed and safety requirements, the procedure manual can also support the
LAME’s assertion of independent judgement in resisting shortcuts. These inherent
conflicts highlight the importance of collective employee representation to protect
LAMEs, and by extension the travelling public, from any adverse impacts of
the operational priorities of a management primarily answerable to shareholders. In the
following section, the article examines the implications of this analysis for the
‘new orthodoxy’ around airline employment relations, with its advocacy of ‘relational
coordination’ posited on shared goals and values. This section advances an alternative
thesis that aircraft maintenance work calls for the exercise of under-recognised relational,
situational and coordinating skills, some of which are required when safety and efficiency
goals conflict. The final section applies the analysis to the issue of heavy maintenance
offshoring, highlighting safety risks in economic rationalist assumptions that are taken as
unavoidable in the ‘new orthodoxy’.
 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 2563

Employment relations and HRM in the airlines

The ‘new orthodoxy’ is informed by a ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective and strategic
choice theory. Allowing that national institutional frameworks incorporate varying roles
for the state, and allow a diversity of forms of employee representation, this literature
argues that political and corporate leaders have ‘strategic choice’. There is thus no
automatic mapping of HRM policy bundles onto national environments, even in a very
‘global’ industry such as aviation. The new airline HRM literature distinguishes two broad
forms of ‘employment relations strategy’, both premised on individual relationships
between employers and employees. A ‘control’ approach entails that ‘managers specify
what needs to be done and instruct employees to comply with those directions’
(Bamber et al. 2009a, p. 11). In a recognisably Taylorist fashion, ‘[e]mployees are
expected to comply, and not to exercise initiative on behalf of the company’ (Gittell et al.
2009, pp. 276 – 277). The ‘commitment’ approach, on the other hand, purportedly
‘allows employees more discretion in the execution of their jobs. In return, employees are
expected to demonstrate greater commitment to the firm and its customers, and to exert
higher levels of discretionary effort’ (pp. 276 –277). The commitment approach is usually
characterised as involving more teamwork or cross-functional coordination, higher levels
of employee discretion, and more flexible job boundaries: ‘whatever is needed to ensure a
successful operation’ (Bamber et al. 2009a, pp. 12, 180).
This twofold categorisation of employment relations strategy is then mapped onto a
threefold typology of management –union relations. In the process of exercising ‘strategic
choice’, management can avoid, accommodate or partner with unions. Accommodation
entails limited forms of bargaining and information-sharing. Avoidance can include
aggressive anti-union campaigns or substitution strategies – management may team up
with an industrially quiescent union it favours or may offer conditions that purportedly
obviate the need for a union. Partnership entails the union and the firm adopting a less
adversarial stance, where both parties are ‘looking for opportunities and for mutual gains
arrangements and interacting more frequently and consultatively beyond the bargaining
table’ (Gittell et al. 2009, pp. 276– 277). Building and maintaining high-quality
relationships among unions, managers and employees is presented as the most effective
approach for achieving high levels of firm performance (p. 296). While ‘improved
relationships between airlines and their employees and unions – that is, commitment and
partnership models – are a path to superior results for the three main stakeholders’
(Bamber et al. 2009a, p. 176), a high commitment and non-union option is also possible. In
either case, organisational ‘success’ is equated with ‘positive’ workplace relations,
particularly to coordinate flight departures (Gittell et al. 2009, pp. 298 –300). A number of
‘functional groups’ – pilots, flight attendants, mechanics, ramp workers, customer service
agents and so on – are portrayed in this normative literature as sharing goals that can be
effectively coordinated through goodwill and company loyalty. Beyond technical
coordination, ‘relational coordination’ is portrayed thus:
When positive, these relationships enable airline employees to effectively coordinate their
work by supporting frequent, timely, problem-solving communication. When negative, these
same relationships serve as obstacles to coordination. (Gittell et al. 2009, pp. 298–299)
The ‘success’ of union exclusion/high control strategies, such as those at Ryanair, is
not acknowledged here. A more compelling picture, however, would recognise that some
prominent and profitable airlines do not run on positive relations but are characterised by
industrial conflict and Taylorised, ‘low trust’ work systems.
2564 I. Hampson et al.

The more critical international literature on airline IR has well documented the
process of deregulation and some of its effects, both actual and potential (Blyton et al.
2001, 2003; Harvey and Turnbull nd; Small 2002; Turnbull et al. 2004; O’Sullivan and
Gunnigle 2009). The deregulatory process has removed the cushion of government
protection. It has reduced both fares and profits, giving rise to greater price and
schedule competition between existing ‘legacy’ airlines and ‘new entrants’ or ‘low cost
carriers’ offering fewer ‘extras’ to customers and reduced employment conditions to
workers (Turnbull et al. 2004). Passenger miles flown have skyrocketed, while costs
per mile have nosedived. Cost-cutting in a range of areas has been the principal
management strategy for restoring profitability in this most turbulent of industries.
While maintenance staff have felt the brunt of economic rationalism in the form of
longer hours, reduced staffing and tighter deadlines, their experiences and potential
effects on safety are yet to be incorporated into the literature on airline deregulation
and IR.

Aircraft maintenance and the literature on aviation deregulation and safety

The work of Belobaba et al. (2009) is an outcome of the MIT Global Airline Industry
Program, developed alongside a first-year postgraduate course at MIT. Advertised as
providing ‘detailed coverage’ of, inter alia, ‘aviation safety and security’, the book’s wide
distribution suggests that it will be influential in the industry. While Belobaba et al. (2009,
pp. 313, 319) state that ‘a textbook about commercial aviation would be gravely deficient
if it did not include a discussion of safety issues’, their disclaimer asserts that the topic of
aircraft maintenance work is too large to warrant inclusion, especially as ‘jet travel has
consistently become safer decade by decade’. Their chapter on safety confines itself to
rectifying statistical oddities in measurement, and discussing airline security against
terrorism. Yet the authors themselves provide evidence that this approach is insufficient,
noting that the risk of death assumed in flying on a third-world carrier is about five times
more than that assumed when flying on a first-world carrier (Belobaba et al. 2009, p. 319).
This requires explanation. Herrera and Vasigh (2009, p. 128) observe that, given the global
nature of aviation and transnational regulation, we would expect little or no difference in
safety rates. In reality, safety rates are much lower in Africa and the Middle East than in
North America, because ‘safety standards or oversight are not as high in these areas of the
world’. Some airlines operate with older aircraft that require frequent and more highly
skilled maintenance. If safety outcomes vary cross-nationally, a fruitful line of
investigation might be to plot variations in maintenance, regulation, training and
employment relations, to identify significant risk factors.
Poor maintenance is a leading cause of accidents and fatalities (Hobbs 2008, p. 1),
although an exact quantification is difficult. Hobbs (2004, p. 2), with support from Boeing,
estimates that 4% of ‘hull loss accidents’ are traceable to maintenance errors. Estimates of
major accidents attributable to maintenance errors range from 12% by the Australian
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB 2001, p. 1) to 16% by Latorella and Prabhu (2000, p. 142).
Harris and Neville (2010, p. 146) quote Rankin’s (1997) estimate that improper
maintenance contributes to 15% of all commercial jet accidents. Maintenance issues are
also a leading cause of flight delays, which create significant cost pressures for airlines.
Latorella and Prabhu (2000, p. 144) quote an estimate by Gregory that 50% of engine-
related flight delays and cancellations are due to improper maintenance, resulting in delays
in aircraft availability, gate returns, in-flight shutdowns and diversions to alternative
airports, all of which increase operating costs.
 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 2565

These factors justify addressing aircraft maintenance, its regulation, labour process
and employment relations issues in any study of airline management, where one of the key
performance outcomes is safe and punctual flying.

Regulation and the organisation of aircraft maintenance in Australia

Aircraft maintenance is heavily regulated. The International Civil Aviation Organisation
(ICAO), established in 1947, develops aviation standards, including maintenance
standards, that are applied (with varying degrees of rigour) across 189 countries through
national aviation authorities (NAAs) – in Australia’s case, the Civil Aviation Safety
Authority (CASA). The standards have until relatively recently been developed and
refined in Europe and America by the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) and
the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) – together constituting the JAA (Joint Aviation
Authorities). These standards were known as the Joint Aviation Requirements, or JARs
(Yadav 2010). From 2003 the European Aviation Safety Authority (EASA) has taken over
their administration within Europe and, increasingly, internationally – although America
has reverted to the FAA standards. In 2011 in Australia CASA adopted the EASA system
(following a transition period beginning in 2007), in which four main sets of standards
govern maintenance processes and the skills, licensing and training for ‘continuing
airworthiness’ and civil aircraft maintenance. EASA parts 42 and 145 govern the workings
of aviation maintenance organisations. EASA part 66 sets out the requirements for
certifying licensed maintenance personnel, in particular the scope of license ‘privileges’.
EASA part 147 sets out the requirements for approving organisations to train Aircraft
Maintenance Engineers to standards set out under part 66. In Australia, these requirements
are known as Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASRs), and govern the conduct of
maintenance work and the training and skill standards required (see CASA 2011).
In Australia in 2009, there were 13,000 CASA-registered aircraft, mostly in the light or
General Aviation sector. Of 833 commercial-style planes heavier than 5700 kg Maximum
Take-Off Weight, over half (496) were operated by regional, domestic or international
airlines, or freight carriers. Qantas and its various market segments owned or leased 232
aircraft, and Virgin another 78 (CASA 2009). Almost three-quarters of Qantas’ revenue
source was domestic (Qantas 2008). The CASA had issued licences to 635 general
aviation operators and 62 airlines to carry out aircraft maintenance and/or train Aircraft
Maintenance Engineers (AMEs) (CASA 2009). Australian labour force surveys have
estimated the aircraft maintenance workforce at 12,300 in 2006 and 14,700 in 2010
(DEEWR 2010). In 2007, of this workforce, 6300 or over 50% were LAMEs who had
acquired additional qualifications licensing them to supervise and sign off the work of
AMEs (CASA 2010). The union covering LAMEs is the Association of Licensed Aircraft
Engineers of Australia (ALAEA), while AMEs are covered variously by the Australian
Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU) (mechanical and structures) and the
Communications Electrical Plumbing Union (CEPU) (avionics).
Market leaders Qantas and Virgin have adopted different approaches to the
organisation of maintenance work in Australia. In 2000, approximately 12.5% of Qantas
engineering and maintenance was contracted out, mainly back to original manufacturers,
while 11% of its in-house work was done for outside commercial and Defence customers
(Qantas 2000, p. 8). This high rate of in-house maintenance was one basis on which Qantas
built its reputation for safety. Its 2005 Annual Report linked the company’s ‘most exacting
standards in engineering’ to the fact that Qantas ‘is one of the few airlines with its own . . .
apprentice, skill development and advanced training for engineers to certify the release of
2566 I. Hampson et al.

Table 1. Productivity growth, Qantas 2000– 2009 (revenue passenger kilometres/employee).

Change
Year 2000/2009
Indicator 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2009

Av FTE employees 29,217 33,044 33,862 34,832 33,670 33,966 16%

Revenue passenger 64,149 75,134 81,276 90,899 102,466 99,176 55%
kilometres (M)
RPK per employee (M) 2196 2274 2400 2610 3043 2920 33%
Source: Qantas Annual Reports (2000–2009).

aircraft and components into service’ (Qantas 2005, pp. 5, 25). In 2006, a reported 125
heavy maintenance checks (‘C’ and ‘D’ checks) were undertaken in-house each year,
when a typical B747-400 ‘D’ check involves 55,000 person hours and over 9000 tasks
(Qantas 2006, p. 25). Between 2001 and 2007, Qantas invested over $360 million in
advanced technical facilities and training (Qantas 2007, p. 26). In contrast, at the time of
writing, much of Virgin’s newer fleet was not yet due for five-yearly D checks, and the
company reportedly relied heavily on outsourcing to Australian labour hire firms for
lighter maintenance and sent heavier maintenance work offshore (Interviews 2009 –2010).
By 2008, Qantas’ off-shoring had also increased, with a flexible figure of ‘80 to 90 per
cent’ now cited as the share of heavy maintenance done in Australia (Qantas 2009).
In the past decade, Qantas has steadily increased productivity (Table 1), while
Australian maintenance unions claim that many ‘efficiencies’ involve some weakening of
regulatory controls, deskilling and increased safety risks. They allege that streamlining
off-the-job training has reduced trainees’ understanding of aerodynamics principles and
diminished their opportunities to acquire hand skills through laboratory practice and
experimentation. In late 2010, engine difficulties in newer aircraft, most notably the A380,
necessitated some extension of the operating lives of existing fleets. Australian
maintenance engineers claim a special experience-based understanding of where faults in
older planes may arise but fear that the safety benefits of this expertise will be lost, if
offshoring of component repair, coupled with modularisation and pooling of parts,
undermines and sidelines maintenance engineers’ knowledge of individual aircraft and
their capacity to track hours of usage accurately (Interviews 2009 – 2010). The final section
of this article returns to the complex inter-relationships comprising productivity;
deregulation, globalisation, skill and safety but we must first explore the unusual impact of
safety concerns on the relationship between skill and control in the LAME labour process.

Safety, skill, discretion, representation: the aircraft maintenance labour process

Belobaba et al. (2009, pp. 5–6) assert that ‘despite worries at the time of deregulation that
competitive cost pressures might lead to reduced maintenance standards, there is no
statistical evidence that airline safety has deteriorated’. We defer a direct empirical challenge
to this claim until the relevant research is done. Instead, we challenge the claim on
conceptual grounds because it reflects a flawed but ubiquitous conception of safety. For
James Reason (1990, 1997), whose work is the basis of most safety regulation, the absence of
a disaster does not mean systems are ‘safe’. As he puts it, safety is a ‘dynamic non-event’,
whereas safety outcomes are produced constantly over time from the tension between the
twin functions of protection and production (or the quest for profits). During incident-free
 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 2567

periods, as cost cutting makes inroads into safety defences, the likelihood of catastrophe may
increase (Reason 1997, p. 6). Heightened competition and resultant cost-cutting in the airline
industry raise the spectre that latent, organisational factors can precipitate individual
mistakes (e.g. Reason 1997, 2008). Top-level decisions made by managers and regulators,
systems designers, and governments have consequences which may lie dormant within an
organisation ‘like pathogens’, ready to combine with local conditions and produce a
catastrophe (Reason 1997, p. 10). As Vogt, Leonhardt, Koper and Pennig (2010, p. 151) put
it, ‘most of the time things go right, but occasionally, and inevitably, an unforseen
combination of the same trade-offs between thoroughness and efficiency results in critical
incidents’. Germane examples of such latent factors include inadequate training and
reductions in the time available for maintenance work processes. The process is also cyclical;
smooth running can engender complacency, whereas a disaster, a ‘near miss’ or a ‘free
lesson’ will quickly place safety back at the forefront of corporate concern (Reason 2008).
While Reason’s widely accepted prescriptions on safety are important, they
marginalise the positive role employee representation can play in safe maintenance
outcomes. He suggests that becoming a ‘high reliability’ organisation entails developing a
‘safety culture’, which entails a hierarchy of cultural safeguards. The ‘informed culture’
values and propagates knowledge of the system as a whole. The ‘reporting culture’
encourages reporting of near misses and safety violations. The ‘just culture’ (or ‘no blame’
culture) encourages reporting and problem-solving by penalising error only in cases of
sabotage or criminal negligence. The ‘flexible culture’ delegates decision making to
experts in moments of crisis (or near crisis) (Reason 1997, 195 ff) – for example in the
‘sign off’ process (see below). In understating the role of conflict and power in
organisations, these prescriptions mirror the ‘unitarist’ approach of the ‘culture gurus’
frequently critiqued in the HRM literature. Reason cites approvingly In Search of
Excellence, the work of McKinsey stable stars, Peters and Waterman (1982).
Concomitantly, he does not explicitly posit a positive role for unions in ensuring safety,
which is important because deunionisation is strategically pursued by many airlines in
deregulated environments. Arguably, therefore, commercial considerations – and at least
some performance management systems – will limit the efficacy of Reason’s
prescriptions for the ‘high reliability’ organisation.
From this discussion of the safety literature, we now turn to the role of the LAME
labour process in ensuring the safety of air travel. According to international regulation, a
civil passenger plane cannot ‘return to service’ after maintenance unless a LAME ‘signs
off’ that the work has been done to the requisite standard. This puts LAMEs in a
strategically and industrially powerful position, as well as in the middle of the tension
between profits and safety. Arguably, LAMEs are ‘blue collar knowledge workers’, or
‘technoservice’ workers (Darr 2004). They use cognitive, technical and interpersonal
skills to do their own work, while supervising and certifying the quality of work done by
others. In doing so, they exercise significant judgement, made more complex by the need
to mediate between management and those they supervise. Airline safety is therefore
crucially dependent on LAMEs’ skills, ethics, diligence and motivations.
This is not necessarily the view of management and system designers, however,
because maintenance work processes are also highly prescribed. As Luby (2005) points
out, in one of few academic discussions of aircraft maintenance work from an employment
relations stance, heavy regulation distinguishes aircraft maintenance work from most other
production or maintenance functions. In the USA, the licensing regimen requires that
mechanics ‘use the methods, techniques, and practices prescribed in the current
Manufacturers’ Maintenance Manual or Instructions for Continued Airworthiness
2568 I. Hampson et al.

prepared by [the] manufacturer, or other methods, techniques, and practices acceptable to

the Administrator’ (FAA, quoted by Luby 2005, p. 207). Departure from the manual is
subject to suspension or license revocation, or fines, or both, even if the work in question
did not cause an accident or incident implicating passenger safety. This regulation
encourages perceptions of the L/AME labour process as taylorised, requiring little
particular skill apart from an ability to follow specified procedures – a view frequently
taken by aviation professional engineers. Luby (2005) also points out that this makes
problematic what he calls the conventional ‘employee involvement’, view of performance
management.
However, notwithstanding heavy penalties, divergences from procedure – erroneous
or deliberate – are relatively common (Hobbs 2004, p. 4; 2008, pp. 12 – 25, passim; Hobbs
and Williamson 2002; Reason 1997, pp. 49 –54). A European study reported in 2000 that
34% of maintenance workers acknowledged their most recent task had been performed in
a manner that contravened the formal procedures (quoted in Hobbs 2008, p. 15). An
Australian survey of L/AMEs found that 30% reported having signed off on a task before it
was completed, while 90% reported having done a task without the correct tools or
equipment (Hobbs 2004, 2008, p. 15). Departures from procedure may be due to badly
written and unclear documentation, or the maintenance engineer may decide there is an
easier or quicker way to do the job than that specified in the manual (Hobbs 2008, p. 18).
Hobbs also found that the most cited reason for departing from procedure is ‘management
pressure’ and ‘the cultural or value systems that permeate the organisation’ (p. 27).
Britain’s Civil Aviation Authority has identified as a ‘human factors’ problem the ‘dual
standards so prevalent in the industry, whereby engineers and technicians are trained to
follow procedures on the one hand, and yet sometimes unofficially encouraged to violate
procedures in order to get the job done’ (CAA 2003, pp. 3 –4). Since departure from
procedure is relatively commonplace, ensuring safety requires a capacity for judgement,
formed through good training and workplace experience, to distinguish benign deviations
from malign ones. Thus when deviations occur, much depends on the expertise, skill,
knowledge, negotiation abilities and judgement of individual LAMEs, coupled with the
strength of their representation and capacity to resist management pressure.
The performance bonuses of managers, who may not be technically qualified, are
commonly linked to ‘on time’ departures, achieved through ‘relational coordination’ of
airline functions. Gittell et al. (2009, p. 303) underscore that a ‘blame culture’ – a ‘search
for departmental failure’ – flourishes around late departures, as managers search out
individuals responsible for a delay. In this culture of blame, Reason’s prescriptions for the
‘high reliability’ safety organisation have little chance of success. LAMEs may face
pressure to ‘sign off’ on work that may not have been done to their satisfaction. While the
professional LAME may respond in the vernacular of one interviewee, by telling the
manager to ‘go and get stuffed’, they may also capitulate to one or more informal pressures
brought to bear, including the threat of management’s withdrawal of the training
opportunities that allow attainment of more licenses and hence increased remuneration.
Interviewees (2009) have claimed instances where LAMEs employed on temporary work
visas faced implicit threats of job loss and resulting deportation. Whatever the truth of
particular claims – a case for further research – LAMEs clearly rely on strong trade union
representation to support their professional safety standards.
The relational competence identified by Gittell et al. (2009, p. 301) is arguably part of a
suite of under-codified skills that are required by LAMEs. Lacking a taxonomy for these
skills, the ALAEA (2009, p. 21) cites ‘minimum age’ and ‘maturity’ as reasons for
preserving maintenance training. Experience and maturity can be seen as proxies for the
 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 2569

under-codified contextual awareness and relational skills, used in conjunction with

technical skills that are essential for quality aircraft maintenance. By combining
knowledge of a plane’s history with previous experience of known metal fatigue problem
areas, an AME can apply contextual awareness skills to detect almost imperceptible
warning signs that may not be listed as part of a scheduled check, and use judgement and
shared problem-solving skills to decide what action to take. Approaching the ‘sign off’
stage, a LAME needs skills of interpersonal awareness to ascertain whether an AME is ‘on
the ball’, or whether further inspection is required. Skills of boundary management
(‘assertiveness’, ‘managing up’) are needed, both for conversations with managers who
exert pressure to sign off on substandard work, and for conversations with team members
who must fix substandard work. Skills of coordination, time management and the
integration of ‘lines’ of work (Strauss 1985), as well as interpersonal communication, are
needed during ‘changeover’ between shifts (for a fuller account of these ‘process skills’
see Hampson and Junor 2010).
Some of these skills are the objects of ‘human factors’ training. This training arose
from changing attitudes to aircraft incident investigation, involving shifts away from a
focus on technical failures and ‘individual’ error towards identifying the organisational or
‘human factors’ that led to a disaster or a ‘near miss’. For example, some investigations
found that many accidents were caused by failures of communication and awareness
among flight crews. The traditional authority structure on flight decks, based on the
unchallengeable power of the captain, was itself a problem if/when subordinates were
intimidated from communicating information which might have prevented an accident to a
socially distant captain. Recognition of these problems heralded the ‘first wave’ of human
factors training, known as Crew Resource Management (CRM) training, designed to
inculcate relational skills of teamwork, situational awareness and a form of assertiveness
training for crisis situations. For example, a subordinate may be empowered to say a
particular codeword to their superiors which signalled ‘it is very important that you listen
to me now’.
Since 2000, Human Factors training has been mandatory for aircraft maintenance
engineers as part of JAR 66 (CAA 2002). Signalled by a US Department of Transportation
and Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular in September 2000 (FAA 2000,
p. 3), the new training was designed to underpin ‘maintenance resource management’ –
described as ‘a general process of maintaining an effective level of communication and
safety in maintenance operations’. Engineers were encouraged to improve their situational
awareness – both individual and team – alongside more sophisticated communication,
cooperation, task allocation and decision-making skills. The most common ‘human
factors’ causing maintenance errors were identified as the ‘dirty dozen’: insufficient
communication, assertiveness, awareness, knowledge, teamwork and resources, as well as
complacency, distraction, stress, fatigue, pressure and dysfunctional norms (FAA 2000,
p. 2). Particular attention was directed towards the ‘ability to verbalise a series of “rights”
that belong to every employee . . . [including] . . . the right to say no, the right to express
feelings and ideas, and the right to ask for information’ (FAA 2000, p. 1). The desirable
organisational end point is the ‘safety culture’ – ‘a pervasive, organisation-wide attitude
placing safety as the primary priority driving the way employees perform their task’ (FAA
2000, p. 3). As argued above, ‘safety culture’ prescriptions are saturated with unitarist
assumptions, and the dynamics of safety at the workplace need a more comprehensive
conceptual framework to apprehend them. Certainly, Reason rightly argued that ‘sign off’
should be governed by expertise alone, not purely commercial considerations. His
prescription for a ‘high reliability’ organisation, however, cannot ensure that expertise is
2570 I. Hampson et al.

given due weight, in the face of managerial demands to meet schedules. Our interviewees
assert that such pressure is a daily event.
As suggested in our introduction, lack of communication between salient academic
literatures has hampered investigation into aircraft maintenance. In industrial contexts
where union organisation is weak, the divisions between the academic and policy
literatures of safety science and airline employment relations are most likely to be
manifest. The ‘human factors’ affecting aircraft maintenance safety are studied
extensively in the discipline of ‘safety science’, but the ‘systems’ approach on which
this literature is based is embedded in the organisational behaviour literature and
challenged in the employment relations literature. Yet there are signs that the safety
scientists are ‘reaching out’. In the introduction to a special issue of Ergonomics, Harris
and Neville (2010, pp. 146– 147) claim that human factors as a discipline has accumulated
expertise from its applied science base, drawing from experimental and social psychology,
engineering, and so on, but has tended to become somewhat fragmented and may lack
‘coherent application’. It is now time, they suggest, to ‘examine the contribution of
ergonomics in a wider, business context, where...commercial organisations . . .
[including] . . . maintenance organisations, are required to balance the requirement for
safety against both cost and performance considerations’. Similarly, Vogt et al. (2010)
argue that human factors should shift from ‘mere error management to an existential part
of core business and, accordingly, to provide measurement and management tools’. While
this ‘servants of capital’ approach may not do justice to the issues involved, any roving
across disciplinary boundaries to analyse the issues of skills and safety in the context of
airline employment relations is welcome, however embryonic. Nevertheless, the common
unitarist assumptions underpinning safety science, HRM and economic rationalism do not
adequately address the questions of power and conflict required for a full contextual
understanding of the LAME labour process.

Offshoring heavy aircraft maintenance: globalisation, deregulation and safety

The effect of theoretical silos can be seen in approaches to maintenance offshoring in the
three airline literatures – the ‘new HR’, IR and safety science. In their introduction,
Bamber et al. (2009a,b, p. 3) briefly raise the question of whether increasing outsourcing of
maintenance will erode safety but do not return to the issue. Belobaba et al. (2009, p. 307)
claim that:
While the verdict on this is still out . . . evidence from other industries that make substantial
use of contractors is that the results vary depending on the quality of the relationships among
contractors and parent firms and the employee groups of the different enterprises that work
together.
This statement does not give due weight to the fractious context of aircraft maintenance
offshoring. In Australia, the limited literature on the subject suggests that decisions have
been driven in part by IR considerations – the threat to relocate can exert a powerful
disciplinary effect on unions (Small 2002).
The relationships between regulation and safety in offshoring were examined in a
2008 Australian Senate Inquiry into the CASA (SSCRRAT 2008), and touched on in a
Senate Inquiry into Workforce Capability in Transport (SSCEWRE 2007). In its
submission to this inquiry, the ALAEA (2007) raised concerns about the safety of
maintenance practices in certain overseas Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul
organisations (MROs), concerns which were strenuously rejected by the airline
concerned. The question of the safety of offshored and outsourced maintenance remains
 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 2571

one for further research. Given the dearth of research, any attempt to answer this question
must cross yet another disciplinary boundary for discussions regarding connections
between outsourcing (contracting out, but not necessarily offshore) and occupational
health and safety (OHS).
While there is limited research evidence on the OHS implications of outsourcing in
aviation maintenance, the general literature on outsourcing and OHS identifies pressures
on work quality, affecting workers’ ability to deliver safety to clients. In a meta-analysis
of the general literature in quality journals on the OHS impacts of outsourcing, Quinlan
and Bohle (2008) identify evidence of a diminution of safety standards, as measured by
injury rates, hazard exposures, and non-compliance with safe operating procedures. They
draw together studies linking diminished safety standard compliance with industry
pressures for the ratcheting up of productivity benchmarks, through transfer of capital
costs and reduction of labour costs, based on deregulated working hours, diminished
induction and supervision, cuts to training budgets, and use of output-based payment
systems. Extended hours and tight turnaround schedules have been linked to increased
likelihood of errors, accidents and ‘corner-cutting’ on safety. Studies of contingent
employment relationships suggest a diminution of both formal and informal knowledge
flows between and among workers and managers, with adverse safety outcomes for
workers and clients. Quinlan and Bohle (2008) also review studies instancing regulatory
failure in outsourcing situations, owing to ambiguous or contested legislative obligations
among contractors and subcontractors, logistical problems in inspecting multiple and
remote worksites, and enforcement issues. For example, the 1996 Valujet DC-9 airliner
crash in the Florida everglades which killed 110 people was attributed primarily to the use
of independent maintenance contractors, citing evidence of cost cutting, disorganisation
and regulatory failure. Where outsourcing moves across national borders, Quinlan and
Bohle (2008) suggest that these problems are magnified by geographical distance and the
potential for employers to ‘cherrypick’ the least onerous regulatory regimes pertaining to
safety and IR.
Definitive research is yet to be conducted on the impact of outsourcing and
offshoring on the formation and deployment of maintenance skills. On the one hand, the
contracting MRO may acquire a critical mass of skill, but if the motive of outsourcing is
to derive a cost advantage, skill acquisition may be overridden by the tendency to cut
corners on training. Unlike in-house maintenance workers, offshore contractors and, by
extension, their workers are under pressure to complete only the tasks for which the
contractor is being remunerated. The modularisation of tasks and pooling of components,
already noted as a feature of the trend towards a globalised maintenance labour process,
with the resulting loss of knowledge of the repair history of individual aircraft, can be
seen as a form of deregulation which reduces employees’ contextual learning and
initiative.
Interviews (2009, 2010) with Australian LAMEs reveal a fear that any trend towards
offshoring of heavy maintenance may compromise the capacity to gain a holistic
understanding of how components interact – conceptual knowledge that cannot be gained
in more intensive line maintenance work. Although the airlines assert that this fear is
exaggerated, the ALAEA (2007) believes the quality of training in Australia is dependent
on heavy maintenance, since it allows trainees to see stripped down aircraft, with their
design principles visible.
The training of the next generation of engineers depends on the airlines making
apprenticeships available. While the Australian government describes future L/AME
labour demand as high to ‘average’ (DEEWR 2010), there are still some concerns about a
2572 I. Hampson et al.

future international shortage of LAMEs. Globally, the aviation industry is projected to

grow at an annual rate of 4– 5%, while the workforce is ageing and requires replacement as
well as growth (IATA 2009; ALAEA 2007). Although there is some argument that labour
and skills requirements will fall owing to the lower maintenance requirements of newer
aircraft, there is also a counterargument that new aircraft will require new skills – for
example, in the use of composites. In addition, as mentioned previously, persistent delays
in the delivery of the next generation of wide-body long-haul aircraft (the Boeing
‘Dreamliner’ and Airbus A380), and teething problems with these new aircraft, have kept
ageing fleets in service and reinforced the demand for engineers with skills in heavy and
aircraft age-related maintenance.
Overseas, the predicted shortage of aircraft engineers is identified as a possible future
brake on economic growth, requiring training policy intervention. In Britain as early as
1999, the Royal Aeronautical Society identified a looming shortage of aircraft
maintenance engineers as a crucial safety issue (RAeS 1999). As a response to the
shortage of qualified aircraft maintenance workers, the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) has proposed that training times for qualifications be decreased, and
that the training be recast into a more competency-based form to permit greater
standardisation and economies of scale (IATA 2009, chap. 11).
Under pressure to deliver ‘harmonisation’ between the qualification structures of
Australian LAMEs and their equivalents in Europe administered by EASA, CASA is
following suit by recasting its existing licensing system. ‘Harmonisation’ is intended to
increase the possibility of transfer of labour between jurisdictions, yet, as Haas (2008)
points out, achieving this in the case of aircraft mechanics has been difficult in Europe
owing to resistance from nation states; parallel resistance is already visible in Australia.
All these proposed changes to license structures have triggered fears of deskilling and
associated concerns about safety (Interviews 2009).

Conclusion
In recent years, the aviation industry has experienced enormous flux through deregulation,
increased competition, price wars and industrial conflict. In this context, simplistic,
managerialist philosophies that paper over the safety implications of cost-cutting, work
intensification, deskilling and diminution of workplace power and democracy are
ill-advised, even dangerous. Unitarist assumptions that managers can encourage greater
employee commitment and initiative in pursuit of organisational effectiveness place
aircraft maintenance engineers in the unenviable position of having to be guardians of both
timeliness and safety. Complex decisions about airworthiness are difficult enough. When
LAMEs risk dismissal for not cooperating with corporate timetables and legal censure for
departing from the strict procedures mandated in aircraft manuals, pressure to compromise
is exacerbated. Because workers in unionised environments are much better placed to
insist on the maintenance of safety standards in the face of managers whose performance
pay may be based on delivering on-time departures, the question of ‘employee voice’ may
underpin accident prevention. The airline HRM literature with its emphasis on discretion-
based definitions of skill sits uneasily beside a safety literature that commonly stresses
procedural compliance. Safe aircraft maintenance depends on appropriate work
organisation, along with utilisation and development of maintenance workers’ skills and
recognition of their collective voice. Proposals to reshape or bypass any of these in the
interests of cost containment call for cautious evaluation.
 The International Journal of Human Resource Management 2573

Acknowledgements
We thank the Australian Licensed Aircraft Engineers Association (ALAEA) and individuals from
various other unions and maintenance and repair organisations for supporting this research. We
thank our interviewees for generously giving us their time, and the Australian School of Business at
the University of New South Wales for the support of a Special Research Grant.

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