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Zauberman, G., Ratner, R. K., & Kim, B. K. (2009) .
Zauberman, G., Ratner, R. K., & Kim, B. K. (2009) .
We present five studies supporting our strategic memory protection theory. When
people make decisions about experiences to consume over time, they treat their
memories of previous experiences as assets to be protected. The first two studies
demonstrate that people tend to avoid situations that they believe will threaten
their ability to retrieve special (rather than merely pleasant) memories. The next
three studies demonstrate that people seek to obtain memory pointers to help them
in what we call strategic memory protection, that is, be- smaller packages of cigarettes to limit how much they con-
haviors that people think will allow them to protect their sume later (Wertenbroch 1998).
ability to remember those experiences that they want to look
back on later. It is noteworthy that, although researchers Memory Protection through Avoidance
from diverse areas have acknowledged the importance of
utility from memory (Baumgartner, Sujan, and Bettman One of our key ideas is that when people are making
1992; Belk 1988; Holbrook 1993; Mather 2004; Wildschut decisions about what experiences to acquire over time, they
et al. 2006), we know relatively little about the strategies do not simply want to repeat experiences that were favorable
in which people engage to protect their ability to do so. Our in the past (Ratner, Kahn, and Kahneman 1999), as would
conceptualization of memories as assets highlights people’s be predicted by reinforcement learning models (Thorndike
efforts to protect the experiential capital that they have 1898). Rather we argue that people avoid situations that
accumulated. they believe will threaten their ability to retrieve special
We will focus on two key predictions that relate to dif- memories. For example, people might be concerned about
ferent strategies in which people might engage. The first adding new associations to their memory of the original
main prediction is memory protection through avoidance, experience (e.g., as when one has a memory of one’s va-
in which people tend to avoid situations that they believe cation with friends in a particular resort and returns to that
will threaten their ability to derive utility from special (rather same place for a business meeting). If new associations (e.g.,
than merely pleasant) memories. The second main prediction conversations with one’s boss over dinner) might be created
For a past experience to provide pleasure through remi- H1: People avoid repeating an experience that they
niscing, it is not enough for the experience to be initially consider very special more than an experience that
encoded in memory: it needs to be recalled and be subject was nonspecial.
to conscious reflection (Elster and Loewenstein 1992; Tulv-
ing and Thompson 1973). In addition, the principle of as- H2: The preference to avoid repeating a special ex-
sociative interference suggests that one’s ability to retrieve perience compared to a nonspecial experience is
initially encoded information can be impeded by information driven by a desire to protect special memories.
that is encoded subsequently (Bower, Thompson-Schill, and Following the same logic, we further suggest that one
Tulving 1994; Cowley 2007; Postman and Underwood important moderator of the desire to protect memory through
1973). Specifically, memory models based on an associative avoidance is the extent to which the elements present in the
network with spreading activation suggest that, when a cue subsequent experience would match those present in the
is activated, activation then spreads along links to the other original special experience. Whereas individuals will avoid
information nodes with which the activated node is asso- situations in which key elements have changed and therefore
ciated. In the context of repeated experiences, any subse- new associations could be created that might interfere with
quent nonspecial experiences that unfold with some of the their ability to recall the initial memory, they will be less
same cues present (e.g., in the same location) as in the initial concerned about avoiding situations in which key elements
special experience could threaten one’s ability to recall the remain the same. Therefore we hypothesize:
original special experience.
Yet, strategic memory protection is not simply about look- H3: The preference to avoid repeating a special ex-
ing back; rather it is inherently a forward-looking process. perience compared to a nonspecial experience is
To what extent are people forward looking about managing greater when different elements than the original
their memory assets? Extensive research on intertemporal experience will be present more than when the
decisions has shown that people exhibit myopic preferences same elements in the original experience will be
(Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Kahneman and Lovallo 1993; present.
Zauberman 2003); that is, people view decisions in isolation
and put disproportionately higher weight on the present than Memory Protection through Acquisition
on the future. This implies that people might not consider
future utility from memory prospectively and thus that they In addition to engaging in protecting special memories
might invest insufficiently in memorable experiences and through avoidance, we propose that people also seek to ac-
their protection. Our proposed process is more consistent quire memory pointers—items that they believe will help
with other research that suggests situations in which people them later to retrieve these earlier memories. Consumer re-
are forward looking about their intertemporal consumption search utilizing qualitative methods suggests that consumers
(Wertenbroch and Carmon 1997), such as smokers buying often possess objects associated with favorable occasions
STRATEGIC MEMORY PROTECTION 717
(Belk 1988; Tian and Belk 2006). Such possessions might perception that it can be difficult to recall spontaneously
consist of photographs of happy moments, trophies from past special memories. Research in psychology has dem-
past accomplishment, mementos from past romances, and onstrated that perceived recall difficulty of past experiences
souvenirs of enjoyable travel (Belk 1988). In the context of is quite malleable and that it affects subsequent judgments.
the current research, individuals might anticipate that ef- For example, participants who were asked to list many (i.e.,
fective memory pointers would be any physical objects that 12) childhood experiences felt difficulty in recalling the past,
are associated with a special experience. Our goal is to test which in turn led them to believe they had a poor memory,
these ideas as further evidence for the more general theory as compared to those who were asked to list only a few
of strategic memory protection by examining the conditions (i.e., 2) childhood experiences (Belli et al. 1998; Winkiel-
and motivations that induce a preference for such memory man, Schwarz, and Belli 1998). In the context of the current
pointers and the types of memory cues people think will be research, those who believe that they have a harder time
most effective. recalling past experiences should value memory protection
We further propose that individuals will distinguish be- to a greater degree than those who think that it is easy to
tween items that are associated specifically with a special recall past experiences. Based on this, we hypothesize:
experience (e.g., a ticket that was used to get into a specific
favorite concert) and those that are not associated only with H7: People’s desire to protect a special memory is
a given special experience (e.g., a season’s pass that was greater when they believe that recalling past ex-
used to get into all concerts that season). If an item can periences is difficult rather than easy.
they previously had a special experience as compared to a Part 1: Desire to Return to a Special versus Pleasant
place where they had a nonspecial experience. On this new Place. Respondents’ own ratings of how special their ex-
occasion, they are told that one of the key elements from perience was indicated that they described experiences that were
the original experience (i.e., the person they were with) will more special (M p 5.80) in the special experience than in the
be substituted with another (i.e., a different person). In this nonspecial condition (M p 3.80; F(1, 193) p 208.29, p !
study, we draw from people’s own idiosyncratic repertoire .001). In addition, two independent coders read individuals’
of personal experiences to test whether memory protection descriptions of their experiences and rated each on a 3-point
concerns can lead people to avoid returning to places where scale in terms of how happy the person appeared to be about
they had special experiences. the experience (1 p unhappy, 3 p happy; Cohen’s k p
.55, intraclass r p .79) and how intense the experience was
(1 p low intensity, 3 p high intensity; Cohen’s k p .47,
Methods intraclass r p .78). These manipulation checks confirm that
One hundred and ninety-five graduate students at the Uni- the experiences participants described reflected greater happi-
versity of North Carolina participated in the study in ex- ness and intensity in the special than in the nonspecial expe-
change for a $10 donation to a local charity. The experiment rience condition (M p 2.85 vs. M p 2.49 for happiness rat-
included two parts. ings; F(1, 189) p 25.46, p ! .0001; M p 2.43 vs. M p
In part 1, participants were randomly assigned to describe 1.72 for intensity ratings; F(1, 189) p 75.98, p ! .0001).2
either an evening out that they considered “particularly spe- As predicted, participants indicated that they were less
cumstances in which respondents would versus would not then to consider going back again, either with the same
want to return to the place where the special experience person or with a different person (manipulated between-
occurred. The coded data indicated that respondents would subjects). They were asked whether they would like to go
want to return only if they were with the same person with back in that circumstance, on a 7-point scale, with endpoints
whom they had been during the initial special experience: labeled “definitely not” and “definitely,” and how favorable
56 noted that they would only want to go back with the they thought that the second experience would be compared
same person (Cohen’s k p .67, intraclass r p .87), whereas to the first if they were to go back (1 p much less favorable,
only six indicated that they would not want to return with 4 p about the same, 7 p much more favorable). Consistent
the same person (Cohen’s k p .65, intraclass r p .82; with the results of the main study 1, the results indicate a
McNemar x 2 (1, N p 195) p 38.73, p ! .0001). In addi- greater likelihood to return to the place with the same person
tion, of those who specified whether they would want to (M p 6.84) than with a different person (M p 3.94;
return if the experience would be similar or different from F(1, 33) p 26.44, p ! .0001). The results also indicated
the initial experience, 44 said that they would want to return greater anticipated enjoyment with the same person (M p
if it were similar and only three said that they would want 4.58) than with a different person (M p 3.00; F(1, 33) p
to return if it were different (x 2 (1, N p 47) p 35.77, p ! 11.41, p p .002). However, an ANCOVA indicated that the
.0001). All results reported for part 2 held regardless of the preference for repeating the experience with the same person
condition to which participants had been assigned in part 1. rather than with a different person continues to emerge even
when one controls for the anticipated favorability of the new
could hinder their ability to derive utility from memory from would appear substantially changed vis-à-vis their earlier
that initial special experience. stay at the hotel with their friends; participants in the un-
changed condition would envision that the hotel would re-
main the same as in the earlier experience.
Methods After reading this description of the upcoming business trip
One hundred and eighty-eight undergraduates at the Uni- and conference logistics, participants were asked whether they
versity of Pennsylvania participated in this study in ex- would prefer to return to the hotel in which they had stayed
change for $10. The study used a 2 (initial experience: spe- with their friends or to stay in another hotel instead (⫺5 p
cial vs. nonspecial) # 2 (subsequent place: unchanged vs. strongly prefer a different hotel, 5 p strongly prefer the same
changed) between-subjects design. hotel). We next measured participants’ beliefs about memories
by asking them to indicate the extent to which they thought
Initial Event and Manipulation Checks. All partici- that returning to the hotel where they had stayed with their
pants first were asked to imagine that they went on a week- friends would (1) taint their memory of their trip with their
long vacation to Albuquerque, New Mexico, with two of their friends and (2) interfere with their ability to remember the
best friends and stayed in an Albuquerque-style hotel near moments from their trip with their friends (on separate 11-
the center of the Old Town. In the special experience con- point scales, where 1 p not at all, 11 p very much).
dition, participants read that the weather was sunny and warm
and that they went on some nice walks around the historic Results
STUDY 3: SPECIFIC VERSUS GENERIC were asked the likelihood of buying a magnet of a beautiful
CUES WHEN ANTICIPATED miniature bungalow on which the name of the resort is
imprinted and respondents in the generic cue condition were
INTERFERENCE asked the likelihood of buying a beautiful graphic of San
In study 3 we move from testing memory protection Diego on which the word “California” is imprinted. After
through avoidance to testing memory protection through cue completing the main task, participants indicated on an 11-
acquisition. Our results thus far indicate that, when a special point scale from 1 (not at all) to 11 (very much) how en-
experience could be followed by a second experience that joyable they thought the vacation with the romantic partner
could hinder one’s ability to retrieve the initial experience, would be for them. Participants in the business trip condition
memory protection concerns arise that drive consumer (N p 60) also indicated how enjoyable the business trip
choice. When such a subsequent experience is inevitable, would be.
we propose that individuals will prefer to acquire a specific
cue pointing only to the special experience more than a Results and Discussion
generic cue that could point them to both the special and
nonspecial experiences (hypothesis 4). In the present study, Manipulation Check. As expected, reported levels of
we used a scenario similar to that used in study 2. We asked enjoyment from the vacation did not differ between con-
all respondents to imagine having a special vacation trip to ditions (M p 10.40 vs. M p 10.22; t(120) p 1.12, NS).
a San Diego resort and then asked half of them to imagine The participants in the business trip condition anticipated
ferent set of participants from the same population (N p dict that, even when the special experience includes some
164) to address the possibility that participants showed re- negative aspects, people prefer specific rather than generic
duced interest in acquiring the generic cue in the subsequent cues more for the overall special experience than for a
trip condition because they would have another opportunity merely pleasant experience. In this study, we also measured
(i.e., during the business trip) to buy the generic cue later participants’ beliefs about the extent to which the target item
rather than due to memory protection concerns. Participants would help them to remember their experience.
read the same scenarios used in the main study and were
asked to indicate how frequently they expected to visit San
Diego in the future (1 p not at all, 11 p very frequently). Methods
Results showed neither main effects for subsequent trip Participants were one hundred and twenty-eight under-
(F(1, 160) ! 1) or for recall cue (F(1, 160) p 1.26, NS) nor graduates at the University of Pennsylvania who participated
an interaction (F(1,160) ! 1). Participants in the business in this experiment for $10. Participants were randomly as-
trip condition (N p 83) also were asked to indicate how signed to one of the four conditions in a 2 (experience:
likely they would be to buy souvenirs when they returned special vs. nonspecial) # 2 (product: sculpture vs. music
on the business trip (1 p not at all, 11 p very much). CD) between-subjects design.
Results showed that those in the generic cue condition were Participants were asked to imagine that they traveled to
not more likely (in fact were directionally less likely) to buy a resort in Cancun, Mexico, with two of their good friends.
souvenirs on the business trip than those in the specific cue The resort was described as being near the world’s largest
will threaten their ability to remember special experiences, these experiences would be more memorable than mundane
and (2) memory protection through acquisition, in which experiences would be.
people seek to obtain memory pointers to cue special mem- Individuals’ reluctance to return to a place where they
ories. We propose that both strategies are driven by people’s previously had a special experience and their desire to obtain
lay theories about memory. We find that, when people select specific memory pointers appear to relate to the perceived
which experiences and products to consume, they care about reproducibility of that initial special experience. Concerns
more than the enjoyment from actual consumption: they also about returning to a place where they previously had a spe-
consider the extent to which the experiences and products cial experience appear to be heightened when there are sig-
they select will affect their ability to recall later their pre- nificant changes to one of the key elements in the initial
vious special experiences. experience. When individuals believe that they can repeat
Strategic memory protection does not, of course, apply the key elements that were present during the initial special
to every decision, and it is likely to arise only when con- experience (e.g., going back to the honeymoon spot with
sidering those experiences that people like to think back on the same person), they are more interested in doing so.
later. However, although these types of experiences are only Perhaps they anticipate that returning to this place under the
a subset of the experiences that one encounters, being able same conditions as the initial event will provide them with
to remember these experiences can be very important to an opportunity to more easily retrieve the earlier memory
individuals’ long-term life satisfaction (e.g., Singer and Sa- (Tulving 1983).
lovey 1993; Wildschut et al. 2006).
meta-memory processes) pertaining to the accuracy and is more effective in rewriting the memory and preventing
source of their memories. For example, participants in cog- recall of the original negative experience (e.g., a corrective
nitive psychology studies rely on their beliefs about the experience).
memorability of certain types of information to judge the
source of information presented in a memory test (Mather, Conclusions
Shafir, and Johnson 2003), and other research examines fac-
tors that affect people’s subjective confidence in the accu- The goal of our investigation is to introduce the idea that
racy of their memories (Son and Metcalfe 2005). Our find- people treat memories as assets to be protected and in par-
ings extend work on meta-memory by examining people’s ticular to demonstrate two key approaches to strategic mem-
beliefs about retroactive interference, particularly as these ory protection that consumers follow: memory protection
relate to the decisions that people make about how to avoid through avoidance and memory protection through acqui-
such interference. Our results do not speak to whether the sition. There has been a great deal of research on memory
memory protection strategies that individuals adopt will be and consumer decision making, but there has been surpris-
effective, although this is an interesting direction for future ingly little experimental research examining the decision
research. Indeed, individuals’ interest in trying to re-create strategies that individuals use to protect their memories. Our
special experiences by having new experiences that closely research is a first step, identifying two such strategies and
match the original could actually produce more interference the role of consumers’ lay beliefs about memory as an im-
rather than less, as greater retroactive interference is found portant determinant. We believe that this research highlights
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