Investigation Summary Report

2017-012: Syncrude Canada Ltd.

Authorization No. 8573N

November 16, 2018

Investigation number: 2017-012

Regulated party: Syncrude Canada Ltd,

BA code 0362

Field centre of origin: Fort McMurray Regional Office

Incident location (nearest town): NW-06-093-10 W4M, about 30 kilometres north,

northwest of Fort McMurray

Contravention date: March 14, 2017

Authorization numbers and Oil Sands Conservation Act authorization number

relevant legislation, regulations, 8573N
and rules: Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act
approval number 26-02-00
Alberta Energy Regulator
Investigation Summary Report 2017-012: Syncrude Canada Ltd; Licence/Approval 8573N

November 16, 2018

Published by
Alberta Energy Regulator
Suite 1000, 250 – 5 Street SW
Calgary, Alberta
T2P 0R4

Telephone: 403-297-8311
Inquiries (toll free): 1-855-297-8311
Email: inquiries@aer.ca
Website: www.aer.ca
 Alberta Energy Regulator

Contents

Summary of Facts ......................................................................................................................................... 1

Company Overview ................................................................................................................................ 1
System Background ............................................................................................................................... 1

Incident Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 4

Response ................................................................................................................................................ 5
Community and Stakeholder Notifications ............................................................................................. 6

Chronology, Findings, and Potential Contraventions .................................................................................... 7

Chronology of Events (Summary) ......................................................................................................... 7
Investigation Findings ........................................................................................................................... 10
Potential Contravention ........................................................................................................................ 12
Contravention Findings ......................................................................................................................... 12

Due Diligence .............................................................................................................................................. 13

Compliance History ..................................................................................................................................... 13

Conclusion and Recommended Counts ..................................................................................................... 14

Mitigating Factors ................................................................................................................................. 14
Aggravating Factors ............................................................................................................................. 14
Recommended Count ........................................................................................................................... 15
Count 1 ....................................................................................................................................... 15

Figures

Figure 1. Syncrude Canada Ltd ............................................................................................................... 2

Figure 2. Simplified flow diagram of naptha hydrotreating unit 13-1 illustrating the leak location. .......... 3

Figure 3. The valve station after the fire. Burnt insulation has been removed and the pipe rewrapped. . 3

Figure 4. Syncrude Canada Ltd. Significant fire/explosion at plant 13-1 ................................................. 4

Figure 5. Naptha product line 13-1P109 showing the split from an ice plug. ........................................... 5

Figure 6. Reporting guidelines indicating immediate reporting of the type of product fire to the AER. . 10

Tables

Table 1. The Government of Alberta’s enforcement history for Syncrude, March 14, 2012, to
March 14, 2017 ........................................................................................................................ 13

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Summary of Facts

Company Overview
Syncrude Canada Limited (Syncrude) is headquartered in Fort McMurray, Alberta, about 440 kilometres
(km) northeast of Edmonton, Alberta (see figure 1). Syncrude’s Mildred Lake facility is about 35 km
north of Fort McMurray, and its Aurora plant is about 75 km north of Fort McMurray.

Syncrude was incorporated in 1964 and began operations at the Mildred Lake facility in 1978. The
facilities are located on what is known as the Athabasca oil sands deposit. Syncrude’s current production
capacity is about 350 000 barrels per day of high-quality, low-sulphur, synthetic crude oil.

System Background
Syncrude uses naptha hydrotreating units (i.e., plants) as part of its secondary upgrading process. Their
purpose is to remove sulphur and nitrogen from the naptha to help bring the finished hydrocarbon product
to a suitable specification for downstream refinery feedstock. The main facility has two identical naptha
hydrotreating plants in parallel. The plants are designated plants 13-1 and 13-2.

The line that failed, causing the release of recycled naptha, is naptha product line 13-1P109 (the line)
originating in plant 13-1 (see figure 2). The line is a carbon-steel pipe with an outside diameter of
150 millimetres (mm; 6 inch) and a wall thickness of 7.1 mm (0.280 inches). It can be operated remotely
from the control room via pneumatic flow valve 5 (FV-5). The line can also be bypassed manually via a
114.3 mm (4 inch) pipe and valve located just above FV-5 (see figure 3). The line originates from an
overhead pipe rack but runs down to a valve station (i.e., a control point) near ground level.

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Syncrude Canada Ltd., Mildred Lake Plant Fort McMurray

Naptha Hydrotreater (Plant 13-1)

Fire/Explosion

Figure 1. Syncrude Canada Ltd. (Source: Google Earth)

Treated naptha contains trace amounts of water, which can accumulate in low points or fluid traps such as
valve stations, sample-points, and instrumentation run-downs similar to the one associated with the
recycle naptha product line 13-1P109 (see figure 3). The pipe is insulated and has electrical heat tracing
(EHT) to prevent accumulated water from freezing.

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Figure 2. Simplified flow diagram of naptha hydrotreating unit 13-1 illustrating the leak location.
(Source: Syncrude Canada Ltd. OH&S incident report)

Bypass

Naptha product
line 13-1P109
(run-down)

FV (pneumatic flow valve) #5

Figure 3. The valve station after the fire. Burnt insulation has been removed and the pipe rewrapped.
(Source: Syncrude Canada Ltd. information request response pictures)

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Incident Overview
On March 14, 2017, at about 1:36 p.m., Syncrude identified a treated naptha hydrocarbon product leak,
which resulted in a fire and subsequent explosion in plant 13-1 in the main Mildred Lake oil sands
processing facility. The leak was in line number 13-1P109 (i.e., the recycle naptha line indicated in the
System Background section above) in the northeast corner of plant 13-1.

Figure 4. Syncrude Canada Ltd. Significant fire/explosion at plant 13-1. (Source: News 1130 video footage)

Over the 2016–17 winter, water had accumulated in the pipe upstream of FV-5. The incident-cause
analysis submitted by Syncrude indicated that the EHT on this pipe was not operating, causing the
trapped water to freeze and expand to such a degree that it caused a split in the pipe. Because the pipe was
insulated and FV-5 was normally closed, the split went undetected until ambient temperatures rose above
freezing, allowing the ice in the pipe to melt and the fluids inside to escape.

Due to the size of the split (see figure 5), an excessive amount of naptha was released, overwhelming the
drain system and causing the naptha to pool and a vapour cloud to form at the northeast end of the plant
13-1 pad. The vapour cloud expanded toward a different part of the plant where it is believed a heat
exchanger caused the vapours to ignite. The fire followed the vapour cloud back to the source, igniting
the pooled naptha and the leaking pipe.

One Syncrude operator, who was near the vapour cloud and the pooled naptha when it ignited, suffered
burns to the lower half of his body. He was transported to Fort McMurray’s Northern Lights Regional
Hospital before being taken to the University of Alberta Hospital in Edmonton for further treatment.

The fire caused significant damage to plant 13-1, which was down for 132 days, resulting in a production
loss of about 12.7 million barrels.

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Response
Syncrude’s initial response to the incident was to try to isolate the leak while deploying firefighting
resources and emergency response personnel to the scene. About seven minutes after the initial report of a
leak, a fire in plant 13-1 was reported to Syncrude’s emergency response coordinator.

At about 1:50 p.m., the 911 emergency line received a call that an individual had been burned in the fire.
The individual was transported to Fort McMurray via ambulance at about 2:00 p.m.

Syncrude’s shift superintendent reported the fire to the province’s Coordination and Information Centre
(CIC) at 2:18 p.m., and at 2:30 Syncrude’s environmental affairs person reported an explosion to the CIC.

The fire was under control by about 2:45 p.m. on March 14. Syncrude allowed a controlled burn to burn
off residual hydrocarbons, and it ensured that a positive isolation plan was in place. The fire was
completely extinguished on March 16, 2017, at about 2:15 a.m. Several of the upgrader’s operations were
either shut down or minimized until the situation stabilized. Syncrude continuously monitored the air on
and off of the site via Wood Buffalo Environmental Association (WBEA) and on-site monitoring stations.

Based on a count from Syncrude’s security card system, an estimated 1300 nonessential workers were
evacuated from the upgrading area by about 2:10 p.m. (37 minutes after the first indication of a leak). The
13-1 plant had to be isolated to ensure that the incident did not escalate. This was done within 15 minutes
of the release being reported. Syncrude’s fire department had the fire under control in just over an hour.

Despite the fact that plant 13-1 has other product streams (including hydrogen and sour gas) that could
have been involved in the fire/explosion, the plant is also very close to several other processing units in
the Mildred Lake facility that could have become part of the incident.

Figure 5. Naptha product line 13-1P109 showing the split from an ice plug. (Source:
email attachment from Syncrude’s response to AER inspection staff)

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Community and Stakeholder Notifications

From outside of Syncrude operations, the first indication of the leak and subsequent fire was the obvious
black cloud of smoke of burning liquid hydrocarbons emanating from the facility and visible from several
kilometres away.

According to the chronology of events submitted by Syncrude, at about 1:49 p.m., Syncrude called the
911 emergency system indicating that a person had been burned and moved to “Building 252.” The
chronology indicated that the individual had been transported to Ft McMurray at about 1:57 p.m.

The Fort McKay (First Nations) Sustainability Group (FMSG) contacted the AER’s Indigenous and
Stakeholder Engagement (ISE) Group by email at about 2:05 p.m. about the fire and explosion at the
Syncrude facility. The intent of the call was to understand the extent of the incident and the potential
impacts on the Fort McKay community. Fort McKay had not been contacted by Syncrude at this point.
The AER did not have definitive information about the type of fire and the response activities because the
AER had not been able to contact Syncrude by this time, either.

At about 2:07, an anonymous text message was sent to the AER’s Fort McMurray Regional Office
(FMRO) inspector reporting the fire and explosion at the Syncrude Mildred Lake facility. The FMRO
confirmed the incident through social media at this time.

At about 2:09, the FMRO tried to contact Syncrude but was unable to. Subsequent calls were made until
about 2:18 when the FMRO was able to talk to an individual at the site. At this time, Syncrude confirmed
that a naptha hydrotreater was on fire and that the company was in the process of evacuating the plant and
isolating that part of the facility. Syncrude did not indicate, at this time, the type of product that was on
fire or the specific resources that it had deployed in response.

Syncrude’s chronology indicated that a call to the CIC was placed at about 2:18 reporting a release of an
unknown product of unknown volume, and a subsequent fire. The caller indicated that Syncrude’s fire
department was responding, that a partial evacuation of the plant was underway, and that Syncrude’s
emergency response plan (ERP) had been activated.

During the incident, the AER’s ISE kept in close contact with Fort McKay, conveying any information
they could gather from the AER’s Field Incident Response Team (FIRST) and the FMRO and its
inspection staff that had been deployed to the site.

The AER’s ISE also kept Fort McKay apprised of the ambient air conditions by monitoring the WBEA’s
fixed air monitoring stations in the vicinity of Fort McKay and in the surrounding area. It was necessary
for the AER’s air-quality expert to monitor the WBEA website (i.e., its monitoring stations) and keep Fort
McKay informed because the AER did not receive any definitive information from Syncrude about the
type (i.e., the product that was burning) of fire until about 6:50 p.m.

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Chronology, Findings, and Potential Contraventions

Chronology of Events (Summary)1

13:34 to 13:41 – A number of alarm conditions were received by the panel operator. Of these, an alarm
from FV5 indicating BADPV (bad process variable) which means that a process condition reading was
outside the instrumentation’s measurement capabilities or set parameters. These alarms were specific to
the recycle naptha pipe that burst.
13:36 to 13:39 – Three lower explosive limit (LEL) alarms were acknowledged by the control room
operator. The alarms were from building 1693 – directly beside plant 13-1 (Syncrude response to Request
for Information question # 6).
13:36 – A Syncrude operator was returning from Plant 13-2 and upon seeing the vapour cloud, called it in
to the panel. He also called for an evacuation of non-process personnel from Plants 13-1 and 2 and
manually activated the evacuation alarm (Syncrude’s OH&S Incident Report).

13:38 – Shortly after that, at ~13:38, Operator B arrived on the scene to assist Operator A. Both workers
donned Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) in preparation for potential isolation attempts
(Syncrude’s OH&S Incident Report).
13:39 – Naptha leak at Plant 13-1 reported to Syncrude Canada Ltd., by (Syncrude) Emergency Response
(ER) – (Syncrude Chronology).
13:39 – The Syncrude control room operator called 911 and the fire hall emergency response was
activated. Operations evacuated surrounding hydrotreater units (Syncrude’s OH&S Incident Report).
13:40 – The Syncrude emergency response coordinator responded via pickup truck (Syncrude Chronology).
13:42 – Syncrude Engine #5 responded to call (Syncrude Chronology).
13:47 – Fire started in Plant 13-1 (Syncrude Chronology).
13:48 – 1st, 2nd and 3rd response and rescue members called out (Syncrude Chronology).

13:49 – 911 call received that person is burned and located at Building 252 (Syncrude Chronology).
13:52 – EOC called by site shift manager (Syncrude Chronology).
13:54 – Aerial #7 arrived on scene and set up on the north side of plant 13-1 (Syncrude Chronology).

13:57 – Injured individual transported to Ft McMurray (Syncrude Chronology).

14:00 – OH&S contacted Syncrude due to information found on social media. No information to share as
EOC was just forming (Syncrude Chronology).
14:00 to 14:30 – SCL tried to contact FMFN (SCL Chronology).

1
The chronology entries are largely copied verbatim from the sources cited.

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14:05 – Emergency upgraded to Level D (Syncrude Chronology).

14:05 – The AER (Calgary - ASE) was contacted via email by the Fort McKay Sustainability Group
regarding an explosion and fire at the Syncrude Mildred Lake Oil Sands Mining Facility. The Fort
McKay Sustainability Group then requested an assessment and discussion of this situation with the AER
(Calgary -ASE) (ASE/FMRO Chronology).
14:06 – FMFN emailed AER’s ASE Subj:
URGENT – PLEASE CALL MY CELL – SYNCRUDE FIRE AND EXPLOSION: We have heard
that there was an explosion and now a fire at Syncrude at their main plant site. We need to understand
the extent of this incident and the potential impacts to Fort McKay. We have heard that they are
starting to evacuate employees, but this information is all third party at this time. Please call me as
soon as you can on my cell. (ASE/FMRO Chronology)

14:07 – Third party text message to AER FMRO inspector asking if AER heard about the fire
(ASE/FMRO Chronology).
14:07 – AER (Fort McMurray - EOP) was made aware of and confirmed references on social media of a
fire and explosion at the Syncrude Mildred Lake Oil Sands Mining Facility (ASE/FMRO Chronology).
14:09 – The AER (Fort McMurray - EOP) attempted to contact the Syncrude Mildred Lake Oil Sands
Mining Facility via telephone but was unable to make contact with Syncrude’s onsite personnel.
Subsequent phone calls were made by the AER (Fort McMurray - EOP) (ASE/FMRO Chronology).
14:10 – All people accounted for in nearby plants (Syncrude Chronology).
14:10 – FMM AER Inspector contacted Syncrude Shift Supervisor. No ANS with Shift supervisor
(ASE/FMRO Chronology).
14:10 – Call from AER. Call received due to information found on social media. No information to share
as EOC was just forming (Syncrude Chronology).
14:18 – FMRO Inspector called Syncrude. (2nd phone call), confirmed call to CIC, confirmed a
hydrotreater was on fire and being isolated and indicated an inspector would be on the way to site to
assess situation. CIC REF #321950 (ASE/FMRO Chronology).
14:18 – 1st CIC notification #321950 received on March 14, 2017 at 2:18:54. Fire reported to CIC by
Plant Superintendent. Incident Details / Complaint Statement:
The caller is reporting a release of an unknown product and unknown volume. The release caught on
fire in one of their naptha treaters with black fume and smoke in the air. No odour yet. Fire department
on site. Partial evacuation. ERP activated. No media attention but there could be later on. No injuries
reported yet. The situation is still not under control. The unit shut down is in progress (ASE/FMRO
Chronology).

14:18 – FMRO inspector contacted FIRST Duty Officer (DO) and indicated event is now on media and
AER inspectors deploying to the site (ASE/FMRO Chronology).

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14:20 – AER’s ASE contacted Fort McKay indicating fire at Syncrude and could be air quality issues
(ASE/FMRO Chronology).
14:25 – FMRO Inspector called Fort McKay Informed her that there is a fire at Syncrude and there may
be some air quality issues. She put me on speaker with herself and Bori Aboro (ASE/FMRO
Chronology).
14:31 – 2nd CIC notification #321952 received on March 14, 2017 at 2:31:41 PM. Caller: John Machin.
Incident Details / Complaint Statement:
Had a fire and an explosion, has been injuries but no firm details yet, caller does not know if there are
any fatalities. ERP the OC is up and running at level 3. Fire is on scene. Unknown cause. Release of a
big black cloud coming up from the unit. This looks like one of the hydro treater units. Have evacuated
the entire plant site. unaware if there is media attention. unknown if there are H2S involved. Off-site
impacts due to release of smoke (ASE/FMRO Chronology).

14:35 – Two FMRO inspectors deployed to site. This is a direct quote from FMRO inspector’s
chronology:
“FMM Inspectors […] deploy to Syncrude. Once onsite, the AER Field Inspector verbally issued
several information requests to Syncrude personnel regarding the status of the incident as well as the
causes, the status of the facility, potential impacts, potential emissions, what product was released,
what product was on fire, and other related information. Through multiple interactions between the
AER Field Inspectors, it did not appear to the onsite AER Field Inspectors that Syncrude personnel
were being forthcoming with this requested information in a timely and reasonable manner: delays of
over twelve (12) hours were encountered in regards to certain AER information requests.”

16:40 – Fort McKay emails the AER’s ASE with the following:
“We have received an update from our internal staff and consultants. They have assessed the air
quality data and the following figure shows the five minute PM2.5 levels and wind direction in Fort
McKay. The concern right now is that PM2.5 levels are climbing and since 4pm have gone from 62
ug/m3 to 103 ug/m3. These are high levels of PM that if they persist and/or continue to rise require
people to take precautionary measures particularly if they have respiratory and/or heart problems but
this is an issue for the health folks to advise. To put the levels into context the 1hour Alberta Ambient
Air Quality Guideline for PM2.5 is 75ug/m3.
I just noted that in the last 5 minutes the level has dropped to 90 ug/m3 which is a positive.
Will AER or Alberta Health provide any further assessment on impacts to Fort McKay First Nation?
The incident has now occurred over 2.5 hours ago and we would like to know if any health advisory is
required. We are receiving multiple calls from the community.”

18:50 – Update from Syncrude to FMRO inspector – fire under control, still burning excess hydrocarbon
in system but being monitored and surrounding equipment being cooled using fire trucks. This was the
first indication from Syncrude regarding the product that was actually burning, quote from AER
inspector’s notes: “Naptha HC (hydrocarbon) fire. Unit is hot, potential under pressure. Treated as hot
pressurized unit.”

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Investigation Findings
The AER’s Major Investigation Team (MIT) considered several factors when assessing this incident.
These factors took into account requirements under the Oil Sands Conservation Act (OSCA), the
Environment Protection and Enhancement Act (EPEA), the AER’s Directive 071: Emergency
Preparedness and Response Requirements for the Petroleum Industry, and Syncrude’s own internal and
external reporting guidelines from section 4.5 of the Syncrude Emergency Plan.

During the incident, AER personnel and representatives from FMSG were unable to find out from
Syncrude the nature of the substance that was burning. Knowing what was burning would have helped
inform FMFN and the RMWB of the possible response options.

Figure 6. Reporting guidelines indicating immediate reporting of the type of product fire to the AER.
(Source: Syncrude’s ERP, page 11, section 4.5, Internal and External Reporting)

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FMFN was looking for information to determine whether to shelter in place, potential for evacuation and
for air monitoring information to aid in assessing the needs of community members with potential
respiratory concerns. The AER’s ISE group tried to relay any pertinent information to FMFN about the
incident, but their efforts to assist the community were limited to what information could be obtained
from AER personnel on site and WBEA’s information that was available on-line.

A quote from FMSG Emergency Services manager from an email sent to the AER’s ISE engagement
specialist received at 1:38 p.m. on March 15, 2017:
Our biggest concerns with Syncrude incident were communication. Not informing Fort McKay First
Nation immediately that the event took place and then not providing us information and updates on the
situation. We understand that they would be preoccupied with the event itself but we also think it is
very important to let Fort McKay know that the event took place and provide us information on it so
we can have the most time available to inform our residents and take any necessary action. Not having
this information could create a greater risk to the health of the Fort McKay residents. We had to
determine that the incident took place by ourselves with no information from Syncrude.

A review of all submitted information from Syncrude including station alarm logs for plant 13-1 from
about 1:30 until about 1:40 and Syncrude’s Occupational Health and Safety incident report indicate that
Syncrude was aware that the line that was leaking was line number 13-1P1309 (produced naptha) and
Syncrude was aware of what was being done to control the leak (response resources, isolating the plant,
etc.). Most of this specific information was not conveyed to the AER until about 6:50 p.m. according to
inspector’s notes.

After considering all of the evidence collected through the investigative process and the information
gathered from initial and supplementary information requests, the investigators had reasonable and
probable grounds to believe that,

1) Syncrude had access to information indicating exactly what was leaking and caught fire at plant 13-1
however, they did not report the type of substance on fire in accordance with EPEA section 111(1)
and in accordance with Syncrude’s own internal and external reporting guidelines until 6:50 p.m.
(about 5 hours and 15 minutes after the leak began); and

2) lack of this information hindered the AER’s response to external stakeholders, specifically Alberta
Health, Fort McKay First Nation, and the RMWB to effectively communicate the nature of the fire
and resources deployed to bring it under control.

The investigation has uncovered a potential contravention of legislation under the jurisdiction of the AER.
This is also an offence that can be prosecuted by the Crown. The following establishes the contravention
and offence.

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Potential Contravention
Legislation/guideline name
EPEA
Section Citation
110(1) Duty to 110(1) A person who releases or causes or permits the release of a
report release substance into the environment that may cause, is causing or has
caused an adverse effect shall, as soon as that person knows or
ought to know of the release, report it to
(a) the Director, […]

the following then states…

EPEA 111(1) A person who is required to report to the Director pursuant to
Manner of section 110 shall report in person, by telephone or by electronic
Reporting means and shall include the following in the report, where the
information is known or can be readily obtained by that person:
[…]
(c) the type and quantity of the substance released;
(d) the details of any action taken and proposed to be taken at the
release site;
[…]
the following then states…
EPEA 227 Offences A person who […] (j) contravenes section […] 111 […] is guilty of an
offence.

Contravention Findings
The line that failed and type of product that was leaking and caught fire was known within minutes
of the first indication of a release:

Alarm logs from Syncrude’s panel indicated several alarm conditions were received by the panel operator
just prior to the fire (see chronology for details). These alarms were specific to the recycle naptha pipe
that burst.

At about 13:38, operations personnel donned SCBA in order to isolate the leaking line. Isolating the line
would not be possible unless it was known which line was leaking (see section 3 chronology for details).

Syncrude did not report the type or quantity of substance until about 6:50 p.m.:

The first indication from Syncrude regarding the type of product that caught fire was at 18:50 p.m.,
according to AER inspector’s notes (see the chronology for details).

Even as late as 16:40, Fort McKay had not received information regarding the type of fire and potential
response actions from Syncrude. The AER was relaying information they were gathering from their own
sources however, because they did not have specific information relating to the type of product that was
burning. This hindered the AER’s ability to properly inform its stakeholders (Fort McKay, RMWB, and
AEMA) about the incident.

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Due Diligence
OSCA (section 26(2)) and EPEA (section 229) each provide a defence to certain offences. The defence
requires the AER to consider whether a regulated party can establish on a balance of probabilities that the
regulated party took all reasonable steps to prevent contraventions. Taking all reasonable steps is known
as “due diligence.” Having established the contraventions above, the AER considers whether the evidence
establishes a defence.

After reviewing all the available information, the investigator concludes that the regulated party did not
take all reasonable steps to prevent the contravention based on the following:

The type of product that was leaking and caught fire (recycled naptha) was known at the first indications
of a leak. This was apparent from communications with on-site operations staff and from alarm conditions
received in the control room. However, Syncrude only reported to the AER that there was a fire at its
plant 13-1 naptha hydrotreating facility.

Syncrude did not report the type of substance initially released and on fire to the AER in accordance with
EPEA section 111(1) and in accordance with Syncrude’s own internal and external reporting guidelines
until about 6:50 p.m. (about 5 hours and 15 minutes after the leak began). Lack of this information
hindered the AER’s response to external stakeholders (Alberta Health, Fort McKay First Nation, and the
RMWB) and its ability to effectively communicate the nature of the fire and potential responses to
communities at risk.

Compliance History
When considering how to respond to a noncompliance, the statutory decision maker takes into account the
compliance history of the regulated party.2 Table 1 shows the compliance history of Syncrude for the last
five years.
Table 1. The Government of Alberta’s enforcement history for Syncrude, March 14, 2012, to March 14, 2017
Accountable Decision Municipality & Acts and
party Action date/penalty legal description sections Comments/disposition
Syncrude Administrative July 5, 2012 Fort McMurray EPEA 110(1) The company failed to report the
Canada Ltd Penalty $5000.00 Wood Buffalo & 111(1) release of hydrogen sulphide
and ammonia on July 9, 2010.
Fine paid on July 20, 2012.
Source: Environmental Law Centre.

2
Manual 013: Compliance and Enforcement, section 1.2: “When considering how to respond to noncompliance, AER staff consider
the factual circumstances of the noncompliance and the severity of its actual or potential impacts. The compliance history of the
regulated party is taken into consideration, as well as how to achieve the best environmental, public safety, and operational
outcomes.”

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Conclusion and Recommended Counts

The investigation into the fire and subsequent explosion at Syncrude’s Mildred Lake facility that occurred
on March 14, 2017, has identified contributing factors leading to the issue of inadequate reporting which
is a contravention of EPEA section 111 (1).

Mitigating Factors
Since this incident, Syncrude has significantly improved reporting and response capacity—specifically
relating to reporting and responding to regulatory requests. It has implemented four new environmental
affairs shift positions that provide 24 hour, 7 day per week coverage to ensure prompt attention to
regulatory information requests. A quote from MIT request for information #2 to Syncrude:

These 4 Environmental Advisors provide 24 hour/7 day coverage to ensure Syncrude promptly
provides the regulators with information. Each Advisor fills out a checklist documenting each call to
the regulator to ensure that Syncrude provides consistent information or states when required
information is not known at the time of the call and that follow up is required.

Aggravating Factors
Although Syncrude was aware of the type of product released at the outset of the incident, it took over 5
hours even after repeated attempts to contact the company, for them to communicate this information to
the AER.

In accordance with the AER’s Directive 071, Syncrude’s own internal and external reporting guidelines
section of the Syncrude Emergency Plan requires, for a level 2 or 3 fire, “Immediate notification to the
AER indicating the type of product, number of response members and equipment on scene.” This
requirement was not, however, adhered to.

Directive 071 also says the following:

Appendix 1 – Definitions for the Purposes of Directive 071

Level-3 emergency –The safety of the public is in jeopardy from a major uncontrolled hazard. There
are likely significant and ongoing environmental impacts. Immediate multiagency municipal and
provincial government involvement is required.

Directive 071 section 11.1.2, Communications and Planning, says,

After contacting the AER, the licensee must notify the local authority, the RCMP/police, the local
health authority, other applicable government agencies and support services required to assist with
initial response if the hazardous release goes off site and has the potential to impact the public or if the
licensee has contacted members of the public or the media.

14 Investigation Summary Report 2017-012: Syncrude Canada Ltd.; Approval 26-02-00

 Alberta Energy Regulator

The licensee must make the following information listed in Directive 071 appendix 8 available to the
public as soon as possible during an emergency:
Appendix 8 – Information Disseminated to the Public at the Onset of and During an Incident

To the general public—during [the incident:]

 Type and status of the incident

 Location of the incident
 Areas impacted by the incident
 Description of the products involved
 Contacts for additional information
 Actions being taken to respond to the situation, including anticipated time period

The following count is a recommendation for the statutory decision maker. It is not final and might
change upon further evaluation of the investigation findings.

Recommended Count

Count 1
On March 14, 2017, in the Province of Alberta, Syncrude Canada Ltd. failed to report the type and
quantity of the substance released when the information was known and readily available, contrary to
sections 110(1) and 111(1) of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, which is an offence
under 227(j) of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act.

Investigation Summary Report 2017-012: Syncrude Canada Ltd.; Approval 26-02-00 15