THE RUSSO-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT;

BRIEF OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS AND PROGNOSIS

BY: ADITHYA K. AYYAR

 A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE CONFLICT

 The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine is the latest military escalation in a prolonged regional conflict between the two
countries that began with the Russian annexation of the Ukrainian peninsula of Crimea.

 Vladimir Putin classified this war as a “Special military operation to demilitarise and decriminalise Ukraine” and also to
“prevent the genocide of the ethnic Russians and the followers of the Russian Orthodox Church” (hereby referred to as SMO)

 The war has led to the breakaway and creation of two States the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics. These states are
not recognised by Ukraine,The EU, NATO and the US but are recognized by Russia and its allies.
 A BRIEF CULTURAL AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF THE CONFLICT

 Relations between Ukrainians and Russians have always been fraught with oppression and subjugation by the Russians against the
‘little Russians’.

 The term was used by the Russians to describe the Ukrainians and the Belarusians, the term meant that; Russia as the older sibling
was supposed to make all the decisions and the others were meant to follow.

 This, Since the time of the Kievan Rus’ has been used to discredit the language, culture, traditions and independent history of
Ukraine and Belarus.

 During the era of the SSR, a mass man-made famine event known as the Holodomor occurred between 19332-1933. The famine
coincided with a Ukrainian independence movement at the time. Numerous historians today conclude that the famine was made
deliberately worse by the Soviet premier Joseph Stalin, in order to quell the movement.

 In 2004 during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, When allegations came to light that the Russian government was interfering with
the Ukrainian presidential process and that the Russian government was secretly supporting pro-Russia candidates, the Russian
government declared that the Ukrainian people were being brainwashed by the west and had become hostile to the idea of peace
and collaboration between Ukraine and Russia.And resoled to further interfere with Ukraine’s democracy for self-gain.
 POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE WAR

 The war between Russia and Ukraine first began in 2014 with the annexation of the Crimean peninsula. The annexation led to
a low-intensity conflict that lasted till February 2022. The conflict was based on a second pro-EU, pro-Democracy protests
called Euromaidan.
 The steps that were taken by the Ukrainian government in collaboration with the West (EU, USA, NATO) in regards to
economic, political and strategic cooperation in the aftermath of the Orange revolution, leading up to the Euromaidan
protests; helped to drastically improve the common man’s plight in Ukraine. This also had the unintended side effect of further
degrading Russo-Ukrainian relations in the same regard as Russia viewed Ukraine’s collaboration with the west as an act of
betrayal.
 The Euromaidan protests were a response to a sudden reversal in policy and rejection of, singing the EU-Ukrainian association
agreement by the then Ukrainian president. This along with a brazen pro-Russian stance by the executive further angered the
people and confirmed their suspicions of corruption and interference by the oligarchs and the Russian government.
 The Russian response to this was to stoke separatist fires in the Crimean peninsula, provide material support and then send in
the military and annex the peninsula.
▪ After the annexation Russia claimed that the people of Crimea felt betrayed by Ukraine’s pro-EU policies and decided to break
away from Ukraine and join Russia.
▪ The military conflict between the two nations was not an all-out war but a prolonged low-intensity conflict. The conflict has
occasional episodes of combat between the two sides.
▪ The Russian government used mortar and artillery fire, armed separatist militants and even PMCs in some cases against the
Ukrainian military. Ukrainian soldiers and even in some cases civilians were killed; to politically and militarily pressure Ukraine
during peace negotiations or when foreign dignitaries came to visit the line of control.
▪ During all this time the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian people did not lose hope instead they kept their spirit of
resistance and their dream of an independent democratic Ukraine alive and continued to stand resolute against Russian
oppression.
▪ In 2022 February Russia conducted a military exercise with Belarus near the Ukraine border. This later proved to be an excuse
to conduct a military buildup and prepare for invading Ukraine.
▪ Just before Russia began its SMO in Ukraine, The Russians allegedly sabotaged their own ammunition dump and also bombed
one of their own local administrators’ vehicles and blamed it on the Ukrainians as their Casus Belli.
▪ As the Russian SMO has continued, the Russian government has used thermobaric weapons, hypersonic weapons, cluster
munitions, and drones.
▪ And has committed war crimes such as mass genocide, denying access to food, water and medical aid to civilians, preventing
civilians from fleeing warzones, stealing from the enemy, sexual abuse of civilians and many more such crimes.
▪ The evidence of these crimes; disproves and lays bare all Russian justifications as to the need for their SMO and proves
malicious intent if the not sole burden of guilt of starting the war.
 STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF THE WAR

 At the beginning of the SMO, The Russian military heavily relied on short-term-contract soldiers and believed
their own propaganda that the Ukrainian people wanted to be liberated by the Russians.
 Nothing could be further from the truth. The Ukrainian people were united in their efforts to expel the invader.
Masses of people signed up as conscripts, fortified towns, removed road signs, armed themselves with homemade
weapons, etc.
 The Ukrainian military to their credit, engaged in an effective guerrilla warfare campaign and not only slowed the
advance of the Russian forces but forced the Russians to reconsider their strategic objectives and hold the capital.
A feat they have managed from the beginning of the war till today.
 The use of modern technology such as drones, hypersonic weapons and the use of a hybrid-multi-dimension of
war has yet to be studied in detail as the war is ongoing.
 CHRONIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

 Ukraine has lost 5 million jobs, 4.3 billions in agricultural and has completely lost its infrastructure of steel, defense equipment
production, transportation, national health services and nearly 2/3 of civilian infrastructure and basic amenities. Russia has
spent 500-900 million per day in military and logistics operations sense this war began and has lost more than 30,000 troops,
1149 air assets, thousands of tanks, armored vehicles and tracks (as of Jun 22nd).
 Since the advent of public relations there has always been a parallel proxy war of narrative control and information
management by nations during war. The Russo-Ukrainian war is no different. Both sides have tried to present the on-ground
events in a manner to discredit the other and to convince the observers of their motivations. Barring any discussion on the
effectiveness of both parties. Russia and Ukraine have used social media and traditional methods of mass
communication to great effect. A new aspect which we have not seen before is documentation of civilian resistance and
the rise of non-professional war analysts and informal reporters. these people have completely changed the way many of us
have seen this war from an in person perspective and have also been very useful in discrediting propaganda and
misinformation.
 LESSONS FOR INDIA
India has not been physically affected by this war, but the diplomatic, strategic (military) and economic consequences that this war has created
for India are very real.
Diplomacy
 While India will always maintain an objective and impartial view of international relations and choose neutrality to maintain strategic
ambiguity. India will face strong opposition to its neutrality in a post-Russo-Ukraine war world.
 India is now in a strained relationship between the US and Russia. Even though India has balanced itself well between Russia, the US and
Europe, the diplomatic and cultural isolation from this war has further deepened the divide between the ‘Western’ and ‘Eastern’ blocs and
India is at risk of being forced to choose sides as this confrontation continues and grows to include different domains and dimensions
(Economic, diplomatic, cybersecurity, narrative control, guerilla warfare)
 India now has to contend with a closer relationship between Beijing and Moscow as Moscow asked for and received military and economic
aid from Beijing during the war, this has brought the two powers together and will be a serious consideration for India in the coming future.
All of this while also balancing the dissatisfaction of its allies in NATO over India’s neutrality
 With a slew of sanctions against Russia, followed by a mass boycott and pull-out of commercial entities in Russia. Russia’s economic strength
has been severely hampered, this also puts a strain on India. According to the Embassy of India in Moscow, In FY19 trade between India-
Russia was $11.6b, this makes Russia one of India’s largest trade partners and if the relations between Russia and the West continue to
degrade, India might become a victim of secondary sanctions.
 In future global summits, official state visits and other such collaborative events. It would be in India’s interest to educate our European allies
regarding the history and importance of India’s neutrality and the need to support its independent decision-making process to maintain the
precarious peace in Asia as India and the West further strengthen their relationship.
 Military
 A new Stimson Center working paper by Sameer Lalwani shows that 85% of India’s military Arsenal is of Soviet/Russian
Origin. This arsenal despite upgrades is showing its age and is not at par with its Chinese counterparts.
 Another problem is that most of China’s military hardware is also of Soviet/Russian Origin and China has been procuring the
same equipment at roughly the same time India began. This gives China a good idea of the capabilities and shortcomings of our
equipment.
 As a consequence of the sanctions, Russia’s ability to manufacture and sell high-end defence equipment to India is severely
limited, This also affects Defence FDIs in India. This will force India to further accelerate its self-reliance in the realm of
defence, but the formation of such industry takes decades and, in the meantime, India will rely on expensive defence imports
from the Western bloc.
 While India has recently increased the speed of modernisation and is also strengthening its self-reliance in terms of research-
development and manufacturer of defence equipment. The setting-up and establishment of large-scale manufacturing take
decades for products as complicated and expensive as defence equipment and infrastructure.
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