Another Mirror for Princes

Another Mirror for Princes

Analecta Isisiana: Ottoman and Turkish Studies

104

The Public Image of the Ottoman Sultans and

Its Reception

Suraiya Faroqhi

Collections of thematic essays focused on specific themes of

Ottoman and Turkish studies are brought together in Analecta

Isisiana. These scholarly volumes address important issues
throughout Turkish history, offering in a single volume the
accumulated insights of a single author over a career of research on
the subject.
The Isis Press

2009
 Suraiya Faroqhi has taught English (1971-72) and history at Middle East Technical
Gorgias Press LLC, 180 Centennial Ave., Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA
University, Ankara (1972-87) and served as a professor of Ottoman Studies at the
www.gorgiaspress.com Ludwig Maximilians Universitat in Munich, Federal Republic of Germany (l988-

Copyright © 2009 by The Isis Press 2oo7). After retirement she now teaches at the Department of History, Bilgi
University in Istanbul.

Pri ncipa l publications

Der Bektaschi-Orden in Anatolien (vom spiiten fiinfzehnten Jahrhundert his 1826,
in Wiener Zeitschrift fiir die Kunde des Morgen/andes, Sonderband II (Wien: Verlag
des Institutes fur Orientalistik der Universitat Wien, 1981); Towns and Townsmen
of Ottoman Anatolia, Trade, Crafts and Food Production in an Urban Setting
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Men of Modest Substance, House
Owners and House Property in Seventeenth-Century Ankara and Kayseri
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Pilgrims and Sultans, The Haj
under the Ottomans (London: LB. Tauris, 1994); Kultur und Alltag im Osmanischen
Reich, (Munchen: C. H.Beck, 1995), English translation by Martin Bott Subjects
of the Sultans, Culture and Daily Life in the Ottoman Empire (London: I. B. Tauris,
2000); Approaching Ottoman History, an Introduction to the Sources (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1999); Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches
ISBN 978-1-60724-089-1 (Munich: C. H. Beck Verlag, series Beck-Wissen, 2000); The Ottoman Empire and
the Outside World, 1540s to 1774 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
Several volumes of collected articles: Peasants, Dervishes and Traders in the
Ottoman Empire (London: Variorum Reprints, 1986); Coping with the State,
Political Conflict and Crime in the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul: The Isis Press,
1995); Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands, 1480-1820 (Istanbul: The Isis
Press, 1995); Stories of Ottoman Men and Women, Establishing Status,
Establishing Control (Istanbul: Eren, 2002).
She has edited vol. 3 The Later Ottoman Empire of The Cambridge History of
Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

A note on spelling and style

As the articles in this volume are for the most part reprints, the style of the
footnotes in the originals has been retained and so have certain peculiarities of
spelling. However in the bibliography all titles follow the same format. With rare
exceptions Ottoman words have been spelled according to the rules of modern
Turkish.

Acknowledgements
I am grateful to the publishers that have permitted me to reprint the articles in this
volume and to Mrs Elif �im§ek who has prepared the index.

Printed in the United States of America

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

1. "The Ottoman Empire in world history: What the Archives Can

tell us" unpublished . ...... .. . .. ........... ........ ..... .. .. .... .. ... .. ... 35

Legitimizing the sultan and his empire

2. "Presenting the sultans' power, glory and piety: a comparative

perspective," in Prof Dr. Miibahat Kiitiikoglu'na Armagan, ed.
by Zeynep Tanm Ertug (Istanbul: Istanbul Oniversitesi Edebiyat
Faki.iltesi Tarih Bohimi.i, 2006): 169-206. ........................ 53
3. "Exotic animals at the sultans' court," unpublished 87

Relating to the outside world

4. "Ottoman views on corsairs and piracy in the Adriatic," in The

Kapudan Pasha. His Office and his Domain, ed. by Elizabeth
Zachariadou (Rethymnon: University of Crete Press, 2002):
357-371. . . ..................................................................... 103
5. "Ottoman attitudes towards merchants from Latin Christendom
before 1600," Turcica, 35 (2002): 69-104. .......................... 119
6. "ibrahim Pa§a and the marquis de Bonnac," in Essays in honour
of Ekmeleddin ihsanoglu, Volume I: Societies, cultures,
sciences: a collection of articles, compiled by Mustafa Ka9ar
and Zeynep Durukal (Istanbul: IRCICA, 2006): 279-294. ........ 149
7. "An Ottoman ambassador in Iran: Di.ini Ahmed Efendi and the
Wahrnehmung
collapse of the Safavid Empire in 1720-21," in
des Fremden, Di.fferenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten in Europa
(1500-1648) ed. by Michael Rohrschneider and Arne Strohmeyer
(Munster/Germany: Aschendorff, 2007): 375-398. Revised and
translated for this volume by the author ...... .
................... ...... 165
6 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES

Outsiders on Ottoman territory and Ottomans abroad:

prisoners, slaves and merchants
INTRODUCI'ION
8. "A prisoner of war reports: The camp and household of Grand
Vizier Kara Mustafa Pa�a in an eyewitness account," in Unfreie
Arbeits-und Lebensverhiiltnisse von der Antike bis in die
Legitimizing discourses and the people to whom they were addressed
Gegenwart, ed. Elisabeth Herrmann-Otto (Hildesheim, Zurich,
New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2005): 206-234. Translated for
In recent years Ottoman historians have tried to explicate the manner in
this volume by the author .................................... . 189
which sultanic rule was legitimized; and the debate concerning this question
9. "Trying to avoid enslavement: the adventures of an Iranian
has branched out until it has involved many if not most areas of current
subject in eighteenth-century Anatolia," in Unfreie Arbeit,
Okonomische und kulturgeschichtliche Perspektiven ed. by history-writing. Such an emphasis is not arbitrary: to some extent at least it
certainly is connected to the conservative temper of the times and the resultant
M. Erdem Kabaday1 and Tobias Reichardt (Hildesheim, Zurich,
tendency to stress consensus over social conflict However political concerns
New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 2007): 133-146. Translated for
do not exclude scholarly considerations: with good reason Ottomanist
this volume by the author ............................................ . 219
historians have been at pains to show that the sultans' rule was not a simple
10. "Bosnian merchants in the Adriatic," in Ottoman Bosnia. A
military occupation that 'enslaved peoples' were intent on throwing off at the
History in Peril has also appeared as The International
-

first opportunity.
Journal of Turkish Studies, 10, 1-2, ed. by Markus Koller and
After all it is remarkable that even in seemingly terminal crises such as
Kemal Karpat (Madison/Wise.: Center of Turkish Studies,
the war with Russia (1768-74) or the rebellion that brought down Selim III
2004): 225-239. .. ..
................. .
................ .
................. .. . 233
(r. 1789-1807), the continued rule of the Ottoman dynasty, as opposed to that
11. "The Ottomans and the trade routes of the Adriatic," in a
of an individual sultan was not really at issue. Biologically speaking the
collective volume edited by Oliver Jens Schmidt (to be
dynasty enjoyed exceptional good fortune as it never died out, although several
published in 2009) Translated for this volume by the author ... 249
times there remained only a single male representative. Even in the 1830s,
Bibliography ....................................................................... .. 267 when the armies of Mehmed Ali �a's son ibrahim �had reached Kiitahya
in western Anatolia apparently the two magnates only planned to depose
Index .................... . . . . . . . ..................................................... . . 291
Mahmud II (r. 1808-39) in favour of his young son Abdiilmecid.1 This
continuity of dynastic rule is in itself remarkable: if as has sometimes been
claimed the Empire had only been a product of war and started to go from
crisis to crisis once these wars no longer brought in major booty, then it
surely would have collapsed on one of these occasions.
Yet no such thing ever happened, even though in certain situations the
Ottoman soldiery proved as much a liability as an asset - as happened during
the war of 1768-74 when many army corps were not fed and brutally exploited
the civilian population, thereby intensifying the food crisis and causing the
disaffection of previously loyal subjects.2 Therefore it is worth paying closer
attention to the mechanisms of legitimization devised by the sultan's viziers
and other administrators. After all it was by means of legitimizing activities,

1 Afaf Lutfi ai-Sayyid Marsot, Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad

University Press, 1984), pp. 224-25.
Ali (Cambridge: Cambridge
2 Virginia Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870 (London, New York: Longman Pearson, 2007),
pp. 148, 149, 176.
8 A N OT H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I NC E S
images and discourses surrounding the Ottoman ruler that numerous
inhabitants of the sultans' realm, both Muslims and non-Muslims were
convinced that the continued rule of the dynasty of Osman was to their
benefit, and perhaps even fanned part of a divine plan. Studying mechanisms
of legitimization involves an analysis of the manner in which the sultan's
power was projected, and how these images were received by ordinary subjects,
office-holders in the capital and grandees in the provinces, but also by foreign
rulers.
These different audiences need to be evaluated separately: for it is surely
unrealistic to assume that a villager from the province of Crete or Karaman
had the same perceptions of what made a sultan a legitimate ruler as a courtier
or judge depending on the goodwill of the sovereign for his career.1 Among
ordinary subjects Muslims and non-Muslims might express widely divergent
views; and the same thing applied to ordinary subjects on the one hand and
members of the elite on the other. Thus the seventeenth-century priest Papa
Synadinos of Serres, who wrote as a contemporary about the brutal repression
undertaken by Murad IV (r. 1623-40) approved of these acts of violence
because 'the Turks' in other words the local Muslims with whom the writer's
relations presumably were often tense, were terrified by numerous executions
'out of the blue' .2 Evidently Papa Synadinos did not think that his own
community might come under threat. On the other hand Evliya Celebi (1611-
after 1683), a former page of Murad IV whom we might call a politically
inactive member of the Ottoman elite, did not deny or criticize the violence of
some of the sultan's measures. But Evliya also wrote a lengthy account of the
jokes and horseplay in which Murad IV engaged with his intimates - perhaps
because he thought that he needed to show that the reign of his hero had not
all been blood and gore.3
At the same time, foreign rulers also might be the addressees of
messages that legitimized the sultan as a powerful Muslim ruler whose views
his neighbours disregarded at their own peril. Such messages were sent out in
a variety of ways, depending on the political conjuncture of the times and the
views of the sultans and viziers in question. A conquest was celebrated
by sending out literary texts describing the sultan's recent achievement: these
I The recent Ph D dissertation of Annemarike Stremmelaar, Justice and Revenge in the
Ottoman Rebellion of 1703 (Leiden: n.p., 2�) de�s with the question of how Mustafa II lost
legitimacy in the eyes of his Istanbul and Edtme subJects.
2 [Papa Synadinos of Serres), Conseils et memoires de Synadinos pretre de Serr�s en
Macedoine (XVII' si�cle), ed., translated and co!llmented. b�Pa_??
lOdorico, :'ith S. Asdrachas,
T. Karanastassis, K. Kostis and S. Petm�zas (Paris: Assoctabon Pierre Beton , 1996), p. 95.
3 Evliya �elebi b Oervi§ Mehemmed Ztlli, Evliya �elebi Sey � ! si, opkapt Sarayt Baldat
304 Yazmasmm Transkrips yonu -Dizini, vol. 1, ed. by Orban �ruk G okyay and YUcel Da#h
(Ista.nbul: Yap1 Kredi Yaymlan, 199 5), pp. 99-104.
I NT R O D U C T I O N 9
jetihnames might be literary creations to be appreciated by cognoscenti in
foreign chanceries, and thus stress that the Ottoman court had fully assimilated
the classical culture of Iranian-style belles lettres. But on a more down-to­
earth level, thefetihnames stressed the power of the sultan who was projected
as a ruler supported by God in his endeavours to expand the realm of Islam.1
Implicitly fetihnames promulgated the message that a ruler who wanted to
avoid his own downfall and the destruction of his realm was well advised to
yield before it came to a military confrontation. Legitimization and what may
be regarded as the opposite, namely intimidation by the threat of force might
thus be served by one and the same set of texts.
In the realms of European rulers the printing press had a significant
role in 'placing the sultan on the map by force of arms': for already in the
sixteenth century, a large number of ephemeral newssheets were printed that
spread more or less fictionalized accounts of Ottoman conquests, complete
with real, semi-real and completely imaginary 'atrocity stories'.2 While a
denizen of central Europe would not agree with the view expounded in the
fetihnames, namely that the expansion of the realm of Islam was a cause for
rejoicing, he might hear in church-and take quite seriously-the argument
that the triumphs of the sultans were a punishment for the sins of the
Christians.
Divine punishment, however unpleasant certainly was part of the
manner in which God organized the affairs of humankind; and viewing
Ottoman successes in this light was a legitimization of sorts. We are thus
confronted with a paradox; while the ephemeral newssheets known as the
'Turcica' were meant to encourage resistance against the sultan, solidarity with
his victims and subjection to local princes as the only possible 'defenders' of
their subjects, they also spread abroad the notion that the advance of the
Ottomans was part of God's mysterious ways. Certainly this form of
legitimization had not been foreseen and much less planned by either the
sultans or their opponents.
Images of Ottoman rule: sultanic munificence and charity
Increasing contacts between 'straight' historians dealing with the
Ottoman world and their colleagues concerned with artistic activities have
made for a clearer understanding of the fact that the sultans did not just rule-
1
Claire Norton is preparing a study of these documents.
2 �I Golloer, Die europ(iischen Tii_r�endr�.cke des XVI. Jahrhunderts, 3 vols. (Bucarest,
Berho, Baden-Baden: Editura Academte• et alu, 1961-71). see for example vol. I, pp. 138-39.
 10 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
or in later periods, preside over a governing apparatus dominated by others. In
addition it was important to present a certain image, and viziers and heads of
chancery took a hand in producing it or else commissioned artists and writers
to do so in their stead. In other words in spite of its exponential growth in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries 'imperial propaganda' through texts and
visual means was not.unknown in the early modem period; and the Ottoman
sultans engaged in it as did their counterparts in other cultures.
If this state of affairs has only been understood quite recently, one
reason is surely that few historians of the Ottoman world have attempted to
link ethnology to the study of politics. Another reason why public ceremonial
has long been neglected is much more trivial: the Istanbul archives of the
Prime Minister, always our principal resource, are not very rich in documents
concerning sultanic receptions, festivities and parades. Presumably the relevant
sources are still hidden away in the palace archives, which have been
catalogued and made accessible only to a very limited extent. As a result
Ottomanists have tended to concentrate on questions of imperial management,
finances and most recently warfare, as well as the economic activities that
underwrite state formation. By contrast they have taken a long time
understanding the importance of public imagery. Even so over the last few
years some relevant points have been made.
Now that scholarly interest in narrative sources - long regarded as
secondary in comparison to the archives - has resumed, historians have
shown how chronicles, accounts of individual campaigns and also poetry could
serve as vehicles for sultanic legitimization. In this enterprise the key feature
was patronage. As there was no copyright, authors and poets depended on the
munificence of a patron and the most desirable of all protectors was the ruler
himself. One author even went so far as to say that it was the worth of the
patron that determined the value of the literary work dedicated to him.1 Thus
when highly esteemed poetry was recited or collected in special volumes
(divans) it was rare to not hear or read at least a couple of texts that praised the
current sultan. Even if a vizier was the actual patron the latter owed his
position to the sovereign and the Ottoman ruler was thus indirectly glorified.
Quite a few sultans moreover wrote respectable verses and had their works
inscribed on the monuments they sponsored: a fine example still extant is the
fountain of Ahmed III (r. 1703-30) in front of the entrance to the Topkapt
palace.2
I Halil lnalctk, Sair ile POlron. Patrimonyal Devlet ve Sanat Ozerinde bir lnceleme (Istanbul:
OoJu-Batt, 2003), p. 48.
Af
2 Hatice Aynur and Hakan Karateke eds., Besmeleyle is.- Suyu .!ff!'l A�med 'e E_yle pua. Ill.
Ahmed Devri /stMbul �eimeleri (1703-1730) (Istanbul: istanbul Buyilqehu Beled1yes•. 199 5).
INTRODUCTION II
Chronicles were another means of legitimizing the Ottoman ruler. It
was a convention to begin such works with the praise of God and the Prophet
Muhammad, and to conclude the introductory section with a laudation of the
reigning sultan. When campaigns were described the ruler might be accorded
the title of 'warrior for the faith' (gazi) although he had not necessarily
participated in person, much less directed the campaign; the histories written
in the reign of Murad III (r. 1574-95) may be cited as a case in point. Even if
an incident was discussed that was highly detrimental to the prestige of the
dynasty, such as the murder of Osman II (r. 1618-22) it was possible to focus
on the evil advisors of the inexperienced ruler that could be declared
responsible for this distressing event. I
Both poets and chronicle writers were rewarded, sometimes with sums
of money and sometimes with appointment to an office that might- or might
not- provide the holder with a respectable livelihood.2 It has bee n suggested
that in the mid-sixteenth century, there was a crisis of patronage; for we find a
sizeable number of complaints to the effect that literary efforts no longer
obtained the accustomed rewards. However that may well have been an
illusion; for while the salaries that Murad II (r. 1421-51 with some
interruptions) had assigned to literary figures without public office were in fact
discontinued by the grand vizier Riistem Pa§a, the ruler's 'privy purse' and
surpluses in the budgets of pious foundations (valajs) continued to be used for
these purposes.3 However there were probably more literary men awaiting
preferment than even the expanding bureaucracy could accommodate and such
people might be vocal in expressing their disappointment The story of
Mustafa Ali (1541-1600) whose strategic errors prevented him from achieving
his cherished goal of becoming the head of the sultan's chancery (ni§ancl) may
serve as a dramatic example: his tales of 'Ottoman decline' reverberate down to
the present day.4
In the sixteenth century it was common practice to reward writers by
appointing them as scribes to pious foundations, or giving them what
amounted to sinecures funded by surpluses in the budgets of such foundations
(zevaid-hor). A remarkable example of 'creative accounting' in the great
Istanbul foundation of Sultan Siileyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-66) that has
recently been brought to light and took place in the late 1500s, may well have
G briel Pi terberg, An Ottoman Tragedy, History and Historiography at Play (Berkeley, Los
�1 ngeles:
a
University of California Press, 2003) p. 121.
lnalctk, $air ile Patron, p. 47.
3
fnalctk, Sair ile Patron, p. 50.
4
Cornell H. Aeischer Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian
Musta/fi Ali (1541-1 600
) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 202-08.
 12 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES I NTRODUCTION 13

been intended to cover up a deficit and thereby protect the salaries of people
generically as Hatuniye (belonging to 'the Lady') while the charities of those
who were receiving grants of this type.1
ro yal women whose sons actually became sultans were called 'of the Valide
But when all was said and done, the appointments of zevaid-hor were a
Sultan' or queen mother. We may therefore regard these pious foundations
marginal function of pious foundations; other aspects were far more
almost as extensions of those sponsored by the rulers themselves. Princesses
significant. Such foundations were supposed not only to facilitate the entry of
by contrast usually had their charitable foundations called after their personal
a dead ruler into paradise but also during his life-time, demonstrate his virtues, names and not their titles. Yet sometimes their activities in the field of charity
especially his piety and charity; on this issue present-day historians concerned may well have been subsumed under the names of their vizier husbands. Thus
with legitimization and many members of the Ottoman elite probably were in in one way or the other the charities of royal women extended the scope of the
agreement. Moreover Stileyman the Magnificent was sufficiently devoted to
sultan's concern for the well-being of his subjects, particularly the Muslims
the spiritual welfare of his wife Hiirrem/Roxelana that he allowed her to
among them.
establish major charitable foundations in her own name; in return the author
of Hiirrem Sultan's foundation document lavished fulsome praise on the ruler
for his munificence. 2 Images of Ottoman rule: the sultans as upholders ofjustice and Islamic law
Nor did the practice of building mosques, schools, libraries, aqueducts
and other public utilities cease in the eighteenth century, when the Empire
An important element in the conglomerate of motifs that made up the
was under pressure and disposable income became smaller. It is worth noting
royal image was that of a just ruler accessible to the complaints of his
that after 1703, when Ahmed III had been obliged to return to Istanbul after
subjects, even and especially if the damage had been caused by his own
the court mainly had resided in Edirne for about half a century, most sultans officials. I Numerous office-holders lost their positions after accusations of
who lived long enough each built a sizeable mosque complex, and some of
having oppressed 'the poo r' had been accepted as justified; admittedly other
their viziers at least ordered the construction of libraries and theological
such oppressors remained in position, and there always was a certain distance
schools. When a destructive earthquake brought down the Fatih mosque and
between claims and reality. Perhaps the most dramatic case of a sultan
the mausoleum of this ruler, beginning in 1767 the buildings were replaced in
assuming the role of 'protector of the poor' was that of Murad lll: when
the style of the times. 3
complaints accumulated that local office-holders used their inspection cum tax­
The study of Ottoman legitimization by feminist scholars also has
collecting (devir) tours to extract large sums of money from hapless villagers
focused o n vakljs. Ottoman princesses and other royal women had been
the sultan permitted local peasant militias to chase these officials away and
responsible for such charities from the inception of the principality in the
summarily prohibited the devir.2 This measure proved such an impediment to
fourteenth century; but only from the mid- I 500s is there enough
tax collection that it was soon abrogated, although aggrieved villagers
documentation available for comprehensive studies.4 In the sixteenth and
continued to invoke it for a while longer. Who knows, perhaps the sultan
seventeenth centuries apparently royal women could acquire at least symbolic
when issuing his command already was more or less aware of the fact that it
visibility through pious foundations only after having passed the child-bearing
would be difficult to enforce; if that was the case we may view his order as
stage. Even then the foundations of the mothers of princes were often known
part of an image-making campaign, an attempt to reinforce the stay-at-home
sultan's shaken legitimacy by showing him to be a just ruler who protected

I Kayhan Orbay, "The Magnificent Siileymaniye Owed a Debt �o th� Butc�er an�the Grocer," his subjects from the unreasonable demands of his own office-holders.
unpublished manuscript. Iam most grateful to the author for shanng h1s findmgs wtth me.
2 Amy Singer, Constructing Ottoman Beneficence: An Imperial Soup Kitchen in Jerusalem
(Albany NY: SUNY Press, 2002 ), p. 66.
3 TUiay Artan, "Art and archi.tecture," i� The Ca'!'bridge His�ory of'f!.lrke • vol. 3, The Later
1
Ottoman Empire ed. by Suratya Faroqh1 (Cambndge: Cambndge Untverstty Press, 2006), p.
476.
1
4 OlkU Bates, "Women as Patrons of Architecture in Turke:r• in . Women in the Muslim World, Mustafa
Akdag, Celdlf isyanlart (1550-/603) (Ankara: Ankara Oniversitesi Oil ve Tarih
ed. by Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie (Ham�rd: �arvard Unrvers1ty Press, 1978), pp. 245-��; fo#rafya FakUltesi, 1963), p. 150ff.
Les lie Peirce, "Gender and Sexual Propnety tn Ottoman Royal Women's Patronage, • m .
Suraiya Faroqhi, "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultantc
Women, Patronage and Self-representation in Islamic Societies,
ed. D. Fairchild Ruggles
Legitimation (1570-1650)" Journal of the Eco mic and Social History of the Orient, XXXIV
no
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2000) , pp. 53-68.
0992), 1-39.
 14 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
In a broader perspective a formula that frequently recurs in Ottoman
documents fits into the same pattern: the officials receiving these
communications were warned that delays due to sloth and neglect, but more
particularly because of corruption would result in exemplary punishment. In
certain cases however office-holders also were given notice that over­
zealousness would be counted against them as well, namely when supposedly
executing official commands, they made innocent people suffer. We are thus
once again confronted with a legitimizing discourse in which the sultan
rhetorically distanced himself from his officials who were not assumed to be
virtuous men but at least potentially both corrupt and unjust.
Of course a sceptical contemporary observer might ask why the sultan
did not find himself servitors of a higher moral calibre; and an independent
mind such as Mustafa All faulted Sultan Murad III for this reason among
others.' But then Mustafa Ali was an exceptional person; and in everyday
practice this legitimizing stance seems to have served its purpose quite well.
Justice and good government did not depend on the religion of the
sovereign; and educated Ottomans knew that the wise kings of ancient Iran or
the Mongol rulers of this latter country during the thirteenth century were no
adherents of Islam: yet the former had become exemplars of virtue and the
latter had managed to defeat the Muslim Seljuks of Anatolia and build an
empire that endured for several generations. Authors writing on statecraft were
thus prepared to admit that the justice of an infidel ruler might preserve his
reign while an unjust Muslim sultan might lose his throne.2
But in practical terms in the Ottoman context just rule meant the
promotion of Islamic law, which gained ascendancy over sultanic commands
and local customs in the long run. This development began in the 1500s but
gained momentum in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Admittedly the
sultans never abandoned their right to command according to the rules of
expediency and the traditions of Ottoman statesmanship. Perhaps the
relationship between Siileyman the Magnificent and the head of his religious
cum legal establishment �eyhiilislam Ebusuud Efendi was emblematic in this
respect: Siileyman ordered his foremost legal expert to ensure that Ottoman
land-holding patterns conformed to Islamic religious law (�eriat)
promulgated an edict that enshrined Ebusuud's findings. Yet at the same time
this pronouncement was based on notions that the sultan was the ultimate
I Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, p. 296.
2 Fleischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual, p. 289.
I NTRODUCT I O N 15
owner of the arable lands in his realm, a view that had not been held by early
1
Islamic jurists.
A similar ambiguity was apparent in the behaviour of eighteenth-
century sultans towards the religious cum legal establishment of their time.
On the one hand sultans convened meetings of learned men and listened to
their discussions with respect and perhaps comprehension. A historian that has
studied these meetings has described them as a theological school or medrese
whose sessions were held in the palace.2 But as the same historian tells us, in
the 1700s the possibilities for members of all but a few families and their
hangers-on to make high-level careers as judges and teachers in theological
colleges were substantially reduced; and the reason for this scaling-down of
career possibilities was the concern of the sultans that jurists cum religious
scholars not under direct palace control might make common cause with
rebels, as had happened in 1703.3 Furthermore in the eighteenth century the
sultans seriously interfered with the revenues of pious foundations, as they had
begun to do already in the 1600s, although these institutions were sacrosanct
if viewed from the standpoint of Islamic law.4 Thus the establishment of state
control over vakifrevenues by Mahmud II was by no means an unprecedented
move, but rather part of the hunt for extra revenues begun by the highly
�eriat-conscious sultans of the eighteenth century.
Images of Ottoman rule: the life cycle of the dynasty
A sultan ruled only - at most - for as long as he lived; and thus the
soldiers, especially the janissaries demanded to regularly be assured of the fact
that their sovereign was alive and in good health. Until Stileyman the
Magnificent managed to more or less abolish this custom in his later years,
for a century between 1453 and the 1550s the sultan regularly dined in full
view of the soldiery. At the same time by his withdrawal into the harem
during his later years, Siileyman continued a tendency that had been noticeable
from the times of Mehmed the Conqueror (r. 145 1-81): following a tradition
and
well known from Abbasid but also Byzantine palace life, the ruler emphasized
his grandeur by retreating from his servitors and subjects and becoming all but
1
Colin Imber, Ebu's-su'ud, the Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
1997), pp. 122-28.
Madeline Zilfi, • A Medrese for the Palace: Ottoman Dynastic Legitimation in the Eighteenth
Century," Journal of the American Oriental Society, CXIII. 2 (1993). 184-91.
3 Madeline Zilfi The Politics of Piety,
: The
Ottoman Ulema in the Classical Age (Minneapolis:
ibliotheca Isl�ca. 1988), p . 212.
Engin Akarh, "Gedik: Implements, Mastership, Shop Usufruct and Monopoly among Istanbul
Artisans, 1750-1850" Wissenschaftskolleg-Jahrbuch (1985-86), 223-32.
 16 A N O THE R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C ES
inaccessible. At official venues he was served in silence to a large extent, and
at such occasions, he himself spoke but rarely.1 Evidently this ritualized
remoteness from everyday affairs if carried to extremes, might make effective
governing difficult, so that we can view this phenomenon as the corollary of
late sixteenth-century vicarious rule by palace and state officials and
seventeenth-century domination of the Ottoman polity by grandee
households. 2
Another issue connected with the sultans' image among subjects and
foreigners, but also with the actual, practical conduct of government was the
fate of Ottoman princes. It has long been known but a recent study has shown
in hitherto unsuspected detail that the adoption of the seniority criterion during
the 1600s , in other words the succession of the oldest member of the ruling
dynasty, really changed the manner in which the Ottoman Empire was
govemed.3 But real life was one thing and imagery quite another. Certainly a
sultan who came to the throne by the late 1600s no longer killed his brothers
as part of the 'ritual' of succession; yet long afterwards and as late as the
I720s , we find a Safavid ruler who entertained an Ottoman ambassador
'needling' his visitor by pointedly asking about the current princes. Thus even
at this late date, killing off the brothers of a newly enthroned sultan was still
part of the image of Ottoman rule at a major foreign Muslim court.
Contrary to the practice current in Renaissance and Baroque Europe, the
funerals of Ottoman sultans by the 1600s were rather sober affairs, in keeping
with the view that a dead ruler's situation was the same as that of any deceased
Muslim.4 However practices had been different in the fifteenth century, when
the interment of Mehmed the Conqueror was accompanied by many dramatic
signs of public grief that Islamic theologians strongly disapprove of.5 Even at
the funeral of Siileyman the Magnificent, who in his later years had been
known for his strict Muslim piety, there were still signs of mourning that
were to disappear in later periods, including the donning of dark-coloured
clothing. As a well-known miniature demonstrates, on this occasion it was for
instance considered appropriate to depict the grand vizier Sokollu Mehmed
Pa�a weeping in his tent at the death of his sovereign.6 But much of the
1 GUiru Necipogl u, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power, The Topkap1 Palace in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries (Cambridge MA: The Architectural History Foundation and MIT Press,
1991), p. 102.
2 Rifa'at A. Abou-EI-Haj, Formation of the Ottoman State, The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to
Eighteenth Centuries (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1991), pp. 3 5-40.
3 Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein, Le serai/ ebranle (Paris: Fayard, 2003), pp. 206-07
i
4 Vatin and Veinstein, Le sera l ebranle, p. 441.
5 Nicolas Vatin and Gilles Veinstein, "La mort de Mehmed II (1481)," in Les ottomans ella
mort ed. by Gilles Veinstein (Leiden: E. J. B rill , 1996), pp. 187-206, seep. 201.
6 Serpil Bagct, "Islam Toplumlannda Matemi Simgeleyen R�nkler: Mavi, Mor ve Siyah," in
Cimeti�res et traditions funeraires dans le monde islamique, Islam Diinyasmda Mel.tlrltklar ve
Defin Gelenekleri, ed. by Jean·Louis Bacque-Grammont and Aksel Tibet, 2 vols. (Ankara:
TUrk Tarih Kurumu, 1996), vol. 2, pp. 163-68.
17
I N T R O D U CTI O N
ceremonial in this particular instance was connected to the unusual fact that
the sultan had died while far away from his capital, on campaign in Hungary;
at the same time hi� successor Selim II (r. 1 566-74) wished to have the body
buried in Istanbul. This decision necessitated a long and quite exceptional
funerary procession that crossed the entire Balkans and finally ended in
Istanbul, where a mausoleum was constructed in the precinct of Stileyman's
great mosque.
Nor were the accessions of Ottoman sultans marked by a great deal of
publicly visible ceremonial. At the time when princes were still being
educated in the provinces and the succession at least in principle was open to
all surviving sons of the deceased ruler, the heir raced to Istanbul to be
enthroned and receive the allegiance of the principal office-holders; this
ceremony was held in the palace court and thus not visible to the subjects. 1
Furthermore it was considered appropriate to hide the death of the previous
sultan until the new one had ascended the throne, in order to prevent a rampage
of the janissaries and other disorders. However once he had been recognized as
the sultan, Selim II did enter his capital in state, an event that has been
described in detail by the Jewish writer Moysen Almosnino who formed part
of the new sultan's entourage.2
Displaying the sultan's person: portraits, hunts and parades
In the absence of the 'real' sultan, an image might fill the gap; but
there were some difficulties involved. It has often been remarked that compared
to the Safavid and Moghul courts the prohibition to depict people and animals
was taken rather seriously in the Ottoman context. As the only major
exception we might point to the arts of the book, meaning both miniatures in
bound volumes and individual sheets that might be included in albums.3 In
these miniatures however showing the sultan and his principal dignitaries was
fairly common practice. Even so the interest in individualized depictions of
persons and animals was limited if compared for instance to the imagery
produced for the contemporary Moghul palaces.
1 Zeynep Tanm Ertug, XVI. Yiizyll Osman/1 Devletinde Ciilus ve Cenaze Tiirenleri (Ankara: T.
f Kiil�tir Bakanhgt, 1999), pp. 35-78. . .
Rab1 Moysen Almosnin o, Extremos y grande1;as de Constantmopla, tr by lacob Cansrno
�Madrid: Francisco Martinez, 1638), pp. 117-19. The original, which I cannot read was written
•n l.adioo.
3 .se!min Kangal et alii eds., The Sultan's Portrait, Picturing the House of Osman (Istanbul:
TUrkiye I � Bankast, 2000), passim.
 18 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
Portraits resembling the sultans that they depicted were prized by
certain patrons such as Sokollu Mehmed Pa�a. who obtained a painting of
Murad III from a Venetian artist and complimented the painter on having
achieved a good likeness. 1 But in Ottoman miniatures the courtiers and
military men who attended the sultan at official ceremonies were differentiated
only by their clothes and insignia, while in an image showing a similar event
at the Moghul court, the facial features of the attendants were markedly
individual.2 In Ottoman miniatures by contrast even a person clearly of
African descent such as the Chief Black Eunuch differed from his fellow
officials merely by the plumpness of his face, a slightly flattened nose and the
dark colour of his skin.3
Sultans' portraits have recently been studied in extenso; and interest
continues. Doubtless a major reason for such a prolonged concern is the
intercultural character of these works. Due to invitations issued by Sultan
Mehmed II Fatih to Costanzo da Ferrara and more famously, the Venetian
artist Gentile Bellini the first surviving images of a sultan were produced by
foreign artists, who actually had seen the person they depicted. Most of the
work that these people undertook for the Ottoman ruler has not survived, but
in spite of multiple restorations that probably have much altered the quality of
the image, Bellini's portrait of Mehmed II is still extant in the National
Gallery (London). Moreover Bellini seems to have had followers in Istanbul
who took their lead from his work although it is also possible that at least
one of the paintings in question was not produced in Istanbul at all, but in
western Iran.4
While Fatih's son Bayezid II (r. 1 48 1 - 1 5 1 2 ) did not continue to
sponsor Italian artists, in the sixteenth century sultans' portraits were again
produced, this time by Ottoman painters. They often form series that adorn
courtly verse chronicles celebrating the rulers' conquests and also universal
histories with a strongly Ottoman slant. These volumes were commissioned
during the reigns of Sultan Siileyman and his successors. In the preparation of
the 'portrait' miniatures to be included in these works, Venetian paintings also
were employed, especially copies of items from the picture gallery showing
notable persons that Paolo Giovio had commissioned for the museum that
I Julian Roby, "From Europe to Istanbul," in The Sultan's Portrait, pp. 136-63, see p. 151.
2 Compare the Ottoman court scenes in The Sultan's Portrait, pp. 129-30 to a scene at the
Moghul court depicted in the same volume p. 55.
3 Esin Aul. Levni and the Surname. The Story of an Eighteenth-century Ottoman Festival
� stanbul: K�bank, 1999), p . 225.
This question was debated between Giilru Necipoglu and John Michael Rogers at a
conference held in London in the spring of 2006. See also Caroline Campbell and Alan Chong,
Bellini and the East (London, Boston: The National Gallery and Isabella Stewart Gardner
Museum, 2005).
I N T R O D U CT I O N 19
in the mid-l 500s, he had put together for his home town of Como. This
collection included images of the sultans among those of other potentates that
Giovio knew of, and sometimes knew in person. 1
Some of the works shown in Como, or images inspired by them, had
been produced by followers of Titian and Veronese. These artists had never
been in Istanbul and thus could only imagine what the people they painted
might have looked like; but this situation apparently was not considered a
drawback at the Ottoman court, where anyhow it was known that no
contemporary portraits existed of any sultans preceding Mehmed the
Conqueror. But in addition there were the portraits of Stileyman the
Magnificent by the Danish artist Melchior Lorichs. Familiar with the work of
Albrecht Durer Lorich had attended the sultan's court and thus actually seen the
subject whom he depicted. Certain Ottoman miniatures showing Sultan
Siileyman and created in the second half of the sixteenth century seem to have
been based on Lorichs' work.
Another way of displaying and enhancing the image of the sultan was
the hunt; and a recent study has shown the importance of this activity in
palace ceremonial.2 Of course this particular element of royal iconography was
not an Ottoman invention. In ancient Iran and throughout the Near East the
ruler had often been depicted as the hunter par excellence, and this tradition
had been taken over by many Islamic rulers. In the Middle Ages faience and
metalwork often bore images of a king on the hunt, and this emphasis was
even more pronounced in the courtly context of the miniatures sponsored by
rulers and high officials in Iran and India.
Hunting was often justified as a preparation for war: the hunters rode
for hours on end, went without food for long stretches of time, practiced
marksmanship and sometimes confronted dangerous animals. These
justifications needed to be developed as certain Islamic men of religion were
less than enthusiastic about the practice: detractors of the hunt pointed out that
in the excitement, the hours of prayer were easily forgotten, apart from the
fact that it was difficult to ensure that the prey was killed in such a fashion
that its consumption was permitted to a Muslim.
There was however yet another aspect that must have recommended
hunting parties to certain sultans: the camaraderie of the chase made it
possible to relax the rigidities of palace ritual . While hunting it was not
possible to always be silent in the ruler's presence, as was de rigeur in the
1 Julian Raby, "From Europe to Istanbul," in The Sultan's Portrait, pp.136-63. �or the beg�nnings
of this unique institution see Price Zimmennann, Paolo Giovio (Princeton: Princeton Uruvers1ty .
� ess, 1995), pp. 158-62.
.
. I thank TUJay Artan for showing me her work on the Ottoman sultans as hunters, forthcommg
IR the "Festschrift Oleg Grabar."
 20 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR P R I NC ES
Topkapt Sarayt; and when the game had been killed, presumably the hunters
found ways of feasting and enjoying themselves. Moreover riding in the
woods must have been a pleasant experience even if little game was actually
killed; and thus we find Sultan Murad Ill, not known to be an enthusiastic
hunter, visiting the royal game preserves with his courtiers probably just to
enjoy the open air. 1 While pleasure and relaxation could not be so easily
accepted as justifications for organizing a hunt as was true of the preparation
for war, we may suspect that some sultans, who after all were mostly young
people, did appreciate the informal gaiety that these occasions permitted.
Within his capital the sultan could present himself prominently by
parading on horseback: this was done in a minor way on every Friday, when
he attended prayers at one of the great mosques. But as Aya Sofya is located
just outside the palace gates and the Sultan Ahmed mosque a short walk away,
not many people had the chance of viewing their sovereign on such occasions.
More inhabitants of the capital might see him when he visited the sanctuary
of Eyup, a few kilometres outside the city walls. However this visit became
'traditional' only in the 1600s, when princes who had been raised in an
inaccessible comer of the palace needed to take possession of their city and be
introduced to its inhabitants at the same time.2 Moreover most sultans
performed this rite only once, namely after their accession to the throne; and
only a particularly 'image-conscious' ruler like Murad IV undertook it on other
occasions as well, for instance after a successful campaign. From a greater
distance the inhabitants of Istanbul might watch their sultan when he attended
celebrations such as the circumcisions of his sons and the weddings of
princesses. But all these events were not really frequent and therefore the rare
appearances of the sultan in public must have been carefully orchestrated in
advance.
Ottoman diplomacy
Sultanic ceremonial could be interpreted by an experienced observer and
provide indications of the relative standing of foreign powers in the eyes of the
ruler's entourage. As a result, quite a few ceremonies taking place in the
sultans' reception room (arz odast) and on the streets of Istanbul were recorded
I
This scene was observed by Michael Heberer of Bretten, a nephew of Luther's close
associate Philip Melanchton and a liberated former galley slave: Johann Michael Heberer von
Bretten, Aegyptiaca Servitus, intr. by Karl Teply (Graz: Akademische Druck- und
Verlagsanstalt, reprint 1 967), pp. 351-52.
2 Cemal Kafadar, "EyUp'te Kilt� K�nma Torenleri," in TOlay Artan ed., Eyiip: Diin/ Bugiin,
11·12 Araltk / 993 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfa Yurt Yaymlan, 1994), pp. 50-61; Nicolas Vatin, "Aux
origines du �lerinage A EyUp des sultans ottomans," Turcica, XXVIl ( 1 995), pp. 91-100.
21
INTRODUCTION
in some detail by foreign ambassadors or members of the staff accompanying
the latter. Already in the sixteenth century the Ottoman capital was visited by
many Venetian, French, Habsburg, Polish and other envoys, some resident for
a number of years and others sent by their sovereigns for a short time and a
specific purpose, such as negotiating a peace treaty or presenting
congratulations on the accession of a new sultan. Much information on the
public presentation of the Ottoman ruler can be derived from Venetian
diplomatic accounts to the Signoria, as the la ter's resid nt am assadors
� �
�
known as the baili were expected to regularly tnform thetr supenors both
while resident and after their return to Venice. 1 In the late sixteenth century
certain Habsburg ambassadors as well as their clerks also have provided
glimpses of sultanic ceremonial as they observed and interpreted it.2
As for the Ottomans before the late seventeenth century their envoys to
foreign courts were relatively low-level officials whose reports, if indeed they
ever were presented in writing have not so far been located. But once the
sultans began to send higher-level personages as ambassadors and expected
them to submit written reports, the question of ceremonial again was
dominant: for whether or not the envoy was treated with respect, or else kept
waiting and otherwise neglected by the court to which he had been sent,
directly reflected on the prestige of the sultan. Thus ZiilfiUr A�a. who
between 1688 and 1692 attended the Habsburg ruler in the hope of ending the
war that had begun in 1683, and who was at one time even imprisoned in a
fortress, had plenty of reasons to complain about the shabby treatment that he
had received at the hands of the officials of Leopold l.3
In brief ceremonial and/or its absence thus served as a means of
communication between royal courts even if they belonged to different cultural
environments· and if the ambassador did not have the necessary background
information u �n arrival, there were always plenty of officials, translators and
hangers-on who could provide it. In this respect there was no great difference
between Ottoman envoys visiting France or Iran and their European or
Moroccan counterparts in Istanbul; and as the informational value of court
I
Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, In nome del Gran �ignore. lnv_iati otto�i a Venezia �1/a �tuiuta d�
Costantinopoli alia guerra di Candia (Venezaa: Deputacaone Edatnce, .1994); Mana .P•� �edana
ambasciatori
Fabris ed., Relaz;ioni dt veneti a/ Senato, vol. XIV Cost . .
wl:lnopoll, Re/az;tom .medt e
(/512-1780) (Padua: Aldo Ausilio-Bottega �i Eras�o, 1996); Enc Dursteler, Venetlans m �
Constantinople. Nation, Identity and CoexiStence m the Early Modern Mediterranean .
�Baltimore: The Joh ns Hoplcins Press, 2006).
Stephan Gerlach, Turldye Giinliigii, ed. Kemal Beydilli, tr. Tiirkis Noyan , 2 vols (Istanbul.
.
Kitap Yaymevi, 2006).
3 [Ziilfikir P
8§8J Ziilfik!Jr P�a'nm Viyana Sefdreti ve Estlreti, Cerfde·i Takrirdt-i Ziilfik!Jr
0
Efen.di [1099-1 / 31/688- 1692J, ed. by Mustafa GUier (Istanbul: �amhca, 200?)! PP· XXIX­
XXX; idem, Viyana'da Osrnan/1 Diplomasisi (Ziilfik!Jr P�a'mn Miiklileme Takrm 1688-/692)
ed. by SongUI �olak (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yayanevi, 2007), p. 30.
 22 A N O T HE R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C E S
ceremonial was so well understood by all the parties concerned it often was
described in great detail, much to the frustration of modem historians who
would prefer to hear about other matters.
The sultan as the 'protector of the world': where merchants and exiles might
find refuge
In today's understanding, ambassadors have a special claim on the
protection of the state to which they are accredited; in case of war or if their
actions have gravely displeased the government that hosts them, they merely
will be 'issued their passports' in other words sent home. However as apparent
from the misfortunes of ZiJifikar Ag�a in late-seventeenth century Vienna,
this rule did not necessarily apply in the early modem period. Nor did the
Ottoman authorities regard envoys as sacrosanct; thus even around 1800, when
Napoleon had occupied Egypt, members of the French embassy were
imprisoned in the Yedikule fortress. Closer to Ziilfikar Aga/Pa�a in time,
when Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pa�a began his 1683 campaign against
Vienna, the Emperor Leopold's Internuntius Caprara along with the
'Kayserliche Resident' Baron Kunitz was arrested and made to accompany the
Ottoman army all the way from Istanbul into Lower Austria. 1
Yet one of the major titles used by the Ottoman ruler was that of
'world-protecting sovereign' (padi§ah-z alempeiUlh), and since the granting of
security was indeed a major part of the sultan's super-royal image, it is worth
pausing for a moment to determine whether this title had concrete
implications and who might benefit from the ruler's protection and support.
Literary figures apart, Islamic men of religion were the most notable
potential proteges; and this applied to specialists in law and divinity as well as
to dervishes. In the sixteenth century, pilgrims to Mecca from Central Asia,
who because of the enormous difficulty of reaching the Hijaz in spite of
Safavid hostility were often in one way or another permanently committed to
the religious life, enjoyed the patronage of the Ottoman sultans. Learned
figures of renown even if they came from a fairly remote province could have
the good fortune to attract the ruler's attention and make a career in the palace:
the §eyhiilislam and writer of memoirs Feyzullah Efendi has left a description
of how he came to Istanbul from the town of Van on the Iranian border and
l [Georg Christoph] Baron Kunitz, Diarium Welches Der am Tiirkischen f!off und hernach
beim Gro.ft-Vezier in der Wienerischen Belaeger�ng gewestl!n Kayser�. Re�rdent Herr Baron
Kunitz eigenhtindig beschrieben... nebst au
.ftfti
hrlrcher Relatron der Wrenerrschen Belagerung
(Vienna: no publisher, no pagination, 1684).
23
I N T R O D UCT I O N
1
rose to become the teacher of a prinee that later ascended the throne.
Dervishes also might gain the favour of a sultan; and among the many
weaknesses that Mustafa All attributed to Murad III, he mentioned the ruler's
2
penchant for 'holy men' of dubious spirituality.
Moreover at least in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman
subjects of whatever religion that traded in Venice and ran into trouble with
robbers and pirates could count on the support of their sovereign. Petitions in
this sense were submitted to the administration, and the latter routinely sent
out relatively low-level envoys who might be simple messengers (favu§) or
interpreters serving the sultan's council; occasionally the latter were of Italian
background and might even take the opportunity to revisit the scenes of their
youth.3 Letters issued in the sultan's name demanded that the Signoria must
make all possible efforts to recuperate the goods that had been stolen. After all
with the peace of 1573 the Ottoman authorities had accepted the view, long
held by the Venetians that security in the Adriatic was the responsibility of
Venice alone. Sometimes these letters indicated that if the attacks on
merchants and their properties did not cease, the sultan might have to send his
own ships; and that was an eventuality that the Signoria wanted to avoid at all
costs.
Not all incidents on the road however needed to be solved through
diplomatic channels. In certain cases low-level local administrators to say
nothing of the merchants themselves, managed to convey the goods of
Ottoman traders who had lost their lives on the road to/from Venice to the
legal heirs living in the lands of the sultans. In such cases, the central
government only issued a command to confirm the arrangements i n question
so as to make sure that nobody ran into trouble with the sultan's border
guards.4 We thus must regard the enterprise of ensuring the security of
Ottoman merchants on the road to Venice as a common venture between the
traders themselves, the Venetian authorities and the sultan's government. But
without the machinery set up by sultans and viziers, the hundreds of traders
from Bosnia, Istanbul and even Anatolia that in the late 1500s and early 1600s
visited Venice every year would have found it much more difficult to secure
the necessary protection.
1
Fahri Derin, "Seyhtilislam Feyzullah Efendi'nin Nesebi Haldunda bir Risale". Tarih Dergisi, X,
14 (1959). pp. 97-103 .
2
Aeischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual,
p. 296,
3 Pedani Fabris, In nome del Gran Signore, p. 82; eadem, "B.etwc:en Diplomacy �d Trade:
Ottoman Merchants in Venice," to be published in "Merchants tn the Ott?man Emptre." ed. by
Suraiya Faroqhi and Gilles Veinstein (Leuven: Editions Peeters, hopefully 10 2008).
4 Such an incident has been discussed in my "Ottoman tutiles in European markets", to be
published in a volume edited by Claire Norton.
 24 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NC ES
In addition there were people who arrived in the Ottoman Empire as
fugitives from religious and political conflicts. What happened to such
refugees depended on the calculations of sultans and viziers, and thus was
difficult to foresee; of course mutatis mutandis this statement applied - and
applies - to governments of any description. Cases concerning refugees of
greater or lesser prominence thus do not lend themselves to generalization and
must be analyzed individually. To mention but a few examples: in the mid­
sixteenth century the Safawid Prince Alqas/Eikas Mirza found that once he had
shown himself incapable of assuring Ottoman conquests in Iran, he was given
to understand that he should return home - where he soon met his death.1
Others were more fortunate; thus people who had fallen from favour at the
Moghul court of Akbar might 'graciously' be granted permission by their
sovereign to undertake the pilgrimage to Mecca; they were expected to remain
in the Hijaz until formally allowed to return. The Ottoman authorities, while
probably less than enthusiastic, tolerated the exiles' presence.2
Others were permitted to establish themselves closer to the seat of
government. Thus the French Huguenot Aubry de La Motraye generally had
very positive impressions of the Ottoman Empire where in the late 1600s and
early 1700s he spent fourteen years. De La Motraye while in Istanbul
befriended his Hungarian fellow Protestant Imre Thokoly who had tried - and
failed - to coordinate his anti-Habsburg uprising with Kara Mustafa P�a's
plans for conquest in Austria and Hungary.3 The sultan refused to hand over
ThOkoly to the Habsburgs in spite of the insistent demands of the latter, but
assigned him a residence in the little town of izmit, spatially close to Istanbul
yet far away from any place where he might have become politically involved.
Aubry de La Motraye visited both Thokoly and his wife and attempted to
console the refugees. A more famous exile was the Swedish IGng Charles XII
after the battle of Poltava ( 1709), who managed to monumentally overstay his
welcome on Ottoman territory and leave sizeable debts besides. De La Motraye
had contacts with the soldier-king as well. As for the debts, their repayment
was still being negotiated several decades later.4
1 Article "Alqas Mirza" in Encyclopedia lranica, vol l , by Cornell Fleischer.
.
2 Nairn R. Farooqi, "Moguls. Ottomans and Pilgrims: Protecting the Routes to Mecca in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," The International History Review. X, 2 (1988), 198-220;
Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans (London: Tauris Press, 1994), p. 1 3 1 .
3 As the original is hard to find I have used a recent Turkish translation: Aubry de La Motraye,
La Motraye Seyahatnamesl, tr. by Nedim Demi�. introduction by Erkan Ser�e (Istanbul:
lstiklal Kitabevi, 2007), pp. 129 32 and elsewhere.
-
4 Fatma MOge G�k. FAst Encounters West. France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth
Century (New York, Oxford, Washington: Oxford University Press and The Institute of Turkish
Studies, 1987), pp. 86-87.
INTRODUCTION 25
The fates of these personages were decided in Istanbul for a variety of
political reasons: presumably the sultan's advisors felt that sending ThOkoly
to his death in Vienna was an additional humiliation after the series of
disasters that had marked the Hungarian campaign. For a while the presence of
King Charles XII was probably regarded as an asset because he was such a
committed opponent of Tsar Peter I, with who the Ottomans were also at war.
But after a while it became clear that the government in Istanbul wanted to end
the conflict with the Russian ruler, while Charles XII by contrast was eager to
prolong it. This conflict of interests resulted in a series of moves calculated to
induce the Swedish king to finally leave Ottoman territory. Yet beyond all
this manoeuvring the protection of refugees could also be viewed on a more
general plane as a sign of the sultans' magnanimity: at the court in Istanbul
the attribute of 'world protector' so often used when referring to the sultan was
not a totally meaningless formula.
Here come the articles...
Asserting sultanic legitimacy
How do the articles in this volume relate to the research on sultanic
legitimization whose principal directions we have outlined here? It is often
claimed that books have their own fates once they go out into the world. But
it is just as true, though less often said that they can take a hand in
determining the fates of their authors. After having produced a given book ,
quite often the writer will be asked to contribute to various collective projects
linked to the topics he/she has previously worked on. Something of the kind
happened to me after The Ottoman Empire and the World around it had
appeared on the market. When thinking about the shapes that my participation
in these projected enterprises might take, I soon discovered that quite a few of
the sources that I previously had used deserved a much more thorough
treatment than was possible in a work of synthesis with a relatively strict
'word count•. 1
I thus began to hunt for documents that might tell us more about the
fates of people like the Austrian prisoner of war Claudio Angelo de Martelli,
one of the few outsiders ever to write about the time he had spent in the
household of an Ottoman grand vizier, albeit a deceased one. Or else when
looking for something quite unrelated in the Istanbul archives I came across
a few documents concerning the travels of an Ottoman ambassador to early
1 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around it, 1540s to 1774 (London: I. B.
Tauris, 2004).
 A N O T H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I NC E S
eighteenth-century Iran, who has left a thoughtful account of his visit;
definitely the journey of Diirri Ahmed Efendi to Teheran merited a closer look.
As I had started out with a project that covered the mid-sixteenth to late
eighteenth centuries, the present collection also focuses on this period. I am
conscious of the fact that some colleagues feel that a study of relations
between the Ottomans and their neighbours should begin at an earlier point in
time. But it remains true that people write best - and most - about periods on
which they previously have accumulated some information. Be that as it may,
I have greatly enjoyed the experience of hunting down documents. I do hope
that some of my colleagues and students will share the pleasures of the chase
and apologize for the overlaps that are hard to avoid in a collection of articles
on related topics.
To a considerable extent, the present volume is based upon archival
research. Thus we will begin with a bird's eye view of work that has been
done in the Prime Minister's Archives of Istanbul and also in collections of
original Ottoman documents located in other places. I Our focus is on 'world
history' and therefore on researchers concerned either with former Ottoman
provinces that long since have become independent, or else on historians
domiciled in states whose historiographies consider that this or that neighbour
to the sultans' territory was an early modern 'predecessor' of their own
present-day polity. Hungarian historiography has been given pride of place
because many of its representatives have developed good connections to
neighbouring disciplines especially archaeology. Moreover due to the
linguistic versatility of many Hungarian scholars, i t is of comparatively easy
access even to historians unable to read Hungarian. On the other hand Greek
historiography based on Ottoman documents has been highlighted for very
different reasons: it is as yet very new, and its scholars seem to focus on
international rather than national traditions of history-writing. Among the
'neighbours' of the sultans we will take a closer look at historical work
undertaken in Poland and Venice during the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries. If this article makes a few readers aware of the possibilities of the
Ottoman archives for international and inter-cultural studies, it will have
served its purpose.
A tout seigneur tout honneur: as the Ottomans were known for their
respect for hierarchies we will follow their example and begin with the sultan
himself, or to be precise, with the manner in which the sultan's image was
presented through processions and public buildings. Historians of art and
architecture have provided us with rather extensive discussions of the Ottoman
rulers' great foundations; they have also studied the conditions under which
royal women might establish their charities. However we know much less
about the effects of such buildings on the spectators. A priori we can assume
1 "The Ottoman Empire in world history: what the archives can tell us."
I N T R O D UC T I O N 27
that mosques, schools and dervish lodges made a considerable impression on
people confronted with structures that in terms of sheer scale, often were
unlike anything they might ever have seen before. Yet this claim is no more
than a hypothesis which needs to be tested. As for the public appearances of
the sultans our knowledge of their reception is even more limited as this topic
has attracted much less interest among researchers.
Now the 'orientalism' debate has made us aware of the mindset with
which many European observers approached Ottoman artefacts. Some
historians have dwelt on the religious conflicts between Christians and
Muslims, and the prejudices that the loss of the Holy Land to Saladin and later
to the Mamluks generated in the consciousness of late mediaeval and early
modem European travellers. 1 A mindset of this type often induced the writer
to dwell not upon buildings but rather upon ruins, an effective way of de­
legitimizing the current Muslim regime. Other historians have shown how
humanistic concern with Greek and Roman texts/artefacts often became a way
of drawing boundaries between 'us the learned' and 'them the uncivilized', or to
cite the title of a recent study, of "creating East and West".2 Thus
paradoxically the pious and the learned had more trouble if they tried to be fair­
minded observers of the Ottoman world.
In this context i t is interesting to compare descriptions of the same
monuments and/or parades written by Ottoman Muslims, non-Muslim
subjects of the sultan and outsiders from the Islamic and the Christian
worlds.3 Remarkably enough such a comparison at least if limited to texts
written before and around the 1650s does not show great differences between
the cultures involved; to the contrary the similarities are much more obvious.
A Moroccan ambassador and his colleagues from Christian Europe offer
comparable comments about the incomparable grandeur of the Aya Sofya;
who knows perhaps these people have reproduced comments picked up from
their tour guides, who in their turns participated in the same laudatory
discourse regardless of religion. Whatever the situation, when visitors of
whatever background came to early modem Istanbul, they were likely to be
impressed by the public buildings and the majestic image of the Ottoman
ruler; thus these means of sultanic legitimization had some effect even upon
outsiders.
1 St6phane Y6rasimos, Les voyageurs dans /'Empire ottoman (XIV!-XV/e siecles),
Bibliographie, itineraires et inventaire des lieux habites (Ankara: Tilrk Tarih Kurumu, 991),
1
�P· 4, 20 and elsewhere.
Nancy Bisaha, Creating East and '!_Vest. Renaissance Humanists and the Ottoman Turks
�Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvama Press, 2006).
"Presenting the Sultans' power, glory and piety: a comparative perspective."
28 A N O T H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C ES
Owning wild and exotic animals was yet another manner of confirming
the power of the sultan in the eyes of his subjects - and thereby, of rendering
his domination legitimate. By his formidable might the ruler forced wild
creatures to do obeisance; but on a different level he was aJso so highly
esteemed by remote Indian or Iranian potentates that they courted his favour by
presenting him with costly gifts including elephants. Like many other rulers
before and after them Ottoman sultans entertained a menagerie and permitted
outsiders to view it; thus by the later 1500s the former Byzantine church
where the animals were housed was so often visited by European travellers
that it must be regarded as a kind of tourist site. In sixteenth-century Istanbul
lions could be paraded in processions, loaded with chains and thereby generate
both fear and respect for the power of the ruler who alone could keep them in
check. As for the years around 1800 when this game was apparently considered
too risky, the presence of securely caged lions still was considered a
significant attribute of the Ottoman sultan: money was spent on housing and
feeding them even at a time of extreme financiaJ stringency.1
Here come the articles...
Relating to the outside world
Questions concerning the relations of the Ottomans with their
Christian neighbours were for a long time the very stuff of Ottomanist
historiography in Europe and the United States. While many European and
American scholars today prefer to work on Ottoman 'domestic' issues such as
urban history, a certain interest in questions concerning the Empire and its
neighbours recently has emerged within the Turkish scholarly community.
This development is connected with what is happening in the world outside of
Ottoman historiography including globalization in the economic realm, the
expansion of tourism not only by foreigners in Turkey but also by Turks in
Europe and the US, and on a more scholarly plane, the recent focus on
empires among historians of the ancient world, India, China and Britain.
Relations with the kingdoms and principaJities of Christendom often
involved border zones both on the Ottoman and the 'other' side of the frontier.
One of these borderlands that long had remained in the shadow and has now
begun to interest researchers is the Adriatic, where Ottoman Bosnia was
neighbour to Venetian Dalmatia and Habsburg-ruled Croatia.2 Research on the
Adriatic and its denizens has become easier now that the Ottoman documents
1 "Exotic animals at the: sultans' court".
2 Drago Roksandi� ed., Microhistory ofthe Triplex Confinium. lnterootionaJ Project Conference
Papers (Budapest, March 21-22. 1997), (Budapest: Institute: on Southeastern Europe:, Central
European University, 1999).
I NT R O D U C T I O N 29
in the Venetian archives have become accessible through an excellent
catalogue.1 In this region Ottoman merchants of whatever religion often were
robbed and even killed by the pirates known as the Uskok, loosely
subordinated to the commanders of the Habsburg border defences but in actuaJ
fact often acting on their own initiative.2 However for some considerable
time, historians were not much interested in the attitude taken by the sultans
towards the damages suffered by their subjects, perhaps because of the long
outmoded but tenacious idee fixe that the problems of merchants on a remote
frontier were not taken very seriously in Istanbul. However in reaJity in the
years before and after 1600, sultans and viziers often intervened in such
matters. In quite a few cases they put considerable pressure on the Signoria of
Venice to ensure that the aggrieved merchants got at least part of their
property back; and the present study discusses how solutions to these thorny
problems were worked out 'on the ground'.3
While Ottoman subjects and especially Muslims that did business in
Venice have entered the scholarly agenda only during the last twenty years, the
situation of foreign traders on Ottoman soil once again is one of the well­
established sub-fields of Ottomanist scholarship. The bibliography is
enormous, even that which has appeared since HaJil Inalcik's seminaJ article
on "Imtiyazat" ( 1 986) in the Encyclopedia of Islam; in European
historiography these grants of privilege were known as the 'capitulations'.
During the last few decades, a mass of previously unknown materia] has been
brought to light and interpreted by scholars such as Hans Theunissen who has
worked on the privileges/capitulations issued to Venice and Dariusz
Kolodziejczyk who has dedicated a massive work to comparable documents
concerning Poland. More recently the work of Mauritz van den Boogert
includes studies on the capitulations and their beneficiaries, with an emphasis
on how these privileges were enforced - or sometimes ignored.4 Differently
furthermore from much of the older work whose authors focused on French,
English or Dutch traders and were not much interested in Ottoman attitudes,
these more recent studies have a good deal to say on problems of reciprocity.5
1 Maria Pia Pedan.i Fabris, I "Documenti turchi" deii'Archivio di Stato di Venezia (Roma:
Ministc:ro pc:r i bc:ni culturali c: ambientali, Ufficio centrale peri beni archivistici, 994).
1
2 Catherine Wendy Bracewell, The Uskoks of Senj. Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the
Sixteenth-Century Adriatic (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1 992).
3 "Ottoman Views on Corsairs and Piracy in the Adriatic".
4 Kate Aeet and Maurits H. van dc:n Boogert eds., The Ottoman Capitulations. Text and context,
�Naples/Cambridge:: Istituto Nallino and Skilliter Centre, 2003).
Hans Thc:unissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The: ahidnames. The: Historical
Background and the: Dc:velopmc:nt of a Category of Political-Diplomatic l!JSltum�nts together
with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents." Ph D d1ssertatton, Utrecht,
1991. (Only available: on the: lntc:rnc:t); Dariusz Kofodzic:jczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic
Relations (15th-18th Century). An Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000).
30 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I N C ES
I NTRODUCTION 31

Once again it seems that the ti me has come to 'pull together' the results of
presumably such an item could have been officially regarded as an ornament.
this research, at least where the seventeenth century is concerned: where do we
But De Ferriol's appearance with an epee de bretteur, that is a weapon
stand and where do we go?I
suitable for actual fighting, made all compromise impossible. Nor were un­
In a way, projecting the image of the sultans as 'world protectors',
diplomatic diplomats the only reason for the crises of the past years: De
border warfare and 'international' trade are all forms of interaction between the
Bonnac was highly critical of the various churchmen patronized by the king of
Ottomans and their neighbours. Any interaction presupposes that some people
France that in his perspective, tended to ruin relations with the Ottomans by
'put themselves on the line' to make such contacts possible: they may
their misplaced zeal. If in recent years the sultan had given permission for
undertake the attendant risks either for private profit as merchants do, or
repairs to be made to the church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem, this was
because they expect career opportunities in the service of their respective
due to De Bonnac's own efforts, and no thanks to the priests.
sovereigns, as is typical of diplomats. Here we will deal with two such
The marquis de Bonnac thus proposed that 'diplomatic' behaviour and a
envoys, both active at the beginning of the eighteenth century: one of them, a
degree of understanding of the Empire's difficulties would serve the interests of
Frenchman posted in Istanbul and the other, an Ottoman active in Teheran.2
the French crown better than the blustering insistence on 'honour'
The French ambassador marquis de Bonnac has left a large number of
characteristic of the recent past. He thus found a common language with the
documents, both published and unpublished.3 He was on good terms with the
grand vizier, who also apparently believed that the sultans might recuperate
Grand Vizier Damad Ibrahim Pa�a and convinced that the abysmally bad
some of the losses of bygone years by means of diplomacy. For this purpose
relations that had prevailed under his seventeenth-century predecessors were not
Ibrahim Pa�a sent envoys not only to the French but also the Safavid court:
a necessary and inevitable outcome of the fact that during the Ottoman­
and while the report of Durri Ahmed Efendi has attracted less attention than
Habsburg war of the 1660 s and the long drawn-out struggle with the
Yinnisekiz Mehmed Efendi's mission to Paris and Versailles, this is mainly
Venetians over Crete, the young Louis XIV had given informal support to the
due to the as yet very limited number of studies on Ottoman-Iranian relations.
enemies of the sultan. To the contrary in the teeth of official disapproval, the
It was Durri Ahmed Efendi 's job to persuade the Iranian court that even
marquis de Bonnac wrote a lengthy memorandum that must be read as an
in the face of a visibly disintegrating Safavid Empire the Ottoman rulers had
indictment of the un-diplomatic behaviour of his predecessor Monsieur de
no aggressive intentions. We do not know to what extent the envoy himself
Ferriol , better known for his patronage of a large album of Ottoman
believed this official stance. But as his report stressed the continuing wealth of
costumes. At one point in his career this unfortunate diplomat apparently
the country, the poor condition of its military and the disaffection of the local
suffered from some form of insanity. De Bonnac gave a lengthy description
Sunnis, we may suspect that he did not, and maybe even advised the grand
not only of the behaviour of his predecessor while in the middle of a nervous
vizier in favour of intervention as soon as an opportunity presented itself. Be
crisis; he also explained why the latter had not even been received at the
that as it may, Diirri Ahmed with his knowledge of Iranian literature seems to
Ottoman court.
have been impressed by the late Safavid court: decadent though it may have
This unfortunate state of affairs was due to De Ferriol's cavalier
been it was still a centre of high culture.
disregard for Ottoman court etiquette.4 Nobody was admitted to the sultan's
presence in arms, yet on the other hand, certain French gentlemen felt it to be
an affront to their dignity to take off their swords even on such an occasion. In
Here come the articles...
the opinion of the marquis de Bonnac, a compromise could have been patched
Outsiders on Ottoman territory and Ottomans abroad: prisoners, slaves and
up if the previous ambassador had appeared with a small decorative weapon;
merchants
I "Ottoman Attitudes towards Merchants from Latin Christendom before 1600".
2 "(brahim Pqa and the Marquis de Bonnac" and "An Ottoman ambassador in Iran: DUrri While envoys placed themselves in a mediator's position more or less
Ahmed Efendi and the collapse of the Safavid Empire in 1720-21". voluntarily, prisoners of war and other foreign slaves had no choice in the
3 Jean-Louis Dusson, marquis de Bonnac, Memoir!! historique sur I'Ambassade de France a
matter. Yet in some instances they might come away with unique
Constantinople, ed. and intr. by Charles Schefer (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1894).
4 For Ferriol's own account compar e Alan Servantie ed., Le voyage a Istanbul, Byzance, observations. An adventure of this kind as we have seen, happened to Claudio
Constantinople. Istanbul du Moyen Age au XXC siecle (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 2003), pp. Angelo de Martelli, a military officer in the Habsburg army, who published
313-21. an account of his captivity while the war was still continuing and that should
32 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
therefore be regarded as a piece of Habsburg propaganda. But the text also has
more to offer.
Captured when the Ottomans marched upon Vienna in 1683 De
Martelli was assigned as prisoner to Kara Mustafa Pa§a in person. 1 However
to his great dismay, the author became a slave of the sultan when the grand
vizier was executed in late 1683 and his possessions confiscated: for as De
Martelli soon learned, slaves of the ruler were not eligible for ransom or
prisoner exchanges. However within short order the young sons of the
executed dignitary were given back part of their father's property on condition
that they pay back the enormous debts owed by the latter. A scramble thus
ensued as the senior members of the household sold off various possessions
including De Martelli who because of his physical weakness was not exactly
attractive as a future slave. He was then freed by means of a diplomatic
negotiation in which the ambassador of the king of England, a neutral ruler,
took a hand. So did an English nobleman who was one of the ambassador's
associates; and in the end, the Habsburg officer left the Ottoman lands as a
tutor to the children of the English envoy.
In our present perspective De Martelli's story is valuable particularly
for the insider's view of the deceased grand vizier's household in Istanbul,
where he spent several months while his ransom was being negotiated.
Apparently Kara Mustafa Pa�a. often described as harsh and overbearing by
foreign diplomats, had succeeded in gaining the devotion of his household,
some of whose members even were prepared to defend him arms in hand when
the order for his execution arrived in Belgrade. These men dfd not search for
new patrons, but remained to take care of the interests of the �a's sons; and
if one of them under the nickname of Maktulzade (son of the executed person)
later built a career in the sultan's service it may well have been due to the
efforts that his father's household dignitaries had expended on his behalf. At
the same time many of Kara Mustafa Pa�a·s household servitors were of
European background, and we are left to wonder whether if the conquest of
Vienna had succeeded, these people would not have become the new
administrators, knowledgeable in local laws and customs and at the same time
completely loyal to their patron the grand vizier.
Thus although De Martelli was not a very high-ranking officer, his
capture, enslavement and sale all were part and parcel of 'high politics'. Our
next chapter by contrast is concerned with a man who had very limited access
to the higher reaches of Ottoman society, living in the provincial town
of Kastamonu in northern Anatolia. He applied to the central government
1 "A prisoner of war reports: The camp and household of grand vizier Kara Mustafa �a in an
eyewitness account".
I NT R O D U C T I O N 33
because he was in danger of being sold as a slave along with his adult
chi ldren. I Of Iranian background and perhaps at one time an 'illegal
immigrant' this man risked becoming victim to a crime about which we have
frequent complaints, namely the enslavement of free persons. Unfortunately
only a single document survives, and we thus have no way of determining the
outcome of this case.
Apart from the activities of envoys, prisoners and refugees, there were
the 'inter-cultural' - to use the modem word - contacts established through
commerce in Izmir, Istanbul or Venice. Important though the attitudes of
Ottoman sultans and viziers to the conduct of trade may have been, what
counted most were the views of the merchants 'on site'. In addition to
business concerns properly speaking there were problems in relating to
strangers encountered for instance in Venice. Further complications might
arise from the Ottoman context from which these travelling merchants had
come and to which they eventually returned. A specialist on the money­
lending pious foundations that flourished in the Turkish-speaking towns of the
Ottoman Empire between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries has concluded
that at least in Bursa, these institutions mainly provided credit for
consumption purposes. Only a few wealthy and privileged businessmen seized
the opportunity of borrowing from pious foundations and then lending money
at the higher rates of interest that prevailed in the Istanbul capital market.2
However practices were different in Sarajevo where apparently it was
common enough for merchants to borrow from pious foundations or else from
funds belonging to orphans that were being administered by guardians. These
funds were often invested in trade, even foreign trade conducted in Venice and
elsewhere. But in such cases lenders and local qadis enforced special safeguards:
no matter whether the merchant profited or lost, he had to return the capital i n
mudarabalcommenda
its entirety. Thus the safeguards of the commercial
contract that protected the travelling trader from the dangers he might
encounter en route were not applicable when the funds belonging to orphans
and pious foundations were at issue. As a result Bosnian merchants who had
been robbed on the Adriatic made particular efforts to get the Signoria to help
them retrieve at least part of their goods.3 Moreover just in case a document
from the qadi of Sarajevo increased their credibility the merchants might
submit an official record that confirmed the amounts they would have to pay
back upon returning home.
I "Trying to avoid enslavement: the adventures of an Iranian subject in eighteenth-century
Anatolia".
2 Murat c;izak�. "Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1 555-1823," Journal of the &onomic and Social
History of the Orient 3813 (1995), 313-54.
3 "Bosnian merchants in the Adriatic"·
34 ANOTH ER M I RROR FOR P R I N C ES

Help from the authorities probably was most effective if the Ottoman
and Venetian governments were willing to cooperate in the protection of
THE OTIOMAN EMPIRE I N WORLD HISTORY: WHAT
merchants. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, this was often
THE ARCHIVES CAN TELL US
the case. For while the Long War with the Habsburgs dragged on (until 1606),
Canbuladoglu Ali Pa�a rebelled in Aleppo and certain groups of mercenaries
known as the Celalis even went over to Shah cAbbas of Iran, sultans and
viziers were in fact concerned about maintaining good relations with Venice.
In the first quarter of the seventeenth century certain officials of the sultan
The Ottoman Empire forms part of a select but still sizeable group of
even put about a story that would have shocked both their predecessors and
polities that claimed to govern if not the whole world, then at least that part
their successors; for now the Serenissima was considered a faithful ally of the
of it which could claim right belief and/or the advantages of civilization. As
Ottoman rulers from the beginnings of the Ottoman principality. Ottoman and
such it can be classed with the Roman, Chinese, Moghul, Spanish, Russian
Venetian traders benefited from this temporary entente cordiale; and the last
and British empires both in their formal and informal versions - quite apart
article in our collection shows how even serious acts of piracy by highly
from other varieties still with us today. After a long hiatus, empires are once
placed personages might be smoothed over if considerations of war and peace
again a 'hot topic', and the polity established by the sultans now is receiving
demanded it.1
some attention on the part of historians interested in comparative studies. This
inclusion of Ottoman history into a broader world historical context from
which traditionally it had been excluded is quite novel, and at least in part due
to the large amount of archival documentation that has become accessible in
recent years. Very diverse topics including the present-day Middle East, global
labour migrations, the world-wide problem of censorship or the history of
women and the family all can be studied more successfully if the Ottoman
archives are taken into account.
Given recent reorganization we must briefly explain what is meant by
the term 'Ottoman archives'. The Archives of the Prime Minister
(B�bakanltk A�ivi) in Istanbul are a comprehensive organization, the basis
being the Grand Vizier's archives that were separated out from the Topkapt
palace archive in the late eighteenth century, and further reorganized in the
nineteenth.1 The Topkapt archives continue to be located on the grounds of
the palace, now a museum. But administratively speaking they have become
part of the Ba�bakanltk Ar�ivi. In addition the Administration of Pious
Foundations and the General Directorate of the Cadastre, both in Ankara for
our purposes will be considered part of the Ottoman archives although
administratively speaking they are separate from the Archives of the Prime
Minister. For the sake of convenience we will also consider major holdings of
Ottoman documents abroad, particularly those in Venice as a special variety of
Ottoman archive.

1 "The Ottomans and the trade routes of the Adriatic". 1 Collective work, BQ§bakanltk Osman/1 Ar�ivi Rehberi (Ankara: Bll§bakanhk, Devlet A�ivleri
Gene! MUdUrlUgll, 2000), pp. XL-XLI.
36 A N O T HE R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C E S
As for the qadi registers (sicil), a major source for urban and provincial
history, in the past they were kept in the district centres where they once had
been compiled. They have thus wound up in l ibraries or archives depending on
the practice of the country in question - if indeed they were not lost or
destroyed during the wars of the 1 900s, as seems to have happened quite often
in Balkan countries and also in Anatolia. A sixteenth-century register of Sofia
was published before it disappeared in the maelstrom of World War II and
other items perished when the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo was bombed
during the wars that accompanied the recent dissolution of Yugoslavia.'
A major resource not only for Turkish history
As the Archives of the Prime Minister are the archives of the Turkish
Prime Minister, the uninitiated may assume that the content is mainly
relevant to Turkey. But that is an over-simplification: after all the
specification 'Ottoman archives' added on to the over-arching official title
already indicates that much more is at stake. Exactly how many of today's
countries can be regarded as 'successor states' to the Ottoman Empire is a
matter of definition; for the sultans' rule in some cases lasted for many
centuries and in others just for a few decades. In addition sometimes only part
of the territory of a present-day state was once a province, sub-province or
district of the Ottoman Empire; and in such cases there is room for
disagreement as to whether the relevant polity should be considered a
'successor state'. To cite an example: does it make sense to claim that Poland
was once 'part of the Ottoman empire' because the region of Kamieniec
Podolsk today in Ukraine, was an Ottoman province for about twenty-five
years in the late seventeenth century, and the territory in question before the
Ottoman conquest had been part of Poland-Lithuania?2 Or to exaggerate even
more: do we really want to declare Italy as a successor state to the Ottoman
Empire because after 1517, the Signoria of Venice paid tribute to the sultans
for its colony of Cyprus, before the island finally was conquered by Ottoman
forces in 1570-73?
I think we can safely leave such discussions to those that enjoy them.
But i n any event we can expect the archives in Istanbul to produce
documentation, more or Jess ample according to the circumstances, that
sheds light on the history of some twenty to forty countries of the present-day
1 Herbert Duda, Galab Galabov, Die Protokollbiicher des Kadiamtes Sofia (Munich:
Oldenbourg, 1960).
2 Darusz Kotodziejczyk, Ottoman·Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th·l8th Century), An
i a letter from the sultan to the Habsburg empress Maria Theresa, dated to the 1740s that
Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), pp. 145-57.
T H E OTTO M A N E M P I R E I N W O R L D H I S T O R Y 37
world. In the first section of this paper we will discuss two examples that
show how the Ottoman archives have been used - or can be used in the
future - if the country in question or at least a large section of it formed part
of the Ottoman Empire for an appreciable period of time. As examples we
will discuss work by historians dealing with Hungary and Greece. To be more
precise, we will highlight works produced by people of Hungarian and Greek
descent, no matter in which countries they operate or have operated, although
it is of course impossible to even dream of completeness. As for the second
section, here we will discuss the resources of the Ottoman archives in terms of
the information they can provide on states such as Poland or Venice that -
despite the Ottoman conquest of some of their territories - basically remained
outside the sultans' domains. During the last twenty years or so, we have
come to understand that the Ottoman sultans were involved in European
history often in rather unexpected ways, and a careful search of the archives
produced by their bureaucrats confirms these observations. 1
Admittedly the hunt for sources in the Ottoman archives is often
arduous in spite of the help that is now given to the historian by the search
facilities of the internet as instituted by the Prime Minister's Archives during
the last few years. Unfortunately there are difficulties for which no easy
remedy has as yet been discovered: often the internet helps us to get access to
the summaries of documents that archivists have produced over time, and not
to the Ottoman texts themselves. However especially for the period before the
nineteenth century most information is found not in individual documents or
files but in bound registers, which especially if made during the 1700s often
encompass over a thousand documents apiece. No archivist could produce a
satisfactory summary of these mammoth collections; the descriptions therefore
usually refer to a few documents located near the beginning and end of the
register in question. To deal with this kind of source it is still necessary to
view the register - or a computerized copy, depending on what the archivists
will let us see - and search the documents one by one. Fortunately Ottoman
officials normally introduced a sultanic command by a more or less detailed
account of the events and correspondences that had preceded it. Thus by reading
the first lines, we will often be able to figure out quite soon whether the
document is relevant or not.
1 Peter Demetz,
Prague in Black and Gold (New York: Hill and Wang, 1997), p. 246 mentions
criticized the expulsion of the Jews from Prague.
38 ANOTHER M I R R O R FOR P R I NCES
T HE O TT O M A N E M P I R E I N W O R L D H I S T O R Y 39

Historians exploring aforeign archive: the Hungarian example1 Denominational identities were involved as well. Catholics recognized
that without Habsburg involvement, nineteenth-century Hungary would have
Why is the Hungarian example a good choice when we try to explicate
been a largely Protestant country; therefore historians who identified with the
the world historical relevance of the Ottoman archives? Scholars from some Catholic cause tended to claim that retaining even a small strip of the country
countries have been more alert in using this resource than others, and I would
- the so-called Royal Hungary - within Christendom was so important that
claim that the most assiduous work is due to our colleagues of Budapest. In
submission to the Habsburgs should be regarded as the lesser evil. After all in
fact it was the Hungarian scholar Lajos Fekete that introduced into the
the areas of direct Ottoman domination there was no Catholic hierarchy; on
Ottoman archives the principle of cataloguing documents according to the
the other hand Hungarian Calvinist churches were more decentralized and
bureaus that had produced them, known as 'organizing by provenience'. In
therefore better adapted to life under the sultans' administration. 1
addition the same personage also wrote a magnificent two-volume introduction
Especially after the First World War yet another political concern
to the documents written in siyakat, a highly specialized form of the Arabic encouraged some Hungarian historians to explore the Ottoman archives. As a
script used in the Ottoman financial administration.2 former participant in the Great War on the losing side, the Habsburg Empire
Hungarian scholars first became interested in the Ottoman archives in
was dismantled. Territorial losses concerned not only the 'Austrian half'; the
the late nineteenth century, at a time when they were still subjects of the 'Hungarian section' governed by the Magyars but inhabited partly by Southern
Austro-Hungarian monarchy. Apparently this concern was politicall y
Slavs was also affected, as the government had to cede territory to the newly
motivated and quite intense; there even was a short-lived Hungarian research
formed state of Yugoslavia. As a result Hungary as it came into being after
institute in Istanbul. Many of these scholars were nationalists, as indeed were
World War I was much smaller than the historical kingdom of the same name;
their colleagues in other European countries. In our present-day perspective
and in part this contraction was due to the fact that under Ottoman rule there
therefore, some of these researchers approached the Ottoman archives with
had been important migrations, with Slav soldiers and peasants settling in the
rather a peculiar agenda; namely they asked themselves whether an 'Ottoman southern sections of the mediaeval kingdom that had largely been abandoned
option' such as had been sought by certain Hungarian noblemen like Imre by their previous inhabitants. Thus Hungarian historians now believed that
Thokoly or Ferenc Rakoszi during the 1600s and 1700s, could have been a
they would better understand what they viewed as a historical calamity by
viable alternative to the Habsburg adherence.3 In other words they asked
familiarizing themselves with the Ottoman period.2
themselves whether more of Hungarian identity would have been preserved if
For us who are interested in scholarship and but tangentially i n
the country as whole had become a vassal kingdom of the sultans, always
nationalism, this information is important because i t helps us situate the
assuming that the latter would have been willing to forgo direct administration
Hungarian concern with Ottoman archives. But if that had been the whole
in spite of the menacing proximity of the Habsburg armies. Thus these
story, it would not have been worth recounting here. At least in my view
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholars were engaged in a project of
what is noteworthy about many Hungarian Ottomanists is their ability to
exploring 'paths that had not been taken' i n Hungarian history. Sultan transcend their nationalist concerns. As far as I can see they have made a
Abdtilharnid I I (r. 1876-1909) by the way was well aware of these sentiments significant section of the educated public both in Hungary and abroad accept
and gained a good many sympathies among educated Hungarians by returning
the notion that after the fall of the independent ki ngdom in the battle of
some books from the library of King Matthias Corvinus that had arrived in Mohacz ( 1 526), there were ti mes and sections of the country where the
Istanbul as booty after the sixteenth-century Ottoman conquest. Ottomans were the dominant power: yet these periods and venues did not
therefore 'drop out of history' . This latter point is worth making because in
Greece or Bulgaria a similar understanding for a long time was officially
unacceptable and even today is probably considered somewhat avant-garde.
1 G�za [)ivid and Plil Fodor, •Hungarian Studies i Ottoman _Hist?ry" in The C?ttomans aruJ
':'
Southeastern Europe, cd. by F1ltrct
:
Adamr and Sunuya Far
oqh1 (Lc1dcn: E. J. Bnll, 2002), pp.
205-50. As 1 do not read Hungarian, Greek or Polish� I have had to confine mrself �o
publications in English, German, French, Italian and Turk1sh; fortunately they arc ava1lablc 1n I For a brief summary of church history during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries see
lstvlin Bitskcy, "Spiritual Life in the Early Modern Age,• in A Cultural History of Hungary.from
substantial numbers.
2 Lajos Fekete, Die Siyaqatschrift in der tiirkischen Finanzverwaltung, 2 vols. (Budapest, 1 955). the Beginnings to the Eighteenth Century, ed. by Laszl6 K6sa (Budapest: Corvma, 1999), pp.
3 Dl1vid and Fodor, "Hungarian Studies," p. 316. 242-49.
2 Dlivid and Fodor, "Hungarian Studies," PP· 317-18.
40 A N OT H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I NC ES
Work in the archives of course is contingent upon physical access; and
Hungarian scholars working on the Ottoman period of their national history
were fortunate in the sense that when the Prime Minister's Archives became
accessible to a wider circle of researchers in the 1960s and 1970s, some of
them were able to take advantage of the new situation. In this sense they were
better off than for instance Bulgarian researchers who by the vicissitudes of the
time were obliged to limit themselves to Ottoman documents available in
their own country. Moreover even though the Cold War and the uprising of
1956 resulted in a separation between those scholars who migrated to western
countries and their colleagues who remained in Hungary, connections between
certain individuals forming part of these two groups remained relatively close;
and scholarly exchanges among Ottomanists benefited as a result. Once again
this is significantly different from what occurred in other countries where
'bureaucratic socialism' was established at the time: scholars of the two
Germanies for instance mostly behaved in quite a different fashion.
To the Ottomanist community of the 1960s and 1970s, the great tax
registers (tahrir or tapu tahrir) of the sixteenth century were a favourite
source. At least for the Ottoman Balkans (Rumeli, Rumelia), most of
Anatolia and parts of the Fertile Crescent, these registers list provinces
(vilayet), sub-provinces (liva, sancak) and districts (kaza, nahiye),
enumerating the local taxpayers according to their places of residence.
Hungarian scholars set about editing and annotating those registers that were
relevant to Hungary, sometimes publishing their work in Turkey. Not only
Hungarians domiciled in the US or other western countries but even those
living i n Hungary sometimes availed themselves of this opportunity.1 For
some scholars dealing with these registers became a life's labour and almost
an aim in itself: I remember the late Tibor Halasi-Kun who towards the end of
his life once said that before all relevant documents had been edited and
discussed, it made no sense to embark on more encompassing projects.2 In
focusing on tahrirs Hungarian scholars were in line with contemporary
researchers in other countries and especiall y in Turkey; and Geza David's work
on the sub-province of Simontornya even was translated into Turkish.3
1 Gyula Kaldy-Nagy e . • Kanuni D evr� B"4in Tahrir Defter/eri (/546-1562) (Ankara: Ankara
� .
killtes1,
Oniversitesi Oil ve Tanh-Cografya Fa 1971).
2 Tibor Halasi-Kun, "Haram County, and the Ottoman Modava Nahiyesi," Archivum
Ottomanicum, IX (1984), pp. 27-90. Further articles on Hungarian counties have appeared in
other issues of Archivum Ottomanicum.
3 G�za Dllvid Osmanl1 Macaristan'mda Toplum. Ekonomi ve Yonetim. 16. Yiizy1lda
�imantornya &mcag1 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakf1, 1999).
T H E OTT O M A N E M P I R E I N W O R L D H I S T O R Y 41
Monographs on the basis purely of tahrirs after a while get to be
limited and limiting. However Hungarian scholars have been adept at finding
sources that allow more broadly based work. Sometimes the supplementary
sources have been located in the Ottoman archives: thus the registers of
appointment to public office, the so-called ru'us defterleri have made it
possible to write short but interesting biographies of various governors,
particularly those who commanded the capital and fortress of Budin!Buda.
Registers of the tax assignments to military men that are known as timars and
zeamets are probably not the most attractive of archival sources: but even so
they have been mined by Hungarian colleagues for biographical data and
promotion patterns. I
But if the truth be told, what makes Hungarian historiography about
the Ottoman period especiaHy interesting is the skill with which materials
from the Istanbul archives have been combined with non-Ottoman sources of
information including archival documents from the Habsburg realm. Some of
the latter items date to the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when the
sultans' administration was firmly in place. Others were compiled in the early
1700s, when after the peace of Karlowitz ( 1 699), the officials of Leopold I
held inquests to determine population figures as well as future taxes; much of
this information was after all based on what peasants chose to remember and
report about conditions in the Ottoman period.
In addition the archaeology of the late mediaeval and early modern
periods is more developed in Hungary than in any other former Ottoman
province.2 Thus admittedly rather scanty records from the sultans' archives
concerning the major and minor fortresses dotting the frontier regions have
been 'brought to life' by excavation: modest necessities of daily existence
including potsherds and remnants of cooking implements have been dated and
classified by origin, while elaborate installations that provided water and
carried off waste also have been studied in some detaiJ.3 All this moreover
occurred at a time when many archaeologists working for instance in Anatolia
were not much concerned with Ottoman finds unless they happened to be of
artistic interest.
I G�za Dllvid, "Die Bege von Szigetvllr im 16. Jahrhundert," in idem, Studies in the
Demographic and Administrative History ofOttoman Hungary (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1997),
�P·1 19-42.
G�za D:ivid and Jpolya Gerelyes, "Ottoman Social and Economic Life Unearthed. An
Assessment of Ottoman Archaeological Finds in Hungary," in Studies in Ottoman Social and
Economic Life, ed. Raoul Motika, Christoph Herzog and Michael Ursinus (Heidelberg:
Heidelberger Orientverlag, 1999), pp. 43-79.
3 Jpolya Gerelyes ed., Archaeology of the Ottoman Period in Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian
National Museum, 2003); Ipolya �erelyes ed., Turkish Flowers, Studies on Ottoman Art in
Hungary (Budapest: Hungarian Nattonal Museum, 2005).
42 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
Another manner of dealing with the limits of Ottoman documents on
Hungary was tried only from the 1990s onward, and then only by a few
people, namely the study of topics that were relevant to the Empire as a
whole, but had only a tenuous connection, or even no connection at all with
events in Hungary. Thus Glibor Agoston has built his reputation through his
work on warfare and armaments; certainly war-making was ubiquitous in
Ottoman Hungary, but his recent book deals with border provinces only in a
limited sense. I Similarly Plil Fodor has done a good deal of work on Istanbul
politics i n the late sixteenth century including naval matters, so that studies of
'the Hungarian connection' form only part of his oeuvre.2 In my view this
development is highly positive, as it means that the history of an Ottoman
border province is being opened up to the wider world.
To put it in a nutshell: by the late 1970s many historians of the
Ottoman Empire all over the world had concluded that social and economic
history, or for that matter any kind of history could not be based on tahrirs
alone. But the Hungarians had a head start in coping with this problem. Given
a historical establishment that considered the early modem - and thereby the
Ottoman - period an integral part of national history, and furthermore an
impressive inclination to devote time and money to research, Hungarian
historians were able to initiate cooperation with neighbouring disciplines in a
manner that other sub-fields of Ottoman history only achieved at a much later
date - if at all. It was probably difficult to convince university deans and
promotion committees that the Istanbul archives should be used to answer
questions about Ottoman history as a whole and not just about Hungary when
ruled by the sultans - but within limits, even that has been achieved. In
Hungary historiography on the basis of Ottoman archival material by now has
a venerable tradition stretching over a century; and new approaches are being
tested exactly because some of the older ones seem to have reached the end of
their useful lives.
Greek historians and their use of Ottoman archives
For Hungarian scholars using the Ottoman archives has become
more or less part of the historian's routine. But the situation is rather different
in Greece where the number of people reading Ottoman Turkish is still quite
1 Gcibor Agoston, Gunsfor the Sultan, Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman
�ire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre.ss, 2005).
2 Pcil Fodor, "Sultan, Imperial Council, Grand Vizier: Changes in the Ottoman Ruling Elite and
the Formation of the Grand Vizieral telhJs," Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum
Hungaricae, 47, 1-2 (1994), 67-85.
T H E O TT O M A N E M P I R E I N W O R L D H I S T O R Y 43
limited. Presumably the conflicts of the twentieth century are mainly to
blame: the Turkish War of Independence was fought mainly between Greeks
and Turks, the population exchange of 1923 disrupted the lives of many
people and in addition the Cyprus conflict, which still has not been solved
.
after more than fifty years, has left a legacy of lasting bitterness on both stdes.
Scholarly exchanges are now more frequent than they used to be, but much
more could be done in this field.
In consequence the scholars that pioneered the use of Ottoman
documents in Greece are for the most part still alive today: Vassilis
Dimitriadis, Elizabeth Zachariadou, John Alexander, and of a younger
generation, Evangelia Balta. As for the doyenne of Ottoman studies in Greece,
Elizabeth Zachariadou has concentrated on the Byzantine-Ottoman 'transition
period' of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries; and this project has made it
necessary for the author to study Byzantine, Venetian and Ottoman materials
side by side. For the period in question however the most relevant Ottoman
archival documents are usually not found in Istanbul , but rather in Greek
monastic archives. Located on the Athos but also for instance in the
monastery of Saint John the Theologian on the island of Patmos, Ottoman
archival material of considerable antiquity is thus available to Greek scholars
practically 'on their doorstep•.! These Ottoman document hoards in Greece are
especially valuable as for the most part the Prime Minister's Archives in
Istanbul only become substantial in the sixteenth century.
These treasures are due to the early contacts of Byzantine monks with
the Ottoman sultans. For during the calamities of the 1300s the former soon
came to understand that the emperors in Constantinople were no longer able
and willing to protect them. As a result quite a few monastic communities
submitted to the sultans and were issued documents that assured them of
protection in return for the payment of certain taxes. Many of these monastic
archives have now been - or are in the process of being - catalogued and
edited: a significant advantage as female scholars are not admitted to the Holy
Mountain. When it came to finding protection, other monasteries were not
slow to discover the strategies that had benefited the Athos communities:
thus the foundation known by the name of Margarid in the town of Serres/
I Elizabeth Zachariadou "Historical Memory in an Aegean Monastery: St John of Patrnos and
e'
the Emirate of Mentesh '" in The Hospitallers, the Mediterranean and Europe, Festschriftfor
Anthony Luttrell. ed. by Karl Borcha.rdt, Nicholas Jaspert and Hel�n J. Nic�ols�n
.
(Aidershot!Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007). pp. 13 1-37. While Theohans Stavnd�s �nd Otmt�ns .
Kastrizis, both young scholars working on th� �fteenth century have so far had: hmtted occaston
to deal with the Ottoman archives, their prorrusma work should at lea:'t be me�tlooed: T� Sultan
of Vezirs (Leiden: E. J. Brill �001) and The Son� of Bayezu!. Emp�re Butldmg .
and
!
RepresentaJion in the Ottoman CIVIl War of 1402-J3 (Letden: E. J. Bnll, 2007).
44 A N O T H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C ES
Serrai was issued a sultanic command already by Murad I (r. 1362-89). 1 John
Alexander has concentrated on other Ottoman document holdings in Greek
monastery archives including the Meteora but also Jess well-known places
such as Voulkanou in Messenia, while Sophia Laiou has studied the archives
of a monastery on the island of Lesbos/Midi11i.2 Furthermore while the
Manchester dissertation of Eugenia Kermeli on the confiscation of monastic
properties by Selim II (r. 1566-74) remains unpublished, she has recently
studied the Ottoman archives of Patmos that have also attracted the attention
of Elizabeth Zachariadou.3
As we are concerned with the use of Ottoman archives, among
Evangelia Balta's many projects it is her work on the tahrir registers covering
Greece that is most relevant; she is also one of a small number of Greek
scholars to have spent long weeks and months working in Istanbul. One of
her major studies concerns the island of Euboa, which before the Ottoman
conquest was a Venetian possession. In line with the preoccupations of
historians working on this material worldwide, she has tried to answer
questions concerning the relationship between population and food supplies.4
A later publication of hers deals with the Muslim and Christian pious
foundations of Serres/Serrai - again as they appear in Ottoman records - and
their role in the formation of urban quarters.5
As for the younger generation of Greek scholars they have 'moved with
the times' and given special attention to the registers compiled by the scribes
of Ottoman qadis. After all work on the basis of these records, concerning
urban history and including micro-historical studies of social relations have
been undertaken from Cairo to Sarajevo, wherever Ottoman qadis once
officiated. Due to historical vicissitudes often impossible to reconstruct, qadi
registers survive in Greek deposits mainly for the island of Crete, the city of
1 Evangelia Balta, Les vakifs de Serres et de sa region (XVe et XVIe s.) {Athens: Centre de
.
Recherches N6o-Helleniques, 1995), pp 185-203.
2 The Ottoman Empire, the Balkans, the Greek l..a"4s, St�ies in Hon ur ofl£!hn C. Alexander,
� Documents on Crete," Turcica 32 (2000), 447-63. While Elena Frangak.is-Syrett does not work
ed. by Elias Kolovos, Phokion Kotzageorges, Soph1a La10u and Mannos Sanyannes (Istanbul:
The Isis Press, 2007), pp. 9-10; Sophia Laiou, "Alliances and Disputes in the Ottoman
Periphery: The Monastery of Leimon (Mytilene) and .its Social Environment in t�e 1_7
1h
ongresi Ankara: 9-13 Eylul . 2002 Kongreye Sunulan Btldirtler
Century," XIV. Tiirk Tarih K
(Ankara: Tilrk Tarih Kurumu, 2005), vol. 2, pp. 139 1-1401
3 Eugenia Kermeli, "Vakifs Consisting of Shares in S.hips: hiiccets fC?m the S�int John Thc:<>logos
Monastery on Patmos," in The Kapudan Pasha. Hts Office and hts Dommn, ed. by �hza�th
Zachariadou (Rethymnon: University of Crete Press, 2002), pp. 213-20: The French h1stonans
Gilles Veinstein and Nicolas Valin also have worked on the Patmos arch1ve.
On the policies of Selim II with respect to church possessions see: John Aluander
(Alexandropoulos), "The Lord Giveth and the Lord Taketh Away: Athos and the Confiscation
Affair of 1568-1569," Athonika Symmeikta, 4 Mount Athos in the 14'"-16'" Centuries (1997),
1 49-200.
4 Evangelia Balta, L'Eubee d Ia fin du X¥ siecle. Economie et population. Les registres de
l'annee 1474 (Athens: Society of the Study of Euboa, 1989).
5 Balta, Les vaJcift de Serres.
T H E O TT O M A N E M P I R E I N W O R L D H I S T O R Y 45
Salonika and the town of Verroia (Ottoman Karaferye); scattered volumes are
available for a few further places in northern Greece as well. In addition a
batch of registers from Crete recently have re-emerged in Istanbul and
apparently are now in the hands of the Administration of Pious
Foundations/Vaktflar idaresi, although there is no telling when they will be
made accessible to scholars. 1
A major monograph based on the qadi registers, on the Jines of what
has been done for Bursa, Jerusalem or Ankara has not to my knowledge been
written on any town in Greece, at least not in any of the languages that I can
read. Even so there is a good deal to report as the scholars who work on these
court registers have published quite a bit of their work in English: Antonis
Anastasopoulos has focused on local elites in northern Greece on the basis of
the Verroia registers of the 1700s, while Eleni Gara has studied these same
registers i n their seventeenth-century incarnations, with special attention to
the debt nexus and the migration of artisans.2 From her work there emerges a
provincial society dominated by wealthy Muslim elite figures, quite consonant
with the setup i n Serrai as reflected in the unique town chronicle of Papa
Synadinos; these members of the Ottoman elite were often moneylenders and
local villages were indebted to them on a permanent, quasi-institutional basis.
But Gara also has brought together Ottoman and Greek sources to highlight
the capacity for self-organization shown by many villagers, most famously on
the islands but on the mainland as well. 3 Marinos Sariyannis on the other
hand has tried to find out something about the 'lower depths' of Istanbul
society including the underworld and drug-addicts. Focusing on a city outside
Greece but that in the past was home to a sizeable Greek populati on,
Sariyannis' project has made it necessary to use an ingenious combination of
narrative and archival documentation.4
1
NUkhet and Nuri Ad1yeke, "Newly Discovered in Turkish Archives: Kadi Registers and Other
on Ottoman documents, her studies of trade and entrepreneurship in lzmir are so important that
one of them must at least be mentioned: Elena Frangakis-Syrett, The Commerce ofSmyrna in
the Eighteenth Century (1700-1820) (Athens: Centre for Asia Minor Studies, 1992).
2 Antonis Anastasopoulos, "The Mixed Elite of a Balka.n Town: Karaferye in the Second Half
of the Eighteenth Century," in Provincial Elites in the Ouoman Empire, ed. by Antonis
Anastasopoulos (Rethymnon: University of Crete Press, 2005), pp. 259-68; Eleni Gara, "f;uha
for the Janissaries - Velen�e for the Poor. Competition for Raw Material and Workforce
between Salonica and Verria 1600-1650," in Crafts and Craftsmen of the Middle East,
Fashioning the Individual in the Muslim Mediterranean, ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi and Randi
Deguilhem (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 121-52.
3 Paolo Odorico et alii (eds. and translators), Conseils et memoires de Synadinos
pretre de
Serres en Macedoine (XVIr siecle) (Paris: Association Pierre Belon, 1996); Eleni Gara, "In
Search of Communities in Seventeenth-century Ottoman Sources: The Case of the Kara Ferye
District." Turcica, 30 (1998), 135-62. .
4 Marinos Sariyannis, "'Neglected Trades': Glimpses into the 17th Century Istanbul
Underworld." Turcica, 38 (2006), pp. 155-79.
46 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
T H E 0 T T 0 M A N E M P I R E I N W0 R L D H 1 S T 0 R y 47

In emphasizing social history Greek researchers working on Ottoman

archival documents fit i n very well with the trends of historical research
current in other parts of the world. While the localities studied are mostly in
Greece, there is limited interest in what might be called 'Greek peculiarities';
and as a group, scholars who work on Ottoman documents seem to distance
themselves from nationalist discourse. The records used are Ottoman at least
for the most part; but the methodology is international.
What a few people can achieve: the use of the Onoman archives by Polish
scholars
We will now discuss some of the 'neighbours' of the Ottoman Empire
whose historiography has benefited or could benefit from the study of
Ottoman archival documents. Compared to Hungary Ottoman studies in
Poland have long been something of a poor relation; and once again political
factors provide at least a partial explanation. After all the Nazi occupation was
both long and extremely destructive. In addition when everything was said and
done, the short-lived Ottoman province of Podolia was probably a minor
preoccupation for Polish historians, and Kamieniec Podolsk a town of the
second order. As a result Polish scholars perhaps did not feel as pressing a
need to include Ottoman documents in their discussions of national history.
However there were some people who thought otherwise: i n spite of
the extremely difficult conditions of the 1950s, Jan Reychman and Ananiasz
Zajaczkowski came up with a comprehensive study of Ottoman diplomatics
that once it had been translated into English, until the appearance of Mi.ibahat
Kiiti.ikoglu's work in 1994 remained the standard work on the subject. Many
students preparing for their encounter with Ottoman archival documents in the
1970s and 1980s must have worked their way through it. Furthermore in
recent years as Crimean documents have become accessible in sizeable
numbers, this work has taken on a new lease of life, as Crimean archival
material happened to be the authors' specialty. I During those same years,
Zygmunt Abrahamowicz also published a catalogue of the Ottoman
documents surviving in Polish archives; this collection is so impressive
1 J n Reychman and Ananiasz Zajaczkowski, Handbook of Ottoman-Turkish Diplomatics, tr.,
� .
rev1sed, m�exed and ed. by Andr,ew S. Ehrcnkreutz, Fanny Davis and Tibor Halasi-Kun (The
Hague, Pa ns: Mouton, 1968);. M�bahat S.KUtUkoglu, Osmanll Belgelerinin Dili (Diplomatik)
(Istanbul: Kubbealll AkademiSI KilltUr ve Sanat Valcf1, 1994).
because it goes back to the mid-fifteenth century, a time for which few records
I
survive in Istanbul.
But at least where studies intended for an international public were
concerned, the real breakthrough came with the work of Dariusz
KoJodziejczyk.2 This author wrote a detailed monograph on relations between
the Ottoman Empire and Poland, which were conflictual for a variety of
reasons. First of all until the mid-fifteenth century there was competition with
the Ottomans over access to the Black Sea and domination over the
principality of Moldavia, a struggle which the sultans won and the kings of
Poland lost. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries moreover, the constant
border incidents between Cossacks and Tatars often strained Ottoman-Polish
relations to the breaking point. At the same time by the late 1500s the
Ottoman sultans were in a position to declare which candidates for the Pol ish
throne they would or would not accept. It is widely known that Prince Henri
of Valois, brother to Charles lX of France allowed himself to be elected king
of Poland and then fled the country stante pede when the news of Charles'
death reached him: he was enthroned as Henri III, famous from the novels of
Alexandre Dumas. Yet it is less well known that this election was due to the
fact that the Ottoman side previously had declared that a candidate from the
Habsburg dynasty or close to the latter would not receive the sultan's
recognition} As the Ottoman chancery registers (Mi.ihimme) make abundantly
clear, Selim II or more likely his viziers would have preferred a local
nobleman. But as they realized that none of the Polish nobles might be able
to secure a majority at the Diet, they were willing to settle for a prince from
the House of Valois. This is one of the classical examples of the Ottoman
archives shedding light on a political conflict in a European country.
Dariusz KoJodziejczyk has discussed the difficult history of Polish­
Ottoman relations with a strong emphasis on the structure and genesis of the
documents in which they have been recorded; in addition he has done detailed
work on the Ottoman tax register of Podolia which was one of the few fully­
fledged records of this type to be produced during the seventeenth century.4 For
the most part by this period the decline of military tax assignments (timar)
and the rise of tax farming had made the preparation of elaborate taxpayer
1 Z gmunt Abrahamowicz. Katalog Dokument6w Tureckich. Dokumenti do Dr.iejow Polski i
fra;.ro': Osc1ennyc
.
� ': I.Atach 1455-1672 �Warsaw: Polska Akadcmia Nauk, 1959).
Danusz K�?dZICJCZyk, Ottoma.n-PoliSh Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Century). An
Annotated &Jwon of 'AJuinames and Other Documents (Leidcn: E. J. Brill, 2000).
3 Kcmal Beydilli, Die polnischen K onigswahlen und lnterregnen von 1572 und 1576 im Lichte
o.rmanischer Archivalien. Ein Beitrag r.ur Oeschichte der osmanischen Machtpolitik (Munich··
Dr Dr Rudolf Trofenik, 1974).
4D arius� Kolodziejczyk, Defter-i Mufass al-i Eyalet-i Kamanice. The Ottoman survey register
of ('od a (ca. 1681) Text, translation, and commentary 2 vols, (Cambridge MA: Harvard
o_ll
Umvers1ty Press, 2004).
48 A NOTHER M I R R O R F O R P R I NC E S
registers in the established provinces of the Empire into an unnecessary
expense. But where new conquests were involved, for example in the Ukraine
such records still were being compiled, probably to provide a reliable basis for
future tax-farming contracts. Ottoman officialdom thus has left us relatively
abundant data on the historical geography of the province: and as
Kolodziejczyk's edition includes a translation, it is not even necessary to
know either Polish or Ottoman to make use of his work.
Rival empires in a common world: the Venetian stato da mar and its
reflections in Ottoman documents
Scholars working on Venice are normally so fascinated by the richness
of the Archivio di Stato that they will rarely search for outside sources in
Istanbul or elsewhere. More profound reasons may be involved as well: for
twentieth-century Venetian historians, the loss of Cyprus to Sultan Selim II
demonstrates the unpalatable fact that in the later 1500s, Venice definitely had
become a second-rate power. Ottoman historians will sympathize: after all we
are also still struggling against the use of 'Ottoman decline' as an explanatory
device for whatever a given historian thinks needful of explaining. As for non­
specialists particularly in the Turkish context, one of the first questions they
will ask an early modernist inevitably concerns 'the beginnings of decline in
the Ottoman Empire'. Ironically as far the historiography is concerned the
Ottoman polity and Venice seem to have suffered a common fate.
A fascination with the 'decline theme' can be an impediment to
research: at least I sometimes wonder whether historians' concern with 'the
decline of Venice' has not been the reason why i n spite of the rich
documentation on the Ottomans that we find in the Venetian archives,
Ottoman history for a long time has been such a stepchild of historians
working out of Italy. At present this situation may be changing, but even
now the works by Italian scholars on Ottoman themes are very l imited in
number. As we are here concerned with the use of archival sources prepared by
the sultans' officials, some of the pioneer work done by Maria Pia Pedani
Fabris unfortunately remains outside our purview: for quite often she has
focused on Venetian records that shed light on Ottoman affairs.1 Even so her
work on the Ottoman documents in the Venetian archives has greatly added to
our understanding of the long and complicated relationship between the two
polities.2
1 Kuru/mast (Istanbul: Tarih ve Tab1at a •· 2004). A. Nilkhet Adtyeke, Nifr! Ad1yeke,
Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, In IWTN! del Gran Signore, lnviati otwmani a Vener.ia dalla caduta di
Costantinopoli alta guerra di Candia (Venezia: Dcputacione Editrice, 1994).
2 Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, I "Documenti turchi" dell'Archivio di Stato di Vener.ia (Roma:
Ministero pe r i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, 1994).
T H E OTT O M A N E M P I R E I N W O R L D H I S T O R Y 49
Furthermore four recent studies on the conquests of Cyprus ( 1 570-73)
and Crete ( 1645-69) both 'crown jewels' of the Venetian colonial empire, have
shown that it is a mistake to underestimate the Ottoman archives and neglect
the perspectives of sultans and viziers.l Vera Costantini's study of the Cyprus
conflict is noteworthy for its attempt to coordinate the sources produced by
Ottomans and Venetians. Remarkably enough, although the Venetian archives
are otherwise so comprehensive, the conqueror Lata Mustafa P�a and his
officials seem to have searched in vain for taxation-relevant documents left by
their predecessors. Maybe such records had never been prepared; for the
Venetians in their colonies did not produce general surveys akin for instance to
the Aorentine Catasto of the 1400s. Or else the relevant registers had been
lost during the sieges of Nicosia and Famagusta, or even carried away by one
or the other escapee. However Vera Costantini has analyzed a register of
prisoners in the Ottoman archives relevant to the conquest of Nicosia and
listing over ten thousand captives.2 She also has located documents that
demonstrate that the Venetians did not totally disappear from the island once
the conquest was completed: certainly the governing cadres were either killed
in the fighting or else fled if they had a chance. But individual merchants
returned once the war was over and the sultan's administration continued to
employ some of them as tax farmers and especially administrators of saltpans.
Presumably these men were expected to provide some continuity in methods
of taxation.
Costantini's statements concerning the "vocazione marittima e
commerciale" of Cyprus confirm the findings of Molly Greene's work on
post-conquest Crete. Both authors have studied their respective topics from an
overarching Mediterranean perspective and concluded that in spite of their
conflicts, the Venetian thalassocratia and the land-based Ottoman Empire
both were part of a shared early modem world. From the late 1600s onward if
we follow Greene's account - and beginning in the late 1500s if we adopt
Costantini's perspective - this 'ancien regime' lost ground against more
'modem' polities: the French who bought olive oil in the ports of Crete and
the English who competed with the Venetians in the late sixteenth-century
eastern Mediterranean, deaJing in valuable cloth but also in everyday goods
1 Molly Greene, A Shared World. Christians a "4 Muslims in the Early Modern Medi�erranean
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000); Erstn GUisoy, Girit'in Fethi ve Osmanll ldaresinin
_Y!'f
•.
h Kil
ltUr YaymcJhgJ, 2006). Vera Costantm1's study of
Fethinden Kaybma Girit (Istanbul: Bab1a
the conquest of Cyprus is forthcoming.
2 Vera Costantini, "Destini di guerra. L' inventario ottomano dei prigionieri di Nicosia
(settembre 1570)," Studi Vener.iani, N.S. XLV (2003), pp. 22941 .
 50 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NCES
such as raisins, of major importance as a sweetener at a time when sugar was
sti l l very expensive. I
For Ersin Giilsoy by contrast the Ottomans are the major topic: his
work is concerned with the events and logistics of the Cretan campaigns and
the manner in which the island was governed once the rule of the sultan had
been established; the Ad1yekes in addition have paid special attention to the
psychological impact of this 'late' conquest upon the self-image of the
Ottoman elite. Interestingly 'campaign studies' are not very common in
Turkish historiography in spite of the popular interest in the Ottomans as
conquerors. In addition both Giilsoy and his Greek colleague Elias Kolovos
from the University of Crete have studied the Cretan tahrir of 1 670-71 . This
enterprise took the place of an earlier registration dated to the year 1650,
which had been much closer to the 'classical' Ottoman practice of estimating
the productivity of peasants who held - or often did not hold - a full or half
farmstead. 2 By contrast the tahrir of 1670-7 1 was concerned with the
productivity of individual pieces of land and no longer with its cultivators; it
was moreover based on the assumption that local peasants and other private
persons - but not the Ottoman state - were the owners of the island's arable.
This novel departure was justified by the argument that the new arrangement
conformed more closely to the tenets of Islamic jurists. All these matters are
of course 'purely domestic' to the Ottoman Empire and the element of contact
with the outside world - Venetian or other - is completely absent here.
However Ottoman-Venetian relationships and more particularly, the
conditions under which subjects of the Signoria could do business on Ottoman
territory are once agai n i n focus when we study the ahidnames (in European
parlance: capitulations) issued by Ottoman sultans. In the same way inter­
empire relations are fore-grounded in the ecnebi defterleri; these registers
consist of the responses that the sultans' officials made to requests by the
Venetian ambassador or balyoz as he was often called in Ottoman documents.3
The ecnebi defterleri survive for the 1600s ; whether earlier examples were
ever compiled remains unknown. For the historian concerned with the
position of Venice on the 'international' scene the latter registers are
particularly precious: for as Costantini has noted Ottoman documents
addressed to the Doge or the resident ambassador closely reflected the political
I
Maria Fusaro, Uva passa, una guerra commerciale tra Venezia e l'lnghilterra (1540-1640)
(Venice: II Cardo, 1996).
2 Elias Kolovos, "Beyond 'Classical' Ottoman Defterology: A Preliminary Assessment of the
Tahrir Registers of 1670-71 concerning Crete and the Aegean Islands." in The Ottoman Empire,
the Balkans, the Greek lAnds, pp. 201-236.
3 Hans Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics: The ahidnames. The Historical
Background and the Development of a Category of Political-Diplomatic Instruments together
with an Annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant Documents," Ph D dissertation, Utrecht,
1991. (Only available on the Internet); compare also Daniel Goffman, The Ottoman Empire and
Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
T H E OTTOM A N E M P I R E I N W O R L D H I S TO R Y 51
'climate' of the time. Depending upon circumstances the Venetians might be
described as 'perfidious' or alternatively as faithful allies of the sultans.1 If we
keep in mind how central the relationship with the Ottoman sultan was for
Venetian trade and indeed for the survival of the Republic, it does not make
sense to limit ourselves to what the Signoria had to say on the matter. Even if
the Ottoman documentation often is silent on issues that most interest the
present-day historian, what i t does say is frequently remarkable and must be
taken into account.
In conclusion
What has this discussion shown us? To begin with a few obvious
points: at least where the early modern period is concerned, the Ottoman
archives do not reflect relations with China, Japan or Moghul India, to say
nothing of the Americas. However they do have a great deal to tell us on
Ottoman provinces that later became independent states, and in this paper we
have only given a very rough sketch of the studies undertaken in this domain
and by implication the possibilities that can be explored in the future.
Moreover where Venice, Poland, Portugal and other empires of the sixteenth
to eighteenth centuries are involved, Ottoman archival records also make a
substantive contribution to historical knowledge; most of this material is
located in Istanbul, but rich deposits of Ottoman documents in Venetian,
Habsburg, French or Polish archives and sometimes libraries also have a good
deal to offer. Whether historians have made use of these sources, and if so to
what extent certainly always has depended on political conj unctures; even
physical access to the archives often was only possible when the relevant
states maintained reasonably good relations. But now that nationalism and the
national state are regarded with a degree of scepticism at least among
intellectuals, and students can learn to read Ottoman documents at major
American universities, there is some reason for guarded optimism.
In this paper we have argued that researchers whose focus is not Turkey
should take cognizance of the Ottoman archives. However this statement does
not stand on its own but is part of a broader discourse: Salih Ozbaran the
major connoisseur of Portuguese archives in Turkey has recently made a
forceful point that Turkish scholars need to get interested in the history of
Basra, today in located in Iraq, but also should follow developments in early
1 Vera Costantini "Contemptible unbelievers" or "loyal friends"? Notes on the many ways the
Ottomans named Venetians in the 16th century," in Matthias Kappler ed., "In and around
Turkic Literatures," forthcoming.
 52 A N O T H ER M I R R OR FOR P R I NCES

modem Yemen and India. Of course in the case of Turkish researchers, such an
interest will be sparked by the Ottoman-Portuguese rivalry in the Indian Ocean
during the early sixteenth century. Yet it is Ozbaran's main point that this
cannot be the whole story. After all, the world is wider than even the Ottoman
Empire at the time of its greatest expansion; and this fact should be taken into
account by Ottomanist historians as well. I
Historical work always is connected to present concerns and doubtless
current trends in the world, such as the presence of Turkish firms on Russian
or German markets form the backdrop against which this re-orientation of
historical research on the Ottomans is taking place. As Turkish firms become
players in the world market, the horizons of Ottomanist historians have also
expanded. But just as religious scholars of the past were warned to keep their
distances from sultans and viziers lest they be corrupted by the temptations of
power, we also need to tread warily when asked to draw connections of
Ottoman situations with present-day problems - although publishers like us
to do just that when they try to sell our books. An examination of eighteenth­
century documents in Istanbul archives on Mosul, Baghdad or Basra has a
great deal to offer historians, but in most cases it is doubtful whether these
records can shed much light on the present-day problems of that ancient and
unfortunate country. Ottomanists now are invited to discover the wider world,
with special emphasis on non-western countries, while historians dealing with
Russia or Greece will be well advised to consult the Ottoman archives. All
this needs to be done calmly, deliberately and not in haste, and with respect for
the peculiarities of each type of document - yet without falling into the trap
of 'document fetichism'.2 Rather a tall order. . .
1 Salih Ozbaran, Yemen'den Basra'ya SmmJal<i Osman/1 (Istanbul: IGtap Yaymevi, 2003).
2 This tenn has been coined by Halil Berktay, of Sabanc1 University, Istanbul.
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND
PIEfY: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
In the Ottoman context, certain personages, buildings and events may
be regarded as emblematic of sultanic power and legitimacy, and the manner in
which these were viewed by contemporaries will occupy us in the present
paper. We will discuss, in a comparative perspective, a number of accounts
that Ottoman Muslims and non-Muslims, but also non-Ottoman authors have
given of these people, structures and ceremonies. The period to be covered
begins in the mid-sixteenth century, when the mature Sultan Stileyman was
on the throne, and ends with the deposition of Ahmed III in 1730. By means
of comparison we hope to bring out those features of sultanic self-assertion
and legitimization that authors from different political and cultural
environments have regarded in divergent ways, but also those personages and
manifestations that were viewed by otherwise very different authors in rather a
similar light. We will thus be concerned with the divides instituted by
religion, and also by the struggles of rival empires and kingdoms. But that is
by no means the whole story: we will also try to understand how across these
barriers, the Ottoman ruling elites managed to establish certain lines of
communication.
At least indirectly such a comparative approach will permit us to
determine whether, and if applicable to what extent, the image that the sultans
projected, largely with their own officials and - perhaps - their subjects in
mind, managed to cross the Ottoman borders. To what extent was it diffused,
in France and elsewhere, and what features were most amenable to
'exportation'? In the long run we will have to ask ourselves to what extent
contrary types of discourse, current in the European context or perhaps also
among Ottoman non-Muslims, impeded the reception of the 'signals' that the
sultans and their entourages sent out to convey to the world at large the
message of sultanic power, glory and piety. But the study of these
impediments will have to be part of a future project.
Our undertaking is beset with quite a few complications. A major
difficulty is connected to the fact that we need to pose the question, which
frequently remains unanswered, to what extent the writings we wish to analyze
represent the reasoned opinions of their authors. Both among Ottoman and
among non-Ottoman writers of the early modem period, it was acceptable
practice to take over passages written by one's predecessors, and it was not
54 ANOTHER M I R R O R FOR P R I NCES
always considered necessary to acknowledge this fact. 1 Convenience apart,
there were several reasons for doing so: as change of all kinds was often valued
negatively, associated with 'corruption' of one sort or another, certain authors
might decide to highlight what they considered the most permanent and
enduring features of any given empire or province. As these would have been
noted already by their predecessors, it would have acceptable to copy the
writings of the latter.2 In addition there was the prestige attached to the 'great
names' of the past; thus we may assume that a Moroccan traveller visitin
Istanbul thought that such quotations added lustre to his own account.
Unfortunately the motivations that in the Ottoman worl� induced a given
author to copy from his predecessors in one instance and to refrain from doing
so in another have rarely been studied. Even worse, as there are relatively few
critical editions available, the unwary reader may be unable to recognize the
'borrowings' in the text that he/she is studying.
When it comes to the reasons that prompted European writers to copy
from their respective predecessors our information is not much better. Once
again very few among the travellers and embassy personnel who have written
about the early modem Middle East are accessible in critical editions, and we
are often hard put to figure out which texts have been copied from where.4
Sometimes quotations from the Bible, ancient authors and scholarly
predecessors were added to a manuscript during the final editing process in
order to establish the author's credentials and help him steer his work through
the bureaus of mistrustful censors. In other cases it may have been quite
difficult for people with a humanistic training to admit that a famed author of
antiquity might be wrong. They might thus copy from their predecessors not
because they were totally convinced, but simply because they could not bring
themselves to make a statement that, empirically true though it might be, yet
I On Evliya Qelebi's practi��s in this respect see MC§kOre Eren, E�liy
a 9elebi Seya'!atrujmesi
erinde bir Ara§tmntl (Istanbul: no pubhsher,
Birinci Cildinin Kaynaklarr Ur. 1960), passtm.
2 Gottfried Hagen, "Oberzeitlichkeit und Geschichte in Katib Celebis (Hhanniima," Archivum
OttoniiJnicum, 14 (1995-96}, 133-60.
3 Abou-1-Hasan Ali ben Mohammed Et-Tamgrouti, [Al-Tam.&hrtltf], En·nafhat el-miskiya .fi-s­
sifarat et-Tourkiya, Relation d'une ambassade f71tlrocaine en Turquie I589·I591, tr. and notes
by Henry de Castries (Paris: Paul Geuthner, 1929), p. VIII.
4 Where such editions are lacking an article or monograph may be helpful. Compare
Annemieke Versteeg, '"Zich te bedienen van den arbeid van anderen' . Bronnen voor de
beschrijving van Turkije," in "lk hadde de f!ieusgierigheid", De r�hen door het Nabije Oosten
van Cornelis de Bruijn (ca. 1652-1727) (Le1den, Leeuwen; Ex One�te Lux and �eeters, 1.9?7) .
pp. 71 -82. Versteeg has established lhat the well-known �st .Comeh� de Bruyn 1s only ongm al
when it comes to his imagery and the data taken from h1s d 1ary. Wtlhout acknowledgment of
any kind lhe artist had copied all other information from his predecessors.
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND P I ETY 55
might lower their own credibility among their fellow scholars. 1 Moreover
then as now, copying must have been the easiest manner of producing a text,
and one must never underestimate the force of sheer laziness. Given these
difficulties it is our only consolation that sorting out the unacknowledged
quotations may not really be all that indispensable to our project: in a good
many though certainly not in all cases, the authors who did the copying will
have agreed with the statements that they copied.
� So much for the intentions of the writers, but how were these embassy
reports, travel accounts and chronicles received by their respective reading
publics? After all since we are here concerned with the effects of written texts
upon communication among sultanic and royal courts, the problem of
reception is key. However in several of the cases studied, our knowledge about
readers and listeners is non-existent or at the least, decidedly unsatisfactory.
We know for instance that Evliya Celebi was little read before the Tanzimat
period, when all at once, the interest and originality of his work was
recognized, and with time he even became something of a culture hero. As to
the other Ottoman authors used here, observations concerning their readership
are for the most part completely lacking.
Nor is the situation a great deal better with respect to the European
sources we are planning to investigate. But at least we can say that the
relazioni to be discussed were not among the best-known of their kind, as in
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, they were not diffused by copying into
manuscripts and distribution to li braries. In consequence they were
inaccessible to the scholars who during the second half of the nineteenth
century, published only those texts that survived in book form.2 However in
their time all rekzzioni were read before the highest Venetian authorities, so
that they had an impact collectively even if not much can be said about the
readership of a particular report. In the present context, it is not possible to
discuss the reception even of key sources; but it is still worth keeping in mind
that we will need to deal with this issue in the future.
Yet i n spite of this and other problems there is a good reason
for undertaking the present project none the less. For anybody who has read
embassy reports surely has noted that in spite of religious, linguistic and
cultural differences, Ottoman courtiers and European diplomats i n
most instances were quite capable of mutually understanding the meaning of
I Frc!dc!ric Tinguely L 'ecriture du Levant a Ia Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, 2000), pp. 73-88
shows how Pierre B�lon du Mans went through all sorts of intellectual and stylistic contortions
when he found himself in lhis position.
2 On lhe manner in which t.hese texts we�e composed and distributed. compare Donald E.
Queller, >Pfhe Development of Ambassadonal Relazioni", in Renaissance Venice, ed. by J. R.
Hale (London: Faber & Faber, 1973). PP· 174-96.
56 A N O T H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I NC E S
diplomatic gestures. 1 In these matters, comprehension seems to have been the
norm and misunderstanding the exception: and quite often, what was declared a
misunderstanding in reality was nothing but a diplomatic ploy. It is therefore
necessary to figure out whether there existed common assumptions that made
it possible to communicate across political, religious and linguistic dividing
lines.
Our study will proceed in three stages. In the first, we will compare the
characterizations of Sultans Siileyman the Magnificent, Murad IV and Ahmed
III by some of their Ottoman, Venetian and French contemporaries. Among
the Ottomans, Evliya c;etebi , Abdi and �em'daru-zade Siileyman Efendi will
be accorded pride of place: they have been chosen mainly because they are
relatively prolix when it comes to personal comments, which is not
necessarily true of all Ottoman authors.2 As to the Europeans, we will
concentrate on some of the less well-known relazioni by Venetian
ambassadors and for Ahmed III, focus on the extensive comments by the
French ambassador the marquis de Bonnac.3
In the second section we will be concerned with a building that has
attracted much attention among Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and that
under the name 'the Blue Mosque' is still a favourite with tourists, namely the
great complex constructed by Sultan Ahmed I. Here we will discuss an
account by Ca'fer Efendi, a member of the household of the Chief Architect
who designed this complex, and also a description by Evliya. For the
testimony of a scholarly Ottoman non-Muslim concerning this last example
of the 'classical ' sultans' foundations, we will include the late eighteenth­
century text by P. (Jugas (or (Jugios) inciciyan. As a seventeenth-century
1 For some good examples compare Christian Windler, "Diplomatic History as a Field for
Cultural Analysis: Muslim-Christian Relations in Tunis, 17()().1840," The Historical Journal,
44,1 (2001), 79-106.
2 For a general discussion of Evliya's life and work, that includes the evidence found after
Cavit Baysun's pioneering work, compare Evliya <;::elebi, Evliya f;elebi in Diyarbekir, ed. and
tr. by Martin van Bruinessen et alii (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988), pp. 3-12. Evliya had not
encountered SUieyman in person, even though he claimed that his father had attended the last
campaign of this ruler (died in Szigetvar in 1566) and was respectfully listened to by Murad IV:
Evliya <;::elebi b Dervi� Mehemmed Z11li, Evliya f;elebi Seyahatndmesi, Topkap1 Saray1 Bagdat
304 Yazmasmm Transkripsyonu -Dizini, vol. I . ed. by Orban �aik Gokyay and YUcel Dagh
(Istanbul: Yap1 Kredi Yaymlan, 1995), p. 98. See also Abdi, 1730 Patrona Halil ihtiltili
halckmda bir Eser. Abdi Tarihi, ed. by Faik Re�at Unat (Ankara: Tiirk Tarih Kurumu, 1943) and
�e�:��nf-z4d � Fmd1khh. SUieyman Efendi, $em'dO.ni:zclde Fu dlklll1 Siileyman Efendi Tdrihi
�
Mur 1 t- tevdnh ed. MUmr Aktepe, 2 vols. (Istanbul: Istanbul Oniversitesi Edebiyat FakUitesi,
1976, 1978), vol. I.
3 Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, ed., Relalioni di ambasciatori veneti al Senato, vol. XIV
po!i, Re/azion! inedite (1512-1780) (Padua: AIdo Ausilio-Bottega di Erasmo, 1996).
Co�tan tino
Th 1s book bemg rather d1fficull to fin�. I am very grate�ul to Professor Pedani Fabris for Jetting
?e have a copy. See also Jean-Lou1s Dusson, m
£I'Amba.s . rqws de Bonnac, Me11J()ire historique sur
a !
ad
s e de France a Constantinople, ed. and mtroduced. by Charles Schefer (Paris: Ernest
Leroux, 1894).
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND P I ETY 57
European author who has commented on the very same building, we will
highlight the description by the French traveller Jean Thevenot.l
In the third section of our study, we will discuss the processions that
formed part of Ottoman court life, be they the visits of sultans to the mosque
on Fridays, or parades on the occasion of other, less frequent ceremonies such
as the circumcisions of princes. Of course these solemn progresses were only
a small part of the entire circumcision festivities, as the latter involved
rejoicings both on specially chosen festival sites and, away from the public
gaze, within the palace itself. Yet we will focus on processions as opposed to
other events, as they have been described by many people, local Muslims and
non-Muslims as well as foreigners.2 As a result our sources on these
ceremonies are truly multifarious: as a particularly well-studied example, there
is the text in which a writer known only by his pen-name of Intizami has
described the parade celebrating the circumcision of Prince Mehmed, later
Mehmed 111.3 Among eighteenth-century chroniclers, Mehmed Ra�id has
included an account of an equally elaborate and luxurious event, namely one of
the processions celebrating the simultaneous circumcisions of the four sons of
Ahmediii.4
Among non-Muslim writers on Ottoman processions Rabi Moysen
Almosnino, who apparently was close to the court of Selim II, has authored a
most interesting text, describing the entry of this ruler into his capitaJ.5 From
a slightly later period, namely the reign of Murad III, the diary of
the Konigsberg (today: Kaliningrad) apothecary Reinhold Lubenau is full of
1 See LCa'fer Efendi], annotation and tr. by Howard Crane, Risdle-i mi'mariyye, an Early­
seventeenth-century Ottoman Treatise on Architecture (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1987) and Jean
Th�venot, Voyag� du Levant! ed. and introduced by Sttphane Y�rasimos (Paris: Masptro,
19�0), pp. 6-9. It 1s rather a p1ty that �e .seventeenth-century Armenian writer Eremya <;::elebi
KomUrcUyan, who also �rote a descnpt1o� of Istanbul, barely mentions the Sultan Ahmed
mosque: Eremya <;::eleb1 KomUrcUyan, Istanbul Tarihi, XVII. Astrda istanbul, tr. and
commentary by Hrand And.reasyan (Istanbul: Istanbul Oniversitesi Edebiyat Fakiiltesi, 1952), p.
4. Thus we have to resort to a much later text: P. Clugasl fnciciyan, XVIII. Asmia istanbul, t.r.
and commentary by Hrand Andreasyan (Istanbul: Istanbul Fethi Demegi istanbul Enstiiisii t
•
1956), p. 39.
2 For �e proces�ions co�nected wit� the accessions and funerals of rulers, the major study is
.
now N1�olas Va�m and : � hiles Vemstem, Le serail ebran/e (Paris: Fayard, 2003), passim. On the
�
processiOns of gtft- a nng ambassadors � cong�tulate a sultan upon his accession see Zeynep
Tanm Ertug, XVI. Y zy1l Osmanll Devlell nde Culus ve Cenaze Ttirenleri (Ankara: T. C. KUltUr
u
Bakanhg1, 1999), pp. 86-87.
3 Several ersions survive, one o_f w�ich, toda� in Vienna, has been published by Gisela
� .
Prohazka-E1sl, ed., Das Surname-1 Humayun, D1e W1ener Handschrift in Transkription mit
Kommentar und Indices versehen (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1995).
·
4 Mebmed �id, Tarih-i Rasid. 5 v?ls. (Istanbul: Matba'a-y1 amire, 128211865-66) vol. s, pp.
214-72; vol. 6 1s by 9e1eb1zade
. Efend1. For relevant Ottoman miniatures see Esin Atll Le
vni and
k
� Su�name, The Story o an EighJeenth-century Ottoman Festival (Istanbul: K�ban , 1999).
he
Rab! Moyse� Almosn!no, Extre11J()S Y grandezas de Constantinopla, tr by lacob Cansino
(Madnd: Franc1sco Martinez, 1638), PP· 55-64. Not knowing Ladino, I am dependent on this
partial translation into Spanish.
 58 ANOTHER M I R R OR FOR P R I NCES
worthwhile details; the author evidently had the leisure to enjoy the sights of
Istanbul, including festivities of all kinds. 1 As a seventeenth-century example,
we will discuss the impressions of sultanic processions recorded in his diary
by Antoine Galland, the first translator of the mediaeval tales which became
known to later generations as the Arabian nights.2 From the eighteenth
century moreover there survives an account by a Venetian ambassador in
Istanbul, who witnessed a procession of the court of Ahmed III in honour of
the Prophet's birthday and another parade forming part of the wedding
festivities of three princesses ( 1724).3 At the end of our analysis we will
examine how the perception of emblematic rulers, buildings and events might
give rise to a common language of gestures, and how, admittedly within
limits, lines of communication between courts and elites were kept open
across religious, linguistic and political boundaries.
Heroic or sedentary: Siileyman the Magnificent, Murad IV and Ahmed Ill in
Ottoman testimonies
In Ottoman bureaucratic tradition, the figure that most vividly
symbolized Ottoman rule was doubtless Siileyman the Magnificent.
Conditions prevailing under this ruler were regarded as standing for all that
was best in the Ottoman state only a short time after his death in 1566, and to
some extent, even within Siileyman's lifetime. During the early years of his
reign, after the conquest of Rhodes and then of the kingdom of Hungary
within the span of a few years, some authors close to the Ottoman court
voiced the belief that Siileyman might well be the eschatological ruler destined
to conquer the whole world for Islam.4 Even to those who did not totally share
these high hopes, it probably seemed that at least the addition of Vienna
and/or parts of Italy to the Ottoman lands could be expected in the near future.
Into this context also belongs the well-known golden helmet that the Grand
I [Reinhold Lubenau,], Beschreibung der Reisen des Reinhold Lubenau, ed. and introduced by
W. Sahm (Konigsberg/ Kaliningrad: Ferdinand Beyers Buchhandlung, 1912 and 1915). Further
interesting details can be derived from the description sent to Venice by the special ambassador
who came to express the Signoria's congratulations at the 1582 circumcision of Prince
Mehmed, later Mehmed III: Pedani Fabris ed., Relazioni, pp. 266-68.
2
Antoine Galland, Voyage a Constantinople (1672-1673), ed. by Charles Schefer, new preface
by Frtdt!ric Bauden (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, reprint 2002}, pp. 117-20.
3 Pedani Fabris ed., Re/azioni, pp. 864-70.
4 On the writings of Mevlana Isa, an important source for such views, see Barbara Hemming,
"Sahib-knan und Mahdi: Tilrkische Endzeiterwartungen im ersten Jahrzehnt der Regierung
Siileymans," in Gyorgy Kara ed., Between the Danube and the Caucasus (Budapest: The
Academy of Sciences, 1987), pp. 43-62 and Cornell H. Aeischer, "The Lawgiver as Messiah:
The Making of the Imperial 1mage in the Reign of Silleyman", in Gilles Veinstein ed., Soliman
le Magnifique et son temps, Acres du Colloque de Paris, Galeries Nationales du Grand Palais, 7-
10 mars /990 (Paris: La Documentation Fran�aise, 1992), pp. 159-78.
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND PIETY 59
Vizier Pargall Ibrahim Pa§a ordered for his ruler in Venice, and which was
paraded on sultanic campaigns. After all, the resemblance to the papal tiara is
too close to be entirely fortuitous.1
But as Stileyman the Magnificent grew older, and no further conquests
i n central Europe had materialized, the notion of the 'Lawgiver as Messiah'
was given up. Now there emerged the more sober view of the sultan as the
protector of Sunni 'right belief' against Shiite 'heretics' .2 Moreover in spite
of the veneration accorded to Sultan Stileyman, Ottoman authors even of the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were by no �eans uncritical of
certain goings-on at his court, including the prominent role allotted to his
wife Hiirrem Sultan.3 If there is any basis to Evliya's claim that his father,
the court goldsmith Dervi § Mehmed Ztllf, had known the Siileymanic age, it
would have been this set of images, mainly laudatory but not entirely
uncritical, to which Evliya was introduced in his youth.
Murad IV was so important to Evliya because of his success in war. In
recent years there have been acrimonious disputes about the extent to which
Ottoman rulers of the fourteenth century and their soldiers viewed themselves
as gazis, that is, as warriors doing battle for the expansion of the Muslim
faith.4 Whatever the outcome of this discussion, there is no doubt at all that
from the later fifteenth century onwards, the quality of gazi was an essential
ingredient of the image that Ottoman writers projected. Moreover almost two
centuries later, Evliya <;elebi cordially agreed with them. Thus Sultan Murad
is depicted as having gained major victories over the 'heretic' Ktztlba§,
although from Evliya's account, it is clear that by the seventeenth century the
religious differences between Sunnis and Shiites were less important than the
political rivalry between the two rulers involved. In this respect, Evliya's
stories thus reflect the ideals, rather than the realities, of his time.
However our author does seem to have had some qualms over the
absence of any visible commitment on the part of Murad IV to war against the
'infidels'. This explains why he has added a chapter on a projected campaign
against Malta, for which the author claims a mighty armada had already been
1
Otto Kurz, "A Gold Helmet Made in Venice for Sulayman the Magnificent," in idem, The
Decorative Arts of Europe and the Middle East (London: The Dorian Press, 1977), pp. 249-58;
see also GUlru Necipoglu, "Siileyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the
Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry," The Art Bulletin, LXXI, 3 (1989), 401-27.
2
The expression 'The Lawgiver as Messiah' comes from Aeischer, "The Lawgiver as
Messiah"; on the Silleymaniye mosque as a monument to victory over Shiite 'heretics', see
Gillru Necipoglu-Kafadar, "The Siileymaniye Complex in Istanbul: an Interpretation,"
Muqarnas, III (1986), 92-117.
3 Leslie Peirce, The Imperial Harem, Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire (New
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 993), pp. 84-86.
4 Cerna! Kafadar, Between Two Worlds. The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, Los
Angeles: University of California Press, 1 995), pp. 10-11 and elsewhere.
 60 ANOTHER M I R R O R FOR P R I NC ES
PRESENTING THE SULTANS ' POWER, GLORY AND PIETY 61

constructed. In all probability a parallel was here to be established with Sultan

Stileyman and Murad IV were both active politicians and military
Siileyman, one of whose last undertakings was a campaign against the
commanders; the same was not however true of Ahmed III (r. 1703-1 730),
Knights of St John that had come quite close to succeeding. 1 On this
who is remembered rather because of changes in palace culture due to an
supposed project of Murad IV's, there seems to be little other evidence, but
increased interest in the decorative arts of France and Italy. 1 Therefore we will
according to Evliya, the Spanish and the Maltese, with fear in their hearts, had
here concentrate not on the ruler by himself, but rather upon the interaction
already offered important concessions. However as the author himself put it,
between him and his grand vizier Nev�ehirli Damad Ibrahim Pa�a. who held
the sultan's death preventing the campaign, by God's inscrutable will there
the grand vizierate for over a decade and dominated the political and diplomatic
was not much to show for the enormous amount of money and effort spent on
life of the 1720s. In 1730 however, this association between sultan and vizier
a great campaign of shipbuilding.
came to an end. A band of soldiers rebelled, found support among certain men
But as our traveller had the opportunity to observe Murad IV at close
of religion and also among a large part of the Istanbul populace, exasperated
quarters, he also stressed some less political features that marked this ruler out
by the costly festivals of the court and the non-occurrence of a long-projected
�
as a special personage. One of them was he sultan' s skill as � marksman.
campaign against Iran, prepared at great cost to the local artisans.2 Ibrahim
.
Even more unusual was the young padi�ah s extraordmary phys1cal strength,
P�a along with his two sons-in-law was executed when the sultan, ultimately
which he demonstrated by his prowess in various sports including wrestling.
in vain, attempted to protect his throne; Ahmed III himself was forced to
In this context of royal self-assertion and without any transition, Evliya also
abdicate a short while later.
mentioned the fact that Murad IV had a large number of people executed.2 But
One of the texts to concern us here is a speech in which the ruler before
although the sultan was probably long dead by the time of writing, Evliya
retiring to a remote part of the palace, supposedly gave topical advice to his
refrained from any adverse comments on what he himself called the ruler's
successor Mahmud I (r. 1730-1 754). Whether such a speech was ever
being 'thirsty for blood' (hunhar). Although he did not explain the reasons for
pronounced or not is a minor issue in the present context. Recorded in two
his attitude, it may well be that after the disorders of the previous decades, the
primary sources, one of them authored by a person who was probably an
re-establishment of the ruler's authority was paramount in his eyes, and the
eyewitness to at least some of the confused events of 1730, it was not a more
means employed to this end a secondary issue.3
or less timeless piece of advice of the kind so often found in Ottoman political
In addition Evliya has also left us a description of Murad IV in the
writing. To the contrary, Abdi listed the mistakes which in his way of
circle of his courtiers, including, apart from the former Safavid commander
Emirgune-oglu Yusuf Pa�a. the author himself as a young man. Here we thinking, had brought the sultan to his present predicament.3 A further
evaluation of the merits and demerits of Sultan Ahmed and Ibrahim �a can
encounter the otherwise fearsome ruler not only listening to jokes and
be found in the chronicle of �em'danl-zade Siileyman Efendi from the Istanbul
witticisms, in which even personal innuendo was not taboo.4 All this was
quarter of Fmd•kh, whose father was, in a minor way, involved in the events
taken in good part by the sultan, who according to Evliya once smiled at an
of 1730.4
obvious allusion to his bloodthirstiness.5 If these stories have even a slight
The first piece of advice given to Sultan Mahmud according to Abdi
basis in fact, it would seem that the aloofness and immobility of the sultan
concerned the necessity that the ruler retain firm control of his grand vizier.
during his public appearances were not necessarily observed on less formal
For this reason he was to avoid keeping one and the same person in office for
occasions.
ten or fifteen years. Of course this was being wise after the event, as Ibrahim
I According to the article 'Malta' in the Encyclopedia of Islam (E!), nd edition, there was a �a, recently killed under more than usually distressing circumstances, had
2
second siege in 1614 and several plans to repeat the att�mpt 10 the second hal� of the
. been maintained in office for more than a decade. �em'dfull-zade concurred with
seventeenth century. However Enore Rossi, the author of th1s artJcle, makes no menuon of a
projected siege in the late 1630s. this assessment; as he put it, Mehmed the Conqueror and Stileyman the
2 Evliya Celebi, Evliya (:elebi Seyahatn/imesi, vol. I , ed. G6kyay, 1995, p. 105. Magnificent had both been served by grand viziers whom they kept in office
3 This positive opinion was shared by at least one Christian subject of the sultan. Com� ar
e [Papa
Synadinos of Serres!. Conseils et memoires de Synadinos pretre de Serres en Ma ce4
ome (XVI!' I For a monograph on the troubles marking the end of Ahmed Ill's reign, see MUnir Aktepe,
s·ecle) ed. tr. and commented by Paolo Odorico, with S. Asdrachas, T. Karanastass1s, K. Kostis
�
a d s. 'Petm�zas (Paris: Association "Pierre Belon". 1996). pp. 94-95. Patrona /syam (Istanbul: Istanbul Oniversitesi Edebiyat FakUitesi, 1958).
4 Evliya Celebi, Evliya (:elebl Seyaham/Jmesi, vol I, ed. Gokyay, p. 103. 2 Aktepe, Patrona lsyam, pp. 95-102. .
3 Abdi, /730, p. 42; compare also Aktepe. Patrona lsyam, p. 156.
.

5 Evliya Celebi, Evliya (:elebi Seyahaln/Jmesi, vol. I , ed. Gokyay. 1995, p. I OS.
4 $em'dtnf-z.Ade, Sem'dbni-z&ie FrndlJcltlr Siileyman Efendi Tiirihi, vol. I, pp. 1 1-13. 44.
 62 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR P R I NCES
for lengthy periods of time, but both had ended up executing their former
favourites. Never at a loss for a telling phrase the author reminded his readers
that even water, the source of all life, rapidly spoiled if not kept flowing. I The
new sultan was urged to take the reins of government into his own hands, and
"not trust other people".2 However this did not mean that he should not accept
advice; to the contrary, he was to consort with old and experienced men,
always praying to God for protection from unworthy servitors. In what may
have been a bit of self-promotion on the part of the author, Sultan Mahmud
was also told to keep in mind that the historians of former reigns could teach
him useful lessons.
Both Abdi and �em'dani'-zade had things to say on the ri ght balance
between generosity and severity. Generosity and the related act of amply
supplying the markets with commodities were considered major virtues.
Although �em'd§nl-zade was highly critical of Ibrahim Pa§a, particularly on
account of the 'immorality' the grand vizier had supposedly permitted, he did
concede that the deceased's pious foundations were a significant point in his
favour. Moreover when attempting an overall evaluation of Ahmed Ill's reign
on the occasion of the latter's death, several years after his deposition, the
same author commented on the low prices that had prevailed in the reign of
the deceased sultan, whose place was hopefully now in paradise: "in the time
of his caliphate, the people did not see the face of scarcity") Ahmed III's
parting advice to Mahmud I also included a recommendation to be munificent.
In the same breath however, the incoming sultan was admonished to
keep the treasury well filled; this advice may well have been actually rendered,
as the historical Ahmed III was very much concerned with the accumulation of
treasure. However when at the beginning of the new regime, cash was
urgentJy needed to pacify the troops, it was not the state treasury but rather the
stocks of gold and silver in the storehouses of Ibrahim Pa�a·s sons-in-law that
supplied the wherewithal!. The former grand vizier's own funds were limited,
due to the generosity that in this context, was depicted as wastefulness.4
�em'dani'-zade also felt that Ibrahim Pa�a. and by implication the sultan, had
not been strict enough: the vizier was supposed to hold "gold in one hand, and
1 Sem:dinf-z!de. $em 'dfinf.z(ide Ftndtkltlt Siileyman Efendi Tdrihi, vol. I, pp. 13-14. The author
has po1nted �ut why long tenure� of grand viziers c�uld be dangerous: as this dignitary normally
promoted h1s own followers, h1s prolonged retention of office would entice candidates who
could .not expect prererment under the current regime to plot a rebellion. Of the latter SUJeyman
Efend1 very much dts appr
oved, even though he felt that the sultan and his grand vizier bore a
share of responsibility f
or the events of 1 730.
2 Abdi, 1730, p. 42.
3 �m'dini'-zAde, $em'dlinf-z{ide Ftndtkltlt Siileyman Efendi Tllrihi, vol. I, p. 44.
4 Sem'dinr-z!de, $em'd4nf-z&le Ftndrkltlt Siileyman Efendi Tllrihi, vol. I. p. 13.
PRESENTING THE S ULTANS' POW ER, GLORY AND PIETY 63
a sword in the other''.1 In the perspective of both �em'danl-zade and Abdi, the
reign of Ahmed III thus had come to a bad end because the proper balances had
not been established: on the personal level, this applied to the relationship
between the ruler and his grand vizier, and on the level of policy, to the
balance between generosity and the need to fill the treasury. Finally Ahmed lli
and Ibrahim Pa§a had made the mistake of not listening to the complaints of
soldiers and artisans in good time. From a different perspective, they also had
neglected to use the power at their disposal in order to nip rebellion in the
bud.
Sultans Siileyrrum, Murad IV and Ahmed Ill in the eyes of foreign
ambassadors
Many Venetian, French, Habsburg, English and Dutch envoys have left
impressions of their receptions in the Topkap1 palace. However an ambassador
would encounter the sultan only at the solemn audience accorded upon arrival,
and once more when about to depart. Moreover, from the later sixteenth
century onwards, it was customary for the sultan to remain in all but
immobile majesty during these receptions. In spite of the presence of a
dragoman, it was thus all but impossible to gain a personal impression of the
ruler's character.2 In consequence the descriptions of the different sultans'
personalities as relayed by European ambassadors to their sovereigns were of
necessity based on hearsay. Quite often the sources of these tales were
Venetian, as the baili had long been established in Istanbul and were
considered especially well versed in Ottoman affairs. But as the baili had no
personal contacts to the rulers either, their descriptions were based on the
relationships with Ottoman courtiers that they had built up over the years.3
Accuracy must have been a frequent casuality.
�em'dini-z!de, Sem'dlinf-z&Je Fmdtkltlt SiJieyman Efendi Tdrihi, vol. I, p. 13. However the
1
author does not tell us how this policy was to be combined with the necessity of "listening to the
words of the people" (p. 7).
2 Gulru NecipogJu, Architecture, Ceremonial and Power, The Topkapt Palace in the Fifteenth
and Sixteenth Centuries (Cambridge MA: The Architectural History Foundation and MIT Press,
1991), pp. 96-1 10.
3 Especially at the end of the sixteenth century, there were a few dignitaries of Italian
background active in the palace, compare Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, "Safiye's Household and
Venetian Diplomacy," Turcica, 32 (2000), 9-�2. On the numerous �avu� that showed up in
Venice during this period, not all of them genume, see Benjamin Arbel, "NQr BanQ (C. 1530-
1583): A Venetian Sultana?" Turcica, 24 �1992). 241-59 and Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, In nome
del Gran Signore, lnviati otUJmani a Veneua dalla cadura di Costantinopoli alia guerra di Candia
(Venezia: Deputacione Editrice, 1994).
64 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR P R I NCES
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND P I ETY 65

The baili wrote their accounts of the Ottoman governmental apparatus

Renier thus seems to have shared the positive impressions which
according to established literary formats, but the latter were flexible enough to
members of the Ottoman ruling group had of Stileyman, after a thirty-year
permit the incorporation of practically useful details. In the present context,
successful reign. Moreover in 1550, the sultan had not yet forfeited many of
we will begin with the character sketch of Sultan Siileyman (r. 1520-66) these sympathies by his part in the elimination of Princes Mustafa and
provided by the bailo Alvise Renier and dated 1550. This diplomat described a
Bayezid, and was not yet considered responsible for placing his least
personage of about sixty-five years, tall, of pleasant countenance, active and in
competent son on the throne. I This positive and even enthusiastic evaluation
good physical condition, who sat his horse well. 1 Renier pointed out that for
is worth noting, given the fact that only ten years previously, in 1539-40,
the reasons outlined above, he could not make an assessment of Siileyman's
Venice had fought a full-scale war against Sultan Siileyman. Moreover the
personality through direct experience. But from the answers to his petitions he
Ottoman ruler was highlighted as active in family politics, particularly as the
had received through the grand vizier, he felt that the sultan's reputation for
current grand vizier was the husband of Suleyman's and Hiirrem Sultan's only
justice was well merited: giustissimo is the term that he did not hesitate to
daughter. This perspective has recently been emphasized in historical
employ, and in the same breath, he also spoke of Siileyman's "goodness" and
scholarship as well, so that one might say that from a present-day perspective,
"worthiness to rule". When in council, the sultan was however considered
Renier had developed a not unrealistic assessment of Istanbul court politics in
somewhat headstrong. Thus when the Persian prince Elkas Mirza, in rebellion
the later Siileymanic age.2
against his brother the reigning shah, had been recommended to him,
As the second example we will analyze a character sketch of the young
Siileyman immediately decided to de-stabilize the state of Iran through the Sultan Murad IV (r. 1623-40). Bailo Giorgio Giustinian's relazione is dated
agency of this prince, although all his advisers suggested that the war against
to 1627, when the young ruler was not as yet the autocrat he was to become
the Habsburg emperor, or further expansion in Hungary, should have priority.
in later times.3 Giustinian considered that Murad IV had learned from the
At the time Renier wrote, the sultan had four living sons of adult or
failures of his two predecessors: the fall of Osman II had taught him to not try
adolescent age, and the bailo thought that this could not but lead to a major
to concentrate power in his own hands exclusively, while the equally dismal
succession crisis in the near future. He also commented on the attachment of
fate of Mustafa I had made it clear that leaving too much power in the hands
Sultan Siileyman to La rossa, meaning Hiirrem Sultan; as the ambassador
of others would also lead to disaster. Throughout the young ruler had l imited
knew, the Ottoman ruler had made her his legitimate wife. The Venetian
the various financial gratifications that under his predecessors, the various
thought that this affection of the sultan for his consort would jeopardize the
grandi (powerful men) had been able to obtain. This policy of moderation was
chances of Prince Mustafa, at the time governor in Amasya and at age thirty­
all the more necessary as in the opinion of Giustinian, the entire economy and
six, in the prime of life. The bailo had heard reports, which he must have
society of the Ottoman Empire was at the time constrained by a great lack of
considered credible, of the military prowess of this handsome prince, who
cash. While Murad IV was accustomed to decide matters according to the
presided over a grand court and was open-handed especially with the
recommendations of his grand viziers, the latter still attended audiences with
janissaries, among whom he was very popular. Among the sons of Hurrem
the ruler in fear and trepidation. For it was always possible that among the
Sultan, Renier had only negative things to say about Selim, later Selim 11.
petitions the latter had received, there might be some which presented the
But he felt that exactly because of the weakness of this prince, the grand vizier
current grand vizier in an unfavourable light, and the ruler might react by
Riistem Pa�a favoured him, for the pasha hoped to increase his pol itical
punishing him severely.4 In Giustinian's perspective, this was part of a
influence under an indolent sultan. Bayezid was barely mentioned, probably
conscious policy: for the young ruler did not want to be completely dependent
because the bailo had not been able to procure any information on him. On
on his grand viziers, but wished to give weight to the opinions of other
the other hand, Cihangir was present in Istanbul, where Renier probably had
members of his council as well.5 It is also of interest that in the late 1620s,
occasion to see him: in spite of a physical handicap, this youngest among the
princes was regarded as very intelligent and a favourite of his father's, who 1 On these events, compare �erafettin. Turan, Kanuni'nin. O!lu $ehztide Bayezid
kept him in his company on account of Cihangir's conversational gifts. �Ankara: Ankara Oniversitesi Dil ve Tanh-Cografya Fakllltest, 1961).
Vak'as1

Compare Peirce, The Imperial Harem.

3 Pedani Fabris ed., RelaVoni, pp. 538-41.
4 Pedani Fabris ed., Relazioni, pp. 544-45.
1 Pedani Fabris, Relazioni, pp. 75-77. 5 Pedani Fabris ed., RelaVoni, p. 56 .
3
 66 A N OT H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C E S
the bonhomie that Evliya ascribed to his favourite sultan was recorded by an
experienced Venetian diplomat as well.
For Guistinian was positively enthusiastic when it came to the
personality of the young ruler. Sultan Murad was described as very handsome
and of affable countenance, especially when compared with the grimness of
Osman II. It is worth noting that the expeditions incognito into the capital,
with the aim of repressing the use of alcohol and tobacco, that were to become
a hallmark of Murad IV's later years, here are attributed to his predecessor.1 By
contrast Murad IV was depicted as inclined more to mildness than to severity,
and where he had used the latter, it was more on account of the
recommendations of his mother (that Guistinian incidentally described as
'wise') than by his own inclination.2 The bailo considered especially
praiseworthy the young ruler's modesty, so far removed from the "pride" of
Osman II. Obviously Giustinian's account reflected the hopes that his
informants placed in what promised would be a regime of moderation and
financial recovery.
As our third example, we will use the character sketch of Sultan
Ahmed III (r. 1703-1730), written by the French ambassador Jean-Louis
Dusson, marquis de Bonnac ( 1 672-1738). The latter being on fairly easy terms
with the grand vizier Nev�ehirli Damad Ibrahim Pa�a, we can assume that
some of the information relayed came from this very source. The marquis de
Bonnac was especially interested in the relationship between the sultan and his
grand vizier; presumably he sometimes stressed the latter's qualities and merits
at the expense of the former. Ibrahim Pa�a appeared as a man capable of
exercising a moderating influence, even when Ahmed III's preoccupation with
the accumulation of treasure was at issue, an activity that De Bonnac depicted
as the dominant passion of this sultan. Moreover the grand vizier felt that the
Ottoman Empire needed a period of recuperation from war; therefore he had
been instrumental in concluding the treaty of Passarowitz/ Pasarof9a in 1718,
in spite of the losses it entailed.3 While normally French diplomacy aimed at
keeping the Habsburgs occupied on their eastern front by Ottoman wars, in
this case, De Bonnac felt obliged to agree with Ibrahim �a's assessment.4
1 Pedani Fabris ed., Re/azioni, p. 551. Papa Synadinos, Conseils et memoires, pp. 94-95
discusses at some length the expeditions of Murad IV into Istanbul as well as the pumshments
meted out to drinkers and smokers.
2 Pedani Fabris ed., Relazioni, p. 563.
3 For a biography of Ibrahim P�a.compare the r�levant entries in t
. �e. El, 2"d ed. and the islam
Ansiklopedisi pubhshed by the M1mstry of Educat1on; both are by Milmr Aktepe.
4 See Monsieur de Chateauneuf's comments who felt that after the defeat of Zenta, the
Ottomans were no longer enthusiastic about war against the Habsburgs, even though he !Umself
was in favour of continuing: De Bonnac, Memoire historique, p. 91. On the contrary v1ews of
De Bonnac, see Memoire historique, p. 139; here he describes the peace of Pasarof�a as
"shameful but necessary".
67
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND PIETY
The French ambassador, who incidentally was praised by the
contemporary chronicler Celebizade for his skilful mediation between the
Ottoman sultan and Tsar Peter I, was no longer in Istanbul by the time of
Ibrahim Pa�a's fall in 1730. Therefore his papers contain no overall
assessment of the cooperation between Ahmed III and his long-time grand
vizier. I However similarly to the Ottoman authors writing on this issue, the
Marquis also dwelt upon the need to practice generosity as a royal attribute, a
consideration that in his opinion, Ahmed III was liable to forget. We have
seen that De Bonnac was a partisan of Ibrahi m Pa�a's, while Abdi and
�em'dani-zade tended to sympathize more with the sultan. We do not know
anything about the reasons for this difference in assessment. It is possible that
the Ottoman authors wished to uphold the legitimacy of the dynasty by
placing whatever blame was due squarely upon the shoulders of the grand
vizier. As to De Bonnac he also had a personal axe to grind: among other
things, he was out to prove to the French foreign ministry that he had a better
grasp of Istanbul politics than his less successful predecessors. Yet it is worth
noting that the ri ght balance between generosity and filling the treasury was
central to Ottoman and non-Ottoman authors.
Public construction and sultanic legitimacy
Apparently Evliya <;elebi did not disapprove of Murad IV's omitting to
build a great mosque complex, while almost all of the latter's ancestors had
done so. By contrast i n the sixteenth century Mustafa 'Ali had emphasized
construction projects as being of major significance when it came to
establishing the status of a ruler.2 Not that construction projects and repairs to
public buildings, especially in the Holy Cities of the Hijaz, were insignificant
in Evliya's eyes. In the case of his favourite ruler Murad IV, the restoration of
the Giil Camii i n Istanbul was therefore made to stand in for the missing
complex of pious foundations.3 Moreover when Evliya visited the Hijaz as a
pilgrim in 1671, he went out of his way to mention a couple of inscriptions
in the name of the current sultan Mehmed IV (r. 1648-87) that commemorated
the latter's - probably not very important - repair projects.4
1 Qelebizade Efendi, published as vol. 6 of the Ta_rih-i RO§id, pp. 223-24.
2 For a synoptic overview over the contents of 'All's chronicle see Jan Schmidt, Pure Wa1erfor
Thirsty Muslims A Study of Mustafa 'Ali of Gallipoli's K iinhii 1-ahbar (Leiden: no publisher, n.
d., probably lm), pp. 284-3�2. 'All d�voted consider�ble attention to .the Ott?man rulers'
'charities', the category in wh1ch. �c�m1�t places �ultan1c p1ous . foundations; th1s shows the
value of such activities in the leg1tlmlzat1on of a SIXteenth-century ruler. I am grateful to Jan
Schmidt for providing me with a copy of his thesis.
3 Evliya Qelebi, Evliya Celebi SeyahalnLlmesi, vol. 1 , ed. Gokyay, p. 91.
4 Evliya Qelebi, Seyahatnamesi, 10 vols. (Istanbul, Ankara: Ikdam and others): vol. 9 was
published in 1935: vol. 9, p. 752.
 68 ANOTHER M I R R OR FOR P R I N C ES
PRESENTING THE S ULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND PIETY 69

Evliya's notions about appropriate sultanic practice seem to have

congratulation. Evliya himself had trouble documenting his statement, the
conformed quite closely to what was really the custom in his own time. In the
only concrete example concerning a vizier and governor of Habe� (Abyssinia).
mid-seventeenth century great public foundation complexes were rarely built,
This dignitary supposedly sent highly decorated candlesticks that were linked
even though smaller charities were still being established. Mustafa 'All had
together with chains and hung up to form a chandelier, in Evliya's eyes one of
certainly been very critical of Murad III under whose rule he had lived for
the most spectacular aspects of the building.
twenty years; yet among Ottoman authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth
How did the Sultan Ahmed mosque appear to an educated non-Muslim
centuries, he was rather exceptional i n this respect. Open criticism of the
inhabitant of Istanbul? For this purpose, we can analyze the description given
persons and politics of sultans both living and deceased was usually avoided.
by P. <iugas (or <iugios) inciciyan ( 1 758-1833) that was apparently written
Evliya �elebi, otherwise outspoken in his criticisms, also conformed to this
towards the end of the eighteenth century. 1 Born in Istanbul, inciciyan had
custom. 1 When he found nothing to praise, he usually preferred to remain
trained with the Mechitarists in Venice, and later become a priest in this order
silent, and this applied to charities and public construction as well as to other
of Catholic monks. As a polyglot scholar, who mostly divided his time
matters.
between Istanbul and Venice, inciciyan was conversant with the 'modern-style'
Yet earlier on, when Evliya was a child at the beginning of the
sciences current in Europe during this period. Among numerous works he co­
seventeenth century, an important sultanic mosque had in fact been built, and
authored an eleven-volume survey of world geography. The description of the
its praises were even sung i n literature. In the twentieth century, it became
Ottoman capital, in which the Sultan Ahmed mosque figures along with other
fashionable to joke about the 'elephant's feet' , i n other words the great piers
sultanic foundations, formed part of this work. After giving the dates of
holding up the dome of the Sultan Ahmed mosque. Yet at the time of
construction ( l 018/1609 to 1026/ 1 617) inciciyan recorded the measurements
construction, this building was hailed as being of superb beauty, a veritable
of the great columns, which thus differently from Evliya, he regarded as a
foretaste of the garden of paradise, and also as a monument of victory over the
major feature of the building. He then went on to discuss the minarets,
Shiites of Iran. A certain Ca'fer Efendi, a member of the household of the
referring to an unnamed Ottoman source, which claimed that the sixteen
chief architect Mimar Mehmed Aga, wrote an entire book designed to
balconies adorning the minarets contained an allusion to the fact that Sultan
publicize, in addition to the other merits and achievements of his patron, the
Ahmed I was the sixteenth Ottoman ruler.2 inciciyan went on to describe the
sublime qualities of this building.2
architectural features of the courtyard and provided a list of all the ancillary
Another extensive description of the Sultan Ahmed mosque was
institutions forming part of the foundation complex. He also recorded that this
authored by Evliya �elebi . Once again this account picked up the paradise
institution possessed a revenue of about 300 purses (of ak�e ) , the
motif - however what was referred to here was not a symbol but 'the real
administrator (voyvoda) of Galata being in charge of running the different
thing', namely a garden located in the outer courtyard of the mosque, whose
charities.
pleasant smells wafted into the building on a fine summer's day. 3 More
When discussing the appearance of the mosque, tnciciyan referred to the
pertinent to our purpose of assessing the trans-cultural impact of this building
admiring comments of foreign travellers, unfortunately without telling us
is Evliya's repeated claim, which does not feature in Ca'fer Efendi's work, that
whose reports he had read. According to this scholarly geographer, the Sultan
numerous foreign kings sent gifts to the mosque, presumably as a form of
Ahmed mosque was often used by the sultan and his court, with the denizens
of the palace wearing their costliest robes for the occasion. Thus this
1 On Mustafa 'Ali's criticism of Murad Ill, compare Cornell H. Aeischer, Bureaucrat and
/n�e/lectual !n the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Mui!afa 'Ali (1541-1600) (Princeton: particular mosque appeared as a place where the sultan could be viewed by his
. Press, 986), pp. 294-307.
Princeton Umvers1ty 1
2 [Ca'fer Efendi], Ris/ile-i mi'm/Jriyye. an Early-seventeenth-century Ottoman Treati
se on 1 fn�iciyan, Jf.Vlll. AsmJ.a Istanbul, p. 39. As I do not read Armenian, 1 have to limit myself to
1rclri�ecture, �- and.annotate� by Howard C�ne, (Leiden: EJ. Brill, 1987), pp. 64-76. jhe. 1�for�at10n g_tv�n
.
by Andreasyan and �
amu�.ciy.a�, who do not tell us when exactly
Evhya <;:eleb1, Evllya fe�ebl Se
yahatnd'!!es1 , vol. �· �d. G�kyay, pp. 86-88. Evliya claims that nct�tyan s . d.escnptJOn was composed. (antcle lnctc1yan' in Dunden BugiJne Istanbul
the dome was h�ld up w!thout column s , a descnphon d1�cult to accept given the notable Ans,�lopediSI b>: �evork Pamu�ctyan) But as an earthquake which took place in 1766 is
,
presence of the elephants feet . He seems to have used th 1s phrase as a cliche. Therefore 1 mentiOned .bY lnctcJyan (p. 9), this date can serve as a terminus post quem, while the terminus
am not sure �hether on. the st�en�th .of his description, we should accept that the original
�osque of Eyup, before 1ts rebu1ldmg ·� h
ante quem IS 1804.
t e late eighteenth century, really had a dome restin
d1rectly on ht� wall�. For �.contrary op1mon, see Aptullah Kuran, "EyUp KUIIiyesi," in TUia � 2 In his commentary, Andreasyan. noted that this result was arrived at by counting Princes
.

�ns �f BayeZ!,d I, � f
SUleyman a�d Musa, s ully fledged Ottoman rulers. For a similar statement
Artan ed E y p: Dun/ Bugun. J/-12 Aral1k 1993 (Istanbul: Tarih Vakf1 Yun Yaymlan• 1 994)•
ii
co��e Ca fer Efend1, RJSt e-1 nu m/Jnyye. 1 987, p. 74. Perhaps this was the Ottoman source
.•

pp. 1 29-35. !il

1
nctctyan had read?
 70 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NCES
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWE R , GLORY AND P I ETY 71

subjects, and in inciciyan's eyes, it must have supplanted the Aya Sofya in
more "elegant, agreeable and spacious". AI-Tamihruti' noted that the plan of
this role. For while the author included an extensive description of the latter
the latter had been inspired by the former, yet almost in the same breath, he
sanctuary as well, in this case there was no mention of the courtiers in their
exclaimed that even though there had been numerous attempts to imitate the
colourful array, whose regular gatherings made the Sultan Ahmed mosque so 1
Aya Sofya, these had all been in vain. Coming from an educated Muslim
special. With the foreign travellers he had read inciciyan concurred in a final
observer, this is an interesting testimony to the supreme prestige of the older
superlative: "nowhere in the world has there occurred a ceremony of similar building.2 Otherwise AI-Tamib_ruti' simply relayed the story of the four
brilliance and magnificence". 1
columns that Siileyman the Magnificent supposedly had shipped from
Alexandria, of which two were lost in a shipwreck.3
More interesting is his discussion of the mosque of Eyiib, which was
Sultanicfoundations and the reports offoreign visitors
assiduously visited by the sultan as well as by ordinary folk. AI-Tamihruti'
mentioned the small but luxurious boats that Sultan Murad III (r. 1574-1 595)
Descriptions of Ottoman buildings by Ottoman observers, whether
used for his frequent visits to this shrine, the richness of the pious foundations
Muslim or non-Muslim, do not survive in large numbers, but the writings of
supporting it, the numerous Korans stocked in a special shelf for the use of
non-Ottoman Muslim visitors and their perceptions of sultanic public
visitors, and the fact that many people, especially prominent Ottomans, made
buildings before the nineteenth century are even scantier. Certainly some
considerable financial sacrifices in order to be buried in this place. Piety, a
Indian and Iranian princesses and princes visited Mecca and Medina, and
strong sense of hierarchy and decorum in addition to an abundance of material
sometimes even went to live there.2 Moreover in 1547-48, the rebel Safavid
goods were the qualities the Moroccan ambassador most appreciated about
prince Alkas Mirza, brother to the current shah Tahmasp I, visited Istanbul, to
Istanbul upper-class culture. As less positive features, he noted a strong
say nothing of the relatively numerous Iranian embassies appearing in the
concern with money-making.
Ottoman capital during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Arriving from
Where European authors are concerned, the description of Istanbul's
the borderlands of the Empire certain Kurdish princes also resided i n the
major mosques, which might or might not include discussions of the aesthetic
capital, and even held office at the Ottoman court.3 But very few of these
merits of these structures, has formed a standard part of travel accounts ever
visitors seem to have left any account of their experiences, and even fewer
were those who commented on the sultans' mosques and medreses. since the sixteenth century. The study of these texts has become a major
concern of Anglophone and especiall y Francophone researchers, who have
However we do possess a description of Istanbul by the Moroccan
ambassador Abu '!-Hasan 'Ali' ai-Tamib_ruti', who arrived in Istanbul in shown how texts from Greco-Roman antiquity, to say nothing of the Bible,

November 1589. Like other distinguished visitors, AI-Tarnihruti' toured the
sights of the city, including the Eyiib Sultan, Aya Sofya and Siileymaniye
mosques; regrettably for our purposes, the Sultan Ahmed mosque had not as
yet been built.4 The ambassador admired all three structures; he felt that the
Aya Sofya was more "massive and grandiose", while the Siileymaniye was
1 inciciyan, XVlll. Asmla Istanbul, p. 39.
2 . Nairn R. Farooqi, "Moguls, O�tomans and Pilgrims: Protecting the Routes to Mecca in the
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centunes," The International History Review, X, 2 (1988), 198-220
3 ismet Parmak.slzoglu, "Kuzey lrak'ta Osmanh HAkimiyetinin Kurulu§U ve Memun Beyin
H�ttralan," Bellete'! XXXV�I. 146 (197�). 191-230; Memun Bey was a contemporary of
. .
Suleyman the �agmficent. H1s d�m1nant mtere_st lay m showing how, by their loyalty to the
Ottoman r uler
. h1s father and he h1mself had gamed the right to the governorship of �ehrizor.
..
The beautes of Istanbul were not his concern, which is all the more regrettable as the author
was fully 1n command of Ottoman and must have known his way around the capital.
4 A�-Tamghruti, En:najhat, pp. 47-61. For a discussion in recent secondary literature, see
Xav1er de Planhol, L Islam et Ia "!f!T, La mosquee et le matelot, Vlle-XXe siecle (Paris: Perrin,
2000�, pp. 231-246. For the penod from 1550 to 1730, I have not been able to find any
descnpllons of the Sultan Ahmed mosque by non-Ottoman Muslims.
have been used in shaping travellers' accounts, even when it was the authors'
avowed aim to produce an 'eyewitness account' .4 By contrast, reports by
Venetian diplomats were meant for presentation to the Signoria only, so that
literary conceits should have been less in evidence. This however is far from
clear, as some of these reports were soon copied and their authors may well
have anticipated this type of diffusion and given a ' literary' form to their
writings. Quite a few relazioni contain relatively standardized descriptions of
Istanbul as 'background information', and thus the borders between these texts
� Al-Tamghruti, En-najhat, p. 54.
While the author did pick up some Turk!sh words and elements of grammar, he probably did
. . .
not know th1s language very well, and h1s m
formallon must have come from people with whom
he could converse in classical Arabic.
3 For oth�r accol!nts of the provenance of these columns, see Orner Liitfi Barkan Siileymaniy
fami ve lmareti ITJ§aatl, 2 vols. (Ankara: �Urk Tarih Kurumu, 1972, 1979), vol. 1 ,'pp. 336-44. e
As examples compare Stephane Yeras1mos, Les voyageurs dans l'Empire ottoman (XI� _
XVI• siecles). Bibliographie, itinlraires et inventaire des lieux habites (Ankara:
TUrk Tarih
Kurumu, 1991) and Tinguely, L 'ecriture du Levant.
 72 ANOTHER M IRROR FOR P RINCES
and ordinary published travelogues are less marked than appears at first glance.
However these diplomats are important to us as they were concerned with the
political effects of sultanic building projects, and exactly these effects, in other
words the 'politics of piety', are our main concern here. We will therefore
begin with an evaluation of sultanic charities by a Venetian envoy. I
Giacomo Soranzo had represented the Signoria at the circumcision of
Mehmed III in 1582; but due to prolonged i llness en route it was only in 1584
that he returned to Venice and presented his report. His text included a
discussion of the Valide mosque in Oskiidar, recently built by Nurbanu Sultan
the mother of Murad Ill, who according to rumours current in Istanbul, was
born a member of a Venetian noble family.2 Nurbanu Sultan had chosen a site
on the Anatolian shore. Her complex was thus somewhat remote from the city
centre, but located in full view of the Topkapt palace across the sea.3 Soranzo
surmised that this site was chosen because she wanted her son to be constantly
aware of her pious generosity. As Soranzo described the mosque as bellisima,
her project seems to have been a full success in worldly terms.
After stressing, in the manner that had become customary, that the
valide sultan was very money-minded and could only be won over by rich
presents, Soranzo conceded that here was one project on which the sultana had
spent lavishly. He emphasized that she had taken care of the future as well, by
assigning sufficient productive revenue sources to guarantee the smooth
functioning of the mosque complex. While some of the shops and khans
assigned to the foundation had been purchased 'ready-made', others had been
built expressly to serve the mosque and its dependencies. Moreover the founder
spent additional large sums in order to construct ordinary dwellings in the
vicinity of the mosque, so that she might feel the satisfaction of having
founded an entire town. Apparently Soranzo himself did not disagree with this
opinion.
When discussing Ottoman accounts of sultanic building projects, we
have focused on descriptions of the Sultan Ahmed mosque. Therefore it would
be inexcusable if we were to miss the opportunity of comparing these
Ottoman Turkish and Armenian texts with a description of the same building
by a seventeenth-century European traveller. Jean Thevenot (1633-67) was a
1 The expression 'the politics of piety' has been coined by Madeline Zilfi, The Politics ofPiety,
The Onoman Ulema in the Classical Age (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1988).
2 Pedani Fabris, Relazioni, p. 271. The entry 'Nur Banu' in the El. 2•d edition makes her an
illegitimate daughter of Violante Baffo and Nicolo Venier, the one-but-last ruler of Paros.
However Arbel, "NOr BanO" has shown that this conjecture is not based on reliable sources.
Other sources of the time make her into a member of a well-to-do Greek family from
Venetian-held Corfu, but this is also doubtful.
3 Whether and if applicable how the locations of mosques founded by different members of the
Ottoman dynasty reflected internal hierarchies has often been discussed by modern scholars,
compare Peirce, The Imperial Harem, pp. 198-2 12.
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND PIETY 73
younger contemporary of Evliya's, and visited the city in 1655-56, when the
Sultan Ahmed mosque had been part of the Istanbul skyline for about forty
years. Thevenot has been described as the epitome of the 'average' traveller,
cautious, prudent, inclined to copy his predecessors whenever he found
something appropriate, but at the same time, a well-informed and
conscientious observer of everyday life. 1 Our French visitor agreed with his
Ottoman contemporaries that the Sultan Ahmed mosque was one of the most
handsome i n the city, and then described the sequence of outer courtyard,
portico and rectangular inner courtyard with its domes supported by marble
columns. The garden praised by Evliya Celebi did not figure in his account,
either because it had disappeared or because Thevenot had visited the mosque
during the cold season. Our author admired the fine fountain and also the
central dome. But what most struck him were the ornaments of glass and other
materials hung up throughout the interior - were these perhaps the items that
Evliya considered the gifts of foreign kings? Among other pieces, Thevenot
mentioned the wooden model of a galley fully outfitted and another such item
showing the mosque itself. We are left to wonder whether these decorations
were attached to the chandeliers that Evliya had so admired. Unfortunately
neither Ottoman nor foreign observers inform us who had decided to hang the
models of these particular items and what purposes they were meant to serve.2
As we have seen, Evliya Celebi and Ca'fer Efendi highlighted the
religious motivations for building the Sultan Ahmed mosque, even though at
least in Ca'fer's account, the political feature of victory over the 'heretical'
Safawids was an important concern as well. Soranzo stressed the political
considerations that had prompted Nurbanu Sultan to found a whole new town,
or town quarter to be more exact, of Oskiidar. But he also made his readers
aware of the religious moment, at least in an oblique fashion: after all, the
prominent location of the complex was to constantly remind the sultan of his
mother's generous piety. On the other hand, P. Gugas inciciyan was not at all
concerned with religious aspects, but the political meaning of the mosque was
very much i n the forefront of his thinking. As evidence there is his comment
on the number of balconies corresponding to the number of sultans who had
ruled down to 1617, and his emphasis upon the brilliant, unique ceremony on
the occasion of the sultan's Friday prayers.
1 Th6venot, Voyage, pp. 6-9. I do not know whether in describing the 'Blue Mosque' Thevenot
had found himself a model to copy. As in the mid-l71b century this building was not as yet very
old (Th6venot explicitly calls it the 'new mosque') possibilities for copying should have been
more limited than in the case of old standbys like the Aya Sofya.
2 The mosque model mentioned here forms part of a small number of known three-dimensional
models of major public buildings; compare Gillru Necipoglu-Kafadar, "Plans and Models in
15th and 16th Century Ottoman Architectural �ctice", Journal of the Society ofArchitectural
Historians, XLX, 3 (1 986), 224-43. Models of ships were often hung as votive gifts in Orthodox
churches, for instance if the ship had escaped a major accident, but we do not not know
whether the models in the Sultan Ahmed mosque, if indeed they were present in Thevenot's
time, served a similar purpose. Compare Angelos Delivorrias, A Guide to the Benaki Museum
(Athens: Benaki Museum, 2000), pp. 162-66.
74 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
By contrast, neither imperial self-assertion nor piety played a major
role in TMvenot's description of the Sultan Ahmed mosque, apart from a brief
reference to the man who prayed for the dead ruler's soul in the adjacent
mausoleum. Considerations of piety did however figure more prominently in
the same author's immediately preceding description of the Siileymaniye,
where Korans as well as mementoes of Mecca and Medina were prominently
displayed near the sultan's sarcophagus. IfThevenot thus showed a tendency to
link religious motifs to the mausoleums rather than to the mosques
themselves, this may be due to the occasions at which he visited the buildings
in question: he probably saw the mosque at a time when no religious services
were in progress, while prayers for the soul of the deceased ruler were a
permanent feature. Thus it appears that on the whole Muslims were more
aware of the religious aspects of sultanic mosques, while non-Muslims
emphasized political and aesthetic considerations, but the opposition was by
no means absolute.
Processions with and without the sultans
Pious foundations apart, public ceremonies were another means of
making the glory of the sultans visible to their own subjects as well as to
foreigners. Much of Evliya's famous first volume, dedicated to Istanbul, is
taken up by a procession of artisans and state officials that marked Sultan
Murad IV's departure on one of his campaigns. For Evliya this parade was the
occas ion, or perhaps rather the pretext, for a commented enumeration of the
office-holders and guildsmen present i n Istanbul i n the mid-seventeenth
century.1 Such processions had been common enough already in the 1500s,
and thus enumerating the participants had become an accepted part of the
'festival books' (surname) that were being composed with increasing
frequency at this time.2
Ottoman sultans did not in most cases participate in these events in
person, but watched them from a tent, loggia or pavilion. Whether the grand
vizier was granted a similar distinction depended on circumstances; in the
famous miniatures depicting the circumcision festivities of 1720, we see
Nev§ehirli Ibrahim P�a observing the proceedings from his own tent. There
I For a discussion of Evliya's description compare Robert Mantran, Istanbul dans Ia seconde
moitie du XVII! sUcle, Essai d'histoire institutione/le, economique et sociale (Paris, Istanbul:
Institut Fran98is d'Arch�ologie d'lstanbul and Adrien Maisonneuve, 1962), pp. 352-57.
2 For rhymed festival books and their place in Ottoman literature, see Mehmet Arslan,
Surnamekr (Osmanil Saray Diiliinleri ve Senlikleri) (Ankara: TUrk Tarih Kurumu, 1999). The
same author has announced a companion volume on festival books in prose.
PRESENTING THE S U LTANS' P OW E R , GLORY AND PIETY 75
were some cases however, when the sultan also took part in the parade. As an
example we might mention the solemn entry into Istanbul that Selim II
celebrated after succeeding to the throne of his father Siileyman the
Magnificent ( 1566). ' Selim II's son Mehmed III repeated the performance after
· his victorious return from the battle of Hacova (Mesokeresztes).2
Following the same tradition, Murad IV also performed a solemn entry
into his capital, namely after the conquest of Revan.3 Among the people of
Istanbul, the turnout was numerous, in Evliya's opinion partly due to the fact
that the inhabitants of the capital had reason to complain of the vizier Bayram
Pa�·s rule during the sultan's absence and in this festive atmosphere, hoped
to find the ruler responsive to their grievances. Entering the city amidst
martial music, the ships in the harbour firing in salute, Murad IV wore the
iron accoutrements of battle and so did his horse. Almost reminiscent of the
triumphal marches celebrated in the Near East of antiquity, the most
prominent Iranian captives were marched in front of the sultan; this included
Emirgune-oglu, who had surrendered voluntarily and was later to become one
of the sultan's favourites. Valuable fabrics were stretched between poles to
mark the processional way; they were later handed over to the soldiery. A day
later, this basically military and political celebration was completed by a
religious procession, when the sultan paid a solemn visit to the mausoleum of
Eyiib Ansari.
Moreover from the seventeenth century onwards, it became customary
to 'introduce' the newly enthroned ruler to his capital, and vice versa, by a
formal pilgrimage to the shrine of Eyiib, where he was girded with a sword
deemed to have belonged a variety of ancient heroes, including his ancestor
Osman 1.4 It has been suggested that parades in which the sultan took centre
stage were instituted after Ottoman princes stopped going to the provinces as
governors, and spent their youths and adolescences in the seclusion of a
Topkap1 palace apartment. For under these circumstances, ascending the throne
meant 'appearing in public' for the first time, and this event was marked by a
major procession.5 As the prominence that Evliya gave to a single such event
amply demonstrates, these parades impressed Ottoman subjects.
1 Almosnino, Grandezas, pp. 55-64; for comments see Yatin and Yeinstein, Le serail ebranli, p.
308.
2 Nicolas Yatin, "Aux origines du pelerinage il Eyllp des sultans ottomans," Turcica, XXYll
�1995),91-100.
Evliya <;elebi, Evliya r;elebi Seyahatnllmesi, vol. 1, cd. Golcyay, p. 98.
4 For an interesting discussion, compare Cemal Kafadar, "EyUp'te Kilt� KU§anma Torenleri,"
in TUJay Artan ed.• Eyiip: Diinl Bugiin, 11-12 Aral1k 1_9�3 (Istanb�l: T�rih Yalcft Yurt Yaymlan,
1994),pp. 50-61; thanks to Christoph Neumann for pomtmg out thts arttcle.
5 Yatin, "Aux origines". According to Evliya <;elebi, �urad IV gi�ed r not o0:e but �o swords
:
namely that of Selim I and that of the Prophet htmself (Evhya <;elebt, Evl1ya Celeb1
Seyalullfrlimesi, vol. I , ed. Gokyay, P· 92).
 76 A N O T H E R M I R RO R F O R P R I NC ES
Religious elements in the sultans ' processions: elements of a common
language?
But at the same time, these festive events were carefully observed by
foreigners as well. As Frenchmen, Englishmen or subjects of the Habsburgs
and the various Italian and German principalities, these people were familiar
with the procession as a singularly effective means of depicting social
hierarchy and also of keeping the royal image present in the minds especially
of town-dwelling subjects.1 Moreover such foreign observers would also have
known that parades usually had some religious significance. In Catholic
countries, priests and bishops, often carrying the Eucharist and thus making
the presence of the divinity apparent to the viewers, participated in many
processions. Beyond confessional boundaries this imagery must have
awakened powerful resonances. After all, even in post-Reformation England,
where we would expect references to the old church to have been taboo, certain
saints continued to figure throughout the reign of Elizabeth 1.2 Moreover
while seventeenth- or eighteenth-century European courtiers certainly did not
believe in the gods of the Greco-Roman pantheon in any religious sense of the
word, it is still remarkable how closely the apotheoses of rulers in the antique
style that decorated so many palaces of the time, resembled the imagery which
in a rococo church, was used to render visible the ascension of Christ or the
assumption of the Virgin Mary. Even for the most Voltairean viewers of the
1770s, visualizing the glory of the ruler in a courtly assembly or procession
thus must have evoked strong religious reminiscences.
Of course Islam knows neither priests nor symbols of the divine
comparable to the Eucharist in the Catholic Church. Yet Evliya knew very
well that a religious component was present in many Ottoman processions.
As an indicator, we may take his consistent references to the heavenly
protectors of the different craft guilds participating in Murad IV's pre­
campaign parade.3 In the case of an army marching out to do battle with the
infidel, the banner of the Prophet was often carried along, and dervishes
participated in order to encourage the soldiery. Thus the artisans who paraded
before Murad IV before they accompanied the Ottoman army they were to
serve on campaign, must have shared i n the religious aura that surrounded
such an undertaking.
1 The literature on processions undertaken in European Renaissance states is too extensive for
even a brief review; but as examples, see Frances Yates, Astraea: The Imperial Theme in the
Sixteenth Century (London: Ark Paperbacks, 1975) and Roy Strong, Art and Power
�Woodbridge/Suffolk: Boydell and Brewer, 2nd ed. 1984).
Roy Strong, "Queen and City: The Elizabethan Lord Mayor's Pageant" in itkm. The Tudor and
Stuart Monarchy. Pageantry, Painting, Iconography, 2 vols. (Woodbridge, Suffolk: The Boydell
Press, reprint 1995), vol. 2: 17-32.
3 On Evliya's sources compare Mantran, Istanbul, pp. 352-353.
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND PIETY 77
Last but not least, religious references were especially prominent in the
processions linked to the Mecca pilgrimage, which were celebrated with
particular elaboration in Cairo, but existed also in Istanbul, Damascus and of
course the two Holy Cities themselves. Among the most famous items
invested with religious significance and guarded in the Topkap1 palace, there
were the locks, usually of gilt bronze, that closed the doors of the Kaaba,
along with their attendant keys. These were exchanged with some frequency,
and the items no longer in use conveyed to Istanbul.1 In addition every year
the Kaaba was covered with a precious fabric, bordered with inscriptions from
the Koran that was manufactured in Cairo and formed one of the visual foci of
the Egyptian pilgrimage caravan. Some European travellers wrote about
having to be discreet and unobtrusive when they wished to view these
processions; this obviously was linked to the aura of sanctity that they
possessed in the eyes of Ottoman Muslims.2
Ottoman sultans made relatively moderate claims to linkages with the
sphere of the divine. Yet sacred deposits such as the banner of the Prophet
were in their special care, while their armies were depicted as doing battle
against 'unbelievers' and 'heretics'. Furthermore, the rulers were surrounded by
religious scholars and holy men whom they patronized, and who with their
characteristic headgear, also were prominent participants i n public parades.
Thus the religious elements i n Ottoman processions must, i n the eyes of
Muslim viewers, have conveyed the idea that as long as he occupied the
throne, the sultan was not a purely secular personage.3 Here was a meeting
point between Ottoman and European notions of rule.
European observers of Ottoman processions
This rather lengthy discussion will hopefully make it easier to explain
how Ottoman processions could be understood by outsiders. Descriptions of
parades and processions abound in European travel accounts of the time; indeed
due to their great numbers, only a tiny selection can be discussed here.
1 Janine Sourdel-Thomime, Clefs et serrures de Ia Ka'ba, Notes d'epigraphie arabe (Paris:
Revue des Etudes Islamiques, hors s6rie 3, Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1971).
Remarkably enough, a sizeable number of Kaaba keys in the Topkap1 Museum go back to the
Mamluk and even Abbasid periods.
2 For a late 17th-century testimony �ompare Henry Maundrell, A Journey from Aleppo to
Jerusalem in 1697, introduced by Dav1d Howell (Beirut: Khayats, reprint 1963), p. 171.
3
This special status of the sultan is also apparent fom the fact that while at official parades,
the solemn religious element was balanced by all kinds�
of jokes and buffooneries, the sultan
himself was never the butt of such amusements. Of course this is merely the image conveyed by
written sources; what people said o� suc.h occ��ons may have been a different matter.
Compare Derin Terzioglu, "The lmpenal CucumcJsJon Festival of 1582: An Interpretation",
Muqarnas, 12(1995), 84-100.
78 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PR I NCES
Reinhold Lubenau visited Istanbul as the sixteenth-century equivalent
of a tourist; that is, he accepted employment as a pharmacist to the embassy
of Bartholomaus Pezzen, the Habsburg ambassador, because he wanted to see
something of the world before settling down to the life of a local notable in a
Baltic town ( 1587-89). His diary was later ornamented with citations from
classical authors in the approved style of the times. But even so, some of the
writer's personal predilections shine through. As we have seen, he thoroughly
enjoyed festivities of all kinds, and as an unofficial visitor, there was nothing
to prevent him from attending whatever games and processions took his fancy.
Lubenau is thus one of the very few writers to describe in detail the
equestrian games through which Ottoman cavalrymen trained for 'serious'
warfare, or else the entertainments on Istanbul fairgrounds, which had quite a
few features in common with the amusements accompanying official
processions.
I He has also produced one of the most detailed descriptions of
the 1582 circumcision celebrations available today; it is however at second
hand, as Lubenau only arrived in Istanbul five years after the event. The Baltic
traveller was not greatly impressed by Ottoman war games. After all, they
were by definition lost by the party representing the Christians, and he wryly
commented on the Jot of certain poor men who had lost their lives in the
commotion of the festival. Yet all in all he seems to have had a good bit of
fun.2
While in Edirne, Antoine Galland observed the parade that in May
marked the departure of an Ottoman army. Remarkably enough, not only
martial virtues were highlighted i n this brilliant event, but with at least equal
force, the basic fact that no campaign is possible unless the soldiers are
properly fed. Thus the show involved a peasant producer of grain, along with
his oxen and plough, followed by bakers showing off cakes and bread, and
dressed up in semi-martial, highly decorated costumes. Next in line were the
butchers, whose apprentices were armed with muskets; they guarded highly
decorated sheep and cows with gilt horns. Galland was particularly impressed
by the manufacturers of fruit preserves, who were represented by a man dressed
in a toga made of strings of fruit candy, and by the makers of mats who
showed off a man with an enormous turban made out of this refractory
materiaJ.3 Even though Galland was an outsider to Ottoman society, he quite
readily understood that this latter image was a burlesque, and that participants
and spectators were enjoying a joke at the expense of officials to whom they
normally owed respect. Particularly this was a day of festive licence for the
1 Lubenau, Beschreibung der Reisen, vol. I, pp. 181-85.
2 Lubenau, Beschreibung der Reisen, vol. 2. pp. 49-57.
3 However, he thought that the soldiers were badly trained in using their muskets.
PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POWER, GLORY AND PIETY 79
local non-Muslims, who were free to dress in whatever way they pleased, and
especially the Armenians seem to have used the occasion for a bit of
boisterous amusement.
The Venetian envoy Girolamo Vignola, who visited Istanbul in 1724,
has left short accounts of the most remarkable ceremonies witnessed during
his stay. These included a parade of the ruler and his four sons to solemn
prayers in the mosque of Sultan Ahmed, in which janissaries featured as well
as palace officials. Vignola recorded that the sultan was watched not only by
the male population of the capital , but also by Turkish, Greek and Armenian
women. In the Venetian diplomat's understanding, the populace regarded the
young princes with special admiration, and he noted the affectionate concern of
their father as well. Vignola interpreted the event as a demonstration that the
succession, and therefore the future of the dynasty, was assured. This
consideration was all the more important as Ahmed III seemed about fifty-five
years old, a respectable age for that time. I
Gifts, tributes and the sultans' honour
In major public processions, gifts given by the participants to the
sultan were sometimes displayed, and occasionally the relevant lists have
1672 come down to us. Evliya even claimed that the presents submitted to Murad
IV at his triumphal entry made it possible to refill the treasury, which must
have been much depleted during years of warfare.2 Foreign ambassadors
arriving at the court also bore gifts. Moreover not only the sultan, but also
the grand viziers and other high-ranking dignitaries expected presents. Rustem
�. grand vizier to SUleyman the Magnificent was known for his demands in
this respect, as attested not only by the snide remarks of the Habsburg
ambassador Ogier Ghislin de Busbecq (Busbecquius), but also by the
complaint of the Kurdish prince Memun Bey of �ehrizor, a subject of Sultan
Stileyman.3
Particularly impressive were the gifts brought by Iranian ambassadors;
these might include valuable manuscripts, which have survived relatively well
because differently from objects made of gold and silver, they could not be
melted down. More exotic were the elephants that the Safavids occasionally
Pedani Fabris ed., Re/azioni, pp. 825-81, especially p . 859ff.
1
2
Evliya c;etebi, Evliya 9elebi Seyahatnflmesi, vol. I, ed. Gtskyay, p. 99.
3 Augerius Gislenius Busbequius, [Ogier Ghislin de Busbecqj, Legationis turcicae epistolae
quatuor, ed. by Zweder von Martels, tr. into Dutch by Michel Goldsteen (Hilversum: Verloren
1994), p. 51. ParmaksJZotlu, "Memun Beyin Hat.tralan," p. 222. For Mustafa 'Air's commen�
about ROstem �·s profit-mindedness. and the advantages of this quality to the sultan's
treasury, compare Schmidt, Pure WaJer, p. 322.
80 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
PRESENTING T H E SULTA N S ' POWER, GLORY A N D PIETY 81

acquired from India and passed on to the Ottoman court. 1 To these gifts the
merely in their monetary value. In the case of Venice, better known to
sultans responded by means of the tayin, that is the food and firewood granted
Ottoman dignitaries than any other city of Europe, specific wishes were often
to any foreign embassy once it had crossed the Ottoman frontier. Ambassadors expressed that the Signoria fulfilled within the limits set by the money
sent to foreign courts also carried presents to be handed over on behalf of the allotted for such occasions. I In other cases, the ruler making the present would
sultan, and semi-independent princes such as Memun Bey, when formally
select items that hopefully would conform to Ottoman taste. Thus in the
appointed to office, received gifts in the ruler's name as we11.2 The bey
1590s, the then Grand Vizier Sinan �a was to have received a suit of armour
reported that the messenger who brought the joyful news of his appointment
with precious metal inlays i n a design inspired by Ottoman motifs.2
and the attendant presents was honoured by various festivities.3
European ambassadors often claimed to regard Ottoman complaints
These ritual exchanges were the subject of much negotiation, as it was
concerning insufficiently costly presents as indicative of an avarice peculiar to
not always easy to draw the line between gifts and tribute. Thus the Austrian
the sultan's court. But this evaluation is one-sided: doubtless officials in the
Habsburgs during the later sixteenth century preserved their self-respect by Ottoman state apparatus expected presents, but in this they acted no differently
calling the tribute that they paid for their Hungarian possessions
from their colleagues in most other states, France included, where the purchase
'Ttirckenverehrung', or gift to the Turks. In the early seventeenth century, the
of office was an accepted form of promotion.3 Certainly it would be
situation remained unclear. According to the Habsburg understanding at the
unrealistic to rule out a concern with monetary values, but this was by no
conclusion of the peace of Zsitva Torok ( 1 606), a substantial lump sum paid
means the whole story. Ambassadorial gifts that were not valuable enough
over on this occasion was to form a kind of 'capitalization' of future annual
seem to have been regarded as an insult to the majesty of the Ottoman ruler,
tributes. In consequence after I 606 there were to be merely gift exchanges
and mutatis mutandis this consideration applied also to presents given to state
between sovereign rulers.4 But this claim did not find favour at the Ottoman
dignitaries. The dynamics of this situation were well analyzed by Ottaviano
court: however, both sides were exhausted by the fighting; and therefore two
Bon, Venetian ambassador at the court of Ahmed I, who pointed out that rich
versions of the peace treaty were made out, which contained contrary
Ottoman dignitaries expected gifts appropriate to their high rank and abundant
statements on this contentious issue.
resources.4 If viewed from the ambassador's angle, different concerns were at
Whether payment was in money or in goods seems to have been
issue. By negotiating the gifts to be given (or not given) at a specific
negotiable. Thus it was customary in the sixteenth century, when the
occasion, the diplomat in question tried not only to keep the expenses of his
silversmiths of Augsburg and Nuremberg enjoyed a good reputation all over
embassy as low as possible, but also to avoid the impression that the ruler he
Europe, to pay part of the 'Tiirckenverehrung' i n the shape of silver tableware
represented was in any way especiaJiy beholden - or even subordinate - to
and the decorative items, sometimes powered by clockwork, that were then
the Ottoman sultan.
popular in wealthy European families. We hear of Ferdinand I's envoy
By the eighteenth century, the gifts to be submitted on the accession of
Busbecq presenting a silver elephant, which was well received by Siileyman
a new sultan by the various ambassadors established in Istanbul had become
the Magnificent.S In the long run, most of these valuables were sent to the
more or less fixed by tradition. Occasions calling for negotiation were less
mint, but at the time of receiving them, the Ottoman court seems to have
routine events, for example a particularly brilliant celebration of a princely
been interested in at least some of these objects in and by themselves, and not
circumcision, such as the famous feast of 1720. On this occasion, evidence
survives of the negotiations conducted by the French ambassador the marquis
1 I van Stchoukine, La peinture turque d'apres les manuscrits illustres, 2 vols. (Paris: Paul de Bonnac with the grand vizier Ibrahim P�a. Discussion revolved around the
Geuthner, 1966, 1971), vol. 1 , 1966, plate CXI.
2 Parmakstzoglu, "Memun Beyin Hat.tralan," p. 221. question whether the circumcision was a state occasion or rather a domestic
3 Parmakstzoglu, "Memun Beyin Hat.tralart," p. 221. festivity, the French position being that gifts were only called for in the
4 Karl Nehring, Adam Freiherr tu Herbersteins Gesandtschaftsreise nach Konstantinopel, in � former and not i n the latter instance. Ibrahim Pa�a by contrast does not seem
Beitrag zum Frieden von Zsitvatorf!k (1606) (Munich: Ol�enbourg! 19�3), p. 27. On the gtf ts
themselves, see Gottfried Mraz, "Dte Rolle der Uhrwerke tn der k8Jserhchen TUrkenverehrung
im 16. Jahrhundert," in Die Welt als Uhr, deutsche Uhren und Automaren 1550-1650, ed. by 1 Pedani Fabris, Re/azioni, p. 93.
Klaus Maurice and Otto Mayr (MUnchen: Deutscher Kunstverlag, 1980), pp. 39-54. 2 This item was never sent due to the beginninf! of �he 'Long War' in 159 and today is pan or
5 Busbecquius, Legationis turcicae epistolae quatuor, p. 51. Compare also Otto Kurz•.Eur pean 3
<? the collections of the Kunsthistorische Museum tn Ytenna.
Clocks and Watches in the Near East (London, Leiden: The Warburg Institute, Untverstty of 3 Pedani Fabris ed., Re/azioni, p. 510.
London and E. J. Brill, 1975), pp. 27-41. 4 Pedani Fabris ed., Re/azioni, p. 510.
82 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
PRESENTING THE S ULTANS' POW ER, GLORY A N D P I ETY 83

to have regarded this distinction between 'state' and 'domestic' as particularly

sparsely inhabited.1 While Thevenot's understanding seems to have been less
relevant to his concerns. Rather, he offered an inducement on a different,
politically astute than that of the Venetian envoys, the architectural beauty of
honorific level. If the French ambassador was willing to make the expected
the Sultan Ahmed mosque played a prominent role in his description, and this
gifts, he would be invited on particularly honourable terms, while the great
was also a major feature of Ca'fer Efendi's account. Thus the legitimizing
respect in which 'tradition' was held at the Ottoman court would ensure that
function of major sultanic foundations could be effective even across religious
De Bonnac's successors would enjoy the same distinction.
and cultural divides. Muslims, Jews and Christians, subjects of the sultan and
On the other hand, the marquis de Bonnac felt that it was imperative to
foreigners, all could concur in regarding these foundations as emblematic of
enhance the status of the French embassy, for he himself had written
sultanic good taste, piety and power.
extensively on the discredit into which some of his predecessors had fallen.1 It
Something rather similar applies to the accounts of public processions.
thus made sense to accept a financial sacrifice that would wipe the slate clean.
The Ottoman courtier and traveller Evliya Celebi, a pharmacist from the Baltic
After all it was not only the status of the ambassador vis a vis the sultan's
such as Lubenau, a French bibliophile and philologist such as Galland, as
court that was at stake. The humiliations that certain of De Bonnac's
well as the Venetian diplomat Soranzo, all came up with interpretations of
predecessors had suffered had been noted by other European envoys as well,
Ottoman public processions that were not all that remote from one another.
and must have resulted in a 'loss of face'. In fact, this competition among
Moreover these observations all accord quite well with our own work on
European ambassadors was of interest also to Ottoman diplomacy.2 With
Ottoman sources. That artisans' processions contained an element of carnival
these considerations in mind, De Bonnac therefore suggested to his
and provided an opportunity for relaxation from everyday constraints has been
government that Ibrahim Pa�a's demands be accepted, and contrary to other
highlighted by Lubenau and is also recognized by present-day historical
ambassadors who preferred to stay away, the French king, along with the
scholarship.2 That the sultan could be viewed as a source of nourishment by
Russian emperor Peter the Great, was prominently represented at the
his soldiers and subjects was well understood by Galland, and has recently
festivities of 1720.3
been taken up in a number of novel studies on palace gift-giving.3 Dynastic
continuity as a major motif of festivals, and as a reason for organizing them at
all, has also been well studied.4 As to the religious features of Ottoman public
In conclusion: buildings, parades, receptions and gift-giving as elements ofa
processions, they have not as yet attracted the attention they deserve, but
mutually intelligible 'sign language '
hopefully that will change in the future.
In connection with these commonalities we can approach the manner
To sum it ail up: when analyzing the effects of the major sultanic
in which communication with foreigners was rendered possible at the Ottoman
pious foundations it emerges that Giacomo Soranzo's understanding of the
court. Evidently linguistic communication with diplomats was gravely
complex founded by the Valide Sultan i n Dsktidar was not so very much at
impeded by language barriers. Only with Iranian envoys and the rare visitor
variance with what we learn from Ottoman descriptions of the Sultan Ahmed
from India or Central Asia could Ottoman dignitaries converse face-to-face, as
mosque. According to Soranzo, the Valide Nurbanu experienced the
Persian was studied by every Istanbul schoolboy with hopes of one day being
satisfaction of having founded an entire town, while Sultan Ahmed I was
considered a gentleman. But sultanic pious foundations and particularly courtly
praised by Ca'fer Efendi because he had founded his mosque in a place that
ceremonial including public parades played a much more effective role in
did not need to be emptied of its occupants because hitherto it had been but
enabling royal courts of different cultural backgrounds to communicate
with one another than has been understood so far. To return once more to the
1 This opinion did not exactly please De �onnac'.s superiors in. Pa�s. who would have pr
�d
eferr
him not to write the history of French d1ploma1.1c representation 10 lst_anb�l fo�nd among h1s
papers and ultimately published by Charles Schefer: De Bonnac, Mbn01re hutortque, 1894, pp. I [Ca'fer Efendi], Risdle-i mi'mariyye, P· 66.
l-65. 2 Tenioglu, "The Imperial Circumcision."
2 De Bonnac, Memoire historique, 1894. p. 102.
3 Necipogu Architecture Ceremonial and Power, p. 72; Hedda Reindl-IGel, '1'he Chickens of
3 Atd, Levni and the Surname, p. 9� i_dentifies one of the amb
assa
d�rs �achi�g the 1720
� Paradise o
J
fficial Meals i� the mid-Seventeenth-century Ottoman Palace," in The Illuminated
procession as Russian. The rel�van� m1mature shows several �uropean d1gm�es m somewhat
_ _ he
Table, t Prosperous House, Food and f
She ter in <?ttoman Material Culrure, ed. by Suraiya
old-fashioned forrnal attne whtch ts not spec1fic to any parucul� place; thts makes sense, as Faroqhi and Christoph Neumann (Istanbul: Onent-lnstltut. 00 ). pp. 59-88.
Tsar Peter had just forced the Russian nobility to shave thetr beards and adopt western 2 3
4 Valin and Veinstein, Le serail ebrante, pas�im. Whether this congruence _means that our
European court dress.
findings are _
reasonably realistic of course n:nwns for future scholarshtp to dectde.
84 A N OT H E R M I R R OR FOR PRI NCES PRESENTING THE SULTANS' POW ER, GLORY A N D P I ETY 85

negotiations between Damad Ibrahim Pa§a and the French ambassador: potentates. All this has long been known to students of European history.1
although on the face of it, hard cash was being exchanged against a purely But the point to be made here is that the 'sign language' of diplomatic
ceremonial advantage, the marquis de Bonnac regarded the offer made to him as gestures was just as well understood and 'spoken' at the Ottoman court. In
a welcome opportunity to repair the diplomatic disasters of the past decades. part, this was certainly due to the fact that certa.in elements of ceremonial as
Without a common understanding of the meaning of ceremonial gestures, such current in the seventeenth century ultimately were derived from late antique
a transaction would not have made any sense. models, that had been reworked by Umayyads, Abbasids, Byzantines and
Another example of communication through the sign language of mediaeval western princes alike.2 But in addition, mutual understanding was
ceremonial is linked to the thorny problem of who got to sit at the most enhanced due to the activities of mediators, for example the much maligned
'honourable' place - if indeed, the visitor was permitted to sit at all. Similarly dragomans; but long-resident and experienced diplomats, including for instance
to the practice of European absolutist courts, seating at public festivities and De Bonnac, might also play this role. Thus Ottoman and European court
ceremonies was an effective means for the sultan's officials to express the societies possessed a range of gestures designed to express honour, rank or else
relative esteem, or lack of it, that they felt should be shown towards a given the lack of these two qualities. The sign language of protocol was either
foreign ruler. In principle, the representatives of non-Muslim potentates were common to both sides, or at the very least, mutually intelligible.
expected to defer to those of Muslims. Diplomatic exchanges between Indian
rulers and the Ottoman court not being very frequent, the ambassador of the
shah of Iran was likely to claim precedence due to his quality as a Muslim. To
what extent this claim was honoured depended on the political conjuncture of
the times. 1 When the representative of the French ruler attended a ceremony in
which he demanded a particularly honourable place in competition with the
ambassador of an Indian prince, a shrewd compromise was found by the
Ottoman court. For its officials had been informed that in India the left hand
side was considered especially respectable, so that both ambassadors' claims
might be satisfied at the same time.2
All this might lead to a lot of petty bickering; at least much of the
manoeuvring for precedence appears as such to an observer of the
early twentieth-first century. But for the purposes of this study, the main
point is that most of the time, foreign envoys and high Ottoman officials
disputed such matters because both sides understood very well what was
at stake, namely the 'reputation' of the relevant ruler within a group of other

1 However, at least in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman court had at least as much trouble in
accepting the shahs of Iran as Muslims as the kings of Spain had in admitting that Queen
Elizabeth I of England or William of Orange were indeed Christians. Thus at the great
circumcision feast of 1582, the Iranian representative was publicly insulted by having to watch
the conversion, with all the pomp and ceremony imaginable, of a Shiite to Sunni Islam. He was
thus in no better case than the European ambassadors who on such occasions, were expected to
attend the war games in which the Ottomans bested their fellow Christians. Compare Nurhan
Atasoy, 1582 Surname·i Hlimayun, An Imperial Celebration (Istanbul: K�bank, 1997), pp. I l l
and 123.
1 William Roosen, "Early Modern Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach," The
2 This story was relayed by the marquis de Bonnac in one of his unpublished papers: Archives Journal
diplomatiques de Nantes, Ambassade de France a Constantinople, S�rie A, Fonds St Priest, <JjModem History, 52,3 (1980), 452-476, see p. 459ff.
Correspondance politique 9, M�moires et pikes divers du marquis de Bonnac 1716-1724, fol. Oleg Grabar, The Formation of s/mnic Art (New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
83a (new pagination). I do not know whether such a case ever occurred, or whether it was hnk
1973), pp. 1 41-78 discusses the � s between Romano-Byzantine and Sasanian building
invented by the author for his own purposes. practices and ceremonial on the one hand, and Umayyad palace architecture on the other.
 EXOTIC ANIMALS AT THE SULTANS' COURT

Throughout the Eurasian continent, power over wild animals since

ancient times has been considered a major attribute of the ruler. This issue has
been well studied for many cultures, including ancient Mesopotamia, or,
closer to the Ottomans in time, Moghul India.1 A variety of meanings have
been suggested for this inclination to exhibit wild animals at the king's or
emperor's court: thus in the early seventeenth century, Moghul rulers
apparently borrowed the biblical motif of the lion lying next to the lamb/cow
as a symbol of the ruler's power, who could command even lions to do his
will.2 However while in the Ottoman case, issues such as palace architecture,
pious foundations or the display of precious cloths and furs have been
intensively studied with an eye towards elucidating their respective roles in
sultanic legitimization, the power of the ruler to control wild animals has not
attracted much attention.
This is all the more surprising as recent work on seventeenth-century
French gardens should have alerted us to the possibilities of making imperial
claims visible by the display of exotica.3 As is well known, the region of
Istanbul even in the seventeenth century was not exactly full of wild and
dangerous beasts. The Ottoman sultans were thus in the same position as the
majority of European potentates, that is, they had to procure most of the
animals they wished to display from far a-field, as it was usually impossible
to have these creatures caught by their own subjects or servitors. But then, the

trouble and expense necessary to bring a wild beast to Istanbul could in itself
be considered a source of prestige, as this meant that the Ottoman ruler either
possessed vassals in remote places whom he could command to do his
bidding, or else he was rich enough to foot the bill himself.

1 Due to the attention paid to animals in Moghul texts and miniatures, the topic is certainly
easier to study in the northern Indian context.
2 Ebba Koch, Shah Jahan and Orpheus: The_ Pierre_ Dure Decoration and the Programme of
Shah Jahan's Throne in the Hall of Publ1c Aud1ences at the Red Fort of Delhi (Graz:
Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1988).
3 Chandra Mukerji, Territorial Ambitions and the Gardens of Versailles (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997). It is noteworthy th.at the author is much concerned with the trade in
plants, but gives only the most cursory attention to the animals that also had some role to play in
the self-assertion of Louis XIV (see PP· 177-78).
 88 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRI NCES
A prologue: Ottoman sultans and the hunt
Hunting is the royal sport par excellence, and in this respect, the
Ottoman sultans followed the precedents established in Near Eastern empires
both pre-Islamic and Islamic. Sasanid art had highlighted the rulers' enjoyment
of the chase, and this example was i mitated in early Islamic art.1 Thus it
became a widespread pictorial topos to depict the king hunting. In real life as
well, rulers could claim special privileges connected with the hunt: the wilder
and rarer a given animal, the greater was the tendency to reserve its ritualized
killing for the prince or sultan. Thus in seventeenth-century northern India,
lions could still be found, although the numbers were doubtless limited. As a
result, lion-hunting was reserved for the Moghul emperor and his sons, unless
a less highly placed mortal enjoying the royal favor had been granted special
permission.2 Presumably the meaning of this privilege was to emphasize both
the ruler's physical prowess and his power to control the rare, strange and
exotic.
But it was not necessary to kill rare and fierce animals for hunting to
feature as a sport suitable for a sultan. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the Ottoman court frequently visited Edirne, where the supply of
game was supposed to be especially good, and occasionally the rulers hunted
on the Ke�i�dag1 near Bursa, the present-day Uludag. Here presumably hares,
deer and perhaps foxes, wild boars or wolves were available, but no exotic
game.3 Hunting trips also might be undertaken in the immediate vicinity of
the Ottoman capita l. In 1588, the former galley slave Michael Heberer was
able to watch Sultan Murad III while hunting in Hasbah�e, on the shores of
the Bosporus.4 This trip seems to have been undertaken more as a
demonstration of the ruler's power and magnificence, than for actually killing
animals. For Heberer describes the display of silks and brocades as well as the
fine horse trimmings paraded on this occasion, while he also notes that the
booty amounted to no more than 'one to six' hares. Apparently a large pile of
dead creatures at the end of the day was not what Murad III expected as the
outcome of a sultanic hunt.
1 See Oleg Grabar, The Formation of Islamic Art (New Haven, London: Yale University Press,
1973), pp. 156-157, where hunting is mentioned among the pleasures that the ruler might enjoy
in a rather demonstrative fashion. .
2 Thus Jahangir reported that while participating in a hunt, one of his courtiers was attacked by
a lion, and he himself fell down in the fray and was even trodden upon by his terrified servitors.
Ultimately the courtier was saved by his companions. Compare Jahangir, The Jahangirnama.
Memoirs ofJahangir, Emperor ofIndia, tr. by Wheeler M. Thackston (Washington, New York
and Oxford ...: Freer Art Gallery, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery and Oxford University Press,
1999), pp. 117-18.
3 For a miniature of Sultan SUieyman hunting deer, see Ivan Stchoukine, La peinture turque
d'apr�s les manuscripts illustris, 2 parts (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1966 and
1971), part I, Ill. XXII (from the "SOieyman-name"); Ill. LXVI shows the same ruler killing a
wild buffalo and Ill. LXIX, hunting a bear (both from Lokman's "Hiiner-name").
4 Johann Michael Heberer von Bretten, Aegyptiaca Servitus, intr. by Karl Teply (Graz:
Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, reprint 1 967), pp. 352-53.
EXOT I C A N I M A L S AT T H E S U LT A N S ' C O U R T 89
However this paper is not about hunting, but about wild animals
caught alive that were transported to Istanbul and kept at the sultans' court.
Thus we have introduced the hunt only because certain wild beasts might be
captured, tamed and used to track down whatever creatures were to be the final
objects of the sultanic chase. In this context, we will focus on wild cats,
namely the leopards (pars) acquired by the court to be used in hunting,
similarly to dogs or falcons. But in addition, we will also deal with felines
kept purely for display, such as lions. Outside the hunt, we will discuss the
elephants that probably produced the most dramatic effect in the sultan's
processions, as they were highly exotic, large enough to be seen from afar and
tame enough to not require a cage. I
Ottoman sources on lions and leopards
Ottoman sources on wild animals in a courtly context are not very
abundant. After a good deal of searching, I have been able to track down a few
official documents from the eighteenth and very early nineteenth centuries. For
the most part, these texts deal with matters only partially relevant to the
animals themselves. Thus we are informed about the pay and food assigned to
the guardians, and only in passing, the texts may also make brief references to
the nourishment assigned to the beasts. More relevant to our purposes, other
documents will discuss the conditions under which the sultan's lions were to
be kept, special emphasis being placed on solid carts suitable for transporting
the dangerous creatures.2
Further information on the keeping of lions survives from 1231/1815-
16; the document in question was written out during the early years of
Mahmud II's reign (r. 1808-39). At this time, the administration was
expecting a gift lion from Algiers, a province which but a few years later was
to be lost to the French. In preparation for the arrival of this animal, the
ancient lion house in the former palace of Fazh Pa§a, near the AtmeydanJ, was
thoroughly overhauled, and there survives a detailed budget of the work to be
done and the expected costs (ke�i/).3
All these matters are very mundane. No Ottoman ruler unfortunately
has written memoirs resembling those of the Moghul emperors Babur and
Jahangir, in which the authors expressed their interest in exotic animals and
l Apart from lions and leopards, the Ottoman palace owned hunting dogs and falcons, and also
gazelles or deer, at least if an illustration of the �econd court of the Topkap1 Saray1, dating from
992/1584, is at all realistic. Compare Stchouktne, La peinture turque, part I, Ill. LXIII. This
miniature forms part of the "Hiiner-n§me" of Seyyid Lokman.
2
See for example Bll§bakanhk AJlivi-Osmanh AJliVi, section Cevdet Saray 4301 (1 159/1746)
and 6460 (1217/1802-03).
3 Cevdet Saray 6712 (12 1/1815-16).
3
 90 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NC E S
their reactions when a particularly rare creature arrived in Delhi or Agra.l No
official source hitherto has been found that explains why the presence of
captive wild creatures was considered so desirable at the Ottoman court. But as
so often, the gaps in our documentation have partly been filled by Evliya
<;elebi's travelogue, in this particular instance the first volume, devoted to
mid-seventeenth-century IstanbuJ.2 For in the context of a great parade that
marked the beginning of a campaign undertaken by Sultan Murad IV, Evliya
has a good deal to say about the exhibitors of trained animals, including those
in the service of the ruler, and also about the wild creatures that they paraded
before the Istanbul populace.
Two European diaristsl
However many more details concerning the sultans' menagerie can be
gleaned from the accounts of European travelers. On these writings in general,
quite a few critical studies have been undertaken during the thirty;ears that
have passed since the appearance of Edward Said's Orienta/ism. Frederic
Tinguely has pointed out that in the sixteenth century, the sultans' menagerie
formed part of the 'tourist itinerary' of European gentlemen visiting IstanbuJ.5
Thus the accounts that we find in many travelogues of the time may not be
based on personal observation at all, but on the remarks found in the writings
of the relevant author's predecessors.6
1 fZahiruddin Muhammad Babur], The Baburnama, Memoirs ofBabur, Prince and Emperor, tr.,
annotated and edited by Wheeler M. Thackston (Washington, New York and Oxford: Freer Art
Gallery, Arthur M. Sackler Gallery and Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 334-42 contains a
veritable description of the fauna of India, including elephants and the different uses to which
they were put. On the less systematic observations of Jahangir, see The Jahangirnama. pp. 1 33-
34.
2 Evliya 9elebi Seyahatnamesi, 1. Kitap Istanbul, Topkap1 Saray1 Bagdat 30 Yazmasmm
Transkripsyonu-Dizini, ed. by Orhan �aik Gokyay (Istanbul: Yap1 ve Kredi Bankas1, 1995).
3 Antoine Galland, Voyage a Constantinople (1672-1673), ed. by Charles Schefer, preface by
Frederic Baudin (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, coli. Dedale, 2002). This is a reprint of the
1881 edition. Reinhold Lubenau, Beschreibung der Reisen des Reinhold Lubenau, ed. by W.
Sahm, 2. vols. (Konigsberg/Kaliningrad: Ferd. Beyers Buchhandlung, 1912, 1915).
4 Edward W. Said, Orienta/ism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978).
5 Frederic Tinguely, L'ecriture du Levant a Ia Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, 2000), pp. 73-88
and elsewhere.
6 Lubenau made some cutting remarks about gentlemen who visited Istanbul, but were quite
incapable of relating to the locals or making sense of what they saw. He also mentions little lists
of 'sights to be seen' (exemp/aria) that he copied and sold to some gentlemen of his
acquaintance. If he had not done so, was Lubenau's conclusion, after their return to
Christendom these people would have been quite incapable of saying anything coherent about
their visit. The existence of such leaflets, which probably did not survive because of their
insubstantial character, helps to explain some of the similarities between the sixteenth-<:entury
travelers' accounts as commented upon by Tinguely, passim. For comparable observations
concerning pilgrimage ac,counts, see Stephane Yerasimos, Les voyageurs dans /'Empire
ottoman (X!ve-XVr siecles). Bibliographie, itineraires et inventaire des lie�a habitls (Ankara:
Ttlrk Tarih Kurumu, 1991). pp. 17-18.
E X O T I C A N I M A L S A T T H E S U LT A N S ' C O U R T 91
However the lively and curious young pharmacist Reinhold Lubenau,
who spent a year in Istanbul in 1588 in the service of the Habsburg
ambassador Bartholomaus Pezzen, was interested in animals as a result of his
professional training. Thus he has left a much more detailed account than
other travelers of his visits to the main sultanic menagerie near the Atmeydam
and its secondary branch, which has only been documented for the sixteenth
century. The latter was located near a Byzantine palace that at the time was
known as that of Constantine, out on the road to Eyiip.' In addition, an
instructive description of the leopard keepers who participated in a sultanic
procession has been authored by Antoine Galland. Galland spent about a year
in Istanbul in 1672-73, and was greatly impressed by the splendor of Ottoman
state ceremonial. His account thus forms a welcome complement to Evliya's
description of a festive parade that must have been happened about a
generation earlier, but appears to have been of rather a similar type.
Both Lubenau and Galland have left diaries covering their stays in the
Ottoman capital that were not published during their own life-times. In the
case of Lubenau, the author did however presumably rework his diary to
conform to the standards of contemporary scholarly writing. This must have
happened long after the author's return to his native city of Konigsberg, today
Kaliningrad. It is probably due to this latter-day revision that the manuscript
contains numerous references, especially to authors of antiquity; these were
after all considered essential in any work claiming scholarly merit.2 However,
for reasons that remain unknown the diary was published only several
centuries later, namely in 1912-15. Lubenau liked a good story and even
though he knew no Ottoman, apparently had no trouble mixing with people.
But he was not very critical in outlook, and as a result, he has relayed a good
bit of folklore which he himself took for gospel truth. Thus he gives us
figures and descriptions reminiscent of Evliya <;elebi at his most exuberant,
not only about the many hundreds of thousands of dead counted in Istanbul
during a recent plague epidemic, but also about the anatomical and
physiological characteristics of some of the animals he had seen.
1 Petrus Gyllius, who was in Istanbul for most of the time between 1544 and 550, also mentions
1
that the sultan's elephants were kept in a ruin called the palace of Constantine, on the 'seventh
hill' and close to the suburb he calls the Hebdomum; compare Pierre Gilles, The Antiquities of
Constantinople, tr. by John Ball and ed. by Ronald G. Musto (New York: Italica Press, 1988), p.
190.
2 In an as yet unpublished paper read at a symposium on the Safavids (London 2002), Sonia
Brentjes has demonstrated that Pietro della V�le, the famous seventeenth-century visitor to Iraq
and Iran, proceeded in exactly the sa�e fash �n. He first wrote a fairly informal diary which
J<
after his return to Italy he interlaced w1th cl�s•c:al quotations, with the specific aim of proving
the scholarly quality of his work and estabhshmg his credentials, above all with the Roman
Inquisition.
 92 A NOTHER M I R RO R FOR P R I N C ES
By contrast, Antoine Galland (1646-1715) a student of Near Eastern
languages was a more sophisticated personage. Apparently he never meant to
publish his diary, but used it in order to compose the more formal writings
that he submitted to his patrons. For the most part, these latter 'official'
accounts of Galland's travels were not published and do not seem to have
survived. But we have the good fortune to possess a rather informal text, in
which the author 'spoke to himself' and possibly was less concerned about
being 'politically correct' than he would have been in the case of a manuscript
meant to be printed: over many pages, Galland waxes enthusiastic about the
visual qualities of Ottoman sultanic parades. By contrast, his contemporary
the French ambassador De Nointel, who witnessed much the same scenes, was
much cooler in his report. After all for a diplomat reporting to Versailles, it
would not have been appropriate to belittle, if only tacitly and by comparison,
the brilliance of the court festivals organized on behalf of Louis XIV.
Oflions, leopards and - less gloriously - hyenas
Leopards, or other wild cats closely resembling them, were quite
frequently used in the sultan's hunt. These creatures that Galland describes as
'une espece de tigre' were apparently very tame and could be taken along on
horseback by their keepers. 1 Galland says that the onlookers felt both
astonishment and fear when seeing the leopards: astonishment because of their
peaceful attitude, and the rich cloths with which they were covered, and fear
because of their ferocious looks. Yet we are left to wonder whether Galland
was really a good judge of the feelings of his Ottoman fellow viewers; for
Evliya, who also listed the pars�ls i n his well-known procession account,
cites a ditty which seems to consist of the excuses made by a leopard keeper
when the animal in his charge had failed to catch anything at all.2
However at least in Lubenau' s view, the leopards took second place to
the lions, of which the Arslanhane housed eight at the time of his visit. These
were also extremely tame, for Lubenau reported that not only did the keepers
play with them 'as if they were large dogs', but they were also sometimes led
through the city so that members of the public could amuse themselves with
them, 'as with a sheep'. Unfortunately there is no information on the trainers,
nor do we find any information on the methods they used in domesticating
their charges.
I Galland, Voyage, p. 135.
2 Evliya t;elebi Seyahatnamesi, 1. Kitap. p. 283.
E X O T I C A N I M A L S A T T H E S U LT A N S ' C O U R T 93
This is all the more regrettable as Lubenau seems to have found means
of communicating with the men in charge of the Arslanhane, and to my
knowledge, he is the only author to relay stories derived from this source.
However the author was much less interested in the leopards and lions than in
a hyena 'czirtlan' (Turkish: szrtlan), which he considered to be extremely
ferocious and courageous. Lubenau gave a detailed description of the creature,
only marred by the tall tale that the hyena had no teeth, and instead did its
biting with a solid bone. In addition to the factual description, the author also
included a good bit of folklore: apart from a belief in the aphrodisiac qualities
of hyena's meat, the author also relayed some stories about the creature's
supposed ability to understand human language. As later accounts do not
mention the presence of hyenas among the animals displayed in the sultan's
menagerie, it is possible that its very rarity gave rise to these fantastic
inventions.1 Or maybe the keepers and/or the translators were just having a bit
of fun at the expense of a curious stranger? If so, they succeeded brilliantly,
because even after more than four hundred years, we are still left guessing.
The Arslanhane: from Byzantine church to Fazll PQ.$a Sarayl
When Lubenau visited Istanbul, the leopards were housed in the main
building of the sultanic menagerie, which the young pharmacist described as a
former Byzantine church.2 Art historians have identified this building with the
church of Christ constructed, in the tenth century, over the Chalke gate of the
original palace of the Byzantine emperors.3 Twenty years after Lubenau, the
Arslanhane was once again described by the Polish Armenian Simeon, who in
1608-09 visited Istanbul on his pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Simeon saw a
variety of felines including lions, and noted that in the fairly high-rise
building, images of saints could still be recognized; these must have been
remnants of frescoes or mosaics.4 In the late eighteenth or early nineteenth
century, the building was once again described by the Armenian Mecharist
1 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica of 1963, the species of hyena found i n Iran and
Anatolia is striped, while the spotted variety lives in Africa, "from Abyssinia to the Cape."
Lubenau describes a spotted animal, although his comparison to a tiger casts some doubts on the
ac_curacy of. his description. If the hyena he saw was i� �
act of the African variety, its rarity
�ght explam why the keepers of the Arslanhane were w1lhng to feed it.
Lubenau, Beschreibung, vol. 1, p. 152-53.
3 Cyril Mango, The Brazen House, A Study of the Vestibule of the Imperial Palace
of
Constantinople (Kopenhagen: Munksgaard, 1959) and the article "Arslanhane" i n Diinden
Bugiine Istanbul Ansiklopedisi, 8 vols. (Istanbul: KiJIUlr Bakanhg1 and Tarih Vakf1, 1993-1995)
by _Semavi. Eyice, who has discovered t
�e most dramatic �ngraving depleting the Arslanhane,
r IllUStratiOn that forms part Of the m�lti-VO�Ume geographiC work Of 0. lnciciyan.
. Hrand Andreasyan tr., Polonyalt Stmeon un SeyahatntJmesi /608-1619 (Istanbul: Istanbul
Oniversitesi, 1964), p. 7.
 94 ANOTHER M I R R O R FOR P R I NCES
E X O T I C A N I M A L S A T T H E S U LT A N S ' C O U R T 95

monk and highly productive geographer G. inciciyan. This author reported that
guru�.l Thus the sultanic menagerie survived the fire of I 802 and at the
the Arslanhane, which in an upper floor also contained a workshop of
present state of our information, we cannot tell when it finally disappeared.2
draftsmen and designers (nakka�hane) was destroyed in a fire and shortly
Apparently the lion expected from Algiers was not a tame creature of
afterwards torn down in order to make room for the extension of the sultan's
the type that had thrilled sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Istanbullus; as a
armory (cebehane). 1
result, it was necessary to make arrangements to get him safely off the ship
Now the nakka�hane was not the only workshop i n this
and through the city. Around 1800, the Palace apparently kept about six carts
neighborhood; quite to the contrary, the Fazh Pasa Sarayt, as the location
solid enough for this purpose, and when these were no longer serviceable, the
where the sultan's lions were kept in the eighteenth century was often called,
parlous state of the Ottoman finances during those years did not prevent the
was filled with a variety of workplaces, including a dye-house whose revenues
administration from assigning money for replacement and repair. Admittedly,
helped to finance the library that Ahmed Ill had founded in the Palace.2
these carts were not very expensive; and a new one could be had for the
Concrete information is hard to come by, but it is quite possible that a disused relatively modest sum of 300 guru�.
palace had been turned into a set of utilitarian buildings, as had also happened
As to the men in charge of lions and other felines, they were grouped
in the Byzantine structure known as the Tekfur Sarayt, where in the eighteenth into two corps. Evliya <;elebi briefly mentions the parsftS or leopard keepers.
century a manufacture of fine faience had established itself.3
In Murad IV's parade as described by this author, the men, supposedly fifty­
But it seems that the fire mentioned by inciciyan did not mean that the
five in number, carried valuable leopard skins and staffs with which they
sultan's menagerie disappeared from the area. For from the ke�if report of
controlled the sultan's hunting leopards, which were covered in costly fabrics.
t23l/l815-16, we learn that the sultan had personally ordered the refurbishing
As an organized body, the leopard keepers seem to have existed until the very
of an old stone or brick construction close to the Hippodrome, inside the
end of the seventeenth century. Then, in 1098/1 686-87, the corps was
compound known as Fazlt Pa�a ("At meydanmda kain Fazlt Pa�a derununda
abolished, probably to save money during the disastrous war with Austria -
mevcud kargirler derununa").4 This included renewal of the iron bars, which
and possibly also as a measure designed to reestablish the dynasty's prestige:
were to close off the arches (kemerler) under which the lions had previously
after all in 1687, Mehmed IV was deposed as unfit to rule exactly because he
been kept. Thus while the building of Mahmud ll's time is not called
had spent so much time and energy on the hunt. In the early eighteenth
Arslanhane, it does seem to have had some past history as a place where the
century, there was an effort to once again found such a corps, but we do not
ruler's lions had been housed. The arches mentioned in our text must either
know whether this attempt was at all successful}
correspond to those of the former church that Lubenau had visited and
However Evliya's most valuable information involves the Arslanhane
described i n some detail, or to some other similar structure, possibly the
as a going concern, supposedly with one hundred employees. These men
former St John's church on the Dihippion.5 In addition to iron grates and bars,
venerated as their patron the Imam Ali, son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad,
the repair project included a refurbishing of the eaves, insertion of window
one of whose titles is that of 'lion of God' .4 It appears that differently from
glass, new floors and also a new door. Total expenses amounted to 3330.5 the leopard-keepers, this institution survived all seventeenth- and eighteenth­
century attempts to save money by streamlining the sultans' court. In fact,
throughout the later eighteenth century, there existed regular positions to be
filled whenever the current incumbent died or retired. Thus in 1 17111757-58,
when Mustafa III had just ascended the throne, a certain ismail asked and

1 See the article "Arslanhane" in Diinden Bugiine Istanbul Ansiklopedisi by Semavi Eyice. received confirmation of his appointment as arslanct, which he had already
2 This dye-house later was transferred to Bursa. Compa Suraiya Faroqhi, "Ortak l§l!kler�e
�
r
Ozel Evler Arasmda XVIII. Yuzytl Bursa'smda f�yerlen" translated by Rtta Urgan m B1r
_
Cevdet Saray 6712. Identification is made difficult by the fact that there were many former
l
Masaldz Bursa... ed. Engin Venal (Istanbul: Yapt ve Kredi Bankast, 1996), pp. 97-1 04.
Byzantine churches in the area.
3 Wolfgang MUller-Wiener, Bildlexikon zur Topographie /stanbuls, Byr.antion Konstantinopolis 2 There is apparently no link to the present-day Istanbul zoo, which for a few decades was
Istanbul (fUbingen: Ernst Wasmuth, 1977), pp. 24 47.
•

•
4 situated in Gulhane Park, adjacent to the Topkapa Palace. The zoo was only founded in the
4 Cevdet Saray 6712 (123111815- 1 6). middle 1950s when a previous animal refuge on the site was reorganized; compare the anicle
5 MUller-Wiener, Bildluikon, p. 81; however on p. 441 the same author surmises that this "Hayvanat bahyesi" in Diinden Bugiine Istanbul Ansiklopedisi.
church was tom down already before or around 1512 to malce room for the Firuz A«a mosque. 3 Cevdet Saray 61 5 1 (1 113/1701-02).
lA question reste ouverte.
4 Evliya (:elebi Seyahalnamesi, 1. Kitap, P· 245.
% ANOTHER M IR ROR FOR P R I N C ES
E X O T I C A N I M A L S A T T H E S U LT A N S ' C O U R T 97

held under Osman III (1754-57) and Mahmud I ( 1730-54). Admittedly the
hidden in their wide legs. We may assume that some if not all of these
position carried the purely symbolic pay of just 2 ak�e a day.l Moreover the
elephants were creatures of art rather than of nature as one miniature shows an
corps of lion-keepers still existed at the beginning of the nineteenth century.
elephant spouting fireworks from his nostrils, and real animals do not take
From this period there survives a petition, in fairly colloquial Turkish, signed
by the chief lion keeper (arslanczba§l).2 Thus while other personnel in charge
�
kindly o that sort of treatment. I In fact the artificers from the corps of the
cannomers and armorers (top�u. cebeci) did construct an elephant in order to
of wild animals were apparently hired and fired according to need, this was not
set off their mock fortress to better advantage, so that quite possibly in 1720,
true of the lion-keepers. Rather, the latter seem to have shown considerable
there were no real elephants present at alJ.2
institutional permanence. I wonder whether this meant that above all other
On the other hand, Indian miniatures show that life-size three­
creatures, lions were considered an important vehicle of sultanic
dimensional statues of elephants did figure in certain palace contexts, and the
representation, almost a kind of necessity.
idea of displaying such artwork may thus have come to Istanbul from the
Moghul empire, along with the living elephants that both Indian rulers and
Ottoman sultans were proud to display. For throughout their existence,
Elephants in pictorial sources
Moghul rulers continued to favor the elephant, for festive as for warlike
pursuits. From the very last years of the dynasty (1815) there survives a
Lions could be procured from North Africa, and certain felines probably
sketch of an elephant image decked out with fireworks, meant to be paraded
came from the mountain forests of the Balkans. However elephants were in a
through the streets at some public festivaJ.3
different category as they had to be imported from India or tropical Africa
As an alternative source of inspiration, the Ottoman palace often must
(probably the former in most instances) and thus must have been even rarer
�
have receiv d the table-sized silver elephants that were popular in Europe
and more precious.3 Their existence at the court of the sultans is documented .
�
d nng the SIXteenth and seventeenth centuries, first as part of the Habsburg
in writing mainly for the second half of the eighteenth century. 4
trtbute and later as diplomatic gifts.4 A late example of this type of decoration
For the older period, miniatures form almost our only source: thus an
still survives i n the treasury of the Topkap1 palace. These pieces may well
elephant figures among the gifts brought to the Ottoman court by a Safawid
have contributed towards familiarizing Palace artists with the decorative
embassy depicted in the early seventeenth century; the animal had probably
potential of the elephant. Reproducing these creatures in different sizes thus
transited through Iran on its way from India.5 A set of miniatures by the
formed part of what may be considered a common Eurasian festive culture.
painter Levni, commemorating the famous circumcision festival organized in
1720 for the sons of Ahmed III, shows several elephants with highly decorated
howdahs participating in the processions that were organized in this context.6
Sultans and elephants in official records
However the miniatures by themselves do not allow us to determine whether
the elephants in question were authentic, or else imitations propelled by men
Less ambiguous are the official documents surviving from the middle
1 Bll§bakanhk A�ivi-Osmanh A�ivi, section Maliyeden miidevver 9989 (1 171/1757-58), p. 45. of the eighteenth century onwards, reflecting the physical presence of an
2 Cevdet Saray 6460 (1217/1802-03).
3 A.lmost not�ing is known about the political context in which certain Indian or Safawid rulers
dec1ded to d1�patch elepha�ts to the Ottoman co�rt; particularly, we have no idea whether � Atll, Levni and the Surname, p. 164.
Istanbul. offic1als
. had previOusly expressed a desue to receive these animals. However the 3 Atll, Levni and the Surname, p. 204.
sup�ly h�es from India t?. th� Portugue�e, Papal and Habsburg courts have been studied in some Co�pare I (?) 4596.• fol. 15, belonging to th� s��liche Museen ZU Berlin, Museum filr
. and Western Eurasia in the Sixteenth
detail: M1chael Gorgas, Ammal Tradmg between Ind1a Islarmsche Kunst, Berhn. In the foreground of th1s rmma ture we see a Jive elephant' wh'l ·
1 e 10
Century -- the Role of the Fuggers i� Animal Trading," in K. S. Mathew, Indo-Portuguese the backgrou�d. � statue of the same animal guards the entran�e to the Palace.
T�tu!e and the_ t:uggers o!Cfermany, Szxteenth Century (Delhi: Manohar, 1997), pp. 195-225 and
� llVIO A. Bed1m,�he Pope s Elephant (Nashville: J. S. Sanders and Company, 1998).
0� the �mbmation of eleph � nts �d fireworks in a Moghul context see Georg Kohler with
. Ahce .YIIlon-Lechn�r eds., D�e scMne Kunst der Verschwendung. Fest und Feuerwerk m
. · der
Evhya has nothm� to say about elephants, so presumably in the middle of the seventeenth �uropaiSchen Geschtchte (Zunch: Mumch: Artemis, 1988), p. 207.
century, the Palace d1d not own any. The standard work on this subject is Otto Kurz, European Clocks and Watche n the N,
5 Stchoukine, La peinture turque, part I, Ill. CXI. This is an illustration of a "Sh!Ut-nime" �
East (London, Leiden: Tbe Warburg Institute, University of London and E. J. Bri�l 1975)·. 1 ���
·

·
executed for Sultan Osman II. the reference
. to Busbecq,
. . 9. As.to Busbecq's
see pp. 28-2 own text' an ed'1t1·0n of the ongma'
6 Esin Atll, Levni and the Surname. The Story of an Eighteenth-century Ottoman Festival along w1th a transIation mto
. Dutch 1s ..,ound m 0g1er
. Ghiselin van Boesbeck ' y1·er br·e
1 ven over
· ·s 71urc1cae quatuor tr. by Michel Goldsteen and
•

(Istanbul: K�bank, 1999) het gezansc -r k"

t hap naar .ur l)e, Legatto_m · .
ep1stulae
annotated by Zweder von Martels (HIIversum: Verloren, 1994), see pp. 268-69.
98 ANOTHER M I R R OR FOR P R I NCES
elephant in the sultanic menagerie. In a sequence of documents dated
1 1 52/1739-40, we are told that expenditure on both the elephant(s) and
its/their keepers amounted to 5 1 0 ak�e (4 guru� and 30 a.k�e) per day and
121.5 guru� per month. I In a further petition dated Rebi' II 1 1 54/June-July
1741, Hact Isa, bearing the title of ser-.filiyan-t hassa (chief elephant keeper)
confirmed having received the monthly allowance assigned to the animal; it
amounted to 15,300 akfe or slightly over 127 guru�. There is no explanation
for the discrepancy between the two figures, which may have been due to
higher food prices or else special needs of the animal and its keepers. This
money was taken out of the customs accounts (probably of Istanbul) and was
spent among other things, on 1 .ktyye ( 1.2828 kg) of sugar, the same quantity
of butterfat and 14 ktyye of bread, which the elephant consumed every single
day.2 Some time during the mid-forties, the Palace moreover acquired a second
animal; but nothing is known about the circumstances of its arrival.
Hact Isa, who was paid 7.5 guru� per month, in 1 1 55/1742 had 1 3
helpers at his disposal, each of whom received no more than four guru�. It
does not seem that there were any specific guidelines concerning the number
of men needed to care for an elephant; for in the occasional 'orders of payment'
that are all we possess as evidence, varying numbers of people are mentioned
even when there was apparently no change in the animals kept. But in all
likelihood, the real attraction of the job consisted of the 'perks': for the men
received a variety of everyday necessities i n kind. In certain accounts, salt,
chickpeas, onions and wax were mentioned.3 In another instance, we hear of
firewood, bread, meat, butterfat and half a ktyye of rice a day, delivered by the
storeroom of the sultanic kitchen. Paying the elephant keepers' money wages
was part of the responsibility of the Palace marshal (mirahor aga).
There is no indication where the elephant keepers had learned how to
take care of the animal; but quite possibly at least the senior man had
accompanied the elephant from its homeland, and undertaken the pilgrimage en
route. While visitors to India often have referred to the close relationship the
keeper (mahout) established with his animal, there is no indication in our
sources that anything of the kind was attempted in Istanbul. Thus it seems
that at the Ottoman court, the art of elephant riding was not really mastered:
the animals, or at times their mechanical images, simply were made to pull
wagons. Or else in a miniature from the earlier surviving illustrated festival
book, that of 1582, two men are awkwardly perched on top of the animal with
1 Cevdet Saray 7256 (1152/1739-40). In the documents of the time, the gurul is considered
e
quiv al ent to 120 alcfe. Compare Cevdet Saray 6852 (1155/1742-43).
2 Cevdet Saray
430 (1 159/1746). The foodstuffs were delivered from the stores of the sultan's
kitchen.
3 Cevdet Saray 2274 (1 155/1742-43), 3635 (1 158/1745) and 6410 {1 154/1741-42).
E X O T I C A N I M A L S AT T H E S U LT A N S ' C O U R T 99
1
a lance to goad it. With due allowance for error, miniatures showing Ottoman
elephant riders in their howdah with the mahout up front do not seem to occur
in the surviving manuscripts. 2
Our next piece of evidence comes from the later eighteenth century,
when the ruler of the Indian principality of Djalbar had sent a single elephant
A document dated 1 197/1782-83 tells us that the sultan had ordered the transfer
of the animal to Edirne; this may indicate that Abdiilhamid I, who spent most
of his time i n Istanbul, considered the elephant of only marginal significance.
This impression is confirmed by the fact that a minor local official, the kt�lak
emini, was expected to find 'a suitable place' for the animal and see to its food
and drink. Apparently the sultan did not think that either he or any members
of his household would ever enjoy seeing the elephant paraded in the streets of
the capitaJ.3 A further bit of evidence survives from the early nineteenth
century, those difficult years when the young sultan Mahmud II was still
consolidating his position. In 1233/1815-16, the year in which, as we have
seen, the lion cages were repaired in the expectation of new inmates, the
Palace also had acquired an unspecified number of elephants by way of Iran,
for which keepers were hired at 30 guru� per month.4 Quite possibly this
regain of activity in the sultanic menagerie had something to do with the fact
that Mahmud II was still quite young, and thus interested in matters of display
that had seemed irrelevant to Abdtilhamid I, who was already middle-aged when
he ascended the throne. Once again, we do not know when the Palace received
elephants for the last time.
And whaJ did it all mean?
Interested foreign observers have provided many details unavailable in
the Ottoman sources, but precisely because of their position as foreigners,
they have not been able to say much about the meaning of the events they had
witnessed. Given the silence of Ottoman official sources, so far I have only
found a single clue concerning the role of wild animals in sultanic ceremonial;
once again we owe it to Evliya Celebi . When describing the famous parade
of artisans and officials held in honor of Murad IV's campaign, Evliya claims
I Metin And, Osmanlt $enliklerinde Turk Sanatlart (Ankara: KUitUr ve Turizm Bakanhg1, 1982),
Ill. No 61.
2 However member of the Iranian embassy s.hown in a miniature of the Sbah-n§me
s of Sultan
Osman II ride a richly caparisoned elephant •n exactly this fashion: Stchoultine, La peimure
turque, part I, lll. CXI .
3 Cevdet Saray 6016 (1 1921 1782-83).
4 Cevdet Saray 6718 (1233/1815-16).
 100 A N OT H E R M I R R O R FOR PRINCES
that ten lions, five leopards and twelve tigers, in addition to foxes, wolves,
jackals and hyenas were marched in the procession by attendants. 1 Particularly
the lions were loaded with chains; but just in case one of them broke loose,
their keepers carried gazelle meat which had been treated with opium and other
somniferous drugs. In case of an accident, the lion, so it was hoped, could be
pacified by this food.
That the lions were not kept i n cages mounted on carts, as seems to
have been the case in the early nineteenth century, may be taken to indicate
that the sight was intended to strike terror in the hearts of the populace. The
viewers were not meant to feel a moderate and vicarious titillation, but the
grip of real fear. Moreover even if Evliya had invented this detail, the story
would still be of interest, for he was a well-informed observer familiar with
Ottoman court practice, and should have known very well what effects the
designers of the procession had intended with their display.
However this was a time of festivity, and the feeling of terror should
not have been allowed to get out of hand. Thus Evliya also told us that the
furriers participating in the parade dressed up as wild animals, and scared the
spectators 'for the mere fun of it. •2 Thus there was a gentle transition between
the 'real' and the 'theatrical ', and the real fear aroused by the chained lions
should have been dissipated by the tame bears and other creatures which
amused the spectators at this and other sultanic processions.3 Apparently it
was an essential part of Ottoman festivals to highlight people on the point of
coming to grievous bodily harm, but stopping just short of this eventuality.4
If a bit of speculation is permitted: this mixture of fear of the lion or other
wild beast, and trust in the joyous outcome of the festive encounter with such
a creature, may well have enhanced popular trust in the protective powers of
the padi�ah-t alempenah, 'the refuge of the world' to whom even wild beasts
did obeisance.
Matters are somewhat different in the case of the elephants. If their
depiction in eighteenth-century miniatures is any guide, they were shown not
as wild beasts, denizens of the jungle, but as animals specially trained to serve
their owners, similarly to the horses that formed the principal responsibility
of the mirahor. While the Ottomans never took elephants along to war, they
emulated this widespread Indian practice, often depicted in Moghul miniatures,
I Evliya 9elebi Seyahatnamesi, 1. Kitap. p. 245.
2 Evliya 9elebi Seyahatnamesi, 1. Kitap, p. 282.
3 Aul, Levni and the Surname. p. 186 shows a scene from the Surname of 1720: here the
specta
tors are entertained by a mock. attack on the part of tame bean>.
4Thus certain people were in the habit of sticking knives into their bodies and thus showing off
their endurance at parades. But when one of them died, the festival organizers, on behalf of
Sultan Murad Ill, prohibited this practice on pain of death. Compare Lubenau, Beschreibung,
vol. 2, p. 51.
E X O T I C A N I M A L S AT T H E S U LT A N S ' C O U R T 101
by the accoutrements the (artificial) elephants were made to pull in their
processions. For in Levni's artwork depicting the celebrations of 1720, we see
these animals carrying turrets equipped with mock cannons, to say nothing of
the images of armed men ornamenting the turrets and the living soldiers
manning the mock fortifications. I At least in the make-believe world of the
festival, the Ottoman sultan had thus augmented his army by the formidable
force of a few war elephants.
Moreover India with its numerous wonders both man-made and natural
enjoyed a certain prestige in the Ottoman world while on the other hand at
least around 1600 there was more or less explicit competition between the
Moghul rulers and the Ottoman sultans. Given this state of affairs, we can
surmise that elephants demonstrated sultanic power and access to exotic
creatures. Perhaps the latter were paraded in the streets of Istanbul to show that
the sultans could rival their Indian counterparts in every conceivable way.2
If we carry speculation yet a step further, we can also suppose that
considerations of this kind moti vated the Ottoman officials who designed the
1720 procession. By showing to the Istanbul populace an image of an
elephant pulling a symbol of massed firepower, namely towers and castles
manned by gunners, they were out to show that the sultan was not merely the
equal of any Indian ruler but in fact the most powerful figure i n the Islamic
world. After all in India the Ottomans, here known as Rumis had long enjoyed
the reputation of being superior fighters due to their employment of guns -
and now at least for the duration of a procession, the sultan's soldiers
possessed elephants as welJ.3 Perhaps the idea was to say that the elephant
served to bring the fortress into position, and thus ceded first place to the
skill and strength of Ottoman soldiers. Or else the organizers may have
thought that really superior power could be obtained by combining the martial
virtues of Ottomans and Moghul Indians. This question, and others like it,
will need further investigation.
I At!l, Levni and the Surname, p. 204. A different version of the same arrangement is found in
And, OsmlJIIli Senlilclerinde Tiirk Sanallart, lll. No 60.
2 Possibly the elephants also were meant to refer to the war elephants of King
Poru�,
.
Alexander/lskender's defeated Indian rival; but to date I have not been able to substantiate th1s
hypothesis. .
There is no doubt that the Moghul ruler Jahangir did see the Ottoman sultan as a nval to be
disparaged. In The Jahangirnama, p. 95 he discussed the visit of a Transoxanian who described
himself as an Ottoman ambassador; only the Moghul court did not believe this claim. In this
ncest
context Jahangir explained that (his � or) Timur had acted magnanimously .tow.ards the
defeated Bayezid Ylldmm, and 1mphed that the Ottoman sultans had been am1ss !n never
sending any envoys to the Moghuls who should have been honored as descendants ofT1mur.
3 Seyyidl 'All Re'fs, Le miroir des pays� Une anabase ottomane � travers 1'/nd.e e� l'Asie
centrale and comments by Jean-Lou1s Bacqu�-Grammont (IAix-e-Provence]: Smdbad­
tr.
Actes S�d 1999) pp. 66-67 referred to the many job offers his men received from Indian
potenta
te .
s 'Although the reasons were not made explicit the soldiers and sailors were probably
considered ex.pert in the use of firearms.
OTTOMAN VIEWS ON CORSAIRS AND PIRACY IN THE
ADRIATIC

The political setting

It has long been known that between 1500 and 1800 the Mediterranean
was filled with officially licensed corsairs whenever the area was a theatre of
war, quite apart from the freebooters who, sit venia verbo, used the occasion
to fish in troubled waters.l Moreover, when there was no major war,
unlicensed pirates were not lacking, and some of them might be commercial
competitors of the people they attacked. This applied, to cite only the best­
known case, to the English merchants of the late 16th century who, by dint of
piracy, tried to eliminate Venetian shippers by driving up the insurance rates
which the latter had to pay.2 In a grey zone between corsairs and pirates moved
those captains who considered themselves to be perpetually at war with the
'other side', regardless of truces and even peace treaties between Venice and the
Ottomans, or the Habsburg King of Spain and the Ottoman sultan. In their
own understanding, such captains were corsairs and not pirates, even though
the government whom they allegedly served might take a different view.
According to a story from the 17th century, an Ottoman freebooter and his
crew were at least as wary of the Sultan's provincial governor as they were of
unidentified sails suddenly appearing on the horizon.3
But then of course all this activity was rendered possible by the fact
that the major states were ambiguous about captains claiming allegiance to
themselves who robbed and enslaved people considered as the 'infidel ',
whoever that might be in a particular case. The Venetian Signoria quite often
found itself in the position of sheltering freebooters. Usually it was only fear
of a major war with the Ottoman sultan which induced the courts of the
Serenissima to punish captured pirates who had attacked traders from Istanbul
or Sarajevo, and sometimes Ottoman pashas - or indeed, to catch the robbers

1 Fernand Braude!, lA Mediterranee et le nwnde mediterraneen a l'epoque de Philippe JJ, 2

vols. (Paris Librarie Armand Colin, 1966). v . II, p. 190-212.
2
Alberto Tenenti, Piracy and the Decline of Venice (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1967).
3A. Tietze, Die Geschichte vom Kerkermeister-Kapitan, Ein tUrkischer Seerliuberroman aus
dem 17. Jahrhundert, Acta Orientalia, 19 (1942) 152-210.
 104 ANOTHER M I RR O R FOR P R I NC E S
at att.l In 1645 the war which, twenty-five years later, led to the Ottoman
conquest of Crete, began with a case of piracy.2 Moreover, we have to
distinguish between the Signoria itself and its local governors in Dalmatia and
elsewhere, who might condone acts of piracy the authorities in Venice
considered highly undesirable. Questions of material gain were much to the
forefront. While apart from a few major port towns, the Dalmatian coasts did
not produce a great deal of revenue, to accord protection to a pirate or self­
styled corsair might entail a share of the booty, a tempting opportunity for an
impecunious Venetian commander.
Something rather similar applies to the Ottoman side. To begin with,
there were the North African provinces of Algiers, Tunis and Tripolis, whose
militias and sea captains, even though they recognised the Sultan as overlord,
did not regard themselves as bound by the treaties which a European state
might conclude with the Ottoman central government.3 But even in the
eastern Mediterranean, there were frequent complaints about provincial
governors who accorded marauders the protection of their fortifications, despite
numerous sultanic commands to the contrary. Apparently day-to-day relations
with foreign merchants were not the province of the central gove:-:tment at all,
but constituted the responsibility of local authorities, often rather junior ones.
Some of these officials felt inspired by the ghazi ethos, and therefore protected
raiders against the infidel even if it meant violating the terms of a privilege
granted by their own Sultan.4 Moreover, material gain was of course no Jess
important in the Ottoman case than in the Venetian. Certain governors,
expecting a share of the loot, provided Algerian or Tunisian corsairs with
protection, victuals and a place to market their captives. Other office-holders,
for the very same reason, might react in the opposite fashion. This was the
case particularly if the Ottoman governors or fortress commanders in question
had established mutually profitable relations with Venetian or other foreign
merchants active in the area they happened to govern.
How the central Ottoman authorities would react to a raid undertaken
by captains owing allegiance to the Sultan thus was determined by ever-shif­
ting political considerations. Not merely the central administration, but also
1A. Fabris, Un caso di pirateria veneziana: Ia cattura della galea del bey di Gerba (21 ottobre
1584), Quaderni di Studi Arabi, 8 (1990) 91-112. This article discusses a well documented
attack by a Venetian pirate on an Ottoman galley carrying the young son of the governor of
Tripolis/Africa, along with his mother. Both these personages were murdered with great
brutality and much further loss of life. Under significant pressure from Istanbul, the Signoria
finally executed the pirate captain.
2F.G. Lane, Venice, a Maritime Republic, (Baltimore 1973) p. 408.
3According to Lane, Venice, p. 408, Venice long refused to negotiate with the three
'Regencies' directly, and Venetian ships accordingly were regarded as legitimate prizes. By
contrast, France and especially Holland were pragmatic in these matters ; cf. D. Panzac, Les
corsaires barbaresques. La fin d'une lpopee 1800-1820 (Paris 1999).
4suraiya Faroqhi, The Venetian Presence in the Ottoman Empire, The Journal of European
&onomic History (Rome), 15 (1986) 345-384.
OTTO M A N V I EW S ON C O R S A I R S A N D P I R A C Y 105
local governors and tax collectors were guided by the interests of the fisc on
the one hand, but often enough, by more particularistic concerns on the other.
A further complication arose from the presence of Austrian Habsburgs
close to the northern edge of the Adriatic Sea. Admittedly in the years around
1600, this dynasty was not yet in the business of encouraging trade through
Trieste. This was to happen only from the 18th century onwards, when the
Habsburgs encouraged immigration into this port town, which, as a result,
became a serious competitor of Venice for the regional trade of northern Italy.
But in the context of Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry, refugees from the Ottoman
Balkans and sometimes also from Venetian territories were made welcome at
the impregnable coastal fortress of Senj/Segna. 1 Known as Uskoks, these men
commanded almost no resources except piracy and/or corsair activity, two
ways of life which, however distinct they might be in theory, often were
difficult to distinguish in practice. The Uskoks' depredations were directed not
only against Muslim merchants; quite to the contrary, Uskok captains attacked
Ottoman Christians with equal relish. If a justification was needed, their
spokesmen often claimed that by recognising the overlordship of the Sultan,
Greek, Anatolian or Syrian merchants had placed themselves outside the pale
of Christianity, to say nothing of the fact that they were Orthodox
'schismatics'.2 Venetian merchants frequently risked becoming the victims of
the Uskoks as well, since they owed allegiance to a hostile state.
Considerable research has been done on the bind in which the Uskoks'
depredations placed the Signoria3. According to the agreement with the
Ottoman Sultans, the Venetians had the right and duty to attack and pursue
pirates active in the Adriatic. Where Christians were involved, this posed no
problems from the Sultans' point of view - proceedings against Muslims,
however, could lead to complications if they were on a large enough scale.
Whenever the Venetians did not act speedily or decisively enough, the
Ottoman side indicated that the Sultan's naval commanders might take the
matter into their own hands, and this was something the Signoria tried to
avoid at all costs. For quite apart from the danger that the presence of the
Sultan's men-of-war might entail for Venetian possessions in Dalmatia,
Venice's standing within Christendom was also at issue. In the troubled years
around 1600, an admission that the Signoria was unable to police the Adriatic
could easily lead to an intervention on the part of Spanish governors based in
Milan or Naples, with serious dangers for Venetian sovereignty.
1 Ca!herine Wendy Bracewell, The Uslwks of Senj,
Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the
Sixteenth-century Adriatic,(Ithaca, London 1992).
2Bracewell, Us/wks, p. 155-174.
3 Bracewell, Us/wks, p. 257.
 1 06 A N 0T H ER M I RR0R F0R P R I N C ES
OTTO M A N V I EW S ON C O R S A I R S A N D P I R A C Y 107

As to the Uskoks, more difficult to discuss because they have left fewer
correspondence still in situ. While special registers of sultanic names exist in
records, the political climate of our times has been more favourable to small
the Istanbul archives, they only begin in the closing years of the 1 7th
non-state communities than that prevailing down to about 19701. Within this
century.1 Moreover, register copies have preserved only the abridged form and
trend, a recent monograph on the Uskoks attempts, as far as the sources
lack the titles and polite phrases which, even though formulaic, often indicate
permit, to show them 'from the inside', allotting much space to the
the current state of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the
arguments with which these notorious raiders justified their activities.
Serenissima. Additionally, the Venetian archives contain sources which do not
However, while this book is built upon a wide range of Venetian and
survive in Istanbul at all. Sultanic rescripts were often accompanied by letters
�absburg documents, the extant Ottoman materials have been completely written in the Grand Vizier's name, which to my knowledge are not to be
1gnored. This omission is worth noting, as the relevant materials are, for the
found in any of the correspondance registers surviving in Istanbul today, at
most part, to be found within the very Venetian archives whose other sections
least not for the 16th or 17th century. Presumably they went into a special
have been so competently exploited.
archive which no longer exists, or so far has escaped the attention of the
cataloguers.
This gap is all the more regrettable as the Grand Vizier's letters allow
Approaching the Ottoman point ofview: the negotiating process
us a glimpse of the actual course of negotiations between the Ottoman and
Venetian governments. In many cases, the language is quite informal: thus a
I n the present paper, we will attempt to fill this gap, at least by a few
Grand Vizier may point out that a given course of action would be in the best
modest case studies. Our entreprise is based upon some official Ottoman
interests of the Signoria, or he may make less than respectful remarks about
documents from the late 16th and early 1 7th centuries. These permit us to
third parties. In a negotiation concerning a dispute between Venice and
recons u:uct, at least to some extent, what policy-makers in Istanbul thought
Dubrovnik, the Grand Vizier thus urged the Signoria to make peace.2 After
about p1rates and corsairs active in the Adriatic, how the latter's activities
all, so he informed his Venetian interlocutor, what was Dubrovnik but an
should be repressed, and the damage caused by these freebooters compensated
infertile bit of rocky coast, which the Sultan had not deigned to conquer
for. Addressed to the doges and their advisors, these letters have recently been
because it did not seem worth the trouble. Moreover, given the fact that
made accessible through often quite extensive summaries in Italian. Even so
the originals are still worth consulting, as a good deal of importan � Dubrovnik was under the Sultans' protection, a continuation of hostilities
might give certain Albanians 'devoid of understanding' or soldiers garrisoning
information remains unpublished.2
Ottoman border forts the wrong idea, namely that the Sultan and Venice were
Most of these texts were issued in the name of the Ottoman Sultan.
at war - the iron fist is palpable within the velvet glove of negotiation
According to a familiar format, they are authenticated by the characteristic
among 'serious states'.31nterchanges of this kind must have formed part of
tugra which contains the name of the ruler along with that of his father.
any negotiating process; but it is gratifying to see Ottoman documents in
Appended to some of these rescripts are contemporary Italian translations; in
which such political bargaining is actually reflected.
the case of the late 16th century, quite a few were prepared by Michele
Membre, an experienced interpreter.3 This Venetian set of original sultanic
letters (name) is of particular interest, for it is rare to find such an extensive
Approaching the Ottoman point of view: victimised merchants
1 For a study of the Cossacks in a similar perspective compare Linda Gordon Cossack
RebellioiiS, Social Turmoil in the Sixteenth·century Ulcrai,;, (Albany 1983).
'

Of course it cannot be ruled out that somewhere in the vast territories

2Maria Pia Pedani-Fabri�, / "Documenti turchi" d�ll'Archivio di Suuo di Venezia. (Roma
. 1994).
One � f the most cnterestmg aspects of the Ven�oan coll.ection is the large amount of archival of the former Ottoman Empire, a cache of petitions written by 16th-century
�te� a l gomg �ack to the late 15th century. Whcle the Prime Minister's archives in Istanbul, the
.

pnnc!pal reposctory of Ottoma.n documents, also contain some material from this period' their
real nches date from the years following 1550.
1
�
C�mp re lsmet Binark et al., Ba§bakcmlck Os TTU?�� I• �r#vi Rf!hberi, (Ankara 1 992) p. 96. For
earher ctmes, some names, not many of.them d ealing wcth Vencce, have found their way into the
3rn some instances, the V�netian arc�ives also contain copies of Ottoman texts written by 'registers of important affairs', the mam chancery records located today in the Istanbul Prime
.
mamfestl .y non-Ottoman sc:nbes. On �cchele Membr�. of Circassian background but with links Minister's archives. Cn addition, the ecnebi defterleri are also of value, but where Venice is
t� Venetc�n �Y.Prus and tJme spen� 1n Iran, see Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, In no� del Gran
-
concerned, they all date from the 17th and 1 8th centuries (Binark et al., op. cit.• p. 144).
Scgnor�. cnvcatc ollomonc. a Venetca da/1 caduta di Constantinopoli alia guerra di Candi
a' 2Pedani-Fabris, Documenli turchi. p. 320, Busta II, no 1218.
(Venezta 1994) p. 29 and 44. ,
3Pedani-Fabris, Docu�nti turchi. p. 320-321 Busta II, no 1218.
 108 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
Ottoman subjects will be located some day. But as things stand at present,
very few such records survive, at least from the 16th century. Moreover, we
cannot expect the Istanbul archives to yield the actual petitions of individual
Ottoman subjects whose goods had been plundered and whose relatives or
servants captured. For in many cases, these petitions, would have been
addressed to the Signoria, without any reference to Istanbul. In consequence,
the Ottoman documents extant in Venice constitute a most valuable
complement to the archives kept by the Ottomans themselves. On the basis of
this material, we can reconstruct the manner in which subjects of the Sultan
who had become victims of pirate/corsair attacks mobilised political support
in their attempts to obtain even partial restitution.
Moreover, when dealing with Istanbul archival material we normally
have to reconstruct the 'voice' of the petitioners, as the only surviving text is
the rescript responding to their complaints. Mercifully for us, Ottoman
officials recounted the salient points of the petitions received, but we cannot
tell to what degree they manipulated the texts in order to bring them in line
with their own notions of stylistically pleasing, or else 'political correct'
petitioning.• Obviously the materials surviving in the Venetian archives
cannot be regarded as spontaneous accounts by Ottoman subjects either.
Presumably there were rules of decorum to be adhered to when addressing the
Venetian authorities, albeit in the Ottoman-Turkish language, and translators
were available to guide the steps of the novice petitioner. But at least the texts
with which we are concerned here do constitute original petitions.2 As such,
they are one step closer to the 'voice' of aggrieved Ottoman merchants than
the more or less extensive petition summaries on which we normally must
depend.
The facts of the case(s)
Of the three cases we will subject to closer analysis, the first is
documented only by a single petition, submitted by the merchant Seyyid
Abdi, and dated Safer 994/January-February 1586.3 However, the incident at
issue must have occurred about two and a half years earlier, as Seyyid Abdi's
servant Piyale spent this period in Segna/Senj, as a prisoner of the Uskoks.
1Suraiya Faroqhi, Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic
Legitimation (1570)- 1650), Jourmal ofthe £coMmie and Social History ofthe Orient, 34 (1992)
1-39; G. Veinstein, L'oralit� dans les documents d'archives ottomans: paroles rapport�es ou
imagin�es ? Oral et ecrit dans le monde turco-ottoman, ed. N. Vatin, Revue du Monde
Musulman et de Ia Mediterranee, 75-76 (1996) 133-142.
2c. Kafadar, A death in Venice ( 1575): Anatolian Muslim merchants trading in the
Serenissima, Raiyyet Riisumu, Essays Presented to Halil lnalcik, eds B. Lewis et al., Jou:YUJI of
Turkish Studies, 10 (1980) 191-218.
3
Pedani-Fabris, DocutMnti turchi, p. 246, Busta 8, no 963.
OTTOMAN VI EWS ON C O R S A I R S A N D PI RACY 109
Seyyid Ali's thirty-six loads of mohair - thus the merchant either must have
been from Ankara himself, or else traded with this city - were travelling on
the ship owned by the mohair broker 'Djoyta Fonta', a Venetian subject. One
of Seyyid Ali's two servitors perished; the other, who was captured, must have
been the same Piyale who had spent time in Senj. According to the plaintiff,
the captain and his crew actuall y made common cause with the pirates, and
took their share of the plunder.
To these occurrences, Seyyid Abdi could invoke a large number of
witnesses. To begin with, his servants had been travelling with a company of
Christians; judging from their names, some of the latter were Armenians, and
the others possibly belonged to the Turkish-speaking Orthodox of central
Anatolia known as the Karamanlis. 1 These men had travelled to Istanbul,
where they had made their depositions; although Seyyid Abdi does not tell us
so, presumably the witnesses also had been despoiled by the Uskoks. In
addition there were some Christians, subjects of Venice in this instance, who
had been in Gabela at the time of the attacks. Last but not least, there were the
captain and crew of the Venetian ship, who would have been relatively easy to
locate for the Signoria. However, if these men really were accomplices, it is
not likely that they would have been very eager to talk about their roles in the
affair.
Unfortunately, Seyyid Abdi tells us very little about his station in
life; but we do gain the impression of a man with considerable self-confidence
and material resources. For unlike the other petitioners, he does not attempt to
arouse pity. On the contrary, his petition emphasises the responsibility of the
Doge in recovering the stolen property. After all, the plaintiff claims to have
assiduously frequented the Dogana, and by implication, losing his business
will not be to the advantage of the Venetian authorities. Moreover, Seyyid
Abdi takes the high moral ground: if the Doge wishes to be 'tranquil at heart',
he had better see to it that justice is done to the petitioner.
Our second case concerns four Bosnian merchants named Muruvvet,
Ibrahim, Hact �ahman and Ali, whose goods similarly had been stolen by the
Uskoks, probably in 1589.2 Presumably pressure from Istanbul started off an
examination in Venice; the Venetian authorities declared that the captain had
done battle with the Uskoks and had recovered the ship and part of the stolen
!
Remarkably enough, none of thes� individual� !s referred �o by �is firstn
af!le. but only by that
_
of his father, possibly the scribe wnting the petitiOn was trymg to mvent fa
mily names. The �ons
of Hac1 Kirkor - or Kirkor pilgrim to Jerusalem - and Hacatur Dursun were defimtely
Armenians. On the other han d the 'son of H1zu Bali Beg' calls to mind a Muslim, except that
f
our text specifies that all the our witnesses were Christians. Probably this man as well as his
fellow merchants 'the son of the priest/monk Karagoz' and 'the son of Aydm Arslan' were
turcophone Orthodox. well attested for this period in Ankara; but turcophone Annenians also
are a possibility.
2
Pedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 253-254, Busta 8, no 996.
 1 10 ANOTHER M I RROR F O R P R I NC E S
property. In response, the Bosnian merchants and a number of other Muslims
as witnesses (�uhud ul-hal) confirmed that they had received the retrieved
goods and had no more claims against the Venetians, since the capitulations
did not require the latter to retrieve captives and property from foreign
territory.
As to the third incident, one among numerous others occurring during
those troubled years, it took place before July 1617, the date of the first
document covering the affair. It involves a group of Ottoman merchants on
their way to Venice from the Dalmatian coast.1 Given the insecure conditions
of the time, they had been accorded a Venetian convoy, whose captains in
Ottoman terminology were known as kapudanlar. Warnings had been received
concerning the presence of Spanish ships in the area. In consequence, the
merchants asked the Venetian captains responsible for their security to get out
of the danger area as soon as possible, and not put in at a spot which had been
designated as especially dangerous. However, the captains would not listen to
their passengers. At night the merchants were i n fact attacked, and lost all
their property. As they hoped for help from the Venetian authorities, they
wasted several months in a port belonging to the Serenissima, without
obtaining any concrete results. This was all the more aggravating as originally
the merchants had resolved to cancel their trip to Venice when they heard that
the Spanish fleet was cruising off Curzola. However, the Venetian governor of
Spalato/Split had assured them that no risk was involved, and that they should
proceed as planned. Evidently this move was linked to the Venetian attempt,
initiated by the Jewish merchant Daniele Rodriga, to develop Spalato as a
major port and rival of Dubrovnik.2
When their expectations of speedy redress had thus been disappointed,
the traders decided to take their grievance to Istanbul, where they must have
interested a high official in their complaint, for a certain Miimin �avu� was
appointed to deal with the affair; the latter's signature appears at the end of one
of the relevant documents heading a long chain of signatories, larger in size
so as to indicate his prominence. Moreover, this was not enough, for the
Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha wrote to the Doge confirming the merchants'
story. This was apparently just part of a round of negotiations, for in a second
letter referring to the damage suffered by the Bosnians, the Grand Vizier
affirmed that he would take into positive consideration Venetian proposals
presented to him by the current bailo. 3
lPedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 317 318, Busta 1 1 , no 1210. The original is undated, the
-
date having been established by the archivists.
2J. Tadic, Le commerce en Dalmatie et l\ Raguse et Ia decadence economique de Venise au
xvue si�cle", Aspetti e cause della decadencia economica veneziana nel seculo XVII,
�Venice, Rome 1961) p. 237-274.
Pedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 322, Busta II, no 1222.
The Grand Vizier in question was Kara Mehmed Pap, who in 1024/1615 led a campaign
against Iran; his siege of Revan/Erivan was unsuccessful, and he was deposed in Zilka'de
1025/December 1616; cf. Ismail Hami Dani§mend, h_ahi, Osman/1 Tarihi KroMiojisi, 4 vols.
(Istanbul: Tilrkiye Yaymevi, 1947) v. Ul, p. 262-264.
OTTOM A N V I E W S ON C O R S A I R S A N D PI R A C Y 111
On 16 March 1618, the Senate responded to the Bosnian merchants'
complaints by disclaiming all responsibility.' Nobody, not even the Sultan,
so the reply ran, could guarantee absolute security at sea - this was
seemingly meant as an allusion to some incident which recently had happened
in Ottoman waters. No Venetian official was allowed to give the guarantees
the governor of Spalato had allegedly given, apart from the fact that he would
not have had the means to enforce them. Implicit, but not spelled out, is the
difference between pirates or corsairs on the one hand, and a fully fledged
enemy fleet on the other. Quite obviously the Venetians did not want to get
embroiled with the powerful Spanish governors in Italy.
If the Signoria had hoped that the newly enthroned Sultan Osman II
would not take up the matter, its members were soon to be disappointed. In
Ramazan 1027/September I 6 1 8 , the young Ottoman ruler assured the
Signoria that he was concerned about maintaining good relations, but
something would have to be done about satisfying the merchants who had lost
their goods.2 It would just not do merely to claim that a governor had
overstepped the boundaries of his powers; the government of Venice needed to
take responsibility for the acts of its officials. Moreover, the Venetians' own
interests equally were invoked; if merchants were to find the sea routes too
insecure, they would cease visiting Venice and go somewhere else. This would
hurt Venetian customs revenues, but would not benefit those of the Ottomans
either.3 Moreover, the Sultan's letter pointed out that the Signoria should
consider the difficult position of its own appointees in Spalato, who now were
constantly confronted with the insistent demands of Ottoman merchants, and
who would be left in peace once this matter was settled.
A further rescript informed the Venetians that the Chief Jurisconsult,
whose opinion (fetva) had been demanded by the aggrieved merchants, had
decided that the Venetian count of Spalato was responsible for the damage the
traders had suffered. Now the governor of the sub-provice of Clissa had been
made personally responsible for the execution of this decision.4
It seems, however, that the whole affair was finally solved, in a manner
acceptable to the Venetians, by the ambassador Francesco Contarini. In the
winter of 1618-1619, the latter came to Istanbul in order to congratulate
l Pedani-Fabris Documenti turchi, p. 324, Busta 1 1 , no 1227. This text survives in Italian, but
carries a note i� Ottoman that the response was 'worthless' because Sultan Mustafa had died in
the meantime. Had the text been sent to Istanbul and then returned, with the comments of a
dragoman in the service of the bailo?
2Pedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 25, Busta II, no
3 1231.
3-rrus argument would have appealed to Fernand Braude!, who has postulated the increasing
popularity of land routes due to the insecurity of the late 16th-century Mediterranean; see
Braude!, Mlditerranee, v. 1, p. 260-262.
4Pedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 326. Busta 11, no 1235.
 112 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PR INCES
OTT O M A N V I E W S O N C O R S A I R S A N D P I R A C Y 1 13

Osman II upon his accession, obtain a renewal of the capitulations and solve
accusations against the Venetian commanders. So the merchants probably
disputed matters still pending. I In the rescript granted to the ambassador upon
took what they could get, and in February 1589 Bali Silahdar, who had been
his return, Osman II promised to uphold the privileges granted by his father to
sent from Istanbul to deal with the affair, remitted a letter to the Grand Vizier
Venetians trading in Bosnia. The new Sultan also stated that - contrary to
Sinan Pasha reporting the incident closed. 1 Possibly the petition of the
previous claims, but that was not dwelt upon - he did not accept the
'assiduous visitor to the Dogana' Seyyid Abdi, whose outcome unfortunately
demands of Ottoman traders who held the bailo, and thereby the Signoria,
remains unknown, constitutes an early step in a comparable negotiation.
responsible for their losses. However, Osman II still recommended that the
Linked to the question of responsibility was the problem of obtaining
Venetians retrieve the goods in question and return them to their rightful
redress. According to the ahidnames, Venetian governments were obliged to
owners.
punish pirates active in the Adriatic and recuperate the stolen goods. As we
have seen, this occasionally happened, though probably in only a minority of
cases; many Uskoks doubtless rapidly carried their booty to Senj and other
Seeking redress: complicities and responsibilities
places, where the Venetian warships could not follow them. At the same time,
the Venetians were not obliged to hand over their own subjects for
One of the questions at issue in all three cases was the degree of
punishment. That remained an internal matter, for the Signoria to handle,
responsibility to be assigned to Venetians, particularly the captains and crews
although, as we have seen, political pressure from Istanbul was often a
acting as official escorts to Ottoman merchants. When the latter abandoned
condition for positive results.
their charges, this might have been due to cowardice or misjudgement, but
also to force majeure, namely, if the opposing men-of-war were too strong
for the Venetian galleys. Frequently, and apparently not without some reason,
Seeking common ground: rulers' responsibilities, fiscal advantages and
the Ottoman victims of spoliation believed that the defecting captains were in
safeguarding the goods oforphans andpiousfoundations
league with the pirates. When in 1589/90, the Ottoman administration
insisted on having this matter cleared up, the captains in question were in fact
In every negotiation, it is customary to legitimise one's own claims by
tried in Venice.2 Predictably, the court decided that there was no evidence of
referring to people, moral concerns or institutions, whom or which one's
collusion with the pirates - was this an attempt at damage control?
interlocutors hopefully will also consider as worthy of respect and/or
More remarkable is the declaration of the Ottoman merchants after
protection. Moreover, reference to such persons or institutions will appeal to
some of their property had been recuperated and returned to them : they
the sympathy of outsiders who may come to hear of the affair. In part, this
appeared before the emin who represented Ottoman interests in Dubrovnik,
procedure can be described as a search for common ground, which should
stating that the Venetians had killed the Uskok robbers and returned the stolen
facilitate the negotiation. But in part this reference to a supposedly common
goods.3 Possibly an agreement had been reached: when getting (part of) their
ground also intends to put the interlocutor in a bad position if the negotiations
goods back, the merchants exonerated the Venetian galley commander so as to
do not produce the desired results. For he has then failed to adhere to principle
eliminate a pretext for future Ottoman intervention. As to the traders, their
which 'all human beings' should accept. In our present-day world, the
main concern must have been with their own goods; after all, the Ottoman
Helsinki agreements and the protection of human rights enshrined in them
administration was not likely to pay them even if they persisted in their
often will provide such a frame of reference. Or when the issue in question

1 P� �
�i- abris, Documenti tu�chi, p. 3�8. Bus� 11, no 1243. The success of this mission is,
concerns present and future European Community members, the future of the
a
lbe
1t mdJr
e ctly,�s� reflected m a sul�mc rescnpt, a copy of which is to be found in Istanbul's
.
common 'European house' may serve the same purpose.
B�bakanhk Ar�JVJ-<?smanh . Ar�1v!• . section Maliye4en Miidevver no 6004, (in fact a
m1scatalogued ecneb1 deften pertammg to both Vemce and Dubrovnik). Dated Receb
1028/June-J�ly 161? and add.ressed to the beg of Bosnia, it forbids a local powerholder to
demand a t�bute ���ke�� of h1s own from Venetian subjects trading on Ottoman territories. In
.
all probab1l�ty, th1s rescnpt was granted to the ambassador because some kind of solution had 1 Pedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 255, Busta 8, no 1002.
been found m the case of the Ottoman merchants' goods carried off by the Spanish fleet. The Sinan Pll§a referred to here was Grand Vizier five times in the second half of the 16th
2
Pedani-Fabris, Docunumti turchi, p. 253-254, Busta 8, no 996. cent�ry; cf. F. �abi�ger and�· Dl{vid EP, s.v. "Sin�n Pasha". Sinan Pll§a earned the undying
·

3
Fedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 253, Busta 8, no 994. enmity of the h1stonan and h erary
t s
man Mustafa Ah, who painted a very black picture of hi
character.
 1 14 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
OTTO M A N V I EWS ON C O R S A I R S A N D P I R A C Y 1 15

When Ottomans and Venetians negotiated, the search for common

styling themselves the 'poor merchants' rather as if they had been addressing
ground was not easy, because so many legitimising discourses, on both the
their own ruler. "If you ask how we are doing, nobody but God knows our
Christian and the Muslim side, were based on religion. One could of course
condition". "What can we do? This is what God has written on our heads.
try to circumvent this barrier by referring to the common Abrahamic tradition.
Obviously, what can we do rabout it]?" I Or else, if important enough,
But this was rarely attempted, apart from occasional Protestants highlighting
the pure monotheism which they themselves and the Muslims supposedly Ottoman traders could take a leaf from the Sultan's book and emphasise that

shared, in contrast with the idolatrous Catholics. I their business was large enough to make a difference to the revenues of the
More common were references to peace and amity, and the ahidnames Venetian state.
which Venice had enjoyed almost throughout Ottoman history; this motif More unexpected is the frequent claim in Ottoman documents of the
would crop up both in Ottoman and in Venetian diplomatic parlance. Ottoman 1 6th and 17th centuries that the merchants who had been robbed, and whom
official negotiators also sometimes referred to the protection of tax-paying the Signoria should aid in recovering their goods, had borrowed money from
subjects, who should not be exposed to the ravages of war and piracy without funds belonging to orphans and pious foundations. Even if their goods had
good cause. This was probably what Seyyid Abdi was thinking of when he been lost, so the argument runs, the traders in question would be obliged to
claimed that the Doge could only achieve tranquillity of mind if the latter saw
pay back the money. So it was presumably an act of elementary fairness to
to it that the petitioner obtained redress. Such statements made sense in the
help the merchants recover their property. Possibly the Venetians' Ottoman
context of Middle Eastern 'mirrors of princes', which enjoined the ruler to
interlocutors also assumed that the former were aware of the inviolability of
protect his subjects.2 It was probably assumed that the Venetian Doge and his
pious foundations; thus the Signoria presumably would appreciate that for
begler would see matters in the same light.
religious reasons, the Ottoman side had no option but to press the claims of
In addition there was the fiscal-economic argument, related to the
the merchants.
previous one and yet distinct. We have seen that the Venetians were to
Albeit obliquely, these statements refer to the fact, by now well
compensate merchants who had been robbed so that Ottoman traders would
known, that Ottoman pious foundations lent out money at interest.2 It is
continue to frequent Venice, and thus augment the Signoria's revenues.
unlikely that commercial partnership, for instance a mudaraba, was involved,
Moreover, the Ottoman interlocutors pointed out that these revenues were
in which an investor provided capital to a travelling merchant and expected a
important to their own state as well, thus confessing to the 'fiscalism' which
large share of the profits. For the mudaraba contract stipulated that a loss for
has been described as a major feature of 'Ottoman economic policy' .3 If we are
which the travelling merchant as the active partner bore no responsibility, as
not 'overinterpreting' our texts, it seems that around 1600, the authors of
was true in the case of most spoliations by pirates or robbers, was not
Ottoman sultanic rescripts were aware of the fact that both states depended on
reimbursed to the investor.3 Thus a pious foundation as a tacit mudaraba
commerce-based revenues. Moreover, the Ottoman sovereign, in whose name
partner would have to accept the loss of its capital in such case. By contrast,
they wrote, apparently had no 'lordly' scruples in spelling out this fact of life.
Ottoman merchants borrowing money from pious foundations were apparently
At least in peacetime, Ottomans and Venetians shared a concern with the
protection of trade routes and the security of customs revenues.
When aggrieved Ottoman merchants appealed to the Doge directly, their
argumentation obviously was somewhat different from that of state officials.
Some of them chose to appeal to the charity and compassion of the Signoria,

1Trus was a min r theme i� EngJish R naissance and 17th-century writing: for the claim of one
? �
�uthor �hat fig�tJ�g �athohcs '!l
ight wm the support and ultimately even the conversion of the
Moors to Chnst1an1ty cf. N ab Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age ofDiscovery' 1
�New Yo�k 1999 p. 155.
� .
1l
.

.
These phrases occur at the beginning and the end of the petition of 1617·' see Pedani-Fabris
Documenti turchi, p. 317, Busta II, no. 1210.
'

H. Inalc1k, Cap1tal Formation m the Ottoman Empue• The Journal of Economic History• 2911 2on th� debate �mon� Ottoman religious figures conc�rning this practice compare J
on E.
�1969) 97-103. .
.
Mandavllle, Usunous Piety: The Cash waq{Controversy m the Ottoman Empire, International
M. Ge�y. Ottoman Industry m. the Eighteenth Century: General Framework, Characte�istics
. Journal ofM iddle East Studies, 10/3 (1979) 289-308.
and Mam Trends, Manufactunng m the Ottoman Empire and Turkey 1500·1950' ed· D· 3M. <:izakya, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships, The Islamic World and
Quataert, (Albany 1994) p. 59-86. Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives, (Leiden, New York 1996) p. 4.
 1 16 A N0TH ER MI RR0R F0R P R I NC ES
required to pay back their loans no matter what had happened to their
ventures. I
Conclusion
These negotiations, with their twists and turns, demonstrate that the
old story about the Ottoman government's lack of interest in the foreign trade
of its Muslim subjects is just not tenable. As we have seen, Ottoman Muslim
merchants were able to obtain the intervention of an official messenger
(favu�). If we keep in mind that favu� in this period were quite often sent out
as ambassadors of a sort, it is readily apparent that the Ottoman central
government did not regard the problems of its subjects trading abroad as
minor.2 Through the work of Benjamin Arbel and others, we have learned that
the Ottoman central government of the 16th and 17th centuries was at times
willing to support its Jewish subjects in their Adriatic commercial ventures,
presumably with fiscal concerns in mind.J Obviously something similar was
1 While we here are concerned with references to loans as a legitimising device and thus with
policy-making, the point in question is also of interest to the historian of comme�. M. t;izalc�.
Cash Waqfs of Bu�, Journal of the Economic and Social History ofthe Orient, 38/3 (1995)
351, has found that tn 18th century, the numerous funds held by Bursa pious foundations did not
often provide commercial credit, but rather consumer loans. However, references to the debts
of me�hants victi!f1ised by pirate attacks would have lost their legitimising quality if such debts
were tn fact a !'ll"ty. In consequence, we can assume that contrary to what happened in 18th
century Bursa, tn the 16th and 17th-century Balkans, pious foundations were a known source of
commercial credit.
Individual loans were often modest, but since merchants typically borrowed from more
than �ne foundation might add up to substantial sums in the hands of a particular partnership.
•
Thus tn 1589 a certatn Hact Uruc had borrowed 13,156 akfe from the Hiisrev Beg foundation,
.
and about !he same amount fom the. lesser-known foundation of Hact Mustafa both of Sarajevo.
But somehmes real fo�unes were tnvotved: thus Miiriivvet b. Timur, along with his partners
Mehmed, the latter's wtfe, Korkud and Oruc had borrowed over a quater million akfe from
eight different foundations; almost 200,000 ak�e came from the mosque of Hact Turhan. Such
cumulation did not often occur .in 18th;century Bursa (t;tzak�. Cash Waqfs, p. 337). Thus it is
all the more remarkable that thts practtce was common enough among Bosnian traders around
1600.
Among the merchants concerned, several are described as tanners, who must have been
exporting leather to Venice, even though this item often enough figured among the goods whose
exportation was prohibited: Suraiya Faroqhi, Die osmanische Handelspolitik des frUhen 17.
Jahrhunderts zwischen Dobrovnik und Venedig, Wiener Beitri:ige fiir die Geschichte der
Neuzeit, 10 (1983) 207-222.
2Pedani-Fabris, In nome, p. 36-40.
3 B. Arbel, Trading Nations, Je s and �en e:rians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean,
. w_
{�t�e_n 1995) p. 164-165, has mterestmg m f ormation on David Passi, who apart from other
actlv tbes, rad�
t be�ween the <?t�oman Emf?i�e and Venice in the 16th century. See also P.
Fodor, An Antl-Serrute Grand V1z1er? The Cnsts m . Ottoman-Jewish Relations in 1589-1591 and
its Consequences, in Idem, In Quest of the Golden Apple, Imperial Ideology' Politics and
Militory Adminstration
i in 1M Onoman Empire, (Istanbul 2000) p. 191-206.
OT T O M A N V I E W S ON C O R S A I R S A N D P I R A C Y 1 17
involved in the case of the Muslims ; Osman II claimed that it was at the
insistence of his merchant subjects that he wrote to the Doge on their behalf. I
Practically no document has been found in which an Ottoman official advised
Muslim Bosnians or istanbullus to say at home and let unbelievers take care
of any commercial concerns they might possess in Venice.
Less clear are the Ottoman authorities' motivations in the non­
commercial realm. It is by no means certain that in the tatters' pespective,
only fiscal concerns were at issue. Quite possibly, it was also a question of
the Sultan's prestige in Venice and elsewhere. One might surmise that
Ottoman officials considered it a disrespectful gesture towards their revered
ruler if the interests of Ottoman subjects, even when active abroad, were
treated in a cavalier fashion. Moreover, as an Islamic ruler, it was also
incumbent upon the Sultan to promote the interests of pious foundations, in
Sarajevo and elsewhere. After all, official pressure well might be exerted on
merchants in order to make them pay back their debts, no matter whether their
investments had been profitable or not. But in real life, not much could be
obtained from a bankrupt trader.
Moreover, the very status of piracy and robbery in Islamic law and
sultanic kanun also must have induced the Ottoman authorities to take such
attacks on their subjects very seriously indeed. For highway robbery was a
crime whose punishment was incumbent on the ruler, while in the case of
other types of homicide, the victim's family had a decisive role to play, and
state intervention remained secondary.2 Any perusal of the Ottoman chancery
registers, however casual, shows that robbery exercised the Ottoman
authorities almost to the exclusion of any other crime.J It is also worth
noting that the term e�kiya could denote both robbers and rebels; thus other
considerations apart, the spoliation of travellers was also an act of defiance
vis-a-vis the Sultan.4 And a crime that demanded a strong response when it
happened on Ottoman territory, must have been equally if not more
reprehensible when it occurred abroad.
1 Pedani-Fabris, Documenti turchi, p. 325. Busta I t , no 1213.
2
"[T)he Koran, and after it Islamic law, punishes the crime of highway robbery ... "; see J.
Schacht, An lntro®ction to Islamic Law, (Oxford 1964) p. 9.
J
on these problems, see Suraiya Faroqhi, Coping with the State, Political Conflict and Crime in
the Onoman Empire, {Istanbul 1995) passim.
"This ambiguity has caused C· Ulu�y to link 'robbery' and 'popular movements' in two well­
known editions ofdocuments from the Manisa k.adi registers: XVII. Asmla Saruhan'da qkiyal1.k
ve Halk Harelcetleri, (Istanbul 1944) and Idem, 18. ve 19. Yiizytllarda Saruhan'da qkiyal!k ve
Ha/Jc Harelcetleri, (Istanbul 1955).
 BEFORE 1600: OTTOMAN ATTITUDES TOWARDS
MERCHANTS FROM LATIN CHRISTENDOM

Ottoman trade has long been a favourite among historians, so that even
following the monumental recent synthesis by Halil Inalcik, first published in
1994 our field
has been enriched by quite a few text editions and secondary
1
studies. Yet for the most part, stress has been laid on what we might call
'objective trends', even though we are probably less convinced of the virtues of
quantification on the basis of often insufficient evidence, than was true twenty
or twenty-five years ago. However in the present historiography of Europe but
also of India, a strong emphasis generally is placed on the 'subjective' factor.2
For the sake of dialogue between different historical subfields, if for no other
reason, it thus would seem useful to summarize what we know about
Ottoman official attitudes at least where the Turkish-speaking provinces are
concerned; the ideas and perceptions of ordinary merchants largely continue to
remain a closed book.3
This study is intended as part of the effort at communication with other
historical subfields which I consider to be a major task of Ottomanists in the
4
present and foreseeable future. Concentrating on the period before 1 600 was
originally imposed by the organizers of a congress which brought together
literary scholars and historians of what Europeanists would call the medieval
and Renaissance periods.s But this time limit makes sense at least to me,
beyond the practical necessity which originally dictated it. Present research
certainly has placed the late sixteenth-century 'price revol ution' in its
historical context, so that it appears as less of a crucial turning point than it
did to scholars working twenty to thirty years ago. However the subjective

1Halil lnalcik, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1 00-1600," in An Economic and
3
Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914 ed. by Halil lnalcik with Donald Quataert
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) (paperback version published in 1997; here
Inalcik's work appears as vol. I). The most recent contribution: Suraiya Faroqhi and Gilles
Veinstein eds., "Merchants in the Ottoman Empire" (Leuven: Peeters, scheduled for 2008).
2Thus Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam are currently engaged in studying the
manner in which early modern visitors from the Iranian world perceived I ndia, and Indian
travellers reacted to Iran.
3ln a superb monograph, Nelly Hanna recently has shown that things were rather different in
Cairo: Making Big Money in 1600, the Life and Times of /sma'il Abu Taqiyya, Egyptian
Merchant (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1998).
4Here would like to pay tribute to the work of Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj, who has made me
I
aware of this necessity: Formation of the Modern State, The Ouoman Empire, Sixteenth to
Eighteenth Centuries (Albany NY: SUNY Press, 1991).
S'Between Empires: Orientalism before .1600', organized by Alfred Hiatt, Ananya Kabir and
John Serjeantson (Trinity College, Cambndge Engl., July 2001).
 120 A NOTHER M I R R O R FOR PRI NCES
importance of this 'ime
t of troubles' for the consciousness of the Ottoman
ruling group should not be underestimated, and 1600 therefore seems a valid
'period limit' for studies concerned with economic and social life.1
Primary sources, both surviving and missing
The Ottoman Empire began its existence in the first half of the
fourteenth century, and by the 1390s, was already a formidable force both i n
South-eastern Europe and i n western and central Anatolia. However the
archives of that early period have not been preserved. Presumably they were
destroyed during or after the battle of Ankara (1402), when Timur defeated
Sultan Bayezid I, nicknamed Y1ldmm ('lightning').2 Nor can the early
fifteenth-century succession wars between Bayezid's four sons, which
continued for about a decade, have been conducive to the preservation of
official documents. 3
In addition, at least compared to the highly developed bureaucratic
apparatus of the sixteenth and a fortiori the eighteenth century, the early
Ottoman state probably possessed but a skeleton administration, whose
members had generated a limited number of files, or rather bags of documents,
to begin with. Historical writings also were not a high priority until the last
quarter of the fifteenth century.4 While it is always dangerous to argue ex
negativo, particularly when dealing with a period of frequent wars, a limited
amount of activity on the part of the earliest Ottoman chanceries still seems a
probable assumption. After all, high-level Ottoman officials and religious
cum legal scholars (ulema), who beginning in the years around 1500 and
continuing throughout the sixteenth century, attempted to collect information
1 omer Ultfi Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the
Economic History of the Near East," International Journal ofMiddle East Studies, VI ( 1975): 3-
28. Barkan's findings recently have been placed in perspective by �evket Pamuk, "The Price
Revolution in the Ottoman Empire Reconsidered," International Journal ofMiddle East Studies,
33 (2001): 69-89. On the 'subjective' aspects see Cemal Kafadar, "Les troubles mon�taires de Ia
fin du XVIe si�cle et Ia prise de conscience ottomane du d�clin," Annales Economies Societes
Civilisations (1986): 381-400.
2 Pamuk, "The Price Revolution".
on this campaign compare Marie Mathilde Alexandrescu-Dersca, La campagne de Timur en
Anatolie (1402), 2nd ed. (London: Variorum Reprints, 1977).
3 Dimitris J., Kastritsis, The Sons ofBayezid. Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman
Civil War of 1402-13 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007).
4
colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire 1300-1481 (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1990) has insisted most
forcefully on the gaps in our knowledge due to these circumstances. Compare Cemal Kafadar,
Between Two Worlds, The Construction ofthe Ottoman State (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1995) for a recent sophisticated discussion of the history and historiography
of the early Ottoman Empire.
B EFORE 1 60 0 121
on early Ottoman history, were not markedly successful.' One of them was so
embarrassed about being unable to locate any documents written in the reigns
of Sultans Osman and Orban, that he proceeded to fake them. This has marred
his credibility, ever since he was 'found out' a century ago.2
Moreover economic/commercial history was even less a concern of
early Ottoman officials than the conquests and derring-do of warrior sultans. It
is not by chance that the two classical studies by Halil Inalcik, which between
them, have introduced Ottoman commercial and economic history to English­
speaking readers, discuss merchants and commerce mainly for the period
beginning with the mid-fifteenth century.3 In consequence, I will focus on the
period between 1450 and 1 600, the years which we associate with the
Ottoman Empire's apogee in politics, but also in poetry and courtly art.4 To
some extent this period also was characterized by economic florescence;
certainly the period before the great devaluations of 1585-86 was less difficult
for urban producers than the decades that followed.s
As we are dealing with foreign merchants, sources produced by these
people or the ambassadors of their rulers back home occasionally can be useful
for our purposes. However since our concern is with the attitudes of the
Ottoman governing classes, non-Ottoman sources must be regarded with a
good deal of scepticism. For after all, the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries
were a period in which the Ottoman sultans viewed themselves as expanding
the realm of Islam against the 'unbelievers'. On the other hand, i n the eyes of
western Europeans, Ottomans were 'infidels', which many of the less informed
authors were still unable to distinguish from the pagans of antiquity.6 Given
'
This is apparent, for instance, from the. collection of ulema �iographi�s put tol!ether by the
scholar Tqkopriiluzade in the early SIXteenth century. While for h1s own ume and the
�
immediate past, TqkopriJluzade carefully differentiates between · ?lid data' !""� ���endary
-
material this is not true for the fourteenth century: Es-saqa 1q en-No maniJJe von
Tas/Wprlizode..., tr and with commentary by 0. Rescher Ostanbul: n.p 1927), passim.
.•
2
compare the article 'Feridun Beg' in The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (from now onwards
El) by J.H. Mordtrnann, updated by Victor M�nage. Feridun Beg's fake was discovered by
MUkrimin Halil Yinan�. "Ferfdiln Beg MOn§eitJ," Tarih-i 'Osmani Encumeni Mecmu'ast, 77:
161-1 68; 78: 37-46; 79: 95-104; 81: 216-26.
3
Halil Inalcik, The Ottoman Empire, The Classical Age, 130f!-1600 (London; Weidenfeld &
Nicholson, 1973), idem, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Soc1ety, 1300-1600.
4
For a general overview compare Esin Atil, The Age of Sultan SiJleyman the Magnificent
�Washington DC, New York: The National Gallery and Harry N. Abrams Inc, 1987).
6well-informed people had known �tter e�er since the �igb middle ages, but might re at
�
such blatantly false opinions even agamst thetr own �tter JUdgment. Compare Norman_ �el,
Islam and the West. The Ma/cing ofan Image, 2nd rev1sed ed. (Oxford: Oneworld Pubhcallons,
1993): 338-43. . . . . .. . .
The question of how informallon, nus1 nforma t1on and dJ�Informa iJ<?n abou_t the lslanuc world
were produced in Renaissano� Europe has been extensively stud1�d d!Jnng the l�t. twenty
years. For an interesting overv1ew over the French scene. see Fr6d�nc Tmguely, L.e cruure du
Levant a kl Renaissance, Enqulte sur les voyageurs fran�ai
s dans /'empire de Soliman le
Magnifique (Geneva: Droz, 2000).
 122 ANOTHER MI RROR FOR P R I NC ES
B EFORE 1 600 123

this state of confrontation, in the realm of 'ideology' and often enough on the
It is a major drawback that for our period, almost all the surviving
battlefield as well, distortions of the adversary's motivations are a likely
sources are official or semi-official in character. Archival documents written
possibility. Therefore apart from some very exceptional situations, only
by private persons, subjects of the sultan, and at the same time, relevant to
Ottoman sources should be used as a basis for describing Ottoman attitudes.
foreign traders, almost never survive. In addition most of the chronicles were
Of course the situation is different when we are concerned with bilateral inter­
written by high officials either still on active service or else in retirement.
state relations, but that topic, for our purposes, is no more than a sideline.
This limitation is rather regrettable. For presumably Ottoman merchants who
Thus our most important sources consist on the one hand, of the
did business with foreign traders, for instance selling cotton in defiance of
treaties and privileges granted by Ottoman sultans to foreign rulers on behalf
sultanic prohibitions, may well have held opinions which differed from those
of the latters' subjects (ahidname). On the other hand, these texts are
held by the Ottoman authorities, at least where their particular commercial
completed by a sizeable number of sultanic commands which, in one way or
partners were involved. I But this aspect of the problem unfortunately remains
another, regulated the activities of foreign merchants on Ottoman territory.
quite inaccessible to the historian of the twenty-first century.
These edicts, copied out into large volumes known as the 'Registers of
Things are further complicated by the fact that Ottoman officials had
Important Affairs' were normally addressed to the governors and kadis of the
totally different priorities from the present-day historian. In Ottoman
localities in which the foreigners traded, and some of the relevant registers
bureaucratic circles, it was customary to discuss the details of a given project
have been published. 1 Sometimes the sultanic commands in question
at considerable length.2 Whether enough money was available, whether the
responded to queries and complaints originally relayed by kadis, governors or
material and/or political returns on the money spent were satisfactory, what
tax farmers. In other instances, a consul or ambassador of a foreign power
countermeasures should be taken in case of resistance to the project in
might have solicited the sultanic rescript on behalf of the latter's subjects.2
question, all these and other matters quite often were debated in the surviving
While for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, we sometimes possess
Ottoman documents. By contrast, why a certain measure might be considered
more or less extensive fragments of the Ottoman correspondences which
desirable from an 'ideological' point of view is but rarely discussed. It would
preceded the actual sultanic edicts, this is quite rare for the period before 1600.
appear that a high degree of consensus on major issues prevailed among
Occasionally foreign merchants also will crop up in the registers of local
Ottoman officials, or in any case, it was 'politically correct' to pretend that
kadis.3 But cases of this kind unfortunately are not too frequent.4
such a consensus existed.3 As a result, it is quite rare that official documents
discuss what we might see as fundamental considerations of policy, such as
!Compare the series of MUI\imme �flerleri, located in Istanbul's B�� anla� A�i�i �m�a
- the legitimacy and reputation of the ruler, the conformity or otherwise of
Ar'§ivi (Registers of lmportant_Affaars, fro� now onw�: MD) pubhsl\ed ��- f�cs 1 m1le WI� certain practices to Islamic religious law, or the mutual obligations of
transcriptions in modern Turkish: lsmet Bm .
ark et a/11 (eds.) 3 Numarala Muh1mme Deften
9731/565, 3 vols. (Ankara: B�bakanhk Devlet �ivleri Gene! MUdtiriUtU. 1993)_and dem i et subjects and sultan.4 Such matters usually remain implicit, and have been
alii (eds.) 5 Numarala Miihimme Defteri (97311565-66), 2 vols (Ankara: same publisher, 1994);
idem et alii (eds.), 6 Numara/1 Miihimme Defteri (9721/564-1565), 3 vols (Ankara: same deduced by modern researchers from indications which are often ambiguous.
publisher, 1995); dem
i t:f
et alii (eds.). 7 !ofumarall ii
himme Defteri (975-�!�11567-1569�. 5 vols Our understanding of Ottoman views of foreign 'infidel' merchants equally is
(Ankara: same publisher, 1997-1998). idem et alu (eds.), J2 Numaral1 Muh1mme De_fter�, 3 vol�
(Ankara: same publisher, 1996); Mehmet Ali Onal (ed), Miihimme Defteri 44 (lzm1r: Akadem1 marred by these silences.
Kitabevi, 1995); Mertol Tulum et alii, Miihimme Defteri 90 (Istanbul: TUrk DUnyas1
A�tumalan Vakf1, 1993).
For texts relevant to forei gn merchants compare for example MD 10, p. 223, No 341
(97911571 -72); 23, p.270, No 571 (98111573-74); 74, p. 247, No 560 (100411595-96).
2 IMD 36, p. 195, No 524 (987/1579-80). On sucl\ busi�ess connections in general comp �re
Examples have survived in the Dubrovnik arcl\ives and have been publisl\ed in translation by Suraiya Faroqhi Towns and Townsmen of Ottoman Anatolla, Trade, Crafts, and Food Production
N. H. Siegman, The Turco-Ragusan Relationship, According to the F_irmans ofMurad Ill (1574- in an Urban Setting 1520-1650 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984): 128-29.
1595) Extant in the State Archives of Dubrovnik (Tile Hague, Pans: Mouton, 1967). See for 2Especially in wartime this sometimes meant that even minor matters were decided in Istanbul:
example Acta Turcarum A2-26, translation on p. 141. compare MD 10, p. i23, No 341 (979/ 1571-72), which _ discu�ses the _fate of a ship ��m
.
3For an example see the summary published in Halit Ongan ed, Ankara'mn lki Numarall Ser'iye
Dubrovnik, whose captain bad att � mpt ed to purchase cotton 10 lzmar. As th1s was n?t an a
c�v1t
y
Sicili (Ankara: TUrk Tarih Kurum, 1974): 124, No 1640. covered by the ahidname, the sh 1p was to be confiscated and used for transporting offic1ally
. .
A checklist of the kadi registers surviving in Turkey, as well as a selectton of sample required supplies
documents, is found in Ahmet AkgUndiJz, et alii (eds.) Seriye Sicil/eri, 2 vols. (Istanbul: TUrk 3TI\at this was not true in 'real life' is a different
matter altogether: for debates within the
DUnyas1 A�llrmalart Vakfa, 1988-89). .. sixteenth-century Ottoman elite compare Co".!ell H. Aeischer, Bureaucrat and lmellectual In
4For an example concerning foreign merchants in Ankara, see Ozer Ergen�. Osman/1 K�asik the Ottoman Empire. The Hi storian Mustafa Ali (1541-/600) (Princeton: Princeton University
Donemi Kent Tarihfillfine Katk1, XVI. YiJzy1/da Ankara ve Konya (Ankara: Ankara EnstJttlsU Press, 1986), passim.
Vakfa, 1995): 113. 4suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and SultanS (London: Tauris Press. 1994).
 124 A NOTHER MI RROR FOR P R I NCES
Guarantees given to the subjects offoreign rulers
As we have seen, the oldest documents in which the Ottoman sultans,
after a fashion, indicate their views of foreign trade and traders are known as
the ahidnames. 1 In European parlance, these grants were known as the
capitulations, from the capitula or paragraphs of which they invariably
consisted. Modern scholars also call them imtiyazat, meaning privileges.
They were granted by many Muslim rulers, including the Mamluk sultans of
Egypt, but also by some of the Turkish-speaking princes whose territories,
located i n South-western Anatolia the Ottoman sultans were to take over in
the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.2 The treaty instruments
concerning minor rulers, such as the princes of Aydm and Mente�e, all
constitute "unilateral instruments used for the conclusion of peace and the
concession of (commercial) privileges. "3
Ahidnames can be viewed as a special case of the aman, the protection
which any Muslim, man or woman, could grant to an outsider; the
beneficiaries of such protection being called miiste'min. Such grants of
protection are always unilateral. Yet there has been some debate over the
question whether ahidnames at all times should be regarded as unilateral
grants by the Ottoman sultans, or whether in certain instances, they should
not rather be considered reciprocal agreements between the sultan and a foreign
ruler. In the Venetian instance, it would appear that the earliest ahidnames, of
1403 and 1411, were unilateral grants. But already in 1419, the ahidname had
been converted into a reciprocal treaty, which demanded the confirmation of
both sides, loosely in imitation of Byzantine custom.
Practice changed again quite rapidly, beginning in 1482, as now
Ottoman ahidnames granted to Venice increasingly came to resemble the
unilateral grants of privilege (ni�an), also used for affairs internal to the
Ottoman Empire. This process continued throughout the sixteenth century,
1The fundamental study on this issue is the article 'lmtiyazat' in El by Halil lnalcik. In addition
there are monographs concerning individual states. On Dubrovnik, see Siegman, The Turco­
Ragusan Relationship. The important study by Hans Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian
Diplomatics: The ahidnames. The Historical Background and the Development of a Category of
Political-Diplomatic Instruments together with an annotated Edition of a Corpus of Relevant
Documents" Ph D dissertation, Utrecht 1991 is only available on the internet. I am most grateful
to the author for supplying me with a copy. Dariusz Kotodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic
Relations (15th-18th century) (Leiden, 2000), with a large body of original douments included,
now constitutes the basic study on Poland-Lithuania.
2on the treaties with Venice concluded by the Aydm and MentC§e princes, whose territories
were located in western and southwestern Anatolia, compare Elizabeth Zachariadou, Trade
and Crusade. Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydm (1300-1415) (Venice:
The Hellenic Institute of Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Studies, 1983): 187-242.
3Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics", vol 1: 82. 'Unilateral' means that the i�suing
prince appears as having made the grant upon his own initiative, without requiring confirmation
on the part of the recipient.
B EFORE 1 600 125
with Ottoman power still growing and its Venetian counterpart now
noticeably on the wane. Particularly after 1540, all ahidnames issued to
Venice, and also the new ones granted to western European rulers, can be
characterized as unilateral grants of privilege.1 Where western and southern
Europe are concerned we can thus regard the Venetian treaties of the mid­
fifteenth century as an exception which confirms the rule of unilateralism.
However in the case of Poland, the norm was confirmation by the king.2
Similarly to all other privileges, ahidnames were valid only for the reign of
the issuing sultan, and had to be confirmed by his successor.
In Ottoman practice, the foreign visitors were granted exemption from
the cizye, the head tax which Islamic religious Jaw required all non-Muslim
subjects of a Muslim ruler to pay.3 Religious law also limited the duration of
the miiste 'min's stay to a single year, after which the foreigner would be
regarded as a non-Muslim subject of the Muslim ruler on whose territory
cizye according
he/she was residing. The new subject would then have to pay
to his means. But Ottoman governmental practice tended to ignore this
particular limitation, and foreign Christian or Jewish merchants normally were
exempt from the cizye regardless of the duration of their stay.
Capitulations were addressed to the ruler and not to his subjects, and
the number of paragraphs directly relevant to traders and trade was often quite
limited. But of course the merchants would benefit from the clauses which
protected the subjects of a given prince or S ignoria in general. A major
privilege absolved foreigners of the responsibility for debts contracted by their
countrymen, if they themselves had not stood surety for the debtor i n
question.4 This also included bailos and ambassadors, who were not to be
made responsible for the debts of merchants from the state which they
represented.5
1Theunissen, "Ottoman-Venetian Diplomatics." vol l: 238-39.
2Kotodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Relations: 68-74.
3This privilege was derived from the recognition of the visitors as temporary sojourners,
regardless of the 'real' duration of their stay; compare Sk.illiter, William Harborne: 88.
Matters were different when 'recognized' permanent residents were involved. Thus after the
conquest of Constantinople/ Istanbul the Genoese of Galata were exempted from all taxes
except the harac, a term often used as a synonym of cizye. After all the Genoese of Galata
were permanent inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire and not merchants spending a few months
or even years on the territories of the sultans: compare Kate Aeet, European and Islamic Trade
in the Early Ottoman State. The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1999): 129.
On the willingness of the Ottoman administration of the early seventeenth century to accept
even long-term residents as foreign subjects, compare Suraiya Faroqhi, "The Venetian
Presence in the Ottoman Empire", The Journal of European Economic History (Rome), 15
� 1986): 345-84.
Susan Sk.illiter, William Harborne and the Trade with Turkey (London: The British Academy
and Oxford University Press, 1977): 88.
5
For a sixteenth-century case in which this issue was of some importance. compare Benjamin
Arbel, Trading Nations, Jews and Venetians in the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995): 1 13-32. On the situation of Jewish merchants see further Minna
Rozen, "Strangers in a Strange Land:. The Extraterritorial Status of Jews in Italy and the
Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth to E1ghteenth Centuries" in Ottoman and Turkish Jewry.
 126 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
Even more directly relevant to commercial cases was the requirement
that a local trader who did business with a merchant protected by, for instance,
the English capitulations must register the contract with the kadi . Normally
such registration was optional, as Islamic religious law values the testimony
of actual living witnesses over written texts.1 But where merchants covered by
the capitulations formed one of the contracting parties, Ottoman subjects who
had not secured such written evidence at the time of the original transaction
were, by sultanic fiat, unable to pursue their claims. This was an important
protection for the foreign party to the contract, as a non-Muslim could not
bear witness against a Muslim in a kadi's court: without written evidence, the
non-Muslim miiste'min often would have been at a severe disadvantage.2 On
the other hand, if the agreement was recorded in the kadi's registers, or a
separate document issued by a kadi was in the hands of the foreign merchant,
all that was needed was a Muslim's testimony to the effect that written
evidence had in fact been presented. Thus the testimony of the foreign non­
Muslim became irrelevant, and the two sides were more or less equal in front
of the kadi.
The uses ofahidnames: alliances against the Habsburgs
What was the motivation for issuing ahidnames in the first place,
apart from the fact that this practice had been current among pre-Ottoman
Muslim rulers? Significant motivations were doubtless the political
advantages which would hopefully ensue from such grants. 3 Thus it is
certainly not due to chance that one of the earliest surviving ahidnames was
issued by a prince hoping for Venetian support against his rivals, in the early
stages of what was to become a ferocious war for the succession of the
defeated sultan Bayezid.4
As to the sixteenth century, i t was doubtless the Ottoman sultans'
dominant motivation to gain allies against their Habsburg rivals. For from the
early sixteenth century onwards, the sultans confronted Habsburg power both
on land and sea. In the western borderlands of the former kingdom of Hungary,
conquered in 1526, it was the Habsburgs who prevented further Ottoman
expansion. And if the failure of the 1529 siege of Vienna may have been due
1Yet particularly in Cairo, some merchants did use the kadi's court in the same fashion as their
_ his The Ottoman Response to European Expansion. Studies on Ottoman-Portuguese Relations in
Italian counterparts used the offices of a notary public, namely to record current transactiOns.
This is the reason why Nelly Hanna was able to write an entire monograph on such a trader:
Making Big Money.
2aiegman, The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: 71; Skilliter, Harborne: 88.
3
For a discussion of these matters, see the article "Imtiyazat" in El by Halil Inalcik.
4 the part of sixteenth-century Ottoman dignitaries, it is almost impossible to separate commercial
For a discussion of this war compare Imber, The Ottoman Empire: 55-74.
BEFORE 1 600 127
to inclement weather as much as to the armies of Charles V, this was surely a
minor point. Moreover this same Charles V had also inherited the kingdom of
Spain, which under his grandparents the Catholic Kings, in 1492 had
conquered the last remnants of ai-Andalus. The Habsburg-ruled Spanish
kingdom also was attempting expansion in North Africa, and thus by the early
sixteenth century, placing in jeopardy the Muslim principalities of the
Mediterranean coastlands.l In addition there was the well-known Ottoman
rivalry with the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, and Portugal became part of
the Spanish domain in 1580.2
Given this situation, sixteenth-century Ottoman rulers were in constant
search of possible anti-Habsburg allies. This situation did not change
significantly when Charles V in 1 556 divided his empire between his son
Philip II, king of Spain, and his brother Ferdinand I who ruled in Austria as
the 'king of Be�· (Vienna), as Ottoman official parlance usually called him.
Seen from the viewpoint of Istanbul, the 'official' Ottoman fleet operated in
the western Mediterranean only intermittently, and the corsairs of North
Africa, in spite of their allegiance to the Sultans, were not necessarily docile
i n following the directives of the latter. Therefore it must have seemed
reasonable to establish good relations with all rulers who could muster
significant naval power against Spanish might in the Atlantic. This was
certainly true of England which had escaped the 1588 Armada in part because
of weather conditions in the northern Atlantic and partly because of the
1 Andrew Hess, The Forgotten Frontier, A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-Afri an
�
Frontier (Chicago and London: The University of C:hicago Press, 1978). Hess' work remams
_ .
valuable because he is one of the very few Ottoman histonans to have used Spamsh sources.
Hess has directed a good deal of polemics against the work of Fernand �rau�el L a
Mediterranee et le monde mediterraneen a l'epoque de Philippe 1/, 2 vols. (Pans: L . .
t brame
Armand Colin, 1 . ed. in one volume, 1949, 2nd ed., 1966). In Hess' view, the cultural divide
between the Muslim and Christian Mediterraneans is taken all too lightly in Braudel's
geographic and economic perspective. However it wou�d appear that comm_onalitic:s in
geography and economies do not, unfortunately for humankmd, preclude adversanal re�attons.
_ _
In addition, the third section of Braudel's book is devoted entJrely to the Ottomano-Htspamc
confrontation of the second half of the sixteenth century.
For a reprise of the B�udelian project, which ho�ever gives trade rathe� short shrif�, see
Peregrine Horden and Ntcholas Purcell, The Corrupting Sea, A Study ofMediterranean H IStory
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000).
2Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: 99. MD 6, p. 166, No 355 (972/1564-65 is addressed to t�e king
of Portugal Don Sebastian, and explains that if the latter really wants peace, he ��st not tmpe�e
the movements of Muslim pilgrims and merchants (compa re also 6 Numara/1 M hi� Defter�).
u
On Ottoman concern with the Portuguese threat to the hnks between Yemen and fndta, see MD
35, p. 293, No 743 (986/1578-79). . . .. .
Ottoman-Portuguese conflict has been exammed by Sahh Ozbaran, compare the artu;:les tn
.
the Indian Ocean and Ottoman Administration in the Arab lands during the Sixteenth Century
(Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1994).
Palmira Brummett Ottoman Sea Power and Levantine Diplomacy in the Age ofDiscovery
(Albany: SUNY Press. 1994) has argued in favour of a commercial i�t�n� be�ind the
'
Otto�an
expansion into the Indian Ocean. Unfortunately, due to the lack of exphctt pohcy stateme uts or.
from political motives.
 128 A NOTHER MI RROR FOR P R I N C ES
strategic mistakes made by Philip II and his admirals.1 But the losses English
captains had inflicted on Philip II were substantial nonetheless.
As to the kings of Poland, when kingship became elective in 1572, the
minimal Ottoman demand with respect to the personage to be chosen was his
hostility to Habsburg designs.2 Thus Sultan Selim II in 1573 acquiesced, not
without misgivings, in the election of the Valois prince Henri, the second son
of Henri II and himself the future French king Henri III. When the latter
rapidly resigned the throne, the next king was Stephan Bathory, prince of
Transylvania and an Ottoman vassal for the latter principality.3 In the closing
years of the sixteenth century, when the 'Long War' between the sultans and
the Habsburgs was in progress, Ottoman diplomacy attempted several times to
forge an Ottoman-Polish alliance.4 To reward present and future support
against the Habsburgs with the grant of an ahidname thus made sense in the
overall context of Ottoman policy in central Europe.
States benefitingfrom ahidnames
Early capitulations, in other words those granted before 1600, were
limited to a relatively small number of states. As we have seen, the oldest
surviving Ottoman privilege granted to the Venetians dates from the year
1403, that is, it was issued in the immediate aftermath of the catastrophic
battle of Ankara. Genoa concluded a treaty with Murad I in 1387, and again,
together with Venetians and others, with a son of Bayezid's in 1403. During
the siege of Constantinople, Genoese policy was highly ambiguous, for much
of it was determined by influential merchants 'on the spot'. Thus the Genoese
simultaneously were supplying the Ottoman armies, maintaining their
settlement of Galata in a state of precarious neutrality and asking for aid to the
Byzantine Emperor from Latin Christendom.5
Starting from 1442 the status of Dubrovnik/Ragusa, a city state which
had paid tribute to the Ottoman Empire since 1439, also was confirmed by
capitulations. After the Ottoman conquest of the Hungarian kingdom (1526),
1 Belgeler, V-VIII, 9-12 (1968-71): 1-152 (from now on both articles will appear as: "Venedik
For a discussion of this much-studied campaign, see Geoffrey Parker, The Grand Strategy of
Philip II (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998): 257-67.
2Kotodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Relations: 123-27. Compare also Kemal Beydilli, Die
polnischen Konigswahlen und lnterregnen von 1572 und 1576 im Lichte osmanischer
Archivalien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der os17Ulnischen Machtpolitik (Munich: Dr Dr Rudolf
Trofenik, 1976).
3Beydilli, Konigswahlen: 140.
4Kotodziejczyk, Otto17Uln-Polish Relations: 127.
5Fleet, European and Islamic Trade: 128. On Genoese interests in the eastern Mediterr&nean,
see Michel Balard, La Ro17Ulnie genoise, (XIIe-dibut du XVe siecle), 2 vols (Rome: bc:ole
Fran�isc de Rome, 1978).
B EFORE 1 6 0 0 129
the city became a client state of the Empire, whose tribute (harac) payment,
12,500 gold pieces in the years around 1500, was regarded as the collectively
paid equivalent of the head tax due from non-Muslims. Yet the city
government also managed to insert into the ahidnames paragraphs which
emphasized that Dubrovnik was not a simple province of the Empire.l
Ottoman officials were not supposed to enter the city, which also maintained
consuls on the sultans' territory to protect the interests of Dubrovnik
merchants, as was practiced by other Christian states. Just after 1600, when it
became Ottoman practice to collect, state by state, the sultanic edicts made out
in favour of foreigners in special registers (ecnebi defterleri), the documents
relevant to Ragusa were joined to those of Venice.2 This connection, ironic
though it appears given the frequent conflicts between the two states, may
have been motivated by the fact that Ottoman scribes quite often wrote
Dubrovnik 'Dobra-venedik', 'Venedik' being the standard Ottoman version of
'Venice'.3
From the 1530s onwards, the French king, as the staunch opponent of
Habsburg encirclement policies, was the only European potentate to enter into
both an offensive and a defensive alliance with the Ottoman sultan.4 Yet
endless controversy surrounds the first ahidname issued, or supposedly issued,
to the king of France. It had been made out in 1536, when the anti-Habsburg
alliance of Fran�ois I and Siileyman the Magnificent was still in its
honeymoon. However the surviving document was issued by the Grand Vizier
'Makbul ve Maktul' Ibrahim Pa�a ('the favourite who was killed');
this dignitary fell from power and lost his life on Suleyman's orders shortly
1 However this did not prevent the Ottoman authorities from addressing the head of the
Dubrovnik council as 'Dubrovnik beglerbegisi': MD 6, p. 193, No 416 (972/1564-65), for a
transcription into the modern Turkish script and a facsimile compare 6 Nu17Ulrall Mii
himme
Defteri.
2
B�bakanhk Allivi- Osmanh Allivi (Istanbul), Maliyeden Miidevver (from now on: MAD)
6004.
3Biegman, The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: 38-45; Faroqhi, "The Venetian Presence".
4rhis can be claimed given the Franco-Ottoman siege of Nice, even though Tinguely,
L'icriture du Levant: 17-18 warns us that the French kings were more concerned about
impressing European courts with this alliance than in common military operations.
For a letter of Sultan Siileyman to Fran�ois I, concerning combined military action, see
Tayyib Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Allivindeki Vesikalar Killliyatmda Kanuni Sultan Siileyman
Devri Belgeleri," Belgeler, Tiirk Tarih Belgeleri Dergisi, 1,2 (1964): 1 1 9-20, continued as
"Venedik Devlet Allivindeki Tiirk�e Belgeler Kolleksyonu ve Bizimle flgili Diger Belgeler."
Devlet Ar�ivindeki Belge1er"). The document in question, based on an original in the
Biblioth�ue Nationale in Paris, has been published in the Arabic script: Belgeler, V-Vlll: 116-
19. As for the documents included in Gokbilgin's edition, the user must keep in mind that these
pieces have since been recatalogued, and call numbers may have changed.
For recent studies concerning these matters, compare Gc!raud Poumar�de, "Justifier
l'injustifiable: !'alliance turque au miroir de Ia chr�tient� (XVIe-XVIIe si�cles)," Revue
d'histoire diplo17Ultique, 3 (1997): 217-46 and idem, "N�gocier aupres de Ia Sublime Porte.
Jalons pour une nouvelle histoire des capitulations franco-ottomanes" in L'invention de Ia
diplo17Ultie ed. by L. B�ly (Paris, 1998): 71-85. For a wide-ranging discussion see idem, Pour en
finir avec Ia croisade. Mythes et rialitis de Ia lutte contre les Turcs aux xvr et XVIr siecles
(Paris: PUF, 2004].
 130 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R INCES
B EFORE 1 600 131

afterwards. Whether or not the surviving document was ever 'ratified' by

fact issued in 1580, and an English ambassador, acting in the name of Queen
Sultan Stileyman was debated for a considerable time. Finally a consensus
Elizabeth but paid by the Levant Company, unofficially had been present in
apparently was reached, which relegated these capitulations to the never-never
land of might-have-been. ! But recently the question has been reopened, with Istanbul since 1579. 1
what final results remains to be seen. However without any doubt, On the Ottoman land frontier, intensive diplomatic relations had

capitulations were issued to the French king in 1 569, in other words well existed, ever since the first half of the fifteenth century, between the Ottoman
before the end of the period studied here.2 Empire and the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. An 'eternal peace' first
Merchants of states to which capitulations had not been granted needed had been concluded in 1533, and the first privilege known as an ahidname was
to come to an agreement with sea captains and consuls from Venice or France. issued in 1553. This was confirmed by Prince Selim, Slileyman the
This regulation constituted a matter of prestige as well as of material gain for Magnificent's heir apparent, while his father was still alive, namely in 1564.
the two states concerned, as the merchants in question paid a due known as the These were important agreements, although the strongly 'western European'
consulage. In consequence, the diplomatic initiatives of English merchants,
slant of twentieth-century historiography, in Europe and the US as well as in
founding members of the newly formed Levant Company, to establish an
Turkey, has tended to push them into the background of historical
ambassador at the Ottoman court, and then to obtain capitulations of their
consciousness.2
own, aroused considerable hostility in French diplomatic circles.3
Moreover when in 1 572, after the end of the JagieUo dynasty, Poland-
However, capitulations were granted to the English in spite of this
Lithuania became an elective kingdom, the Ottoman sultans began to promote
opposition, largely because the subjects of Queen Elizabeth I appeared as
their own candidates for the Polish throne.3 These were normally local
formidable opponents of the Spanish crown. This was due especially to the
noblemen, preferably those whose possessions were situated close to the
defeat of the 'Invincible Armada' in 1588, but even in the decade preceding this
frontier with territories under the sultans' control . For these men would be
naval campaign, English 'Luteran's were regarded with interest by the Ottoman
concerned about the damage which Ottoman and Tatar raiders could inflict on
court.4 Capitulations 'recognizing' the English ruler and her subjects were in
their lands and peasants, and thus nolens volens frequently formed a pro-
Ottoman faction in the Polish diet. Only when the election of these local
1Gaston Zeller, "Une h!gende qui a Ia vie dure: Les capitulations de 1535," Revue d'Histoire
Moderne et Contemporaine, 2 (1955): 127-32. In his article on "Imtiyazat" in El, Halil Inalcik figures proved impossible, which as we have seen was often the case, did
has adopted Zeller's arguments.
Ottoman rulers and viziers resign themselves to a foreign prince of firmly
For a recent bibliography concerning this debate, see Merlijn Olnon, "Towards Classifying
Avanias: A Study of Two Cases Involving the English and Dutch Nations in Seventeenth­ anti-Habsburg credentials.
Century Izmir,'' in Alastair Hamilton, Alexander H. de Groot, Maurits van den Boogert eds,
Friends and Rivals in the East, Studies in Anglo-Dutch Relations in the Levant in the Seventeenth
to the Early Nineteenth Century (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000): 160-61.
2Even before the formal issuance of an ahidname, good relations were apparently considered 'Western' foreigners on Ottoman territories
important by the sultan. Compare MD 5, p. 39, No 93 (973/1565-66), of which a facsimile has
been published in 5 Numarail Miihimme Defteri. This official letter (name) is addressed to the
'Fran�e padi§ah1'; it expresses Sultan Siileyman's satisfaction that the recent Anglo French
-
Many clauses in the ahidnames did not formally refer to traders,
conflict has been settled. although of course apart from diplomats, merchants would have been the
On the protection of French traders against interference by local powerholders on the island of
Djerba, also before the grant of the 1569 ahidname, see MD 6, p. 617, No 1359 (972/1564- likeliest visitors from western and southern Europe to frequent the Ottoman
565), compare also 6 Numarall Miihimme Defteri. realm. Furthermore after the destruction of the Mamluk sultanate in 15 16-17,
�Skillitl?r, William Harborne: 38. On the issue in its entirety see Miibahat KUtiikoglu, Osmanll­ there were the numerous pilgrims to Jerusalem, who also might visit a few
lngi/iz lktisadf Miinasebetleri (Ankara: TUrk KiiltiiriinU Ara§Urma EnstitUsii, 1974) and Victor
Menage, "The English Capitulation of 1580, A Review Article" International Journal ofMiddle Christian holy sites outside of the town itself.4 While these pious visitors
East Studies, 12 (1980): 373-83.
4
Christine lsom-Verhaaren, "An Ottoman Report about Martin Luther and the Emperor: New
Evidence of the Ottoman Interest in the Protestant Challenge to the Power of Charles V,"
Turcica, 28 (1996): 299-318 shows that in the early 1530s, the Ottoman court received
information about the Protestant movement from an Albanian mohair merchant. However this l skilliter, William Harborne: 40.
report was marred by numerous inaccuracies, not the least of which was the notion that Luther
was a lord with an army under his command. 2Kolodziejczyk, Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations: 1 17-19.
Just after the end of the period concerning us here, in 1614, the Protestant Dutch were granted 3MD 21, p. 168, No 406 (980/1572-73). This text has been published, in facsimile and German
capitulations because they opposed the Spanish kings, and it was a considerable disappointment translation, by Beydilli in Konigswahlen: 30-31; for the facsimile, see the Appendix of his book,
to Ottoman viziers that the Dutch soon turned out to be more interested in trade than in fighting. without page numbers.
Compare Alexander H. de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic, A History pjthe 4A major restoration of the aedicula in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre took place in the
Earliest Diplomatic Relations 1610-1630 (Leiden, Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch­
Archaeologisch Instituut, 1978). middle of the sixteenth century. Compare Martin Biddle, The Tomb of Christ (Thrupp­
Stroud/Gioucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1999): 100.
 132 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRI NCES
did not stay very long and for the most part, had only limited contacts with
the local population, they did spend a few days, weeks or months on Ottoman
territory, and needed to be escorted to their destinations. I
In addition there were the spies; a recent study has demonstrated that the
long arm of the Venetian Signoria's secret services certainly reached all the
way to fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Istanbul.2 But remarkably enough,
while the Ottoman authorities were quite concerned about the activities, or
even just the possible actions of Iranian spies, they do not seem to have paid
all that much attention to the Venetian secret service at least in peacetime.3
We can only speculate about the reasons. But given the numerous comings
and goings between the Empire and Venice, and the existence of an Ottoman
'colony' in this latter city sultans and viziers may well have surmised that they
had the situation 'under control'.4 In some cases political information
concerning European courts may have been provided by the bailos in exchange
for Ottoman tolerance of Venetian secret service activities.
Intermediaries
Up to this point we have assumed that it was always clear and simple
to distinguish between the subjects of the Ottoman sultan and those of foreign
Christian rulers; and on the juridical level, this is of course true enough.
However in practical everyday terms, the distinction was not always equally
clear-cut. To mention one example, there was the city state of Dubrovnik,
which may be termed a typical 'emporium' distributing goods arriving
1 Stephane Yerasimos, Les voyageurs dans /'Empire ottoman (XIVe - XV/e siecles),
.
Bibliographie, itineraires et inventaire des lieux habites (Ankara: Tiirk Tanh Kurumu, 1991):
17-18.
2 Paolo Preto, I servizi secreti di Venezia, Spionaggio e controspionaggio al tempo della
Serenissima: cifrari, intercettazioni, delazioni, tra mito e realta (Milano: EST, 1999). On the
reverse phenomenon see N. H. Biegman, "Ragusan Spying for the Ottoman Empire," Belleten,
XXVII (1963): 237-55.
3Things were of course quite different in wartime. Compare the janissary arrested under
suspicious conditions near Dubrovnik, a putative Venetian spy: MD 12, p. 132, No 291
(978/1570-71 ). See 12 Numarall Miihimme Defteri.
4For a report to the young Sultan Siileyman, to the effect that the French and Genoese were
preparing ships to aid the Knights of Rhodes (1522), see Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet
Alltvindeki Belgeler," Belgeler, V-VIII: 140-41. This message apparently reached the Ottoman
court through the Venetians; it contains a brief account of a Franco-English war, which the
English won, and a Franco-Spanish war, in which the French King came out on top.
From the very end of Siileyman the Magnificent's long reign dates a letter to the Doge of
Venice, in which the latter is ordered, in no uncertain terms, to pass on a letter addressed to
Mustafa Pqa, at that time besieging the island of Malta -- the contents cannot have been very
confidential. The Venetians are also expected to furnish intelligence: MD 6, p. 647, No 1424
(972/15), for a facsimile and a transcription in modem Turkish characters, see 6 Numaralt
Mii
himme Defteri.
B EFORE 1 6 0 0 133
1
from distant parts between adjacent major states. Dubrovnik paid tribute to
the sultans without ever having been conquered.2 For as an Ottoman text dated
1617 rather graphically put it, this was an 'infertile rock' which was not worth
the trouble and expense of a sultanic campaign.3 However in real life this was
not quite accurate to say the least; for Dubrovnik's tribute was much more
significant than what could have been collected from an Ottoman provincial
town on a remote and rocky coast close to the western frontier. As Catholics,
the traders of Dubrovnik moved easily in Italy and other parts of Catholic
Europe, and even did business with merchants living in states with whose
rulers the sultans might be at war.4 In their identity as Ottoman subjects on
the other hand, they were able to trade freely throughout the sultan's domains.5
A comparable role as intermediaries fell to the Sephardic Jews who i n
the sixteenth century straddled the Ottoman-Venetian border.6 Many of them
had arrived in Venice after a long tour through Europe, and for the sake of the
city's trade, the Venetian authorities granted a de facto tolerance to those
people who had been baptized i n Spain or Portugal, but had chosen to revert
to their old faith before moving to Venice.? In many cases, some members of
a given family or business partnership might be subjects of the Ottoman ruler
and others of the Signoria. As a result, the bankruptcy of a merchant such as
Hayyi m Saruq, who really or purportedly had marketed a consignment of alum
IMD 23, p. 85, No 612 (981/1573-74) lists the goods in which during the Cyprus war and its
2
immediate aftermath, Dubrovnik merchants were allowed and forbidden to trade. Certain
varieties of leather, raw wool and sheepskins were permitted, while the list of prohibited goods
was much longer: grain, arms, gunpowder, horses, cotton, lead, beeswax, chagrin leather and
the fat of slaughtered animals, used in soap and candle manufacture.
2on the role of emporia compare K. N. Chaudhuri, Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean.
An Economic Historyfrom the Rise ofIslam to 1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1985): 56,63, 98-99.
3Archivio di Stato, Venice, Documenti turchi, Busta 1 1 , No 1222 (1617).
For an Italian summary of this document, a little too late for our purposes but instructive
concerning Veneto-Ragusan relations of the period around 1600, compare Maria Pia Pedani
Fabris, I •Documenti turchi" dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia (Roma: Ministero per i beni
culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici, 1994): 322; similar sentiments
have been expressed, not quite as drastically, in Documenti turchi, Busta 1 1 , No 1218. The
relevant summaries in the catalogue, much older than the volume itself, had been prepared by
Alessio Bombaci shortly after World War II.
4Biegman, The Turco-Ragusan Relationship: 44. As a result, during the Cyprus war (1570-
1573), the Ottoman authorities were much concerned that goods purportedly sent to Dubrovnik
were really destined for Venice: MD 12, pp. 545-546, No 1038 (1071-72); see also /2 Numarall
Miihimme Defteri.
5For Dubrovnik traders corning to grief in the Aegean see MD 12, p. 561, No 1071 (979/1571-
72); compare also 12 Numarall Miihimme Defteri. On a Dubrovnik trader who had a fortune of
122,000 ak�e taken away from him, probably by a customs official see MD 6, p. 193, No 416
(972/1564-65). Compare also Francis Carter, Dubrovnik (Ragusa), A Classic City State (New
York: Academic Press, 1972): passim.
6Arbel, Trading Nations, passim.
?Brian Pullan, The Jews of Europe and the Inquisition of Venice 1550-1670 (London: I. B:
Tauris, 1997): 145-67.
134 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
belonging to the Ottoman ruler, came to constitute a source of lengthy
disputes between the two states. I
Nor was this type of ambiguity limited to Veneto-Ottoman Jews,
similar cases also occurring among certain families of Venice's staunchly
Catholic patriciate. Stationed in Istanbul as bailo before being elected doge,
Andrea Gritti had fathered a son by a woman who was an Ottoman subject.
Ludovico/Aivise Gritti refused to return to Venice when his father ordered him
to do so, even when the two states were at war. He may well have continued
to enjoy some favour at the Ottoman court because he was viewed both as a
source of information and a potential negotiator.2 Furthermore, as Kate Aeet
has suggested, it is quite possible that Genoese customs farmers were active in
early Ottoman ports, thus once again combining a role in the sultans'
financial administration with citizenship in an Italian city state.3 In this
instance as in the cases of Ludovico Gritti and certain influential Jewish
businessmen, individuals on the one hand might possess the overlapping
identities of diplomat, customs farmer and trader, and on the other, the
conflicting allegiances of an Italian city state and the Ottoman Empire.4
A marginal note: Ottoman Muslims in Italy
For a fairly long time it was assumed that Ottoman Muslims, when
they traded at all, preferred the highly regulated commerce supplying Istanbul,
avoiding involvement with 'infidels' and a fortiori, travel to Christian
countries. After all, Muslim religious scholars did not regard their
coreligionists who maintained close contacts with 'unbelievers' with any
particular favour. Moreover commercial undertakings in the lands of the
'infidel' could easily be left to Ottoman non-Muslims who possessed much
better political and social contacts i n Christian territories. A prominent
Cairo merchant of the late sixteenth century, whose business activities are
1 Arbel, Trading Nations: 104-05. Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet A!'§ivindeki Belgeler," Belgeler,
V-VIII: 131 has published a sultanic letter addressed to the Venetians, which concerns the alum
a certain Haron, a relative of the famous Josef Nassi, proposed to sell in Venice.
On the importance of the �ebinkarahisar alum mines during this period, see MAD 5454
(985/1577); for an interpretation compare Suraiya Faroqhi, "Alum Production and Alum Trade
in the Ottoman Empire (about 1560-1830)", Wiener Zeitschriftfiir die Kunde des Morgen/andes,
71 (1979): 161-62.
2Ferenc Szakaly. Ludovico Gritti in Hungary, 1529-1534, A Historical Insight (sic) into the
Beginnings of Turco-Habsburgian Rivalry (Budapest: Akad�miai Kiad6, 1995). My thanks to
G�za David for supplying me with a copy of this study!
An Ottoman document in the Venetian archives confirms the role of the 'Beyoglu' Ludovico
Gritti as a negotiator: Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet A!'§ivindeki Belgeler," Belgeler: 1,2: 144-145.
3 Aeet, European and Islamic Trade: 13 ff. ·
4
4Arbel, Trading Nations: 36-37.
B EFORE 1 600 135
exceptionally well documented, did in fact use Jewish intermediaries for
buying and selling in Venice, while certain other traders of Cairo mandated
Venetian merchants visiting the Egyptian metropolis. I
Yet that is by no means the whole story. In sixteenth-century Ancona,
Muslim merchants possessed a fondaco (residence cum storehouse) of their
own, and just after the end of 'our' period, in the beginning years of the
seventeenth century, a sizeable palazzo on Venice's prestigious Canal Grande
was converted into an establishment of the same type.2 In the years just before
and after 1600, Venice was in trouble economically, and we can be fairly
certain that the Signoria would not have paid out the substantial sums of
money needed for this undertaking had the number of Ottoman Muslims been
insignificant. As an example, one might mention a record in Venice's
Archivio di Stato concerning the story of a very ordinary Muslim trader killed
in a brawl. In the course of settling the inheritance, his goods were bought by
other Ottoman Muslims who happened to be present in Venice at the time,
and the number of potential buyers was not negligible.3
In fact, we know of merchants who came all the way from Ankara in
order to sell mohair and mohair fabrics, which constituted almost the only
source of ready money for certain villages to the west of this Anatolian town.4
Others, who came mainly from Bosnia, probably sold raw wool to the
manufacturers of woollen cloth active in Venice at this time. Apparently the
Ottoman rulers of the period around 1600 did not believe that the Muslim
traders frequenting Venice or Ancona did anything particularly strange or
reprehensible. For when Ottoman Muslim merchants were robbed en route
not a rare occurrence in these years of Uskok piracy, they were often able to
obtain letters to the Doge, written in the name of the sultan and/or the grand
vizier, who energetically asked the Venetian authorities for redress.5
I
Hanna, Making Big Money: 64-65.
2
�erafettin Turan, "Venedik'te Tilrk Ticaret Merkezi," Belleten, 32, 126 (1968): 247-83; Ennio
Concina, Fondaci, Architettura, arte e mercatura tra Levante, Venezia e Alemagna (Venezia:
Marsilio Editori, 1997): 219-46. I am grateful to Giampietro Bellingeri for providing me with a
copy of this book.
3Cemal Kafadar, "A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the
Serenissima•, Journal of Turkish Studies, 10 (1986), Raiyyet Riisumu, Essays presented to Halil
lnalcik ..: 191-218.
.
4Documenti turchi Busta 8, No 960, see also Pedani Fabris, 1 documenti turchi: 245-46; in
Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Al'§ivindeki Belgeler," Belgeler, V-VIII: 122-24, we find a rescript
concerning Jewish merchants bringing mohair fabrics to Venice. See also MD 24, p. 231, No
614 (982/1574-75), for an interpretation compare Faroqhi, Towns: 143.
5
suraiya Faroqhi, "Ottoman Views on Corsairs and Piracy in the Adriatic," in The Kapudan
Pasha. His Office and his Domain, ed. by Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: University of
Crete Press, 2002): 357-371 and reprinted in this volume.
For an example of the sultan's government putting pressure on the Venetians in order to
secure the repression of the Uskoks, see MD 5, p. 445, No 1 194 (973/1565-66), see 5 Numaral1
Miihimme Defteri. This text is an official letter to the doge of Venice, warning him that if the
Venetians do not deal with the Uskoks and their helpers, the sultan will be obliged to send out
galleys of his own.
 136 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
Customs revenues and ready money
Moving from the discussion of persons to that of goods and money, it
must not be forgotten that the control of trade routes, and the revenues to be
derived from customs payments, constituted important sources of Ottoman
economic power. Apparently Mehmed I I the Conqueror (Fatih) had a good
understanding of the importance of the international trade in spices - which
incidentally, were just as popular among Ottoman consumers of the times as
they were among western Europeans.1 In the second half of the fifteenth
century, the Mediterranean marts for spices lay on Mamluk territory in Aleppo
and Cairo. But the Ottoman sultans of the ti me appear to have made an effort
to turn this trade toward Bursa, an undertaking which, due to the great
distances involved, did not succeed in the long run.2 However with the
conquest of the Mamluk sultanate in 1516-17 and of Iraq in the 1 530s, the
Red Sea and Basra routes, which remained important in European trade until
about 1600 and into the mid-eighteenth century where intra-Ottoman trade was
concerned, in any case came under the control of the sultans.
Paying customs duties was the major obligation of foreign merchants
according to the ahidnames, and normally subjects of the sultan paid less than
aliens. Muslims always were favoured over non-Muslims. However given the
small number of Muslim subjects living under Christian rulers during the
period concerned, the clauses favouring Muslim traders only applied in the
case of Poland-Lithuania, and even that but occasionally.
Customs dues were often farmed out, and customs farmers depended on
the payments of both foreign and Ottoman merchants. As a result these
temporary officials and foreign merchants might establish complex and
sometimes conflict-laden relationships in order to maximize profits. On the
one hand, already fifteenth-century documents indicate that a tax farmer if he
so wished, might cause any amount of difficulty to the merchants under his
jurisdiction. He could demand supplementary dues, obliging the foreigners and
their consuls to take the matter to the kadi or even to the central government,
!This is evident from the large quantities of pepper and other spices often found in the larders
of Ottoman pious foundations. Compare for instance MAD 4706, p. 14 (1001-1009/1592-1601);
these accounts concern the pious foundation of Sultan Selim II in Konya.
Other evidence comes from the complaints of Yemeni merchants concerning the manner
in which tax collectors abused them when collecting - in kind - the spices due to the Ottoman
state: compare for example MD 47, p. 122, No 308 (990/1582).
.
2Halil lnalcik, "Bursa and the Commerce of the Levant," Journal of the Economic and Social
History ofthe Levant, 3 (1960): 131-47.
B EFORE 1 6 00 137
always an expensive business. I A customs farmer also could instigate searches
for contraband goods, and these actions were especially troublesome when, as
sometimes happened, the personage in question maintained links to the
commercial rivals of the European traders with whom he had to deaJ.2
But at the same time, enlightened self-interest also might work in the
opposite direction. The farmer of the customs dues or - if the latter had found
no takers willing to shoulder the risks of collection - a temporary salaried
official (emin), at times might defend the merchants' interests vis a vis the
Ottoman administration. However this kind of cooperation, not to say
collusion, did not necessarily find its way into the official records, be they
Ottoman or European.3
Official Ottoman views of foreign trade and traders are all but
inseparable from the attitudes of the relevant officials towards the problems of
precious metal and coinage.4 Silver was mined in limited quantities on
Ottoman territory, both in the Balkans and Anatolia. But costs were high; in
consequence, tribute and trade constituted the most important sources of the
silver and gold so urgently needed for coinage. However at the same time, the
Empire was located astride some of the major routes to South-east Asia, and
in consequence, there was an appreciable outflow of specie eastward. In spite
of attempts to stem the export of silver and even copper to Iran and India, the
lure of Indian spices and fabrics continued to be very strong.5 By contrast, the
gold and silver brought in by western Europeans must have contributed to the
official tolerance which they were shown. However while in the late sixteenth
century, debasement of the currency was regarded as a sign of political decline
by quite a few Ottoman authors, price increases possibly due to a greater
abundance of silver were not laid at the door of French, English or Italian
merchants.6 Overall it does not appear that the role of foreign merchants as
suppliers of silver and gold was considered as important by the Ottoman
administrations of the time as their attempts to export prohibited wares.7
1An instructive text has been published by Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet Af§ivindeki Belgeler."
Belgeler, V-VIII: 109. Here we learn about Alexandrian merchants who did business with the
Venetians on credit, and when the time came to pay, they produced a document stating that they
were indebted to the exchequer. Since the tax collector could claim precedence over private
creditors, this was apparently an easy way of avoiding payment. In Istanbul it was assumed that
the whole business was fraudulent, and in all likelihood local officials against a suitable reward.
made out the relevant documents.
2Arbel, Trading Nations: 41; Fleet, European and Islamic Trade: 134-41.
3Arbel, Trading Nations: 42-45.
4�evket Pamuk, A Monetary History ofthe Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2000).
5Pamuk, A Monetary History: 134.
6Kafadar, "Les troubles mon6taires."
7Jn addition, foreign trade was a source of shipping space for Ottoman private merchants
as
well as for the state. Certainly in the sixtc:enth century there was as yet no predominance of
foreign shipping in Ottoman waters, but 1t :was still a frequent practice to hire ships from
Christian lands. For a case involving a VenetJan.shipper, see MD 5, p. 72, No 168 (973/1565-
66); for a facsimile compare 5 Numara/1 Mfihimme Defteri.
 138 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NCES
Imported goods
However, political, fiscal and monetary concerns apart, there were also
commercial considerations, in the narrow sense of the term, involved in the
granting of capitulations to certain European rulers. However, it is easy to
exaggerate the i mportance of late fifteenth or even sixteenth-century trade with
Europe in the general economic balance of the Ottoman Empire. A spate of
recent studies have taught us that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the
Ottomans traded with both east and west.1 In addition there was the sizeable
commerce between different provinces of the Empire itself, although, given
the deficiencies of our sources, the volume of these exchanges cannot be
measured. Thus commerce with states of western and southern Europe, while
forming the 'window' through which European and American historians
traditionally have regarded Ottoman economic history, merely forms a small
part of a much wider picture.
However there were certain items which Ottoman customers, and more
particularly the ruling group, did procure from European states. For
armaments, English tin was of some significance, while especially in the
second half of the sixteenth century, Ottoman urbanites of the 'middling sort'
purchased the woollen cloths which the English could sell at relatively cheap
prices.2 For the latter derived major profits from Mediterranean trade by
reselling Iranian raw silk to the developing silk industries of western and
central Europe; on the other hand selling woollen fabrics cheaply was
preferable to sending the ships out empty. When Venice developed a woollen
industry from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards, the products of
these manufactures also found some customers in Ottoman ports.3 Yet none
of these imports was in any way crucial to the functioning of the different
regional economies which made up the Ottoman realm.
While by definition the volume of luxury trade was minor, it did
possess a disproportionate significance for the Palace and governmental circles
I see for example: Dina Rizk Khoury, "Merchants and Trade in Early Modern Iraq," New
53-86; lnalcik, "The Ottoman State: Economy and Society;"
Perspectives on Turkey, 5-6 (1991):
Hanna, Making Big Money.
2senjamin Braude, "International Competition and Domestic Cloth in the Ottoman Empire: A
Study in Undevelopment," Review, II, 3 (1979): 437-54.
3 Neumann eds., Ottoman Costumesfrom Textile to Identity (Istanbul: Eren, 2004): 219-29.
Domenico Sella, "The Rise and Fall of the Venetian Woollen Industry," in Brian Pullan ed,
Crisis and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Si
xteenth and Seventeenth Centuries
(London: Methuen and Co. Ltd, 1968): 106-26 analyzes the fortunes of the industry, but does
not discuss the sources of raw wool.
One of these Ottoman customers was the governor of Bosnia Mustafa Pll§a. a relative of
the powerful Sokollu, compare Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet AF§ivindeki Belgeler," Belgeler, V­
VIII: 1 24-25.
B EFORE 1 6 0 0 139
on whose writings we must depend for most of our information. I Thus in
addition to silk cloth manufactured in Istanbul or Bursa, the Palace imported
valuable textiles from Venice, where certain workshops seem to have oriented
their production specifically towards the Ottoman market.2 Fine glassware was
also exported to Istanbul from Venice, to say nothing of the cheese known as
grana padano, which was well liked at the late sixteenth-century Ottoman
court.3 Moreover, once printing had become an important industry, Ottoman
readers of Greek normally procured their reading matter from Venice; certain
publishers in this city catered for readers of the vernacular, as opposed to the
classical language. Religious texts held pride of place, but a certain number of
secular works also were marketed.4
The 'Ottoman economic mind'
It is now over thirty years ago that Halil Inalcik has given us an
account of the reactions of Ottoman officialdom with respect to trade in
general, of which the business of foreign merchants merely constituted a
special case. In the intervening period, the work of Metin Kunt, Mehmet
Genet. Bruce Masters, Murat Cizakcta, Edhem Eidem, Daniel Panzac, �evket
1
Compare Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet A!"§ivindeki Belgeler," Be/ge/er, 1,2: 200-01 for an
Ottoman pasha buying 30,000 akfe's worth ofjewelry from Venice (938/153 1-32).
Luxury goods moreover travelled both ways, Polish noblemen being particularly avid
consumers; compare Andrzej Dziubinski, "Polish-Turkish Trade in the 16th to 18th Centuries,"
in War and Peace, Ottoman-Polish Relations in the 15th - 19th Centuries (Istanbul: Turkish
Ministry of Culture and Polish Ministry of Culture and Art, 1999): 38-45. While Dziubinski has
worked on materials located in Poland and the Ukraine, some information also can be found in
Ottoman sources. Thus in 972/1564-65, permission was accorded to the ambassador of the king
of Poland to buy velvet in Bursa for his sovereign: MD 6, p.93, No 194; compare also 6
Numarall Mii himme Defteri. For a study based upon Ottoman sources, compare Gilles
Veinstein, "Marchands ottomans en Pologne-Lituanie et en Moscovie sous le regne de Soliman
le Magnifique," Cahiers du monde russe, 35, 4 (1994): 713-38.
A more unexpected luxury arriving in Renaissance Europe from the Ottoman Empire
consisted of antique marbles from the region of Athens; their exportation was prohibited by MD
33, p. 181. No 357 (985/1577-78).
2 Louise Mackie, "Ottoman Kaftans with an Italian Identity," in Suraiya Faroqhi, Christoph
3Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, In nome del Gran Signore, lnviati ottomani a Venezia dalla caduta di
Costantinopoli alta guerra di Candia (Venice: Di(JUtazione Editrice, 1994): 92-93 discusses the
diplomatic gifts received by Ottoman envoys_, whtch were often selected after the preferences
of the personage in question had been ascertamed.
4Evro Layton, The Sixteenth Century Greek Boofc in Italy, Printers and Publ�shersjor the Greek
World (Venice: The Hellenic Institute of Byzantme and Post-Byzantine Studtes, 1994).
 140 ANOTHER MI RROR FOR PRINCES
B EFORE 1 600 141

Pamuk and others has further refined these concepts.1 From the Ottoman
Muslim world. 1 But the most significant of all Ottoman prohibitions
administration's point of view, the crucial consideration was the supplying of
concerned the exportation of grain, at least from the middle of the sixteenth
local markets. For only in this way could prices be kept low, and a moderate.
century onwards.2 Earlier the sultans in good years had issued special permits
level of prices i n tum was considered a prerequisite for keeping the costs of
to export, of which Venice was a major beneficiary.3 But as the sixteenth­
war and administration within acceptable l i mits.
century population expansion made itself felt, and 1 590s harvests were
Official concern with the interests of local craftsmen was not totally
miserable throughout the Mediterranean, wheat became the principal
absent. But when Ottoman rulers intervened i n order to protect the artisans'
contraband article and foreign merchants almost by definition potential grain
supplies of raw material from purchase by foreign traders, this was not
smugglers.4
because the export of finished goods, as opposed to raw materials, might be
expected to enrich the sultans' realm. Rather official solicitude was prompted
by political and moral considerations: the ruler was, noblesse oblige, expected
Foreign merchants between central and local forces
to provide his 'poor subjects' with the means of making a livelihood. Viewed
from a different angle, only craftsmen who could support themselves and their
However the capitulations provided no more than a framework. While
families could be counted upon to provide the sails, anchors, weaponry and
ambassadors negotiated the first-time grant and the renewal of existing
other goods required for war, to say nothing of the needs of the Palace. With
capitulations at the court in Istanbul, the process of implementation was
only slight exaggeration, we may conclude that the Ottoman administration
basically a local one.5 This meant that provincial governors, kadis and, above
became concerned with the fate of craftsmen only if the latter complained, and
all, customs farmers were the principal authorities to which the foreign
if the needs of the state were visibly in jeopardy. In consequence merchants
merchants needed to tum.6 However it would be naive to assume that these
from Latin Christendom were viewed as a problem only in specific contexts,
local figures necessarily had the same agenda as the central power. We have
especially if from the Ottoman realm they removed raw materials needed by
already encountered the most extreme case, namely the North African militias
the state and/or domestic producers.
cum owners of corsair ships, who refused to recognize the treaties concluded
Given these attitudes, importation was generally viewed with a more
by the sultans with foreign Christian powers, and demanded that European
favourable eye than exports. Quite a few goods, including leather and cotton
potentates treat with them directly. Local commanders of frontier garrisons
(used in the manufacture of sails) were considered of military value and
might be moved by the ethos of Holy War against the 'unbelievers',
labelled as contraband per se.2 Once again, this way of thinking was not
and protect corsairs who attacked 'infidel' ships, to say nothing of the financial
uniquely Ottoman, but also prevailed in late mediaeval Europe, where
the popes frequently issued stringent prohibitions against trading with the

I Halil Inalcik "The Ottoman Economic Mind and Aspects of the Ottoman Economy," in Studies
of the Econo'mic History of the Middle East, ed. Michael Cook (London, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1970): 207-18. .
. Ion the prohibition against selling slaves to the Mamluks compare: Balard, La Romanie genoise,
See also: Metin Kunt, "Dervi§ Mehmed P8§8, Vezu and Entrepreneur: A Study 10 Ottoman
Political-economic Theory and Practice", Turcica, 9, 1 (1.977):. 197-2 �4; Br�c� Masters, ,"The vol t: 298.
2 Preventing the exportation of grain presumably was one of the �ajor reasons why from the
Sultan's Entrepreneurs: The Avrupa tticcan and the Haynye tuccans 10 Syna, lnterna�10nal
late sixteenth century onwards, non-Ottoman merchants were forbidden to enter the Black Se_a
.
Journal of Middle East Studies, 24 (1992): 579-97; Mehmet Gen�. ·�ttoman In1u.stry 10 the
Eighteenth Century: General Framework, Characteristics and Mam Trends, tn Donald Compare Halil Inalcik, "The Question of the Closing of the Black Sea under the Ottomans," m
Quataert ed, Manufacturing in the Ottoman .Empire and Turkey 1500:1950, (Albany: SUNY Archeion Pontou, 35 (1979): 74- 110.
Press 1994) 59-86· Daniel Panzac, Les corsatres barbaresques, Ia fin d une epopee 1800-1820 However exceptional pe�issio_ns wer e. �om��imes granted: see MAD .6004. .P· 42 for a
(Pari;: CNRS Editions, 1999); Edhem Eidem, French Trade in Istanbul n i the Eighteenth Centu!Y Venetian trader allowed to visJt Ism
ail and K1h (Kiha) for the purpose of buymg wh1te sturgeon
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999); Edhem Eidem, Daniel Goffman, .Bruce Maste.rs, The.Otto� C1ty (1032-1033/1623-2
4).
3
between East and West, Aleppo, lvnir and Istanbul (Cambndge: Cambndge �ntvers1ty Press, For an Ottoman permit issued to Venetians hoping to buy grain in the vicinity of Athens, dated
1999); Parnuk, A Monetary History. J:lowever with few exceptions, these stud1es focus on the 948/ 1541, see Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devle� AT§ivindeki Bel�eler," Belgeler, V-VIII: 78-79. For
eighteenth and early nineteenth centunes. the Venetian perspective, compare .Maunce.Aymard, Vemse, Raguse er ie commerce du bte
.
2 MD 7, p. 403, No 1696 (976/1568-69) ordered increased �igilanc� t the checkpo10t of
� pendant Ia seconde moitii du XV/e s1ecle (Pans: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1966): 135-40.
Geli bolu to prevent French and Venetia!! mer�hants from exportJ.ng proh1b1�.g<>?ds, see �lso 7 'JPeter Clark ed, The European Crisis of the 1590s, Essays in Comparative History (London:
Numaral1 Miihimme Defteri. For a dJscussJon c�mpare Sura1ya . Faroqh1, D1e. o!ma�sche George Allen & Unwin, 1985): 232.
Handelspolitik des frilhen 17. Jahrhunderts zw1schen Dubrovmk und Vened1g W1ener 5Faroqhi, "The Venetian Presence".
Beitrligefiir die Geschichte der Neuzeit, 10 (1983): 207-22.
•

6 rbel, Trading Nations: 31-54.

A
 142 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
advantages to be gained from such protection. 1 Incidentally, matters were no
different on the Venetian side of the border, where Ottoman Muslim merchants
who had been despoiled by the Uskoks or other freebooters, surely not without
some justification used to claim that Venetian fortress commanders were in
league with the pirates.2
Apparently the Ottoman authorities were inclined to think that the
problems of foreign (and domestic) merchants should be solved by officials
stationed in the locality where the traders were active, with the kadis taking on
a prominent role. Of course these officials were expected to report to Istanbul,
and abide by the directives given by the central government But delegation of
authority meant that the foreign state also could set up a local organization,
and in the English ahidname we find the clause that consuls could be
appointed in the cities of Alexandria, Cairo, Tripolis in Syria, Tripoli in
Africa, Tunis, Algiers and other places.3
World systems theory and the Ottomans
If trade in luxury goods between two polities or regions prevails over
other kinds of exchange, scholars who work within the framework of world
systems theory consider that the two economies i n question are integrated only
to a minimal extent.4 To what extent is this judgement applicable to the
Ottoman case? Doubtless silken and woollen fabrics as well as glassware of
better quality, which as we have seen, all played an important role in
Ottoman-European trade before 1600, were at least semi-luxuries. As to the
Iranian raw silk which was marketed by way of Bursa or Aleppo, it would
seem that it also should be rated among luxury products, even though raw silk
was of course a semi-manufactured item. However raw cotton, grain and most
1 For a Venetian complaint on such an issue see Documenti turchi, Busta 6, No 785; for a
summary compare Pedani Fabris, ! docu_mef!ti turchi: 196. �n this particu1� insta ��· SUieyma
the Magnificent ordered a second mvestJgabon. For accordmg to the Vene1an t pellbon, the k
ad1
of Arnavud Belgrad1 (Berat), who had been in charge of the first, had not taken any particular
interest in solving the dispute.
Gokbilgin, "Venedik Devlet A�ivinde�i Belgeler": Belgeler V-VIII: 88 has publishe� a
sultanic command, dated 943/1536, concernmg robbers who had attacked a group of Venet1an
traders; these merchants had attended a fair in the Morea. While the attackers were found, they
were let go by the official in charge of handling the case. Now Sultan SUieyman ordered a
court investigation which was to determine the responsibility of local officials.
As to the Ottoman side of the matter, a tine example is MD 3, p. 436, No 1306 (967/1559-60);
for a facsimile and modern Turkish transcription of this text, see 3 Numaralt Miihimme Defteri.
2For one example among many see Documenti turchi, Busta 9, No 1 053; compare Pedani
Fabris, I document/ turchi: 269.
3Skilliter, Willam
i Harborne: 88.
41mmanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System. 3 vols. (New York etc: Academic Press,
1974, 1980, 1989). vol l: 302.
B EFORE 1 600 143
leathers, whose role in smuggled trade we also have had occasion to witness,
were daily necessities, and moreover belonged to those little-rewarded branches
of production which world systems theory views as a mark of 'peripheral'
regions. The real difficulty is that we usually have no way of measuring
smuggling, and thus cannot really judge the quantities of wheat or cotton
involved.
One might thus consider that even in the late sixteenth century, the
Ottoman economy was not as yet 'incorporated' into the expanding 'world
economy' of capitalist Europe, even though the process of incorporation
showed some signs of beginning, at least in a few places. In other words, the
Ottoman realm still constituted a 'world economy' in its own right. This issue
has however been a matter of considerable dispute, with one school of thought
in favour of an early 'incorporation' and a concomitant disruption of Ottoman
manufactures from the late sixteenth century onwards. 1
More recently however, another school of thought has gained in
importance. As we have seen, historians have come to better appreciate the
relatively limited volume of European imports in comparison to the large
quantities of goods circulating in Ottoman domestic markets. Even more
inaccessible to the eye of the researcher are the yet larger quantities of goods
which must have changed hands between villagers, or between villagers and
nomads, in the context of more or less ritualized gift exchanges. European
merchants of the sixteenth century therefore are today viewed by some
historians myself among them, as relatively marginal to the Ottoman
economy.
In addition, it has been observed in several instances that industries
which went through a 'bad patch' in the years around 1600 later revived to a
greater or lesser extent2 These observations cast doubt on the assumption that
already from the late sixteenth century onwards, the Ottoman Empire
functioned merely as a market for European manufactured goods and a source
of cheap raw materials. According to historians who agree with the view
'? outlined here, 'incorporation' was a matter of the late eighteenth or even the
early nineteenth century, and not of the years preceding 1600.3 However this
1 6mer LUtfi Barkan, "The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the
Economic History of the Near East," International Journal ofMiddle East Studies, VI (1975): 3-
28; Murat <;izak�a. "Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry: A Study in Ottoman Industrial
Decline 1550-1650"' in The Ottoman Empire and the World Ecorwmy. ed. Huri Islamoglu-inan
(reprint: Cambridge, Paris: Cambridge University Press and Ma.ison des Sciences de I'Homme,
1987): 247-61.
2 Murat <;izak�a. "Incorporation of the Middle East into the European World Economy,"
Review, VIII, 3 (1985): 353-78.
3Moreover even in the nineteenth century, �rtain Ottoman producers handled the challenge of
western competition more actively and creatively than had previously been assumed. Compare
Donald Quataert, Orroman Manufacturing in the Age ofthe Industrial Revolution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
 144 A NOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
global evaluation does not exclude the possibility that in certain regions close
to the sea, where grain or cotton smugglers were most active, a degree of
integration prevailed even in the late sixteenth century. Now that we possess
many more regional studies than was true thirty years ago, we have come to
better appreciate that what was true for one town did not necessarily apply to
another, even if the two places only were situated at a distance of a few
kilometres from one another.
The Onoman upper cltzsses, 'provisionism' and preparation for war1
Both adherents of world systems theory and their opponents, who
emphasize the importance of local Ottoman reactions to the intrusion of
European goods and merchants, agree in viewing Ottoman craftsmen and
traders as bonafide actors in the economic field.2 In addition, there has been
some debate over the role of the Ottoman upper class. Ever since Halil
Inalcik's seminal works, it has been well understood that a laissez-faire
approach towards the importation of European goods did not prevent the
Ottoman ruling group of the fifteenth or sixteenth century from viewing the
commercial interests of its subjects, both Muslims and non-Muslims, as
worthy of sultanic protection.3
In addition, members of the Ottoman upper class could and did take part
in commercial activities. For 'our' period, the most famous example probably
concerns Rustem Pa�a. Stileyman the Magnificent's grand vizier and
son-in-law showed an uncanny sense for money-making investments, a
character trait which European observers also commented upon.4 More
1 on 'provisionism', e. g. the concern with provisioning as opposed to producing, see Geny,
"Ottoman Industry.•
2For a sophisticated discussion of this dispute, compare Huri tslamoglu-lnan, "Oriental
Despotism in World System Perspective," in eadem ed. The 0Noman Empire and the World
Economy, (Cambridge, Paris: Cambridge University Press and Maison des Sciences de
!'Homme, 1987): 1-26.
3
Halil lnalcik, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire", The Journal of Economic History,
XXIX, I (1969): 97-140. For a recent amplification of this view where piracy is concerned
compare Faroqhi, "Ottoman Views on Corsairs and Piracy", reproduced in this volume.
By contrast, Traian Stoianovich had suggested that at least the eighteenth-century Ottoman
state was not much interested in protecting the enterprises of its subjects: "The Conquering
Balkan Orthodoll Merchant." The Journal ofEconomic Hi story, 20 (1960): 257.
The background of these varying attitudes definitely needs further investigation.
4
0gier Ghiselin van Boesbeck, Vier brieven over het gezantshap naar Turkije, ed. by
Zweder von Martels, tr. by Michel Goldsteen (Hilversum: Verloren, 1994): 50-51 discusses
Rilstem �·s talent for putting in order the finances of Siileyman the Magnificent.
For some references to this grand vizier's pious foundations an.d thus, indirectly, to his
properties, compare the relevant articles in lslllm Ansiklopedisi, lslllm Aleminin Cografya,
Etrwgrafya ve Biyografya Lugat1 by �inasi Altundag and �erafettin Turan, as well as in EJ; 2nd
ed. by Christine Woodhead. For ROstem �·s previous ownership of the fairgrounds of Dolyan
compare MD 85, p. 112 (104111631-32).
B EFORE 1 600 145
frequent were members of the Ottoman upper class who participated in urban
economic life in an indirect fashion, namely by establishing pious foundations
which rented out urban real estate. For these elite men (and occasionally
women) constructed khans and covered markets, in which both domestic and
foreign merchants rented space. Admittedly, the founders themselves profited
only to a limited extent once their pious foundation had been established. Yet
they must still have been interested in the commercial activities of the cities
in which they had financed construction, if only to protect the symbols of
their own piety. As long as 'infidel' merchants paid their rents, they were
perfectly acceptable tenants of such foundation-owned buildings, and neither
founders nor administrators expressed any particular objections against them. 1
However another set of assumptions has it that the Ottoman state was
willing to subordinate all 'economic' interests to warfare, and that in this
context, the commercial concerns of its own subjects, and even those of the
Ottoman elite, counted for relatively little. Where foreign merchants were
involved, this attitude could have a variety of repercussions. As the preceding
discussions have shown, under certain circumstances alien traders were regarded
as possible threats to the Empire's war-making capacities, namely when they
tried to export goods considered to be of military value. But these foreigners
could also be considered as welcome additions to the Ottoman marketplace, as
the goods they brought into the Empire directly or indirectly facilitated the
provisioning of court and armies. Moreover as the balance of trade in this
period was favourable to the Ottomans, European merchants were significant
providers of gold and silver, the very sinews of war. Thus from the viewpoint
of those scholars who regard the Ottoman ruling group as geared mainly to
warfare, the 'provisionist' mentality of sultans and viziers presented foreign
merchants with a wedge which opened the door permitting the latter to intrude
into the Ottoman polity.2 This was to become a major issue mainly i n the
centuries following 1600 . But certain exposed industries, such as the cost­
intensive silk manufacture of Bursa, experienced the rough winds of European
competition already in the late sixteenth century.3
This debate hinges around the problem to what extent the Ottoman
ruling group understood the changes in commercial structures that were being
brought about by the 'new' economic actors of the late sixteenth century,
lin Aleppo khans belonging to pious foundations established by Ottoman dignitaries even could
�
be leased t merchants and consu.ls on a long-term basis. Thus the French had rented such a
khan: see Paul Masson, Histoire du commerce franyais dans le Levant au XVlle siecle (Paris:
Hachette, 1896): 378.
2A historian of Ottoman warfare has concluded that these difficulties did not prevent the
Ottoman 'war machine' from functioning satisfactorily, and this well into the seventeenth
century: Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500- 1700 (London: UCL Press, 1999).
3
<;:izakya. "Price History and the Bursa Silk Industry•.
 146 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
B E� O R E 1 6 0 0 147
particularly the English. I Many Ottomanist scholars probably would consider
today that this issue is only marginally relevant to 'our' period. Put of the sixteenth century are not having an easy time, due to the limitations of
our ources. 1 As we have seen, whatever notions we do possess have
differently, between 1550 and 1600 there were perhaps fewer changes due to � .
labonously been p1eced together from ahidnames, political correspondences
European traders active on Ottoman territory that would have demanded the
with western European rulers, sultanic edicts issued upon the requests of
immediate attention of a responsible official of the sultan's than had been
foreign ambassadors and intra-Empire official correspondence aimed at curbing
assumed about thirty years ago. Certainly Venice, the Ottomans' old enemy
the exportation of forbidden goods. Furthermore much of the surviving
and trading partner, was in considerable difficulty.2 But then Venice's obvious
evidence dates from the period after 1600, because it was only then that
and well-documented economic problems would not have made a contemporary
Ottoman officials began to document their reactions to the presence of western
observer from Istanbul's political elite worry overmuch about the fate of the
and central Europeans in separate registers (ecnebi defterleri) devoted purely
Ottoman polity. After all, the trade routes to India through the Red Sea and
to the affairs of foreigners.
Indian Ocean remained open to merchants from Cairo and elsewhere.3 Only
Ahidnames have been extensively studied; indeed it is not an
historians of our own time - and not contemporaries - have come to see the
exaggeration to say that questions linked with these grants of priv ilege figure
affinities between the Venetian and Ottoman politico-economic systems; and
among the best-known issues in Ottoman history. This clearly is due - to
in some instances, they even have proposed that the two polities stood and fell
name only work undertaken during the last thirty years - to the efforts of
together.4 All this is far removed from the perspectives of an elite Ottoman
Inalcik with respect to the ahidname issue in its entirety, Zachariadou for pre-
living in the age of Murad III or Mehmed Ill.
and proto-Ottoman South-western Anatolia, Poumarede for France, Skilliter
and Menage for England, de Groot, Butut and van den Boogert for Holland'
Theunissen for Venice and Kolodziejczyk for Poland.2
In conclusion: avenues ofpossible research
But when i t comes to discussing the attitudes of the sultans'
administrators in a less 'document-oriented' mode, the Ottoman perspective on
Scholars attempting to gain a sense of what the Ottoman elite thought
'infidel' merchants is still sorely neglected, if only because advance in this
of the changing situation in international commerce during the closing years
field depends so much on 'chance' finds of documents.3 That foreign merchants
1 This revision is linked to the understanding that the Asian land routes remained well.travelled
but exceptionally occur in the kadis' registers has not facilitated the historian's
long after 1600, in spite of all the advantages possessed by the chartered companies of England
and Holland. For a 'classic' statement of the older view compare Niels Steensgaard, The Asi an task either. Moreover Ottomanists have tended to place special emphasis on
Trade Rt!Volution of the Seventeenth C.entury. 7'!'e �t India Companies and the Decline ofthe matters internal to the Empire, not only because the sources orient us that
Caravan Trade (Chtcago, Lo�don: Chtcag� Umverstty Press, 1973). A significant challenge has
come from Stephen Fredenc Date, lnd1an Merchants and Eurasian Trade, 1600·1 750 way, but also because we have come to understand that in the years before
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Rudolph Mathee, The Politi
cs of Trade in
1600, foreign trade was important but certainly not decisive for the
Safavid Iran. S�lkfor silver 1600·1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 53·55
� C:
and Ina Bag dt�U·Mc abe, The Shah'� Silk for Europe's Silver. The Eurasian Tradeof the functioning of the Ottoman economy. Historians of the 1970s and 1980s have
l{
Ju a A�memans m S a
f av.rd Iran and lndra (1530-/750), (Atlanta/Georgia: Scholars Press and
Umverstty of Pennsylvama, 1999): 31. All these recent works stress the continuing importance focused on smuggling and particularly the exportation of war-related goods,
of caravan routes.
because they were concerned with the implied threat that foreign merchants
2This was a favourite research topic in the 1960s and 1970s, compare Brian Pullan ed., Crisis
and Change in the Venetian Economy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London:
Methuen & Co, 1968) and Richard Tilden Rapp, Industry and Economic Decline in 1
Seventeenth·Century Venice (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). For a more This problem has plagued Daniel Goffman when writing Britons in the Ottoman Empire' /642·
recent study of this kind see Maria Fusaro. Uva passa, Una guerra commerciale tra Vener.ia e 1660 (Washington University Press. 1998): 1 1 .
lnghilterra (1540·1640) (Venezia: II Cardo, 1996).
3 Hanna, Making Big Money: 77·84.
� !
l nalc k, "h�tiyaz�t" in El;
I l.nJus
. tJfia le !l �
�achariadou, Trade and Crusade; Pouma Me, "Justifier
r
nd r em, .Negoc;,•er aupres de Ia Sublime Porte"; Skilliter, William Harborne,
�
Menage, Capttulatton of 1580 ; de Groot, The Ottoman Empire and the Dutch Republic­
4w�en it came to controlling the grain trade, this similarity between Ottomans and Venetians is
M�hmet Bulut. Ottornan·Dutch Economic Relations in the Early Modern Period, 1571-1699
partcularly apparent; compare Liltfi GO�er, "Osmanh Imparatorlutunda Hububat Ticaretinin
! (Htl �ersu�: Verloren, 2001): Kate Fleet and Maarten van den Boogert eds, The Ottoman
Tabt Oldugu Kayttlar," istanbul Oniversitesi iktisat Falciiltesi Mecmuasr, 13 (1951-52): 79-98
and Aymard, Venise, Raguse et le commerce du b/e.
Capuu!a ttons Text
�
and !
.
Contex_t (Na�les/Ca�br dge: Istit�t� Nallino and Skilliter Centre, 2003);
Theuussen, Ottoman·VenetJan D•plomaucs ; KolodzteJczyk, Ottoman·Polish Diplomatic
Amon� historians who have commented on this similarity in a more general fashion, see
Renz? P act, La ·�ala" �� Spa�ato e i� commercia veneziano nei Balcanifra Cinque e Seicento �
Relations.
:
(Vemce Deputaz1one d1 Stona P�tna per le Ve�ezie 1971): 20 and more recently .Molly
:
3 Literary.texts su�h as captivity reports and othe travel accounts also may yield snatches of
;
. orrnatJon. Compare Cern Self and Others: the Diary of a Dervish in
Greene, A Shared World, ChriStians and Muslrms rn the Early Modern Mediterranean valuable m f � Kafadar,
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press; 2000): 205. Seventeenth·century Istanbul and Ftr st· person Narratives in Ottoman Literature'" Studia
lslamica, LXIX (1989): 121 ·50.
 148 AN0T H ER M I R R 0R F0R P R I NCES
posed to the Empire's economic equilibrium. But by now it is hard to say
anything very novel on this issue, given the limitations of our source
material. The publication of original documents, which due to the efforts of
both Venetian and Turkish scholars has proceeded apace during the last seven
years has made much relevant evidence more accessible than it used to be even
a few years ago. I
Given this situation, it is certainly not by chance that during the
1990s, scholars interested in pre-Tanzimat Ottoman relations with western and
central Europe have increasingly concentrated upon the seventeenth and
especially the eighteenth century, where documentation both Ottoman and
French or English is so much more ample. Moreover we have come to
understand that regional identities in the economic field continued to exist
even when imperial centralization was at its height; but of course this issue is
much more easily studied with respect to the 1700s. We thus observe a certain
decline of interest in the 'classical' period, and a corresponding increase of
concern with the previously much maligned period of 'decline'.
But if we wish to advance our understanding of sixteenth-century
Ottoman attitudes, what can we do? In my view the time has come to pay
more attention to Ottoman documents surviving in European archives,
especially those of Venice. For here we often find evidence of the political
bargaining undertaken not in the names of the sultans themselves, but in that
of grand viziers and provincial governors. These less official texts are often
more instructive than edicts issued under the rulers' tugra, for in the last­
named, it was customary to emphasize claims to world domination and
downplay anything as sordid as the balancing of mutual interests. Yet
channels for 'give and take' did exist. A recent study has made it clear that
quite a few more or less 'subterranean' links between the Ottoman world and
Venice were formed during the sixteenth century; and from our viewpoint
these will repay further exploration.2 It would also appear that in spite of
intensive research, the archives of Dubrovnik have not as yet yielded up all
their treasures.3 To a degree, the Ottoman materials surviving in these and
other archives may help us understand the complicated negotiations,
subterfuges and tergiversations which form the stuff of real political and
commercial relations, and which go beyond the rather general, stereotyped
provisions of the ahidnames.
1compare Pedani Fabris, I documenti turchi and the publications of MUhimme registers
mentioned on p. I22.
2Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, "Safiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy." Turcica, 32 (2000): 9-
32.
3For a relatively recent contribution see Bo�ko I. Bojovic, Raguse et /'Empire ottoman (1430-
1520) (Paris: Association Pierre Belon, 1998).
NEGOTIATING A FESTIVITY IN THE EIGHTEENTH
CENTURY: iBRAHiM PA�A AND THE MARQUIS DE
BONNAC, 1720
In the present paper, we will analyze certain aspects of the relationship
between Nev�ehirli Damad ibrahim P�a (about 1662-1730), grand vizier to
Sultan Ahmed III, and the French ambassador Jean-Louis Dusson marquis de
Bonnac ( 1 676- 1738). Our focus will be a major Ottoman festivity, namely the
princely circumcision of 1720, in which one of these two men played a
central, and the other a supporting role. We will attempt to understand why
certain issues formed the subject of intensive negotiations, not to say
haggling, between the highest Ottoman official and the ambassador of one of
the major European states. This is mainly reflected in the published and
unpublished writings of the French ambassador the marquis de Bonnac, which
will form the main primary source for the present paper1• For background
information, our major source will be the chronicle of the religious scholar
and diplomat Mehmed �id (died in 1735), who was close to the grand vizier
Damad ibrahim � and a contemporary of the event he described2.
Debates and disputes concerning ceremonies, in which seventeenth and
eighteenth-century diplomats were so often involved typically constitute the
bane of archival researchers. When squabbles about precedence but also about
material prestations degenerate into more serious quarrels, reams of paper tend
to get filled. Historians wading through this ocean of correspondence in search
of political or economic data therefore are likely to suffer a great deal of
frustration. Whether a French ambassador was allowed to appear in the
presence of an Ottoman sultan girded with a sword, and if so, of what type
this sword might be, is not a problem whose significance we readily
appreciate. Therefore it is easy for the modern researcher to fall into a
moralistic trap, assuming that the members of seventeenth or eighteenth­
century ruling groups were inclined to waste their time - and ours - on
futilities.
1Jean Louis Dusson, marquis de Bonnac, Memoire historique sur l'Ambassade de France a
Constantinople ... publie avec un precis de ses negotiations a Ia Porte ottomane, ed. by Charles
Schefer (Paris, 1894), 40 (when discussing the embassy of Girardin).
2For a biography, see the relevant article in The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, by
Christine Woodhead. Mehmed �id, Tarih-i R�id (Istanbul, 1282/1865-66), vol. 2 14-72. For a
summary in German, see Joseph von Hammer (Purgstall], Geschichte des Osmanischen
Reiches ... (Pest, 1831), vol. 7, 264-76.
 150 A N 0T H E R M I R R 0 R F0R PR I NC ES
However during the last twenty-five years or so, the search for political
ideology in the pre-Tanzimat Ottoman Empire has changed our perceptions.
Particularly the more open-minded representatives of our discipline have
become interested in the social anthropologist's perspective on political
history, and this has affected the views of some Ottomanists concerning the
'externals' of diplomatic relations1 . If political power is linked not only to the
material, but also to the 'symbolic' capital of a given sultan, king or head of
state, 'holding one's rank' no longer seems a totally futile exercise.
Moreover the officials, military men and palace servitors who make up
any court constitute a small, tightly knit community, comparable to a village,
although of course the stakes of the game played by the participants are much
higher than they could ever be in a peasant community. Thus the interactions
of the members of a sultanic or royal court may be investigated on a 'micro'
level, as a social anthropologist would study any small town or village. To
take an example from eighteenth-century France, the writings of the due de St
Simon and others have allowed modem researchers to study competition
among courtly families for material resources, links established through
marriages or the role of status assertion through the patronage of artists and
writers2. A perspective informed by social anthropology characterizes much of
this work, and GUiru Necipoglu, Leslie Peirce and Ttilay Artan have pointed
out how similar approaches may be taken when analyzing the Ottoman court3.
But as yet much remains to be done.
Obviously the momentous impact of certain decisions taken at a royal
or sultanic court does not allow us to study this institution in isolation from
the society it governed. Quite to the contrary, courtly society depended for its
very survival on the resources furnished by peasants, artisans and merchants.
After all no courtly society can exist without revenues or religious and
political legitimization. In consequence, the new-style diplomatic historian
cannot but endorse the criticisms which in the fairly recent past, certain social
anthropologists have directed at their confreres and consoeurs studying small
1 William Roosen, "Early Modem Diplomatic Ceremonial: A Systems Approach," The Journal of
Modern History, 52,3 (1980), 452-76 and for an Ottoman context: Christian Windler,
Diplomatic History as a Field for Cultural Analysis: Muslim-Christian Relations in Tunis, 1700-
1840," The HistoricalJournal44, 1 (2001), 79-106.
2For an excellent example see Pierre Chaunu. "L'Etat," in Histoire iconomique et sociale de Ia
France, general editors Fernand Braude! and Ernest Labrousse, vol. 1,1, 90,128. On an
collecting as a means of accumulating 'symbolic capital'. that is social prestige, see Pierre
Bourdieu. Die feinen Unterschiede, Kritik der gesellsclwftlichen Urteilskrajt. tr. by Bernd
Schwibs and Achim Russer (Frankfurt/Main, 1987), 440-41.
3Tillay Artan, "From Charismatic Leadership to Collective Rule: Introducing Materials on the
Wealth and Power of Ott?man Princesses in the Eighteenth Century," Toplum ve Elwnomi. IV
(1993�. 53-94; GUir� Nectpoflu, A�chitecture Cerei1J()nial and Power. The Top/capt Palace in
•
the Fifteenth and SJJCteenth Cent�rtes (Cambndge MA., 1991); Leslie P. Peirce, The Imperial
.
. 1
Harem. Women and Soveretgnty m the Ottoman Empire (Oxford, New York, 1993).
t B R A H t M PA�A AND THE MARQUIS DE BONNAC 151
communities 'as if they were alone in the world'. 'Micro' studies of courtly
society only gain their full meaning if linked to the larger societal context.
Moreover i n exercising domination, soldiers and officials certainly play
a crucial role; yet much of the ruler's power is based on consensus. This can
take a variety of forms, and at least in part is manufactured by the ruler and his
entourage, through ceremonial both religious and courtly'. As an Ottoman
example of this technique of government, widespread the world over, one
might adduce the sultans' control of the pilgrimage cities of Mecca and
Medina. Here there were few if any troops. By contrast imperial largesse,
highly visible gestures of piety and (usually) well-managed diplomatic
relations with the Sharifs, who ruled the area under Ottoman suzerainty,
constituted key legitimizing factors2. Or to use an example from the centre of
Ottoman government, eighteenth-century sultans often emphasized their piety
by organizing lectures and disputations by and among well-known religious
scholars, which they attended in person. While these rulers may well have
viewed themselves as being in need of religious instruction, it can be assumed
that such gestures also served to legitimize their ruJe3.
In Ottoman history, anthropologically inspired studies of politics and
diplomaticy are still in their beginnings, and they have not really 'separated
out' from the more conventional work on diplomatic history. Yet a start has
been made. Thus for instance Selim Deringil in his work on the Hamidian
period has shown that the Ottoman diplomacy of that time maintained links
with Muslims in various British or Dutch colonial territories4. Typicall y
Ottoman representatives tried to persuade the leaders of such Muslim groups
to have the sultan-caliph mentioned in the Friday sermon. While this is a
traditional mark of sovereignty throughout the Islamic world, Ottoman
diplomats did not of course assume that such a mention really placed the
Ottoman sultan in control of African or Southeast Asian territories. Yet this
gesture did imply that in his quality as caliph, Sultan Abdtilhamid possessed a
moral authority over the Muslims in question. This could become politically
relevant in case the partition of the Ottomans' Muslim core lands was placed
on the immediate political agenda. Especially in India, the reactions of
Muslims toward such a possibility were in no way indifferent to the
representatives of British colonial powerS.
1 For a pointed formulation of the things courtly ritual is expected to achieve, see Clifford
Geertz, Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia (Chicago. 1971)'
36-38.
2Suraiya Faroqbi , Pilgrims and Sultans (London, 1994).
3Madeline Zilfi, The Politics of Piety (Minneapolis, 1988), 227-32.
4Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman Empire: Abdillhamid II, 876- 909 •
1 '
International Journal ofMiddle East Studies 23 ( 1991), 345-59.
5Azmi Ozcan, Indian Muslims, the Ouomans and Britain (1877-1924) (Lcidco, 1997).
 152 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NCES
Establishing rank and the 'language ofceremony'
In the early eighteenth century, the Ottoman ruler doubtless was more
powerful on the international scene than was to be true in the time of Sultan
Abdiilhamid II. However maintaining and increasing 'symbolic capital' was
not a negligible consideration even in this earl ier period. Unfortunately the
considerations underlying Ottoman diplomatic behavior during the pre­
Tanzimat period often are difficult to discern, due to the penury of sources.
The eighteenth-century deliberations of grand viziers and reisiilkiittabs
concerning the honors to be ganted or refused to different foreign envoys rarely
have come down to us. Such written communications as survive, especially
the official correspondance (names) are often strongly formulaic and thus
difficult to interpret. Yet from the reactions of the foreign personages present
at the Ottoman court, it is evident that the sultans' high officials were well
aware that by certain types of behavior, they might honor or else disparage a
foreign ruler through his envoy.
Not rarely, the representatives of Christian rulers thought their
ceremonial standing at the sultan's court to be so significant that they were
willing to sacrifice opportunities for concrete negotiations if they felt they
were not being treated according to their rank1 • Considerations of this kind
were relayed by ambassadors stationed in Istanbul to the French or Swedish
king, the Habsburg ruler or the Staten General in Den Haag. Impractical
though such behavior may seem when viewed through present-day eyes,
ranking played an important rule in the competition among seventeenth and
eighteenth-century European rulers, with the Ottoman court as a sometimes
aloof and sometimes rather interested spectator. After all , in seventeenth­
century France, England, Italy, or the Germanies, the stage formed one of the
most potent symbols of courtly and indeed of human existence; and people
were expected to act according to their respective stations in life2 . But
considerations of rank were also of significance where Iranian or Mughul
ambassadors were concerned, even if the underlying ideology was substantially
different3.
I However the marquis de Bonnac observed that diplomatic negotiations could perfectly well
begin without the ceremonial preliminaries. In his view it was therefore unnecessary to make
concessions with respect to the modalities of an ambassadorial reception: de Bonnac:
L'ambassade de France, 38.
2Richard Alewyn, Das grosse WelttheaJer. Die Epoche der hii fischen Feste (Munich, 1989).
3 foreign ambassadors at the Ottoman court, if only because Shah 'Abbas insisted on conducting
From his seventeenth-century predecessors. the marquis de Bonnac had learned that at
sultanic circumcisions, the ambassador of the Mughul emperor walked to the left and the
French ambassador to the right. According to the same source, the left was considered more
honorable at the Mughul court, while the opposite obviously was true of the French. The French
ambassador in Istanbul claimed to be of the same rank as the Mughul representative. But given
the fact that the Mughul dynasty was Sunni Muslim, it is highly doubtful that the Ottoman
te�rifatfl saw the matter in the same light (Archives diplomatiques de Nantes, Ambassade de
France a Constantinople, Serie A, fonds St. Priest, Correspondance politique 9, M�moires et
pi�ces divers du marquis de Bonnac 1716-1724, fol. 83a (new pagination).
IBRAHIM PASA AND THE MARQUIS DE BONNAC 153
We may thus think of precedence, gestures of humility and diplomatic
gifts - the latter of which might shade off into tribute - as a kind of
language which on the whole was 'interculturally' understood. Certainly the
comprehension of a foreign diplomatic ritual required some intellectual effort,
for even within the Islamic world, court ceremonials differed considerably from
one another. Thus the customs of Shah 'Abbas' court in Isfahan were in
certain respects quite unlike those of its Ottoman contemporary ! . Moreover,
given the different religious and cultural backgrounds, diplomatic customs
differed substantially between the Ottoman court and those of the principal
European rulers as well.
But these differences did not prevent certain gestures from being
universally understood. Thus for instance certain presents were selected
precisely because it already was known to the gift-giving court that they
would be highly valued by the receiver. An Iranian embassy might bring an
elephant to Istanbul; and this gesture was appreciated by the Ottoman court, as
evident from the fact that it was eternalized in a miniature from the Topkap1
palace workshops2. Nor did the language of ceremonial gift-giving become
unintelligible when the border between the Muslim and Christian worlds was
crossed. Where gifts from the Habsburg court or the Venetian doge to
Ottoman sultans and grand viziers were concerned, we even know that certain
types of presents were actively solicited by members of the receiving court3.
Understanding courtly ritual was complicated by the fact that even
though it changed slowly, ceremonial did tend to differ over time: in the
Ottoman case, it is well known that the basic features of court ceremonial
were laid down in the time of Mehmed the Conqueror. However significant
changes occurred in the reign of Siileyman the Magnificent and later as well,
especially in the eighteenth century4. Even so, information about the meaning
of certain gestures seems to have been readily available to foreign envoys,
even when due to wars or other circumstances, a lengthy break i n diplomatic
relations had intervened. A translator of the sultan's council, as well as the
embassy dragomans, must have relayed such information when needed, and the
1
on the reception of the 'ambassador' Sir Anthony Shirley at the court of Shah 'Abbas, compare
Lucien-Luc Bellan, Shah 'Abbas I, sa vie, son h.istoire (Paris, 1932), 88-89. At least if Shirley's
embassy report is to be believed, his reception was profoundly different from the reception of
diplomatic negotiations in person.
2I
van Stchoukine, La peinture turque d'apres les manuscrits illustres (Paris, 1966), plate CXI.
3
Gottfried Mraz, Die Rolle der Uhrwerke in der kaiserlichen Tiirkenverehrung im 16.
Jahrhundert" in Die Welt als Uhr, Deutsche Uhren und Automaten 1550-1650 ed. Klaus
Maurice (Munich, 1 980), 39-54 ; Maria Pia Pedani, /n nome del Gran Signore, Invi�ti Ottomani
a Venezia dal/a caduta di Constantinopo/i alia guerra di Candia (Venezia, 1994).
4Necipoglu, Architecture. Ceremonial and fower. 15-30; Artan, "Bogazi�i Cehresini Degi§tiren
Soylu Kadmlar ve Sultanefendi Saraylar1," Istanbul Dergisi, lll (1992), 109-18.
 154 ANOTHER M I R R O R FOR P R I NC E S
I B R A H i M PA$A AND THE MARQUIS DE BONNAC 155

gossip exchanged between embassies filled whatever gaps might remain. This
the Balkansl . Presumably Louis XIV had tolerated such activites on the part
is valid even though at times, an inexperienced or poorly counseled diplomat
of his subjects in order to make his 'special relationship' with the Ottomans
might misunderstand the meaning of a given gesture - to say nothing of
more palatable to other Christian rulers. For throughout the sixteenth and
cases in which the 'misunderstanding' was deliberate.
seventeenth centuries, the French kings had suffered a notorious propagandistic
disadvantage due to their alliance with the 'infidel" against a fellow Catholic
power2. In consequence, Franco�Ottoman diplomatic relations, though never
The political context
broken off, had cooled down considerably. One of the marquis de Bonnac's
predecessors reported that when in 1665, he asked to be received by the grand
The political circumstances in which the Ottoman Empire found itelf at
vizier, he was given very rude treatment. This was due to the fact that in the
the beginning of the eighteenth century are not without importance for our
early years of Louis XIV's personal rule, Frenchmen constituted a notable
study. In 1718 the Peace of Pasarof�Passarowitz had been signed after an
presence among the Ottoman Empire's enemies, the Knights of Malta not
attempt at mediation on the part of the British ambassador. The treaty was
excluded3 .
concluded on the basis of uti possidetis: by its terms the Venetians lost the
Moreover on the eastern borders, the collapse of Safawid rule in Iran
Morea, which the Ottoman administration decided to treat as a newly
formed a further source of international tension4• In 1719-20, Mir Mahmud,
conquered province. On the other hand, the Habsburg ruler acquired both the
the leader of the Ghalzai tribal unit in what is today Afghanistan, was
fortress of Belgrade and the Banate of Teme�var 1 . Thus the Habsburg Empire
recognized by the Safawid Shah Sultan Husayn as governor-general. In later
had become an even more serious threat to Ottoman control of the Balkans
years, this position allowed Mir Mahmud to make a bid for the control of
than it had been at the end of the seventeenth century, when the treaty of
futher provinces. Also in 1719, the Lezgis, who were Sunni inhabitants of a
Karlof�lowitz was concluded2.
section of the Caucasus and hitherto had been subjects of the Safawid state,
This situation must have encouraged Ottoman diplomats to strengthen
revolted against the latter. This rebellion constituted a reaction against the
ties with France. However this was easier said than done. Immediately after
Safawid governing class, which at that time was attempting to convert all its
Pasarof�a. the Ottoman court wanted to avoid getting embroiled with the
subjects to Shi'ism. Unwilling to submit to this treatment, the Lezgis sought
Habsburgs for some time3. Yet by entering into closer relations with the
out the Ottoman sultan and placed themselves under his protection. In
French ki ng, such a result was difficult to avoid, if only because where the
addition, the Russian Czar Peter I attempted to use this state of turmoil for the
French side was concerned, creating difficulties for the Habsburgs was one of
conquest of the Caspian coast ( 1 722), where the Russian Empire already
the most significant reasons for sending ambassadors to Istanbul at all.
controlled the port of Astrahan. By 1723, a military confrontation of the two
This had been the major concern even in the first half of the sixteenth
empires over the Iranian spoils thus seemed a likely eventuality.
century, when Siileyman the Magnificent and Fran�ois I allied in opposition
From an Ottoman viewpoint, the international scene was worrisome
to the Habsburg ruler Charles V. However more recently, these relations had
enough for the grand vizier Nev§ehirli Damad ibrahim Pa§a to set aside the
suffered an eclipse: during the Ottoman-Venetian war for Crete ( 1 645-1 669),
grievances against French policy which had accumulated in the course of the
French noblemen, including an illegitimate son of the deceased King Henri
later seventeenth century. In 1720 the first high-ranking Ottoman official to
IV, had fought on the side of the Venetians, and the same thing had occurred
visit Versailles, a full-scale ambassador rather than a simple envoy, embarked
during certain late seventeenth-century Habsburg-Ottoman confrontations in
upon his journey5. At the French court, reviving the Franco-Ottoman alliance

ILavender Cassels, The Struggle for the Ottoman Empire. 1717·1740 (London, 1 966), 1-28.
2Rifa'at Ali Abou-EI-Haj, "Ottoman Attitudes toward Peace-making: The Karlowitz Case". De1 I Ekkebard Eickhoff Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen, Umbruch in Siidosteuropa 1645-1700
,

Islam (1974), 1 3 1-37. rt. 2. ed. 1988). 241-64.

.
3This is probably the reason why {brahim Beg, the Ottoman ambassador se�t to Vtenna for the
.
signing of the t.reaty (not to be confused with the homonym�us grand �tzter) sta>:ed on to
witness the wedding of the Habsburg Erzherzogin Maria Antorua to the hetr presumptive to the
throne of Poland and duchy of Saxony, the later king Augu�t Ill (1719). August 1�. the
bridegroom's father, was inspired by this encounter to laun�h 10 the same year, a .ser es . of
�
'ottomanizing' feasts at his Dresden court. In one of them he htmself figured as the sulta
n . Eme
gute Figiir machen. Kostiim und Fest am Dresdner Hof(Dresden, 2000), 68-70.
(Stuttga
2Gerard PoumarMe, "Justifier l'injustifiable: !'alliance turque au miroir de Ia chretiente (XVI0-
XVW si�cles)." Revue d'histoire diplomatique. 3 (1997), 217-46.
3De Bonnac, L'Ambassade de France, 70 (report of the ambassador De Ia Haye Vantelay).
4Hans Robert Roemer, "The Safav�d Period" in The Cambridge History of Iran. Vol. 6 The
Timurid and Safavid Periods (Cambndge, 1986), 3 10-24.
5Fatma MUge G09<:k, East Encounters West, France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth
Century (Oxford, Washington, 1987).
 156 A NOTHER M I R R O R F O R P R I NCES
I B R A H I M PA�A AND THE MARQUIS D E BONNAC 157

also was viewed as a matter of some importance, as evident from the large­
Moreover the marquis de Bonnac was quite critical of certain types of
scale paintings documenting the Ottoman visit, one of which still survives in
behavior in which, as he felt, his predecessors had all too often indulged, to
the Versailles Palace museum 1 •
the detriment of their missions. On reading de Bonnac's reports, one gai ns the
This attention on the part of the ministers of Louis XV largely was due
impression that he was opposed to excessive demands for ceremonial 'special
to the fact that the latter still hoped to prevent Ottoman entanglements in Iran,
treatment' on the part of French ambassadors. Thus the marquis' account of the
and if that proved impossible, to at least avert a war between Ahmed III and
dispute initiated by one of his predecessors, who according to French usage
Peter I. For given recent defeats in southeastern Europe, it seemed obvious
wished to be received at the Ottoman court while wearing his sword, was
that an Ottoman Empire fully occupied on its eastern and northern frontiers
roundly disapproving of this provocative conduct1 • At the same time the
could not form a counterweight to Habsburg power. Lengthy attempts at
author seemed to think that the criticisms which in France were directed
mediation by the French ambassador to Istanbul, the marquis de Bonnac, must
against French ambassadors who adopted Ottoman dress were rather
be viewed in this context2. The treaty which was concluded between the two
exaggerated. If this was really considered important, the marquis felt that it
rulers in 1724 divided Iran into two 'spheres of influence', while attempting to
would have been sufficient to order the ambassador to resume French costume
ensure that the Russian and Ottoman empires did not acquire a common
without taking other, more drastic measures against him. De Bonnac reported
frontier.
without comment the difficulties caused to an Ottoman official by a
Frenchman who stepped with his shoes on his host's carpet, and thereby made
it unsuitable for use in prayer. But one does sense that up to a point, the
Ibrahim P�a and the marquis de Bonnac
marquis appreciated the Ottoman official's point of view.
More outspoken was de Bonnac's criticism of one of his predecessors,
ibrahim p� has not left any memoirs; but the marquis de Bonnac has
who had insisted on acquiring a boat ornamented in a fashion which according
produced not only extensive diplomatic correspondence, but also a treatise,
to Ottoman protocol, was the exclusive privilege of the sultan. After having
explicating Franco-Ottoman diplomatic relations for the instruction of his
caused a great deal of bad blood, the ambassador had to remove his boat from
successors. From these texts it appears that although conversation was only
the capital. According to de Bonnac, he would have done better if he had
possible through interpreters, the marquis de Bonnac developed considerable
conformed to the custom of the country from the outset2. Throughout, one
respect and even liking for his Ottoman interlocutor3. In part this must have
gains the impression that the marquis favored a pragmatic approach, which
been due to the fact that while Ali P�a. ibrahim P�a's predecessor as grand
may well have facilitated relations with the equally matter-of-fact grand vizier.
vizier never had bothered to hide his loathing for Christians, !brahim P�a's
d
attitu e was less emotional. We get the impression that in spite of having
held a succession of courtly and bureaucratic appointments, the grand vizier
Festival politics
really was a diplomat by inclination, and where the highly professional
marquis de Bonnac was concerned, this probably made for some mutual
In the present paper, we will deal with a Franco-Ottoman negotiation,
understanding. ibrahim Pa�a had opposed the 'war party' during the
to which many of the considerations outlined above apply in one fashion or
Peterwardein campaign, and had become grand vizier after this confrontation
another. As we have seen, in September 1720, Sultan Ahmed m had his sons
had ended badly for the Ottomans. He favored a period of recuperation and
circumcised, and married off one of his nieces, a daughter of his deceased
reconstruction, and while French diplomacy normally preferred to see the
predecessor Mustafa II. The sultan decided to celebrate the occasion by a feast
Ottomans embroiled with the Habsburgs, de Bonnac seems to have been
distinguished by its lavish magnificence. In terms of the empire-wide and even
realistic enough to appreciate ibrahim �a's point of view.
international interest this celebration aroused, it is conparable to the 1 524
festivities on the occasion of the wedding of the then grand vizier Pargalt
I For the picture showing the solemn entrie of the Ottoman ambassado�, see T<!plcopi a
Versailles, trisors de Ia cour ottomane,
exhibition catalogue, mus6e de Vei'S8llles (Pa
ns, 1999),
324.
2De Bonnac, L'Ambassade de France, 216-80. 1De Bonnac, L'Ambassade de France. 51.
3De Bonnac. L'Amba.ssade de France. 1 6 1 .
2De BonnK, L'Ambassade de France, 51.
 158 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
ibrahim Pa�a, to whom SUieyman the Magnificent had given his sister in
marriage. Other remarkable festivities followed; in 1582, it was the
circumcision of the later Sultan Mehmed Ill, while the great festival of the
seventeenth century was celebrated in 1675, to honor the circumcisions of the
future Sultans Mustafa II and Ahmed III. The festivities of 1720, to which
foreign ambassadors were invited, lasted for two weeks1.
Not every princely circumcision was celebrated in an equally lavish
fashion, and thus we need to ask for the reason why Sultan Ahmed III and
Nev�ehirli ibrahim �a decided on September 1720 as a suitable time for
such a major enterprise. Doubtless there were personal reasons; apparently an
earlier date once had been envisaged, but the celebration had been put off due
to sickness in the sultan's family. But if viewed i n a broader context, it is
likely that the political situation also had been taken into consideration: on
the one hand, a major war recently had been ended by the Ottoman ruler,
successfully as far as the Venetians were concerned, while the opposite was
true of the conflict with the Habsburgs. On the other hand, it was not at all
impossible that the sultan would in the near future again go to war in Iran.
Given these circumstances, a great festivity may have been an occasion to
enhance the sultan's prestige and gather support for the campaigns to come.
Moreover Sultan Ahmed III among his contemporaries possessed a
reputation for being mainly concerned with the contents of his treasury. By
contrast, ibrahim Pa�a attempted to ensure a balance between 'taking' and
'giving'. The marquis de Bonnac recounts that the grand vizier once tried to
persuade his sultan that while securing revenues and amassing cash was a
necessary function of government, a ruler could retain the loyalty of his
subjects only if he visibly distributed largesse2. In the anecdote relayed by de
Bonnac, ibrahi m P�a in fact suggested that Ahmed I l l should concentrate
either on securing revenues or else on distributing gifts. The grand vizier
himself undertook to fulfil l whatever the ruler considered the less congenial
task, and the reader is left to conclude that gift-giving and largesse probably
fell to the lot of tbrahim Pa�a.
If this story has any validity at all, we may surmise that it was the
grand vizier who convinced the Sultan that a peaceful interval, which well
might be of short duration, was a good time to strengthen social and political
ties by distributing the appropriate largesse. Some of these gifts went to the
members of the sultan's household. In fact the chronicler Mehmed Ra�id, in
1 A n official 'festival book' documenting this event was copiously illustrated by the painter
Levni: Esin AtJl, Levni and the Surname. The Story ofan Eighteenth-century Ottoman Festival
(Istanbul, 1999). According to marquis de Bonnac, L'ambassade de France, .142, the foreign
envoys only were asked to attend after ten days, during the last stage of the fesuval.
2Marquis de Bonnac, L'Ambassade de France, 153-154.
i B R A H t M PA�A AND T H E MARQUIS DE BONNAC 159
his lengthy description of the 1720 festival, emphasized the attendance and at
times active service of Ottoman officeholders at the celebrations, in particular,
at the wedding of the Princess Emetullah, which in other accounts is often
eclipsed by the circumcisions themselves 1 • Most i m portant to this
sophisticated bureaucrat at one time ambassador to Iran were obviously the
offices held by the men who attended the wedding celebrations (apart from a
brief mention of the princess being received by her spouse at her arrival in the
marital home, there is no reference to the female participants)2. The prestige
of these courtly and state offices was symbolized by the clothes and turbans
worn by the participants. In addition, Ra�id reported that the visitors and those
who took a more active role in organizing the wedding festivities all received
robes of honor, while some attention was also paid to the gifts given to the
sultan at this happy occasion3. This emphasis on gift exchanges makes it
seem probable that apart from making visible official hierarchies by a series of
processions, an exchange of presents did in fact constitute the central function
of a courtly feast.
But sultanic bounty was not limited to members of the court. To the
contrary, lavish public banquets offered to dignitaries who were not courtiers
and even to private soldiers also formed an important aspect of the festiva14.
Moreover five thousand poor boys were circumcised at the same time as the
princes, several hundred every day, and included in the festivities5. In addition
there were the numerous people employed temporarily in adding luster to the
festival, such as acrobats, dancers and tulumbacts in charge of policing the
streets. All these people must have received money and gifts6. In any event,
by this sequence of banquets, Sultan Ahmed III could strengthen his ties to
broad sections of the Istanbul population.
What was the role of ambassadors in such a context? Several
miniatures in the official festival book, by the famous miniaturist Levni and
his school, record the foreigners' presence as spectators of the processions
which formed such an essential part of both Ottoman and early modern
European celebrations7. We find the French and - a real novum - the
Russian ambassador attending one of these parades together; since we are
dealing with Petrine Russia, the newcomer is attired in the French fashion and
I Ra§id, Tarih, vol. 5, 220-221.
2
R3§id, Tarih, vol. 5, 225.
3
Ra§id, Tarih, vol. 221-222.
4Ra§id, Tarih, vol. 5, 236 and elsewhere.
5
Ra§id, Tarih, vol 5, 237 and elsewhere.
6 Although 1 have made a diligent searc�. I have to date fo':'nd very little evidence of di�content
.
among the subject population concernmg the eltpenses l�n�ed to the festival. But g1ven the
overwbelmingly official character of our sources, that fact m 1tself does not mean every much.
7Atd, Levni, 9 -95.
4
 160 A N0THER M I R R 0R F0R P R I NCES
I B RAHiM PA�A AND THE MARQUIS DE BONNAC 161

thus indisguishable from other prominent Europeans. All these personages are
might have left us an interesting version of the proceedings l . As to the
dressed the same way, namely in a tight-waisted long embroidered coat, puffy
English representative, he attended, but did not find the festival site very
knee-breeches and black stockings. They are invariably clean-shaven and the
remarkable; with its numerous acrobatic shows, Okmeydam en jete merely
hair is worn open, reaching down to the shoulders. In most cases it probably
reminded him of London's St Bartholomew's fair.
would have been a wig, while the hats are black and of the type frequently
One of the major reasons for pre-festival contestation was the question
found in seventeenth-century Dutch portraits. One wonders whether this garb,
of the gifts to be proffered. Ra§id's account has made it clear that Ahmed III
in which overcoats do not figure, may have constituted what Ottoman officials
expected major gifts from his dignitaries, who in some cases were specifically
concerned with protocol regarded as the proper attire for 'Franks', rather than
invited from the provinces, presumably with such an aim in mind. Moreover
clothes actually worn in 1720. However, the noblemen's swords, which had
the artisans' guilds participating in the procession not only had to foot the bill
caused so much trouble in an earlier period, are nowhere in evidence in Levni's
for the floats in which their crafts were exhibited, but also make the ruler
miniature, although some of the visitors do sport canes.
expensive presents. Thus it is in no way surprising that the foreign
According to the same source, the foreign guests had been assigned
ambassadors also were expected to contribute.
seats in tents, admittedly rather modest structures, but located in the
However the marquis de Bonnac claimed that in the course of time, a
immediate vicinity of sultan and grand vizier. This is remarkable because
set of rules had developed concerning the occasions at which the sultan was or
Ra§id, when listing the tents flanking that of the sultan, did not mention a
was not to be offered presents in the name of the French ruler. This involved a
structure specifically assigned to the ambassadors I. On Levni's miniature, the
distinction between 'public' and 'private'; thus the accession of a sultan or the
more prominent among the European visitors were seated on decorated chairs.
first visit of an incoming ambassador were to be considered state occasions, at
A surviving account of the Habsburg ambassador, which described one of the
which presents were due. But the same was not true of weddings or
festival processions, presumably is based on the notes which one of his
circumcisions in the sultan's family, which the French ambassador claimed to
attendants had taken while attending a function of the type shown in Levni's
. . . consider private events. Given the public importance of royal weddings in
mtmatures2. At another occas10n, we find European visitors embarked i n a
seventeenth- or eighteenth-century France, it is rather difficult to accept thjs
small boat, in order to get a better view of some of the festivities taking place
claim at face value. A clever diplomat, the grand vizier may have sensed this
on the waters of the Golden Hom. However, since in this picture the figures
incortsistency, but he did not engage in a discussion concerning the limits of
are shown only down to the waist, it is less evocative than the other one3.
'public' and 'private' at the French and Ottoman courts - from our point of
In addition to their attendance at the procession, the ambassadors
view, this reticence is of course highly regrettable. Rather, ibrahim Pa�a laid a
apparently were assigned a certain day at which they could visit the festival
bait which de Bonnac found hard to resist. As the grand vizier put it,
site out at Okmeydam. This becomes apparent from a remark by the marquis
participation in the festival on Ottoman terms would, given the sultan's strict
de Bonnac, who says that a special courtesy was extended to him. The day on
adherence to precedent, ensure that French ambassadors would receive
which he was to have visited Okmeydan1 being very rainy, he was given
honorable invitations to sultanic festivals in the future. Special care was taken
another time, so that he could visit in more pleasant circumstances4. However
to demonstrate that the 'three hundred' years of amity between the two
the Dutch ambassador chose to not attend at all; this is rather a pity, in so far
emperors, namely the French and the Ottoman, had not been forgotten. As a
as the latter had retained the services of J.B. Vanmour, a professional French
result, the marquis de Bonnac wrote home that given these circumstances,
painter who produced canvasses showing his patron at several official
there was no good reason for refusing to give the desired presents2.
functions. While rather unsatisfactory as a documentarist, Vanmour still

1 R�i�. Tarih, vol. 5, P: 226 �· De �onnac reports having been received in the tent of the reis 1 R. van Luuervelt, De Turk.se" schild �rijen van J.B. Vanmour en zijn school. De verzamelin
efel!flt: Ce':ltre des Archives D1plomatJques de Nantes, Serie A Fonds St Priest, vol. 8, Mimoires
_ de Bonnac.
van Corneits. Ca*f
l en, ��adeur. b l) de Hoge Porte. 1725-1743 (Istanbul, 1958). For the us �
ma�e.o! Vanmour s pamun�s Jn Vemce see Guardi, Cuadri turcheschi. Fondazione Giorgio Cini
et p1eces d1verses du marqu1s .
;Haus-Hof und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, Turcica I, f 89, 9 October 1720. �Xh1b1taon catalogue (Vemce, 1993). My thanks go to Gianpietro Bellingeri for malting th"18
Important publication available to me.
Abl, Lewli, 94-95. 2
4Marquis de Bonnac, L'Ambassade de France, 142. Archives Nationales, Paris, Jetter of the marquis de Bonnac to the King, 28 September 1720, K
344 No. 50.
 162 ANOTHER MI RROR FOR P R I NCES i BRAH i M PA�A AND THE MARQUIS DE BONNAC 163

In conclusion
Gift exchanges were a significant means of making this hierarchy
visible and at the same time, cementi ng it. The sultan bestowed robes of
Certainly the minor points of ceremony over which ibrahim P�a and
honor on his dignitaries, and set a silver ewer filled with coins as a prize for
the marquis de Bonnac argued with such perseverance do not form a substitute
acrobatic skill. As to the pashas and other officials, they responded by gifts of
for physical power, such as an army or navy. Yet the very fact that at a critical
money, precious cloth, valuable horse gear and jewelry, while the guildsmen
point in Mediterranean history, diplomatic gifts and ceremonial ranking were
also made gifts which must have badly unbalanced their budgets. By accepting
considered to be of such importance by two sober and experienced personages,
to present gifts in the name of his sovereign, the French ambassador took his
should give us cause to think. It would appear that 'baroque' intellectuals of
place in this hierarchy, thereby demonstrating that the French king continued
western, southern and central Europe were not alone in seeing the world as a
to value Ottoman support. But even the Russian czar, who within a few years,
theater. A glance at Levni's miniatures tells us that for the duration of the
was once more to come close to war with the Ottoman Empire, still
festival, Ahmed Ill and Ibrahim Pa�a also were 'on stage', the play in which
considered himself bound by the treaty of 'eternal' peace concluded only a few
they acted being concerned with the centrality of the Ottoman Empire within
years earlier. For two festive weeks, the position of the sultan remained
the state system of its day. And just as in a Shakespearean play, the cast of
uncontested.
serious actors was supported by those whose specialty was comedy, including
young artisans with ambitions to cut a fine figure, acrobats and clowns, as
such people turned out at the Ottoman festival as well. By their capers, and
also by the handsomeness of the participating young apprentices, these
representatives of Ottoman city life set off the various dignitaries, when the
latter, according to both Mehmed Ra�id and the miniaturist Levni, solemnly
arrived at the festival site to do obeisance to the sultan!.
It would seem that in this ordered and hierarchical system which the
Ottoman court projected, the foreign ambassadors had a role to play. They
took their places among the Ottoman officials who waited to kiss the robes of
the ruler, although the ceremonial applicable in their particular cases was
different. How the lefrifatfl and other officials in charge of organizing the
1720 festival 'placed' the representatives of foreign rulers is surrounded by
some ambiguity, as the Ottoman sources I have seen do not explicitly discuss
the issue. Apparently the foreign visitors, who after all were not present every
day, simply were assigned whatever tent was available at the time of their
visit. Or else the reis efendi, in his capacity as the interlocutor of foreign
envoys, made provision for them. From the marquis de Bonnac's account, it
would appear that the grand vizier had promised the representative of the
French king an honorable place among the visitors, and this promise, if we
believe Levni's version of events, was fulfilled.
But in the end, the exact position of the ambassadors constituted a
matter of detail. What counted was principally that i n the setting of the
festival, out in the open in Okmeydam, the sultan presented himself as the
apex of a hierarchy of dignitaires encompassing a large section of the Ancient
World, all the way from India to Great Britain by way of Russia.

1Ra§id, Tarih, vol. 5. 230 ff.

AN OITOMAN AMBASSADOR IN IRAN: DORRI AHMED
EFENDI AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE SAFAVID EMPIRE
IN 1720-21

A novel approach in foreign relations

Quite a few Ottoman ambassadors or at least envoys before the

eighteenth century have visited European, Iranian or even Indian courts. But
most of them have not left reports, or perhaps they have done so but we have
not as yet found them. Quite possibly some of these documents still lie in the
storerooms of the Topkapt palace archives, un-catalogued and unknown to
historians. I
For the period before 1700 two reports of Ottoman ambassadors to
Vienna have been published: the earliest is rather short and was written by
Mehmed Pa§a, who after the battle of St Gotthard on the Raab ( 1 664)
concluded a twenty-year peace in Vienna. A better known participant in this
embassy was Evliya <;elebi whose report on the Habsburg court was both
lively and unofficiaJ.2 However we have no way of knowing whether any of
the dignitaries serving under Sultan Mehmed IV (r. 1648-87) ever had a chance
to read this work and if they did what they thought of it. Most recently reports
and official documents concerning the visit of Ziilfikar Pa§a also have become
available; this personage attended the Habsburg court in 1688-92 in an
unsuccessful attempt to negotiate an end to the war of 1683-99, and for a
while he was imprisoned in a fortress for his trouble.3
For those Ottoman envoys, who came to foreign courts before the
1660s the documentation produced in the places that they visited typically is
our main source of information. Thus the Venetian archives contain a
considerable amount of data about the �avu� or kapucu who as not very high­
ranking officials typically were dispatched to the Signoria with a single clearly

1 For an exception see Giancarlo Casale, "His Majesty's servant L!itfi, the career of a
�reviously unknown sixteenth-century Ottoman envoy to Sumatra ." Turcica, 37 (2005): 43-82.
..

[Evliya <:elebi], Im
Reiche des Goldenen Apfels, des tiirkischen Weltenbummlers Evliya
Celebi denkwiirdige Reise in das Giaurenland und in die Stadt und Festung Wien anno 1665,
translated and commented by Richard F. Kreutel, Erich Prokosch and Karl Teply (Wien:
Verlag Styria, 2. edition, 1987), for the report of Kara Mehmed see: 255-63.
3 Mustafa GUier, Ziilfikiir Pa$a'nm Viyana Sefareti ve Esareti, Cerfde-i Takrirllt-i
Ziilfikll.r
Efendi (Istanbul: <:amhca, 2007). Unfortunately t�e book is marred by many printing errors, but
.
it does contain a facsimile of one of the ongmal manuscripts. See also [Ziilfik�r Pll§a),
Viyana'da Osmanll Diplomasisi (Ziilfik1Jr PCI§a'mn MiikLUeme Takrfri /688-1692) ed. by Songiil
�olak (Istanbul: Yeditepe Yaymevi, 2007).
 166 ANOTHER MI RROR FOR P R I N C ES
defined responsibility.! These office-holders carried letters written in the name
of the sultans from which the unwary reader might conclude that the doge of
Venice was something like an Ottoman provincial governor. In addition they
frequently also carried less formal texts issued by the chancery of the grand
vizier that must have served as the 'real ' basis for negotiations and in which
greater at.tention was paid to political realities.2
Perhaps the young Ottoman Sultan Ahmed I. (r. 1603-17) did send a
letter to the court of the Mughals in Delhi and Agra; but if so, the carrier was
not an envoy but rather a t.raveller from Transoxania, who had passed through
Istanbul possibly when on the halj. However this letter was not accepted as
genuine by its recipient the emperor Djahanglr (1569-1627), who recounted
this visit in his memoirs when narrating the events of 1608. As a reason for
his scepticism Djahangir pointed out that hitherto no Ottoman envoy had been
seen in Delhi or Agra, and moreover it had not been possible to check whether
the letters presented by the Transoxanian visitor were genuine or not.3
In fact one of the very few Ottoman office-holders to turn up at the
Mughal court was Seyyidi 'Ali Rei's, who was not an ambassador at all but a
mid-sixteenth century admiral who had lost his ships and happened to be in
attendance at the Mughal court when the emperor Humayun died and Akbar
ascended the throne. However it is most unlikely that had Seyyidi 'Ali Rei's
appeared in Delhi in DjaMngir's time, this naval commander and would-be
diplomat would have been regarded as a 'proper' ambassador.4 Official
exchanges of envoys between the Ottomans and the Mughals thus seem to
have been quit.e minimal; and while many pages of Seyyidi 'Ali Rei's'
fascinating report appear as if an ambassador were speaking, in reality the
book is no more than an unofficial t.ravelogue.
However around 1700 the Ottoman court developed a new interest in
diplomacy: after the treaties of Karlowitz/Karlof�a ( 1 699) and
Passarowitz/Pasarof�a ( 1718) that both involved serious territorial losses
the authorities in Istanbul seem to have concluded that it would be useful to
1 Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, In nome del Gran Sigrwre, Inviati ottomani a Venezia dalla caduta di
Costantinopoli alia guerra di Candia (Venezia: Deputacione Editrice, 1994).
2 Suraiya Faroqhi "Ottoman Views on Corsairs and Piracy in the Adriatic." in The Kapudan
Pasha. His Offtce'and his Domain, ed. by Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon: University of
Crete Press, 2002): 357-71 and "Bosnian Merchants in the Adriatic," in Ottoman Bosnia, A
History in Peril The /nternat�onal Journal of Tu�kish Stu_dies, 10, 1-2, ed. by Markus Koller
and Kemal Karpat (Madison/Wtsc.: Center of Turktsh Studtes, 2004): 225-39, both reproduced
••
in this volume.
3 [Jahangir), The Jahangirnama, Memoi�s of Jahangir, Emperor of India, translated and
commented by Thackston Wheeler (Washtngton, New York, Oxford: Freer Gallery of Art et
alii, 1999): 95.
4 Seyyidi 'Aif Re'fs, Le miroir des pays, Une anabase ottomane a travers_ l'lnde et I'Asie
centrale, translated and annotated by Jean-Louis Bacque-Grammont ([Atx-en-Provencej:
Sindbad-Actes Sud, 1999); Mehmet Kiremit ed., Seydi Ali Reis, Mir'litii'I-Mem41ik, lnceleme,
Metin, Index (Ankara: TUrk Oil Kurumu, 1999).
AN OT T O M A N AMBASSADOR I N IRAN 167
explain their own policies at foreign courts and also collect political
intell igence. After all it is possible to argue that if in 1683 the Ottoman
government had been better informed about what had happened at the Polish
court, the Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pa�a would have taken precautions
against the approach of the allied armies of the Holy League and not been
taken unawares, leaving the rear of the besieging army unprotected.
In this context the embassy of Yirmisekiz Mehmed Efendi to Paris and
Versailles (1720), which was meant to 'put the Ottomans on the mental map'
of French court circles, in the Istanbul governing milieu seems to have been
considered as quite significant. Among other matters this ambassador was
supposed to bring back information about novelties in courtly culture; and
this assignment he fulfilled to the full satisfaction of Sultan Ahmed III (r.
1703-30). The sultan even had his ambassador's report translated into French;
and it was sent to the court of the young Louis XV as a polite gesture. 1
Yirmisekiz Mehmed Efendi 's mission has also attracted considerable interest
among modem historians.2
Much less attention however has been paid to the fact that in 1720
Ahmed III also sent an ambassador' named Diirri Ahmed Efendi to Iran. While
shorter than the account of Yirmisekiz Mehmed the report written by the
envoy to Iran is also very instructive. It will form the topic of the present
study.3
An ambassador travels
We do not know very much about the life of Diirri Ahmed Efendi: he
came from a family that resided in the eastern Anatolian town of Van, close to
the Iranian border; supposedly he had lost the use of one eye. Educated as a
scri be in the Ottoman chancery he was able to expand his knowledge of
Persian, the rudiments of which he had perhaps already teamed in his home
town; he became proficient in both language and literature. Apart from his
1
Mehmed efendi, Le paradis des in.fid�les, Un ambassadeur ottoman en France sous Ia
Regence, introduced by Gilles Veinstein (Paris: Fran9ois Masptro, 1981).
2 Fatma M!ige G�ek, East Encounters West. France and the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth
Century (New York, Oxford, Washington: Oxford University Press and The Institute of Turkish
Studies, 1987); compare also the exhib�tion catalogue Topkapi a Versailles, Tr�sl?rs de Ia cour
· ottomane (Paris: Editions de Ia Reumon des Musees Nat10naux und Assoctallon Fran9aise
d'Action Artistique, 1999).
3 Ahmed Oiirri Efendi, published in Mehmed R �id, Tarih-i R�id. 6 vols. (Istanbul: Matba'a-yt
amire, 1282/1865-66), vol. 5: 382-?8; Dourry Efendy, Relation de Dourry Ef.en.dy ambassadeur
de Ia Porte ottomane aupr�s du ro1 de Perse ··· translated by De Fiennes (Pans: Ferra, 1810): J.
72.
 168 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRINCES
embassy report he has left a collection (divan) of poetry. I Presumably his
literary skill was a starting point for Durri Ahmed Efendi's career; Iranians
apart after aJl between Istanbul and Delhi Persian was known to all men - and
a few women - who whatever their native languages might be, thought of
themselves as belonging to polite society. Before being sent to Iran the author
had held various offices in the Ottoman bureaucracy; while on this official
mission he ranked as a finance director of the second order and was appointed
chief accountant after his return.2
Presumably Grand Vizier ibrahim P�a and his advisors had been at
pains to locate personalities suitable for the embassies they were to undertake.
Even though Yirmisekiz Mehmed Efendi knew no French, he rapidly formed a
circle of acquaintances in Paris and Versailles, while Durri Ahmed Efendi at
the Safavid court could present himself as an educated gentleman of rank and
make observations and collect information that would have remained
inaccessible to a person without his accomplishments.
The chronicler Mehmed Ra�id informs us that Durri Ahmed returned to
the Ottoman capital in Safer 1 1 34/December 1 72 1 ; the envoy claimed to have
spent a little over six months in Iran, but according to the documents analyzed
by Munir Aktepe, he should have left Ottoman territory in the late autumn of
1720. He had departed from Istanbul a good deal earlier as before crossing the
border he spent some time in eastern Anatolia.3 Gi ven the new interest of
Ahmed III and his grand vizier in diplomatic contacts, several official
documents concerning this trip have come down to us. These records are also
emblematic of the increasing bureaucratization of the Ottoman Empire in the
1700s: in earlier times Ottoman scribes at the very most copied into their
registers the laissez-passers issued to departing envoys. However the three
documents dealing with the embassy to Iran are more specific: thus we learn
that before leaving Ourri Ahmed Efendi was told that for every day of actual
travel, at certain pre-determined stops he had the right to collect 2000 ak�e of
good quality, in other words in non-debased coin.4 This sum of money
corresponded to about 5.5 Venetian ducats, rather a paltry sum as he must
1 Mllnir Aktepe,"Dilrri Ahmet Efendi'nin iran Sefareti," Belgelerle Turk Tarih Dergisi 1
�196?) 1: 56-60; 2: 60-63; 3: 64-66; 4: 60-62; 5: 53-56; 6: 82-84. '
Fwk R�ar Unar, Osmaf!ll Sejirlert ve Sefaretnameleri, completed and edited by Bekir S1tlu
raykal (Ankara: TUrk Ta h �urumu, _ I 968): 59-61 ; Aktepe,"Oilrri Ahmet," 1: 60; 5: 56.
n
_ to Franz Babmger, D1e Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke
Accordmg
(Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1927): 326 the embassy took place in 1720; this statement is based
on the date given by De Fiennes in the heading ofhis translation. It also agrees with the archival
documents concerning OUrri Ahmed's embassy. For a detailed discussion of travel dates
compare Aktepe, "D!lrriAhmet" 1: 61 and 5: 55-56.
4 Bqbakanhk A11ivi-Osmanh A11ivi, Istanbul, Section Maliyeden mildevver (from now '
onwards: MAD) 9906 p. 300 (1 13211719-20).
. 6 These paragraphs are missing in Mehmed Rqid's version, but they are extant in De Fiennes'
A N OTTOM AN A M B A S S A DOR I N I R A N 169
have had to pay the expenses of a sizable suite. 1 In addition the envoy was
allowed to collect some barley and straw for his camels. Tax farmers situated
along his route were instructed to deliver these items upon demand and
according to a well-established Ottoman practice, were to reimburse
themselves at the end of the year by subtracting the relevant sums of money
from the dues that they owed. Thus the central administration took up an
interest-free loan for the benefit of its envoy.2
Probably these assignments turned out to be insufficient. In any event
plenty of complaints came in, detailing how the ambassador had collected far
more than was his due. Possibly Durri Ahmed Efendi when passing through
the regions of Malatya und Diyarbakn had figured that the central
administration was far too distant to control his each and every move. In
Malatya he had obtained 200 Dutch guru� beyond what he had been assigned,
and in Diyarbalm as well the envoy owed money to local people.3 But Durri
Ahmed was a creditor as well as a debtor; and the garrison of his hometown of
Van was ordered to pay him back what its members owed him, so that he
would be in a position to finance his trip.4 Apparently his family was
involved in local tax-fanning: a brother of Ourri Ahmed's was expected to take
care of the latter's interests while the ambassador was in Iran.5 However it is
hard to determine exactly what kinds of transactions were involved, as the
money was demanded in the name of the ambassador by the Ottoman financial
administration and not by the creditor directly.
In one way or another Durri Ahmed Efendi upon his return had to deal
with a number of financial complications. He referred to this situation i n his
report, declaring that in the course of his six and a half months in Iran he had
received 53 purses. Unfortunately the purse being a variable unit of money it
is hard to say how much he really had collected in terms of ak�e or guru§. Of
this amount 15 purses remained when Durri Ahmed finally returned to Van. If
his account can be believed the author used some of this money to repair
certain pious foundations established by his family. Durri Ahmed thought that
this act also redounded to the glory of sultan and grand vizier; perhaps he felt
that he deserved some financial compensation for his gesture.6
1 According to �evket Pamuk, A Monetary History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2�): 144 in 1725 I ducat was wonh 375 akfe; five years earlier
' the akfe may have been worth a httle more.
2 MAD 9906 p. 581-2 (1 13211719-20).
,
3 MAD 9908. p. 8 ( 1 1 33/1720-21).
26
4 MAD 9906 p. 4 12 (1 13211719-20).
,
5 Aktepe, "Oilrrf Ahmet,• 2:61.
lranSiation: Douny Efendy, Relalion de Dourry Ejendy: 56.
 170 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRI NCES
The report and how it was received
According to the requirements of protocol Diirri Ahmed addressed his
report to Sultan Ahmed III; but in the conclusion we find him complimenting
the Grand Vizier ibrahim Pa�a, son-in-law (damad) to the sultan; thus he
acknowledged the role of this highest Ottoman official in his appointment.
Most of the account covers the ambassador's trip, according pride of place to
the author's encounters with Shah Soltan Husayn and the equivalent of the
grand vizier in the Safavid administration, known as the 'itimdd al-davla. The
shah at this point had left his capital of Isfahan and undertaken a campaign
against Kandahar; after a lengthy detour the court had ended up in Teheran.
Here the ruler possessed a substantial palace; but otherwise the later capital of
Iran appeared to Ahmed Durri as rather a small place (kasaba).
The most important scenes of this report have been rendered in the
shape of dialogues; moreover the author has inserted a number of poems in
Persian and Turkish, as was common in elegant prose. Occasional quotations
appear in their original Persian shape; but on the whole the text has been
written in a language reasonably close to educated speech and not in formal
Ottoman with its many Arabic and Persian elements. At the end of Ahmed
Diirri's report we find a short systematic account of the late Safavid court and
its dignitaries as well as a brief description of the local political geography.
No instructions survive; thus we do not know what results the
Ottoman court expected from Diirri Ahmed Efendi's embassy and what matters
that he was to highlight in his report. In all probability the ambassador had
received oral instructions on the issues he was to discuss.1 We only can deduce
these concerns from the text itself. Evidently the Ottoman authorities wanted
their envoy to present the strengths and good qualities of their own
administration in the face of the shah and his most important dignitaries. But
the ambassador also tried to analyze the reasons why Safavid rule over an
empire that at least in his own opinion, was quite wealthy had now come
close to collapse. In this context presumably ibrahim Pa§a wanted to find out
whether a campaign against the Safavid domains at this point was likely to
succeed. At the Iranian court an attack on the part of the Ottoman sultan was
greatly feared and the author attempted to dispel these concerns with words that
sounded plausible but in the end turned out to be untrue. Although Dtirri
Ahmed Efendi did not disclose his own opinions about war and peace, most
likely after his return he spoke in favour of an Iranian campaign, which did in
fact come about a few years later, ending with the conquest of Tabriz.2
1 Aktepe, "Dlirrf Ahmet" 1: 58.
.
2 Fariba Zarinebaf-Shahr, "Tabriz under Ottoman Rule (1725-1730)," unpublished Ph. D.
dissertation, The University of Chicago, 1991.
A N O TT O M A N A M B A S S A D O R I N I R A N 171
At the time of writing Dlirri Ahmed Efendi's report must have been a
state secret. But as Safavid rule collapsed so fast, already in 1722 according to
the opinion of many historians, the text evidently was made accessible 'to the
public' quite soon.1 Apart from several libraries in Istanbul, copies are
available in Paris and Vienna.2 In 1745 the text was translated into French by
De Fiennes, a student in the French training program for interpreters of Middle
Eastern languages (jeunes de langue). Moreover the Jesuit priest Juda
Krusinski, who had spent considerable time in Iran produced a translation into
Latin.3 The French translation only appeared in print in 1810, in a volume
mainly containing the writings of the scholar Fran�ois Petis de Ia Croix
Junior, who had travelled in the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century.
Apparently Ahmed III was not as much interested in the report of Diirri
Ahmed as in the almost contemporary text by Yirmisekiz Mehmed Efendi; and
later generations have tended to agree with the sultan. Certainly Diirri Ahmed's
work was soon included in the influential chronicle of Mehmed Ra§id (died in
1735). Ra�id's interest may have been motivated by the fact that in the late
1720s, shortly after Diirri Ahmed's trip he also went to in Iran as an envoy.
Yet apart from Mtinir Aktepe's seminal article only cursory attention has been
paid to this work.4 This neglect is especially regrettable as it has promoted the
notion that Ahmed III and his advisors were only interested in the principal
capitals of Europe. In consequence modern historians have connected the
Ottoman interest in diplomacy in rather too one-sided a fashion with the recent
defeats of the sultans' commanders by the armies of Prince Eugene of Savoy.
Even if high officials in the service of Ahmed III had come to realize that
military victories were no longer a foregone conclusion, at the Ottoman court
of the 1720ies the possibilities of diplomacy were being explored with wider
concerns in mind.
1
�
Di er
f
en� views on th� end of the dyn�sty are possible: it all depends on whether certain
Safav1d pnnces, who bnefly held court 10 one or another province of Iran' are considered
�retenders or legitimate rulers.
Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber: 326; Unat and Baykal, Osmanll Sefirleri: 61.
3
I have: not seen the manuscripts or the translation by Krusinski; however Aktepe, "Dlirri
Ahmet" IS based on the former.
4 Aktepe, "DUrrl Ahmet" is of special interest as the author has found and partly published the
correspondence between the Ottoman and Safavid courts that was \inked in one way or another
to the embassy of Dilrri Ahmed Efendi. These documents are found in the Miihimme and
�
Na�e-i Hurnayun series of the �ll§bakanh AJ'§ivi-Osmanh A!'§ivi. Thus the present author has
co�tmued the work of her one-time hoca 10 extending the search to the Maliyeden miidevver
senes.
 172 ANOTHER M I R R O R FOR P R I NCES
A N OT T O M A N A M B A S S A D O R I N IRAN 173
The weakness of the Sajavid Empire: 'foreign policy' and military affairs
on what in a later age would have been called a goodwill-mission to the court
in Teheran. He also included but a very few comments on the policies of the
In my perspective the report of Ahmed Durri is mainly a discussion of
Sunnite Uzbeks on Iran's north-eastern border and on the Russian Empire of
the factors accounting for the weakness of the Safavid Empire i n the years
Peter the Great even though the latter was highly active in the Caucasus
before it finally went down.' As at the same time the author focuses on the
during just those years. While he did encounter the ambassadors of both these
continuing wealth available in this territory, it is likely that as we have seen
polities he only said that the Iranian court treated them with much less
he wanted to entice the Ottoman court to begin a campaign against the ri val
consideration than was shown to his own person. Perhaps Diirri Ahmed was
dynasty. Ahmed Durri has given a far more coherent account of the current
so flattered by this attention that he omitted to comment on the obvious
political and military crises than of the sources of Iranian prosperity; after all,
limitations of the Safavid worldview; or else he emphasized his own
the author had been educated as an Ottoman gentleman and official and thus
prominence because it was considered a reflection of the importance that the
was well versed in literature including chronicles. On the other hand he had no
court in Teheran accorded to the Ottoman sultan.
background as a merchant and his financial experience probably was limited as
Thus we may hypothesize that the report of Durri Ahmed was
well.
somewhat anachronistic, whether knowingly or not must remain an open
To begin with Iran had extended frontiers that were difficult to defend;
question: for in the early seventeenth century in other words about a hundred
this situation was especially apparent in the South-east, i n present-day
years earlier, the Ottomans and Safavids really had been the only great powers
Afghanistan. Already in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there had been
active in this region.l But on the other hand the government in Istanbul was
numerous clashes between the Safavids and their Mughal neighbours in this
region. 2 In the early 1700s Prince Mlr Ovays had established himself in quite aware of Russian policies in the area; in 1724, about three years after

Kandahar as an independent ruler. His son MahmGd, who was not a Shiite like Durri Ahmed's return Ahmed III came to a formal agreement with Tsar Peter

the Safavids, but rather a Sunnite, extended his campaigns all the way into
Central Iran.3 To compound the problems facing the ruling dynasty, the
Afghan tribe known as the Bahad1rlu had conquered the city of Herat, today
also located in Afghanistan, which had been joined to the Safavid realm in the
sixteenth century. Further to the north the Bahad1rlu also seemed poised to
occupy the city of Mashhad, situated close to the north-eastern frontier of
today's Iran, famed for its sanctuary and a major pilgrimage site. Additional
crises were brewing in the Caucasus, where traditionally the Safavids were pre­
eminent but where Sunnites were numerous; thus the Lesgians who were one
of the more important Sunnite groups of the region seemed inclined to accept
the suzerainty of the Ottoman sultans.
It is noteworthy that our author has so little to report about the other
concerning the division of western Iran into Russian and Ottoman 'spheres of
interest'. Conceivably our author had been sent on a simple goodwill cum
fact-finding mission and it was only the collapse of Safavid rule in 1722 that
awakened Ottoman interest in territorial acquisitions.2 At the present state of
our information it is impossible to be sure.
One of Oiirri Ahmed Efendi's favourite topics was the lack of military
preparedness in the late Safavid Empire. Thus he commented that firearms
were not being produced and especially noted the lack of cannon manufactures.
In Istanbul by contrast, firearms were taken much more seriously; already in
the mid-fifteenth century, shortly after the conquest of Constantinople, the
Ottoman sultan had instituted a cannon foundry, which was refurbished by

powerful neighbours of the Safavid polity. Probably Durri Ahmed Efendi said Stileyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-66). In 1719, just before Ahmed Diirri set
nothing about the ambitions of his own government because he had been sent out for Teheran the buildings had been destroyed by a fire and were replaced
during the following years.3

�
1 We possess two studies that analyze the weaknesses o the late S�avid E'"!lpir e, both
emphasizing international trade: Rudolph P. Matthee, The Pol1t1cs
_ of
Trade m Sa/
aVId
Iran. Silk
for Silver 1600-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999): 22 4-30 und Ina
I When diplomatic relations were involved such anachronisms were not rare. Thus Jahangir,
Baghdiancz McCabe, The Shah's Silk for Europe's Silver. The Eurasan
i Trade of the Julja The Jahangirnama: 95 penned a lengthy comment on the battle of Ankara (1402) in which the
Armenians in Safavid Iran and India (1530-1750) (Atlanta I Georg1a:
_ Scholars Press and
Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I Ylldmm had been defeated by his own ancestor Amlr Timur. From
University of Pennsylvania, 1999): 354-62.
this event over two hundred years old at the time of writing, Jahangir deduced that the Ottoman
2 [Jabangir], The Jahangirnama, passim contains an enumeration of the many cas:npai�ns �t d
sultans ha a moral obligation to send envoys to his own court.
this ruler undertook or ordered to be undertaken in what is today Afghamstan, dunng h1s re1gn
_
2 Roemer ''The Safavid Period": 327.
of about twenty years.
3 Ahmet Aran ''Tophane-i Amire," in Diinden Bugiine Istanbul Ansiklopedisi (Istanbul:
3 Hans Robert Roemer, ''The Safavid Period," in The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 6 ed. by
o."nik ve Toptumsal Tarih Valcf1, 1993-94), vol 7; Gll.bor Agoston, Guns for the
'

TUrkiye Ekon
Peter Jackson and Laurence Lockhart (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986): see
.

Sultans, Military Power and the Weapons Industry in the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge:
especially 31 0-31.
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
 174 ANOTHER M I RR O R FOR PRINCES
In addition the ambassador remarked that in the entire Safavid Empire
there were only three cities with significant fortifications namely Kandahar,
Erivan und Derbend; however the first-named had already been lost. These
remarks too must be viewed against the backdrop of Ottoman military
practice: on both the Habsburg and Venetian frontiers sieges with their
paraphernalia of mining, sapping and artillery fire were the very stuff of war.
As three examples among many, we may refer to the conquest of Candia
( 1 669) and the two sieges of Vienna, of which the second from June to
September 1683, came quite close to succeeding.1 Even in their Iranian wars
the Ottomans tended to focus on the conquest of fortresses: thus Sultan Murad
IV in 1635 had conquered Erivan, one of the three key fortified towns of the
Safavids according to Diirri Ahmed, although he had been unable to hold it. In
1638-9 after a long siege the same ruler had retaken Baghdad, a city that in the
early part of the seventeenth century had been in Safavid hands for some time.
In addition Diirri Ahmed Efendi's hometown of Van was a major border
fortress.2 We can thus assume that in the eyes of the envoy, Ottoman military
men were good at handling fortresses both when in the offensive and when
defending their own territory; in comparison their counterparts in the service
of the Safavids cut a rather poor figure.
Diirri Ahmed Efendi's comments on military affairs in certain respects
correspond to what has been said by certain historians of the late twentieth
century.3 Certainly guns and artillery were known and used by military men in
the service of the shahs. But this use was sporadic rather than systematic, and
firearms did not lead to the restructuring of annies as happened in early modem
Europe and according to recent research, in the Ottoman Empire as well.4
Probably the relative lack of interest in firearms and the paucity of fortified
places were interrelated. As Ottoman armies tended to focus on fortresses,
rulers such as Shah 'Abbas I pursued a strategy of creating empty spaces in
which the enemy was expected to lose himself; at ti mes this strategy might
even involve the destruction by Iranians of Safavid fortifications. Moreover
field artillery was relatively useless in battles with nomads, who in the Iranian
context were a much more serious threat to settled government than in the
l John Stoye, The Siege of Vienna (Edinburgh: Birlinn, reprint 2000).
2 Jean-Louis Bacqu4!-Grammont, "Un plan intdit de Van au XVIle si�cle," Osman/1
Ara§tlrmalaTI, II (1981): 97-122.
3 Rudi Matthee, "Unwalled Cities and Restless Nomads: Firearms and Artillery in Safavid
. 1996): 89-4 6.
Iran," in Charles Melville (ed.), Safavid Persia (London: I. B. Tauns, 3 1
4 2 Dourry Efendy, Relation de Dourry Efendy: 55; the transc�ption was the creation of De
HalilInalcik, "Military and Fiscal Transformation in the Ottoman E'!'pire, 1600- 1700,"
Archivum Ottomanicum, VI (1980): 283-337; Gabor Agoston, "Ottoman Artillery and European
Military Technology in the Fifteenth to Seventeenth Centuries", Acta Orientalia Hungarfca, 47
(1994): 15-48 and "Ottoman Warfare in Europe 1453-1826" in Jeremy Black (ed.), European
Warfare, 1453-1815 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 999): 118-44 and 262-63.
1 Afghan Occupation ofPersia (Cambndge: Carnbndge Umvers1ty Press. 1958): 42.
A N OTT O M A N A M B A S S ADOR I N I R A N 1 75
Ottoman lands. Probably Safavid interest in cannons and gunpowder was not
exactly promoted by such considerations. 1
The comments of the Ottoman envoy on Iranian soldiers also are quite
remarkable. In Dtirri Ahmed Efendi's estimation they were good sharpshooters,
expert in the use of bows and arrows as well as of firearms. But leadership was
poor and the envoy went so far as to claim that in the Safavid ruling group of
his own time reasonable men were few and far between. Moreover the ruler
and his circle had lost the will to maintain themselves in power; and
everywhere one could hear people say that the dynasty of the 'Cheykh-Oghlou'
was about to go down.2 In this latter judgement the Ottoman observer agreed
with many European authors of the time, who disapproved particularly of the
obvious lack of interest that the reigning Shah Soltan Husayn took in matters
of state.3
The weakness of the Safavid Empire: the exaggerated self-confidence of
courtly society and its lack ofpolitical realism
Three hundred years after the events, it is impossible to say to what
extent Dtirri Ahmed Efendi's account of Shah Soltfut Husayn was fair; but in
our text the last Safavid ruler appears as a weak person who only sought the
friendship of Ahmed III and the latter's envoy because he hoped that this
connection would protect him from his enemies. However the shah, who in
Durri Ahmed Efendi's account was always referred to with expressions of
respect was perfectly capable of asking questions in a most friendly tone of
voice, which put the Ottoman envoy in an awkward position. Noblesse
oblige: Diirri Ahmed took such behaviour in good part. We will now attempt
to analyze the reasoning that motivated the ambassador's criticisms of Shah
Soltan Husayn.
In Diirri Ahmed Efendi's perspective it was strange that the Safavid
court believed or at least claimed to believe that the different rebellions
challenging the rule of the shah were due to petty disputes and intrigues, while
quite obviously the crisis was much more serious and profound. Implicitly the
Ottoman envoy thus was critical of the tendency to explain all political
conflicts by the routine tensions between persons and factions that were and
1 Matthee, "Unwalled Cities": 395-405.
Fiennes, who added that the dynas!f bore. hiS
t name because 1ts ancestor was - correctly -
supposed to have been a famous derv1sh she1k.
3 For an impressive example see �urence Loc�art, T_he F�ll of the Safavi Dynasty and the
 176 A N OT H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C E S
are everyday occurrences at any seat of government In certain cases the author
noted the 'reality underlying the rhetoric'. While Safavid dignitaries claimed
that certain people from Daghestan appeared at court to express their devotion
to the shah and were rewarded by gifts "out of compassion and because of their
poverty" Dtirri Ahmed observed that these gifts compensated the Daghestanls
for leaving the Iranian-controlled sections of the Caucasus in peace; otherwise
they were sure to raid these areas for slaves. Policies of this type certainly
were not unknown in the Ottoman realm even though the author preferred to
not mention the relevant parallels: thus for two centuries already the Ottoman
sultans had been sending money, grain and other valuables to the Bedouins
living close to the pilgrimage route to Mecca. In this instance as well the
tribes were given grants-in-aid so that they would leave the pilgrims in peace.•
This situation must have been well-known to most of Dtirri Ahmed's readers
i n Istanbul; therefore the author perhaps also intended to admonish his public
to avoid self-satisfaction and judge political situations on their merits.
A potential 'fifth column': the Sunnites ofIran
In Dtirri Ahmed Efendi's account the religious tensions between
Sunnites and Shiites living in Iran were a major topic; the author also was
interested in the consequences of these tensions for the political relations
between sultan and shah. Ever since the early sixteenth century the sultans had
projected an image as defenders of Sunnite right belief; in so doing they had
claimed superiority not only over the unbelievers of Europe but also over the
Shiites of Anatolia and Iran. As the latter were concentrated in the Safavid
realm that was governed by the shahs, Iran came to be viewed as a land of
misbelievers.2 At the same time the politically relevant elite of Iran adhered to
the Shi'a of the Twelve Imams. At least in the sixteenth century, ritual
cursing of the first three caliphs that i n Shiite perspective had deprived the
descendants of the Prophet Muhammad of their birthright the caliphate, was
part and parcel of Safavid self-definition while causing much official
indignation in Istanbul. In the Ottoman-Iranian peace treaty of 1590, and
already in its predecessor the peace of Amasya ( 1555) the sultans had therefore
Community and Leadership, ed. by Aron Rodrigue (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1992) : 123-66.
l Suraiya Faroqhi, Pilgrims and Sultans (London: Tauris Press, 1994): 65-69.
2 3 Selim Deringil, "The Struggle against Shi'ism in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman Counter­
On. Sultan SUiey f1lll!I 'S using hi.� major mosque in orde_r to express the sixteenth-c.:ntury
confltct �tween Sunmtes and Sh�ttes compare GuJru NectpogJu-Kafadar, "The S!Jieymaniye
Complex m Istanbul: an Interpretation," Muqarnas, [II (1986): 92-117.
A N OT T O M A N A M B A S S A D O R I N I R A N 177
imposed a paragraph that expressly forbade the ritual cursing of "companions
of the Prophet." l
Towards the late seventeenth century religious policy became a serious
weakness of the late Safavid Empire; and Dtirri Ahmed Efendi addressed this
issue at some length. During those years the shahs attempted to make Iran
into a country where apart from a few foreigners the entire population was
Shiite. Certainly the persecution of Sunnites in Iran and Shiites in the
Ottoman lands had been common in the sixteenth century as well. Sultan
Siileyman had put great pressure on the Shiite-inspired minority today known
as Alevis and there had been considerable emigration from Anatolia to Iran
that was at least partly caused by religious persecution.2 As for Iranian
Sunnites who wished to pursue a career in government service they often
enough found out that their only chance lay in emigration. But where the
Ottomans were concerned attempts to secure religious uniformity among
Muslims by the year 1600 had largely ended. Only after 1880 do we encounter
renewed attempts to convert the Shiite subjects of the sultan in Iraq and
elsewhere, now with relatively modern tactics inspired by those of Christian
missionaries. 3
Matters were rather different in Iran during the late seventeenth and
early eighteenth centuries. Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians were exposed to
considerable pressures and often emigrated, moving to places as different as
India and Venice. Life was also made difficult for Sunnites both in the
spiritual and material sense; sometimes they were targeted for special dues that
they only could escape by converting.4 Durri Ahmed did not discuss the
problems that this policy implied for Jews and Christians; however
considerable attention has been paid to the situation of non-Muslims residing
in Safavid Iran in the secondary literature of the late twentieth century.5 The
Ottoman ambassador by contrast focused on those regions which in his
opinion were principally inhabited by Sunnites. From his account it appears
as if these Sunnites who supposedly made up thirty percent of the population
of the Safavid Empire only waited for a ruler of their own religious
convictions who would liberate them from their present oppressors. This
1 Bekir K�tiikoRiu,. Osmanlt-iran Siydsf Mandsebelleri vol. I, 1578-1590 (no more published)
�Istanbul: Istanbul Universitesi Edebiyat FakUitesi, 1962): 195.
Ahmet Refik [Ait.mayj, Onaltmct asmJa Raftzflik ve Bekta§flik. Onalltnct astrda Tiirkiye'de
Raftzflik ve Be�flige dair Hazinei evralc vesilcalarmt havidir (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit
1932); Colin Imber, "The Persecution of the Ottoman Shiites Accord.ing to the Miihimm�
Defterleri 1565-1585." Der Islam, 56 (1979): 245-73.
Propaganda," Die Welt des /slams, XXX (1990): 45-62.
4 Roemer, "The Safavid Period": 313.
5 Lockhart, The Fall ofthe Sofavi Dynasty: 10-9.
 178 A NOTHER M I R R O R F O R P R I NC E S
A N OTTOMA N A M B A S S ADOR I N I R A N 179

disaffection of Iranian Sunnites came out with particular clarity when the
In fact Ahmed Diirri 's interest in commercial matters was linked to his
author described the reception he was given by the inhabitants of the town of
official mission: for the peace of Passarowit:z/Pasarof�a stipulated that Iranian
J).iazlre: the entire population turned out to meet him and he claimed to have
traders, for the most parts Armenians called acem tiiccan in Ottoman parlance
been profoundly moved.l Thus the long-term attempts on the part of Ottoman
should be permitted to pass through the Ottoman realm and bring their goods
sultans and grand viziers to conquer western Iran could be legitimized by the
to Habsburg territories. I During the previous decades of almost continuous
sufferings of the Sunnites under Iranian rule.
warfare the transit of these traders had been forbidden and as a result, Iranian
goods were sold at unusually high prices in Vienna and elsewhere in the
Habsburg domain. But now that peace had been concluded this transit trade
The prosperity of the country
was considered to be of mutual advantage, as after all the traders paid
substantial customs duties that helped fill the sultans' treasury. A paragraph in
Di.irri Ahmed Efendi reported that at least in the towns, the Iranian
the treaty of Passarowit:z/Pasarof� thus specifically allowed the passage of
economy was prosperous. As peasants were not numerous foodstuffs
these merchants and specified the duties they were expected to pay. It was part
apparently were twice as expensive as on Ottoman territory, but the
of Ahmed Durri's mission to inform the Safavid court of this change in
townspeople were doing well; the author did not explain how this was
Ottoman policy.
supposed to have worked in a pre-industrial economy. In this context Durri
Ahmed mentioned that the population was dense and large and small towns
were numerous; when passing through he claimed to have encountered but few
Self-presentation, Ottoman style, or how the ambassador was received at the
poor people. By contrast villages were rare and those that did exist seemed to
Safavid court
Diirri Ahmed to rather resemble towns. Such a settlement might hold between
three hundred and one thousand houses and possess a public bath. However the
Apart from bringing back information about the difficulties of the
tribal societies of Iran did not make any impression upon the Ottoman visitor.
ruling dynasty and the wealth of Iran, Di.irri Ahmed Efendi evidently intended
Textile manufactures both urban and rural appeared to be major sources
to convince the court in Teheran that in spite of recent defeats on European
of wealth; and in this respect as well the envoy's impressions have been
fronts the Ottoman sultan was still a force to be reckoned with. Presumably it
confirmed by recent research.2 Both silk and cotton fabrics were manufactured;
was hoped that the shah in his difficult position would be overawed to the
and it was also common to mix the two fibres. The products of a few large
point of conceding whatever demands Ahmed III and his grand vizier might
cities were traded on the interregional level; presumably this remark of the
make in the future. Put differently 'propaganda' in favour of the sultan might
author's implied that many other textiles were manufactured for local use
was one of the major duties of the envoy. In writing his account the latter
only. Ahmed Di.irri stressed that Iranians did not import fabrics from abroad,
fulfilled the probable exigencies of his superiors by including a relatively
apart from a few Kashmir shawls and some rough French woollens. Once
detailed summary of his conversations with the shah and his grand vizier.
again although the author did not say so, this situation differed from that of
Unfortunately I do not know of any Iranian source that would permit us to
the contemporary Ottoman Empire where both Indian and French fabrics found
check the claims of Di.irri Ahmed Efendi.
an extensive clientele. Perhaps the relevant remark was meant as a comment
A particularly effective way of documenting the prestige enjoyed by
upon the Ottoman situation, for the consumption of Indian luxuries certainly
the Ottoman sultan at the court in Teheran was the description of the
was not unknown among the Iranian upper class as well.3
ceremonies with which Diirri Ahmed was received and sent on his way. The
language of ceremonial being intelligible at both courts, our author paid close
attention to this aspect. He thus reported that upon his arrival, one of the
Iranian viziers travelled twenty-two miles too meet him; great pomp was
1 Ahmed DUrri Efendi in Tarih-i R�id. vol. 5: 396-97, in the version given by De Fiennes this
section has been considerably abridged. deployed, and the vizier's suite numbered about three thousand persons. Even
2 Willem Aoor, The Persian Textile Industry in Historical Perspective 1500-1925 (Paris: in smaller towns receptions were quite elaborate. In this context the Ottoman
L'Harmattan, 1999).
3 Aoor, The Persian Textile Industry: 30 1 .
1 Aktepe, •ounf Ahmct" 1: 58-60.
 180 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR P R I NCES
envoy listed the victuals and other items which the shah sent in order to
ensure his support and that of his suite; presumably the value of these
necessities and their prompt arrival also could be construed as marks of
respect. But the most important event was certainly the reception by the shah
and his 'itmdd
i al-davla. To give but one example: when the official letter of
the Ottoman Grand Vizier Damad ibrahim Pa§a was handed over to the latter's
opposite number, the Iranian dignitary supposedly kissed the document with
as much respect as Dtirri Ahmed himself had done.
In this courtly environment the ambassador could creatively employ his
special talents; in other words Dtirri Ahmed Efendi was not confined to a
purely reactive role. Both Persian and Ottoman poems were recited with
relative frequency, and the author participated in these literary sessions.
Supposedly the Iranian courtiers complimented the envoy on his knowledge of
Persian; and he must have enjoyed emphasizing this fact when addressing the
sultan and grand vizier.
Self-presentation, Ottoman style: the beauties of Istanbul and the wisdom of
Ahmed III
The Ottoman ambassador also attempted to impress the Iranian court
by emphasizing those points that the Ottoman elite considered its own major
strengths. The beauty of Istanbul had a role to play in this competitive courtly
game. Otirri Ahmed Efendi reported that he had provided the shah with an
extensive description of the mosques and other pious foundations of the
Ottoman capital; he highlighted the handsome and elegant appearance of the
Topkap1 Saray1, and even evoked the view of the Bosporus. 1 In 1703 when
Ahmed III ascended the throne he had had to promise that henceforth he would
reside in Istanbul and not in Edime as his predecessors had done; and perhaps
this praise of the old-new capital was meant to counter gossip about Sultan
Ahmed's enforced move. In addition this description may have been a
concealed attempt to score a point against the Iranian ruler, who had just left
his capital Isfahan to better resist his enemies. At least that is my
interpretation of Durri Ahmed's remark that 'not only' the rulers of India and
Uzbekistan envied Sultan Ahmed on account of his superb capital city. As the
third important ruler of the Muslim world was the shah of Iran, the reader of
Dtirri Ahmed's lines was likely to complete them by adding the latter's name
to the list of rulers who would have liked to reside in Istanbul.
1 In the version relayed by Mehmed R�id this paragraph is briefer than in De Fiennes'
translation: Ahmed Diirri Efendi in Tarih-i Ra§id, vol. 5: 383; Dourry Efendy, Relation de
Dourry Efendy: 28-9.
AN OTTOM A N A M B AS S ADOR I N I R A N 181
Praising the person of Ahmed III was another important element i n
Ottoman self-presentation; but as this sultan had not won any major victories
and could not boast any remarkable physical achievements, the envoy chose to
depict him as a wise ruler. Dtirri Ahmed Efendi explicitly declared that his
sultan did not enjoy hunting, although the shah certainly thought that this
activity was particularly appropriate for a ruler. 1 Shooting exercises
supposedly were the only sport in which Ahmed III occasionally showed an
interest although even here, he was more a spectator than an active participant.
On the other hand Dtirri Ahmed stressed that his ruler took the duties of his
office very seriously; he regularly listened to the meetings of his high officials
and by regularly attending Friday prayers in one of Istanbul's great mosques,
he not only fulfilled a religious obligation but also ensured that the people of
the capital had a chance to encounter their ruler. The envoy also reported that
Ahmed III invited scholars of Islamic law and religion into the palace in order
to profit from their knowledge. Lectures of this kind were sponsored by
several sultans of the eighteenth century, but it is noteworthy that this
activity could also serve to legitimize an Ottoman sultan in front of other
Muslim rulers.2 In addition Ahmed III was presented as a lover of books, who
reserved one day a week for their study in the palace library that he had himself
founded and richly endowed.3
A coherent policy of reconstruction
But surely the most interesting feature of Dtirri Ahmed's story is his
account of the political program that he attributed to his ruler: for this was
rather different from the sets of measures generally recommended in the 'books
of advice' that from the later sixteenth century onwards were so often written
by intellectually minded Ottoman bureaucrats.4 After all these texts mainly
recommended that the sultan limit the size of his standing army, restore the
military tax assignments (timars) to the status they had possessed in the reign
1 Dourry Efendy Relation de Dourry Efendy: 22; Ahmed Diirri Efendi in Tarih-i Ra§id, vol. 5:
�
380. This comm nt is all the more remarkable as otherwise the shah refused to countenance the
killing of animals: Lockhart, The Fall ofthe Safavi Dynasty: 41.
2 Madeline C. Zilfi, "A Medrese for the Palace: Ottoman Dynastic Legitimation in
the
Eighteenth Century." Journal ofthe American Oriental Society, CXIII, 2 ( 1 993): 1 84-91.
3 This handsome building still adorns the third court of the_ Topkap1 palace. In a note_De Fiennes
_
claims that Ahmed III was not considered to be a connOisseur of Arab1c and Pers1an; Dourry
Efendy, Relation de Dourry Efendy:l6, note. 31. But as the poetry com.�s�d by_ this sultan �as
considered far from insignificant and Ottoman poetry presupposed farruhanty w1th the class1cal
Persian authors, this claim can be discounted.
4 On the difficulty of correctly interpreting these texts see Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj, Formation
of the Modern State, The Ottoman Empire Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1991): 53-60.
 182 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRINCES
of Stileyman the Magnificent, weed out corrupt officials and - if possible or
necessary - defeat rebels, conquer new provinces and afterwards thank God for
victory by endowing a mosque or two.
By contrast Dtirri Ahmed stressed that the sultan had sent orders to all
provinces in his empire to restore all existing mosques, theological colleges,
caravansaries and other pious foundations. He also had ordered to pay their
stipends and gratuities to the students enrolled in these colleges, as well as to
other persons engaged in religiously meritorious activities. Presumably these
payments mostly had been discontinued during the decades of warfare that had
preceded the peace of Passarowitz/Pasarof�. Evidently their resumption
presupposed that the necessary means could be made available; unfortunately
Dtirri Ahmed did not specify where these sums of money were supposed to
come from. Doubtless these restorative measures were intended to enhance the
reputation of the sultan and the Ottoman house in general: the ruler presented
himself in the role of facilitator, who made it possible for his subjects to Jive
a pious life by re-vitalizing the necessary institutions. But Ahmed III also
restored buildings of a military nature; and in 1720 at the very same time
when Dtirri Ahmed was in Iran, this ruler also ordered major repairs to the
fortifications of the Balkan town of Nish; construction workers even were
recruited from distant Crete.
This policy of reconstruction was real and by no means a
propagandistic invention of the Ottoman envoy. Some forty years ago Cengiz
Orhonlu was able to show that after the peace of Passarowitz/Pasarof� in
1718, the Ottoman authorities made a major effort to re-ensure the security of
the caravan routes compromised during decades of warfare. Fortified khans
were constructed, several of which became the crystallization points of small
towns. At the same time the villagers responsible for the security of certain
stretches of road in exchange for tax exemptions, i n this period were given a
more formal organization than had been true in earlier years, for instance in
the sixteenth century.1 At least in some provinces tax collection was reformed
and detailed bureaucratic rules, not always very realistic, were issued to limit
corruption and waste. Such measures had become necessary because during the
wars of 1683-99 and 1715-18 all expenditures outside the combat zones had
been scaled down to the point of non-existence: even many fortresses of the
hinterland were very poorly supplied. But it is significant that not only we
modem historians discern a 'policy of reconstruction', but that a well-informed
contemporary made the same point when praising his sovereign.
1 Cengiz Orhonlu, Osman/1 lmparatorlutunda Derbend Tqlcilah (Istanbul: fstanbul Oniversitesi
Edebiyat FaJcUJtesi, 1967): 59-94.
A N OTTO M A N A M B A S S A D O R I N I R A N 183
The Ottoman also had their problems: the fate of non-enthroned princes and
the relationship to non-Muslimforeign powers
In the seventeenth century the Ottoman dynasty had come to regard its
oldest male member as the legitimate successor of the reigning sultan.
Thereafter the well-known and much criticized custom of killing off the
brothers of a newly enthroned ruler was almost completely abandoned.1 From
the seventeenth century onwards these princes were more or less imprisoned in
a special section of the palace and rarely were visible to the public, a
precaution common to both Safavid and Ottoman rulers. Even so Diirri
Ahmed was visibly uncomfortable when the shah questioned him about the
fate of the Ottoman princes. This reticence is all the more noteworthy as
Sultan Ahmed III did not hide away his sons and on festive occasions showed
them off to the population of his capital.2 But we can assume that at the
Iranian court the hecatombs of young Ottoman princes buried shortly after the
accessions of their royal brothers in the late 1500s were not forgotten; and
after all even in the seventeenth century certain sultans including Murad IV (r.
1623-40) had had their brothers killed, if not at their accessions then at some
later time. Quite obviously these were not matters which an educated Ottoman
of the early eighteenth century liked to remember.
It is interesting to see that Diirri Ahmed retorted by j,ointing out a case
in which the shah himself had not acted in accordance with the traditions of
his house. Presumably he meant to imply that if previous Ottoman rulers had
had their brothers killed, at least they had the excuse of having obeyed the
traditions of their dynasty. Somehow the ambassador had found out that
Soltan Husayn had permitted the Safavid princes imprisoned i n his harem
access to slave girls; and this was the issue that now was supposed to cause
embarrassment to the shah even though, as the envoy was happy to concede
the Iranian ruler had acted out of compassion. In this discussion the
representatives of the two rival dynasties evidently were caught between the
horns of a dilemma. On the one hand it was important to demonstrate that the
princes of the relevant dynasty were not exposed to the undignified conditions
accompanying imprisonment. But on the other hand, both Ottomans and
Safavids since the seventeenth century had developed dynastic laws that
demanded that potential claimants to the throne be detained and prevented from
having children.3 As these two alternatives were mutually exclusive it was
always possible to fault 'the other side' whenever that became politically
convenient.
I Nicolas Valin and Gilles Veinstein, Le Strait ebrante (Paris: Fayard, 00 ): 204- .
2 3 17
2 Maria Pia Pedani Fabris ed., Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al Senato, vol. XIV
Costantinopoli. Re/azioni inedite (1512-1780) (Padua: AJdo Ausilio-Bottega di Erasmo, 1996):
864-70.
3 Roemer, "The Safavid Period": 366.
 184 A N 0T H E R M I R R 0 R F0 R PRI NCES
A N 0T T 0 M A N A M 8 A S S A D 0 R I N lRAN 185
The second troublesome point concerned the peace treaties of
he did not hesitate to interrupt the speeches of Iranian dignitaries and
Karlowitz/Karlof� (1699) and Passarowitz/Pasarof� (1718) that the sultans
emphatically complain to the shah concerning the misdeeds of the latter's
had concluded with the rulers involved in the so-called Holy League, namely
governors stationed along the Ottoman-Iranian borders. In the same vein,
the Habsburg Empire, Poland, Venice and Russia. After all, these treaties had
Diirri Ahmed Efendi reported that whenever he had received gifts and polite
sanctioned the loss of Hungary as well as the principality of Transylvania,
attentions from Iranian grandees, he immediately had reciprocated in kind. The
hitherto an Ottoman dependency. In the long run, both Mehmed IV (r. 1648-
Ottoman ambassador and therefore the ruler that had sent him were not to be
87) and Mustafa II (r. 1692-1703) were dethroned because of these defeats. Yet
outdone at any foreign court.
by the treaty of Passarowitz/Pasarof� that had been signed in 1718 in other
But almost i n the same breath the author also explained how he
words in the time of the ruling sultan Ahmed III, even the important fortress
managed to gain acceptance on the part of the shah's entourage by acting in a
city of Belgrade had been lost. '
manner becoming to a diplomat. Thus when the Iranian grand vizier indicated
We have no way of knowing whether these events really were discussed
by a gesture that a certain issue was not to be broached in the presence of his
in the polite and detached terms that the ambassador's report suggests. It is
ruler Diirri Ahmed claimed that he immediately took the hint. For as he told
quite possible that the shah and his courtiers highlighted recent Ottoman
his readers he understood straight away that by insisting, he might have gotten
defeats, but that the envoy preferred to not share the details with his readers. If
his interlocutor into trouble with the latter's own sovereign. All this
Diirri Ahmed Efendi is to be believed Shah Soltan Husayn only wished to be
diplomatic manoeuvring however only was possible because the author was
informed about the recent peace treaties - or truces as they were regarded
fluent in Persian and fully conversant with Iranian classical literature. If his
within the framework of Islamic law. The Safavid ruler wanted to know
account is at all reliable, his literary knowledge and skills surpassed the
whether the agreements applied to short or to lengthy periods and whether in
expectations of the Teheran court where even well-educated non-Iranians were
all cases a written text had been agreed upon. Diirri Ahmed replied that some
concerned. Perhaps Diirri Ahmed Efendi wished to indicate that he was
of the treaties were valid for twenty-five and others for thirty-five years:
available if another embassy were to be sent into this crisis area. But whatever
originally the sultan had been unwilling to grant them but as the Christian
his plans, they were nullified by the author's untimely death shortly after his
rulers had insistently sued for peace, he ultimately had agreed. As for the latter
return to the Ottoman lands. I
they had promised that every year, merchants and ambassadors personally
As we have seen Diirri Ahmed felt that the late Safavid court was
would attend the sultan's court and present their gifts. Thus the author
deplorably amiss when it came to military preparedness and political prudence.
postulated a resemblance to the tributary embassies whose attendance at the
But there were compensations: literature, apparel and also musical performance
Safavid court Diirri Ahmed previously had noted. However the Ottoman envoy
were strikingly elegant. We may even suspect that Diirri Ahmed feared that in
did not speak of tribute but rather of gifts; and thus in a way he responded to
comparison the Ottoman sultan would cut a less impressive figure: for at one
the changing political situation.
point he recorded quite indignantly that of course Ahmed III was more majestic
in appearance that his Iranian counterpart. On one occasion literary men were
sent to the lodgings of the envoy to both entertain and impress him; and
The ambassador as a negotiator
whenever he was received at court a concert was given. While the author did
not record the quality of these performances it still is worth noting that he
Apart from the oral guidelines that Diirri Ahmed Efendi had received in
never said anything negative about them; yet when it came to Iranian
Istanbul, he also had his own agenda. Quite obviously he wanted to impress
personalities and policies he certainly did not hesitate to make
the powers that be by his skills as a negotiator. Thus he emphasized how he
uncomplimentary remarks. Therefore it is likely that singers and musicians
studiously avoided 'capture' by Iranian courtly ritual; and to any perceived
usually were highly skilled. Perhaps Durri Ahmed Efendi was more impressed
slights he reacted immediately.2 Several times the author told his readers that
by the culture of the late Safavid court than one might think at first reading.

1 Rifa'at A. Abou El-Haj, "Ottoman Attitudes toward Peace-Making: the Karlowitz Case •• Der
•

Islam Ll (1974): 131-7.

2 See Aktepe, "Dilrrf Ahmet" 2: 61-63 for one ellample among several. I
Compare Aktepe. "DUrrf Abmet" 5: 56 on the dates given in the sources for DUrri Ahmed's
death.
 186 A N 0T H E R M I RR0R F 0R PRINCES
A N O TT O M A N A M B A S S A D O R I N I R A N 187

In conclusion
they were talking about.1 Certainly invasion projects only became acute when
the collapse of Safavid rule resulted in a power vacuum in Iran, and that
In a relatively brief text the Ottoman ambassador has succeeded in
happened only after the conquest of Isfahan by the Afghans in 1722. But some
conveying a graphic account of his aims and the means that he used to achieve
'contingency planning' on the Ottoman side is likely to have occurred earlier
them. It was his primary concern to impress the Safavid shah with the power
on, and the reports of the khan of Erivan about invasion plans that Oiirri
of Sultan Ahmed III and the latter's concern with good government. In this
Ahmed Efendi was at pains to discredit may well have contained a core of
context Durri Ahmed Efendi descri bed a program of reconstruction that
truth. We will need to locate further sources before we can be sure.
probably had been designed in the entourage of Grand Vizier ibrahim P�a and
While Damad ibrahim Pa�a was not a diplomat by his early training he
that he attributed to the sultan personally. With hindsight Ahmed Ill may thus
evidently had talents in this field and was able to appreciate the value of
appear as a predecessor of the reforming Sultan Selim III (r. 1789-1807).
contacts between royal courts. In the years following the peace of
However around 1720 military problems were not as evident as they were to
Passarowitz/Pasarof�a this grand vizier evidently tried to establish contacts
be about seventy years later. Therefore the sultan and his grand vizier could
both to western and to eastern rulers. If diplomacy was to be of use to the
afford to focus on restoring pious foundations, thus legitimizing Ottoman rule
Ottoman government after a series of less than successful wars, the relevant
by the services rendered to the cause of the Muslim religion and by
policy did in fact imply the collection of information and the projection of
implication to education as well.
'sultanic propaganda' in all major kingdoms and empires. European rulers
Throughout Sultan Ahmed III and his grand vizier seem to have
were part of this setup but they did not monopolize Ottoman attention. In this
demanded first-hand political information. At least this is what we may
context Diirri Ahmed Efendi should have been a most valuable servant of the
conclude after reading the brief but sometimes quite apposite remarks of their
Ottoman grand vizier, as he was one of a probably limited circle of men who
ambassador concerning the products of Iranian artisans and the political crisis
possessed the ' intercultural flair' needed for Ahmed III's new style diplomacy.
that was to end with the demise of the Safavid Empire a few years later. Given
We are left to wonder what might have happened if both Durri Ahmed and the
the scarcity of sources it is hard to decide whether Durri Ahmed Efendi was .
Safavid Empire had survived longer.
right in considering the Sunnite population of Iran as an at least potential fifth
column; a certain amount of wishful thinking probably was involved. Yet
whatever the situation i n practical terms, the author's comments on this issue
are of interest, as they show that well-informed Ottomans continued to believe
that they could use the conflict between Sunnites and Shiites to destabilize the
Safavids and thus further the political aims of their rulers. In addition we can
guess at the impression that the court of the last Safavid shah made upon an
educated Ottoman gentleman such as Durri Ahmed Efendi: certainly it seemed
weak and even decadent, but at the same time it was highly cultivated; in
some visitors it even might cause a secret inferiority complex.
Concerning the diplomatic activities of the author, i t is evident that
just like i n contemporary Europe, an envoy was expected to 'lie abroad for the
good of his country'. For presumably Durri Ahmed Efendi knew - or at least
could guess - that there was a distinct possibility that Sultan Ahmed III and
his entourage might decide to attack western Iran. But it was his brief to
persuade the shah of the contrary. Therefore we find him indignantly rejecting
a suggestion that Ottoman intentions were not altogether peaceful: people that
put about such rumours - or so Diirri Ahmed claimed - did not know what

1 Ahmed DUrri Efendi, in Mehmed RB§id, Tarih-i Ra§id: 374; Dourry Efendy, Relation de
Dourry Eferuiy: 7-38.
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS: THE CAMP AND
HOUSEHOLD OF GRAND VIZIER KARA MUSTAFA IN AN
EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

A considerable amount of work has been done on the fates of prisoners

of war, but most studies concern the post-1850s. Interest has focused on the
American War of Secession, British actions against the Boers in South Africa,
most prominently the two World Wars and in addition the Korean and
Vietnam conflicts. In the near future we surely can expect a number of studies
on prisoners of war taken in the Anglo-American wars i n Kuwait and Iraq. Yet
the early modern period to a large extent remains a terra incognita. What is
more, researchers who do deal with this period have concentrated on the Thirty
Years War or the unending armed conflicts of the eighteenth century between
the five 'great powers' of contemporary Europe.
As for the campaigns by Ottoman sultans against the Habsburg rulers
in Vienna, the kings of Poland and the Signoria of Venice, the problems
connected to prisoners of war have received but cursory attention. This
remains true even when the prisoner in question is reasonably prominent: thus
an extensive biography of the well-known geographer and writer on military
matters Luigi Fernando de Marsigli devotes but a very few pages to the period
that this author spent on Ottoman territory as a prisoner of war. 1
Probably historians have not shown much interest in the stories of
soldiers captured in wars involving the Ottomans because it is often assumed
that between Muslim and Christian rulers, there simply were no common
frames of reference. Although in Christian Europe the treatment of captured
soldiers often was brutal enough, historians will posit that there existed a
shared set of Christian values or at least some common ground between fellow
Catholics or Protestants. This was not true however when the opposing
parties were of different religions. Therefore in Habsburg-Ottoman wars for
instance it was not feasible to conclude formal arrangements for the exchange
of captured soldiers and especially officers, of the kind that in eighteenth­
century Europe might be made before the rival armies even encountered one
another in the field.2 Given this lack of common norms between the
Ottomans and their Christian opponents, prisoners of war were not protected
by any written or unwritten law. Whether they were captured by soldiers of
the sultans or those of the Habsburg emperors, what happened to these men

1 John Stoye, Marsigli's Europe (New Haven. London: Yale University Press, 1994): 20-23.
2Daniel Hohrath, "'ln Cartellen wird der Werth eines Gefangenen bes\\mme\'
Kriegsgefangenschaft als Teil der Kriegspraxis im Ancien Rtgime," in In der Hand des
Feindes. Geschichtsschreibung zur Kriegsgefangenschaft von der Antike bis zum Zweiten
Weltkrieg, ed. by RUdiger Overmans and the Arbeitskreis Militiirgeschichte (KOin, Weimar,
Wien: Bohlau Verlag, 1999): 141-70.
 1 90 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRI NCES
therefore depended exclusively on the characters and intentions of their captors.
Probably this situation has discouraged quite a few historians; for they must
have worried about encountering a mass of disparate bits of information in
widely scattered primary sources, from which it might be all but impossible
to produce an overall picture. 1
At least until the end of the seventeenth century i t is in fact true that
prisoners of war taken in the Ottoman-Habsburg borderlands enjoyed few
guarantees, apart from the fact that captors who had taken prisoners whose
families were of some wealth and standing expected substantial ransom
payments and therefore had an interest in the survival of their captives.2
Shortly after a battle it was common practice for both Ottoman and Habsburg
soldiers to kill their captives. Those prisoners who survived the traumatic
hours and days following such an encounter most often were enslaved, and a
return became increasingly unlikely once the military corps to which the
captor belonged had removed itself from the battlefront. That such was the fate
of most Christian captives in Ottoman hands is relatively well known because
ransoming such people was part of the ordinary business of ambassadors. It is
less often realized that the Habsburgs also enslaved their captives, and this was
still common practice during the conquest of Ottoman Hungary in the 1680s.3
In southern Italy enslaved Muslim prisoners of war could be encountered even
in the beginning of the nineteenth century.4
All this is correct; but it is not the whole story, as will become
apparent from our discussion of a little known captivity report from the late
seventeenth century. In reality ransoming and exchanges of prisoners between
Ottomans and Habsburgs did occur even if no formal agreements had preceded
the wars in which these men had been captured. Such a procedure from the war
of 1683-99 will be the subject of the present study. Our source was published
for the first time in 1689 and reprinted a few years later: no full-scale modem
edition is available. The author was Claudio Angelo de Martelli, who in spite
of his Italian name seems to have spoken German as his native language and
published his book in German. When captured near Vienna in the summer of
1683 De Martell i was serving his as a 'Rittmeister', in a regiment of
'Kiirassier's, whose commander was Count Diinewald. Thus he was a an older
I These difficulties are reflected in Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World
Around it, 1540s to 1774 (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004): 1 1 9-36.
2 Geza David and Pal Fodor eds., Ransom Slavery (Leiden: Brill, 2007).
3 Osman Aga, Der Gefangene der Giauren. Die abenteuerlichen Schicksale des Dolmetschers
Osman Aga aus Temeschwar, von ihm selbst erztihlt, tr. and commented by Richard Kreutel and
Otto Spies (Cologne, Graz, Vienna: Styria, 1962). For an edition of the original see Osman Aga,
Die Autobiographie des Dolmetschers 'Osman Aga aus Temeschwar, ed. by Richard Kreutel
(Cambridge: Gibb Memorial Trust, 1980). For a French translation see: Prisonnier des infideles.
Un soldat ottoman dans /'empire des Habsbourg, tr. by Frederic Hitzel (Aix-en-Provence:
Sindbad-Actes Sud, 1998). For the context compare Frederic Hitzel, "Osman Aga, captif
ottoman dans !'empire des Habsbourg a Ia fin du XVIIe sitcle," Turcica, 33 (2001): 191-2!6.
4 Salvatore Bono, Schiavi musulmani nell' Italia moderna, Galeotti, vu' cumpra, dcmestici
(Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche ltaliane. 1999).
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 191
contemporary of Osman Aga, who fell into Habsburg hands as a very young
officer during this same war. I De Martelli was an Ottoman prisoner for about
two years, during which time-span he experienced the household of the
recently executed grand vizier Kara Mustafa P� (1634-83) at first hand. Under
circumstances that we will discuss De Martelli was able to return to Habsburg
territory long before the peace of Karlowitz and continue his military career.2
By 1689 as the title page of his book indicated he had been promoted to the
position of "General Adjutant: und Obrist Leutenand".3
I Claudio Angelo de Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti, das ist warhafft: und eigentliche
Beschreibung der Anno 1683 ...au.Pgestandenen Gejaengnu.P (Vienna: Matthias Sischowitz,
1689). A copy of this book is in the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbiittel. I gained access
to this rare work due to the help of Gesine Bottomley and her team, librarians in that paradise of
scholars known as the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin. Long may they flourish!
Apart from what De Martelli and a few of his contemporaries report, not much seems to
be known about this officer's biography. Unfortunately I was unable to consult his file in the
6sterreichisches MiliUirarchiv (Vienna).
A cousin of De Martelli's was the dean of the cathedral chapter of Augsburg whom the
author called "Freiherr von Schonstain" (De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 96). According
to Joachim Seiler, Das Augsburger Domkapitel vom DreijJigjahrigen Krieg bis zur Siiku/arisation
(1648-1802) (St. Ottilien: Eos-Verlag, 1989): 375ff. the person referred to was Leonhard Frey
vom Schonstein, licentiatus utriusque iuris (1624-93). Frey vom Schonstein came from a
patrician family domiciled near Lake Constance and in Vorarlberg on Habsburg territory. The
family had acquired its noble status only in 1669, when the emperor Leopold I had granted them
the title "vom SchOnstein". This personage apparently was De Martelli's closest male relative; I
am obliged to the archivists of the cathedral archive in Augsburg for their aid in tracking him
down.
In another section of his book De Martelli declared that he was unmarried and had no
close relatives (De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: I l l). However this claim may be untrue;
for he seems to have had a wife or female companion whose name he did not mention (ibid.:
151, 152). My reasons for doubting his statement are the following: when referring to the wives
of other people he often used the term "Liebste" ('beloved'). Therefore it is possible that when
he wrote about his own "Liebste" he meant 'Eheliebste', a common term for spouse at this time.
Or else the union may not have received official sanction. His partner apparently lived in
Innsbruck. I have not been able to explain why the author did not mention any attempts to
inform his "Liebste" of his whereabouts. Otherwise he quite often gave the names of the people
to whom he sent mail. While De Martelli never spoke about children either legitimate or
illegitimate, his "Schwager" (brother-in law) Freiherr Pienner von Pixenhausen did make a
brief appearance in his memoirs. This person was apparently a canon, probably in the little
Bavarian town of Milhldorf. But when De Martelli returned from Istanbul, Pienner von
Pixenhausen had been dead for some time.
De Martelli claimed that he had been a soldier for sixteen years; however possibly he was
thinking not of the date of his capture in 1683 but rather of the time at which he wrote his book
(1685-89). Thus probably at the time of his capture he was in his middle thirties. De Martelli
also remarked that before his Ottoman adventure he had served in the Netherlands, the German
territories and Hungary. He had been taken prisoner once before, namely in the Hungarian
wars and had spent part of his captivity in the house of a local nobleman.
Apparently the author was dissatisfied with the progress of his career and took the
opportunity offered by his report to point out this fact (ibid.: 71). It is worth noting that the
relevant passage was not deleted by the censor.
2 For a biography see the article "Mustafa P3§a, Merzifonlu, Kara" by Miinir Aktepe in islam
Ansiklopedisi (published by the Turkish Ministry of Education), vol. VIII: 736-38.
3 De Martelli wrote many German verses, of execrable quality. In addition he apparently
spoke
Latin well and at least understood Hungarian, Italian and Polish. At one point he remarked that
an acquaintance had addressed him i n "Teutsch/Waelsch/und Franzosisch" (German, ltalian
and French). I do not know whether we should conclude that he also understood French (De
Martelli, Re/atio captivo-redempti: 60). At one point he had to pass up a chance to flee because
as he told his readers, he knew no Serbian or Croatian (ibid.: 92). De Martelli's knowledge of
Polish was to prove a veritable survival skill.
 192 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
War propaganda, late seventeenth century-style: asserting piety and loyalty
When De Martelli's book was published in 1689 the Habsburg­
Ottoman war over Hungary was still raging. The peace of KarlowitzJKarlof�a
only was concluded ten years later: when the book appeared the armies of
Leopold I had occupied Belgrade (1688). De Martelli profited materially from
this latter event as Be§ir Aga the former Ottoman commander of the fortress
along with the latter's family, was assigned to the author "as my slaves".1
Thus De Martelli's memoirs should be regarded as a piece of war propaganda,
intended to justify the actions of the imperial army and even to legitimize
them in religious terms. Quite often the author mentions his loyalty towards
Leopold I and his devotion to the Catholic Church in one and the same breath.
But perhaps most remarkable is his confession that taken by themselves, his
religious convictions might not have been strong enough to ensure his
survival in Ottoman captivity - meaning presumably a survival without
conversion to Islam. Only his loyalty to his ruler and to his commander
Charles of Lorraine as he puts it, allowed him to hold out in spite of all
pressures.2
This combination of Catholic piety and loyalty towards the ruler is
clearly expressed already on the title page. In the last lines of the long text
that filled this page according to the custom of the times, religious catchwords
abound: the author's release from captivity is described as miraculous, God's
intervention is invoked and there is a reference to salvation as well. In the
dedicatory prologue the author dwells at length upon his steadfast adherence to
his Catholic faith. Remarkably enough the book is dedicated not to some
military figure or even to the emperor Leopold himself, but to a canon regular
by the name of Franziskus from the Premonstratensian monastery of Pernegg,
who was a member of the estate of Habsburg prelates.3 As yet another
example of the religious discourse favoured by De Martelli there is an episode
that the author described as having happened shortly after he had been wounded
I De Martelli, Relatio captivo·redempti: 154.
2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo·redempti: 70.
3 In his prologue the author refers to the kindness that Franziskus von Pemegg - as an
individual - had shown towards himself. He also had reason to be grateful to the order of the
Premonstratensians collectively, of which Franziskus was a member; but he does not tell us
what this kindness involved in concrete terms. As I was informed by Prior Benedikt Felsinger
and the archivist of the monastery Pater Johannes Mikel (Kloster Geras/Pemegg), Franziskus
von Pemegg is identical with Franz von SchOilingen. In the late seventeenth century the latter's
family had recently been ennobled and when in 1700 the priory was ra!se� to the.status of an
abbey, Von Sch61lingen became its first abbot. I am most g!"l'tef
ul fo! th1s p1ece of lnfOf!118llO�;
yet it is a pity that the archives of the monastery contaJ� .no e�1dence of the relat 1 �nshtp
between De Martelli and Franz von Sch611ingen Howev�r 1t
. IS
of .mte�st. that once a�a1n, �e
find churchmen from recently ennobled families of the rrunor nob1hty Within the authors soc1a l translator not mentioned (Frankfurt/Main: Matth. Wagner,
circle.
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 193
and captured. A dish containing meat was offered to him, which he was unable
to eat; and while De Martelli was well aware of the fact that shock and loss of
blood had made it impossible for him to consume anything much, he did not
omit to mention that these events had taken place on a Friday when his
religion forbade him to touch meat. In the same vein he reports that after his
return to his homeland he visited the pilgrimage church of Altotting to thank
God and the Virgin Mary for his fortunate escape; De Martelli undertook this
pilgrimage even before reporting to his commander in Vienna.
Another example of the religious discourse so much favoured by De
Martelli concerns his emphatic refusal to convert. The barber who treated the
author's wounds immediately after his capture apparently suggested such a
move, while warning the prisoner that by refusing he risked execution. If De
Martelli's story can be believed, he responded by stressing his willingness to
die a martyr's death. However such claims do appear somewhat formulaic.
Thus we find a similar statement in the report of Giovanni Benaglia about the
embassy of the Habsburg Internuntius Caprara; in 1683 Kara Mustafa Pa§a
had taken this diplomat from Istanbul all the way to the gates of Vienna. Once
Caprara sent a messenger to the emperor although the grand vizier had
expressly forbidden him to do, supposedly remarking "oh how fortunate would
we be if they soon were to send us off to paradise" ("0 wie waren wir aile so
gliickselig/ wann sie uns aufs baldiste ins ParadiS schickten.") 1
As is well known the wars between Habsburgs and Ottomans were
viewed by both sides not only as secular power struggles but also as religious
wars. De Martelli also makes this point by giving his readers a lengthy
account of how crosses and communion were mocked by the opposing side.2
However it is not so clear how many of these acts - in so far as they really
had occurred - had been committed by Muslims. After all religious imagery
was just as objectionable to the Hungarian Calvinists who so often were
Ottoman allies and who certainly were no great respecters of Catholic ritual
objects, including the bread and wine used in the mass. In addition stories
about the desecration of churches always made 'good copy' and should therefore
be treated with circumspection.
I De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 23; Johanne Benaglia, Au.Pftihrliche ReijJ-Beschreibung
von Wien nach Constantinopel und wieder VAriick in Teutschland... deft Hochgebohren Grafen
und Herrn Herrn Albrecht Capraro etc. welche Er als /hro Romisch-Keyserl. Maj.
Extraordinari-Gesandter... den Stillstand mit der Ottonu:���is Pjorten VA verltingernl verrichtet,
1687): 100.
2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 33-34.
 194 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 195

Explaining capture - or what happens if a soldier is overwhelmed by a

the Tatars who in the meantime had crossed the Raab. Thereupon the author
powerful opponent
was personally ordered by the commander-in-chief to reconnoitre the
possibilities of crossing the Raab and Raabnitz rivers; and in the course of
Unless completely incapacitated by their wounds prisoners of war have
this undertaking he was captured on 2 July. This information is confirmed by
sometimes had to defend themselves against accusations of disloyalty - Soviet
the Ottoman Divan interpreter Alexander Maurocordato, who briefly recorded
soldiers who had the great misfortune of being captured by the Nazi armies
in his diary that Claudio Mart[ell]i had been captured along with 60 men.l De
during World War II form a particularly harrowing example. 1 Presumably De
Martelli reported that unexpectedly he was confronted by a troop of 300 Tatars
Martelli stressed his loyalty at every step because he had similar potential
and tried to extricate his troops. But from the beginning this attempt did not
challenges in mind. Being overpowered however formed a plausible excuse;
have many chances of success and after being wounded, the author could not
and De Martelli already in the title of the first chapter of his book stressed the
avoid capture.2
enormous size of the Ottoman army when it first appeared before Vienna.
De Martelli also demonstrated his continued loyalty to the Habsburg
Supposedly two to three hundred thousand soldiers of the sultan were
cause by highlighting his frequent attempts from prison to contact his
accompanied by about a hundred thousand Tatars. In reality it must have been
commander. Apart from transmitting information about his whereabouts that
difficult to form an accurate idea of the size of the Ottoman army, and the
might prove to be of military value, these letters presumably were meant to
author's aim in reporting these figures probably was meant to demonstrate
encourage the officers in charge to arrange for an exchange of prisoners
that he and his fellow soldiers had been powerless to resist such a multitude.2
involving De Martelli. In fact after his letters had been received the author was
De Martelli gives his readers a detailed account of the circumstances
sent clothing and l O guilders: however he does not tell us whether this was a
under which he was taken prisoner; and this information also should be viewed
private gesture on the part of one of his correspondents or whether the money
as part of a tactic that permitted the author to justify his behaviour. When on
came from an official army fund.
30 June 1683 the advance guard of the Ottoman army reached the river Raab,
As a further token of his devotion to the imperial cause De Martelli
De Martelli went out to reconnoitre; and this move resulted in a skirmish with
included a detailed discussion of the projects for flight that he supposedly had
Ottoman troops that had reached the other side of the river. The next day Duke
elaborated before being taken from Belgrade to Istanbul and later on, during his
Charles of Lorraine ordered a larger-scale exploratory move to figure out the
stay in the Ottoman capital; however none of these plans even came close to
strength of his opponent; but this was interrupted by an attack on the part of
realization. Once again presumably the author stated his intentions in order to
make it clear that in real life flight was impossible. At the same time looking
1 Thus the military career of Luigi Femand Ma igl� ended �ith a dishonourable discharge out from a window of the Belgrade fortress he supposedly counted the army
? !S
.
from the imperial army because the authonlles m _Y•enna �heved that as a second to the
. .
commander of the fortress of Breisach he had too rap1dly subm1tted to the arm1es of Lou1s XIV. units that the Ottoman commanders sent out to strengthen the defences of
The commander himself was executed: Stoye, Marsigli's Europe: 246-47. Buda. He did in fact manage to pass on this intelligence to his commander
2 [Georg Christoph] Baron Kunitz, Diarium Welches Der am Tiirkischen !!off und hernach
beim Groj)-Vezier in der Wienerischen Be/ae�er�ng gewest�n Kayser!. Re�1dent Herr Baron Charles of Lorraine: at other occasions he also established contact with the
Kunitz eigenhlindig beschrieben ... nebst au
j)foh her Relation der W1enenschen Belagerung
rllc margrave Hermann of Baden and with the Habsburg diplomat Georg von
(Vienna: no page numbers, no publisher, 1684) begins by estimating t�at the C?ttoman army
consisted of 170,000-180,000 men including the Walachian and Moldav•an contmgents. Later Kunitz who as we have seen was a prisoner in the camp of the grand vizier.3
.
on the author revised this figure, suggesting that many troops were occupied elsewhere and that
thus only 90,000 men were available for the siege .of Vienna.
. . .
However in the appendix ofthis little book we find a text claurung to be a !rJinslatJon of an I Richard F. Kreutel, Karl Teply eds. and translators, Kara Mustafa vor Wien, lf5!33 aus der
Ottoman document recording a review of troops du�ng the la�r sta�es of the s1ege. As far as I Sicht tiirkischer Que/len (Verlag Styri�: Graz, Yi.enn�, Cologne, 1982): 81. For a b1ography of
can tell the original has not yet surfaced. Accordmg to Kumtz th1s document was dated 18 this Ottoman dignitary who had stud.•ed med1cme m Padua and had done research on the
Rarnazan/7 September 1683 (according to present-day conv�rsion tables 18 Ramazan that y� ar circulation of blood' see Nestor Camar1ano, Alexandre Mavrocordato, le Grand Drogman, son
corresponded to 20 August). At this muster 168,000 sold1ers allegedly �ere c�unted �h1le activite diplomatique (1673-1709) (Salonica: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1970). Richard
losses amounted to 48,544 men. Both Kunitz' and Benaglia's books are available m the W1ener Kreutel is one of the very few modern historians to have taken notice of Claudio An�elo de
Stadt- und Landesbibliothek located in the Vienna city hall. Martelli and his book; see Kreutel and Teply eds. and translators, Kara Mustafa vor W1en: 23
The pre-publication story of the Kunitz diary is rather interesting: �e editorlprinter claimed and elsewhere.
.
that the text was found in Kunitz' tent after the Ottoman army had humedly evacuated Jts camp 2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 13-15.
before Vienna. If this claim is more or less correct we can. �ume th�t the author �hen �en 3 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 41-42, 94, ?6· Kunitz, Diarium: no pagination, p. 1
away by the withdrawing Ottoman army intentionally left his d1ary beh�n�: after all 1t cont.med .
. according to my count only mentions De Martelli a smgl«: time, namely when he ecord�� the
military intelligence. Moreover once the Ottoman arm1es had lef!, Kum z t work was usable for Rittmeister's capture. Kunitz also had learned that the pnsoner whom he called [Claud1 had
propaganda purposes; and probably for this very reason it was pnnted the next year.
been assigned to the grand vizier.
 196 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRI NCES
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 1 97

Giving information to the other side - or refusing to cooperate

peace mission initiated in 1688 had failed the Ottoman envoy Ziilfikar Pa§a
also was imprisoned in a fortress. 1
Soon after his capture the author was questioned on the part of the
In Ottoman-Habsburg confrontations an officer who provided the
Tatar khan and the grand vizier. From the very beginning he tried to keep his
enemy with data beyond name, rank and serial number apparently was not
rank and decorations secret, even though a Rittmeister was not a very high­
regarded as a traitor; for even though De Martelli made much of his loyalty to
level officer. More significant was the author's position as an imperial aide
the imperial cause he admits to having given Kara Mustafa Pa�a some
de camp: presumably De Martelli wanted to avoid detailed questions
information about Habsburg fortresses and their commanders, even if the
concerning Habsburg tactics and strategy. We may assume that at this early
author asserted that the relevant statements were vague, ambiguous or even
stage the Ottomans had not yet laid hands on many captives of any
downright false. In this context De Martelli made brief references to the
prominence in the imperial forces; and it was probably for that reason that
materials that Ottoman officers used in order to make sense of the information
Rittmeister De Martelli was confronted several times with the highest
he had provided and to plan their undertakings. Apart from the ubiquitous
commanders in the sultan's army.
rulers and compasses, the author observed maps covering among other
The author claims to have even kept his family name secret as far as
localities Vienna and Gyor/Raab. Unfortunately we have no way of knowing
possible: when talking to the Tatar khan and to Alexander Maurocordato he
whether the map that the author saw was identical to the one and only
supposedly identified himself simply as a soldier. However the success of
Ottoman map showing the besieged town that has come down to us.2
these tactics should not be overestimated. I Thus for instance the Ottoman
De Martelli had a good deal to say about his encounter with Alexander
chief interpreter knew De Martelli's family name perfectly well and at their
Maurocordato; as we have seen the latter by contrast only mentioned the event
very first encounter, used it to address the self-styled 'Claudio the soldier'.
in a single line. The high position of the interpreter who was dressed in the
Mavrocordato had probably received this information from the Hungarian
Ottoman style was clearly apparent from his appearance on horseback and the
nobleman Ferenc Horvath, who knew the author of our text from earlier
size of his suite. At this occasion Mavrocordato seems to have taken some
military confrontations.2 Certainly during his stay i n the Ottoman camp De
trouble to establish a dialogue with the imprisoned Habsburg officer.3
Martelli usually went by the name of Claudi; but as the Ottomans normally
According to De Martelli Maurocordato immediately emphasized that he was a
used given names in preference to family names it does not seem likely that
Christian and thus by implication not a 'renegade'. This opening gambit
the chief interpreter was the only person to know De Martelli's true identity.
confronted the author with the undeniable though unpalatable truth that there
However in this respect at least the latter was quite optimistic; and when
were Christians that wholeheartedly espoused Ottoman expansion.
imprisoned in the fortress of Belgrade he continued to hope that there were
Maurocordato suggested that the conversation be held in Latin, which
only two people that knew his family name. He therefore became rather upset
as we are told several times, De Martelli not only read and understood but also
when the Polish diplomat Samuel Prosky a newcomer to the local dungeon,
spoke. Presumably by choosing this language unknown to the Ottomans and
called De Martelli by his full name.3
also to most soldiers on the Habsburg side, Maurocordato wished to suggest
As to the situation of Prosky it is necessary to put his situation into
that certain parts of the negotiation at least would remain confidential. In all
perspective. While it has long been known that the Ottomans of the time
likelihood the Divan interpreter sub rosa offered the prisoner that he could
imprisoned foreign ambassadors when at war with their rulers, Ottoman
ambassadors on Habsburg territory might suffer the same fate. Thus when his
1 Giiler, Ziilfik/ir P�a: XXX.
2 Richard Kreutel und Karl Teply, ""Abbildung der Festung Wien, getreulich wiedergegeben"
Der gro8e tiirkische Plan zur Belagerung Wiens" in Richard F. Kreutel, Karl Teply �ds. and
translators Kara Mustafa vor Wien, 1683 aus der Sci ht iirkischer
t Que/len (Verlag Styna: Graz,
1
Herr von Quarient, a cousin of the Habsburg envoy at th� Ot_to�a� court who was �S? in f!!e Wien Kol�. 1982): 257-88. See also De Martelli, Re/atio captivo-redempti: 20.
camp of Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pap asked De Martelli qu1te Insistently to ke�p h•s tde�tJty 3 De Martelli saw Maurocordato riding a horse in the Ottoman military camp. This privilege
.
secret. Evident\y Von Quarient had not yet grasped that the Ottomans had long smce Jd�ntJfled
_ .
indeed showed that the interpreter was highly valued by the grand viz!er;!::>r
travel apart non­
�
their prisoner; see De Martelli, Re/atio captivo-redempti: 24. On the office and responsibilities Muslims were often forbidden to appear on horseback: Matthew Elliot, Dress Codes m the
of an imperial aide de camp: ibid.: 71. Ottoman Empire: The Case of the Franks,'' in Ottoman Costumes, From Textile to �denlil)>, �d.
2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 20-21. The auth�r had spent e1ghtee . . by Suraiya Faroqhi and Christoph Neumann (Istanbul: �ren 2004): 103-23 . In certam cases the
� mon�hs m : .
Eperies as a prisoner of Prince ThOkoly who was firmly committed to the Ottoman s1de. grand vizier seems to have taken Maurocordato's adv1ce; !n fact De Mart�lli tho�ght tha� he
3 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 71. owed his very life to the interpreter's powers of persuasiOn: De Martelli, Re/atto captiVO·
redempti: 25.
 198 ANOTHER M IRROR FOR P R I N C ES
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 199

secure the latter's release if only De Martelli could guarantee repayment of the
chances of booty once the Ottoman army had stormed Vienna. Thus the author
600 - or perhaps only 300 - Thaler that this move would cost him. In
told us that in order to get information on buried treasure three former
addition Maurocordato wanted information about the state of Vienna's
Habsburg subjects now converted to Islam mistreated him rather badly. In all
defences. However the author claimed that he refused to be tempted and gave
likelihood high-level Ottoman commanders were not directly involved in this
away no details; but in order to not make an enemy of Maurocordato, De
affair. Certainly booty-making in a conquered city could make the fortunes of
Martelli excused himself on account of his miserable physical condition due to
Ottoman generals as of their opposite numbers anywhere else. Indeed after the
the wounds he had recently sustained. Possibly the Habsburg officer thought
failed siege of Vienna the grand vizier was accused of having waited too long
or wished his readers to think that the data he provided to the Ottoman side
in storming the city; as a motive for this unexpected caution, he supposedly
were known anyhow; in this case his account was meant to convince his
had wanted to secure a capitulation because in this case he would not have
audience that he had not given away any really sensitive information.1 If we
been obliged to permit his soldiers several days of plunder and thereby lose a
can believe De Martelli's claims the latter even refused an explicit offer of
large share of the riches that the Ottomans assumed were stored in the
release in exchange for information that he considered treasonous.2
Habsburg capital. But treasure hunts in the narrow sense of the term probably
It is likely that the 'good cop, bad cop' interrogation technique was as
were more often undertaken on the private initiative of ordinary soldiers.1
familiar to Ottoman investigators as it was to their opposite numbers of later
Among the places where De Martelli suffered his captivity he singled
periods. In this case Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pa§a took on the role of the
out the fortress of Belgrade for special opprobrium; and to make life worse he
threatening 'bad cop.' By contrast Maurocordato tried to persuade the author by
was imprisoned in this castle for almost a year. To describe his ordeal the
offering inducements as an alternative to the big stick brandished by the
author turned to scriptural models namely the psalms and even the passion of
Ottoman commander. Thus the author was first included in a line of prisoners
Christ; at least in the prose sections of his story the author did not otherwise
and loaded with chains; after he had had time to reflect on his difficult
use literary devices of this type very often, preferring to account for concrete
situation the chains were taken off and he was conducted to the interpreter.
situations in concrete terms. Apart from dirt and hunger De Martelli
emphasized the cold, the airlessness of the dungeons and the lack of water.
However he did not view the Ottoman high command as responsible for this
The sufferings ofa prisoner
situation, imputing his and companions' misery rather to the behaviour of the
fortress commander (dizdar).2 It is worth noting in this context that the
To portray himself as a faithful servitor of his ruler and a true-believing
Ottoman supply system which otherwise worked reasonably well, in the
Catholic besides, De Martelli did not omit a detailed description of his
winters of 1683-85 all but collapsed, so that the Belgrade garrison also was
sufferings as a prisoner. But even if these descriptions contained an element of
famished. When De Martelli was about to leave Belgrade the commander by
self-interest the tribulations suffered by this prisoner and many others on both
contrast showed him somewhat more consideration; as for the dizdar's wife,
sides of the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier were real enough. From this and other
she had previously been sending alms to the prisoners in secret. Unfortunately
wars we possess any number of reports concerning hunger, beatings, sickness,
De Martelli does not tell us whether he felt any obligation to reciprocate when
loss of social status and mortal peril; it therefore makes sense to view these
the couple, now themselves prisoners were assigned to him as slaves after the
afflictions as constitutive of the experiences of prisoners of war. In this
Habsburg capture of Belgrade.
·

respect De Martelli's report resembles that of Osman Aga to say nothing of

Aside from the material deprivation that at least in part had been caused
reports written by people who suffered the same fate in other epochs.3
. by the severe winter cold the captives in the fortress of Belgrade were exposed
Life for the prisoner was made especially difficult by the fact that m
to what we might call the psychological warfare of the Ottomans. Every once
addition to militarily relevant information demanded by the high command
in a while rumours were circulated to the effect that the Polish or Habsburg
certain soldiers hoped to use De Martelli's presence to increase their own
armies had suffered major defeats. Supposedly 60,000 Poles had lost their

l
I De Martelli, Relatio captivo·redempti: 19-20. De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 32. According to Thomas M. Barker Doppeladler und
,

2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 28. Halbmond, Entscheidungsjahr 1683, translated and ed. by Peter and Gertraud Broucek (Graz,
3 For a rather dramatic instance compare De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 39-4{). Wien Koln: Styria, 1982): 81.
2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 50-Sl, ffl.
 200 A NOTHER MIRROR FOR PRI NCES
A PRISONER OF WAR R E POR T S 201

lives and King Jan Sobieski was a prisoner i n the Istanbul fortress of Support networks
Yedikule. Similar psychological warfare through the spreading of rumours
also was used on the Habsburg side; and when in 1688-92 Ziilfikar P�a was
To survive in extreme situations victims need to locate people able and
sent to Vienna to find out whether peace could be concluded, he also had great
willing to provide help, in a material but also in a moral sense. Until the
difficulty in verifying rumours that his Viennese interlocutors put about. 1
Polish Internuntius Samuel Prosky appeared in the fortress of Belgrade, De
In the Ottoman case probably these stories were meant to strengthen
Martelli's sources of support were l imited to a few gifts from Habsburg
morale among the sultan's soldiers and their effect upon the Christian
officers and occasional help from people on the Ottoman side, like
prisoners was incidental though probably not altogether unwelcome to high­ Maurocordato or the wife of the dizdar of Belgrade. Matters improved with
level Ottoman officers. De Martelli struggled against the onset of depression
Prosky's arrival because the Ottomans still regarded him as a diplomat
for instance by repeating to himself that major military forces were not
accredited to the Porte and thus continued to supply him with food and fuel. In
usually fielded in mid-winter. Therefore in his perspective there was good addition the personality of Prosky was of some significance: for as we can
reason to doubt the veracity of rumours reporting the supposed defeat of large
conclude from De Martelli's account and as the latter explicitly recognized, the
Habsburg annies. Yet De Martelli also wrote that his one-time fellow prisoner
Polish diplomat in spite of his unfortunate situation was very generous. The
i n the fortress of Belgrade, the Polish lnternuntius Samuel Prosky, considered
latter's survival skills even included cookery; and he was also much better than
some of the details perfectly convincing and became quite worried as a result2
De Martelli at establishing contact to people outside the fortress. Catholic
Up to this point we have analyzed our text as a piece of war propaganda
priests and merchants Jiving in Belgrade were part of Prosky's circle of
and as an attempt of the author's to salvage his military career by justifying
acquaintances; and they sent food parcels to the prisoners. These people also
his behaviour in Ottoman captivity. But there are other more individualistic
forwarded letters so that King Jan Sobieski and the Habsburg high command
facets to his book as well: for it is quite remarkable how often the author
refers to his desperation, a major defect if viewed from the standpoint of a were informed of the plight of Prosky and De Martelli.

believing Christian. Thus he does not hesitate to note that during the first
weeks of his ordeal when the interrogations were over and he realized the full
extent of his predicament during the long marches through Hungary, he acted
in a fashion that only can be described as suicidal. At one point he asked the
irregulars (segmen) of the guard to finish him off; and when they did not
comply, he consciously started a fight with the guardsmen hoping that they
would kill him.3 In later months as well, as a prisoner in Belgrade and in the
following year when waiting for his ransom in the Istanbul household of the
executed Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa Pa�a De Martelli evidently suffered from
nervous exhaustion and depression. When in this state of mind he was capable
of cooking up poorly thought-out plans for escape, of which in one case
certain European diplomats residing in Istanbul particularly needed to dissuade
him.4 By narrating these episodes De Martelli stops describing himself as a
model prisoner with limitless capacities for resistance and appears as an
These two men were able to mobilize support because of the social
positions that they enjoyed in their respective home countries; and at least De
Martelli had a well-developed sense of entitlement. Thus he did not omit to
explain to his readers that the aid received from certain residents of Belgrade
was meant for Prosky and himself alone; in the Rittmeister's view of things it
was only because of the Polish diplomat's personal generosity that other
prisoners also received a share of this bounty. But from the context it is
perfectly clear that this opinion was by no means shared by the other captives.
In the end Prosky was sent to the sultan's court in Edirne, and De
Martelli had to make do without the savoir vivre of his companion. But
shortly after Prosky had been taken away De Martelli did manage to get
pennission to attend Easter services in the church of the Catholics at Belgrade.
On this occasion and on later ones as well, alms were collected on behalf of

individual with his obvious weaknesses and limitations. the prisoner; and Francesco Calogero, a rich merchant from Dubrovnik, made
a special effort on De Martelli's behalf. As the alms given by the Belgrade
Catholics were quite substantial the author was able to make appropriate gifts
1 Mustafa Giller, Ziilfi/Wr P�a'mn Viyana Sefdreti ve Esareti, Cerlde·i Takrirdt-1 Ziilji/Wr
E
jendi (Istanbul: Camhca, 2007): XXIX.
to the commander of the fortress and thus gain the latter's goodwill. Moreover
2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 80. i n the following days and weeks the presents that the Rittmeister received
3 Perhaps the guards er �used to �II the author t;>ecause the Ottoman_command still viewed him were so ample that he was able to share some of his money with the other
as a possible source of m
formatlon. At one pomt when De !-fartelh was n'? longer cap�ble of
walking the guards even carried �im part of the way Yet �� man� other ms�ces pmoners
;
captives. I
unable to march were summarily killed off: De Martelh, Relat1o capllvo-redempll: 30-31.
4 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 70-71, 80. 120.
l De Martelli. Re/atio captivo-redempti: 83-85.
 202 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR P R I NC E S
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 203

Once arrived in Istanbul, De Martelli had to establish new support

Tensions among Christians: Habsburg-Hungarian conflicts
networks. This time it was not a question of food and fuel as he lived in the
household of the sons of Kara Mustafa Pa§a and thus was provided for, but
When discussing the disputes between Ottoman Muslims and Catholic
rather of his ransom that was still in the process of being negotiated.
Habsburgs, it is easy to forget that the Ottoman advance increased pre-existing
Although he was not permitted to leave the house, De Martelli with the help
tensions among Christians and caused formerly latent conflicts to become
of a fellow prisoner who had attached himself to the Habsburg Rittmeister as
apparent. Thus it is worth noting that when De Martelli recounted the
his servant, succeeded in sending a letter to Johann Ernst von Steyer, resident
attempted flight of a Hungarian from Ottoman captivity he found it necessary
factor of the trading company known as the 'Orientalische Kompagnie.'
to stress that the fugitive was betrayed to the authorities by a Protestant
Apparently this man had been living in Istanbul throughout the war and was
shoemaker. Apparently the author thought that religious conflict was at the
not even confined to his home. Probably Von Steyer and a certain Herr von
bottom of this event. Possible other reasons for the shoemaker's behaviour
Quarient a relative of the Habsburg diplomat Baron von Kunitz, managed to
were not mentioned: they could have included purely secular motives such as
interest the British ambassador Chandos in the fate of De Martelli; our author
identification with the stronger side, personal enmity or the hope of
had been in contact with Von Quarient while still in the grand vizier's camp
alleviating his own difficult condition. But De Martelli did not acknowledge
and later on, this personage resided for a while in Galata. On De Martelli's
these possibilities.
behalf the two Habsburg gentlemen also contacted Montagu North, an English
Almost in the same breath the author bitterly complained about the fact
diplomat present in Istanbul at that time. Both these latter personages were
that only a very few Hungarian peasants were willing to give him and his
members of the English nobility, and this fact probably explains why their
fellow prisoners in Ottoman hands any kind of support. In this case enmity
sympathies only went out to a fellow gentleman. As for the other prisoners,
between Catholics and Protestants could well have had a part to play. The
unable to provide 150 Thalers per person as ransom money, one by one they
forcible re-establishment of Catholicism on the part of the Habsburgs
were sold off to the galleys1; De Martelli's former servant Max wound up in
probably was intensely unpopular among Hungarian Calvinists; and if the
the household of an Annenian.
magnates whose uprisings had recently been suppressed by the emperor had
In addition to this intervention by Christian noblemen, the author also
any followers among the peasantry this situation could have contributed to the
received help from certain Muslims; and while it may not have come easily to
atmosphere of hostility described by De Martelli. t Viewed from the author's
admit this fact in writing, De Martelli does tell us that the young sons of Kara
standpoint Teutsche' (Germans) and 'Ungam' (Hungarians) were two distinct
Mustafa Pa§a once seem to have interceded on his behalf. This help came at a
groups bound together by ties of solidarity; as for his own person in spite of
decisive moment; negotiations concerning De Martelli's ransom had reached an
his Italian name he regarded himself as one of the Teutsche' and was viewed
impasse and he risked being transferred to the fortress of Yedikule or even onto
as such by his acquaintances. De Martelli was well aware that these terms had
the galleys. Just as significant was the support of the treasurer of the deceased
meanings beyond ethnicity; for he once commented that all soldiers of the
grand vizier, whom the author introduced as Mehmed Aga This personage
emperor were regarded as Teutsche' no matter what their ethnic backgrounds
even offered to contribute the substantial sum of 500 Thalers to De Martelli's
may have been.
ransom, as a loan if possible but as a gift if necessary. The reader comes away
Being identified as a Teutsche' and soldier in the imperial army meant
with the impression that the author's poor health and probably his modest
that the 'Ungam' regarded De Martelli as an enemy. Thus he tells us that when
demeanour while in the household of Kara Mustafa Pa§a's heirs elicited both
he was a prisoner in the town of Ustolni Belgrad/ Szekesfehervlir/
pity and sympathy. But in addition while in Istanbul De Martelli seems to
StuhlweiBenburg his Hungarian fellow prisoners decided that he was supposed
have made more friends, among Christians but also among Muslims than he
to clean the toilets - such as they were; the author's poor health evidently did
was later willing to admit.2
not count as an excuse. However some members of the 'teutsche Nation •

decided to themselves do the job in order to prevent further unrest ("zur

Yerhiitung ferrerer Unruhe"); perhaps the dispute also involved a disagreement
over the question whether 'an officer and a gentleman' should be obliged to
1 De Martelli, Relatio captivo·redempti: 1 14- 16.
2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 133.
1 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 35.
 204 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NC E S
undertake this menial task. Firmly taking sides in this factional dispute, De
Martelli also maintained that the 'Teutsche' had been mistreated by the
'Ungaro' when the two groups of prisoners were being transported together
from Buda to Belgrade by boat. Apparently the 'Ungam' had access to food that
they were unwilling to share with their rivals.l However from today's
perspective the whole conflict seems to be of a kind that has been witnessed in
numerous camps of the twentieth century, when groups might be artificially
created by the administration and hierarchies established, due to the differential
access of their members to scarce food supplies.
Upon arrival in Belgrade the prisoners were shown to the Ottoman
fortress commander and his entourage; this event was accompanied by a good
deal of mistreatment that according to De Martelli was carried out by two
'Hungarians'.2 Supposedly these men justified their behaviour by claiming
that earlier on, the 'Teutsche' had been priv ileged; but currently the Ottoman
soldiers were very angry at the latter due to the defeat before Vienna and now it
was the tum of their own countrymen to gain the upper hand.3 Unfortunately
we are not told whether the two men perhaps were partisans of Imre
Thokoly's. Given the unstable military situation apparently Ottoman officers
in charge of the Belgrade fortress deliberately incited 'Hungarians' and
'Germans' against one another so as to better control the masses of prisoners
in their charge.
Conflicts among Christians: M. de Guil/eragues and his Jesuit priest
In the closing years of the seventeenth century the Austrian Habsburgs
had two main opponents, namely the Ottoman sultan and Louis XIV. In the
wars of 1683-99 however the king of France was more or less neutral, and as a
result the French ambassador in Istanbul comte de Guilleragues could
sometimes act as a mediator.4 Apparently the ambassador expressed some
interest i n intervening on behalf of Claudio de Martelli. But as relations
between Louis XIV and Leopold I remained quite tense the author had to tread
very cautiously when it came to entertaining relations with members of the
1 De Martelli. Relatio captivo-redempti: 38 and 47.
2 De Martelli, Relatio captivo·redempti: 70-71 calls the commander Petscbir Aga/Be§ir AJa.
After the death of Kara Mustafa � De Martelli addressed a petition to the fDV��'· ask.ing
for firewood and supplies. The petition was acted upon and as a result certain prisoners were
� nnitted to work in the city where they also received alms from the Orthodox population.
De Martelli, Relatio captivo·redempti: 51-55.
4 Jean-Louis Bacqu6 Grammont, Sinan Kuneralp, Frederic Hitzel, Representants permanents
de Ia France en Turquie (1536-1991) et de Ia Turquie en France (1797-1991) (Istanbul, Paris:
Editions Isis. 1991): 24-25.
A P R I SONER 205
OF WAR REPORTS
French embassy. Possibly his contacts were more significant than stated in
his book; after all the author was still on active service and had to consider his
military career.
After a long stay in Belgrade, De Martelli finally was removed to
Edime and later sent on to Istanbul. Once in Edime he was accorded a certain
liberty of movement: after all flight from this inland city was all but
impossible. Here he was contacted by a Jesuit priest acting on behalf of the
French ambassador. The two men visited a mosque together and on this outing
they had a lively discussion concerning the pol itical positions of their
respective sovereigns; unfortunately we are not told in which language the
debate was conducted. Otherwise the author gave detailed information on this
encounter in which of course he claimed to have emphatically defended the
Habsburg position. However i t is evident that De Martelli was at pains to not
lose the goodwill of the Jesuit. After all the latter's mediation might have
been important if the comte de Guilleragues had decided to intervene on behalf
of the prisoner. But as we will see once in Istanbul, the author was able to
mobilize support from other neutral diplomats whose intervention was less
risky.
Kara Mustafa Pa§a in life and death
De Martelli reported that he was brought into the grand vizier's
presence a number of times, but mostly he did not record details of the
interrogation. Only on the encounter that took place just a few days before
Kara Mustafa P�a's execution did the author provide a certain amount of
information. In this case the initiative came from De Martelli: he had
submitted a petition and thereupon was called in once again to face the grand
vizier.
In his book the author has included both the Latin original of his
petition and a German translation. The terrible living conditions in the fortress
of Belgrade formed the main topic. According to the author by the end of 1683
there were only twenty-two survivors among the one hundred and thirty-eight
men who had been incarcerated i n the local dungeons. However the letter
relayed in De Martelli's work was worded so sharply that it is hard to believe
that it was submitted to the grand vizier 'as is'. More likely Alexander
Maurocordato, who in any case would have seen all writings in Latin addressed
to Kara Mustafa Pa�a edited the petition before submitting it. After all an
angry outburst of the grand vizier's could not have helped the cause of the
prisoners and in addition Maurocordato had his own position to consider: De
 206 ANOTHER MIRROR F OR PRINCE S
A PR I S ON ER O F W AR R E PO R T S 207

Martelli himself observed that the position of the latter at this time was
movement was rendered extremely difficult. De Martelli also met Muslims
seriously compromised. I Whatever the ins and outs of the case, the petition
that had been imprisoned in the fortress; they were janissaries awaiting
brought results: the vizier ordered to remove De Martelli's chains, although
judgement and apparently their situation was not any better than that of the
this privilege was not extended to his fellow prisoners. He also received new
prisoners of war. During this new spell of incarceration De Martelli seems to
clothes and money to purchase food and firewood. In the following days the
have lost contact with the deceased vizier's household for the time being; he
condition of the other prisoners also improved. But this bounty did not last
was much depressed by the information that now he had become the sultan's
long; for already on 25 December the grand vizier was executed upon the
property, and people in this position were not eligible for ransoming or
sultan's command, and all orders issued by the deceased were abrogated as a
exchange.1
result.
Certainly De Martelli did not personally witness the execution of Kara
Mustafa Pa�. But he was close enough to the events; for in late December the
The household of the deceased grand vizier
author belonged to the contingent of captives that had been assigned to the
grand vizier in person, and negotiations had begun for his ransoming or
Already for the mid-sixteenth century cases have become known of
exchange. For the time being the author had been removed to the house of
Ottoman dignitaries who i n their households educated young slaves and
Mustafa the anahtar-dar, the person in charge of the grand vizier's keys, so
servitors that later might be taken over into the service of the sultan.2 But
that he was in a position to discuss the situation with people who had
from the late 1500s onwards and especially in the seventeenth century this
witnessed at least some of the events connected with the execution: after all
arrangement became increasingly significant as a manner of recruitment into
certain prisoners were ordered to dig the grave of the dead dignitary. Further
the Ottoman central elite. In this period moreover factions crystallized within
details i n De Martelli's account confirm our impression that he saw and heard
the state apparatus whose members consisted of people from the same or
quite a bit: thus he refers to a son of Kara Mustafa Pasa's by the name of
adjacent regions. Thus there was a certain degree of cohesion among
Yusuf Be�. who shed bitter tears over his father's death. Both Yusuf and his
dignitaries from the Balkans who were opposed by groups of officials from the
brother Mehmed seem to have died young, as the biography of Kara Mustafa
Caucasus; a number of influential commanders and administrators were of
Pa§a by Munir Aktepe only mentioned a son named Ali. This latter young
Abchasian (Abaza) backgrounds.3 This situation was in tum exploited by the
man also made an appearance in De Martelli's account; later on he was to have
Ottoman sultans: quite a few expenditures that earlier on had been undertaken
a career as Maktulzade Ali Pa§a. The author also remarked that when the order
by the central administration now were considered to be the responsibility of
for execution arrived the members of the grand vizier's household prepared to
viziers and provincial governors.
defend their patron. But Kara Mustafa Pa§a accepted his death stoically and
Thus a household well supplied with competent members and supplies
without any kind of resistance; in this respect De Martelli provided
(miikemmel kapt) in the seventeenth century came to be a pre-condition for a
independent confirmation of the Ottoman sources covering the events, of
successful career in the Ottoman administration. On the other hand a dignitary
which surely he knew nothing.
already in office had more opportunities for acquiring such a household than
Moreover where the confiscation of the executed grand vizier's
did other less highly placed persons. After all, the royal road to success firstly
possessions was concerned De Martelli really was an eyewitness; or to be
exact he himself formed part of Kara Mustafa Pa§a's estate. The confiscation 1 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 64, 84-85.
procedure included an examination of the local archives. Certain prisoners were 2 Meti n Kunt, "Kullann Kullan," Bogazifi Universilesi Humaniter Bilimler Dergisi Ill (1975):
able to flee in the confusion surrounding the death of the vizier; as for the 27-42.
3 Rifa'at A. Abou-El-Haj, "The Ottoman Vezir and P sha Households 1683-1703: ('
remainder they were ordered to come to the former dwelling of Kara Mustafa _ �
Preliminary Survey," Journal of t�e �e�ican Onental Soctet y, XCIV(I974): 438�7; Met•n
Pa�a where they were counted. Shortly afterwards they were sent back to Kunt, "Ethnic-Regional (Cins) Sohdanty m the Seventeenth-Century Ottom�n Establishment.,
International Journal ofMiddle East Studies 5 (1974): 233-39; Com_llll H. Fleischer, Bu�eaucrat
the dungeons and had their feet shackled in such a manner that any kind of and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire, The Historian Mu stafti Ali (1541-1600) (Pnnceton:
Princeton University Press, 1986): 209.
. . . .
In the 1 700s and early 1800s the 'political household' was a key mstJtutJOn m many �ttoman
1 De Martelli Relatio captivo-redempti: 56-64, 1 33; for the complaints of needy Muslims provinces as well: Jane Hathaway, The Politics ofHouselwlds in Ottoman Egypt, The RISe of.the
against the ex�
Qazda§IIS (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) and more recently Thomas Lter,
Haushalte und Haushaltspolitik in Bagdad 1704-1831 (WUnburg FRG: Ergon Verlag, 2004).
cuted grand vizier compare p. 87.
 208 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRINCES
involved ties of marriage between actually or potentially influential people and
secondly the education of young slaves that once launched in their careers,
hopefully would remain loyal to the patron who had raised them. Marriage ties
were considered so important that they were formed even in the households of
eunuchs: thus in the late 1500s the influential palace eunuch Gazanfer Aga
invited his sister from Venice to Istanbul to strengthen his position by her
marriage to an influential personage.1 While De Martelli did not record any
observations on this matter he did have quite a few things to say about the
recruitment of young slaves. In brief, as the functioning of 'pol itical
households' very rarely has been described 'from the inside', the casual remarks
of this Habsburg prisoner of war, who for the most part did not comprehend
the significance of what he saw have considerable historical interest.2
Overall the founders of 'political households' in the Ottoman realm
were able to secure the loyalty of their slaves and freedmen. Where former
prisoners from Central and Western Europe were concerned, probably the
narrow limits on social mobility in their homelands had a role to play in these
remarkably successful changeovers. Non-nobles in many parts of Europe
found the doors of advancement firmly closed to them, while faithful service
in an Ottoman grandee's household might well open the gates of power.
Moreover many prisoners from Central Europe must have been serfs in their
home villages; and they may well have preferred a lack of personal freedom in
their new environment combined with the chance of upward mobility to a
similar deficiency in their homelands that was unlikely to be ever remedied in
this world. Of course there were exceptions; thus Alexander Maurocordato
recorded in his diary that after the lost battle before Vienna ( 1 2 September
1683), when Kara Mustafa Pa�a had to leave his tent behind "the escaped
slaves of the grand vizier" stole the latter's jewels. Only a small part could
later be recuperated by those pages - in other words presumably by young
slaves - that had remained loyal to their patron.3
A few months after the death of Kara Mustafa Pa�a news arrived in
Belgrade that the three young sons of the former grand vizier had been accorded
part of their father's property. As a condition they were required to pay back
the latter's debts, which amounted to the hefty sum of 800,000 Thaler.
major sales campaign was the result: thus a khan i n Izmir that had belonged to
Kara Mustafa � changed hands for 500 kese equivalent to 25,000 imperial
! �ari a Pia Pedani Fabris, "Safiye's Household and Venetian Diplomacy," Turcica, 32 (2000):
- 2
2 Another rare example of such a story told 'from the inside can be found in: Robert Dankoff
The Intimate Life of an Ottoman Statesman, Melek Ahmed Pasha (1588-1662) As Portrayed �
�
Ev/iya t;elebi's Book of Travels, introduced by Rhoads Murphey (Albany NY·. SUNY Press
1991).
3 Kreutel and Teply ed. and translated, Kara Mustafa vor Wien: 89.
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 209
Thaler. 1 De Martelli formed part of the possessions thus returned, so that
once again he became 'disposable'. Members of the Belgrade garrison made
guesses concerning the future fate of De Martelli and his fellow prisoners. One
suggestion was that they would be sold to the naval arsenal to serve as rowers
on galleys, or else they might be set to work the agricultural properties
(�iftlik) that the family of Kara Mustafa Pa§a had been able to retain.
Liberation upon payment of a ransom also was once again an option.2 We do
not know how and why i t was decided that De Martelli should be offered this
chance of freedom; but as this option was taken, the author was kept within
the Istanbul household of the former grand vizier and thus enabled to describe
it at some length.
Household dignitaries
Kara Mustafa Pa§a's former household contained people of the most
diverse ethnic backgrounds. We may surmise that the grand vizier had hoped
for significant conquests i n Central Europe that would have justified the
formation of one or even several provinces. In this case administrators from
the regions concerned, who knew the languages, laws and customs of the new
territories and who were above all completely loyal to his own person would
have been invaluable to the grand vizier in maintaining himself at the pinnacle
of power. Presumably the more prominent members of his household had had
hopes of becoming grandees in their own right; and without knowing it our
author seems have met them at a moment when they needed to seriously
reconsider their options after their patron's execution and the confiscation of
his property.
At the very beginning of his captivity De Martelli encountered an
interpreter by the name of Mustafa who originally came from Tyrol and had
reached the trusted position of 'keeper of the keys' (anahtar-dar).3 Once in
Belgrade De Martelli was received by this man with formal politeness;
A Mustafa enquired about the health of his interlocutor and as we have seen at
the end of 1683, when Mustafa Pa�a met his end, the author was staying at
1
Mlinir Aktepe, "iZ;mir Hanlan ve Car§Jian hakkmda On Bilgi," Tarih Dergisi, 25 (1971):
54; Bozkurt Ersoy, /zmir Hanlar1 (Ankara: AtatUrk KUitUr Merkezi, 1991): 119.
105-
De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 90. 134.
3 Fo� a brief overview over the office-holders employed in the household of a grand vizier see
lsmll HaiOO Uzun�J/1, Osmanil Dev/etinin Merker. ve Bahriye Te�kil011 (Ankara: 1ua 1ari
a h
•
Kurumu, 1948): 168-71. How�ver the sources used by Uzun�1h do not refer to a keeper of
the keys. Compare De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 1 8;
the latter also had beard rumours
that the commander of Belgrade had taken most of the foodstuffs assigned to the imprisoned
Polish diplomat Samuel Prosky: see ibidem: 73.
 210 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
the house of the anahtar-dar. The latter also wanted to find out from De
Martelli why overall the captives were in such a terrible state. In the
subsequent conversation Mustafa the anahtar-dar claimed that the grand vizier
had set aside money for the needs of his captives. Presumably he wanted to
indicate that it was not his patron who was responsible for the misery of the
prisoners, but rather lower-level officials who had misappropriated the relevant
funds. Seen from a different perspective however these Ottoman officers may
well have considered that at a time of acute food shortages the needs of their
own soldiers were more i mportant than those of 'enemy aliens'.
We do not hear anything about Mustafa's Tyrolean background, which
probably was quite modest. By contrast Mehmed Aga the treasurer (hazinedar)
of Kara Mustafa Pa§a had been born as a Polish nobleman. Apparently this
personage was on bad terms with Maurocordato; for in his diary the latter
acidly commented that the luggage and tents of the grand vizier had been
abandoned before Vienna because the treasurer had lost control of the situation.
Apart from his role as chief interpreter Maurocordato was also Mustafa Pa§a's
physician, so that perhaps his remarks indicate rivalries within the household.
According to De Martelli the hazinedar's father had once offered 6000 ducats
for the release of his son. But the treasurer evidently was comfortably
established i n the former grand vizier' suite where he had attained a position of
authority. l He therefore did not show much inclination to return to Poland.
However the key position in this household - and others like it -
was in the hands of the grand vizier's lieutenant known as the
kahyalkethiida.2 A grand vizier could order his kdhya to deputize for him i n
any affair he wished to delegate. B y the eighteenth century this office had
come to be integrated into the state bureaucracy, but apparently i n Kara
Mustafa Pa§a's time it was still a household position. But even so the kdhya
Hasan Aga was not always present in his office, as he possessed a house in
the capital with pages of his own.
As for these young men they were apparently as cosmopolitan a
company as those of the grand vizier had been in the latter's own lifetime.
Quite possibly Hasan Aga had taken over responsibility for some of these
rather youthful pages after the death of his patron. De Martelli specifically
1 Kreutel und Teply ed. and translated, Kara Mustafa vor Wien: 89; De Martelli, Relatio
captivo-redempti: 110, 1 1 2. Mehmed Agas predecessor Hilseyin Aga, promoted kap1C1lar
kiihyas1 in the camp before Vienna supposedly was a French convert to Islam. This man called
Hofmarschall according to Habsburg terminology seems to have been particularly close to his
patron. According to Benaglia, when Kara Mustafa P3§a was invited to marry an Ottoman
princess he complied most unwillingly as he had to divorce his wife of many years standing.
According to the rumours related by Benaglia the grand vizier then arranged a marriage of his
ex-spouse to one of his trusted servitors a Frenchman converted to Islam. If the story was true
at least in part, it probably concerned Hilseyin Aga (Benaglia, AujJftihrliche ReijJ-Beschreibung:
65 and 168).
2 Uzunya�JIJ, Merkez ve Bahriye Te$kiMh : 168.
A P R I S ON E R OF WAR R E P O RT S 211
mentioned a Hungarian and also a Spaniard from Gran Canaria, now named
Abdullah, who had been captured near Sevilla and had reached the Ottoman
capital by way of Algiers.' De Martelli described quite a few encounters with
converts to Islam; in most cases he did not mention their Christian names and
probably did not even know them. But he made an exception in the case of the
page Abdullah, recording his original name as Domenico Gonzalez de
Cascavalez. This unusual form of identification may have been motivated by
Abdullah's attitude: contrary to many of his fellows, the latter apparently
refused to identify with his new situation in life.
In the course of his captivity De Martelli was as we have seen
interrogated several times i n the presence of the grand vizier; much more
frequently however was he called in by the kdhya Hasan Aga. Probably the
latter had been promoted to his high office rather recently as his predecessor
Ahmed Aga had been killed before Vienna.2 After arriving in Istanbul in the
autumn of 1684 the author was again taken to see Hasan Aga, and i t is worth
noting that this was one of the few Ottomans of whom De Martelli painted a
positive picture. The dignified behaviour of this personage visibly had a role
to play and also the fact that Hasan Aga treated the prisoner rather well.
After the execution of the grand vizier it was this personage who very
energetically defended the interests of the family of his former patron. Less
highly placed dignitaries from within the household such as <;avu§ Hiiseyin
Aga, treated the kdhya with a great deal of respect.3 In the debates concerning
De Martelli's ransom Hasan Aga also had a key role to play. In this context
the author was explicitly warned to watch his step as the kdhya was regarded a
very capable negotiator versed in all the refinements of diplomacy. As a proof
of his skills we might view one of the gambits used by Hasan Aga: at one
point he declared that if negotiations concerning De Martelli's ransom were to
continue much longer, the status of the prisoner as an imperial military officer
was sure to become public knowledge. In such an eventuality however he
would not be in a position to help De Martelli in any way.4
1 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 109.
2 Benaglia, AujJftihrliche ReijJ-Beschreibung:166.
3 De Martelli, RelaJio captivo-redempti: 95-6, 109.
4 De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 115.
 212 A NOTHER M I R ROR FOR P R I NC ES
A PRISONER OF W A R REPORTS 213

Liberation in sight
received a letter concerning his possible exchange written by a Habsburg
official named Leonhard Hartl. I But while Hartl's letter was dated October
When the reader opens the memoirs of former prisoners who lived in
1683, it only arrived on the Ottoman side towards the end of the year. But at
the early modern age, he/she understands from the very structure of the account
just this time Kara Mustafa Pa�a was executed, so that this project also came
that the story, from the author's viewpoint at least had a 'happy end'. As the
to nothing.
title page of his book indicates, De Martell i viewed himself as one of the few
Discussions about De Martelli's ransoming were only revived after he
fortunate people who returned home after having spent time as a prisoner of
had arrived in Istanbul; after all, the debts of Kara Mustafa Pa� still had not
war. The author was very conscious of his good fortune and often referred to
been paid and the household administrators were in dire need of cash. At first
his acquaintances that died in captivity or were sold off as galley slaves. At the
negotiations were conducted by an "Unter-Chihaia", or subordinate of the
same time De Martelli apparently wished to make it clear that he was only
Jmhya, in the presence of a wealthy Jew. De Martelli was requested to induce
willing to accept liberation if his status as a Habsburg officer was not
his family to pay up; otherwise he would be transferred to the prison of the
jeopardized. Let us turn back for a moment to the beginning of his captivity,
naval arsenal (beylik) and lose all hope of repatriation. At least unofficially
when he refused Mavrocordato's offer of release against payment of 300-600
the Spanish page Abdullah had a share in these deliberations; the author
gold pieces. As De Martelli immediately received 10 ducats when his captivity
reported that the young man had become a good friend who gave him
became known in the Habsburg camp it is hard to take at face value his
important information on how to conduct himself during the negotiations.
assertion to the chief interpreter that he had no way of paying the ransom
At a later stage the central figure was a Jewish mediator known as
demanded. As previously outlined De Martell i was probably worried about the
David Ogli Rosales, who discussed with the kAhya whether the offer of l 000
kind of information he might have to give in exchange for his freedom.
Reichsthaler that De Martelli finally accepted as a feasible ransom could be
Nor was this the only case i n which the author claimed to have paid
taken up in the name of Kara Mustafa Pasa's sons without making Hasan A�a
close attention to the circumstances under which he would accept liberation.
took bad. Rosales also negotiated with a 'Turk' whose name De Martelli did
At a later point in time when he had had ample opportunity to familiarize
not mention. This man was one of the numerous creditors of the deceased
himself with all the hardships of life in prison, De Martelli refused the offer of
grand vizier: as a partial payment, he was offered the weakly captive who
some cavalrymen (sipahi) to buy him from the grand vizier and then collect
irony of ironies now was officially declared a Hungarian. Not that this offer
his ransom for themselves. I As a reason for his refusal the author mentioned
was very tempting to the creditor; but Rosales induced him to accept by
his concern that he would suffer even worse mistreatment from these 'private
explaining that given the large number of competitors for a limited supply of
entrepreneurs' than he had already undergone in the official dungeons. But at
money, he risked getting nothing at all if he did not settle for this capti ve
the same time he recognized very well how risky it was for him to be taken .
right away. In addition Rosales had to ply a subordinate of the ktihya wtth
ever deeper into Ottoman lands as a captive of the grand vizier. Given these
gifts and fine words, for this man threatened to ruin the negotiations at the
circumstances it seems reasonable to highlight De Martelli's statement that he
very last minute. All these parlays involved a substantial risk for the mediator
expected help from the Habsburg authorities established in the fortress of
who at one point was even threatened with the galleys. Unfortunately De
Komorn; if my interpretation is correct i t was important for De Martelli to be
Martelli had nothing to say about the motives of Rosales.
officially ransomed or exchanged. In any case the whole project came to
In the end the deal was concluded and the representative of the currently
nothing apparently because Kara Mustafa Pa�a refused to sell his captive to
absent grand vizier (kaymakam pa§a) had a legal document issued (hiiccet)
the cavalrymen.
that made it all official. After leaving the room the so-called Hungarian was
An official exchange did however seem possible during November­
sold by his new owner in front of four Muslim witnesses. His purchaser was
December 1683, when an Ottoman officer by the name of Mustafa wrote to
the English diplomat Montagu North who had De Martelli taken to the
the commander of Ustolni Belgrad to the effect that he was a prisoner i n
British embassy. Thus in the spring of 1685 De Martelli ceased to be an
Komorn and asked for his exchange against a certain Claudi. This project
was apparently supported by the imperial side, for with the same mail 'CI�udi'
I De Martelli,Relatio captivo-redempti: 46. De Martelli reported that he had seen the letter
.
I De Martelli, RelaJio captivo-redempti: 43. written in Ottoman Turkish and that 1ts contents had been relayed to h1m by a Greek - who
knows, perhaps somebody from the entourage of Maurocordato.
 214 A N OT H E R M I RROR FOR PRINCES
A PRISONER OF WAR R EPORTS 215

Ottoman slave, although apparently the kaymakam later regretted the deal and
De Martelli also was impressed by certain things that h e saw in
had the author searched for without finding him. Although De Martelli did not
Istanbul. On the domestic level he wrote quite enthusiasticall y about the large
say so this may well have been another diplomatic ploy; it is after all
and handsome room in the house of Hasan Aga where he was quartered
perfectly possible if not probable that the kaymakam knew quite well that the
awaiting the result of his ransom negotiations. The author also briefly
former slave was now domiciled in the Biiyiikdere summer quarters of the
commented on the impressive sight which then as today, Istanbul offers when
British ambassador.I Probably we will never recover the exact details. But De
viewed from the seaside. When after his liberation he was able to go
Martelli was issued an English passport and left the Ottoman Empire on an
sightseeing in the vicinity of the Ottoman capital he admired both Byzantine
English ship. On passing through the Dardanelles in the summer of 1685 the
and Ottoman water conduits. I However De Martelli's comments on such
vessel was inspected and the Habsburg officer appeared as the instructor
matters were never more than brief asides: the author remained as he once had
(Hofmeister) of the boys forming part of the ambassador's household: once
defined himself, a pious and perhaps somewhat bigoted Catholic and a devout
again his knowledge of Latin had stood him in good stead.2 Thus De
adherent of the imperial cause.
Martelli's captivity had lasted somewhat less than two years.

In conclusion
Impressions fromforeign parts

De Martelli's account is fascinating for a variety of reasons, one of

Mter describing his departure from Belgrade the author for the first time
them concerning an absence rather than a presence. Although the author knew
made a few remarks showing that at least occasionally he had an interest in the
Latin well, we find no citations from the literature of antiquity with which
people and places that he encountered while in the Ottoman lands. Presumably
quite a few of his contemporaries tended to ornament their texts. This
this change in tone was due to the fact that he was now feeling better,
'straightforwardness' can be easily explained if the interpretation given here is
although he continued to be quite weak. It was a piece of good fortune that he
at all reasonable, namely that De Martelli was an officer on active duty who
did not need to turn over the money received from the Belgrade Catholic
wrote because his experiences were regarded as useful 'war propaganda' on the
congregation to his guards; thus he was able to afford a few extras i n the
'home front', but also in order to justify his behaviour while in captivity. In
course of his travels, including visits to the public baths. In this context the
this context, citations from the Bible or the literature of classical antiquity
author learned if he had not done so earlier, that even relations between
would not have served any useful purpose.2
prisoners of war and their owners were not always and everywhere adversarial.
At the same time this purpose of the author's explains why we find so
To De Martelli's great disapproval some captive young girls had already begun
many bits of military i nformation that must have been obsolete even in the
to live with their captors "like married couples." As we have seen De Martelli
autumn of 1685 when the author returned to Vienna, to say nothing of the
apparently went sightseeing in the mosque of Edime without getting himself
time when the book appeared in print in 1689. Viewed as propaganda in the
or the Jesuit accompanying him into trouble; and when he had to wait for a
war against the Ottomans which after all was still conti nuing at that time,
while in the customs-house of Tekirdag/Rodoscuk, some high-ranking
discussing military details obsolete or not, had a certain utility. Information
Turkish gentlemen treated him to a cup of coffee. The author thus came to
about troop strengths and other such issues created a martial atmosphere and
realize that his status as a captive notwithstanding, normal human relations to
thus emphasized the characteristic quality of the book: it was in every way the
certain Ottoman Muslims were not impossible.
work of a serving military officer. If viewed as part of the author's strategy

l De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 140; the author thought that this was the result of an
intrigue by a dragoman in the service of the French embassy.
2 Ex-prisoners returned from the Ottoman lands were su�ject to. a _number ?f IX Iitical and
?
religious rituals, which De Martelli described in some de�l. 0!' �tmtlar P':'CtJces tn n<Vthern
Italy see Giovanni Ricci, Osessione turca. In una retrov1a cnsttana dell Europa mcderna
(Bologna: II Mulino, 2002).
l De Martelli, Relatio captivo-redempti: 10�. 105, 107, 108. Benaglia, Auj)ftihrliche Reij)­
Beschreibung: 78 also praised the water condutts.
2 As 1 learn from an as yet unpublished paper by Sonja Brentjes, the �oman nobleman Pietro
della Valle, before giving his travel impressions on the Ottoman Emptre �f the 1 � o the
�
printer apparently did legitimize his work before the papal censor by addmg on thts lond of
schola;ly apparatus. 1 have come to my present suppositions and interpre�tions after readi�g
the book of Gudrun Jancke, Autobiographie als soziale Prax�s. Bez1ehungs�onzep�e m
Selbstzeugnissen des 15. und 16. Jahrhunderts im deutschsprach 1gen Raum (KOin, Wetmar,
Wien: Bohlau, 2002). My heartfelt thanks to both colleagues!
 216 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
A PRISONER OF WAR REPORTS 217

of self-justification, it also made sense to show that he had collected and

If we keep in mind that the author's attempts to justify his behaviour to the
relayed this infonnation when he was himself in acute danger; for the resulting
home authorities made it difficult for him to acknowledge his friendship with
message would have been that the author did not neglect the interests of his
a Muslim, the backhanded admissions concerning his relationship to the
sovereign even when he was at death's door.
treasurer take on special importance.
However in the present study we view De Martelli's account i n a
From all this we can conclude that in the late seventeenth century there
perspective that is rather different from that which author, publisher and last
existed something like an elite culture that encompassed the subjects of
but not least the Habsburg censors promoted during the closing years of the
different rulers, and at least some members of the Ottoman elite fonned part of
seventeenth century. As a starting point we have looked at the relationships
this charmed circle. Where the Ottoman realm was concerned this broadly
that a Habsburg military officer had to establish and/or activate in order to
inclusive culture became possible due to the emergence of 'political
survive as a prisoner of war. In De Martelli's case, quite a few of his life
households' whose members saw themselves as part of an elite group, albeit
chances were l i nked to the cosmopolitan composition of Kara Mustafa Pa�a's
without the legally established privileges of European nobilities. 'Aristocrats'
household which the latter had probably set up so as to have a faithful and
themselves, these people could relate to the elites of other countries. The
competent staff available to take over the new province(s) that he hoped to
English aristocrat Lady Mary Montagu, who visited Edirne and Istanbul about
conquer. Certainly Kara Mustafa Pa�·s physician, treasurer and keeper of the
a generation after De Martelli, probably had this situation in mind when she
keys were profoundly loyal to their patron but this connection did not
pointed out that only a personage of high status in his/her own society could
necessarily prevent feelings of solidarity with De Martelli. Thus Maurocordato
expect to find acceptance among members of the Ottoman elite. I
presented himself to the author as a Christian, though not of the Catholic but
the Orthodox variety. As for the Spaniard Abdullah, if the Habsburg officer
judged his fonner friend correctly, he sympathized with the outsider because in
a certain sense, he continued to regard himself as a Christian.
In addition in spite of the numerous conflicts between Christian kings,
in a Muslim context the staffs of European embassies sometimes might build
solidarities on the basis of religion or denomination. Diplomatic
considerations apart such sentiments may have motivated the French
ambassador to send a Jesuit to contact De Martelli in Edirne. Probably the
intervention of the English ambassador and Montagu North at least in part
was motivated by the wish to help a fellow Christian; and once De Martelli
had been liberated the diplomatic representative of the Netherlands also helped
out. In these two instances however i t is difficult to separate solidarity with a
fellow Christian from the political aim of mediating in the Habsburg-Ottoman
conflict, as this issue was important for both English and Dutch diplomats. I
Fellowship between nobles or gentlemen was another source of
solidarity that probably benefited De Martelli. Kara Mustafa �a's treasurer
Mehmed Aga, married to three wives if our author got the story right and thus
well integrated into the Ottoman elite was prepared to make a substantial
financial sacrifice to faci litate the ransoming of his friend. It i s likely that
Mehmed Aga's memories of the society of Polish noblemen in which he had
grown up made it possible for him to develop the personal sympathies
without which he would not have offered to pay part of De Martelli's ransom.

1 GUier, ZiJijilc4r P�: 25. 1 Lldy Mary Wortley Montagu, Turkish Embassy Letters' ed. and introduced by Anita Desai
and IV..a!colm Jack (London: Pickering. 1993): 60.
TRYING TO AVOID ENSLAVEMENT: THE ADVENTURES
OF AN IRANIAN SUBJECT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ANATOLIA

The story

The events upon which this study is based have been taken from a
petition dated 1 174/1760-1; however the text that we possess is not what the
petitioner himself wrote, but merely the response of the Ottoman
administration. This situation is typical for Ottoman practice: the original
letters reaching the central government but rarely were preserved in the
archives. l In this particular instance we only know the petitioner's given
name; it was Himmet. While it was customary to identify people by name and
patronym, the latter is missing in our text. Himmet was a Muslim Iranian,
who according to his own statement had been living for a long time in the
town of Kastamonu in northern Anatolia, where he served a local man. The
latter's patronym also is missing; but his given name was Mustafa. All we
can say is that Mustafa probably was not one of the local notables, for these
people from the seventeenth century onwards not only always declared their
patronyms, but also favoured the use of family names.
Now Himmet, who did not say anything about his line of work
according to his own statement wanted to strike out on his own, in other
words leave the service of Mustafa. However his employer was not ready to
consent and threatened Himmet that he would sell him into slavery along with
his children who had been married for quite some time. Apparently this threat
needed to be taken seriously, as Mustafa had secured the support of certain
notables of Kastamonu in this matter. Even a sultanic order commanding him
to desist had not had the desired effect. Now Himmet asked for a second
official document to forbid Mustafa further aggressions of this kind. But the
Ottoman central government acted as it frequently did in such cases, namely
transferred the case to the qadi of Kastamonu, who was to make a decision on
the rights and wrongs of the dispute. In addition the governor and a colleague
of the qadi of Kastamonu officiating in a nearby town were both informed of
the affair.

1 Bll§bakanhk Al'§ivi-Osmanh Al'§ivi, Anadolu Ahk§m Defterleri (AAD), 35, p. 250, No. 753.
220 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
Unfortunately nothing is known about how the case was finally
decided. Historians who have worked with Ottoman registers will know that
this is a common problem: in this case as in many others only a single entry
survives infonning us of the trouble between Himmet and Mustafa. However
and that is a piece of good luck for the historian, the extant record concerns a
relatively late state of the dispute: much had already happened.
With the help of the available research literature we will now attempt
to place this complaint in its historical context. In so doing we will risk some
speculation about the background of the affair and with all due caution, about
its possible ending. Fortunatel y an excellent monograph concerning the court
of Kastamonu has appeared a few years ago, which covers the period down to
1744; without this study, our task would have been all but impossible. 1 We
will focus on problems connected with the legal enslavement of people from
without the Ottoman realm and the illegal enslavement of the sultans'
subjects; in addition there is the 'grey area' concerning the treatment of Iranian
prisoners of war. In so doing we will try to find out something about the
practices and reactions of enslavers and enslaved, but also about the measures
through which Ottoman officialdom tried to deal with the situation.
Enslaving prisoners of war
Our first question will be: how could Mustafa claim Himmet as his
slave? The first possibility that comes to mind is that the latter had entered
Ottoman territories as a prisoner of war. When Muslims and non-Muslims
were at war, Islamic religious Jaw considered the enslavement of prisoners as
perfectly licit; down to the early eighteenth century not only the Ottoman but
also the Habsburg authorities acted according to this rule. A prisoner of war
could only avoid enslavement if he was either exchanged or else a ransom was
paid. Ransoms were a significant source of income for troops stationed in
border areas; they were usually higher, and often considerably higher than the
price of the same person when sold as a slave. Thus the life chances of a
prisoner of war depended to a significant extent upon the financial resources of
his/her family and the latter's willingness to spend them on his/her behalf. In
the Ottoman lands or in Iran, there were no organizations such as the
Trinitarian monks in Christendom that devoted themselves to the liberation of
prisoners. But even so Ottoman soldiers captured on the western frontiers at
1 Bog� A. Ergene, Local Court, Provincial Society and Justice in the OltO
tnaf! Empirf'. Leg_al
Practice and Dispute Resolution in (:ankm and Kastamonu (1652-1744) (Letden: E. J. Bnll,
2003).
T R Y I NG TO ENS LAVEM ENT 221
AVOID
least, did manage to get ransomed or exchanged, either while hostilities
continued or following a peace agreement. 1
As Islamic religious Jaw prohibits the enslavement of subjects of
Muslim rulers, the presence of Iranian prisoners after any campaign against
the Safavids posed serious legal problems.2 Matters were complicated by the
fact that in their centuries-long confrontation with the Safavids, the Ottoman
sultans refused to recognize the shahs of this dynasty as legitimate Islamic
rulers.3 In the mid-sixteenth century �eyhlilislam Ebussuud Efendi, the
supreme Ottoman juris-consult even decreed that the Iranians were such
malignant heretics that they could no longer be regarded as Muslims.4 Yet
even Ebussuud forbade the enslavement of 'children of the KlZIIba§', as Iranian
Shiites were often called by Ottoman authors.5 Moreover in the seventeenth
century the Iranian court distanced itself from the 'extremist' notions of the
adherents of Shah Ismacil I (r. 1501-1 524), who had regarded their ruler as
divine and instead accepted the 'nonnal' views of the Shiites that recognize the
existence of twelve Imams. But even so certain Ottoman religious scholars as
late as the eighteenth century refused to regard Iranians as Muslims. If this
view was accepted in all its consequences - but only then - the enslavement
of Iranian prisoners became licit in tenns of Islamic law.6
Our text contains a claim of the plaintiff Himmet, which the Ottoman
authorities did not contradict and thus probably accepted as true, to the effect
that throughout the realm, it was forbidden to buy and sell 'such real Muslim
Iranians'. In fact we do not know how many Iranian prisoners of war really
served as slaves in the Ottoman lands for any length of time. As one of the
very few relevant documents that have been studied in detail we can put
forward, in spite of its early date, a list of artists and artisans who served the
I Suraiya Faroqhi, "Als Kriegsge�ang�ner bei den Osmanen: M�!it�rlager u�d HaushaJt des
GroBwesirs Kara Mustafa PS§a 10 emem Augenzeugenbencht 10. Unjre1e Arbelts· und
Lebensverhiiltnisse von der Antike his in die Gegenwart, ed. by Ehsabeth Herrmann-Otto
(Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 2005): 206-34 deals with he fate .of �n A�strian officer who
at one point, was about to be exchanged for an Ottoman; Enghsh
� vers1on m th1s volume.
2
Ertugrul Oiizdag, Seyhiilislam Ebusuud Efendi Fetvalart f$1gmda 16. As1r Tiirk Hayat1
�Istanbul: Enderun, 1 972): 101.
This view explains the treatment of Taclu Hatun, one of the wives of Shah lsmac1l: captured
in the battle of <;aldtran (1514). She was not held for �ns<?m and r�tumed to her h!-lsband �ter
the end of hostilities, but married off to an Ottoman dtgmtary. Ev1dently her earher marnage
was regarded as no longer valid; the sources do not t�ll us what !.�
clu Hatun herself thought of
this procedure. See Ismail Hakk.t Uzun�ar�tlt, . �ah lsma1l 1n Zevces1. Tacit Hammm
Miicevheratt," Belleten, XXIII (1959): 61 1-19.
4 Diizdag, $eyhiilislam Ebusuud Efendi Fervalart: 1 10-1 I .
5
Diizdag, $eyhiils
i lam Ebusuud Efendi Fetvalart: 1 1 I. On Abdullah �endi an �arly eighteenth­
century scholar with views similar to those of Ebu�suud compa�e Htlmar Kr�ger, Fetwa und
� }
en eyh iil:�fldm. vom 17.
Siyar. Zur internationalrechtlichen Gutachtenprax1s der os msch
wm 19. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung des Behcet ui-Fetdva (W1esbaden:
Otto Harrrasos witz, 1978): 125-33.
6 Y. Hakan Erdem, Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise 1800-1909 (Houndmills­
Basingstoke: Macmillan and St Antony's: 1996): 21.
222 A NOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
sultan's court in the year 9321 1526. This text relays the names of certain
people who had been brought to Amasya and later to Istanbul by Sultan Selim
I. (r. 1512-1520) after his Tabriz campaign. 1 In most cases there is no way of
telling what the legal status of the new arrivals may have been. But whenever
this information has been given we learn that the men i n question had been
banished (siirgiin): in other words they had been ordered by Sultan Selim to
settle in another province of his realm. While not permitted to leave the place
to which they had been assigned, in all other respects they had the rights of
free persons.2
Probably the artists whose names appear in the register or else their
fathers had at one point been prisoners of war. But as apparently the pay of
skilful artists/artisans in the Ottoman realm was satisfactory, some of these
men may well have come to Istanbul voluntarily. This document thus does
not provide any indication that in the time of Selim I, any Iranian prisoners
were enslaved. But as so little information is available about the status of
early sixteenth-century palace artisans, we cannot be absolutely sure that no
former slaves have found their way into the register.
Overall, we do not know how Iranian prisoners of war were treated
throughout the period that began with the death of Selim I in 1520. Possibly
a formally accepted principle that 'real' Muslim Iranians could not be enslaved
by the middle of the eighteenth century was still something of a novelty.
Perhaps the relevant decision had only been made after the fall of the Safavids,
when the new ruler of Iran Nadir Shah (r. 1736-47) declared that he was going
to abolish Shiism as the state religion of his realm and have the Shia included
as the fifth accepted interpretation of Islamic law (mezheb) within Sunnite
Islam, on a par with Shafiism, Hanbalism, Malikism and the Hanefi school of
law that was favoured by the Ottoman sultans. This ambitious undertaking
was even the subject of an Ottoman-Iranian treaty ( 1 736). But by the time
'our' document was written, the enterprise had failed; for in 1743 Sultan
Mahmud I (r. 1730-54) explicitly revoked the admission of the Shiites into
the community of Sunnite lslam.3 Yet it seems possible that in the course of
the negotiations the Ottoman side had denounced the enslavement of 'real'
Muslim Iranians and not revoked this principle even after the negotiations had
failed; at least that is how I would interpret the tacit acceptance of Himmet's
declaration by the Ottoman authorities. If so, Iranian prisoners who had fallen
into Ottoman hands during the numerous wars against Nadir Shah should have
benefited from the arrangement.
1 fsmail Haklu Uzun�JIJ, "Osrnanh Saraymda Ehl-i hiref "Sanatkarlar" Defteri," Belgeler
XV (1986): 23-76.
2 Orner LUtfj Barkan.• "Osmanh fl_llparatorlu#unda Bir fsUn ve Kolonizasyon Metodu Olarak
Silrgil.nler," Istanbul Oniversitesi lktisat Faki.iltesi Mecmuas1, XI, 1-4 (1949-50): 524-69; XIII,
1-4 (1951-52): 56-78; XV, 1-4 (1953-54): 209-37.
3 On the continuing hostility of certain Ottoman religious scholars against Shiism see Kruger,
Fetwa und Siyar: 134.
TRYING TO A V O I D E N S L A V E M ENT 223
What exactly is meant by 'real' Muslim Iranians? I would assume that
the expression denoted people that had been Muslims before crossing the
Ottoman borders. After all, the Ottoman armies must have captured subjects
of the shah of Iran who were non-Muslim inhabitants of the Caucasus. For
down to the eighteenth century the latter region was mostly an Iranian sphere
of influence; only during major Ottoman campaigns was the power of the
sultan paramount at least for limited periods of time. 1 It is unclear what
members of the Ottoman judicial apparatus thought about such non-Muslim
captives. If the shah was accepted as a bona fide Muslim ruler, they also
should have been protected due to their status as subjects of such a sovereign.
But if the shah was not regarded as a Muslim, they may well have been
enslaved.
If this set of assumptions is more or less correct, prisoners made in
wars with the Iranians who had only accepted Islam after capture would have
not been protected from enslavement. Such a practice did in fact conform to
Islamic religious law. Moreover it is well known that while slaves typically
were liberated only after having become Muslims, manumission was in no
way an automatic consequence of conversion.2 In peace treaties with Christian
rulers it was often stipulated that non-Muslim ex-captives were to be sent
home. The fate of those that had accepted Islam by contrast was regarded as a
purely domestic affair: thus the 'capitulations' (ahidname) granted to the ki ng
of Poland Michal in 1 672 stated unambiguously that there was to be no
change in the condition of slaves who had already become Muslims.
However whether Muslim prisoners in Christian hands or the non­
Muslim subjects of Christian rulers who had been captured by Ottoman
soldiers really got to go home at the conclusion of a peace treaty always
depended on a variety of conditions. For obvious reasons the people who had
acquired such prisoners might claim that the latter had converted, or even use
their power as slave holders ensure that the prisoners actually did convert.
Other pretexts for retaining the captives surely were not lacking. Seeking the
release of such prisoners thus was often a source of great frustration to the
envoys that had been given these thankless tasks.3
1 Since the reign of Peter the Great the empire of the Tsars was the third great player in the
region. On the conflicts between Ottomans and Safavids in the sixteenth cen tu r y see Bekir
Kiltiikoglu, Osmanll-iran Siydsf Mi.indsebetleri, I. 1578-1590 (Istanbul: istanbul U nive rsitesi
Edebiyat Fakilltesi Yaymlan, 1962), passim (no more published).
2 Dariusz Kotodziejczyk, Olloman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th-18th Century), An
Annotated Edition of 'Ahdnames and Other Documents (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000): 505, 512. On
the liberation of a slave that had not converted see Erdem, Slavery: 3 1 .
. 3 Mehmed Emnl as Ottoman envoy to Russia experienced many difficulties in this context·
compare: Mehmed Emnf Beyefendi (P�a)'mn Rusya Sefareti ve Sefaret-nlimesi, ed. by MUni;
Aktepe (Ankara: TUrk Tari Kurumu, 1974).
224 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NCES
In the case of the non-Muslim populations, Georgians and others that
inhabit the Caucasus and its immediate vicinity the situation was complicated
by the fact that in the eighteenth-century Ottoman provinces of Egypt, Iraq
and even Tunis there was always a need for military slaves, the so-called
Mamluks. It is thus quite possible that many non-Muslim boys and young
men captured in the wars between Ottomans and Iranians ended up in the
service of the Ottoman grandees controlling these southern provinces; and
some of the captives may even have been sold to viziers and pashas who
hoped to enlarge their households in view of rising in the Ottoman
administration. Quite possibly this state of affairs explains why only 'real'
Muslim Iranians, and not the shah's non-Muslim subjects, were explicitly
protected from enslavement
On the other hand Ottoman soldiers did not have a general license to
enslave the non-Muslim subjects of the shah. Even �eyhiilislam Ebusuud,
who as we have seen was a bitter enemy of the Iranian Shiites, had decided
that Armenian prisoners made during the sultans' campaigns against the shah
should not be enslaved as there was no good reason for assuming that they had
fought against the Ottoman armies. 1 As further sources are discovered these
observations and interpretations may yet coalesce into a more coherent picture;
at present all we can do is to assemble the scattered data.
Tradersfrom Iran on Ottoman territory
If Himmet had not been a prisoner of war he could have come to the
Ottoman Empire for purposes of trade, and settled i n Kastamonu. However
commercial opportunities in this provincial town of northern Anatolia were
probably limited, as it lay at a considerable distance from the great caravan
route that connected Istanbul to Erzurum and Tabriz by way of Amasya and
Tokat. But in the seventeenth century the place had possessed a certain
reputation on account of its cottons (bogast) probably of medium quaJity; at
this time cushion covers with printed designs from Kastamonu were on offer
in the bazaar of Istanbul. Furthermore different kinds of nails from the same
town aJso found customers in the Ottoman capital. More important was the
manufacture of copperware from ore mined i n nearby Ki.ire. However we can
assume that the decline of the Kiire mines since the later seventeenth century
had a negative effect on Kastamonu's role i n manufacturing and thereby also
on its role in interregionaJ trade; however some local coppersmiths were active
I Dtlzdag, Seyhiilislam Ebusuud Ejendi Fetvalan: 1 1 1-12.
TRYING E N S LA V E M ENT 225
TO AVOID
even in the early nineteenth century. I But none of these activities provides a
really plausible reason why an Iranian trader should have chosen to settle in
this place.
For the most part Iranian merchants visited the Ottoman lands in order
to sell the raw silk that was produced in the realm of the shahs.2 However
aJready since the sixteenth century, when the silk trade was resumed after the
wars between Selim I and Shah Ismacil I many though certainly not all
merchants engaged in this trade were Armenians. This pre-eminent role of the
Armenians had preceded the monopolization of the Iranian silk crop by Shah
cAbbas I (r. 1587- 1 629). As in the sixteenth century political and religious
controversy between Ottomans and Safavids continued even when the two
empires were not actuaJJy at war, the Armenians being Christians may have
given the sultans' officials less cause for suspicion. After all Iranian Muslims
so often were denounced as secret representatives of the dervish order of the
Safavids, which had its adherents in Anatolia as well.3
In the later sixteenth and early seventeenth century Shah 'Abbas I
moreover had forced the Armenians to migrate to his capital of Isfahan, where
they were settled in a suburb of their own and the most prominent merchants
of the community were given the task of marketing the shah's silk as his
official agents.4 In the Ottoman Empire the Armenian merchants dealt with
local businessmen supplying the workshops of Istanbul or Bursa, but also
with English or French exporters. From Ottoman archival documents of the
eighteenth century we learn that these Iranian subjects, known as acem
tiiccart were well organized. In the Empire's larger cities they possessed
special representatives or consuls known as iehbender. Probably these
consuls would have intervened if an acem tiiccart was enslaved. But Himmet
as a Muslim would not have had easy access to these networks: and if a bit of
fantasizing is permitted, we may imagine him as a former acem tiicrt
ca , who
had become a Muslim at some point and therefore could no longer rely on the
support of his former colleagues in his hour of need.
1 Miibahat Kiitiiko�lu Osmanlllarda Narh MiJessesesi ve 1640 Tarihli Narh Defteri (Istanbul:
Enderun Kitabevi, 19S3): 129, 176, 194. 195, 298; Su�aiya Faroqhi, Towns a_nd Townsrrn;n of
Ottoman Anatolia. Trade, Crafts and Food Production tn . an Urban Settzng (Cambndge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984): 181.
2 Ne§e Erim, "Trade, Traders and the State in Eighteenth Century Erzurum", New Perspectives
on Turkey, 5-6 (1991): 123-50.
3 Halil lnalcak "Bursa XV. Asar Sanayi ve Ticaret Tarihine Dair Vesikalar," Bel/eten, XXIV
(1960): 45-102; Coli� Imber, "The Persecution of the Ottoman Shiites According to the
Milhimme Defterleri 1565-1585," Der Islam, 56 (1979): 245-73.
4 Ina Baghdiantz McCabe, The Shah's Silkfor Europe's Silver. the Eur ian Trade of the Julfa
�
Armenians in Safavid Iran and India (1530·1750) (Atlanta I Georg1a: Scholars Press and
University of Pennsylvania, 1999): 1 15-40.
226 A N 0T H E R M I R R0R F0R PRI NCES
TRYING TO AV O I D E N S LA V E M ENT 227

For the sake of argument we may assume that Himmet had found
legal terms a free person provided his/her services on the basis of a contract
himself on Ottoman territory, perhaps as a merchant or servitor to a trader
that he/she had concluded with his/her employer; in the case of children a
when once again war broke out between the sultan and the shah. If at al i �ent or guardian concluded the contract on their behalf. Such contracts might
possible the subjects of a prince at war with the sultan left the country as
mvolve the completion of a single specific task; thus a courier might obligate
soon as possible.1 Thus the Nuremberg trader Wolffgang Aigen during the
himself to transmit a letter or message. I When extra workmen were needed,
Ottoman-Venetian war over Crete ( 1654-69) represented a Venetian merchant
artisans might employ labourers who were neither their apprentices nor their
in Aleppo, who evidently felt that the risks of a continued presence on
journeymen; in most cases we do not know whether such people were hired
Ottoman territory were too great. As a citizen of the imperial city of
for a specific time or to complete a stipulated task. In large cities such as
Nuremberg, Aigen was a subject of the Habsburg emperor, who was a neutral
Bursa we occasionally hear of places where people looking for work waited for
in this particular conflict When the latter in his tum was embroiled with the
masters who might need them; probably people that entered workshops in this
sultan i n the 1660s however, Aigen himself felt that it was best to leave
manner often were but casually employed.2
Aleppo in a hurry.
We also may find contracts whose duration was not fixed, nor was a
Iranian traders must have arrived at the same conclusion a good deal
specific task stipulated. People entering into engagements of this type often
earlier: for when Sultan Selim I was at war with the first Safavid ruler he had
stmply declared that they hired themselves out (nefsini icare etmek).
arrested and banished the Iranian merchants on Ottoman territory and
Moreover when the contracting parties were illiterate or like Himmet perhaps
confiscated their goods.2 However not all experts in religious law considered
at the beginning of his stay, did not speak Ottoman Turkish, such contracts
this act justifiable; and when Selim's son Siileyman the Magnificent came to
may have been completely informal. Arrangements of this kind only came to
the throne he soon abrogated it.
the notice of the qadi when there was a conflict; and only then did they enter
Given this problematic situation we may assume that Himmel had
into the register.
opted to stay in Kastamonu during the Ottoman-Iranian wars of 1733-36 or
Obviously under such circumstances if the servant was unlucky he/she
174346, perhaps because he had married a local woman. We have good reason
might find him/herself working without pay. Occasionally documents to that
to connect our story to events which by the lime the petition was written were
effect have come down to us: thus the duration of an apprenticeship was often
already some ten to twenty years old. For as we have seen Himmet referred to
not formally established, and some masters continued to employ without pay
married children of his that were accessible to Mustafa, in other words they
young men who long since had acquired a good command of their respective
probably lived in or near Kastamonu. All these remarks point to Himmet's
crafts. Perhaps in some cases people hired themselves out for unspecified
prolonged residence in this town. Furthermore the complaint to which our
services in order to work off their debts; but to date I do not know any
sultanic command responded was by no means the first document issued i n the
examples of this practice. Overall it must sometimes have been difficult for
course of the affair. As a result it is safe to assume that months or perhaps
free people to find service jobs, because many wealthy households felt that
even years had passed since Mustafa had first threatened Himmet and his
their privacy was better protected by employing slaves; the latter practice was
family.
common enough within the Ottoman upper classes even in the second half of
the nineteenth century, when the slave trade already had been outlawed. Given
this difficulty of finding employment, employers often must have had the
How a servant could become a slave
whip hand.3 Or else Himmet may well have known too much about Mustafa's
commercial or private business, so that the latter did not want his former
Himmel did not deny that he was a servant of Mustafa; but we do not
servant out of his control and maybe even as a competitor.
know whether he was part of his employer's household or lived on his own. I n

1 Wolffgang Aigen, Sieben Jahre in Aleppo (1656-/663), ein Abschnitt aus den "Rei.ft­
Beschreibungen" des Wolffgang Aigen, ed. Andreas Tietze (Vienna: Verlag des Verbandes der
wissenschaftlichen Gesellschaften O
sterreichs, 1 980): 7, 120.
� Faroqhi, Towns and Townsmen: 5 I.

2 Fahri Dalsar, Tiirk Sanayi ve Ticaret Tarihinde Bursa'da

3 Dalsar, Bursa'da lpelcfilik: 316.
lpd.fililc
.h
(Istanbul·· Istanbul
Oniversitesi lktisat FakOitesi, 1960): 1 3 1 -33. E ud Toledano, The Ottoman Slave Trade and its Suppression: /840-1890 (Princeton··
.
Princeton Umversity Press, 1982): 78-79.
 228 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
TR Y I NG T0 AV0 I 0 ENS LAV EM EN T 229

Dealing with Ottoman officials

served by little African boys; these had often been captured on Ottoman ships
by pirates who had wealthy Italian purchasers in mind.' Moreover the
As we have seen the administration in Istanbul did not re-issue the
Habsburg aristocracy also acquired little black boys as pages, and in their
earlier ineffective sultanic command, but ordered the qadi of Kastamonu to try
opera 'The Cavalier of the Rose' , written in the early twentieth century Hugo
the case. We do not know whether the dispute had previously come to court.
von Hoffmannsthal and Richard Strauss have included a memento to these
On the face of it, it seems likely, for a man of limited income such as
youngsters in the shape of the page Muhammad.
Himmet would have started out by seeking a solution on the locaJ level. But
But in quite a few cases it probably sufficed to send the kidnapped boy
perhaps the qadi of the time had good contacts to influential people living in
or girl to a distant region where he/she would then have all the trouble in the
Kastamonu; he may have even been one of the people that according to
world trying to prove his/her free status. For where could such boys or girls,
Himmet, Mustafa had mobilized to enslave an outsider from a strange land.
stranded among strangers, find witnesses who would testify to their status as
At the same time the decisions of a qadi did not bind his colleagues.'
free people? Or if the men or women in question had been already been
Therefore it was not unknown for plaintiffs dissatisfied with the outcomes of
manumitted but were now threatened with a second enslavement, they would
their cases to bring them to court a second time. They only needed to wait
need someone to confirm that they were freedmen and freedwomen. In these
until the qadi had changed, and that might happen i n very short order.
cases a rule inherent in Islamic law which placed the onus of proof on the
Moreover it is worth noting that in the eighteenth century, an exponentially
plaintiff might work to the disadvantage of people who had been kidnapped
increasing number of plaintiffs preferred to take their problems to Istanbul.
and illegally sold as slaves. If the victims had no manumission documents
All they obtained from the central administration was normally a command
they were helplessly exposed to the men who claimed to be their owners.
issued in the name of the sultan, in which the local qadi was instructed to try
After all in many cases the latter did not need to prove that they had acquired
the case. Yet to do so was only the judge's normal professional obligation.
their supposed slaves in a legal fashion.
Probably plaintiffs were willing to spend time and money on obtaining such a
At least manumission documents (hiiccets) issued by one qadi were
command because in this manner the qadi was informed of the interest that the
accepted by his colleagues all over the Empire. This was the practice,
central administration took in the case. Thus this official would be sure to
although as we have seen in principle no qadi had the power to force his
understand that he needed to watch his step and that it would not do to decide
fellow judges in any way. Cases of manumission documents being declared
according to the purely Ioca.l considerations that otherwise might affect his
invalid by a qadi on the grounds that he was not obliged to accept the decision
judgment. Moreover in this particular case Himmet may well have hoped that
of another judge have not been found to the present day; and there is a fai r
as a result of his request the administration would reiterate the previous
chance that they do not exist. Even though in Hanefi law witnesses are
command with added emphasis.
stronger proof than documents, in case of manumission the possession of the
Regarded in a wider context problems connected with i llegal
relevant paper was crucial. Certain Habsburg subjects even regarded their
enslavement constantly occupied both the qadis and the Ottoman central
hiiccets as so important that they had them translated and included them in the
administration.2 It often happened that subjects of the sultans were abducted
books in which they later narrated their captivities.2
by robbers or pirates and sold into slavery. In some cases one and the same
In the mid-eighteenth century the time of Himmet's tribulations, it was
person even was enslaved several times: thus Ottoman traders purchased blact
apparently quite common for free people to be abducted, probably because the
slaves from Africa, but might lose the latter on the seas around Italy. Fo
kidnappers wanted to use or sell the victims as slaves. Thus we possess the
at Italian princely courts it was often considered the height of elegance to be
complaint of a descendant of the Prophet (seyyid), who with his wife
had travelled to the little town of Burdur in south-western Anatolia, where the

Halil Sahillioglu, "Bursa Kadt Sicillerinde I� ve Dt§ Odemeler Aract Olarak "KitJbii'I-Kadt"
1 1 Giovanni Ricci, Ossessione turca, In una retrovia cristiana dell'Europa mcderna (Bologna· 11
·
ve "SUfteceler," in Tiirkiye ktisat
/ Tarihi Semineri. Metinler, T
art . lar, 8-10 Haziran 1973,
1�nuJ .
Mohno, 2002): 50-54.
ed. by Osman Okyar and Onal Nalbantoflu (Ankara: . Hacettepe Universitesi, 1975), 103-44, � As an example compare: Johann Michael Heberer von Bretten, Aegypliaca Serviau3
compare p. 115. �uced by �I Teply (Graz:. Akade�sche Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, reprint 1967): 332:
tn
2 Nicolas Vatin, "Une affaire interne: le sort et Ia liberation de personnes de condition Jibre 33 Johann Wild, Reysbesch�e1bung e1'!es Gefangenen Christen Anno 1604 (Stuttgart:
•

illegalement retenues en esclavage," Turcica, 33 (2001): 149-90. StemgrUben, 1964): 228-30 gtves a deatled account of how he received his manumission
.

t
document.
230 AN0TH E R M I RR0R F0R PR I NCES
TRYING TO AVOID ENS LAVEMENT 231

woman had some claims, presumably to property. • According to the

In conclusion
husband 's petition his wife had been abducted; but in this case we do not
know whether it was in order to prevent her from making good her claim, or
Whatever the situation in this particular case it is clear that the
for some other reason. In another case however the intention of enslavement
presence of slaves in elite or simply well-to-do Ottoman households could
was clear enough: another seyyid had lodged a complaint that his little
threaten the freedom of ordinary subjects of the sultans. If there had not been
daughter had been kidnapped; and an inhabitant of Izmir by the name of Kara
any potential purchasers for Himmet and especially for his children, Mustafa
Ali had sold her into slavery.2
would not have tried to enslave the family. Estate inventories of the
In another case taken from the same register, a customer expressed his
eighteenth century indicate that by this time even well-to-do urbanites that
indignation at having been cheated. Supposedly without suspecting any
were part of the subject population found it more difficult to acquire slaves
trickery he had purchased a young slave that later was able to prove his free
than had been true for instance in the time of dramatic Ottoman expansion
status. Now in accordance with Islamic law, the buyer demanded the return of
during the sixteenth century. 1 However such servants still were very much in
his money; in such cases the slave was to be liberated forthwith and the seller
demand even in the 1700s. Presumably this state of affairs encouraged some
had to indemnify the buyer. But here as in other cases it was difficult to
people to threaten and even kidnap young men and especially women in order
transform law into practice; for the seller, whose nickname 'the associate of
to sell them as slaves to wealthy households. For after 1700 the principal
Ali the bastard' perhaps indicated his less than respectable frequentations had
reason for sixteenth-century slave hunts, namely the need for rowers to man
disappeared and could not be found.3
the galleys largely disappeared as navies now consisted only of sailing ships.
In this case the victim of the trickery declared that the man who had
When it comes to speculating about the outcome of the affair: it does
sold him a free person as a slave was i n the habit of engaging in such illegal
not seem very probable that after all the noise and upset that the case must
deals, in other words was a hardened criminal. The Ottoman administration
have aroused Mustafa really had a chance to sell Himmel and his family into
was well aware that slave dealers were likely to flout both religious law and
slavery. Such events were more likely to occur when the prospective slave­
the commands of the ruler; and at least i n Istanbul these traders were kept
holder did not have to worry about possible witnesses. I would surmise that
under fairly strict control.4 We are left to wonder whether i f Himmet's
some kind of compromise was reached, with the mediators who in the
complaint was justified, Mustafa and his allies among the notables of
tribunals of Ottoman qadis so often helped the parties settle out of court
Kastamonu also were in the business of routinely selling free people into
suggesting the necessary arrangements. In the worst of cases perhaps Himmet
slavery. Normally children and juveniles who could not easily defend
was not able to leave Mustafa's employment after all; or else Himmet paid
themselves in court were the preferred victims of such illegal manipulations.
over a sum of money for the privilege. Perhaps one day we will find a
But as the subject of a foreign ruler with whom the sultan often was at war
document shedding further light upon this case.
Himmet also may have seemed an easy prey.
During the past twenty years or so, Ottoman petitions and the court
cases of which they formed an indispensable part have been discussed at length
by a number of historians. Most of these studies have fore-grounded the qadi
registers; but all scholars that have dealt with these collections of documents
know very well that men and women who felt that they had been unfairly
treated and possessed some means might take the trouble of carrying their
1 complaints to lstanbul.2 In all likelihood most of the plaintiffs had sufficient
Suraiya Faroqbi, "Opfer der Gewalt: Einige F:tlle von Mord, Raub uod Bedrohung in
Nordwestanatolic:n um 1160," in Gewa/t in derfriihen Neuzeit, ed. by Claudia Ulbrich, Claudia knowledge of their rights and of legal procedure in general to successfully
Jan.ebowski and Michaela Hobkamp (Berlin: Duocker & Humblot, 2005): 275-90.
2 present their cases; within certain limits Himmet also possessed these skills.
AA!J 3_5, p. 177, No. 541 (1 17411760-61). This case also was passed on the qadi for judicial
exammatton.
3 AAD 35, S. en, No. 283 (1 17411760-61).
4 Suntiya Faroqhi, "Quis Custodiet Custodes? Controlling Slave Identities and Slave Traders in 1
�d
Eighteenth Century Istanbul " in Fr_onti�rs of Faith, ed. by Eszter AndN and 0!1 the large number of slaves in Bursa around 1500 compare Halil Sahillioglu "Slaves in the
Soc1al and Economic Life of Bursa in the late 15th and early 16th Centu;ies'• Turcica'
Seventeenth
y6rg1 T6th (Budapest: Central European Uruvers1ty and European Science Foundation•
lstvlfn G
XVU(l985): 43-1 12.
2001): 1 19-34. 2 Ergene, Local Court: 142-88.
232 A N 0T H E R M I R R 0R F0R PR I NC ES
Our present discussion certainly has shown that the eighteenth-century
Istanbul registers of sultanic commands have a good deal to teach us about the
long-standing problem of illegal enslavement.1 However it is hard to deny that
many questions remain unanswered; and assumptions and hypotheses play a
much larger role in our discussion than we would expect to find in a study of
eighteenth-century developments. Only further discussion of these sources and
their connections to documents contained in the qadi registers will allow us a
better understanding of these matters.
I Due to technical reasons it was unfortunately not possible to consult the qadi registers of
Kastamonu that have now been moved from the National Library to the National Archives in
Ankara.
BOSNIAN MERCHANTS IN THE ADRIATIC
The present author being a historian of crafts and commerce and not a
historian of Bosnia, this modest contribution is concerned with a problem of
trade in general, and Ottoman trade in particular. We will deal with the manner
in which provincial merchants, usually without access to 'politically'
generated funds, financed their various undertakings. Its relevance to Bosnia
derives from the fact that some rather interesting evidence pertaining to this
question happens to come from Sarajevo. I However it is not in a local archive
in which the relevant text has survived, but rather in that great repository of
Ottoman materials known as the 'Documenti Turchi' section of the Venetian
state archives. Here texts made out in the name of Sultan Siileyman the
Magnificent and his successors and grand viziers are found along with letter
drafts and petitions of sometimes very modest merchants, based in Bosnia but
also in Istanbul and Anatolia.2 How the document to be studied here came to
be located in Venice is not the least interesting part of our story.
Any study of trade must include the problem of capital fonnation and
commercial financing, for almost never did an individual merchant have at his
disposal an amount of capital large enough to allow him to 'go it alone' .3
Moreover even if he did possess extensive resources, it was always more
prudent to divide the risks among several participants. However in the
Ottoman case, studies of commercial financing are difficult to undertake
because of a notorious lack of primary sources. To this date, only in Cairo has
a pre-eighteenth-century merchant been discovered who made a habit of
recording his business dealings in the kadi's court, thus providing us with
precious evidence concerning the numerous partnerships in which a wealthy
trader such as Ismail Abu Takiyya came to engage during his reasonably long
career.4 As a result, studies by Ottoman historians dealing with the pooling
1
There exists a large scholarly literature in Bosnian, which I am unable to read, and as a result,
my options are quite limited. I am grateful to Markus Koller for summarizing certain essential
�ublications.
Pedani Fabris, Maria Pia, I "Documenti turchi" dell'Archivio di Stato di Venezia (Roma:
Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, Ufficio centrale per i beni archivistici). The
document to be discussed is recorded under Busta 8, No 990 (p. 252 in the catalogue).
3 Inalcik, Halil, "Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire", The Journal ofEconomic History,
XXIX, 1 (1969), pp. 97-140.
4 Hanna, Nelly, Making Big Money in 1600. The Life and Times of lsma'il Abu Taqiyya,
Egyptian Merchant (Syracuse, 1998). Modern Turkish spelling will be used throughout; as a
result, certain names will appear in the text in a form which slightly differs from that found in
the secondary literature.
 234 A N 0T H E R M I R R0R F0R PR I NC ES
of commercial capital usually have emphasized the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. After all for this later period, commercial accounts penned by
Ottoman merchants of whatever religion or ethnicity, while by no means
abundant, are at least occasionally extant.1
For the sixteenth or seventeenth century, other source materials have to
be used. Registers of the kadis' courts will occasionally contain references to
disputes between members of commercial partnerships, usually focusing on
the division of profits when the association came to be dissolved. But at least
outside of Istanbul, their number is usually too small for coherent discussion.
Or else the accounts of pious foundations (vaklj) have been studied, for at
least in the Turkish-speaking provinces of the Empire and especially in
Istanbul, such establishments often lent out money at interest, at what was
considered a moderate rate, namely ten to fifteen percent.2 Unfortunately such
accounts normally contain only the names of the borrowers and not the lines
of work in which the latter were engaged, which makes it difficult to separate
the takers of commercial credit from the crowd of other borrowers. However a
specialist of this question has recorded his impression that at least in the
eighteenth century, most loans given out by the pious foundations of Bursa
were of rather moderate size.3 All these difficulties in locating appropriate
source material explain why so few attempts have been made to find out how
Ottoman merchants of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries obtained their
working capital.
A register of merchant debtors
However, the document from the Venetian archives which will concern
us here, a short register to be more specific, conveys an unusual amount of
information on commercial credit. The text is a simple listing of borrowers
owing money to certain pious foundations of Sarajevo; but it does tell us
explicitly that all the people so involved were merchants. Unfortunately we
1 <;:izak�a. Murat, A Comparative Evolution of Business Partnerships. The Islamic World and
Europe, with Specific Reference to the Ottoman Archives (Leiden, New York, 1996).
Especially relevant to our purposes is Gedikli, Fethi, Osman/1 Sirket Kiiltiirii. XVI.-XVII.
Yiizy1llarda Mud/Jrebe Uygulamas1 (Istanbul, 1998); among other sources, the author has used
the kadi registers of Galata, one of the most highly commercialized among all the wards of
Is��bul. ln t.his pl�ce, references to the partnership known as mudarebe, very probably the
ongtn of the medteval European commenda, are much more frequent than in other kadi
registers. Gedikli focuses on legal development.
2 Barkan, vmer
A Lutfi' and Ekrem Haklu Ayverdi (eds.), Istanbul Vakljlan Tahrfr Defteri' 953
·
�1546) TtJrthli (Istanbul, 1 970), pp. XXX-XXXVIII.
<;:izak�. Murat, "Cash Waqfs of Bursa, 1555- 1823," Journal of the Economic and Social
History ofthe Orient, 38,3 (1995), pp. 313-54. See particularly p. 337, where the author points
out that only a minute share of all borrowers were able to augment their resources by pooling
capital secured from a variety of foundations.
B 0S N I A N M ER C HANTS I N T H E AD R I ATI C 235
are not told in what goods these people traded; we only know that a few men
were identified as tanners (debbag). These latter entries may mean that in
Sarajevo, there were tanners who had branched out into the wholesale leather
trade, as is known to have happened in other places and later periods as wel1. 1
Moreover the men mentioned in our text as principals mostly had junior
partners who, on their behalf, traveled to 'Frengistan' , that is Catholic and
Protestant Europe. On the other hand, the senior partners seem to have been
sedentary, and managed their businesses from premises in Sarajevo. At the end
of the list, there is a confirmation of authenticity made out by the kadi Hasan,
along with the latter's seal. Unfortunately there is no date, and the name
'Hasan', with no patronym attached, does not provide much of a clue either.
However the Venetian archivists assign this register to the year 997/1589.2
In the second section of our document, introduced by the phrase
'register of traders' properties', we once again find a list of debtors, but this
time, the status of the creditor institution is harder to determine. Apparently
declarations to the effect that these creditors were also pious foundations had
been received by the kadi 's office. But the officials in charge found that claim
difficult to accept, as the interested parties were not able to show any
documents demonstrating that the pious foundations at issue had been properly
established. This reticence would seem to imply that when foundation
administrators turned to the kadi asking for any kind of legal procedure, they
needed to show their written documentation first
Apparently the testimony of witnesses, in spite of its paramount value
in Hanefi interpretations of Islamic law, in this particular context was not
considered very helpful; or else the supposed founders of the vakifs at issue
were unable to provide satisfactory testimonials. This perceived deficiency was
expressed, in the second section of the register, through formulations of the
following type: "owed by Kastm b Mahmud, rthe money lent being the]
1
Faroqhi, Suraiya, "How to Prosper in Eighteenth·century Bursa: the Fortune of Hact Ibrahim
Tanner" in Stories of Ottoman Men and Women: Establishing Status, Establishing Control :
� stanbul, 2 �), pp. 1 13-30.
� . .
The descnptron tells us that the reg1ster IS relevant to an attack upon Bosnian merchants that
took place near the church of Skurje, a Venetian possession. According to Pedani Fabris' 1
"Documenti turchi", p. 252 there is a document relevant to this issue in the section known as
'Lettere e scritture turchesche, filza 4, c. 147' which I have not seen. In this latter text Murad
III complains to the Doge concerning the aggression suffered by the Bosnian merchants :
Moreover Pedani Fabris, I "Documenti turchi", pp. 243-44, No 953 also records a hiiccet of
complaint concerning an Uskok attack against Bosnian merchants near the church of Skurje
t�e pirates ha�ing taken their captives to Lesina. While the microfilm that I have used does not
gtve any particulars about the attack, and does not specify where it took place, it is not v�ry
�robable that two such events occurred close to the church of Skurje at approximately the same
�
lime. lf this reasoning is co�ect, t en I "Documenti turchi", pp. 243-44, No 953 should refer to
the same events as the regtster dtscussed here. But given the numerous pirate attacks of that
time, this is no more than a supposition.
 236 ANOTHER MI R ROR FOR PRI NCES
property of Hact Stileyman, who declares 'I have made it into a pious
foundation' ". This section also was certified as correct by the kadi Hasan.
As to the third list, which is also the shortest, it is composite and may
have been put together after the second one had already been confirmed by the
kadi. For as the heading records, supposed foundation property for which no
documentation could be shown, and which thus should have been recorded in
the second section, was here lumped together with property belonging to
orphans and yet a further category, described as is/a.s-1 vusaya. I would assume
that these latter sums of money had been willed by deceased inhabitants of
Sarajevo to people of their choice, as they were entitled to do with one third of
their property only (islds meaning division into thirds). Presumably because
the legatees were absent or minors, the legacies were being administered on
their behalf by executors/ guardians (vasi, pl. vusaya), who invested the
money by entrusting it to merchants.1 Once again, the list bears the signature
of Hasan the kadi of Sarajevo.
While our register records the amounts of money owed by Sarajevo
merchants to persons and pious foundations, it does not specify the unit of
money involved. However from the context we can gather that ak�e were
probably intended, the only problem deriving from the fact that while Istanbul
foundations of the mid-sixteenth century normally held or at least recorded
their cash in the shape of ak�e. in Sarajevo - and sometimes in Bursa as well
- it was customary to use the dirhem. However as there were no dirhems in
circulation in the Ottoman Empire of the sixteenth century, we can assume
that this latter unit was employed as a money of account only, and 'reaJ'
transactions were in ak�e.2
Clouds of witness
When compiling the register, extreme care had been taken to document
all the debts in question by the testimony of a large number of witnesses. To
begin with, the debt of any individual or partnership to a given pious
foundation or orphan's fund was confirmed by two witnesses. But in addition,
once the debts owed by any one individual to a greater or smaller number of
pious foundations had been enumerated, there was a long list of so-called
§Uhud ul-hal. These were witnesses who seem to have been called in not
because they had necessarily seen the completion of the transaction itself, but
1 Schacht, Joseph, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford, 1964), pp. 173-174.
2 Pamuk, �vket, A Monetary History of the �no� Empire (Cambridge, 2000) pp. 99 and �02
refers to coins called dirhem by modem numismatists, but not to any means of payment wb1cb
sixteenth-century Ottomans called by this name.
B 0S N I A N I N T H E A0R I ATI C 237
M E R C H A NT S
because they had a general interest in the outcome of the case, and probably in
the functioning of the local court as well. Such personages routinely had their
names affixed to the protocols of court cases in the kadi registers, as well as to
any certificates (hiiccet) issued by the judge. 1 Given this situation, it makes
sense to regard our register as just such a certificate, even though it is never
e.xpressis verbis described as a hiiccet.
While we do not know why certain people were selected to act as §Uhud
ul-hal in any individual case, it was common enough to ask people of some
social status to affix their names, in this capacity, to a newly issued
document. By the standards of central Anatolia, the number of witnesses
appearing in the Sarajevo court was very high. In seventeenth-century Kayseri,
it was normal to call in between four and seven people as §Uhud ul-hal, and
twelve constituted an upper limit that was rarely reached, let alone surpassed.
Yet in Sarajevo, groups of about twenty witnesses were no exception, and
rarely was the number lower than eight or ten. However toward the end of the
first section of our register, a whole series of entries concerning debtors to
different pious foundations all were confirmed by the same group of §uhud ul­
hal. References to these people were abridged by using, several times over, the
term 'the aforementioned 1 individuals I'. This must have meant that these
particular entries were compiled in a single session of the court. However we
have no way of knowing whether, whenever the §Uhud ul-hal listed differed
from one case to the next - a circumstance that was also quite common -
these entries had always resulted from separate court sessions.
It has often been noted that whoever selected the §Uhud ul-hal preferred
to involve local dignitaries that is people with some title or other.2 But in the
Sarajevo case, bearing a title was apparently not considered very important.
We find an occasional teacher in a theological-legal college (medrese) and,
just as rarely, a preacher of Friday sermons (hatib). But otherwise, the
witnesses were ordinary Muslims, whose only title was, in a relatively large
number of instances, that of a pilgrim to Mecca (hact). We may interpret this
as an indication that the §Uhud ul-hal concerned by this register were normally
merchants, who would have had more opportunities to perform the pilgrimage
than other more sedentary townsmen. But on this issue, as unfortunately on
quite a few others, certainty is impossible to achieve.
I Jennings, Ronald, "Kadi, Court and Legal Procedure in 17th C. Ottoman Kayseri," Srudia
Islamica, XLVIIl (1978), 142-48.
2 Jennings, "Kadi, Court and Legal Procedure," p. 143-44.
 238 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
Pious foundations as moneylenders. or how to make optimum use of limited
assets
Pious foundations profiting from money-lending certainly appear
contrary to Islamic religious law, which strictly prohibits the taking of
interest. However as the 1546 register of pious foundations edited by Orner
Liitfi Barkan and Ekrem Hakkt Ayverdi demonstrates, this practice was quite
popular in Istanbul by the middle of the sixteenth century. 1 It also spread to
the larger towns of Anatolia and Rumelia, including of course Sarajevo,
although it was never adopted in the Arab provinces of the Empire. In part,
this relative popularity of cash-based pious foundations in Istanbul was
probably due to the fact that about one hundred years after the Ottoman
conquest, within the walls of the capital city there was no longer much real
estate available that pious donors could assign to their future foundations. On
the other hand, trade had taken a notable upswing, ever since the construction
boom of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries had provided Istanbul
with shops and covered markets from which trade could be conducted, while
the return of (relative) peace permitted both Ottomans and resident foreigners
to expand their commercial activities.2
We can therefore surmise that at the seat of the sultans, by the
sixteenth century cash was more abundant than real estate. We may also
assume that there were quite a few people of some means who wished to
devote some of their resources to pious and charitable ends, but who were
unable to acquire houses, shops or gardens in sufficient numbers. Moreover i t
i s worth keeping i n mind that i n mid-sixteenth century Istanbul, women
formed a sizeable percentage of the people establishing pious foundations, but
their share among the owners of real estate was probably much more limited.3
Yet females were likely to possess jewelry and ready money, and the spread of
cash-based pious foundations thus must have made it easier for women to
institute charities that might remind future generations of the donors' religious
merits and worldly reputations.
However, many of these considerations did not apply to provincial
towns; thus i n Sarajevo presumably there was no great scarcity of land
suitable for pious foundations. However money that donors were willing to
invest in pious foundations was made available, at least partly through a
flourishing trade with Venice and Dubrovnik. In addition it is quite possible
1 For one example among a multitude, compare Barkan and Ayverdi (eds.), istanbul Vakiflan,
p. 23, No 153.
2 Inalctk, Halil, "The Hub of the City: The Bedestan of Istanbul.'' International Journal of
Turkish Studies (Madison, Wisc.), l, 1 (1979-80), pp. l-17.
3 Baer, Gabriel, "Women and Waqf. An Analysis of the Istanbul Tahrlr of 1546", Asian and
African Studies, 17 (1983), pp. 9-27.
BOSNIAN M E R C H A NTS I N THE ADRIATIC 239
that the Istanbul model in itself was prestigious enough to invite imitation;
and we might propose a similar explanation for the spread of cash-based pious
foundations to the larger towns of Anatolia, where we find them with some
frequency in the seventeenth century.
Remarkably enough, the early discussion concerning the acceptability
or otherwise of money-lending pious foundations did not focus upon the
taking of interest, but upon the durability, or else the perishable character, of
coins. For Islamic legal scholars demanded that the things assigned to a pious
foundation, as sources of revenue or else for current use, should not be too
perishable. I Real estate was of course viewed as imperishable and therefore
preferable even though only the rights to the land itself were durable. For as
all administrators of pious foundations knew, or else found out to their cost,
buildings were quite impermanent, as they were easily destroyed by
earthquakes and, particularly in Istanbul, by periodic fires.2
By comparison, gold and silver coins appear relatively permanent, as
these two metals are not easily destroyed by chemical processes. However it
was well known to religious scholars, and also to ordinary people that coins
could be demonetized; in fact that happened quite often, namely whenever the
sultans attempted to gain extra revenues by reducing the weight of the ak�e or
guru§. There also might be attempts to restore confidence in the coinage by
increasing its weight, although that happened much less frequently. And of
course a pious foundation that needed to function on the basis of a quantity of
ak�e or guru§ on the point of being demonetized might well sustain
substantial losses when trying to convert this now all but useless money into
current coin. After all, a major reason for re-minting was the profit that
accrued to the treasury in the course of such proceedings, and by contrast, the
gain of the sultan's treasury was the loss of the pious foundation.
It was only after cash-based pious foundations had become part of the
social setup that a more fundamental critique was formulated, particularly by
the scholar Mehmed Birgevi. This pious jurist put his finger on the most
serious problem, namely that the prohibition of interest taking was being
subverted by the very institutions designed to net their authors religious merit.
However even though the teachings of Birgevi were quite influential among
the 'fundamentalist' Kadtzadeliler of the seventeenth century, and also among
later generations, this did not by any means lead to the abolition of pious
1 Mandaville, Jon E. "Usurious Piety: The Cash Waqf Controversy in the Ottoman Empire",
International Journal of Middle East Studies, X, 3 (1979), pp. 289-308. See also �izak�. "Cash
Waqfs,", pp. 316-17. On money-lending pious foundations in mid-sixteenth century Sarajevo
see Norman, York, "lmarets, Islamization and Urban Development in Sarajevo 1461-1604," in
Feeding People, Feedng
i Power, lmarets in the Ottoman Empire, ed. Nina Ergin, Amy Singer.
Christoph Neumann, (Istanbul, 2007), pp. 81-94, see p. 91.
2 �izak�a, "Cash Waqfs,", pp. 316-20. Books, which were often donated to a mosque or
dervish lodge, presented a problem because they were even more impermanent; yet perhaps
due to self-interest, scholarly opinion was willing to accept them.
240 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I N C ES
B O S N I A N MERC HANTS I N THE ADRIATIC 241

foundations based on cash holdings.1 Quite to the contrary, the latter

disciples, nor the specific problems attached to the management of cash-based
continued to flourish throughout the seventeenth and - in part-eighteenth
centuries. A pragmatic justification had been provided by Ebusuud Efendi, the foundations prevented public-spirited personages from establishing and

influential head of the religious establishment under Siileyman the Lawgiver.2 administering them.

For this eminent scholar had pointed out that if cash-based pious foundations
were abolished, many mosques and public charities would have to cease
operations, which could only be to the disadvantage of the Muslim Money-lending pious foundations in Sarajevo and - perhaps - elsewhere
community.3
in Bosnia
In the 1600s charitable persons who wanted to help their neighbors
defray the often unforeseeable and therefore potentially ruinous avarlZ taxes, In our text, the debtors enumerated the pious foundations and orphans'
not rarely instituted cash-based foundations devoted especially to this funds to which they owed money.' Almost sixty such foundations were
purpose.4 Other funds were intended to provide for the upkeep of mosques, and named; the exact number remained unclear, as usually no particulars were
thus the imam of a well-endowed religious institution might be responsible given beyond the names of the founders in question. Thus quite possibly
for the administration of three or four such cash-donations, for which he
several bearers of fairly frequent names, such as for instance Hact Mustafa,
needed to find solvent borrowers. He would also be required to collect the
were in fact two persons instead of one, and had accordingly established more
interest that was to be expended according to the stipulations of the donor, for
than one pious foundation. But as the register did not provide any particulars
instance on purchasing oil for the mosque lamps or providing clean mats
allowing us to distinguish between them, these possible homonyms appear to
when required. As to conditions obtaining in the eighteenth century, especially
us as one and the same person. Moreover the locations of the lending
the pious foundations now often established by ar:tisans' guilds in Istanbul and
foundations also remaining unclear, some of the merchants may have
Bursa held most of their assets in the form of cash. As the accounts were
audited with some frequency, we know something about the borrowers and borrowed from vakifs located not in the town of Sarajevo itself but elsewhere,
also about the manner of administering foundation-owned capitaLS However as probably within Bosnia itself, but in a few instances, who knows, perhaps
throughout the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth century, the currency even outside of the province.
was constantly being devalued, cash-based foundations would have had a very Women were comparatively rare among the founders of cash-based
short life-span had the administrators not made special efforts to raise vakljs that had lent money to the Bosnian merchants whose complaint
additional capitat.6 Thus neither the opposition of Mehmed Birgevi and his
concerns us here. Our register records the foundations of Melek-sima, Mihri,
Ommi, Zahide, Ay�e and Devlethan; all these women were given the title
I Zilfi, Madeline, "Discordant Revivalism in Seventeenth-Century Istanbul", The Journal of
Near Eastern Studies, 45,4 (1986) pp. 251-269.
hatun, which in the sixteenth century still indicated respect. In all likelihood,
2 Diizdag, Ertugrul, $eyhiilislam Ebusuud Efendi Fetvalan Ts1gmda 16. Am Tiirk Hayat1 the foundation of Ommi hatun is identical to that recorded in the kadi register
�Istanbul, 1972). (sicil) of Sarajevo dated 973/1566, which possessed a capital of 9600 or 9900
Imber, Colin, Ebu's-su'ud, the Islamic Legal Tradition (Edinburgh, 1997), pp. 193-95.
Compare also Mandaville, "Usurious Piety." dirhem; here the interest collected by the foundation has been politely
4 Compare the �rticle "avanz" in the islam Ansiklopedisi published by the Turkish Ministry of
disguised as baha-l savb or 'money for cloth', one of the conventional ways
Education, by Orner Liitfi Barkan.
5 Faroqhi Suraiya, "Ottoman Guilds in the Late Eighteenth Century: The Bursa Case", in
,
of recording such matters.2 Given the much greater frequency of women
Making a Living in the Ottoman Lands 1480-1820 (Istanbul, 1995), pp. 93-ll2. patrons in Istanbul, it may be worth finding out why only Melek-sima,
6 Many of them succeeded, at least for a while. Thus in the records produced by the auditors of
the Bursa cash-based and craft-guild-sponsored foundations at the end of the eighteenth
century, we encounter many supplements, probably made after the foundation under discussion 1 The major source for this information is Avdo Suceska, "Vakufski krediti u Sarajevu prema
had been in operation for some time. These additional funds were recorded in the name not of podacima iz sid!ila Sarajevskog kadije iz godine 973, 974 I 975/ 1564, 65 I 66," Prilozi za
the guild itself, but in the name of the individual who had provided the money. Presumably Orientallnu Filologiju, 44-45 (1994-96), pp. 99-131. Once again, my thanks go to Markus Koller
whenever the foundation funds became dangerously depleted, the administrators must have for making me aware of this article and translating the relevant sections.
found some well-to-do merchant or even guild member who was willing to help the foundation 2 Suceska, "Vakufski krediti," p. 121. The Arabic text and the trans.l.ation into Bosnian give
raise supplementary capital. Maybe the administrators even encouraged donations by promising
prospective donors that their names would be entered into the foundation's records and thus divergent figures. However on p. I04, the author mentions a vak1j of Ummi hatun which had a
remembered 'in perpetuity'; after all, similar privileged treatment is accorded to the 'sponsors', much larger amount at its disposal. Possibly the foundation had received donations at different
'benefactors' etc. whose names adorn many museums and libraries today. See also <;izak�. times, which were subject to separate accounting.
Opsirni popis Bosanskog sandfaka iz 1604. godine, ed. by Adem Hand!ic (Sarajevo,
"Cash Waqfs,", pp. 317-320.
·

Whether such measures were already required in seventeenth-century Sarajevo unfortunately 2000), vol. 1/l, p. 76 conta!ns a reference to a small foundation established by Devlete (in
Turkish: Devlet) hatun; but smce Devlet and Devlethan are not the same name, I would hesitate
remains unk.nown. On currency devaluation, compare Pamuk, A Monetary History, p. 40ff.
to identify the two foundations.
242 A N OT H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C E S
Mihri, Ommi, Zahide, Ay�e and Devlethan had been able to enter the
illustrious company of vakzf founders. Were there perhaps customary
impediments to female property holding that did not exist in the capital?
In but a few instances, our list describes the institutions in question in
such a manner that one can at least hope to find out something about them,
however vaguely. This applies to the mosque of Hact Durahan b Nasuh, with
which a school and a buka'a were associated. 1 For in 1614, when the pious
foundations of Bosnia were systematically recorded, there was in fact an
institution named Hact Durahan/ Turban; however this establishment did not
contain a mosque or other buildings, but merely provided money for the
upkeep of street pavements and gave out money for the celebration of nights
that were festive according to the Muslim calendar.2 As the name of the
founder, while not unusual, is not of the 'Ahmed b Mehmed' type, we may
surmise that the two vakzjs had some connection; perhaps the buildings had
been destroyed in a fire, and the founder had decided to rededicate the remaining
capital? A little less vague is the reference to the foundation of Yakub P�a.
for a mescid of this name did in fact exist in Sarajevo in 1614.3 Unfortunately
I have not been able to find out anything about the foundations known by the
names of Bali Be� and Sinan Be�; this is all the more regrettable as both seem
to have been rich in capital, with no less than six debtors recorded in each
case.
A major lender to Bosnian merchants was the complex of mosque,
theological school and other pious and charitable institutions established by
the famous Gazi Htisrev beg, still extant i n downtown Sarajevo.4 According
to the foundation document of 1537, this institution owned 300,000 dirhems
to be lent out in such a fashion that every 10 produced an annual income of l
dirhem. Thus the interest had been set at 10 percent; these figures
corresponded to a capital of 1 ,200,000 akfe, or an annual income of 12,000.5
The foundation administrators were enjoined to lend the money out 'according
to the leriat, avoiding interest'; given the previous specifications, this
probably should be understood as an admonition to not go beyond the rate
specified in the document. Furthermore the administrators were to lend only to
solvent and honest merchants, craftsmen and peasants.
I Redhouse James W., A Turkish and English Lexicon (Istanbul, 1921 ) tells us that this �ord
,
was often used for structures of the religious character whose exact purpose remamed
unspecified.
2 Opsirni, ed. Hand!ic, vol. Ill, p. 34.
3 the register, the lists of debtors are introduced by notes to the effect that the
Opsirni, ed. Hand!ic, vol. 1/1, p. 484.
4 For a translation of the relevant foundation documents into Bosnian compare "Vakufnam�
Gazi Husrev-bega iz 1537", t.rs. by Fehim Spaho in Anonymous, V aku_fnam e iz Bosne I
Hercegovine (XV.· XVI. vij_ek) (Sarajevo, 1985), pp. 61-68, compare particularly p. 64, once
again consulted due to the kindness of Markus Koller.
5 Suceska, "Vakufski krediti;" p. 103.
BOSNIAN MERCHANTS IN THE A D R I AT I C 243
On the other hand, servitors of the Ottoman administration were
considered bad credit risks by the authors of the 1537 foundation document,
and were thus to be avoided: this applied not only to the officers associated
with the governors and locally stationed military men (ehl-i or/), timar-
holders not excluded, but also to judges and teachers in theological schools.
All these dignitaries were mentioned in the same breath as people that were
publicly known as liars and cheats; while the ehl-i orf had bad reputations
throughout the empire, the inclusion of judges and teachers of law and divinity
is rather more surprising. I It has been suggested that servitors of the sultans
were considered poor credit risks because they were moved at short intervals,
and could thus avoid their creditors; this was certainly part of the problem.2
But at times we find a similar stipulation even where foundations based in
Istanbul were concerned. Yet as higher functionaries normally lived in the
capital while lobbying for new appointments, the problems caused by
functionaries' mobility should have been less urgent here than in a border
province, where officials did not normally remain once their terms of office
were over.
We may assume however, that high-level officials could - and did -
use their political contacts to avoid payment, and that this possibility caused.
the donors supplying pious foundations with capital to view them with
considerable mistrust. And on a more general level, it is worth recalling that
in the late sixteenth century, the governors sent to the provinces along with
their retinues were often viewed as people with whom the locals only
associated if they planned to cause trouble to their neighbors. Thus it would
seem that reprobation went beyond the simple issue of credit-worthiness and
touched upon matters of overall morality; for it was common enough, and the
foundation document associated with Gazi Hi.isrev forms a graphic example of
this trend, to demand that borrowers be of good reputation and regarded as
trustworthy in their communities.
Why compile a list of borrowers in serious trouble?
Against this backdrop, we will try to determine why our register of
merchant debtors was compiled, and this will allow us to explain how it
finally came to rest in the Venetian archives. In all three sections of
1 Faroqhi, Suraiya, "Political Activity among Ottoman Taxpayers and the Problem of Sultanic
Legitimation (1570-1650)" Journal ofthe Economic and Social History ofthe Orient, XXXIV
(1 992), pp. 1-39.
2 Sueeska, "Vakufski k:redili;" p. 109.
244 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NCES
traveling members of certain commercial partnerships had, on the return trip
from 'Frengistan', been attacked by robbers, or as our text put it, by
'unbelievers whose faces bite the dust'. Some of these unfortunates had been
killed, while others had been carried off. We are also told that information
concerning the fates of the prisoners and murdered men had reached Sarajevo
by means of their more fortunate travel companions who had managed to
escape. Moreover when mentioning the names of certain individual debtors,
the text sometimes specifically stated that this or that person was either dead
or had been imprisoned.
Thus our register was no routine product of an auditor attempting to
ensure that foundation administrators did not make off with the money
entrusted to them, but rather the outcome of a special emergency. Now the
fact that this register is located i n the Venetian archives makes i t seem
probable that it was originally addressed to the Signoria, even though the
covering letter which originally must have accompanied it, seems to have
been lost. However from other documents in the Venetian archives, i t is
possible to reconstruct at least part of the context. I
We have seen that in their complaint, the Bosnian merchants placed
special emphasis upon the fact that they were in debt to pious foundations or
else to funds held in trust for orphans. For apparently the debtors were required
to repay the money borrowed even if their trading ventures had ended in
disaster through no fault of their own. This would not have been the case had
the trustees in question entered into a partnership (mudarebe) with merchants
planning to travel, for in such instances, the loss would have been borne by
whoever had provided the capital.2 From this state of affairs, we can conclude
that lending money at interest was conceived as a means of protecting the
sums of money owned by pious foundations, as well as those held in trust on
behalf of orphans, from dilapidation. No matter what happened to the venture
in which the funds were invested, the beneficiaries were guaranteed that the
1Faroqhi, Suraiya, "Ottoman Views on Corsairs and Piracy in the Adriatic," in The Kapudan
Pasha. His Office and his Domain, ed. by Elizabeth Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 2002), pp. 357-
71 and reproduced in the present volume.
2 In his study of eighteenth-century cash-based Bursa foundations, Murat (,;izak�a has shown
that these institutions did in fact receive interest ((,;izak�a, "Foundations", pp. 330-33).
After all, the sums of money the administrators derived from the funds placed at the disposal of
the foundation in their charge always constituted a set percentage of the original fund, ten,
twelve or fifteen percent according to the case at hand. This regularity would have been
impossible to achieve had these foundations entered into commercial partnerships.
If further proof were required (which, in my view, is not the case), then the evidence disc-ussed
here also could be taken to show that the pious foundations of late sixteenth-century Sarajevo
did not participate in mudOrebes.
B0SN IA N M ERC H A NT S I N TH E A DR I A TI C 245
invested capital would return to them, an arrangement that was not possible in
the standard types of commercial partnership.1
As the next step, we may ask ourselves why the Ottoman authorities
felt that the Doge and his advisors should be informed of the especially
difficult situation of the Sarajevo traders. Such a gesture seems intended to
appeal to feelings of fairness and compassion. But if we focus on the world
views reflected in the official parlance of both Ottomans and Venetians, it does
not seem to make much sense to assume that the authors wished to appeal to
the finer sentiments. After all in the view of a sixteenth-century sultan or
vizier, Venice was located outside of the Islamic world, and with the ruling
group of such a state, no community of values was imaginable. And as any
historian of early modem Europe is well aware, similar assumptions were
made in 'official Venice' as well. Therefore what was the point of describing
in detail the plight of Bosnian or other Ottoman merchants who owed debts
that due to the losses suffered, they could scarcely repay?
However when we read the numerous letters written by Ottomans who
were not sultans to the Venetian authorities, it is not rare to find remarks
which show that some people were willing to go beyond this binary
opposition of the Muslim and Christian worlds. When on a personal level, an
Ottoman dignitary maintained reasonably good relations with Venice, he
might for instance allude to the fact that as rulers of 'serious' states, both the
Sultan and the Signoria knew how to handle political problems and prevent
them from getting out of hand. Examples of economically-based pragmatism
could also be encountered. Thus the Doge and his advisors were sometimes
reminded that if they failed to protect traders, the latter would find other routes
- for instance through the territory of the Venetians' hated rival, the Ottoman
dependency of Dubrovnik. This of course could only be of great disadvantage
to Venice, whose position in international commerce, as was probably well­
known in Istanbul, in the seventeenth century was being challenged by
powerful competitors.2 By implication, merchants ruined because of their
debts back home would cease to trade, and that would mean a further reduction
of turnover for their Venetian business partners. Given these circumstances, it
made sense to encourage the Signoria to do everything in its power to help the
traders recoup their losses.
1 Compare Gedikli, Osman/1 $irket Kiiltiirii, pp. 213-36. The same author also has some very
valuable �evelopments on what h�ppened if the muddraba capital was lost through no fault of
_
the traveling merchant, and also m cases _m wh1ch the latter was in fact netd responsible·. pp.
237-55.
2 Sell�, Domenico, :crisis a
!'d Transformation in Venetian Trade," in Crisis and Change in the
Venetian Economy m the Su:teenth and Seventeenth Centuries, ed. by Brian Pullan (London,
1968), pp. 88-105.
 246 A N OT H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I N C E S
On the other hand, such claims apparently were only convincing to the
Venetian authorities if they had been authenticated by the proper authorities.
Complaints from traders who had been robbed certainly were frequent in the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. After all, this was the time in
which the aggressions of the Uskoks, pirates subject nominally to the
Habsburgs but inclined to rob Christians and Muslims with equal relish,
occurred with maximum frequency} Moreover Ottoman merchants who had
been robbed tended to complain, often certainly with some justification, that
the Venetian captains responsible for the safety of travelers in the northern
Adriatic had made common cause with the pirates.2 On the other hand, it was
at this time regular practice on the part of the Sultans to demand restitution of
the losses sustained by their subjects from the Signoria. Or else, so it was
occasionally threatened, a naval detachment would have to be sent from some
Ottoman port in order to deal with the piracy problem. In order to prevent
such an occurrence, the Venetians therefore had to go to some trouble and
expense to recover goods robbed by the Uskoks and other pirates. It is likely
that before beginning such difficult procedures, they demanded authenticated
documents (hiiccet) from the Ottoman plaintiffs applying to them.
Understanding the meaning of such documents should not have presented
much of a problem to the Venetian authorities, for there were quite a few
translators who were familiar with Ottoman, and also knew the relevant
bureaucratic procedure.3
However one question must for the time being remain unanswered: did
the Venetian authorities in fact accord priority to merchants who had borrowed
money from pious foundations and/ or orphans, or was this simply an
assumption of the kadis and merchants back in Sarajevo? For there does not
seem to be any doubt that at least the kadi Hasan had this matter much at
heart. Or less he would not have compiled separate lists of people who had
borrowed money from authentic pious foundations, and of those who were
indebted but could not prove that their creditors really possessed vakifstatus.
For if the Venetians' concern was principally with the fact that bankrupt
Ottoman merchants could not continue to trade, then the damages suffered by
I Bracewell, Catherine Wendy, The Uskoks of Senj, Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the
Sixteenth-Century Adriatic (Ithaca, London, 1992).
2 Pedani Fabris, / "Documenti turchi", p. 276, Busta 9, No 1078.
3 Many of the Ottoman documents recorded in Pedani Fabris, I "Documenti turchi" have
contemporary translations into Italian attached to them. On the world in which such
intermediaries lived, compare Kafadar, Cerna!, "A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim
Merchants Trading in the Serenissima", Journal of Turkish Studies. 10, (1986), Raiyyet Riisumu,
Essays presented to Ha/il lnalcik ..,pp. 191-218.
On arguably the most sophisticated translator in the si�teent�-centu� Y_enetian service, who
was also sent to Iran as an ambassador, compare Pedam Fabns, Mana P1a, In nome det 'Gran
Signore. Inviati ottomani a Venezi
a da/la caduta di Costantinopoli alia guerra di Candia
(Venezia, I994), pp. 29 and 44.
B O S N I A N M ER C H A NTS I N T H E A D R I A T I C 247
the suppliers of capital in a mudaraba were to be taken just as seriously as
those sustained by debtors to pious foundations and orphans' funds. Thus from
the Venetian point of view, there should have been no difference between the
two categories. But perhaps after all it was assumed in the court of Sarajevo
that these debtors were in such a parlous position that anybody involved in
international trade, even if an 'unbeliever', would sympathize with their
plight? The problem needs further investigation.
Conclusion
We may thus conclude that 'our' register was meant to authenticate the
claims of a sizeable group of Bosnian merchants who had been robbed,
presumably by Uskok pirates. These claims were directed not against the
robbers themselves, who remained inaccessible in their mountain fastness of
Senj, but against the Venetian state. For the Signoria claimed the right to
police the Adriatic, and this claim was accepted as convenient by the Ottoman
Sultans. Of course the effectiveness of such complaints must not be over­
estimated. In the best of cases, the Venetians were only able to retrieve part of
the goods stolen, and sometimes the ship itself, which was difficult to hide
and for which the pirates themselves might not have had much use. On the
other hand kidnapped merchants and easily transportable wares might be harder
to retrieve. After all the Veneto-Ottoman understanding in these matters
specified that the Venetians could not be expected to enter a foreign state in
order to retrieve prisoners or stolen goods.1 However there were pirates who
were Venetian subjects, and in those cases, the Signoria was expected to
proceed against them directly.2
From a present-day viewpoint, the reaction of a prudent merchant
would have been to seek maritime insurance, especially since in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, Ottoman owners of ships did sometimes avail
themselves of the insurance facilities existing in Venice. After all at about
this time, a famous case was fought out in Istanbul which involved a ship
that was lost while insured in Venice; the question the Ottoman authorities
had to decide was whether the bailo, as the representative of the Venetian
state, could be held responsible for the debts of Venetian insurers - after a
great many arguments back and forth, it was decided that he could not.3 But
1 Senj formed part of the Habsburg border territories.
2 Compare Fabris, Antonio, "Un caso di pirateria veneziana: Ia cattura della galea del bey di
Gerba (21 ottobre 1584)" Quaderni di studi arabi, 8 (1990), pp. 91- t l2.
3 Compare Tomaso Berte!�. ll palazzo degli ambasciatori di Venezia a Costantinopoli e le
anriche menwrie (Bologna, 1932), p. 139, note 97. I owe this reference to Benjamin Arbel, to
whom I am profoundly grateful. There is another study on this subject, but in this respect, I can
do no more than to quote Fernand Braude!: reference egaree.
 248 A N O T H E R M I R R O R F O R P R I NCES
then the Ottoman ship owners who purchased insurance in Venice may have
been larger i nvestors than the comparatively modest businessmen operating
out of Sarajevo.
From the hficcet examined here, it is apparent that in late sixteenth­
century Bosnia, cash-based pious foundations were frequently used by
merchants to finance their business acti vities. While we cannot identify most
of these institutions i n official registers of pious foundations, it is worth
noting that some large and very well established institutions, such as the
vakifof Hiisrev Beg, had acquired cash funds that were lent out to merchants.
We may hypothesize that most private owners of capital avoided relatively
high-risk operati ons, such as crossing the Adriatic in an age of piracy.
Therefore Sarajevo traders doing business in Venice seem to have had trouble
finding people willing to enter into muddrabas, for the latter would have had
to sustain the loss in case the capital came to grief through no fault of the
traveling partner. Thus traders were reduced to finding the necessary cash under
conditions relati vely disadvantageous to themselves, and borrow from pious
foundations and orphans' funds: for as we have seen, whatever happened to
their business ventures, the hapless merchants still were obliged to pay back
their debts to these especially privileged creditors.
THE OTTOMANS AND THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE
ADRIATIC
A discussion of relations between early modern kingdoms and empires: the
Ottoman viewpoint
Complications in the Adriatic region between Venice, the Habsburg
Empire and the Ottoman sultans have been studied quite frequently; but while
many of these studies are very thorough and detailed, the Ottoman perspective
all too often is missing. At the very most, this or that reaction of a sultan or
vizier will be studied on the basis of European sources reporting the
impressions of a Venetian, Habsburg or French envoy. Thus it is easy to
come away with the impression that the Ottoman power elite had little to say
on the subject of the Adriatic, perhaps because the Empire was mainly land­
based and therefore problems concerning maritime traffic were not taken very
seriously. Yet such an interpretation seems to be quite mistaken; and in this
article we will attempt to present a more appropriate evaluation of Ottoman
views and intentions concerning maritime trade in the Adriatic region.
Quite recently however a number of studies have been published that do
include the Ottoman perspecti ve; with respect to Venice, Maria Pia Pedani
Fabris and Daniel Goffman have made especially important contributions. 1
But as Goffman has explained in a convincing fashion, it is often very hard to
'synchronize' the statements of Ottoman sources and their counterparts written
by authors from Western or Central Europe; for sultans and viziers had their
own agendas that often were quite different from those of European potentates.
Opportunities for dialogue on the official level were therefore limited; and
certain questions concerning the Ottoman-Venetian relationship for instance,
are treated in Ottoman sources either cursorily or not at all. Furthermore at
least where the early modem period is concerned, more documents concerning
Adriatic - and for that matter Mediterranean - navigation survive in Venice
than in Istanbul. Therefore even if historians make a concerted effort to 'take
both sides into account' they may find themselves emphasizing the Venetian
standpoint to the disadvantage of its Ottoman counterpart. To balance this all
but unavoidable defect we can only try to analyze all source materials produced
by the sultans' officials with particular thoroughness.
I Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, In nome del Gran Signore. lnviati ottomani a Venezia dalla caduta di
Costantinopoli alia guerra di Candia, Venice, 1994; eadem, Dalla frontiera al confine, Rome.
2002; Daniel Goffman. Britons in the OttOIIUJn Empire 1642-1660, Seattle and London. 1998;
idem, The Otloman Empire and Early Modern Europe, Cambridge, 2002.
 250 A N 0T H E R M I R R 0R F0 R PRI NC ES
Certainly in the years just before and after 1600 the Ottoman central
government took a close interest i n the fate of its traders travelling to Venice.
All merchants who were Ottoman subjects, whether they were Muslims, Jews
or Christians, might tum to the sultans' court when they needed protection
from robbers on land and pirates on the high seas. To some extent the
Ottoman court was concerned with the customs revenues that could be
collected from successful traders after their return; this consideration was
voiced quite often and thus must have been part of the principles of good
government in the Ottoman lands as well as in Christendom. But in addition
the �ultans' concern with the fates of their merchants also was politically
motivated: after all an attack by foreign subjects against Ottoman traders at
least symbolically also involved a challenge to the power and legitimacy of
their rulers in Istanbul.
The sources
Subjects of the sultans who were attacked by robbers and/or pirates
could procure themselves official letters written in the names of the sultan
and/or grand vizier of the time, which put pressure on the Signoria of Venice
to compensate the victims of crimes that might or might not have been
committed by Venetian subjects. But whatever the rights and wrongs of the
case at issue, the attacks had occurred in waters which the government of
Venice claimed to control. By sending a special messenger (faVu§) to the
Serenissima, the Ottoman authorities stressed the importance of the robbery,
demanding the recovery of the stolen goods and/or the punishment of the
robbers. 1 These envoys had to be housed and entertained at the Signoria's
expense; thus the latter had good financial reasons for solving the affair in
question as quickly as possible. In consequence the Venetian archives contain
a good deal of information about these Ottoman messengers and their
business.2
Apart from turning to the sultans, Ottoman merchants who had been
robbed on Venetian territory, or else on the Adriatic itself also might petition
the doge for help in recovering at least part of their goods. As a result of both
these procedures a considerable amount of correspondence concerning the
problems of Ottoman traders in the Adriatic lies in the Venetian state archives,
1 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Otto� Vie�s on Corsairs and Piracy in the Adriatic," in The Kapudan
Pasha. Hsz
. f!ffic� and hi
sD omazn, ed. by Elizabeth Zachariadou, Rethymnon, 002: 357-71
�reprod� ·� th1s volume). 2 Bombaci.
Pd
eamFabns, /n IWme del Gran SigMre, passim.
THE OTTOMANS AND THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE ADRIATIC 251
and some fifteen years ago has been made accessible by a very full and detailed
catalogue.1
The petitions of such traders typically have been written in a simple
form of Ottoman Turkish. Mistakes are not rare and both style and
handwriting make it clear that the authors were literate but only on an
elementary level. Most of these petitioners were Muslims: this fact is worth
noting because many Christian and Jewish subjects of the sultans were robbed
in the Adriatic under exactly the same conditions; at least some of these men
must have been literate in Ottoman as well. But presumably non-Muslim
Ottoman subjects mostly wrote their petitions in languages such as Greek,
Slavonic or even Italian. However, at least some Muslim Bosnian merchants
that were not native speakers of Turkish also preferred to write their petitions
in this official language of the Ottoman administration.2
These petitions cum complaints throw an unfortunately rather meagre
ray of light on the manner in which traders from the sultan's lands that
otherwise have left few written records, presented themselves to the
authorities: even fairly well-to-do merchants often thought it politic to
approach both sultan and doge in the guise of humble petitioners. Furthermore
these accounts allow us to pinpoint some of the danger spots on the way from
Istanbul to Venice. Upon occasion our texts also show the arangements that
Ottoman travellers might make in order to protect their persons and goods.
But apart from to these records in Turkish that were preserved in
Venice, we possess a further collection of relevant source materials located in
the archives of Istanbul, known as the 'Foreigners registers' (Ecnebi defterleri)
or more precisely as the 'Registers concerning foreign states' (Oilvel-i ecnebiye
defterleri). Unfortunately many of these registers seem to have been lost; and
those concerning Venice while among the oldest to survive, begin only in the
early seventeenth century. In these document collections we find the replies
issued in the name of the sultan to the requests and petitions of the
ambassadors of foreign rulers. The original petitions were never copied out;
but it was customary to preface the actual command by a summary of the
correspondence that had occasioned it. In the Venetian case most of the letters
asking for the sultans' intervention and thus setting into motion the
bureaucratic process were written by the scribes of the permanently resident
1 Maria Pia Pedani Fabris, / "Documenti turchi" deli'Archivio di Stato di Venezia; Roma, 1994.
This archival catalogue is made accessible to the non-Ottomanist by its long summaries in
Jta.lian of many of the most important documents: they mostly have been prepared by Alessio
2 Suraiya Faroqhi, "Bosnian merchants in the Adriatic," in Ottoman Bosnia, A History in Peril­
this publication has also appeared as The International Journal ofTurkish Studies, 10, 1 2 ed. by
Markus Koller and Kemal Karpat (2004): 225-39 (reprinted in this volume).
- ,
 252 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR PRI NCES
representative of the Signoria known as the bailo (often spelled balyos
Turkish). Most of the sultanic commands deal with Istanbul and the city's
immediate environment; but as the Venetians possessed a well-developped
consular network in many places that their traders might visit. the ambassador
might intervene in favour of merchants and consuls situated in fairly remote
provinces as well. Moreover for reasons that are not always clear, the interests
of certain Christians subject to the sultans, particularly the Maronites living
in Mount Lebanon, also were occasionally defended by the bailo, and therefore
the relevant sultans' commands found their way into the 'Registers concerning
foreign states' covering the affairs of Venice. 1
Strangely enough Ottoman chancery officials were in the habit of
copying edicts concerning Venice and Dubrovnik/Ragusa into the same
volumes, even though the two polities were bitter rivals and the tiny city-state
of Dubrovnik was a tributary of the sultans. Possibly this custom dated back
to the ti me before 1570 when Venice also paid tribute to the Ottomans for its
possession of Cyprus, so that from the Istanbul perspective, the legal status if
not the physical power of the two republics was comparable. Moreover the
spelling of the names of the two cities in the Arabic script must have helped
to perpetuate the custom: when only the consonants are written the terms of
'Venedik' and 'Dobra-Venedik' (Dubrovnik) look rather similar, especially if
we take into account that in this script. 'd' and 'v' are easily confused if written
by a careless scribe. In the present article we will concentrate on one of the
earliest among these 'Registers concerning foreign states'. Found in the series
'Diiveli ecnebiye' it dates to the early seventeenth century and mainly covers
Venetian affairs.
Commerce in context
Viewed from Istanbul it was the principal role of the provinces to
supply the sultans' court, the armies, the navies and last but not least, the
population of the capital. Demands in money, food, raw materials and human
labour were quite high, and securing them formed one of the major tasks of
I B�bakanhk AJlivi-Osmanh AJlivi, Sektion Maliyeden mildevver (from now BA-OA, MM)
No. 6004 and 17901; these two registers have been miscatalogued and actually belong into the
series DUveli ecnebiye. Both of them cover the period from 1618 to 1628. Sultans' commands
dated to these very same years are also fou.nd in BA-OA, Series DUveli ecnebiye 13/1. l still
have not been able to detennine the criteria by which these rather similar documents have been
distributed over the three surviving registers. When writing "The Venetian Presence in the
t
Ottoman Empire•, The Journal of European Economic His ory (Rome), 15 (1986): 345-84,
i
repri nt in The Ottoman Emp re and the World Economy, ed. by. Huri fslamoglu lnan,
Cambridge, 1987: 31 1-44 I only knew MM 6004 und 17901. My acqaintance with O!lveli
ecnebiye 13/1 is still quite recent.
THE OTTOMANS A N D THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE ADRIATIC 253
in
local administration. In this perspective the western Balkans and the Adriatic
coastlands doubtless were less important than the Aegean region. Given
natural conditions it could not well have been otherwise: both in the eastern
Balkans and in western Anatolia agricultural resources were and are much
greater than i n the Adriatic coastlands. For in Dalmatia the strips of land with
a Mediterranean climate are quite narrow and the adjacent mountains rough and
infertile. Furthermore the Aegean is much closer to Istanbul, and to reach the
eastern Mediterranean from the Adriatic it was necessary to circumnavigate the
Peloponnesus, a difficult and sometimes dangerous undertaking under
seventeenth-century conditions. As a result Ottoman archival documents have
much Jess to say about the region that concerns us here than about Macedonia
or Thessaly with their cottons, raisins and woollens so often delivered to the
Ottoman capital.
Even so in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries there were quite a
few Ottoman merchants in the Adriatic region if only because traders on their
way from Istanbul to Venice could not avoid passing through. Moreover
Muslim, Christian and Jewish subjects of the sultans lived in the city of the
doges over lengthier or shorter periods of time, trading over long distances not
only with the Ottoman capital but even with far-off Ankara. It is thus a
mistake to assume that the initiative in this trade was always on the Venetian
side. I A broad selection of goods arrived from Istanbul; Ankara was a source
of mohair fabrics and yam. Ottoman documents only begin to cover this trade
from the second half of the sixteenth century onwards. But for this latter
period, relatively 'late' by the standards of the Venetian historian. they have a
good deal to tell us.
Thus around 1 574-75 the inhabitants of a number of villages and small
towns in the vicinity of Ankara responded to the complaints of a tax collector
about the poor quality of the silver coins in which they had paid their taxes,
pointing out in their defense that the only coin they had at their disposal was
that received from middlemen as payment for their deliveries of mohair to
Venice.2 Certainly explanations given to the tax collector always should be
taken with a grain of salt, yet the Ottoman office-holders involved must have
known the economic activities of the region reasonably well and even if not
strictly truthful, the excuse that no better-quality coins were available at least
must have sounded believable. From this story we can conclude that by the
1570s exporting mohair to Venice was a significant source of income to
certain villages of the Ankara region.
1 Cemal Kafadar "A Death in Venice (1575): Anatolian Muslim Merchants Trading in the
Serenissima• Jou �nal of Turkish Studies, 10 (1986), also published as Raiyyet Riisumu, Essays
presented to Ha �
lil lnalcik ...: 191-218; Benj n Arbel, Trading Nations, Jews and Venetians in
the Early Modern Eastern Mediterranean, Le1d en, 1995.
2 BA-OA, Milhimme Defteri 24, p. 231, No. 614
(98211574-75).
 254 ANOTHER M I R R OR FOR PRINCES
THE OTTOMANS AND THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE ADRIATIC 255
How were these products carried to the Adriatic, and from there to
As for the Venetian authorities they were willing to invest in the new
Venice? As even in the second half of the twentieth century Ankara's road
connections to the Black Sea coast were mostly quite poor, we may assume route because in this way they hoped to diminish the trade of their eternal rival

that many traders preferred the caravan route to Istanbul. As an alternative, it Dubrovnik. Around 1620 the latter town did in fact suffer major commercial

was possible to travel through Izmir, especially when after about
town had developed into a major port.1 But the complaints of merchants that
had been attacked by pirates were so frequent that in spite of the higher costs
involved, i n all probability many traders preferred to traverse the Balkans,
reaching an Adriatic port by an overland route. This assumption fits in well
with the observations of Fernand Braude!, who now over forty years ago noted
that in the second half of the sixteenth century, Mediterranean maritime routes
had become so insecure that many merchants re-discovered overland
transportation.2
As a result the ancient Roman road known as the Via Egnatia was used
not only by soldiers but also by traders, although Ottoman documents usually
were concerned with its military functions. In these records we find the
expression sol kol or left arm; this term applied to the south-western route
that led into the Balkans from Istanbul; for when the traveller's back was
turned towards the Ottoman capital, the sol kol lay on his left-hand side.
Among the Adriatic ports which could be reached on the Via Egnatia the most
important was Dubrovnik; just like Venice this town was without antecedents
in antiquity, having come to prominence only in the middle ages.3
In 1573 the peace treaty between Sultan Selim II (r. 1566-74)
Signoria that ended the Cyprus war had stipulated that the coasts of the
Adriatic should be patrolled by Venetian captains, to protect Ottoman and
other traders from attacks by the numerous corsairs and pirates infesting these
waters.4 At some point in time the two sides also agreed that Gabela, a port
originally preferred by Ottoman subjects as the starting point for their
crossings of the Adriatic should be given up i n favour of Spalato/Split, a
place located on Venetian territory. The Ottoman side agreed to this change as
the powerful Jewish merchant Daniele Rodriga had persuaded the Venetian
1650 this losses. 1 Moreover given the expanse of water to be patrolled and the multitude
of corsairs and pirates it made sense to concentrate all efforts on the security of
a single route. At the same time during the early years of the seventeenth
century the Ottoman government also was willing to make a major effort in
order to enhance security on the routes connecting the different urban centres
of the Balkans to Spalato.2
A policy of neighbourly relations, Ottoman style
During this period, until the war over Crete ( 1645-69) ruined what was
left of Ottoman-Venetian commerce, the sultans seem to have been seriously
concerned about maintaining friendly or at least reasonably good relations with
the Signoria. The political problems that beset the Ottoman Empire at this
time have frequently been discussed and therefore can be referred to here only
in passing. On the one hand the so-called Long War with the Habsburgs in
Hungary continued until the peace ofTsitva-Torok in 1606, while the navy of
Naples, at that time a province of the Spanish Empire governed by ambitious
and the
viceroys, was an additional threat to the western Balkans.3 On the eastern
border the situation was yet more serious: in 1623 when the Ottoman ruler
Murad IV (r. 1623-40) was only a boy, Shah 'Abbas I of Iran conquered
Baghdad. Only in 1638, towards the end of his reign was Murad IV able to
invade Iraq and regain the city. Furthermore in the late sixteenth and early
seventeenth centuries all of Anatolia was badly shaken by a series of
mercenary rebellions, und even large cities like Bursa or Ankara were
temporarily occupied and sacked by the mutineers. Control of the situation
was not made any easier by the fact that several sultans of the time were of

authorities to institute a closely supervised connection between Spalato and unstable mind or else were enthroned as children. When it came to the
legitimacy of the Ottoman dynasty the reconquest of Baghdad, the ancient seat
Venice that was considered more secure than any other Adriatic route.
of the caliphate evidently was given special importance. Presumably
considerations of this type explain why Murad IV for all his posturing as a
victorious conqueror preferred to concentrate all his forces on reconquering Iraq
; Daniel Goff man, lzmir and the Levantine World, 1550-1650, Seattle/London, 1990: 50-51.
and avoided any conflicts on the Habsburg or Venetian frontiers.
Feman� Braude!, La Mlditerranee et le monde miditerraneen a l'epoque de Philippe 11, 2
vols., Paris 1966, vol. 1: 261.
3 Elizabeth Zacbariadou (ed.), The Via Egnatia under Ottoman Rule, Rethymnon, 1997.
4 Acc rding to European customs of the time,
� the captain of a ship might receive a commission 1 Renzo Paci, "La Scala, di Spa/ato e il commercia veneziano nei Balcani fra Cinque e
from h1s sovereign to attack the ships belonging to the subjects of another ruler with whom the Seicento, Venice, 1971: 81-82.
forme� �as_at war. �uch captains were called corsairs. They temporarily became part of the 2 Paci, "La Scala.,: 105 and 110.
C?rruruss10rung rulers navy; and once peace was concluded their commissions were abrogated.
Pir
a tes by contrast attacked whatever ships they could find; they were not considered 3 Caroline Finlcel, The Administration of Warfare: the Ottoman Military Campaigns in Hungary,
belli�erents and legitimately could be hanged by those who captured them. While clea.r in law, 1593-1606, 2 vols. Vienna 1988; Jan Paul Niederkom, Die europiiischen Machte und der
,Lange Tiirlcenkrieg" Kaiser Rudolfs II (1593-1606), Vienna, 1993, passim; BA-OA, Diiveli
.
the d1fference between corsai rs and pirates was often blurred in practice.
Ecnebiye 13/1, p. 153, No. 720.
 256 ANOTHER M I R R OR FOR P R I NCES
Ottoman officials were not in the habit of arguing about issues of
foreign policy, at least not in the documents that have come down to us. As a
result many concerns of sultans and viziers need to be deduced from the
relatively bland texts available; and our deductions are never totally certain.
Therefore it is especially interesting to find a few documents that discuss the
manner in which Ottoman diplomats conceptualized long-term good relations
with a non-Muslim polity. Thus a sultanic command dated Ramazan
1027/August-September 1618 and addressed to the Islamic judges (qadis) of
iskenderiye/Shkodra, Bar and Olgun claimed that the Venetian government
'since ancient times', had been linked to the Ottoman throne in good faith,
peace and amity. In reaJity, peaceful relations such as they were, were of a
much more recent vintage, having been instituted by the peace treaty of 1573.
According to Islamic law peaceful relations with a non-Muslim power
continuing over forty years and more were inherently dubious; but our texts
carefully avoided any reference to any legally motivated need to resume 'holy
war against the infidel.' As is well known, the Ottomans established long­
term treaty relations not only with the Venetians but with other Christian
polities as well; and by the early seventeenth century, documents that set out
the conditions of such 'peaceful coexistence', the so-called
ahidnames/capitulations had been granted to Venice, France, England and the
Netherlands. I In quite a few texts contained in the Duveli ecnebiye register we
even find the claim that good relations with the Venetians went back all the
way to the times of Sultan Orban (r. 1326-62), thus writing the campaigns
and conquests of Mehmed II, Suleyman the Magnificent and others right out
of history.
Presumably at least some Ottoman officials knew very well that such
statements were historically false. But the factual truth of these claims is of
limited importance. It is much more significant that in the early seventeenth
century, some high-level Ottoman officials thought it desirable to invent a
long and peaceful tradition of neighbourly relations pour les besoins de la
cause.
In the text of August-September 1618 addressed to the qadis of
lskenderiye/Shkodra, Bar and Olgun that we previously have had occasion to
discuss, the addressees were admonished to maintain the peace. More
specifically the Ottoman central authorities forbade any attacks on Venetian
territories, ships and even individual subjects. Provincial administrators were
told to maintain good relations with their Venetian counterparts including the
sea captains in charge of maritime security on the Adriatic routes. As we will
see this passage was of special significance; and other sultanic commands in
our register help us figure out to what concrete issues it might apply.
1 Compare the article "lmtlyazat" in The Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd edition, by Halil Inalcik
and BA-OA, DUveli ecnebiye 13/1, p. 153, No. 720.
THE OTTOMAN S A N D THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE ADRIATIC 257
trouble
Venetian merchants trading with Ottoman subjects might have
collecting the sums of money owed to them; problems relating to c
?mmercial
credit and only
debts were especially frequent as many local traders bought on
could pay their suppliers when they had sold at lea �
t part of the �oods
.
previously purchased. In such situations a Venetian creditor m•.ght act
hke n �
obtaimng a sultamc
Ottoman merchant who had been robbed by pirates,
command that supported his claims. Only in this case the officials supposed
and
to intervene were not the Venetian authorities but the sultans' governors
qadis, and the sultan's writ was supposed to document the good faith of the
Venetians seeking official intervention.
As a graphic example we have a letter that in the early sevent enth�
century was addressed to Osman Pa�a. who had been sent to Yanya/Janmna to
collect taxes; as so often happened, the second recipient of this sultanic order
was the local qadi.' A Christian trader from this town named Boyo (?) Marko
had been active in Venice and incurred debts to the tune of 278 guru�
(probably in Spanish coin): the creditor was a certain Covan Badran (?) In
addition other goods remained unpaid that Marko had acquired from other
trading partners whose names were not mentioned. By some tric � or �o the
aggrieved Covan put it, Boyo (?) Marko had managed to leave Vemce � tthout
satisfying his creditors; and at the time of writing, for a considerable time he
had once again been established in his home town of Jannina. At some point
in the past Covan had sent a representative to Marko's residence, who had �n
unable to collect the money; to make a bad matter worse the contumactous
debtor had made sure that Covan's representative suffered financial losses. A
number of sultanic commands to examine the matter in court had not elicited
any positive response either; and therefore the Ottoman ruler now reiterated his
order. Unfortunately we have no way of knowing whether Covan had better
luck this time.
This story was by no means unique; and we possess documents
concerning a similar conflict but involving more important people. In Ju e­
. �
�
July 1605 the authorities in Istanbul responded to a complamt fro the bat�o,
.
dealing with 2863 Venetian silver coins owed to the nobile Alotstus/Aivtse
Contarini. 2 His debtor also was a Venetian subject; but as the latter had
farmed a saltpan situated on Ottoman territory he probably lived somewhere in
the lands of the sultan. As was customary in such cases Contarini had sent a
representative to collect the debt; but he must have been anxious to avoid the
kinds of trouble that had occurred in Boyo (?) Marko's case. Therefore
preliminary measures were taken in Istanbul: the governor of Bosnia, as well
1 DUveli ecnebiye 13/1, S. 54, No 235.
2 DUveli ecnebiye 13/1. p. 23, No 80.
 258 A NOTHER MIR ROR FOR PR I NCES
as the qadi of an unspecified town, was to make sure that the case came to
court. Apparently this case was taken more seriously by the authorities than
the Jannina dispute: either the Contarini demands were better documented or
else the social position of the creditor was taken into consideration. For our
text specified that if the debtor continued to refuse payment after the court had
decided against him, he was to be arrested and sent to IstanbuL
Dangers along the coast
Unpaid bills and contumacious debtors caused numerous annoyances;
but much more serious were the attacks of pirates and corsairs. Ottoman
subjects of whatever religion were particularly threatened by the so-called
Uskoks. These men defined themselves as refugees from the sixteenth-century
Ottoman advance in the Balkans. But quite a few of them had joined the
Uskok community without any direct involvement in the Ottoman-Hungarian­
Habsburg confrontation, and thus were not refugees in any ordinary sense of
the term. Uskok headquarters were located in the fortress of Senj/Segna,
perched on top of a mountain; appropriately and amusingly the Ottomans
called this place Seng, which is Persian for 'rock'.
In principle the Uskoks were supervised by the Habsburg archidukes of
Styria and were counted as militiamen serving on the imperial military
frontier. However control by the Habsburgs was often nominal and by the
standards of early modem European custom, the corsair status of the Uskoks
was highly doubtful as well. After aH they were in the habit of re-defining
Venetian and other merchants who traded with Muslims as 'bad Christians'
whom they might legitimately attack. But as the Venetians for the most part
were at peace with the Austrian Habsburgs, the latter could not have
commissioned Uskok captains to attack Venetian ships. However
considerations of this type do not seem to have had much impact on the war­
making of the Uskoks, particularly as the pay owed to them by the imperial
authorities often was greatly in arrears. I pirates to save the life of her son; but she was murdered in the m st brutal and
For the Venetian authorities the Uskoks were a major threat: every
time Ottoman merchants were pillaged, kidnapped and even murdered by the
latter, the claims of the former that they were able to ensure the security of
goods and persons i n the Adriatic lost credibility.2 Thus letters from the
administration in Istanbul made it quite clear to the Signoria that the sultan
1 Catherine Wendy Bracewell, The Us/coles
Sixteenth-Century Adriatic Ithaca NY, London, Sen}. Piracy, Banditry and Holy War in the
of
2 Paci, La "Scala": 69-70.
1992: 139-54.
THE OTTOM ANS AND THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE ADRIATIC 259
would have to send a naval detachment of his own if the attacks did not st P· ?
. �
But such a move would have been a major loss of presttge for t e Venettan
:vemment especially in the eyes of the Spanish governors of Mtlan, whose
�rritory had a common border with the Venetian terrafer�. As a result the
Venetians finally went to war with the archidukes of Styna and after a short
confrontation obtained the relocation of the Uskoks away from the sea.
However in some conflicts of this type the Ottoman gover ment �
clearly made common cause with the Venetians. Thus there survtves a
.
command of Sultan Ahmed I (r. 1603-17) addressed to the governor of Bosma
(October 1609), dealing with an attack on the part of the Uskoks ?n t�e
Ottoman fortress of iskardin.l Mter this event some people ad complamed tn
.
�
.
I tanbul that men from the Venetian castle of �tbentk/Sebemco had
;ru cipated in the attack. By contrast the bailo had affi rmed that the Uskoks
.
certainly were no subjects of Venice. If ever the S1gnona . caught these
miscreants they were sure to be exemplarily punished. As our text tells us,
these assurances had been accepted by the sultan's court, and ow th governor � �
of iskardin was enjoined to forbid slanders against the Venet1ans w1th respe t
. . .
�
to th IS affair. The prohibition was intended to protect the Seremss1ma s
subjects; for if significant numbers of Ottoman soldiers and/ r mlTtttamen
· �
.
carne to believe in Venetian complicity, any subjects of the S1gnona could
become the victims of reprisal actions.
Life in and around the Adriatic was made even more difficult by the fact
�
that certain Venetian captains, whose job it was to protect Ottoman and oth r
merchants sometimes engaged in piracy themselves. A particularly d r:amattc
case of this type occurred in 1584, when Venice and the Ottoman Em�tre had
long been at peace. Near the island stronghold of Corfu, whtch �he
Serenissima managed to defend throughout its existence, the Venettan
commanders Gabriele and Giovanni Emo attacked and robbed a galley
belonging to the Bey of Djerba, which was to bring the widow of the
governor Ramazan P�a to Istanbul. This Ottoman lady had entreated the
�
sadistic fashion along with her serving women.2 Moreover surv1vors among
the men were cruelly killed even after they had surrendered, probably becau e �
the robbers were afraid of leaving any witnesses. All valuables on the shtp
were plundered by Gabriele and Giovanni Emo and their crew and �uld.not be
retn·eved·, the Venetian treasury had to compensate the owners he1rs for
·
the goods lost. At first the Signoria hesitated to publicly proceed agamst the
1 Diiveli ecnebiye 1311, p. 73, No 3!1.
2 Antomo
· Fabn·5 "Un caso di pirateria veneziana: Ia cattura della galea del bey dt· Gerba (21
1584)," Quaderni di Studl. Arabi,. 8 (1990)·. 92 1 12.
•
ottobre -
 260 ANOTHER MIRROR FOR PRINCES
culprits; this complacent attitude was not rare and quite often such robbers
were punished leniently if at all. But soon it became clear that due to this
appalling crime, the Serenissima had been pushed to the brink of war with the
sultan at a time when the authorities regarded such a confrontation as
absolutely undesirable. As a result the government finally decided to publicly
execute at least one of the two commanders.
This case certainly was extreme; but the everyday risks of travel in the
Adriatic are clearly apparent from the complaints of Ottoman merchants who
might have lost a servitor or two through pirate action, to say nothing of
material losses. These men often claimed that the Venetian captains
responsible for conveying merchantmen safely to Venice i n fact had made
common cause with the attackers. Surely in many cases this complaint was
justified.' However in some instances tactical considerations may have played
a part as well: for in all likelihood the authorities in Venice felt a greater need
to intervene if their own servitors and/or officials stood accused of complicity
i n these crimes.
Our register also documents certain cases in which Venetian traders had
been robbed by Ottoman subjects. A series of sultanic commands covered the
misfortunes of the ship Liona that had been taken by pirates when returning
from Istanbul to Venice. While the attack took place when the Liona was
trying to round the Peloponnesus, the case also concerned the Adriatic as
several of the robbers came from the Ottoman island of Aya Mavra, which is
located at the entrance to the latter sea.2 As for the remaining pirates, they
came from the Peloponnesus itself.
According to Venetian claims the value of the ship's cargo amounted to
300,000 gold pieces; whether this estimate was at all realistic of course is
impossible to determine. In this <:_ase as well some of the sailors were
murdered; and as the pirates apparently did not possess any official backing,
they hurriedly disposed of the loot. Just like Ottoman traders in the same
position, the Venetians demanded that their property be returned and those
survivors that had been enslaved should be set free. As usual it could not be
realistically expected that the new owners of these slaves and trade goods, who
might have purchased them in good faith or else been accomplices of the
pirates, would be willing to return their acquisitions without further ado.
Therefore the sultan ordered that even the excuse "this item has been acquired
on behalf of the [Ottoman) treasury" was not to be considered as valid where
the goods robbed from the Liona were at issue.
1 Arcllivio di Stato, Venezia, Documenti turchi, Busta 8, No 963; Pedani Fabris, I
turchi". p. 240 has a detailed summary of this teJtt by Alessio Bombaci.
2 DUveli ecnebiye 13/1, p. 41, No 170 (�evval 1015/January-february 1607), p. 49, No 2 1 1
(Cem.l 1016/August-Septcmber 1607) and others.
THE OTTOMAN S AND THE TRADE ROUTES OF THE ADRIATIC 261
Matters were complicated by the fact that the governor of t e �
Peloponnesus (in Ottoman: Mora) recently had been dismi ssed and �ts
�
successor had not yet arrived. Therefore at the time of writing, he Venett n
�
slaves still had not been liberated; and to top it all off the Engltsh consul tn
Balyabadral Palaiopatras had profited from the situation and acqUired . some
.
items taken from the Liona for himself. Now in the years around 1 600 nvalry
between English and Venetian merchants was bitter; and the latter must have
feared that once the English consul had gotten involved, no possibility would
remain of retrieving even part of the goods that had been robbed from the
Liona. In the tong run we will need to find out whether this thorny affair has
also been treated in documents surviving in the Venetian archives.
A rather unique case in our register concerns a man who was probably a
Venetian subject and who acted as middleman in the ransoming of Muslim
captives. These people had been enslaved somewhere in Christian Europe;
unfortunately the Ottoman term of 'Frengistan' is so vague that we cannot be
more specific. I Our text only tells us that this middleman was an experienced
traveller by the name of Odoardo; it does not even state whether he was a
subject of Venice or else of Oubrovnik. Apparently Odoardo had eceived a
�
laissez-passer from the authorities in Istanbul that stated that 1ts holder
wished to travel to the province of Algiers and from there to 'Frengistan.'
After arrival he planned to visit his home town, purchase Muslim slaves with
his own funds and bring them to the Ottoman capital. Presumably the
families of the former captives would then reimburse him; but of this aspect
of the deal, our text says nothing. All Ottoman office-holders along the entire
Mediterranean coast were to assure Odoardo's safe passage; they also were
enjoined to permit him to buy supplies at the prices current in l�al markets.
Odoardo thus had received a typical Ottoman laissez-passer, no dtfferent from
those also issued to Muslim travellers.
Unfortunately our document has nothing to say about the details of the
transaction. Thus we do not know whether Odoardo when he previously had
�
spent time in Istanbul already had contacted the families of t e people that he
.
planned to ransom, and perhaps in some way had been commtss•oned to d so.
�
It is also conceivable that when Odoardo was in 'Frengistan' he had come mto
contact with enslaved Muslims who had asked him to arrange for their
ransoming.2 In the Venetian state archives we find a few letters by Muslim
prisoners to their families that for one reason or another never reached their
"Documenti
1 DUvcli ecnebiye 13/1, p. 63. No 287 (Safer 1018/May-June 1609).
.
2 Salvatore Bono, Schiavi musulmani nell' ltalia maderna. Galeotti. vu' cumpra, domesnc1,
.
Naples, 1999.
 262 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR PRINCES
destinations; they contain requests to relatives for speedy ransoming.1 Slaves
from Christian Europe who wound up in the Ottoman lands were ransomed by
a variety of organizations that mediated between captives, their families and
the people who now held them; these arrangements are often reasonably well
documented and have been studied in detaii.2 As so little is known about
Ottoman efforts in this direction the laconic account of Odoardo's activities in
his laissez-passer is especially frustrating.
Enforcing the policies of the Ottoman central government in remote
provinces
As our discussion concerning the Liona case has demonstrated, in a
remote province a command of the sultan might be highly respected but was
not necessarily enforced. There were several reasons for this state of affairs:
certainly on the one hand provincial governors and qadis operated within the
framework of what we would today call a political ideology that enjoined the
strictest possible obedience to any command of the ruler. But at the same time
in spite of significant growth i n the course of the sixteenth century, the
bureaucratic apparatus was relatively small and the geographical distances
enormous. Therefore in practice local officials were free to interpret their
orders; and such interpretations were compatible with the operation of the
sultans' governmental system, as all office-holders shared a commitment to
the expansion of the Islamic domain and the repression of infidel rulers.
Certainly overall policies were determined in Istanbul, but the details which
were so often decisive were subject to local negotiation. As a result local
power-holders possessed considerable room for manoeuvre.
In the past it has often been claimed that this state of affairs was due to
corruption and decline of the state apparatus, which supposedly began at some
point during the later years of Siileyman the Magnificent (r. 1520-66). But as
our information about the workings of the Ottoman government increases it
becomes more and more obvious that a certain oscillation between centralizing
and decentralizing tendencies was part of the Empire's structure from the very
beginning. It is well known but cannot be repeated too often that our notions
about Ottoman history are conditioned by the state of preservation of the
Ottoman archives, and also by the fact that as the state bureaucracy expanded,
more and more issues came to be transacted i n writing. In consequence we
I Pedani Fabris,! "Docwnenti turchi": 555, No. 013.
2 du declin" Annales ESC, 43 (1991): 381-400.
2 Most recently compare: G6za I>.fvid and Pal Fodor (c:ds.), Ransom Slavery along the Ottoman
Borders (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2007).
THE OTTOMAN S AND THE TRA DE ROUTES OF THE ADRIATIC 263
know much more about the period after 1550 than about preceding centuries.
It is therefore all too easy to take at face value the claims of certain Ottoman
authors who wrote that in the past, everything had been different and much
better: there is simply no way of checking their claims.1
In concrete terms the commanders of fortresses on the shores of the
1600 were able to protect Algerian corsairs even
Adriatic, already long before
when forbidden to do so by the central government; they collected a share of
·the booty in return for their tolerance. During the second half of the sixteenth
century, an experienced observer such as the bureaucrat and literary man
Mustafa All (1541-1 600) regretfully concluded that the sultans' writ might be
unenforceable in outlying border provinces.2 Nor was it only a matter of
derring-do and financial gain: the commander of such a fortress on the shores
of the Adriatic might reason that he defended a major source of Islamic sea
power at a time when political constraints prevented the sultan from doing so
·
himself. In its turn the council of the sultan might consider such initiatives
deplorable at least under certain circumstances. But if in spite of numerous
crises the Ottoman Empire survived for many centuries, one of the reasons
surely was the fact that local officials could exercise a degree of initiative
within the framework of Islamic law and the regulations issued by the sultans
(kanun-z osmani). On the other hand this latitude to decide local issues locally
did not mean that the central government might not demote and otherwise
punish office-holders that it considered recalcitrant: the contra.ry was obviously
true.
In conclusion
As the sources introduced here amply demonstrate, i n the years before
and after 1600 the Ottoman central government was quite concerned with the
security of its subjects that travelled the Adriatic, usually for purposes of
trade. The texts contained in the 'Registers concerning foreign states' are
responses to issues the bailo relayed to the grand vizier and ultimately to the
sultan himself; by contrast the documents in the Venetian state archives show
that Ottoman subjects particularly merchants, were able to mobilize the
sultan's officials when their own interests were at stake. Moreover when
soliciting official intervention, Ottoman and Venetian traders who had been
robbed by corsairs or pirates used comP'arable strategies: only the Venetians
1 Cemal Kafadar, "Lc:s troubles mon6taires de Ia fin du XVIe si�le et Ia conscience ottomane
2 Cornell H. Aeischer, Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire. The Historian
Mustafa Ali (1541-1600), Princeton, 1986: 66.
 264 A NOTHER M I R ROR FOR P R I NC E S THE OTTOMANS AND THE TRADE ROUTES O F THE ADRIATIC 265

had the advantage of being able to tum to the bailo, who was already well did not make a great effort to produce an intellectually convincing argument.
established, while traders from the sultans' realm had to start 'from scratch' In this perspective officials dwelt upon the long-tenn adherence and loyalty of
when mobilizing support both in Istanbul and in Venice. But even so we can the Venetians to the Ottoman ruler. This 'invented history' also can serve to
hardly claim that the Ottoman elite of the years around 1600 had no interest in show that even though religious law was constantly exalted and efforts were
the problems of traders and trade. made to fonn a polity that was consistent with Islamic tenets, the government
Certainly such protection did not imply that exportation in general and in Istanbul did not become the prisoner of its own ideology. In practical terms
the export of manufactured goods in particular were in any way promoted by the ideology of holy war was not an impediment when it came to the
the sultans' officials; it has been known for decades that the contrary was implementation of neighbourly relations with individual Christian states over
true.! As Ottoman office-holders were above all concerned with the .
several decades. As for the sultans' councillors when addressmg both the
provisioning of the Empire's mil itary and administrative apparatus and Venetian and the Empire's own provincial governors, they were prepared to
secondarily with the needs of local populations, imports for the most part justify their policies by a legitimizing intellectual construction.
were viewed in a positive light, while exports seemed to be the prelude to
future bottlenecks. Thus in the early modem period the one concern shared by
Ottoman and Western European administrators was the preservation of
'treasure' in other words of gold and silver. Both sides agreed that wars could
not be fought without bullion and that metals suitable for minting should be
kept within the realm. But in the early seventeenth century the Ottoman
balance -of trade with the Christian countries of Western and Southern Europe
was for the most part positive and thus produced an inflow of silver. Concerns
about the supply of bullion therefore remained i n the background when
Ottoman administrators for instance judged Venetian trade.2
Apparently sultans and grand viziers regarded the protection of their
subjects, in the dangerous Adriatic region or wherever else they might be as
first and foremost a matter of prestige and legitimacy. After all, one of the
most frequently used titles of the sultans was that of 'world protector'
(padi�ah-t alempenah). And if the Ottoman ruler claimed to protect mankind
as a whole, then evidently his own subjects had the most obvious claim to
shelter under his mantle.
Furthermore in the years before and after 1600 the sultans were
concerned to maintain good relations with Venice; even a very serious case of
piracy such as the murder of Ramazan �a's widow and the sailors manning
the Djerba galley was not permitted to ruin this relationship, at least not in
the long run.3 There is no need to repeat the day-to-day political concerns that
informed this choice; yet it is interesting to see that the Ottoman viziers and
their aides attempted to find an 'ideological' reason for this policy, even if they

rn spite of its age the following article is still most relevant Halil lnalcilc, "Capilal Formation in
l
the Ottoman Empire", The Journal ofEconomic History, XXIX. 1(1969): 97-140.
2 Mehmet Gen�. "Ottoman Industry in the Eighteenth Century: General Framework,
Characteristics and Main Trends,• in Manufacturing in the Ottoman Empire and Turlrey 1500-
1950, ed. by Donald Quataert, Albany NY, 1994: 59-86. Mutatis mutandis the points made in
this article are also valid for the seventeenth century.
Fabris, "Un caso di pirateria veneziana": 106.
3
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 268 A NOTHER M I R R OR FOR P R I NCES
B I B LIOGRAPHY 269
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I, 2 Adriatic Sea 23, 28, 33, 105-106, anahtar-dar 206, 209-2 10

Zimmermann, Price, Paolo Giovio (Princ 1 1 3. 1 16, 233, 246-249, 253- Anatolia, Anatolian 14, 23, 32, 36,
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254, 256, 259-260, 263-264 40-41, 72, 105. 120, 137, 176-
Agoston, Gabor 42 177, 2 1 9 , 229, 233, 237-239,
ahidnames 50, 1 13-1 14, 122, 124- 253, 255
126, 128- 129, 1 3 1 , 136, 142, Ankara 120, 128, 135, 253-255
147-148, 223, 256 (see also Arbel, Benjamin 1 1 6
Capitulations) Archives of the Prime Minister I 0. 26,
Ahmed A�a. kfihya/ kethiida of grand 36-37, 40, 43 (see also
vizier 2 1 1 Ba�bakanltk Ar�ivi)
Ahmed Efendi, Durri 26, 3 1 , 165, Archivio di Stato, Venice 48
167-169. 171- 172, 174- 1 87 Armada, Invincible 127, 130
Ahmed 1. sultan 56, 69. 8 1 -82, 166. Armenian 93, 109, 224-225
259 arslanc1 95
Ahmed III, sultan 10. 12, 53. 56- arslanc1ba�1 96
58. 6 1-63, 66-67, 79, 94, 96, Arslanhane 92-95
149, 156-159, 161 - 162, 167- Artan, Ttilay 150
168. 170- 171, 175, 179- 186 An odast, in the Topkapt palace 20
Aigen, Wolffgang 226 Astrahan 155
ak�e 169, 236, 239, 242 Atmeydam 89, 91 (see also
Aktepe, Monir 168, 171, 206 Hippodrome)
AI-Andalus 127 Austria, Austrian 22, 24-25, 39, 80,
Albania, Albanian 107 95, 105, 127, 204, 258
Aleppo 34, 136, 142, 226 avanz taxes 240
Alexander, John 43-44 Aya Mavra 260
Alexandria 71. 142 Aya Sofya/ Hagia Sophia 20, 27, 70-
Algeria, Algiers, Algerian 89, 95, 71
1 04. 142, 2 1 1 , 261-262 Aydm 124
 292 ANOTHER MIR ROR FOR P R I NCES
I N DEX 293

Ay�e hatun, of Sarajevo 241-242 Bulgaria, Bulgarian 39-40

Ayverdi, Ekrem HaJOO 238 Covan Badran (?) 257 Elizabeth I, queen of England 76, 130-
Bulut, Mehrnet 147
Bahadulu 172 Crete, Cretan 30, 44-45, 49-50, 131
Burdur 229
baha-1 savb 241 104, 154, 182, 226, 255 emin 1 12, 137
Bursa 33, 88, 136, 139, 142, 145,
bailo, bai/i 2 1 , 63-66, 1 10, 1 12, 125, Curzola 1 10 Emo, Gabriele 259
225, 227, 234, 236, 240, 255
132, 247, 257, 259, 263-264 (see Cyprus 36, 48-49, 252, 254 Emo, Giovanni 259
Busbecq/ Busbecquius, Ogier Ghislin de
also balyos/ balyoz) faVU§ 23, 1 10, J J6, 165, 250 England, English 29, 32, 49, 63, 76,
79-80
�elebizade, chronicler 67 103, 127-128, 130, 137, 142,
Bali Beg 242 Ca'fer Efendi 56, 68, 73, 82-83
Bali Silahdar 1 1 3 Cairo 44, 77, 134, 136, 142, 146,
fiftlik 209 146, 148, 152, 1 6 1 , 202, 213-

Balta, Evangelia 43-44 �izak�a. Murat 139 214, 216, 225, 256, 261
233
Balyabadra/ Palaiopatras 261 Daghestan 176 Erivan 174, 187 (see also Revan)
Calogero, Francesco 201
balyos/ balyoz 50, 252 (See also Dalmatia, Dalmatian 104-105, 1 10, Erzurum 224
Calvinism, Calvinist 193, 203
bailo, baili) 253 e#iya 1 17
capitulations 124-126, 128, 130,
Banate of Teme�var 154 D�vid, Geza 40 Euboa 44
223, 256 (see also ahidnames)
Barkan, Orner LiJtfi 238 debbag 235 Evliya �elebi 8, 55-56, 59, 66-69,
Caprara, Habsburg lntemuntius 22,
Basra 136 derbend 174 73-76, 79, 83, 90-92, 95, 99-100,
193, 200-201
Deringil, Selim 151 165
Ba�bakanhk Ar�ivi 35 (see also Catholicism, Catholic 39, 76, 127,
Archives of the Prime Minister) devir 13 Eytib/ Eytip Sultan 20, 70, 75, 9 1 ;
133-134 , 1 89, 192-193, 198, 201,
Bathory, Stephan, prince of Devlethan hatun 241-242 mosque of 7 1
203, 214-216, 235
Dimitriadis, Vassilis 43 Fabris, Maria Pia Pedan i 48, 249
Transylvania 128 cebeci 97
Bayezid 1/ Yddmm, sultan 120, 126 dirhem 236, 241-242 Fazh Pa�. palace of 89, 93-94
Cebehane 94
Bayezid II, sultan 18 Diyarbalor 169 Fekete, Lajos 38
Celali 34
Bayezid, prince 64-65 dizdar 199, 201 Ferdinand I, emperor, in Ottoman
Chalke gate, of the Byzantine palace
Belgrade 32, 154, 184, 192, 195-196, Djahangir, Moghul emperor 89, parlance king of Be� (Vienna) 80,
93
199-201, 203-205, 208-209, 214 166 127
Chandos, British ambassador 202
Bellini, Gentile 18 Djerba 264 Beg of 259 Ferriol, monsieur de, French
Charles of Lorraine 192, 194-195
Be�ir Aga 192 Dogana 109, 1 13 ambassador 30-3 I
Charles V, Habsburg emperor 127,
beylik 213 154 Dubrovnikl Ragusa 107, 1 10, 1 12, fetihname 9
Birgevi, Mehmed 239-240 Charles XII, king of Sweden 24-25
128-129, 132-133, 148, 201, fetva I l l
Black Sea 47, 254 238, 245, 252, 254-255, 261 Feyzullah Efendi 22
Cheykh-Oghlou 175
Bon, Ottaviano 8 1 Durahan/ Turban b Nasuh, HacJ 242 Aeet, Kate 134
Chief Black Eunuch 18
Bonnac, Jean-Louis Dusson marquis de Diiveli ecnebiye defterleri 251-252, Fodor, PaJ 42
Chief Elephant Keeper/ ser-jiliyan-1
256 (seealso Registers fondaco 135
30, 3 1 , 56, 66-67, 8 1 -82, 84-85, hassa 98
concerning foreign states) France, French 2 1 -22, 24, 29-30, 49,
149, 155-158, 161 Cihangir, prince 64
Ebusuud Efendi, $eyhi11islam 14, 5 1 , 53, 56. 6 1 . 63, 66-67, 73, 76,
Boogert, Maurits van den 29, 147 cizye 125
221' 224, 240 8 1-84, 89, 129-130, 137, 148-
Bosnia, Bosnian 23, 28, 33, 1 10-1 I 2, Clissa, sub-provice of 1 1 1
Ecnebi defterleri 50, 129, 147, 251 150, 152, 154-156, 160-163, 168,
1 17, 135, 233, 241-242, 244-245, Constantine, palace of 9 1
Edime 12, 78, 88, 99, 180, 201, 171, 178, 204-205, 225, 249, 256
247-248, 251' 257, 259 Contarini, Aloisius/ Alvise 257-258
205, 214, 2 1 6-217 ambassador 157, 159
Boyo (?) Marko, merchant 257 Contarini, Francesco 111
Egypt, Egyptian 22, 224 Fran�ois I , king of France 129, 154
Braude!, Femand 254 Corfu 259
ehl-i (jrf 243 Frengistan 235, 261
Britain, British 35, 1 5 1 , 154, 2 1 3 Cossacks 47
British ambassador 202, 2 1 4 Eidem, Ethem 139
Costantini, Vera 49-50
Budin/ Buda 41, 204 Costanzo de Ferrara 1 8
buka'a 242
 294 ANOTHER M I R ROR FOR PRI NCES I N DEX 295

Gabela 109, 254 Henri III, French king 128 Ibrahim Pa�a. Nev�ehirli Damad 30, Karlowitz/ Karlof�a, peace treaty of
Galata 69, 128 Henri IV, French king 154 31.61-63. 66, 67, 74, 8 1 -82. 84, 4 1 , 154, 166, 184, 191-192
Galland, Antoine 58, 78, 83, 91 -92 Henmann of Baden, prince 195 149, 155-156, 158, 161- 162, Kastm b Mahmud, of Sarajevo 235
Gara, Eleni 45 Hijaz 24, 67 168, 170, 180, 186. 187 Kastamonu 32, 219, 224, 226, 228,
Gazanfer Aga 208 Himmet, of Kastamonu formerly of Iran tbrahim Pa�a, Pargah, Makbul ve 230
gazi 1 1 , 59, 242 2 19-222, 224-231 Maktul 59, 129, 157 kaymakam pa�a 213-214
Gen�. Mehmet 139 Hippodrome 94 (see also Atmeydan1) ibrahim Pa�. son of Mehmed Ali Kayseri 237
Genoa, Genoese 128, 134 Holland, the Netherlands, Dutch 29, Pa� 7 Kermeli, Eugenia 44
Giovio, Paolo 18-19 63, 1 5 1 , 160, 169, 216, 256; ibrahim, Bosnian merchant I 09 kl�lak emini 99
Giustinian, Giorgio 65-66 Dutch guru� 169 imtiyazat 124 (see also ahidnames Ktztlba� 221
Goffman, Daniel 249 Hungary, Hungarian 17, 24-26, 37-42, and capitulations) Knights of St John 60
grand vizier l l , 16, 22, 25, 30, 35, 46, 58, 64, 80, 126, 128, 184, fnciciyan, P. Gugas/ Gugios 56, 69, Ko lodzicjczyk, Dariusz 29, 47-48,
58-59, 64-66, 79, 8 1 , 107, 1 10, 192-193, 203, 2 1 1 ' 213, 258 70, 73, 94 1 47
129, 144, 148, 152-153, 156-159, huccet 229, 237, 246, 248 tntizami, pen-name of surname Kolovos, Elias 50
161, 169-170, 178-180, 185-187, HUrrem Sultan/ Roxelana 12, 59, 64- author 57 Komom, fortress of 212
189, 191, 193, 195, 198-200, 65 isa, Hact Chief Elephant Keeper 98 Krusinski, Juda 171
202, 205-206, 209-213, 264 HUsrev Beg, Gazi 242-243, 248 iskardin 259 Kunitz, Georg Baron von 22, 195, 202
Greece, Greek 26, 37, 39, 42-43, 45- Inalcik, Halil 29, 1 19, 121, 139, 144 iskenderiye/ Shkodra 256 Kunt, Metin 139
46, 52, 105, 139, 251 lndia, Indian 19, 28, 5 1-52, 70, 80, is/&-1 vusaya 236 KUre 224
Greene, Molly 49 83-84, 87-88, 96-98, 100-101, ismail, arslanc1 95 Ki.itahya 7
Gritti, Andrea 134 1 1 9, 137, 146, 1 5 1 , 165, 177- itinu2d al-davla 170, 180 KUtUkoglu, MUbahat 46
Gritti, Ludovico/ Alvise 134 178, 180 izmit 24 Laiou, Sophia 44
Groot. Alex.ander de 147 Indian Ocean 127, 146 Jan Sobieski, king of Poland 200- Leopold I, Habsburg emperor 2 1 -22,
Guilleragues, comte de, French Iran, Iranian 19, 2 1-22, 24, 28, 3 1 , 201 4 1 , 192, 204
ambassador 204-205 33, 64. 70, 79, 83, 96, 99, 132, janissary Lesgians, Lezgians, Lezgis 155, 172
17, 64, 79, 207
guru� 169, 239 137-138, 142, 152-153, 155-156, Jerusalem 3 1 , 93, 1 3 1 Levant Company 130-131
Gill CamH 67 158-159, 165, 167, 170, 172-174, Levni, painter of miniatures 96, 101,
jeunes de langue 1 7 1
Gillsoy, Ersin 50 176-180, 182-186, 220-226; shah Jews, Jewish 17, 83, 1 1 0 , 1 1 6, 133- 159-160, 162
Habsburg Empire 2 1 , 24, 28-32, 34, of Iran 84 135, 177, 213. 250-25 1, 253- Liona, Venetian ship 260-262
38-39, 41, 47, 5 1 , 63-64, 66, 76, Iraq 255 254 Lorichs, Melchior 19
78-80, 91, 97, 103, 105-106. 126, Isfahan 153, 187, 225 Louis XIV, king of France 30, 155,
Kaaba 77
128-1 29, 1 3 1 , 152-154, 156, 158, Ismail, shah 221, 225 Kadlzadeliler 239 204
160, 165, 174, 179, 184, 189, Istanbul 1 0 - 1 1 , 17-18, 20, 22-29, 32- Louis XV, king of France 156, 167
kadi registers 147, 231-232, 234,
190-192, 195-201. 203-205, 208, 33, 36, 38, 42-45, 48, 51-52, 54, 237, 241 Lubenau, Reinhold 57, 78, 83, 91-94
212-213, 216, 220, 226, 229, 67, 73, 75, 77-79, 8 1 , 83, 87, 89- Mac.edonia, Macedonian 253
kadi, kadis/ qadi, qadis 122, 126,
246, 249, 255, 258 9 1 , 93, 97-99, 101, 103, 108-1 1 1 . 136, 147, 219, 227-229, 231,
Mahmud I, sultan 6 1-62, 96, 222
Mahmud II, sultan 7, 15, 89, 94, 99
Hacoval Mesokeresztes, battle of 75 117, 1 3 1 - 132, 134, 139, 142, 235, 246, 256-258, 262
Halasi-Kun, Tibor 40 153, 156, 159, 176, 180-181, Mhya/ kethuda 210-2 1 1 , 213 Malatya 169

Hanefi 222, 229, 235 193, 195, 200, 202, 204-205, Kamieniec Podolsk 36, 46 Malta, Maltese 59-60
Hasan A�a. k.ahya/ kethiida of the grand 208, 213, 215, 217, 222, 224- Kandahar 170, 172, 174 Mamluk 27, 124, 136, 224
vizier 210-21 1 , 213, 2 1 5 225, 230-234, 238-24 1 ' 243, 245, Maronites 252
kanun 1 1 7, 263
Hasan, k.adi o f Sarajevo 235-236, 246 247, 249-254, 257-262, 264-265 kanun-1 osmani 263
Marsigli, Luigi Fernando de 189

Hasbah�e 88 Italy, Italian 61, 105-106, 134, 137, Martelli, Claudio Angelo de 25, 3 1 -32,
kapucu 165
hatib 237 152, 228, 251 kapudanlar 1 10 190-197, 199-200, 202-204,
Hatuniye 13 Izmir 208, 230; 254 Karaferye 45 Masters, Bruce 139
Hayyim Saruq 133 Karaman, Karamanlis 1 09 Maurocordato, Alexander 195-198,
Heberer, Michael 88 205. 208, 210, 216
 296 ANOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NCES
I N DEX 297

Mecca 22, 24, 70, 74, 77, 1 5 1 , 176 TTIUdfirabal mudarebel commenda 33,
Osman Aga 190, 198 reis efendi 162
Medina 70, 74, 1 5 1 1 1 5 , 244, 247-248 reistilkiittab 152
medrese 15, 70, 237 Osman II, sultan I I, 65-66, 1 1 1 -
Murad I, sultan 44, 128 relazionel relazioni, Venetian
55-
Mehmed Aga, hazinedar of Kara Murad II, sultan 1 1
1 1 2 , t l7
56, 65, 71
Mustafa Pa� 210, 216 Osman Ill, sultan 96
Murad III, sultan 1 1 , 13-14, 18, 20, Renier, Alvise 64
Mehmed Aga, Mimar 68 Osman � 257 Revan 75 (see also Erivan)
23, 57, 68, 7 1 , 88, 146
Ozbaran. Salib 5 1 , 52 Reychman, Jan 46
Mehmed Ali � 7 Murad IV, sultan 8, 20, 56, 59-61 , 65-
Mehmed Beg, son of Kara Mustafa Pa�
padi§ah-1 alempenahl the sultan Rodriga, Daniele, Jewish merchant
67, 74-76, 79, 90, 95, 99, 174,
refuge of the world 100, 264 1 10. 254
206 183, 255
Pamuk, �evket 139 Rome, Roman 35
Mehmed Efendi, Yinnisekiz 3 1 , 167- Mustafa Ali 1 1 , 14, 23, 67-68, 262
Panzac, Daniel 139 Rosales, David Ogli 213
168, 171 Mustafa I, sultan 65 Roxelana (see Hiirrem Sultan)
Mehmed II, sultan, the Conqueror Paris 167-168, 171
Mustafa II, sultan 157-158, 184 ru'us defterleri 41
(Fatih) 15-16, 18-19, 61, 136, pars 89
Mustafa III, sultan 95 Rumcli 40
153, 256 parsp 92, 95 Russia, Russian 7, 25, 35, 52, 155-
Mustafa Pa�. Kara 24, 32, 167 , 189,
Passarowitz/ Pasarof�a. peace treaty IS6, 163, 173, 184 ambassador
Mehmed III, sultan 72, 75, 146, 158 1 9 1 , 193, 197-198, 200, 202,
Mehmed IV, sultan 67, 95, 165, 184 of 66, 154, 166. 179, 182, 184, 159
205-206, 208-209, 212-213, 2 1 6
Mehmed Pa§a, grand vizier 1 10, 165 187 RUstem Pa§a 1 1 , 64, 79, 144
Mustafa Pa�. Lata 49
Patmos 43-44 Safavid Empire 165, 172, 174, 177,
Mehmed Pa�. Sokollu, grand vizier Mustafa, anahtar-dar of Kara Mustafa
Peirce, Leslie 150 187
16, 1 8 Pa�a 206, 209-210
Peloponnesus 253, 260-26 1 (see Safavid, Safavids 16-17, 22, 24, 3 1
Mehmed Ra§id 57, 149, 158-162,
60. 70, 73, 79, % . 155, 168, 170-
Mustafa, of Kastamonu 219-220, 226-
168, 171 also Morea/ Mora)
228, 230-23 1 171, 175-176, 179, 183-187 , 221-
Peter l, tsar and emperor 25, 67, 82,
Mehmed Zdli, Dervi§ 59 Mustafa, Ottoman officer and Habsburg 222, 225-226
155-156, 173
Mehmed, prince (later Mehmed Ill) 57 captive 212 Said, Edward 90
Peterwardein, campaign of 156
Melek-sima hatun 241 Mustafa, prince 64-65 Salonika 45
Pezzen, Bartho1omaeus, Habsburg Sarajevo 33, 36, 44, 103, 1 17, 233-
Membre, Michele, Venetian interpreter Miimin Cavu§ 1 1 0
and diplomat 106 ambassador 78, 91 238, 241-242, 244-246, 248
Miiriivvet, Bosnian merchant I 09
Memun Bey, prince of �ehrizor 79-80 Philip n, king of Spain 127-128 Sariyannis, Marinos 45
miiste'min 124-126
Menage, Victor 147 Podolia 46-47 Selim [, sultan 222. 224, 226
Nadir, shah of Iran 222
Mente�e 124 Poland, Polish 26, 36-37, 46-47, Selim l l , sultan 44, 47-48, 57, 64, 75•
N�hane 94
51, 93, 125, 128, 184, 1 96, 128, 254
mescid 242 name 106-107, 152
199-201, 210, 216, 223 Selim Ill, sultan 7
mezheb 222 Necipoglu, Giilru 150
Poland-Lithuania, Commonwealth Se1im, prince 1 3 1
Michal, king of Poland 223 3, 247•
ni�an 124 Senj/ Segna 105, 108-109, l l
Mihri hatun 241-242 of 1 3 1 , 136
ni§anc1 1 1 258
Milan 259 Poltava, battle of 24
Nointe1 monsieur de, French Serrai/ Serres 43-45
Portugal, Portuguese 127, 133
Mir MahmOd 155, 172 ambassador 92 seyyid 229-230
Poumarede, Geraud 147 Seyyid Abdi, merchant 108, 1 13-1 14
MiT Ovays, Prince 172 North, Montagu, English diplomat
Prosky, Samuel, Polish diplomat Sharif 1 5 1
mirahor ala 98, 100 202, 213, 216 59. 176-177.
Moghul 17-18, 24, 35, 5 1
196, 200-201 Shia, Shiism, Shiites
Nurbanu Sultan 72-73, 82
Protestantism, Protestant 189, 203, 186, 221-222. 224
Moldavia 47 Nuremberg 226
Simeon , of Poland 93
Montagu, Lady Mary 217 235
Odoardo, involved in ransoming Sinan Beg 242
Raab, river 194-195
Morea/ Mora 154, 261 (See also negotiations 261-262 Sinan Pa� 8 1 , I 1 3
Peloponnesus) Rakoszi, Ferenc 38
Okmeydaru 160-162 sipahi 2 1 2
Morocco, Moroccan 21, 27, 54, 70-71 Ramazan Pa� 259, 264
Orban, Sultan 256 siyakat 38
Red Sea 136, 146
mosque complex, of Valide Sultan in Orhonlu, Cengiz 182 s Skilliter, Susan 147
eign state
Registers concemmg for
· .
OskUdar 72, 82
·

Orientalische Kompagnie 202 '

Dave l ' Sofia 36
Motraye, Aubry de Ia 24 252, 263 (See also
ecnebiye defterleri) Sol kol 254
. 122
Registers of Important Affatrs
298 A NOTHER M I RROR FOR P R I NC ES I NDEX 299

Soltan Husayn, Safavid shah 155, te�rifatp 162 Yusuf Beg, son of Kara Mustafa P�a
Vcrroia 45
170, 175. 184 ThessaJy 253 206
Versailles 155, 167-168
Soranzo, Giacomo 72-73, 82-83 Theunissen, Hans 29, 147 Via Egnatia 254 Yusuf Pa§a, Emirgune-oglu 60, 75
Spain, Spaniard, Spanish 103, 1 1 0- Thevenot, Jean 57, 72-74, 83 Vienna 22, 25, 32, 58, 126, 165, Zachariadou, Elizabeth 43-44, 147
1 1 1 , 127, 130, 133, 2 1 1 , 255, ThOkoly, Imre 24-25, 38, 204 171, 174, 179, 190, 193- 194, Zahide hatun, from Sarajevo 241
259 timar 4 1 , 47, 243 197-200, 204, 208, 210-2 1 1 , Zajaczkowski, Ananiasz 46
Spalato/ Split 1 10- 1 1 1 , 254-255 Tinguely, Frederic 90 215 zeamet 4 1
Staten General in Den Haag 152 Tokat 224 zevaid-hor 1 1- 1 2
Vignola, Girolamo 79
Sultan Ahmed Mosque 20, 68-69, 72- top�u 97 voyvoda, of Galata 69 Zsitva Torok, peace of (1606) 80, 255
74, 79, 82-83 Topkap1 palace/ sarayt 10, 20, 35, 63, Yakub Pa§a 242 ZUifikar Agal Pa�a 21 -22, 165, 197,
Sunnites 59, 176-178, 186, 222 72, 75, 77, 97, 142, 153, 165, 200
Yanyal Jannina 257-258
Surname 74 180
Yedikule, fortress 22, 200, 202
SUieyman Efendi, �em'dani-zade 56, Transylvania 184
61-63, 67 Trieste 105
SUieyman the Magnificent 1 1- 1 2 , 14- Tripoli, in Africa 142
19, 53, 56, 58-61, 64-65, 7 1 , 75, Tripolis, in Syria 104
79-80, 129- 1 3 1 , 144, 153-154, tugra 106, 148
158, 173, 177, 182, 226, 233, tulumbac1 159
240, 256, 262 Tunis 104, 142, 224
SUJeyman, Hac1 236 TUrckenverehrung 80
SUJeymaniye mosque 70, 74 Ukraine 48
siirgiin 222 ulema 120
Sweden, Swedish 24-25, 152 Uskok 29, 105-106, 108-109, 1 12-
Synadinos of Serres, Papa 8, 45 1 1 3, 135, 142, 246-247, 258-259
Syria, Syrian 105, 142 Uzbekistan, Uzbek 173, 180
O
Szekesfehervar 203 lgUn 256
�ahman, Hact Bosnian merchant 109 Ommi hatun, from Sarajevo 241-242
�ehbender 225 OskUdar 72-73
�em'dani-zade (see Siileyman Efendi, vaklf l l - 12, 15, 234-235, 241-242,
Sem'dani-zade) 246, 248
�eriat 15, 242 VaJide Sultan 13, 72
�eyhiilislam 22, 221, 224 Van 22, 167, 169, 174
$ibenikf Sebenico 259 Vanmour, J. B. 160
�uhud ul-hal 236-237 Venice, Venetian 21, 23, 26, 28-30,
Tabriz 170, 222, 224 33-37, 43-44, 48-51, 55-56, 58-
Tahmasp I , Safavid shah of Iran 70 59, 63, 65, 69, 71-72, 79, 8 1 , 83,
tahrirl tapu tahrir 40-42, 44, 50 103- 1 15, 1 17, 124-126, 128-1 30,
Tatar 47, 194-196 132-133, 135, 138-139, 141- 142,
tayin 80 146, 148, 153- 154, 158, 165,
Teheran 26, 30, 170, 173, 179, 185 174, 177, 184, 208, 226, 233-
Tek:fur Sarayt 94 234, 238, 243-257, 259-261 , 263-
Tekirdag/ Rodoscuk 214 265; doge of Venice 166; Venetian
Terraferma 259 ducats 168