Ready, Set, Action: The Role of Digital Media Tools in Harnessing Youth Power for

Greater Cultural Understanding

Sophia Marie C. Mauleon and Alyssa Camille Palenzuela Dalizon

Abstract
The ASEAN and ROK community has generally enjoyed the positive economic and political
returns of their strong partnership, particularly seen in the fields of trade and investment. When
it comes to socio-cultural ties, however, much work is needed to be done to promote a better
understanding of ASEAN cultures in Korea. While Korean culture has permeated through
geographic barriers, Southeast Asian nations are still yet to enjoy similar (or even relatively
close) amounts of popularity and adulation that the former has received. This is largely
attributed to widespread cultural misconceptions and misunderstandings, perpetuated by media
representation and inaccurate news reporting. These harmful prejudices usually translate to
instances of discrimination and unjust subordination. With this, there is a need for a more
concerted effort on both sides to promote better cultural understanding. This is especially
important among the youth, who are not just seen as the future of society, but also regarded as
an increasingly dynamic and active sector of the community at present. However, the sector is
largely an untapped potential, especially when it comes to diplomatic affairs. Given this new
era of citizen diplomacy in the online sphere and the need for greater cultural understanding,
the role of the youth as citizen diplomats should be seriously considered.

This paper particularly looks into how the youth, particularly ages 15-35, of today’s digital age
can better foster cultural understanding between ASEAN and Korea, address misconceptions
and biases, and more generally, deepen the socio-cultural relationship between the two parties
through citizen diplomacy measures. This was done by utilizing a three-dimensional
framework that analyzes how digital media can be used to further diplomatic efforts. The study
finds that current digital media tools lend three main elements that can be used by the youth
for cultural awareness and promotion, namely: 1) agenda-setting, 2) presence expansion, and
3) conversation generation. From here, the paper builds on how these can be harnessed to
induce greater participation. It particularly recommends two general courses of action: crafting
a purposive and interactive digital engagement platform for the youth and unifying all state and
non-state efforts to create a neutral framework to guide all cultural promotion efforts.
 Ready, Set, Action: The Role of Digital Media Tools in Harnessing Youth Power for
Greater Cultural Understanding

Background
In a span of a little over 30 years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and
the Republic of Korea (ROK) has enjoyed a strong and steady partnership with generally
positive returns. Dating back to 1989, there is a concerted effort on both sides to strengthen
economic ties, address security concerns, and cultivate deeper socio-cultural understanding
among its communities. This is particularly reflected in initiatives such as ASEAN + 3,
ASEAN-ROK Free Trade Area, ASEAN-Korea Culture Exchange Year, dialogue relations,
and regional forums, among others (Kamaruddin & Galas, 2019). This has generated equally
beneficial effects on the two parties, especially in terms of trade and investment (Nghia, 2020).
When it comes to socio-cultural ties, however, much work is needed to be done to promote a
better understanding of ASEAN cultures in Korea. While Korean culture has permeated
through geographic barriers—largely attributed to the Hallyu Wave—Southeast Asian nations
are still yet to enjoy similar (or even relatively close) amounts of popularity and adulation that
the former has received. In a survey conducted by Yoon et al. (2017), they found that the image
of ASEAN among Korean youths mostly revolved around poverty and labor issues, instead of
deeper cultural associations. This is compared to ASEAN youth’s positive image of the East
Asian country, signified by the keywords, “developed”, “clean”, and “advanced”. The survey
also found that news from Korea about the region is often wrong and inaccurate, distorting
their view of ASEAN as a whole. Media representation of Southeast Asians in Korean media
is also far from flattering, often reinforcing the stereotype that they are poor and hold a
subordinate position to them (Ilma, 2020).

These prejudices translate to instances of discrimination against Southeast Asians in Korea. A

report by the Korea Herald, written by Ko (2021), shows that a considerable number of foreign
residents living in the country have experienced discrimination or unfair treatment. The report
further states that Southeast Asians are more likely to experience this than their whiter
counterparts due to their skin color and the general misconceptions about the region. These
misconceptions also affect how the youth view the relations between the two parties. Whereas
SEA youth views ASEAN-Korea relations favorably, most Koreans have a more lukewarm
reception to this (Yoon et al., 2017). Given the need for stronger cooperation and ties between
the two, there needs to be a serious effort from both sides to address misconceptions and
enhance cultural understanding among the youth. This is important as the youth—whom
ASEAN Member States and Korea consider to be around the ages of 15-35 (ASEAN-Korean
Centre, 2021)—represents a dynamic and increasingly engaged sector in society that has the
power to enact positive change and call the shots for a more inclusive and diverse future. In the
ASEAN region alone, youth leaders and other related networks are purported to have a vital
role in integrating the countries together, particularly through the means of social movements
and cultural exchanges (Hasan & Raga, 2015). The same is touted for the youth of Korea who
are known for harnessing the power of the digital media to express their discontent, forward
their concerns, and rally for change (Kang, 2016).

One way to better forward mutual understanding is through the promotion of citizen diplomacy,
particularly emphasizing the role of the youth. While the term ‘diplomacy’ has long been
associated with official functions of the state, the concept has evolved in recent times to
accommodate the needs and trends of the increasingly complex international sphere. One
development of which is citizen diplomacy. The US-based Center for Citizen Diplomacy
defines it as “the concept that every global citizen has the right, even the responsibility, to
engage across cultural differences and create shared understanding through person-to-person
interactions” (as cited in Bird, 2021). The emergence of these new types of diplomacy entailed
a shift in focus, particularly to one that viewed regular citizens as primary actors and effective
initiators, rather than being passive targets (David, 2012). Here, citizens are defined as
autonomous individuals representing themselves to practice diplomacy with the resources they
have. Therefore, citizen diplomacy is the action of individuals or a group of individuals as
autonomous agents, undertaking some functions of diplomacy such as 1) negotiation, 2)
gathering or disseminating information, or 3) representation, with the aim to serve their interest
without any attachment with other actors (Paul Sharp, as cited in David, 2012).

Given this new era of citizen diplomacy in the online sphere and the need for greater cultural
understanding, the role of the youth as citizen diplomats comes into play. The Center for
Citizen Diplomacy (n.d.) believes that this provides the opportunity for individual and
collective global fluency, creating opportunities to address misunderstandings. The youth—
known for their proficiency in the digital space—can become their own educators and
diplomats with the use of social media as their own resources in promoting mutual forbearing
with others, debunking misconceptions, and correcting prejudices (Grand-Clement, 2017). As
citizen diplomats transcend territorially bound identities, they could perform unofficial dual-
accredited roles in the enhancement of bilateral relationships through the use of social media,
connecting with people from all over the world (Lee, 2020). Changes in technology and the
international platform welcome the new forms of communication in an era of unprecedented
interconnectedness, as any individual with access to the internet can create a following and
build a community for themselves. Therefore, when the youth is properly educated and given
the right platforms, the generational equity and prominence of digital media can initiate
engagement and activity between two or more countries’ populations, motivated by a
responsibility to cultivate a mutually productive and healthy dialogue (Martin & Jagla, 2013).
Citizen diplomacy, as the role adopted by the youth, can then be used as a tool for correcting
misunderstandings between Koreans and Southeast Asians, paving the way for a more inclusive
and diverse future.

Framework
This paper aims to study how the youth of today’s digital age can better foster cultural
understanding between ASEAN and Korea, address misconceptions and biases, and more
generally, deepen the socio-cultural relationship between the two parties through citizen
diplomacy measures. To better structure the discussion, it will make use of a modified version
of Bjola et al’s (2015) three-dimensional framework on how media is used in diplomacy. In
this paper, the three elements were aligned with common cultural competencies, such as
awareness, familiarity, and practice. This is classified as follows: 1) agenda-setting, which will
tackle generating awareness and highlighting cultural inequalities, 2) presence expansion
which will focus on breeding familiarity, and 3) conversation generation which will deal with
cross-cultural dialogue. A visual representation of this framework can be found in Appendix A.

While this was originally used by the proponents to determine and analyze the effectiveness of
state efforts in social media, this can also be applied to citizen-led programs and initiatives due
to the similar instrumental effects of digitalization on attracting engagement and articulating
messages to the public. In this paper, however, the analysis takes a more specific approach by
focusing on how the three aforementioned elements of digital media can be used to promote
mutual cultural understanding. For the purposes of this paper, the digital media tools used in
his study will mostly revolve around those with interactive features, such as social media and
video-sharing platforms. The youth would also be given due focus, primarily due to their
increasing role in public affairs and their more intensive use of online spaces. The general
discussion of this paper will be backed up by relevant literature on the subject, as well as real-
world examples and cases. With this, the paper attempts to present a detailed analysis of how
digital media can be harnessed to promote cultural understanding and recommend ways in
which this can be achieved by the youth.

Discussion and Analysis

Digital media is described to be the convergence of interactive media, online networks, and
existing media forms that enables peer-to-peer forms of communication (Ito et al., 2008). The
many-to-many channel allows for a more bottom-up form of engagement where the "users" of
media drive the conversation, instead of just being limited to the main "producers" of the
content. Per Ito et al. (2008), this is a low-cost form of content production that allows the
consumer to author, edit, and distribute messages and other content. This has important
implications on diplomatic efforts, especially ones that are citizen-led.

Agenda-Setting
According to Bjola et al. (2015), media platforms play a vital role in setting the diplomatic
agenda by enabling a more extensive method of spreading knowledge and starting
conversations. They stated that this is an important requisite for interaction as it should be
grounded in familiarity, shared understanding, and common interest first to generate a real and
informed dialogue between communities. Agichtein (2008) also adds that social media
provides a major advantage as it has greater reach, frequency, and immediacy compared to that
of traditional media (Bjola et al., 2015). For regular citizens, this means that they can have
greater say on what becomes public agenda and what does not. The content sharing feature of
most digital applications allows them to look for information, share their experiences, and pitch
in their thoughts on issues they deem important. This includes matters that are socio-cultural
in nature.

Bloom and Johnston (2010) state that the media can be exploited to facilitate cross-cultural
exchange and generate greater understanding between two communities of different cultures
because it exposes people to diverse opinions, perspectives, and appearances found online. This
was backed up by Nadhifah et al. (2020) who stated that YouTube vlogs of South Koreans
about Indonesia foster cultural proximity by highlighting the common ground between the two
cultures. Content creators such as Bandung Oppa, Noona Rosa, and Hari Jisun do this by
showing similarities when it comes to cuisine, language, (particularly, the honorific system that
denotes hierarchy and seniority), and even in traditional medicine. While there were notable
differences between the two, these were still viewed in a positive light and mostly done to
enlighten the audience about other ways of living. Aside from this, media also has the power
to shed light on cultural inequalities and address popular misconceptions. According to Smith
et al. (2020), it has unique affordances—such as visibility and scalability—that promote the
recognition of institutional discrimination. This allows people to explore “representation,
misrepresentation, and lack of representation of cultures and countries in the global
community” (NAMLE, 2007 as cited by Bloom and Johnston, 2010). An example of this is the
YouTube channel of Kring Kim where she interviewed Korea-based Filipina actress Cherish
Maningat about the discrimination that she experienced working in the entertainment industry.
The digital creator also debunked some myths about Korea and Koreans in general in another
video. Media content like these puts issues of discrimination and cultural misconceptions into
light, allowing people to acknowledge the problem and reflect their role in it. With this, taboo
topics—such as those of racism—are pushed into public consciousness and become a matter
of public agenda. Given the many misconceptions about ASEAN countries, digital media can
be used as a tool to correct prejudices, positively inform Koreans about other ways of life, and
highlight important similarities across cultures.

Presence Expansion
Presence expansion is considered another vital element for diplomatic strategies to succeed.
Without proper traction, the agenda being pushed forward will neither be heard nor have any
effect on shaping public opinion (or in this case, fostering mutual understanding). Thus, the
advent of digital media lays out an accessible platform that can provide the needed visibility
and reach to influence a large number of people, at significantly lower costs. Per Smith et al.
(2020), algorithms and other digital connections found in most social media applications can
lead to increased exposure to sociopolitical content. In particular, algorithms, machine learning
methods, and filter bubbles make sure that the more a user engages with certain content, the
more it would appear on one’s digital feed. These are now being utilized by online social
movements to push issues into the limelight and breed recognition and familiarity of the matter
at hand. This is especially an advantage for regular citizens who would otherwise not have the
state machinery or resources to reach a wide range of people.

In terms of generating better cultural understanding between communities, presence expansion

is important to gain traction and spread out the message to the larger community. While using
one’s platform to highlight cultural inequalities or enlighten people about common grounds,
this must have enough backing to reach the intended audience and increase their exposure to
these types of content. This is especially important because cultural competence cannot be
mastered within a day and misconceptions cannot be fully corrected by a single post. What is
needed, thus, is increased and constant exposure to better foster cultural awareness and
familiarity. A case in point is intercultural adaptation observed in foreign students. Sawyer
(2011) reports that international students use digital media tools to learn more about the host
country’s culture and overcome the cultural gap. In particular, these tools allow them to
familiarize themselves with the language, meet other people in the locality, and better
understand the values and traditions that are new to them. The results of the aforementioned
study imply that fostering cultural awareness is not only a long-term effort; it must also involve
a community of people that understands and practices the way of life, along with people who
are willing to listen and understand. The process of doing this is made easier and more
accessible through digital media, especially given its many-to-many channels of
communication. YouTube creators such as Bandung Oppa, Noona Rosa, and Hari Jisun have
more or less a million followers on the platform, with accumulated views amounting up to 700
million. This kind of reach would not be possible for regular citizens in a traditional media
setting, especially without state machinery. Thus, digital media tools give ordinary citizens the
capacity to reach a wide audience at a low cost.

Conversation Generation
The final aspect of this framework is conversation generation, also known as engagement with
the audience (Pamment 2013, as cited in Bjola 2015). The ubiquity of technology along with
the availability of digital media has made it impossible for the world to turn inward, building
conversation generation from one culture with another (Gungwu, 2018). More particularly,
social media has offered a quasi-continuous dialogue with its interactive feature, allowing to
enhance mutual understanding and reduce misinformation, potentially creating an inclusive
platform that allows for the proper facilitation of cross-cultural conversations. In simpler terms,
this evokes engagement across multiple countries at a time. Furthermore, citizen diplomacy
can be further developed through the easy navigation and accessibility features offered by
digital media that can increase opportunities for intercultural dialogue. Conversation
generation, thus, is a dialogue-based communication that stimulates collaboration among
people, which can be easily achieved through digital media by ordinary citizens.
A study on the impact of social media found that conversations made possible in interactive
sites on the internet establish interconnectedness which is integral for healthy communication
with people in the host and home countries (Sawyer, 2011). In particular, the connections
formed through engagement and conversation helped in overcoming adjustment challenges and
establishing a sense of community among the subjects who were international students in a
foreign country who used social media as an outlet to communicate (Sawyer, 2011). The
intercultural communication here is seen to positively affect the users’ intercultural
communication competence (ICC), referring to the effective interaction between individuals of
different cultures (Hastjarjo & Rahayu, 2017). It also helps with boosting the confidence that
would allow them to engage in healthy dialogues with people from other cultural backgrounds.
This was further reinforced in a study led by the University of the Philippines in 2018 where
intercultural communication competence and its relationship with sense of community was
examined, with the findings stating that the given variables along with reinforcement of needs
can positively affect ASEAN integration (Muyco & Flor, 2018). Moreover, Muyco & Flor
(2018) recommended an increased familiarization with all countries of the ASEAN and its host
for a heightened sense of community which is also associated with positive mental health,
participation, and connectedness. Notwithstanding, the same study showed that despite citizens
from ASEAN showing a strong sense of support in the creation of the community, they did not
actively participate in the formation process or were given information about community
efforts. This has led them to stay passive rather than engaging and building deep connections.
Hence, the use of digital media among youth can be mobilized to generate conversations that
lead to intercultural dialogue, with the youth as citizen diplomats paving the way for ASEAN-
ROK inclusivity.

The Youth as Active Influencers

As seen, the emergence of digital platforms can highlight the prevalence of cultural
misrepresentation in online spaces, as well as generate better socio-cultural awareness through
increased exposure. It also has the capacity to engage different people in cross-cultural dialogue,
allowing them to be more familiar with their differences and practice their skills (See Appendix
B). Given this, the youth—as the main drivers and audience of these platforms—have a great
say in pushing for greater awareness and participation on these matters. In particular, a study
found out that citizens aged 16 to 24 across Southeast Asia spend roughly 60% of their day
online, with 99.6% of that spent on social media websites, such as Facebook and Instagram
(Kemp, 2021). Moreover, the same study also found that YouTube attracts the largest audience
in this age group, where people usually engage through the comments section. This allows for
the critical consumption of the content, as they are not merely passive receivers of the content
but can generate discussion and converse with other people. The citizens of the Republic of
Korea are also no stranger to digital media themselves, being dubbed as the “digital Korea''
with their advanced digital environment that has extensively penetrated Koreans’ daily lives
(Yoon, 2018).

With the rise of digital tools, the youth have the power to become citizen diplomats where they
are both the subjects and objects of diplomatic efforts. This is particularly applicable to content
creation and consumption. In fact, over the past years, there has been an emergence of content
on social media and video-sharing platforms that do not just focus on lifestyle, beauty, or travel
content and instead, lean on the side of socio-political commentary. If anything, this shows
how the youth is engaging more readily in political affairs and gearing more towards active
participation in governance. Per Caron et al. (2018), these messages and commentaries are
often embedded in a larger social, political, and cultural framework and are motivated by civic
interests, values, and intent. This leads to the creation of a particular type of civic engagement
that demonstrates the youth’s ability to engage in political affairs, primarily using creative,
multimodal strategies that are relatable to their fellow online peers (Lange, 2014, as cited by
Caron et al., 2018). Given this context, youth content creators can be seen as savvy insiders
who enjoy a unique position of influence in virtual communities—one such way is through
generating the prompts for discussion. This can then be utilized to shed light on cultural norms
and nuances, as well as introduce topics that are usually considered taboo in nature. This can
be seen in the content of Bandung Oppa and other Indonesian-focused Korean vloggers, Kring
Kim’s interviews, as well as Facebook and Twitter threads on cultural affairs. Content creation,
however, is only one part of it. The critical consumption of messages and the dialogue
generated through these are also vital components of promoting cultural awareness. The
features of most digital media sites also render them as relatively active actors in the sphere, as
they have the ability to share their thoughts and engage other people in conversation even if
they are not the main producers of the content. Thus, their input still has the power to shape
and influence the discussion. Per Gerodimos (2010), young people are very much willing to
engage with online content, especially when the benefits of doing so are clear and if they find
it relevant to their daily lives. They are also found to be more engaged with content if they find
the content and the process convenient, personalized, and emotionally engaging.
Digital tools, thus, provide the youth with opportunities for greater and more active
participation in civic affairs. This is in accordance with the current research on “young-
networked-citizens” that highlights how the youth of today uses interactive and peer-based acts
that revamp traditional participatory frameworks and create new forms of mobilization and
agenda-setting (Caron et al., 2018). Regardless of means, however, it still endows similar
benefits of traditional civic engagement, such as voice expression, development of identity,
better argumentation skills, interaction with diverse interests and opinions, and intellectual
stimulation (Gerodimos, 2010). This can play a major role in addressing cultural issues if the
use of digital media in promoting awareness and breeding familiarity is further institutionalized
and supported by both state and non-state actors.

Conclusion and Recommendations

While ASEAN and ROK have made great strides to improve their relationship with each other,
much work is needed to be done to address the cultural misconceptions and harmful prejudices
of Southeast Asians in Korea. This is vital if the two parties are looking to strengthen and
deepen their socio-cultural ties with each other. This need coincides with the rise of a dynamic
and increasingly engaged youth sector in both regions and the advent of digital media that
paves the way for more inclusive and accessible diplomatic efforts. With this, there is a need
to maximize the unique affordances of the emerging technology to foster better intercultural
competence among the youth and improve youth participation in governance affairs. To do this,
however, there must be clear, unified direction and ample state and non-state support. It also
must be noted that digital tools must also be coupled with traditional elements of diplomatic
efforts to be relevant to the audience and the socio-political space (Gerodimos, 2010). With
this, the recommendations fall into two main groups.

First, building a neutral framework and mutually beneficial goals for all cultures involved is
highly important in fostering long-term, genuine relationships. As views between ASEAN-
ROK relationships tend to be misinformed, it will be necessary to correct these through
intercultural dialogue, grounded on similar principles. In Europe, strengthening intercultural
dialogue is espoused on equality, respect, and basic human rights, therefore requiring a neutral
institutional and legal framework based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law
(Council of Europe Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 2008). This was expedited by clear legislation
and policies against discrimination, adopting an interdepartmental committee and a National
Action Plan based on international human rights standards, and a public debate marked by
respect for cultural diversity. This hits two objectives at once: 1) a framework sets clear goals
and educates people more systematically, and 2) discrimination and unfair treatment is avoided.
In the ASEAN-ROK community, the framework can be applied through capitalizing on virtual
platforms, reconnecting with different societies, and integrating it into the school curriculum,
virtual programs, and cultural partnerships (Churella et al., 2021). The framework will not
impinge on individual autonomy but rather lend a unified direction to educate and build an
environment that is conducive to understanding.

Second, this paper recommends a more purposive, interactive method of educating and
empowering the youth to participate in promoting, addressing, and fostering better cultural
understanding. This can be done by looking into sponsoring the creation of cultural awareness
content, especially for content creators with large international followings; partnering with
youth networks and other non-governmental organizations to promote cultural diplomatic
efforts; and holding cultural dialogue workshops and forums to better put their skills into
practice. In addition, Muyco and Flor (2018) found that general information about other
cultures is not enough to translate into intercultural competence, hence, there is a need to create
a platform with an immersive landscape to stimulate participation. While this is largely hinged
on digital media, this must also be coupled with traditional practices such as holding
intercultural exchange programs, promoting tourism, and hosting leadership summits,
conferences, and other youth-focused programs to increase exposure to diverse cultures and
solicit solutions for tackling cultural problems.

The role of the youth in harnessing a more inclusive ASEAN-ROK is ripe with the dominance
of social media. As is highlighted in this paper, however, dynamic youth engagement, with
the right mix of traditional and digital tools, and ample multi-sectoral support are needed to
make this a reality.

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Functioning of the Contemporary On-Line Promotional System and Its Sustainable
Development. Sustainability 2020, 12, 7138; doi:10.3390/su12177138
Yoon, K. (2018, May). Digital Media and Culture in Korea. Communication, Digital
Media, and Popular Culture in Korea: Contemporary Research and Future Prospects,
Chapter: 10. Publisher: Lexington Books
Yoon, J., Kim, K., Jung, B., Ko, W., & Kim, Y. (2017). Mutual Perceptions of ASEAN and
Korean Youth. Seoul: ASEAN-Korea Centre.
Appendix

Appendix A
Bjola et al’s three-dimensional framework on how media affects diplomacy
Appendix B
Operational Framework on Youth Citizen Diplomacy in Culture
 A Tale of Two Locales: Cross-Cultural Perceptions and (Mis)understandings between ASEAN
and the Republic of Korea
Hyungjoo Jeong and Ying Shan Hannah Chia

Abstract

The proliferation of people-to-people connections that transcend boundaries have driven modern international relations.
Marked with spirit and dynamism, relationships between the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’) and the
Republic of Korea (‘South Korea’) have also developed in similar directions. Abundant linkages based on tourism,
business, education, culture, and the internet exist. Youth, with their globalised perspective and mobility, have acted as
impetuses in establishing such connections. Disappointingly however, mutual perceptions between youth of ASEAN and
South Korea did not follow such trends. In addition to the disparate levels of interest and knowledge that youth of ASEAN
and South Korea have for one another, appropriated forms of representations have inhibited the development of a healthy
ASEAN-Korea youth relationship. This is particularly concerning, as an ASEAN-Korea youth relationship characterised
by imbalances, misperceptions, and hierarchical mindsets are by no means conducive to realising a mature ASEAN-Korea
relationship where both entities interact as equal beings and recognise each other’s rich economic, political, and social
potential. Moreover, existing ASEAN-Korea youth platforms – despite the symbolic value they retain – have been
inadequate in addressing such obstacles. They were not only limited in length and scope but have not provided sufficient
opportunities for youth to define and take their role in shaping ASEAN-Korea relationships. Recognising such
impairments in current ASEAN-Korea youth relations, we put forth two solutions which are focused on providing agency,
spreading accurate information, and facilitating authentic interaction between youth of ASEAN and South Korea. We
posit that youths should proactively create social norms to change mindsets across the whole of society and that platforms
for physical and virtual interactions that are organic, consistent, and inclusive are necessary. Such forms of youth
connections that can fundamentally transform mindsets and spark broader change will set the basis for a sustainable and
future-oriented ASEAN-Korea partnership, where youth think upon objective and meaningful information, develop a
sense of ownership, and build tighter relationships.
A Tale of Two Locales: Cross-Cultural Perceptions and (Mis)understandings between ASEAN
and the Republic of Korea

1. Introduction
The domain of international relations is no longer exclusive to governments. Transnational
people-to-people connections proliferated, increasingly infiltrating international relations
(Modaber, 2016). Human exchanges happening through migration, travelling, internet
conversations, and education have contributed to building bridges between different societies.
Particularly, youth have had a central role in driving such changes. With their willingness to
adapt to a globalizing world, they became the backbone of international interactions.

ASEAN and Soouth Korea are characterised by such dynamism. Youth have actively
participated in building people-to-people connections between the two locales through the
consumption of cultural goods, migration, tourism, and education since the 1990s (Ancho et
al., 2021). Despite such mushrooming of exchanges, it is true that imbalances in understandings
and discordant perceptions remain. South Korean youth’s exposure and understanding of
ASEAN remain limited vis-à-vis their ASEAN counterparts.

In this essay, we not only problematise the lack of understanding in South Korea per se but go
as far as to suggest that the conditions of ASEAN-Korea youth relations require youth of both
entities to passively accept appropriated forms of information. Put simply, mutual perceptions
are not only uneven but also shallow and ill-informed. What is needed, then, are initiatives and
platforms that can fundamentally transform youth’s mindsets and leverage them as agents for
broader social and international change. To this end, we propose two possible remedies: (1)
changing mindsets and social attitudes through norms and (2) thickening interactions. These
solutions will contribute to shaping a healthy and constructive ASEAN-Korea relationship.

The essay consists of three sections. First, we analyse the problems underlying the mutual
perceptions between ASEAN and South Korean youth by borrowing ideas from the theory of
poststructuralism. We each examine the broader landscape, ASEAN youth’s perceptions of
South Korea, and South Korean youth’s perceptions of ASEAN. The second section assesses
the limitations of current forms of ASEAN-Korea youth events and suggests points to be
improved on. The final section builds upon the previous one and introduces solutions that can
redress the problems in mutual perceptions.
 2. The Imbalance and Beyond
Research conducted in 2017 by the ASEAN-Korea Centre (AKC) and the Korea Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies (KISEAS) provides one of the most updated and comprehensive
statistical research on ASEAN-Korea youth relations. The results indicate that there are mainly
two ways in which the ‘imbalance’ manifests. First, attitudes toward ASEAN-Korea relations
greatly differ between young populations of each entity. While 75.2% of ASEAN youth
responded that ASEAN-Korea relations are positive, only 31.8% of South Korean youth
responded likewise (Yoon et al., 2017). Instead, they were more lukewarm. Most South Korean
youth (61.8%) expressed that ASEAN-Korea relationships were normal (Yoon et al., 2017).
Second, the way youth conceptualised each other diverged. Most ASEAN youth associated
South Korea and its people with positive terms, such as ‘developed,’ ‘friendly,’ ‘clean,’ or
‘beautiful.’ (Yoon et al., 2017). This stands in stark contrast with how South Korean youth
described their ASEAN counterparts. To South Korean youth, ASEAN mostly came across as
a tourist destination and a developing region, associating the region with terms such as ‘migrant
workers,’ ‘poverty,’ ‘tourism,’ and its climate (Yoon et al., 2017). Some even attributed
ASEAN to racialised notions such as ‘skin’ or ‘dark-skinned’ (Yoon et al., 2017).

These imbalances are certainly problematic for a future-oriented and sustainable ASEAN-
Korea partnership. Discordance in perceptions inhibits the emergence of a common
understanding and equal interactions (Griffiths, 2007). The statistics indicate that South Korean
youth hold a limited understanding of ASEAN as an influential economic and political actor
with rich culture and history, unlike ASEAN youth. For South Korean youth to perceive
ASEAN in such ways blinds them from grasping the full potentials of ASEAN, posing a barrier
to a healthy, reciprocal ASEAN-Korea partnership (Griffiths, 2007).

2.2 Poststructuralism
Though statistics are powerful, they do not tell the entire story. We aspire to investigate the
relationship beyond the mere differences in numbers and keywords. Poststructuralism is a
theory that highlights how societies come to understand each other and their own identity (Doty,
1993). In the context of ASEAN-Korea youth relations, it helps identify the mediums through
which perceptions are formulated and perpetuated.

Poststructuralists posit that representations – language, images, or physical actions – that one
is exposed to are important in constructing an individual’s worldview (Doty, 1993; Metro-
Roland, 2010). Yet, not all representations are accurate, and that ‘worldview’ might thus
emerge as an appropriated understanding of reality (Doty, 1993). Representations are merely a
way of expressing reality, not reality itself. Employing such ideas, we problematise the
information youth access, in addition to the imbalance in perceptions. Current youth relations
between ASEAN and South Korea are not characterised by cross-cultural ‘understanding’ but
cross-cultural ‘appropriation,’ because each side acquires knowledge of one another by
passively absorbing shallow, misrepresented forms of culture.

2.2.1 ASEAN Perceptions of South Korea

It is often naïvely assumed that the spread of culture is desirable (Holden, 2013). The success
of the K-Wave (or Hallyu) in Southeast Asia is frequently described as a positive phenomenon
(Holden, 2013; Kim, 2019). Indeed, the K-Wave plays an instrumental role in shaping ASEAN
youth’s perceptions of South Korea. It brought ASEAN youth’s attention to South Korean
culture as a whole, setting foundations for interregional interactions via tourism, migration, or
education.

We, however, attempt to add nuance to such optimistic assumptions. Cultural flows, especially
when it is unidirectional as in the ASEAN-Korea case, entail risks (Metro-Roland 2010). An
uncritical acceptance of Korean pop culture can render negative consequences such as cultural
imperialism (Siriyuvasak & Shin, 2007; Youk, 2019). As Youk (2019) has written, an
idolisation of Korean pop culture can result in cultural hierarchies where Korean culture is
considered superior to that of Southeast Asia.

Granted such, it is imperative to problematise how ASEAN perceptions of South Korea are
mainly created via a narrow and biased range of sources, that is, Korean entertainment media.
It is widely acknowledged that popular media is not the most accurate portrayal of reality.
Mainstream ASEAN perceptions of ‘Koreanness,’ or what constitutes as ‘Korean,’ are
constructed primarily from the passive consumption of Korean products, rather than actual
interactions with South Korea and its population (Jeong et al., 2017). Despite the worldwide
popularity of socially critical media products such as Parasite or Squid Game, most Korean
cultural products do not show South Korea as it is but rather present a manufactured,
convoluted version targeted for popular consumption (Schulze, 2013). A common example is
the idolisation and overrepresentation of romance between characters of pale, ‘thin’ physical
features in Korean dramas do not correspond to the diversity of body types in South Korea,
which can impose biases against physical features that do not fit South Korean beauty standards
(Schulze, 2013). To channel the power of popular media into shaping a productive and
meaningful ASEAN-Korea youth relationship, new ways of accessing information and forms
of interactions should be introduced.

2.2.2 South Korean Perceptions of ASEAN

As Kim’s (2019) research shows, shifts are occurring in Korean media’s depiction of ASEAN.
Once written as a tourist site or a developing region, ASEAN in South Korean media is
increasingly portrayed as a region with rich potential of becoming a post-China economy.
Improvements notwithstanding, South Korean youth’s perception of ASEAN remain distorted
and shallow. To most South Korean youth, ASEAN is either a tourist destination and a
developing region, and the main source of information about ASEAN remains confined to
media (including social media and TV/radio) (Yoon et al., 2017).

While tourism is central to ASEAN’s economy, the region’s socioeconomic diversity and dynamism
cannot be reduced merely to its luxury hotels and tropical weather. Furthermore, passive acceptance of
limited and biased media sources renders racialised perceptions of ASEAN, which are ethically and
socially reprehensible. South Korean media has been widely criticised by people of multicultural
backgrounds for portraying Southeast Asia as a poor region, a source of foreign labourers and marriage
immigrants who come to South Korea for better economic opportunities and occupy the lower levels of
the country’s economic hierarchy (Brown & Koo 2015; Kim, 2019; Lee & Kim 2021). ASEAN and its
population have also frequently been targets of discriminatory jokes in TV shows for their physical
features (Alper, 2015). Worse is the general lack of representation of ASEAN countries in South Korean
media and beyond. Southeast Asian representation in South Korean and Western popular media is
generally confined to historical events, i.e., the Vietnam War.

Instead of interacting with ASEAN and ASEAN people, South Korean youth have passively accepted
appropriated media portrayals of ASEAN, which constructs their predominant understanding of
ASEAN. Such processes explain the racialised and discriminatory terms such as ‘dark-skinned’ that
South Korean youth link to ASEAN people and shallow perceptions limited to tourism and food, instead
of ASEAN’s rich culture, history, or economic potential. At its worst, this also resulted in a sense of
South Korean superiority and Southeast Asian inferiority felt by some members of the youth population.
Indeed, this is not only limited to youth but prevails across South Korean society, such media sources
are not consumed just by youth (Brown & Koo, 2019). To unlock the potentials of future ASEAN-
Korea relations, South Korean youth should not dismiss ASEAN as an inferior region but see it as a
viable economic and political partner, which requires a fundamental revamp in mindsets.

3. Limitations of Existing Youth Initiatives

Indeed, many organisations in ASEAN and South Korea have attempted to address these issues. There
were laudable efforts to bring youth of ASEAN and South Korea together and diversify the means of
interaction. The list extends from bilateral university exchange programmes, the ASEAN+3 University
Network formed by ASEAN, to the ASEAN-Korea Youth Forum and the ASEAN-Korea Frontier
Forum, hosted and supported by ASEAN-related organisations such as AKC or the ASEAN-Korea
Cooperation Fund (AKCF). Although such events hold symbolic value for they represent closer
ASEAN-Korea ties and provide a ground for youths to interact, whether they can offset the shallowness
and narrowness of mutual perceptions between ASEAN and South Korea are dubious in three aspects.

First, they lack voluntariness. Most are conducted in a top-down manner by large organisations. The
agendas are already given, the roles are assigned, and the participants are selected. For example, in the
ASEAN-Korea Youth Summit, topics are chosen for the participants by hosting organisations, and the
event retains the format of a formal conference which adolescents are unfamiliar with (MOGEF, 2021).
Given that the issue in question is the ‘roles’ that youth can take, such opportunities that strip youth of
chances to define their roles and conditions of interaction are inappropriate. These settings may inhibit
more casual forms of interactions to which youth can be more susceptible. Because participating youths
are assigned ‘roles’ in a formal environment, they might not feel the need to genuinely and openly
socialise, essentially removing the purposes of such programmes. While such events are for youth, the
irony lies in that they are not by youth.

The second issue lies in the lack of continuity. While university exchanges happen only for 1-2
semesters, in youth events, interactions persist only for a few days. For instance, the ASEAN-Korea
Youth Innovation Forum was held for a day, and the ASEAN-Korea Frontier Forum – the longest –
was only held for a week (AKC, 2018; AKCF, 2019). Although such experiences may help foster
awareness and basic understanding youth, it is doubtful whether the effects of such short-term events
could overcome the influence that media poses on youth’s thinking.
The final problem is the lack of inclusiveness. The defined range of ‘youth’ is people who are 15-35
years old. On the contrary, only university students are eligible to participate in all such events,
including the ASEAN+3 Educational Forum, and the ASEAN-Korea Youth Innovation Forum, not to
mention university exchanges (AKC, 2018; AKCF, 2019; AUN, 2019). Only one, the ASEAN-Korea
Youth Summit is open for teenagers (MOGEF, 2021). Individuals in their late 20s and early 30s are
largely excluded from such opportunities. This is concerning, as working youths in their 20s and 30s
usually possess exponentially higher resources, political interest, and social influence compared to their
younger peers. Albeit having the greatest potential for igniting change, they are being left out.

4. Addressing the Imbalance and Beyond

Having understood the reasons for asymmetric cross-border perceptions between both entities, crucial
then is how we might address it. The reasons above highlight the need for interactions that can change
mindsets from below. To do so, youths should be provided with platforms for long-term and inclusive
interactions where they can take the initiative. Youth, as future vehicles of ASEAN-Korea relations,
will need to take proactive roles. Focusing on the role of youth, we find two main possible courses of
action, not necessarily mutually exclusive, in inciting needed change and redressing the imbalance.

4.1 Reshaping Social Attitudes

Misperceptions and lack of understanding about ASEAN societies is not a problem unique to South
Korean youth alone, but one that transcends various segments of South Korean society (Brown & Koo,
2019). Norms condition the society we live in, and thus constitute a principal factor in deciding our
individual attitudes to the world and how we deal with it (Johnston, 2001). More often than not,
impressionable young minds are likely to have views that conform to, rather than contradict,
conventional opinion, or, at the very least, construct their unique views as filtered through existing
societal norms. To this end, one must consider how general attitudes and perceptions of youth are
functions of their nested positionality within society – as Metro-Roland (2010, p. 562) summarises,
“We can only view the world through the lens of our own traditions, experiences, and prejudices. There
is no Archimedean point… detached from our own “historically-effected consciousness” with which to
neutrally view the world.”

Returning then to the issue of racial bias especially in how young South Koreans perceive Southeast
Asia, one must thus address head-on that their views are simply a function of larger societal perspectives
within South Korea. The remedy to addressing inaccurate cultural perceptions then can be found in
seeking to fundamentally evolve social attitudes themselves. With South Korea branded as the “most
connected and Net-addicted country on Earth” (Taylor, 2006), the internet can prove a potent catalyst
in reshaping social norms via discursive exchange. Following Ok (2011), who argues that the
digitalisation of South Korean society has meant that the internet in itself can be taken as a public sphere
served as a medium for social interaction. It then can, by extension, constitute a means for which social
norms and collective attitudes are defined and redefined. In this, we thus find an opportunity for South
Korea’s hyper-digitalised youth to be mobilised in constructing more unbiased understandings of
Southeast Asia, both within the generation and older age groups. It complements the lack of
voluntariness and continuity in existing youth events as norms can organically emerge and the digital
environment lifts restrictions to who can participate in developing norms.
The propensity for the rapid spread of new ideas and agendas as enabled by connections in virtual space
is something (2016) dubs as a process of ‘cultural ignition’, and one that shows the vast potential the
internet has for sparking needed social change. South Korea’s history and familiarity with internet
activism, such as the 2002 candlelight vigils and the 2008 American beef import protests, thus leads us
to our first proposed plan of action for its youth: utilising the internet to challenge and, by extension,
change existing social attitudes and perceptions not just of Southeast Asia, but other countries and
regions that are similarly viewed through racial bias.

Noting the inseparability of this issue from a notion of moral righteousness, this is a means not wholly
dissimilar to the phenomenon dubbed as ‘cancel culture’, referring to “collective strategies by activists
using social pressures to achieve cultural ostracism of targets (someone or something) accused of
offensive words or deeds” (Norris, 2021, p. 4), wherein the outcome often results in the ‘cancelling’ of
targets in question. However, noting the limitations of cancel culture, primarily in its effects on free
speech, as well as the potential detraction in its ability to address systemic issues due to the
individualisation of experiences, we do not advocate for its adoption wholesale (Bouvier, 2020; Norris,
2021),. Rather, we see potential in one of its defining mechanisms – replicating across digital space the
individual calling out of abhorrent behaviours detrimental to the cause, to produce collective action (in
this case, dislodging mainstream social views of Southeast Asia from existing biases). In doing so,
social attitudes can hopefully be reconstituted meaningfully, through the emergence, cascade and
internalisation of new social norms (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). In tackling racial bias, this can help
us see the mainstreaming of norms that see such bias as detrimental or undesirable, and therefore tackle
this barrier towards a more discerning and accurate understanding of Southeast Asia not just amongst
South Korean youth, but South Korean society at large.

Beyond challenging undesirable discourse, education also plays a crucial role in correcting existing
misperceptions and deepends knowledge. Crucial is recognising that ‘youth’ as a categorical entity
should not be treated as a monolith, and that disparities in cultural understanding amongst young
individuals can in fact vary widely (Keating & Melis, 2017). As such, what also needs to be addressed
is not just the imbalance in understanding between ASEAN and South Korean youth, but also the
asymmetries that exist within both groups. Thus, just as the internet can be used to ‘ignite’ relevant
discourse needed to champion needed agendas, digital interactions can similarly be used to promote
and spread accurate information by those that already have it. A recent trend that has surfaced in the
past year is the use of infographic material on social media platforms, particularly Instagram, to explain
relevant concepts to contemporary discourse on social justice issues. A phenomenon Nguyen (2020)
dubs as “PowerPoint activism”, it conforms to the Instagram limit of 10 pictures per post to produce
accessible explanations of central terminologies and ideological tenets of social justice agendas, thereby
making these ideas more easily digestible to a wider audience. They have been particularly influential
in calling out derogatory terms of behaviours performed by people or injecting new perspectives into
the broader discourse, which are all needed in ASEAN-Korea relations. In this vein, youth of both
countries can use similar tools to encourage the spread of more accurate cross-cultural understandings
through such material, meant both for domestic and international peers.

4.2 Thickening Intersocietal Interactions

As discussed, existing mutual perceptions of Southeast Asia and South Korea rely heavily on a limited
number of channels and are constructed primarily from product consumption, rather than authentic
interaction. As such, what proliferates is not true cultural understanding of South Korea itself, but rather
an appropriated version of what South Korea is imaged to be, as filtered through the receptive contexts
of the beholding agents. Conversely, the dependence on tourism and domestic media in forming South
Korean perceptions of Southeast Asia thus result in similarly narrow and appropriated impressions, in
which Southeast Asia as an entity itself is not truly grappled with, but rather merely symbolised in the
eyes of the South Korean gaze.

Addressing the deficit in both depth and accuracy of mutual cultural perceptions and the flaws of formal,
top-down, short-term, and exclusive youth events thus require a substantive shift in how these
perceptions are even built in the first place. Acknowledging that current methods rely on an
intermediary medium that allows for the imposition of cultural meanings by the perceiver and on
conditions of interactions set by external actors, important then is allowing for direct and authentic
cross-border interactions between people of both societies that bypasses the risk of appropriation. To
this end, we propose that youth in both ASEAN and South Korea can facilitate an increase in the volume
and intensity of direct interaction between themselves, done via the development of transnational
platforms for such interaction. One way this can be done is via the establishment of youth non-
governmental organisations (YNGOs) and transnational youth networks (TYNs), defined as "cross-
disciplinary professional groups… [that] connect influential individuals under the age of 40" whereby
'influential individuals' refer to those that have demonstrated professional merit and achievement"
(Acosta et al., 2020, p. 2). Whilst the focus of TYNs need not be on improving mutual understanding
per se, they nonetheless can provide a platform for which youth from different countries gather and
interact via long-lasting linkages and organised programmes, such as annual summits, which are
voluntary, continuous, and inclusive. For example, Shaping Horizons, a social innovation-centred
programme aimed at meeting the UN SDGs, hosts programmes and biannual summits for youth from
the UK and Latin America. TYNs and YNGOs have the potential to stand as evolved forms of youth
events thanks to such qualities. By establishing similar programmes between ASEAN and South Korea,
this can provide a solid platform in enabling quality cross-border interactions between like-minded
youth in both regions.
These platforms, however, need not be confined to formal groupings. Noting that only a minority of
youth will be able to participate in either TYNs or YNGOs, informal and organic means, specifically
the creation of international online subcommunities, can prove useful in widening access to
transnational platforms of interaction regardless of achievement, socio-economic background, or
interests. So long as individuals possess a digital device with internet connection, they are able to
participate in such online communities, binding youth across borders with similar interests. In the
context of ASEAN-Korea relations, one key example would be K-Pop Stan Twitter. Malik and Haidar
(2020) examine how K-Pop Stan Twitter, an online Twitter-based community of K-Pop fans bound by
their shared interest in particular idols or artists, can in fact constitute as a Community of Practice (CoP).
In CoPs, as members regularly communicate, interact, and collaborate with one another, processes of
learning, though unintended, occur as a result of such activities (Wenger, 1998). Through such
exchanges, members commonly form interpersonal relationships, with some even reporting how they
made friends through such experiences (Malik & Haidar, 2020). Thus, what we find here is the potential
for similar interest-based online communities in other fields, such as sports, in enabling authentic
transboundary interactions between youth, which can prove a crucial starting point in piquing mutual
interest and providing the means, to learn more about each other’s cultures and countries.

5. Conclusion
The problem of asymmetries in understanding between the youth of ASEAN and South Korea is by no
means simple. As shown, this is a phenomenon riddled with multi-layered complexity, deeply rooted
in how both societies conceive of and interact with the world around them. Whilst we have attempted
to dissect these underlying factors in a cross-disciplinary fashion drawing from literature in international
relations, sociology and anthropology (to name a few), we by no means are able to provide an exhaustive
explanation. Nonetheless, based on our findings that demonstrate the importance of national identities
and public discourse in defining current cross-border cultural perception, we hope that our suggestions
prove useful towards championing a fairer, and more accurate understanding of each entity by the other.
By improving mutual understanding on both ends, this will serve as a crucial and necessary foundation
upon which robust ASEAN-Korea relations can be built, in which such multilateralism will help in
creating a stronger regional community to tackle the most pressing issues of our time, such as climate
change, economic under-development, and in the current context, the global COVID-19 pandemic.

For a generation of ‘digital natives,’ the internet can serve as an especially potent tool for youth in
undertaking action towards tackling the current impediments in a mature cross-cultural understanding.
Of course, caution needs to be taken noting the double-edged nature of digital media, in that just as it
can be used to advocate for social good, the dangers of misinformation and pitfalls of internet culture,
such as cyber-bullying, also abound. Nevertheless, as ASEAN and South Korean youths ourselves, we
hold faith in the ability of our generation to transcend these hurdles to building a firm and long-lasting
partnership, ready to tackle future challenges.

Word Count: 4,000

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 Building Partnership in Overcoming COVID-19 through City Diplomacy:
the Cases of Sister City and Sister Province between Indonesia and Korea

Annisa Pratamasari

Abstract
In ancient civilizations, city-states (polis) used to manage their affairs and were the main actors
in the era. Since Westphalia, however, the world has transformed into a state-centered political
constellation in which nation-states are the main actors. In these recent years, cities have been
back to the international stage, and more specifically, public diplomacy. ASEAN and Korea
have also embarked on sister cities, or sister province, programs for years already. In the case
of Indonesia, East Java Province, for instance, has signed up the Sister Province Agreement
with Gyeongsangnamdo since 1996, while Surabaya and Busan have actively promoted their
joint activities in many areas for more than 20 years. Henceforth, I would argue that city
diplomacy, especially in the pandemic era, would be more effective in the joint effort between
nations in tackling the issues that come with the pandemic). This paper also employed small-
scale qualitative data through interviews with staff who directly work in the cooperation
division for sister city and province partnership in East Java and Surabaya. Nevertheless, the
findings showed that the partnership for COVID-related measures had successfully reinforced
the partnerships between Korea and Indonesia, yet it has not gone beyond medical equipment
aid.

Keywords: city diplomacy, sister city, sister province, covid-19, pandemic aid, pandemic
cooperation, city partnership, ASEAN, South Korea.
Building Partnership in Overcoming COVID-19 through City Diplomacy: the Cases of
Sister City and Sister Province between Indonesia and Korea

1. Introduction
In ancient civilizations, city-states (polis) used to manage their affairs and were the era's leading
actors. Since Westphalia, however, the world has transformed into a state-centered political
constellation in which nation-states are the main actors. In these recent years, cities have been
back to the international stage, and more specifically, public diplomacy. Amari and Sevin
(2020) noted that traditionally, Sister Cities International and the International Visitor
Leadership Program had accommodated the partnership between cities, but there have been
growing trends for more comprehensive diplomacy partnership between cities recently, such
as co-hosting Olympics, cultural exchange programs, and even city branding. McLarty (2014)
mentioned that cities have also been helping with emission reduction and other sustainable
projects.

With increasingly complex issues to solve at the national level, city diplomacy provides a
solution to achieve national goals at a smaller scale, yet arguably more effective. Currently, the
national government expects their municipalities to generate their regional income, which does
not depend on the national budget. Hence, many municipalities embark on sister cities or
friendship cities programs to generate revenue and create a more prosperous region. Climate
change has been one of the main issues in city partnerships. For instance, in 2016, ICLEI,
UCLG, and C4 initiated the #CitiesIPCC campaign, which coincided with Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, and this campaign later managed to establish more partnerships with
climate-related NGOs and INGOs, like UN-Habitat and World Climate Research Program
(Lecavalier and Gordon, 2020).

ASEAN and Korea have already embarked on sister cities or provinces for decades or years.
The partnership generally encompasses trade and cultural agreements. Even though some city
partnerships, like Jerusalem (of Israel) and Jenin (of Palestine), managed to go beyond trade
and culture, but went into peace establishment and reconciliation between Israel, Jordan, and
the West Bank (Barber, 2014).
Table 1 below shows the municipal partnership between South Korean cities and ASEAN
member states (hereafter, AMS). Busan is notably very active in pursuing city partnership as it
has listed more than 20 sister cities and 11 friendship cities all over the world, affirming its
vision to be a 'global city.' Most Busan partnerships with ASEAN encompass trade, investment,
and culture. For instance, with Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam), Busan signed an agreement for
workshops and offered technological advances to Vietnamese companies. Meanwhile, Suwon
City with Hai Duong (Vietnam) focused their partnership on exchanging fabric and agricultural
goods

Table 1 1. Municipal Partnership between South Korean Cities and AMS

Sister Cities
South Korea ASEAN Member States
Busan (https://www.busan.go.kr/) Surabaya (Indonesia), Ho Chi Minh
(Vietnam), Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Cebu
(the Philippines), Yangon (Myanmar)
Changwon (https://www.changwon.go.kr/) My Tho, Da Nang (Vietnam)
Daegu (https://www.daegu.go.kr/) Da Nang (Vietnam)
Daegu (Seo - https://www.dgs.go.kr/) Bacolod and Angeles (the Philippines),
Gimheon (https://www.gc.go.kr/) Subang (Indonesia)
Gimhae (https://www.gimhae.go.kr/) Bienhoa City and Tay Ninh Province
(Vietnam)
Gwangju (https://www.gwangju.go.kr/) Medan (Indonesia)
Incheon (https://www.incheon.go.kr/) Haiphong (Vietnam), Manila (Philippines),
Phnom Penh (Cambodia), Banten
(Indonesia)
Jangheung (https://www.jangheung.go.kr/) Claveria (the Philippines)
Osan (https://www.osan.go.kr/) Quảng Nam (Vietnam)
Seoul (http://english.seoul.go.kr/) Jakarta (Indonesia), Hanoi (Vietnam),
Bangkok (Thailand
Suwon (https://www.swcic.or.kr/) Bandung (Indonesia), Hai Duong
(Vietnam), Seim Reap Province
(Cambodia).
Ulsan (https://www.ulsan.go.kr/) Khanh Hoa (Vietnam)
Yongin (http://www.yongin.go.kr/) Kota Kinabalu (Malaysia)
Source: The municipal's official websites

The coronavirus (or COVID-19, hereafter) pandemic practically has disrupted the business-of-
usual around the globe since late 2019. The pandemic has dislocated the global value chain,
hindered international and domestic travels, transformed the conduct of education and business,

1This table might not completely list all the existing municipal partnership due to the limited data. Also, it does
not include other kinds of partnership, like Friendship Cities, or memberships/participations
and destroyed the livelihood of many people. For example, ASEAN-KOREA Center (2020)
reported that the number of inbound travelers to Korea from ASEAN countries decreased
sharply at 45% from the previous year, while Koreans traveled much less to Vietnam and
Thailand (dropped 72%). In addition, the travel ban has severely hurt the tourism industry,
especially for countries like Korea and Thailand, whose tourism industry can generate much
revenue for GDP. Looking at these facts and statistics, overcoming COVID-19 deserves to be
the highlight of ASEAN-Korea partnerships during and after the pandemic.

Henceforth, the author would argue that city diplomacy, especially in the pandemic era, would
be more effective in the joint effort between nations in tackling the issues that come with the
pandemic. For this essay, the author shall only make Indonesia's sister-city and sister-province
programs like the study case, specifically in East Java and Surabaya (the capital city of East
Java Province). This paper also employs small-scale qualitative data through interviews with
some staff who directly work in the cooperation division for sister city and province partnership
in East Java and Surabaya. Due to time constraints, the author only interviewed them by filling
in a small open-ended question list 2. In addition, I gathered the data from the official websites
or social media platforms that belonged to the municipal and provincial governments.

2. Literature Review
2.1. Covid-19 and Korea's Public Diplomacy
South Korea's COVID-19 responses have been applauded as one of the best approaches in
containing the pandemic spread domestically through a systematic track-and-trace (Max and
Choe, 2020). Even as the country faces the second and the third wave in 2021, in which the
infection rate hit 3,000 cases per day, South Korea still managed to keep the death rate low
(Lee & Tiberghien, 2021). According to Korea CDC, the cumulative death since the pandemic
started is only 2,980 deaths out of 381,694 confirmed cases as of November 2021 (Ministry of
Health and Welfare, 2021). Korea's successful COVID-19 strategy can be attributed to the
quick response of the Korean government and the Ministry of health after learning from the
previous MERS outbreak in 2015 and the implementation of state-of-the-art tracking and
tracing technology which made it possible for Korea to contain the pandemic without resorting
to full lockdown (Pratamasari, 2020).

2 The question list shall be included in the Appendix, after the references section.
This effective containment of COVID-19 has given birth to another channel of public
diplomacy in public health and helped boost South Korea's nation branding. Lee and Kim (2020)
argued that the image of a nation in the pandemic era is tightly related to containment measures.
They reasoned that nation branding is related to its reputation; thus, if a country successfully
deploys a series of policies to contain the pandemic spread, its international standing shall be
elevated. Such a notion fits Lee and Kim's (2020) definition of public diplomacy, which refers
to the nation-state's strategy to promote its international interest through exporting ideas,
culture, and economic aid.

Fazal (2020) further argued that pandemic requires global health diplomacy because the
'mitigation of pandemic requires a global response' and partnership among all stakeholders.
Along with Korea, some countries embarked on their public health diplomacy campaign during
the pandemic era. China, for example, fostered an image as the global public health leader and
initiated the 'Health Silk Road' as a part of its health diplomacy (Baruah, 2021). For the Chinese
government, such measures become an absolute necessity as the COVID-19 outbreak started
in Wuhan, China, and China's national image has been tainted with racist remarks which label
the virus as 'Wuhan Virus.' Across the strait from China, Taiwan seized the opportunity to
enhance its international presence under the 'Taiwan Can Help campaign by exporting their
masks and PPE to other countries as medical equipment supplies engulfed the world at the
earliest stage of the pandemic (Wu, 2020). While South Korea brands every pandemic
diplomacy effort with 'K-,' much like their famously known cultural productions, K-pop. Like
many other countries, South Korea began its diplomatic effort at the state level by donating
medical equipment, like masks and personal protective equipment (PPE), and donating around
2 million medical masks to their closest ally, the US (Lee & Kim, 2020).

The Minister of Health and Welfare then coined a term, 'K-Quarantine,' to devise a roadmap to
export Korean testing kits and tracking technology to other countries (Schwak, 2021). K-
quarantine project allocated KRW 11.4 billion and included RT-PCR testing and high-tech
quarantine-related products. The government evidently hoped that this project would revive
Korea's export-led strategy, bringing its initial economic development and exporting them to
developing countries like AMS. Besides K-Quarantine, another diplomacy effort from Korea
to ASEAN is ASEAN Response Fund which provides financial aids to the COVID-stricken
economies. Last month, the South Korean President, Moon Jae-in, promised an additional USD
5 million for ASEAN to help their vaccination effort and recover their economy (Kim, 2021).
Previously, South Korea contributed around USD 6 million in the financial fund, USD 5
million for COVID testing kits, and USD 19 million for a comprehensive support program for
ASEAN countries (Kim, 2021). These efforts signaled that South Korea earnestly attempts to
enhance its relationship with ASEAN and boost its presence in the region.

2.2 City Diplomacy

Leffel (2018) asserted that city diplomacy went on a different track than traditional state
diplomacy due to the acceleration of decentralization and interest formation in the global
community. As mentioned in the introduction, city (polis/city-states) diplomacy preceded state-
to-state diplomacy in the pre-Westphalian era and even dated back to ancient Greek. While
state-to-state diplomacy remains at the center of international relations, city diplomacy has
been gaining back its tractions in IR scholarships for the last two decades (Amari & Sevin,
2020; Wardhani & Dugis, 2020). The partnership between municipalities encompasses many
areas, such as tourism, cultural exchange, trade, education, and even investment (Edmond,
2020).

Partnership at the micro-level could bring some benefits for the nation-state, as well, because
some issues are too complicated to be solved at the higher level of government. Wardhani and
Dugis (2020) listed several reasons why cities could, and should, play a more significant role
in diplomacy than nation-states. Firstly, many states are decentralizing and enabling cities to
be more independent in handling their policies, including global ones. Secondly, as the leader
of the cities, mayors are supposedly aware of what the citizens need. Moreover, most of a
country's population are city-dwellers, and they are legitimately the prominent representative
of a country (citizens). Thirdly, global issues, like pollution, pandemic, migration, and climate
change, are too complex to handle at the national level. As a result, the cities now can be the
leading actor in taking the issues into their hands and overcoming them. Lastly, the cities
originated democracy for a thousand years, dating back to Athens and Rome's ancient era.
Hence, the cities might be well-suited to exercise democracy

McLarty et al. (2014) noted that sister city partnership in sustainability issues could address
several issues (e.g., economy, environment, and society) and address mutual goals
simultaneously. Similarly, CitiesIPCC Conference also amplified the voice of the networked
cities and put their research knowledge to overcome climate change issues (Lecavalier and
Gordon, 2020). Barber (2014) further mentioned the City Protocol, which aimed to strengthen
city partnerships through a website in multiple areas, such as sustainability, quality of life, and
citizen participation. Regarding COVID-19, some smart cities in Indonesia use their network
to overcome the pandemic. For instance, Makassar city collaborated with the Japan Association
for Smart Cities in ASEAN (JASCA) to support online education amid the pandemic
(Rachmawati et al., 2021). The other cities also have their applications to monitor the pandemic,
provide information and service related to COVID-19, offer e-government services, and many
others; however, it was unclear whether these applications were the products of city-level
partnerships (Rachmawati et al., 2021). Nevertheless, from the other examples, it is clear that
city partnerships and city diplomacy have taken center stage at global diplomacy and acted as
a force to be reckoned with.

3. Municipal and Provincial Partnership in Overcoming Covid-19: the Partnership

between Korea and Indonesia
Mori (2020) argued that municipal governments decided on the partnership based on
'contingent' reasons like 'historical relationship' or 'happenstantial circumstances,' instead of
strategic ones. In Indonesia, an international partnership is regulated under the Ministry of
Home Affairs Regulation No. 25 of 2020. The regulation stipulates the rules, the areas of
cooperation, and overall decentralization of power from the national government to local
governments to conduct international partnerships. The Minister requires diplomatic relations
between states before approving municipal/regional partnerships; it coordinates, coordinates,
and evaluates them under its jurisdiction (Miss P, personal communication, November 5, 2010).
Nevertheless, as long as the partnerships are deemed beneficial for the people's welfare, the
Minister would delegate the authority to conduct diplomacy to the lower levels of government.

In most sister city or sister province partnerships between Indonesian and South Korean local
governments, cultural exchange, education, and community development become the focus of
cooperation, such as in the case of Surabaya-Busan (Surabaya City. Public Relations Division,
2019) and Yogyakarta Special Region-Gyeongsangbuk (Licensing and Investment Office of
the Special Region of Yogyakarta, n.d.) partnerships. Another example, the Subang-Gimcheon
partnership, includes a series of cooperation in the medical field, such as providing free medical
treatments and training for doctors and nurses at Subang Hospital (Kotasubang.com, 2019). In
addition, East Java provincial government mentioned that the central government encourages
international partnerships for every province, and almost all provinces in Java Island have
established a partnership with South Korean provinces (Miss S, personal communication,
November 5, 2010).

Meanwhile, regarding COVID-19, Subang-Gimcheon represents a pattern of observable

interaction in other sister cities and sister province cooperation regarding the pandemic
management. The pattern showed that South Korean local governments would provide medical
assistance and supplies, while Indonesian governments would become aid recipients. During
the early stages of the pandemic, local Indonesian industries struggled to meet increased
demands for medical equipment; thereby, they required the central and local governments to
seek supplies from other countries actively. Some South Korean local governments saw the
provision of testing equipment and personal protection equipment (PPE), especially protective
masks, to improve ties with their sister city or sister province partners in Indonesia. This role
as a provider of supplies was both backed by and complementary to South Korea's outstanding
success in effectively handling the pandemic in its early stage (Lee & Kim, 2021).

One of the 'aids' from the local South Korean government occurred in June 2020 when Seoul
donated a real-time polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) machine to the Special Capital
Region of Jakarta, its sister city (Jelita, 2020). At that time, Jakarta was having difficulty
procuring or borrowing the RT-PCR machine, so that the provincial government distributed
official letters to eight developed cities containing requests to borrow the machine and pledged
to return the machine when the pandemic subsided. Personal accounts from the Jakarta
governor, Anies Baswedan, highlighted that the late Seoul's former Mayor, Park Won-soon,
responded by providing the machine as a grant, instead of merely lending the machine (Era. id,
2020) and the gesture managed to enhance Jakarta's testing capacity by 900 per day. Such a
seemingly personalized and straightforward gesture has shown Indonesian local governments
the value of municipal and provincial partnerships with their Korean counterparts in managing
public health crises like the COVID-19.

Later in September 2020, Bandung received 20,000 KF94 and KF80 protective masks from the
Suwon government, which also covered all administrative and delivery costs (Bandung City.
Public Relations Division, 2020). Bandung city government then distributed the masks to the
public, health, and frontline workers (Bandung City. Cooperation Division, 2020). The
donation of protective masks represents the majority of Korean local governments' COVID-
related assistance to their Indonesian counterparts. In December 2020, the Special Region of
Yogyakarta received 50,000 protective masks from Gyeongsangbuk Province, its sister
province (Yogyakarta Special Region Government, 2020). To the Yogyakarta government,
Gyeongsangbuk Province stood out as the first sister province to donate masks. While
Gyeongsangbuk's neighbor, the Gyeongsangnam Province, donated 26,000 masks to its sister,
East Java Province, both sides wished that this aid would foster further partnership between
both provinces (Kominfo, 2021).

The impact of these donations becomes more significant in times of shortage and public health
crisis, as in the case of Hamyang's donation of 24,000 protective masks to Bogor amid a mask
shortage in April 2021 (Halidi, 2021). The symbolic handover event of the masks also served
as an opportunity for both Hamyang and Bogor regency governments to reaffirm their
commitment to future long-term cooperation (Bogor Regency. Regional Secretary, 2021).
These supplies also significantly help local governments facing shortages and lack of access to
important technologies and products, such as Bogor and Jakarta. At the same time, these
donations reinforce the positive perception of Indonesian local governments of South Korea
and its local governments' reliability as partners in times of crisis and beyond.

While the cases mentioned above represent short-term initiatives to provide humanitarian
support, the pandemic has also served as an opportunity to start new long-term-oriented
partnerships, like establishing a sister province partnership between Chungcheongnam
Province and West Java Province. In its Letter of Intent, which was signed on December 3,
2020, both sides mentioned three priorities: (1) Economic and Tourism Development; (2) Eco-
friendly Environment; and (3) Human Resources Development (Ranawati, 2020). Furthermore,
Indonesian Ambassador to South Korea Umar Hadi (in Ranawati, 2020) remarked that in
addition to Human Resources Development, cooperation between the two provinces in digital
technology would prove to be crucial due to the global digitalization accelerated by COVID-
19, and it represents interprovincial cooperation in addressing the long-term consequences of
the pandemic.

Similarly, while not publicly engaging in COVID-related cooperation, other local governments
such as Surabaya and Busan adopted technology to conduct their intercity cooperation during
the COVID-19 pandemic. This cooperation usually takes the form of online workshops and
webinars on various topics, mainly education and culture. Surabaya-Busan partnership has
been one the most outstanding and active partnerships for 20 years in which Busan contributes
through Busan Foundation for International Cooperation (BFIC), and Surabaya enhances the
partnership through the Association of Korean Society in East Java (Surabaya City's
Cooperation Division, personal communication, November 5, 2010). The cases presented
above have shown that South Korean local governments have generally taken proactive
initiatives to provide COVID-related humanitarian assistance to their Indonesian partners while
maintaining a steady level of other interactions and cooperation through online platforms.

4. Conclusion.
Despite the expanding roles of cities, Barber (2014) concluded that the ‘states are not going
anywhere’ at the international diplomatic scene. Nevertheless, the cities and provincial
partnerships have enriched the diplomatic relationship between states, and it is something that
we should nourish. In the case of the ASEAN-Korea partnership amid the pandemic, it is
evident that the cities and provincial governments have actively conducted partnerships
through various means, from providing aids to conducting online workshops. I believe that
such partnership will continuously strengthen the relationship between ASEAN (Indonesia)
and Korea as the cities/provincial government actively cooperate in many issues.

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Appendix

Questions and Respondents List

*This is the translated version of the questions. The original interview was conducted in Bahasa
Indonesia.

1) What is the main reason for implementing this sister city/sister province partnership
program?
2) In which kind of field, the municipal/provincial government usually carry out the
cooperation?
3) Are there any special considerations for choosing a municipal/provincial partner in this
program? For instance, geography, cultural/historical similarities, or something else?
4) For partnership with KOREA, is there anything interesting/different compared to
similar cooperation with other countries? Perhaps they're more active or do more
events/activities together, for example.
5) During the pandemic, was there any cooperation/assistance within the framework of
this sister city/sister province program? If so, what form?
6) The sister city/sister province program is considered a new form of diplomacy. In your
opinion, does this form of city diplomacy replace or complement diplomacy between
countries?

**The respondents' names shall remain anonymous and the author will only mention the
institution and divisions they belong to.

- Interviewee 1 (Ms. P), a staff in the Partnership Facilitation Center (Pusat Fasilitasi
Kerja Sama) of the General Secretary of the Ministry of Home Affairs.
- Interviewee 2 (Ms. S), a Cooperation Analysts at the Cooperation Affairs Division,
Bureau of Government and Regional Autonomy, the East Java Provincial Government.
- Interviewee 3, the Cooperation Division of the Surabaya City Government.
 Strengthening Mekong-Korea cooperation: Promoting synergies among Mekong
cooperative mechanisms on climate change mitigation and adaptation towards
sustainable development
Thi Ngoc Thuy Bui and Ha Phuong Nguyen

Abstract
The first Mekong-ROK Summit in 2019 adopted the Mekong-Han River Declaration,
upgrading the relationship between the Mekong sub-region (MSR) and Korea to a strategic
partnership on the three pillars of People, Prosperity, and Peace and seven priority areas of
cooperation: culture and tourism, human resource development, agriculture and agricultural
development, villages, infrastructure, information and communication technology,
environment, and non-traditional challenges. One of the most prominent issues of the Mekong
sub-region is climate change and sustainable development. Rated as one of the regions in the
world that will be most affected by climate change, the Mekong sub-region is of great
importance to the development of ASEAN as half of the members of the Association in this
sub-region. Coping with climate change is considered a long-term battle in which humans have
to build adaptation capacity along with mitigate climate change related activities. Thus,
cooperation and support from internal resources and external partners are needed, especially
for MSR countries. Besides Korea, about 15 Mekong-related cooperative mechanisms exist.
These cooperative mechanisms have different objectives, operating methods, and fields of
cooperation, but at the same time, these cooperation mechanisms have overlaps in many fields
of cooperation with the same partner - the Mekong sub-region - due to the desire of each partner
to form an effective and extensive cooperation, making a significant contribution to the
development of the region. Since then, the problem of coordination and complementarity
between Mekong cooperation mechanisms and sub-regional issues arises. Synergy is not a new
concept, but it is raised recently in a situation of having objective-sharing but isolating
institutions and seen as the way to make collaborative efforts “better”, “bigger” and “become
more cost effective”.

From these issues, the paper aims to make some implication for the Mekong-ROK cooperative
mechanism to coordinate and supplement with other Mekong cooperative mechanisms as one
way to ensure the success of the cooperation Mekong-Korea in response to climate change and
reinforces the relationship between the Mekong countries and Korea. To address that, this
chapter will first assess climate change in the Mekong sub-region to highlight the need for
external support to the sub-region. It also identifies the concept of synergy, then discusses gaps
in coordination and complementarity among other Mekong cooperation mechanisms. Before
conclusion, some implications about opportunities and challenges for the Mekong-ROK
mechanism to synergize will be analyzed. In the end, the paper will examine the prospects for
future cooperation between the Mekong and Korea as well as synergies with other Mekong-
related mechanisms.
 Strengthening Mekong-Korea cooperation: Promoting synergies among Mekong
cooperative mechanisms on climate change mitigation and adaptation towards
sustainable development

1. Background
The relationship between ASEAN and Korea was upgraded from a comprehensive partnership
to a strategic partnership at the 13th ASEAN-Republic of Korea (ROK) Summit in Hanoi,
Vietnam in October 2010. Soon after a year, to strengthen the cooperative relationship and
show a deeper interest in ASEAN, Korea established a cooperative relationship with the
Mekong sub-region (MSR), including five members of ASEAN namely Cambodia, Laos,
Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam through the implementation with the first Mekong-ROK
Ministerial Conference held in 2011. The Conference adopted the first Mekong - Han River
Declaration on the establishment of the Comprehensive partnership between the Mekong
countries and Korea for common prosperity. 2019 marks a new milestone in the Mekong-Korea
relationship when the Mekong-Han River Declaration was approved by the leaders of the
countries at the 1st Mekong-ROK Summit in Busan, upgraded to a strategic partnership on the
three pillars of People, Prosperity, and Peace and seven priority areas of cooperation: culture
and tourism, human resource development, agriculture and agricultural development, villages,
infrastructure, information and communication technology, environment, and non-traditional
challenges (MOFA, Korea 2019).

One of the most prominent issues of the Mekong sub-region is climate change and sustainable
development. Rated as one of the regions in the world that will be most affected by climate
change (MRC, n.d), the Mekong sub-region is of great importance to the development of
ASEAN as half of the members of the Association in this sub-region. In addition, most of the
countries in the Mekong sub-region are economies with a large development gap with the
predecessor economies of ASEAN such as Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Moreover,
climate change does not exist alone but also cross-border with many other development areas
such as agriculture, urban development, infrastructure, etc. MSR countries, therefore,
desperately in need of support and help from external partners in the work require a lot of
resources for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Looking at the contribution to the
region, most recently, Korea had established Korea-Mekong Water Resources Collaboration
Research Center (KMCRC), the Korea-Mekong Forest Cooperation Center (KMFCC), the IoT
for Mekong Delta project and the significant influence of the Mekong-ROK Cooperation Fund
as well as ODA and many other implementing projects.

Beside Korea, many countries have established cooperative relations with the Mekong sub-
region, prominently are the Mekong - Lancang cooperation (MLC) mechanisms and the
Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) (cooperation with China); Mekong – Japan cooperation;
Mekong – the U.S cooperation; and mechanisms for cooperation among Mekong member
states such as Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the others. Therefore, the existing
cooperative mechanisms of the Mekong sub-region are also keen to support the sustainable
development of the sub-region and climate change adaptation, integrating into their program
plans. For the motivation to form cooperation plans and programs with the Mekong sub-region,
it can serve as a way to deepen the existing relationship with ASEAN. The reason is that the
countries of the Mekong sub-region are all geared towards the goals set out in the ASEAN
sharing plans, emphasized in ASEAN Strategic Plan on Environment (ASPEN) 2016-2025 that
"Effective collaborative partnership with various stakeholders is important for successful
implementation of ASPEN” (ASEAN, 2016, p.14). These cooperative mechanisms have
different goals, operating methods, and fields of cooperation, but at the same time, these
cooperation mechanisms have overlaps in many fields of cooperation with the same partner -
the Mekong sub-region - due to the desire of each partner to form an effective and extensive
cooperation, making a significant contribution to the development of the region. Since then,
the problem of coordination and complementarity between Mekong cooperation mechanisms
and sub-regional issues arises. Synergies are seen as ways to make collaborative efforts “better”,
“bigger” and “more cost efficient”.

From these issues, the paper aims to make some implications for the Mekong-ROK cooperative
mechanism to coordinate and supplement with other Mekong cooperative mechanisms as one
way to ensure the success of the cooperation Mekong-Korea in response to climate change and
reinforces the relationship between the Mekong countries and Korea. To address that, this
chapter will first assess climate change in the Mekong sub-region to highlight the need for
external support to the sub-region. It also identifies the concept of synergy, then discussing
gaps in coordination and complementarity among other Mekong cooperation mechanisms.
Before conclusion, some implications about opportunities and challenges for the Mekong-ROK
mechanism to synergize will be analyzed. In the end, the paper will examine the prospects for
future cooperation between the Mekong and Korea as well as synergies with other Mekong-
related mechanisms.

2. Climate Change Challenges in the Mekong Sub-region

Climate change, refers to the increase in the Earth’s temperature driven by excessive
greenhouse gas emissions, could influence the entire world, but given in ASEAN Development
Outlook that “Although impacts are global, climate change operates differently at regional and
local levels” (ASEAN, 2021, p.110). In the Southeast Asia region, the Mekong sub-region
emerges as the most significant being exposed by climate change. The Mekong sub-region has
been known as a resource-rich area of Asia, possessing millions of hectares of forests with
diverse ecosystems. In recent years, the impacts of climate change in the Mekong region on
human and ecological well-being, economic activities, physical assets, and the environment
have become more evident. These impacts include increased frequency and intensity of tropical
cyclones, floods, droughts, landslides, and sea level rise (Kuntiyawichai et al., 2015). Because
of them, the roads, water supply infrastructure, hydropower production, and coastal
infrastructure will be at risk. Prolonged droughts due to lack of rain also have a negative impact
on hundreds of thousand hectares of land and cause damage, adversely affecting crop
production in this region. The Lower Mekong River Basin (LMB) include Cambodia, Lao PDR,
Thailand, and Vietnam are more being projected to be the region most affected by heat
extremes, climate change-related sea-level rise and would lead to food shortages and
diminished livelihoods given that a large share of region’s population lives in low-lying
coastlines. (ADB, 2017; MRC, n.d). As such, while Mekong Delta contributes about 40% of
Vietnamese aquaculture, nearly 50% of Vietnamese staple food, and 20% of population, the
rising sea level to a third meters could cause a huge loss in Vietnam’s GDP and delete almost
arable land in this area (ASEAN, 2021). Combined with these serious existing challenges of
climate change, MSR countries are thus exceptionally subjected to climate change impacts.

Noting that not only the Mekong sub-region has to bear the climate change consequences, but
this region needs extra attention because of its typically vulnerable trait compared to other
ASEAN member states, coming from two cues. The first reason is that MSR countries have
limitations on wealth, infrastructure, and capacity to deal with the long-term process of climate
change. Most MSR countries hold a development gap with the ASEAN-6 economies including
Singapore, Brunei Darussalam, Malaysia, Philippines, and Indonesia (ASEAN, 2018). In 2017,
whereas the average GDP per capita of total ASEAN was about 4.3 thousand USD, the figure
of ASEAN-6 was nearly 1 thousand USD above it, and the figure of CLMV was about 2.4
thousand USD lower than it. In addition, natural hazards are likely to worsen at the places with
limited approach to resources (ASEAN, 2021). According to the Global Climate Risk Index
2021, in terms of the long-term Climate Risk Index (CRI), among the 10 countries most
affected from 2000 to 2019, Mekong sub-region has two on the list, Myanmar (ranked second)
and Thailand (ranked ninth), and the two remain countries also appears on next ten ranked from
11th to 20th which are Vietnam and Cambodia (Eckstein et al., 2021). However, the other
ASEAN countries except the Philippines was listed at the range 51-100. There is also evidence
of growing interlinkages between climate change and other environmental problems. It is
demonstrated that climate change has connection with transboundary haze pollution, water
security, marine pollution, planetary, animal and human health (Seah & Martinus, 2021). Major
changes in the Mekong River ecosystem due to climate change are believed to be increasing
the region's vulnerability and exacerbating socio-economic problems.

The MSR countries have mostly continued in their path of rapid economic growth and
increasing regional integration. They also play an important role in the development of ASEAN,
especially in the situation of coping with serious climate change (Nguyen et al., 2020). ASEAN
has made huge efforts aiming to solve climate change and environment problems such as the
establishment of the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment (AMME), the ASEAN
Senior Officials’ Meeting on Environment (ASOEN), the ASEAN Working Group on Climate
Change (AWGCC) to study climate issues, consult policy, and organize tasks to ASEAN
members. Many ASEAN statements highlight the need to cooperate with multi-stakeholders to
their issues (ASEAN, 2016). Coping with climate change is considered a long-term battle in
which humans must build adaptation capacity along with mitigate climate change related
activities. Thus, cooperation and support from internal resources and external partners are
needed. Cooperation mechanisms, with financial and technical support provided by more
advanced partners would be favorable in the case of MSR countries (Nguyen et al., 2020).

3. The Concept of Synergy

To begin, the idea of synergy appeared in the Mekong – Han River Declaration 2019 as the
parties “Seek synergies between the Mekong-ROK Cooperation mechanism and other
Mekong-related initiatives and mechanisms such as the Ayeyarwady-Chao Phraya-Mekong
Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS), Cambodia - Lao PDR - Viet Nam Development
Triangle Area (CLV-DTA), Cambodia - Lao PDR - Myanmar - Viet Nam Cooperation
(CLMV), Mekong River Commission (MRC), Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic
Cooperation (GMS)…” (MOFA, Korea, 2019, p.6). It is not a new concept, but it was raised
recently in a situation of having objective-sharing but isolating institutions.
Synergy does not have a sole definition. However, either way, synergy means combining
resources from individual parties to produce synergistic results that are greater than the
individual results. Morat et al. (2011) commented that synergies are situations that occur when
unrelated individuals or organizations come together to share knowledge and experiences.
Wörlen et al. mentioned the bright prospect of synergies when "whenever synergies occur, the
whole becomes greater than the sum of the components" (2020, p.6) but need to actively create
it. The authors also suggest three promising synergistic effects on the subjects: 1) Greater
impact due to the wide range of methods available, 2) More scale for projects demanding huge
resources that if implemented by a single party it will take a long time, 3) Allocate resources
more efficiently and cost saving through learning from partners having experience working in
the field while avoiding duplication necessary when both parties want to participate in activities
in that field. Mouat et al. (2006) explained synergies as a factor that helps to take advantage of
the overlapping goals of the parties while reducing duplication in resource allocation.

Synergies are expected to produce such results, but members also need to avoid drawbacks
when synergy weakens the overall effort, thus becoming a backward expectation. These are the
cases where organizations take a long time to find ways to harmonize cultures, ways of working
and interests of the parties. It is an inevitable first step to organize integrated activities smoothly
and in coordination with each other, not to allow to form surface synergies while having
internal disagreements and conflicts. In addition, in the process of cooperation, joint action
decisions that need the consensus of the parties will take more effort to reach than decisions
when working separately.

4. Mekong Cooperative Mechanisms and Synergy Status Quo

According to Le (2018), since the 1990s, about 15 regional cooperative mechanisms have been
established, both among regional countries and with external countries. These mechanisms
have different cooperative fields and objectives, operation frameworks, and financing systems.
Among them, the GMS was established earliest in 1992 at the initiative of the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) and has a general secretariat at ADB as well national secretariats in
each country member. With the Mekong Agreement 1995, the MRC is the only organization
in the region that is intergovernmental organization working directly with the member’s
governments and each member country has their National Mekong Committee. Then, many
countries expressed their interests to hold partnerships with the Mekong sub-region such as
India with Mekong-Ganga cooperation in 2000, Mekong-Japan cooperation from 2007, the U.S
with Lower Mekong Initiative in 2009. There was still a new cooperative mechanism built in
recent years as the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation in 2016. Saying about achievement, the MSR
cooperation has helped regional countries improve their socio-economic conditions
substantially and most has transformed to be more proactive and important into collaboration
with the Mekong sub-region. However, there also exists shortcomings that standout are the
duplication of projects, and mixed results among cooperative mechanisms when their outputs
include other parties’ work in this content (Le, 2018).

Figure 1: Key Mekong Cooperative Mechanisms

MLC China
Thailand
GM China (Guangxi &
MRC Yunnan Provinces)
Cambodia
MG
India
Lao PDR CLV
DTA
MRS
CLMV Japan
Vietnam
Korea

Myanmar
MUSP The U.S

Source: Le (2018); MOFA, Korea (2019)

The synergies among MSR cooperative mechanisms have been implemented in latest years.
Standing out are the Mekong-the U.S cooperation with Mekong-Japan cooperation. They have
established The Japan-U.S-Mekong Power Partnership (JUMPP) to work together on energy
security and sustainability issues of Mekong countries. The synergy supports the goals of
Japan-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership, as well as ACMECS Master Plan 2019-2023 and
ASEAN Connectivity 2025. In addition, there also are the intra-regional mechanisms that
collaborate with extra-region related mechanisms such as ACMECS and some important
Mekong’s partners when ACMECS invited Japan, China, India to become its development
partnerships. Remarkably, ACMECS has suggested the soon synergies with other Mekong
cooperation mechanisms including Mekong-Korea mechanism (De et al, 2020). The Mekong-
Korea collaboration is also one of the few Mekong-related mechanisms that recognizes
synergies as an important output (MOFA, Korea, 2019). Mekong-Korea cooperation has made
financial contributions on sharing projects between them, and adjusted activities under the
Mekong-ROK Plan of Action 2021-2025 along with ACMECS and the ACMECS Master Plan
2019-2023 to complement each other.

The collaboration and complementary among Mekong-related mechanisms has showed some
spotlights but current status quo in the cooperative mechanisms of the Mekong sub-region
shows that there are many potentials and opportunities for the Mekong-Korea cooperation to
explore synergy when the coordination and complementarity between the cooperation
mechanisms is still scattered, and most of them are seeking opportunities to synergize with
each other.

5. Implications for Mekong-ROK Cooperation to Proceed Synergy

Synergies enhance single efforts. The individual efforts here are the efforts of each Mekong
cooperation mechanism to support solving the problems of the Mekong sub-region, specifically
within the scope of the paper is responding to climate change and sustainable development.
Naturally, it raises major concern about how these mechanisms might combine and connect
with each other. It is because beside the goal of deepening their relationship with Mekong
countries, the ultimate goal is to contribute to the development of the Mekong sub-region,
towards succeeding sharing commitments and maintaining the achieved results. This chapter
will make some suggestions for Korea and Mekong-ROK cooperation to execute synergies
with other Mekong-related initiatives and institutes watched from opportunities and challenges.

Opportunities
First, implementing synergy does not require the formation of a synergistic, complementary
power among all the mechanisms. Depending on conditions, capabilities, assessment of
opportunities and risks of instability, the Republic of Korea along with the Mekong-Korea
cooperation instrument can choose which parties to synergize to achieve effective collaboration
and achieve goals. With nature as a consultation mechanism, Mekong-ROK cooperation has
more space for collaboration and complementation with other Mekong-related initiatives when
both focus on dialogue relations by supporting, providing assistance, sharing knowledge,
experience, expertise, technology, and other means. In addition, synergies can emerge and form
more quickly when the parties find shared ground in a diversity of commitment. (Table 1)

Table 1: Alignment of priorities in environment of Mekong cooperative mechanisms with

Mekong-ROK Plan of Action 2021-2025

Mekong cooperative Priority areas relevant to Mekong-ROK cooperation

mechanisms

Mekong-Japan • Sustainable Natural Resources Management

(Adapted from The • Marine Plastic Litter, Aquatic Resources Management
Mekong–Japan Initiative • Water and River Pollution
for SDGs toward 2030) • Disaster Risk Reduction and Disaster Management
• Flood and Drought Management
• Greenhouse Gas Emissions
• Data Management and Environmental Monitoring
• Circular Economy and Waste Management

Mekong-the U.S • Natural Resources Management, Environmental

(Adapted from Mekong-
U.S. Partnership Plan of
Action 2021-2023)
Conservation and Protection, Ecosystems Services
• Sustainable Water Use
• Sustainable Energy Management and Energy Security
• Disaster Management, Risks Mitigation, and Early-warning
System
• Flood and Drought Management

MGC • Water Harvesting,Water Data Collection

(Adapted from Mekong • Groundwater Management, Transboundary Basin
Ganga Cooperation Plan Management, Water Quality Monitoring
of Action 2019-2022) • Rural Information Technology and Rural Water Supply
Technology
• Flood and Drought Management, and Disaster Reduction

GMS • Natural Resources Management and Ecosystem Services

(Adapted from The Greater
Mekong Subregion Core
Environment Program
Strategy and Action Plan,
2018-2022)
• Resource and Energy Use Efficiency
• Air, Water, and Soil Technology Treatment, Pollution
Control and Remediation
• Disaster Risk Management
• Rural Environment Management
 • Electronic Waste Management
• Climate financing

ACMECS • Natural Resources Conservation

(Adapted from Bangkok • Sustainable Water Resources Management
Declaration 2018 and • Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency
ACMECS Master Plan • Disaster Risk Management
2019-2023)

MRC • Sustainable Aquaculture Management

(Adapted from Basin
Development Strategy
for the Mekong River
Basin 2021–2030 &
MRC Strategic Plan
2021–2025)
• Water Resources Development, Wetland and Watershed
Ecosystems Protection and Development, River
Monitoring Network
• Irrigated Agriculture Development
• Data Management and Sharing
• Flood and Drought Forecasting, and Early warning
• Climate Change Risks and Impacts Assessment
• Capacity Building and Climate Financing

Source: MOFA, Korea (2021b); MOFA, Japan (2010); MUSP (2020); MEA, India (2019);
GMS (2017); MFA, Thailand (2018); MRC (2021)

Furthermore, their synergistic collaboration should first focus on and commit to three levels of
priority in climate change affects and sustainable development, namely the needs of Mekong,
of ASEAN, and global agreements. Most urgently are the present needs of MRS countries. For
example, they are said to be at the high risk of catastrophic weather conditions and natural
hazards such as tropical cyclones, floods, droughts, landslides, and rising sea levels
(Kuntiyawichai et al., 2015). Besides, the problems related to water resources also need more
care when this region has fast urbanization and high population density (ASEAN, 2020). The
next point coming into mind is the priorities field of ASEAN, especially mentioned in ASPEN
2016-2025 and other agreements on environment. According to ASEAN Environment
Cooperation (2019), the top priority actions for partners working on environment and climate
change are adaptation, mitigation, finance and investment, and technology transfer. Moreover,
they should also consider to global engagements that MSR countries made such as UN
Sustainable Development Programme (SDGs) 2030 and Paris Climate Agreement. Korea and
Mekong-ROK partnership could take this into consideration as a solid map providing more
comprehensive and integrated approaches for a synergized framework.
Challenges
However, responding to climate change is an area that requires coordination and cooperation
between the parties, not a separate effort. In the context of synergies with other MSR
cooperation mechanisms in responding to climate change in the sub-region, there are many
difficult challenges to solve and consensus related to national interests and territorial security,
such as Mekong River water resource, transboundary issues linked to environmental
management including shared natural resources, hydropower development (Le et al., 2020;
ADB, 2013). Also, it might be more challenging for Mekong-Korea to synergize with
mechanisms of external region’s partners than intra-regional ones. It is from the fact that there
are many cooperation mechanisms between countries in the region and with foreign partners,
each with different operational objectives, fields of cooperation, and different ways of
organization.

Therefore, looking for effective synergies from the beginning, parties might choose the
potential fields to conduct synergies to avoid the conflict. In general, before implementing
synergies, there should be a specific process from selecting partners to implement synergies,
identifying shared thematic areas in which the parties are engaged, analyzing harmonization
and capacity gaps between the parties in the field in order to select the appropriate stage that
the two sides can synthesize or complement each other. In addition, while establishing
synergistic partnerships could be hopeful, it should also be noted that trust and responsibility
need to be created between Mekong-ROK and the prospective partners.

Another concern is how to manage coordination and activities with other organizations.
According to the Asian Development Bank (ADB), parties could consider these types of
collaboration working on the environment and climate change: knowledge partnership, funding
partnership, and technical working group to achieve blended funding, overlapping prevention,
and comparative advantages (2013). Knowledge synergy refers to collaboration between
partners’ specialized agencies where participants can contribute and exchange information and
data, share experience to build a more comprehensive knowledge applying into work. It could
function well with areas such as early warning systems or hazard weather forecasting and
monitoring. Funding synergy could mean co-financing for ambitious programs demanding
large funds and run in the long-term, especially when climate change would never stop.
Technical working group aims to collaborate between separate partners to utilize the potential
strengths of each other. Korea could rely on those suggestions to implement synergy with other
Mekong-related mechanisms.

6. Conclusion: Prospect 30 years on

In conclusion, this paper contributes to the raising requirement of collaboration for climate
change as it promotes the synergy between Mekong-ROK cooperation and other Mekong-
related mechanisms. Though the Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted both partners with multi-
faceted impacts and it would take time to recover, the climate change has persisted. From this
situation, there have been more issues raised on cooperative priorities. Besides, taking
advantage of this situation, people say that it would be an opportunity for a greener build back.
In addition, what we do need to achieve in cooperation is to get climate change under control.
Ahead of the mid-century, three decades remain, the world is moving towards a low-carbon
future and commitment to reach net zero emissions to keep 1.5 degrees within reach. That is
what the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26) held in Glasgow, UK in
November 2021 mentioned. However, the Earth’s mean temperature has risen by around 1.1°C
since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (ADB, 2017). That says all the related
stakeholders must speed up on climate change mitigation. Climate change is cross-sectoral as
well as unpredictable while knowing that the most vulnerable regions such as the Mekong
subregion are having the highest risk of climate change consequences. In addition, climate
change action must be examined in relation to other issues referring the inter-dependence.
Addressing all the issues collectively requires an integrated and long-term approach over
several decades. (ASEAN, 2021). Climate change is a key determinant of the Mekong sub-
region development future. Thus, the synergy among other Mekong-related initiatives and
mechanisms, in the form of collaboration and complementation, would be an encouraging way
for both Korea and the Mekong sub-region to implement their activities and programs towards
mid-term and long-term objectives. In the end, the synergy is not only for Mekong countries
but also for the development of ASEAN and Korea relationship, and complimentary to the
ASEAN regional integration efforts.

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Strengthening ASEAN-Korea Cooperation in Mitigating the Impact of Climate Change
and Promoting Sustainable Development in the Mekong Region
Claire Lim

Abstract

Ensuring sustainable development is one of the key priorities for the Mekong region in the
coming decade. The Mekong region has been described to be the ‘lifeblood’ of the riparian
Southeast Asian states and therefore has widespread impact on the development of the ASEAN
region as a whole. However, due to climate change and the increase in man-made infrastructure,
Mekong’s unique ecosystem is facing a slew of environmental problems. As various countries
step in to provide development assistance and attempt to solve such environmental issues, a
new layer of geopolitical challenges has started to emerge in the backdrop of the Mekong
region’s attempts to tackle their unique environmental issues.

This paper will begin by deconstructing the key problems faced by the Mekong region and the
subsequent consequences on the Mekong region. In particular, the paper will cover
environmental problems as well as geopolitical issues. Before seeking to find remedies for
these problems, the paper will first conduct an analysis on the position and strategic interests
of key developmental aid providers to understand their motivations. The aim of this analysis is
to provide a better idea of how ASEAN and South Korea can position themselves as the key
drivers of sustainable development in the region.

After gaining deeper insight on the possible value propositions for ASEAN and South Korea,
the paper will then discuss opportunities for South Korea and ASEAN to collaborate on
providing developmental assistance. Proposed areas in the recommendations covered include
“Expanding and improving South Korea’s current initiatives to coordinate a long-term plan,”
“Leveraging on South Korea’s Technological Expertise: Bracing Mekong countries for the
inevitable environmental impacts,” and “Expanding ASEAN’s role in providing developmental
assistance to Mekong.”
Strengthening ASEAN-Korea Cooperation in Mitigating the Impact of Climate Change
and Promoting Sustainable Development in the Mekong Region

Introduction
In recent decades, the Mekong region has been plagued with environmental and socio-
economic issues. The provision of developmental assistance has been embroiled in the
intensified strategic competition between global and regional powers. At present, regional
powers, like Japan, India and South Korea have mostly been involved in isolated bilateral
engagement with the region. There remains great potential for collaboration across the various
developmental aid initiatives. On the other hand, ASEAN, in consideration of the geopolitical
situation, has yet to actively include Mekong issues on its agenda. As such, there remains a gap
of opportunity which South Korea can utilise in coordinating regional efforts and leveraging
on ASEAN to create a model of sustainable development.

I will begin this paper by deconstructing the key problems faced by the Mekong region,
followed by an analysis on the position and strategic interests of key developmental aid
providers including ASEAN and South Korea. By gaining deeper insight into the strategic
interests of stakeholders, the paper will then discuss opportunities for South Korea and ASEAN
to collaborate on providing developmental assistance. Proposed areas include methods to
expand and improve current initiatives and leveraging of South Korea and ASEAN’s expertise
to create a concrete plan for the provision of technical assistance.

Part 1: Analysis of Problems Faced by the Mekong Region

I will begin my essay with an analysis of the current problems faced by the Mekong region.

1.1 Environmental Problems

Currently, China has built 11 dams across the Mekong River. There are another nine dams
planned and Chinese conglomerates are also in collaborations with Laos for more dams to be
built. This has given China the ability to impound large amounts of water and therefore subject
lower Mekong areas to unpredictable floods and droughts. In 2019, the amount of water China
impounded was sufficient to prevent the monsoon driven water rise in Chiang Saen, Thailand
(Stimson Center, 2020). This has resulted in a slew of environmental, economic and social
problems for downstream Mekong countries.

One key consequence is the impact on rice production in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and
Cambodia. With large amounts of water impounded in the dams upstream, the water levels
downstream has made the environment less conducive for rice planting. The main rice planting
area in Thailand is the Chao Phraya River, while in Vietnam, it is the Mekong river delta.
Coupled with the environmental effects of less rainfall, the water levels downstream has been
reduced by 30% since August 2019 (Nikkei Asia, 2020).

In addition, the decreasing water levels have also put food supplies and employment at risk in
Cambodia. In the Tonle Sap Lake, the reverse course of the river usually pushes about 38.37
cubic metres of water (roughly 13 times the size of Hong Kong) during the monsoon season
yearly (ASEAN Today, 2020). Due to the confluence of two factors - water being impounded
upstream and climate change, the amount of water flowing into the river has been greatly
reduced and the time period of abundance reduced from five months to merely six weeks. The
course reversal of the river plays an important role in the migration and spawning of fish. The
spawning of fish is crucial for fishing sustainably and the migration of fish affects the size of
catches. It was reported in 2019 that catches have been down 80% or more. (ISEAS, 2021).
The economic and social consequences have been grave. Sources mention that over 80% of
Cambodians rely on fish as the main source of protein. Furthermore, the fishing industry
employs over 20% of Cambodia’s workforce. When water levels face a sustained reduction, it
creates a trickle down effect of negative economic and social consequences for Cambodia as
food supplies and jobs are put on the line.

1.2 Geopolitical Issues

1.2.1 Transparency of Water Resources

To account for the reduced water levels in 2019, China has repeatedly pinned the blame on
climate change causing reduced rainfall in the upstream sections of the river. However,
contrary findings were released by a US-government funded study. Eyes on Earth Inc, a
consultancy specialising in water, suggested ‘surface wetness’ in China’s Yunnan province.
Using satellite data captured using the Special Sensor Microwave Imager/Sounder (SSMI/S),
the study showed that Upper Mekong actually experienced higher than normal levels of
combined rainfall and snowmelt during the May-October wet season in 2019 (Reuters, 2020).
As China does not have a formal water treaty with the Lower Mekong countries, they have
simply responded to the findings with a statement that they will investigate the cause of the
drought further. The lack of enforcement measures or criterias to hold China accountable for
their actions in the Mekong region has left the Lower Mekong countries little negotiation power
in their dealings with China.

1.2.2 Partnerships and Alliances

Despite the consequences of dams, not all Mekong countries hold the same view regarding
dam-building. Laos, has leaned close to China and will be developing most of the planned dam
projects with support from Chinese companies and Chinese funding. In the development of
dams, two projects in the past decade have already widened the rift between Laos and
neighbours Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia. In the development of the Xayaburi Dam in 2011,
the Laotian government promised to consult its neighbours to allow for joint management of
the river and sustainable development. Later, Laos however went ahead with a signed contract
to start construction in the next year despite strong objections from Vietnam (Thanhnien News,
2012). A similar situation happened with the Dan Sahong Dam bordering Cambodia. Despite
promises of a joint impact study between Laos and its neighbours, Laos announced two months
later that construction of the dam would begin. This went on despite calls from its neighbours
to extend the impact study (ISEAS, 2021).

Part 2: Understanding South Korea and ASEAN’s position in the Mekong region

2.1 Analysis of Major Aid Providers Currently

In many ways, the China driven Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC) and the US-led Lower
Mekong Initiative (LMI) are competing structures and a reflection of the emerging geopolitical
rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

From the first LMC meeting in Sanya, 2016, Premier Li Keqiang had already offered the
Mekong countries US 1.6 billion in preferential loans and a further 10 billion in traditional
credit sources (East Asia Forum, 2018). There is clear emphasis on the building of
infrastructure to strengthen connectivity between China and the Mekong countries.
‘Connectivity’ has been raised as a key objective of China’s cooperation with the Mekong
countries in the five-year Plan of Action on the LMC 2018-2022. The plan aims to integrate
the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 as well as other sub regional plans in the hopes
of establishing a Lancang-Mekong corridor (China Daily, 2018). In the Greater Mekong
Summit (GMS) 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi has also communicated explicit
intent to connect the GMS with the landmark Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (LSESEAC, 2018).
More than just building relationships, China’s broader intention is to integrate the Mekong
countries under its economic ecosystem and cultivate their interdependence with China. With
that intention, LMC becomes more than just economic assistance but a part of China’s strategy
to expand its strategic and geopolitical interests.

The Lower Mekong Initiative (LMI), led by the US, commenced in July 2009. To date, the US
has provided more than US 3.5 billion in the last decade while bilateral trade in 2018 has
amounted to US 109 billion (ISPI, 2020). In the tenth LMI meeting, the US Secretary of State
Mike Pompeo denounced China’s extra territorial river patrols and its attempts to weaken the
Mekong River Commission and control the flow of the river. Aligned closely with the US is
Japan, who considers the Mekong region a part of its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
(FOIP). Mekong is situated between the Indian and Pacific Oceans and vital for Japan’s trade
routes in the region. The FOIP centres on the postulation that the Indian and Pacific Oceans
should be considered a united, free and open space, and that the freedom of this area is of global
interest. In the 2019 Department of Defence Indo Pacific Strategy Report, the United States
considers the FOIP a containment strategy for China. These considerations suggest a possible
shift in the LMI mandate towards regional security more than mere economic assistance.

2.2 South Korea’s Position

In understanding South Korea’s role in promoting development in the region, South Korea’s
competitive advantage in the Mekong Region has to be analysed. First, South Korea has the
ability to present itself as an attractive option in avoiding great power rivalry when accepting
assistance. The Mekong region has a favourable geographical position being situated along
global trade routes with close proximity to the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits. This
economic factor, coupled with the geopolitical clout of the Mekong countries, has made the
region privy to intervention from both the US and China. In pushing for their individual
agendas, Mekong countries have been caught in precarious power play which is where South
Korea can present itself as a viable third option.
In bridging the differences, South Korea can promote cooperation in the tackling of a non-
traditional security threat such as Water Management. Global and regional players will be more
open to cooperating on an area that does not hinge directly on geopolitical interests but instead
directly impacts the sustainability of the region and their economic interests in the region. With
the US, South Korea can tap on the extensive water-related data gained through the Lower
Mekong Initiative which has been established since 2009. Korea’s expertise in technology can
be integrated with the US water resource information to support water management in the
Mekong River basin. In particular, the Sustainable Infrastructure Partnership (SIP) established
by the Friends of the Lower Mekong has advanced groundwater management, socio-economic
information sharing and cumulative impact assessments. There is also the Mekong Water Data
Initiative (MWDI) which has gathered the expertise of more than 60 government and non
government partners to advance data sharing and science based decision making (US Mission
to ASEAN, 2020). From China, stated in the Five Year Plan, there is also interest to expand
and develop a water quality monitoring system of which access to data and information will be
made available to all Lancang-Mekong countries (China Daily, 2018). The Lancang-Mekong
Water Resources Cooperation Centre has also been established to facilitate better water
management. There is willingness for cooperation amongst the US and China to better manage
water resources. Evidently, water resources if not managed well, will result in grave economic
consequences which each stakeholder will be keen to avoid.

2.3 ASEAN’s position

ASEAN’s involvement in the Mekong region issues thus far has mostly been limited to the
ASEAN Mekong Basin Development Cooperation (AMBDC) entity. This entity was
established to promote economic and social cooperation between the ASEAN and the Mekong
region. Since its inception, the AMBDC has played a crucial role as convener which has
brought about greater awareness to Mekong related issues; with the first Ministerial Meeting
of the AMBDC happening more than two decades ago in 2016. This was especially incremental
at a time when the Mekong region received but lesser attention and developmental assistance
than it has today. There has been consistent signalling of ASEAN’s commitment towards the
Mekong region, but there has been limited progress on planned initiatives like the flagship
Singapore-Kunming Rail Link. Over the years, with the incorporation of more pressing issues,
the issues of the Mekong region have faded into the background, receiving less focus than it
did before. With Vietnam becoming ASEAN chair in 2020, it has lobbied extensively for
Mekong issues to be incorporated into the agenda. Unfortunately, Vietnam’s efforts have been
overshadowed by the more vital and pressing problems brought about by the pandemic
(Bangkok Post, 2020). As such, there remains great potential for a revival of AMBDC’s role
as a convener and leader in addressing Mekong issues.

Revitalising the AMBDC is also in line with ASEAN’s organisational interests and goals.
Primarily, ASEAN centrality in the regional architecture can be strengthened and reinforced
with ASEAN playing a greater role in the Mekong region. There remains a confluence of issues
in the background of Mekong’s challenges which may threaten the erosion of ASEAN
centrality. Principally, this includes the increasing external intervention which has led to
Mekong issues being embroiled in great power rivalry. The increasing influence of China and
its ability to prove itself as a well endowed developmental partner has also forced certain
riparian countries like Laos to take sides in order to secure their national interests. There has
also been an increase in regional players like India, Switzerland and Japan and most recently,
Australia. Certain regional players come under the US bloc and their combined sphere of
influence may squeeze out ASEAN’s role in the Mekong. In addition, as an economic incentive,
improving ‘Mekong dynamics’ will allow for improved Southeast Asian connectivity. Intra
ASEAN trade will be greatly facilitated and goods from maritime Southeast Asia will be able
to reach the inland areas of the Mekong region. The increased volume of intra ASEAN trade
will allow for greater economic prosperity of the region as a whole (The Diplomat, 2019). As
such, on the grounds of ASEAN centrality and intra-regional trade, it will benefit ASEAN to
become more involved in the region.

Part 3: Expanding and Improving South Korea’s current initiatives to coordinate a long
term plan

Currently, South Korea’s developmental assistance to the region has been conducted through
the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and the Mekong River Cooperation Fund
(MRCF). ODA consists of funds from different providers within Korea, with one key
organisation being the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA). Between 1987 and
2017, ODA to the Mekong Region comprised 74% of the developmental aid sent to recipient
countries. Plans have been made to increase the ODA by 20% annually till 2023. As South
Korea is intending to significantly increase ODA to the Mekong region, it should consider a
long term approach in plans with Mekong countries to achieve intended objectives in the long
run. Currently, each developmental project is conducted as a reactive mechanism to problems
or anticipated challenges faced. A long term coordinated approach would be more reasonably
suited for sustained development. Internally, as the MRCF is also funded by the South Korean
government, an inter agency organisation to centralise developmental efforts to the Mekong
would allow for greater coordination. This would prevent an overlap of coverage between
KOICA (main provider of ODA to Mekong) and MKCF which would promote better coaction
between the two bodies.

Secondly, MRCF can expand the scope of its developmental assistance to prevent tensions in
resource sharing. MRCF projects are aimed to improve information exchange, trade
collaboration, creation of employment and political cooperation with the objective of
improving the welfare of the Mekong countries. South Korea has provided close to nine million
through the MRCF thus far (Mekong Institute, 2020). One example of a developmental project
funded by the MRCF is a study to improve environmental conditions in the Tonle Sap Lake.
Conducted in 2017, the study assessed upstream and local developmental impacts on the
ecosystem and investigated the hydraulic feasibility of recommendations such as an Early
Flood Diversion from the Mekong River into the Tonle Sap Lake. Such studies have uncovered
more insight on the environment and shed light on how the riparian countries can better manage
water resources (Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, 2017). South Korea can look
to improve and expand current schemes for a more targeted outcome. For example, MKCF
projects tend to target a certain segment of the Mekong River such as the Tonle Sap Lake. This
creates tension in resource sharing as each country benefits to different extents from the same
project. South Korea could look at expanding the scope of developmental projects to include
more than one country in each developmental project. This would ease the tension of resource
sharing and promote greater cooperation among Mekong countries on developmental projects.

Thirdly, South Korea also currently publishes its Plan of Action (POA) every five years with
reviewed objectives for its three pillars (People, Prosperity, Peace) and seven priority areas
(Culture and Tourism, Human Resources Development, Agriculture and Rural Development,
Infrastructure, Information and Communication Technology, Environment, and Non-
traditional Security Challenges). Currently, the POA consists merely of key guidelines to frame
cooperation areas and as a statement of South Korea’s commitment towards the Mekong
countries. Instead of mere guidelines, South Korea can frame the plan in terms of actionables
it has agreed upon with the Mekong countries which would be executed in the next five year
term. This would serve as a blueprint for cooperation which would provide structure to the
extensive development assistance provided by South Korea. Where possible, South Korea can
also take the lead to coordinate developmental efforts with current subregional organisational
entities such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy
(ACMECS) and the Swiss Mekong Region Cooperation Strategy (MRS) amongst others. This
would enable better policy and executionary complementarity, allowing for information
sharing and avoiding duplicity in developmental efforts.

Part 4: Leveraging on South Korea’s Technological Expertise: Bracing Mekong countries

for the inevitable environmental impacts

While much can be done on the macro level in terms of policy making and coordination, more
has to be done on the ground as well. Specifically, Mekong countries will have to brace
themselves for the inevitable environmental impacts. South Korea, using their technological
expertise, can play a role in aiding countries to be well prepared for the challenges ahead.

One key tenet is Prevention, which involves putting in place robust early warning systems in
areas prone to floods and droughts. Early warning systems have been crucial in preventing lives
from being lost to environmental disasters. Paul Conrad, Cambodia Director for aid group
People in Need (PIN) which developed early warning sensors in Cambodia said “Too many
times, communities in high-risk areas learned of the threat too late and lost everything,”
illustrating the importance of early warning systems in disaster prone areas (Eco Business,
2017). Early Warning System (EWS) 1294 is a phone based alert system which circulates
information to registered users through text message and a Facebook message has already
saved the lives of many Cambodians since 2015 (Relief Web, 2020).

One example of a successful early warning system is the Hydrodynamic Model Flood Warning
System around the Tonle Sap Lake that was built in 2017. Hydrodynamic modelling is the
study of fluids in motion. Fluids in motion include forces caused by tides, winds and motions
and masses of fluid meeting (Intertek, no date). Therefore, by building a warning system around
hydrodynamic modelling, communities can more effectively evaluate and predict the
environmental impact. The implementation of the system started with a hydrological
assessment of potential sites followed by a recommendation of six final sites where the warning
system was to be based. A final report based on a hydrodynamic model is written and lastly,
training is provided for the project team manning the facility (RFMMC, MRCS, 2017). The
hydro-meteorological station is based on a telemetry system which allows timely information
on flood, low-flow (drought) and climate variability to be collected. Individuals in high risk
communities are then given notice by the system, so they can protect themselves from predicted
environmental damage (RFMMC, MRCS, 2017).

South Korea’s expertise will come in useful in aiding the Mekong countries. In the spirit of
cooperation and building on experience from South Korea’s own disaster risk reduction, the
Government of the Republic of Korea, in partnership with the city of Incheon and the UNISDR
Office for Northeast Asia, has launched a Global Education and Training Institute for Disaster
Risk Reduction (GETI) (UNDRR, no date). GETI’s goal is to improve resilience building in
urban cities by incorporating disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation to economic
and social policies. In working towards this goal, the organisation advocates for stronger
partnerships between local and national governments as well as for information sharing
between national hydro-meteorological services and other climate change data collection units.
Leveraging on GETI as a knowledge partner, South Korea can tap on GETI’s expertise to
coordinate the expansion of early warning systems to include other potential sites in the
Mekong subregion. The expansion of the entire early warning system network can be a project
led by GETI, utilising funds from MKCF and ODA while leveraging the regional influence of
ASEAN to aid in the actual execution of the system.

Part 5: Expanding ASEAN’s role in providing developmental assistance to Mekong

ASEAN has expressed intention for greater connectivity amongst Southeast Asian nations.
This has culminated in the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity 2025 (MPAC) which seeks
to ‘achieve a seamlessly and comprehensively connected and integrated ASEAN that will
promote competitiveness, inclusiveness, and a greater sense of Community’ amongst ASEAN
member states (ASEAN, 2017). By facilitating improved physical connectivity, integrated
institutional connectivity and enhanced people-to-people exchange, ASEAN will better address
political, economic and social challenges and build a more integrated ASEAN Community. It
is evident that the organisation goal that ASEAN is striving towards in the next decade is
Connectivity. This is aligned with what is needed in the Mekong Region - developmental
assistance in order to connect these mainstream ASEAN countries with its maritime
counterparts. In the Initial Rolling Pipeline of Infrastructural projects under the MPAC, 15 out
of 19 projects are conducted in the Mekong countries. This shows that there is an urgent need
for development in the Mekong region but also immense contribution potential that the Mekong
countries can provide to ASEAN. In identifying these 19 projects, ASEAN has screened for
the economic potential of the projects, principally in determining if they are able to attract
robust investments. This is followed by a feasibility study. An impact study is also carried out
to understand the impact on regional connectivity, the environment and the communities which
will benefit from the project (ASEAN, 2019).

In terms of planning and execution, it is evident that ASEAN is able to promote government to
government cooperation. It also has extensive expertise and experience as the primary regional
organisation in Southeast Asia. ASEAN’s implementation expertise therefore complements
South Korea’s developmental assistance in financial and technological areas and GETI
knowledge expertise in disaster reduction and climate change management. There is a clear
collaboration opportunity that the three organisations can work together on in providing more
targeted and sustainable development outcomes. Moreover, South Korea and ASEAN also find
themselves in favourable political positions as neither outrightly aligns with either US or China
and therefore making them a viable collaboration partner in the perspective of the Mekong
countries.

Conclusion

On the surface, it may seem as though the Mekong region is already saturated with
developmental assistance from global and regional players. In reality, with more players in the
region, the provision of developmental support becomes more complex. Recipients and
sponsors have to consider the interests and agendas of each party and in the process become
intertwined in a delicate political situation. There is hence a gap of opportunity which South
Korea and ASEAN can leverage on considering its political position.

In terms of finding a remedy to the environmental and social problems faced by the Mekong
region, while the issues are complex, both ASEAN and South Korea possess the knowledge
and capabilities to resolve current challenges. What remains is for both parties to demonstrate
greater resolve not just in actively participating in developmental assistance but in
spearheading the whole developmental effort.

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 The Emerging Korean Leadership on Sustainability in Mekong

Tang Zepeng, Wong Jun Hao

Abstract

Although South Korea (ROK) does not have immediate interests and links with the Mekong
sub-region, ROK has been a key partner of the countries in the Mekong sub-region for the past
decade. In fact, President Moon Jae-In’s 2017 New Southern Policy (NSP) signalled South
Korea’s (ROK) strategic refocus on Southeast Asia (SEA), ushering in an era of increased
cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), including the Mekong
states. The establishment of the Mekong-ROK Summit in 2019, among many other cooperation
frameworks between ROK and the Mekong countries, also proves there is a great deal of
synergy and potential that future cooperation can unlock. Furthermore, ROK is an emerging
global sustainability leader due to her strong commitment to fighting climate change – as
evinced through the Green New Deal 2020 and strong track-record of domestic green
investments and sustainability policies. By virtue of ROK’s strong green credentials, as well
as the decades’ worth of goodwill and strong partnership forged with the Mekong states, ROK
is in an excellent position to become the sub-regional leader and coordinator of climate change
and sustainable development efforts. Specifically, this paper will expound on novel ways for
the ROK to coordinate and even lead efforts in three main areas: first, in regional research and
development (R&D) efforts for sustainability and development issues; second, in the
development of the green industrial sector; third, in plugging gaps in existing regional
cooperation frameworks such as the Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation
Strategy (ACMECS) and the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The overarching spirit of a
powerful “Republic of Korea-Mekong Vision” can thus take a significant first step by
solidifying regional sustainable development cooperation efforts led by the ROK.
The Emerging Korean Leadership on Sustainability in Mekong

1.0 Introduction

President Moon Jae-In’s 2017 New Southern Policy (NSP) signalled South Korea’s (ROK)
strategic refocus on Southeast Asia (SEA), ushering in an era of increased cooperation 3 with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Kwak, 2020). The increasingly closer
ties between ROK and ASEAN is evident – ASEAN is now the second-largest trading partner
of ROK, while ROK is the fourth-largest trade partner of ASEAN (Lim, 2021) 4. On sustainable
development in the Mekong region, the establishment of the annual Mekong-ROK Summit in
2019 and subsequent adoption of the Mekong-Han River Declaration 5 cemented promising
future cooperation efforts (MOFA, 2020). Thus, it would be important and constructive to
explore how the untapped potential of ROK-Mekong cooperation in sustainable development
could be unlocked.

Elucidating ROK’s role in Mekong affairs requires understanding the politics of the Mekong.
The river flows along the CLMV countries (Cambodia-Laos-Myanmar-Vietnam) and Thailand.
Most regional cooperation in the Mekong exists within these 5 countries, and China or the US
in some cases. The integration of the CLMV countries into ASEAN and ASEAN Economic
Community (AEC) has generally been slow due to a lack of political will – including weak
ASEAN institutional frameworks, rising regional inequality and uneven spatial development
(Singh & Das, 2014). Furthermore, CLMV countries inherently lack a strong political or
economic alignment with the rest of ASEAN, especially the older ASEAN+5 members 6 .
Therefore, ASEAN is generally uninterested in most Mekong issues. ROK can thus plug a gap
that ASEAN and the AEC cannot fill. ROK’s can facilitate the sustainable development of
Mekong, which will directly and indirectly improve ROK’s position globally while

3
The NSP has continuously expanded its scope every year, up to a total of 9 strategic tasks and 92 core projects
in 2019 (Jaehyon, 2019).
4
Moreover, funds for ASEAN projects have also increased sharply, such as the emergence of the USD$92 million
Korea-ASEAN Global Intra Fund, USD$14 million ASEAN-Korea Cooperation Fund, $USD200 million Global
Infrastructure Fund, and the $USD1.2 billion Global Plant, Infrastructure and Smart City Fund, among many other
existing and expanding cooperation funds (Nicholas, 2021).
5
Full name of the declaration is: Mekong-Han River Declaration for Establishing Partnership for People,
Prosperity and Peace.

6 Weak domestic institutional and logistics infrastructure hinder CLMV countries, except Vietnam, from
achieving AEC targets for CLMV integration. This significantly weakens strategic alignment between Mekong
states and ASEAN.
strengthening partnerships with the Mekong countries. This also entails connecting ASEAN to
Mekong, to utilise political spaces created by ASEAN for conversations, dialogues, and
cooperation (Ha & Ong, 2020).

ROK can increase its political and economic influence in SEA through stronger Mekong
cooperation. Unlike China, US, Japan, and the older ASEAN members, ROK’s relationship
with the CLMV countries is much more cordial without significant historical baggage (Howe
& Park, 2019). Furthermore, as a middle power, ROK's presence in the affairs of the Mekong
will cause less consternation to ASEAN's leaders wary of great power politics. This puts the
ROK-Mekong partnership at an optimal position for mutual benefit and the maximum
utilisation of both their comparative advantages, with less great power entanglement (Yeo,
2020). ROK’s advantage lies in its political neutrality, development experience, and significant
investments into sustainable technology and research, whereas the Mekong states have the
advantage of being resource-rich and rife with potential, while also possessing the political will
to constantly look for sustainable development and climate solutions (Koo & Deyo, 2018; Lee
et al., 2020).

By virtue of ROK’s substantial investments in sustainable development as well as the decades’

worth of goodwill and strong partnership forged with the Mekong states, ROK is in an excellent
position to become the sub-regional leader and coordinator of sustainable development efforts.
Specifically, this paper will expound on novel ways for the ROK to coordinate and even lead
efforts in three main areas: first, in regional research and development (R&D) efforts for
sustainability and development issues; second, in the development of the green industrial sector;
third, in plugging gaps in existing regional cooperation frameworks such as the Ayeyawady-
Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Cooperation Strategy (ACMECS) and the Mekong River
Commission (MRC).

2.0 ROK-Mekong Green R&D Alliance

R&D efforts are vital in informing climate protection and sustainable development policies in
the Mekong. Current R&D efforts are plenty, but they suffer from significant politicisation 7
(Wang et al., 2021). Generally, ASEAN plays a minimal role in Mekong green R&D due to

7
While Baker (2016) highlighted that only about half of all scientific papers are trustworthy due to human error,
the inaccuracy of science and failure in introducing effective solutions are even more pronounced when there are
“duelling experts” – specifically, the US-China power contestation in the case of the Mekong River (Wade, 2004).
the lack of consensus and interest – partially due to caution against offending China while
simultaneously viewing Mekong issues as under the purview of its sub-regional frameworks
and not its direct institutional responsibility (Ha, 2020). Many current think-tanks and research
partnerships receive funding from or are led by the great powers - China and the US 8. This
creates another political dimension that Mekong countries must tread carefully on, impeding
genuine multilateral cooperation for the maximum benefit of the region (Strangio, 2020).

We thus argue that ROK can add value to regional R&D in two ways. First, the ROK can
position itself as a “benign power” as it is not embroiled in great power rivalry, like the US and
China are (Ping, 2020). ROK is in a more neutral and advantageous position to coordinate
objective sustainable development research efforts. This can boost the credibility and
acceptance of research efforts, by maintaining an impression of objectivity. Second, ROK is
also a R&D powerhouse, even if the total dollar amount of R&D trails behind economic giants
like China and the US 9. In time, ROK is likely to emerge as a global leader in the R&D of
renewable energy and other sustainability-related technologies, due to the ambitious 2020
Green Plan which prioritised R&D in emerging sectors such as future mobility and green
remodelling (Lee & Woo, 2020). Hence, ROK has much to bring to the table, and can work in
tandem with Mekong research institutes for mutual benefit by advancing sustainability research.

Previously, two new Mekong-ROK Research Centres were announced during the 2019
Mekong-ROK Summit, but few details followed. We argue it is vital for ROK to press on with
the establishment of these research centres and suggest ways of augmenting the performance
of these institutes. We also go further to propose a third research institute focusing on human
resources development and idea generation. Finally, we recommend housing these three
research institutes in a “ROK-Mekong Green R&D Alliance”, to tap on synergies between
these bodies via the generation of beneficial feedback loops.

2.1 Establishing the Mekong-ROK Biodiversity Centre as a regional hub for conservation

8
A cogent example is the Global Center for Mekong Studies spearheaded by China, which comprises six research
institutes in the region (Chhengpor, 2017).
9
In Korea, R&D spending as a percentage of GDP is higher than China and the US, and is second only to Israel
(Dayton, 2020). ROK was also first on Bloomberg’s Innovation Index from 2014-2019 (Jamrisko & Liu, 2020).
Conservation is a crucial first step in stabilizing the current ecology for future sustainable
development – contributing to climate adaptation in the shorter term and climate mitigation in
the long run (Quan et al., 2018). Furthermore, climate change is exacerbating the damage
caused by the development projects along the Mekong 10. Conservation thus becomes essential
to improving resource management for future Mekong survival. However, current conservation
efforts within Mekong fall short (Lohani et al., 2020). Therefore, there is great potential for
ROK to lead regional conservation efforts.

The Mekong-ROK Biodiversity Centre was announced in 2019 at the inaugural Mekong-ROK
Summit 11 (MOFA, 2019). Since then, there has been little news about the new Centre 12. This
section will highlight the potential that conservation has in progressing sustainability research
and how it can be strategically utilised for improving Mekong-ROK cooperation. The Centre’s
current purview focuses on establishing equitable cooperation for biodiversity conservation 13.
However, existing conservation mechanisms are insufficient (Johnson et al., 2012).
Considerable gaps exist between conservation biology and its application. Policymakers often
do not utilise conservation science in policymaking, instead prioritising other factors for
practical purposes. Thus, new ways of cooperation and communication between research
centres and governmental institutions need to be introduced. Here, the new Mekong-ROK
Biodiversity Centre could utilise Track 1.5 feedback loops 14 to create spaces for policy
entrepreneurship in conservation.

The new Centre can serve as the key institution for regional and international conservation
efforts along the Mekong. It can actively work with regional research institutes to come up
with novel ways of conservation and resource utilisation - using the many existing ROK and
Mekong grants to spur innovation and drive new research on this rather stagnant field. It can
engage with regional cooperation frameworks to present its objective scientific findings and

10
Currently, the estimated economic costs of the declining Mekong fisheries alone are projected to be at least $23
billion by 2040, which is far greater than the cost of potential efforts to mitigate that (MRC, 2018).
11
Subsequently, at the 2nd Mekong-ROK Summit in 2020, commitment towards the Centre was reaffirmed.
Specifically, Official Development Assistance (ODA), the Mekong-ROK Cooperation Fund and the Mekong-
ROK Action Plan were explicitly mentioned as frameworks that will support the new Centre (MOFA, 2020).
12
This could possibly be due to the political uncertainty in Myanmar which is the designated site for the Centre.

13It was also announced that ROK’s National Institute of Biological Resources (NIBR) will be lending their
expertise to this cause.
14
Track 1.5 diplomacy refers to a mix of both government officials and non-governmental entities, such as
researchers and activists (Chataway, 1998).
recommendations, acting as an impartial sustainable policy entrepreneur and a hub to gather
policy opinions and spur academic discussions. These Track 1.5 exchanges with CLMV
countries through existing regional cooperation frameworks can provide fresh and
unprejudiced third-party conservation ideas into the currently lacking conservation efforts.
Consequently, this rejuvenated focus can help steer ASEAN focus towards Mekong as well,
improving regional conservation cooperation.

Within the Mekong, conservation efforts are sporadic – either occasional summits or marginal
regional cooperation efforts. The ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity holds many workshops on
conservation, but the focus is rarely on the Mekong region as it simply is not as important to
the rest of ASEAN (Von et al., 2017). Previously, there was also the Mekong Delta Natural
and Cultural Conservation Forum, but it was cancelled in 2013 after 3 iterations (Quang et al.,
2020). To overcome the sporadic nature of current efforts, the new Centre can hold annual
forums bringing together government officials, NGOs and researchers to share best practices
and coordinate conservation efforts, as well as set clear and tangible targets for countries to
work together on. The Centre could also work with Conservation International and the World
Wildlife Fund to channel and coordinate conservation research efforts in the region. Doing so
will give the Centre greater legitimacy as the key institution in regional biodiversity
conservation and research. This creates greater transparency and accountability, via
international scrutiny and interest. Thus, the conservation science in this region will improve
at a far greater pace, while engagement with government leaders in the Mekong region would
also gain more credibility from international and regional support.

This proposed role of the Centre would not require further resources than what is already
committed. It merely requires a conscious effort to continue steering focus to regional
conservation research. However, by itself, this initiative might not be enough to create a new
ROK-led regional focus. Thus, a comprehensive ROK-Mekong Green Alliance is vital.

2.2 Spearheading of a new water-monitoring and utilisation cooperation framework

The politicization of science is perhaps clearest on the Mekong issue of water-monitoring.

Currently, both the US and China have their respective mechanisms 15. However, both have

15
Two key efforts at water-monitoring within the Mekong River are: the US-led Stimson Centre’s Mekong Dam
Monitor (MDM) and the Chinese-led Lancang-Mekong Water Resources Cooperation Information Platform
(LMWRC) (Grünwald, 2021). The MRC also has its own water-monitoring system, but the Chinese and US
projects receive much more regional and international attention in general.
been accused of letting politics drive science (Wang et al., 2021). Therefore, as a relatively
neutral third-party, ROK can utilise its expertise on water research to create a parallel water
monitoring and utilisation information-sharing platform. While no party can ever be truly
neutral, this new platform could help to alleviate some of the political suspicions around the
objective science of water-monitoring.

The existing capabilities of the Mekong-ROK Joint Water Research Centre and Korea Water
Resources Corp (K-Water) enable the extension of ROK’s water-monitoring and utilisation
expertise into the Mekong. In 2019, K-Water signed an agreement with the Mekong countries
to open the Mekong-ROK Joint Water Research Centre to improve water utilisation
technologies and research (Herh, 2019). This Centre could extend its purview to include water-
monitoring, given the satellite technology ROK possesses and the access to the river it now
has. ROK can serve as an additional neutral party between the US and China in water
monitoring, to separate science from great power politics (Kim & Cha, 2016). This is within
ROK’s capacity and in accordance with the new research centre’s focus - no significant new
resources would need to be allocated. The increased information sharing will improve the
credibility of scientific evidence for more informed planning. Furthermore, ROK can work
with both US and China to expand existing tools available to the Mekong region, to improve
the overall water utilisation capabilities of all parties. This would improve ROK’s international
standing on water-monitoring and utilisation, and unlock increased cooperation on ROK-
Mekong sustainable development matters.

2.3 ROK-Mekong Institute: Streamlining and enhancing Knowledge Sharing Programs

For research and development efforts to be fruitful, it is first important to have researchers who
are well-trained in the field of sustainable development and who are sensitive to the
developmental issues and politics of the Mekong. To this end, the bulk of ROK’s current ODA
in the Mekong goes to Knowledge Sharing Programmes (KSP), to transfer ROK’s own
expertise in sustainable development and to create networks between researchers (Se Hyun,
2019). KSP thus constitutes an important arm of ROK’s soft power in the Mekong, as it creates
long-lasting networks between policymakers and researchers from both sides. Current KSP
programs by ROK are mostly administered by the Korea International Cooperation Agency
(KOICA) 16. Another initiative is the KOICA Scholarship, aimed at providing researchers in
the region with Master’s and PhD scholarships to pursue sustainable development courses at
Korean universities. While there have been a few one-off KSP collaborations between ROK
and the Mekong states 17 , the bulk of KSP programs focus on giving out scholarships and
traineeships (Se Hyun, 2019).

These efforts are certainly laudable. However, the long-term impact of current KSP can be
amplified through the creation of a ROK-Mekong Institute think tank to firmly establish
Korea’s presence as a R&D leader for sustainable development in the Mekong. Such a think-
tank can boost knowledge production by connecting trained, returning researchers from the
ROK’s various scholarships and attachments, thus augmenting existing programs. To further
boost knowledge production and human resources development, the institute can also hold
regular conferences and seminars to connect research with real-world programs. Most
importantly, as our proposed think-tank is housed with two other research institutes under the
ROK-Mekong Green R&D Alliance, beneficial feedback loops between researchers and
program administrators can be strengthened. For example, if certain conservation, water
utilisation or sustainable development programs are found to be ineffective, the findings can
be quickly reported to the ROK-Mekong Institute such that the lessons learnt can be
incorporated into future KSP, augmenting existing training efforts to be even more targeted at
the Mekong. Likewise, novel findings from researchers in the ROK-Mekong Institute can be
efficiently transmitted to program administrators linked to the other two institutes to improve
the efficacy of on-going programs. In this way, a cycle of value creation is created within all
three research institutes in our R&D Alliance. The establishment of such an Alliance will firmly
enshrine ROK’s role in regional R&D efforts as the Alliance becomes a nexus for knowledge
creation and debates on the practicalities of implementation. It can also be a cost-effective way
of boosting ROK’s soft power in the region, especially when compared with the much bigger
ODA budgets of countries like China and Japan.

16
A notable example is the Capacity Improvement & Advancement For Tomorrow (CIAT) program, launched in
2012 by KOICA and tailored towards the developmental needs of the GMS (KOICA, 2021). CIAT invites the
region’s policymakers and researchers to ROK for knowledge sharing and technical training.

17 An example is the Vietnam-Korea Institute of Science and Technology that received funding from ROK

(KSP, 2021).
3.0 Leveraging the private sector for green industry development

Climate change mitigation and sustainable development are generational challenges that the
public sector cannot tackle alone – the green industry 18 is often touted as being key to
mitigating the worst effects of climate change (OECD, 2011). Indeed, the pivotal role that
private sector players can play in sustainable development and climate change has been echoed
by ASEAN and ROK leaders alike (Lee, 2018), affirming that tapping on private sector
expertise and dynamism is crucial. The ROK is in a favourable position to take point in
coordinating green industry development in the Mekong as it has strong comparative
advantages in green industries and technologies vis-a-vis the Mekong states. The ROK’s
domestic green sectors are relatively more mature and are also set to grow due to the
government’s strong commitment on climate change, as outlined in the Green New Deal 2020.
Particularly, ROK has strong comparative advantages in the future mobility 19 and green energy
sectors. Lee and Kim (2021) found that future mobility is the most important arm of the Green
New deal, comprising 1963 projects with a combined national funding of more than USD 1.2
billion. Another key sector that the ROK has substantial expertise in is the green energy sector 20,
which is also poised to grow under the Green New Deal.

The ROK’s position as a coordinator of green industry development in the Mekong becomes
even more favourable when we consider the generally non-existent green industries of the
Mekong countries. How then, can the ROK capitalize on its experience in engaging the private
sector in green industry development, to spur the growth of the Mekong’s green enterprises?
To elucidate this, we begin by outlining current initiatives, then suggest ways for the ROK to
build on these initiatives to play a central role in green industry development in the Mekong.

18
Though a universally accepted inclusion criteria for an enterprise to be considered “green” is absent,
governments and academics generally agree that green enterprises must achieve carbon reduction or other
environmental goals (Shapira et al., 2014). The green industry thus comprises enterprises in green energy, future
mobility, energy efficiency and other subsectors.

19
Besides the development of electric cars and charging infrastructure, some future mobility projects also concern
the greening of maritime transport, such as the conversion of civilian and government ships into liquefied natural
gas or hybrid-fueled ships (Lee & Woo, 2020). This would be of particular interest to the Mekong states, due to
the preponderance of commercial transport along the Mekong.
20
To support the goal of increasing renewable power generation, the government is conducting R&D and
feasibility studies of offshore wind farms, floating solar farms and more (Lee & Woo, 2020).
3.1 Current regional investment & private sector engagement initiatives

The ROK has worked closely with the Mekong states to boost sustainable development in the
region. However, there remains a lack of focus on harnessing private sector expertise and
finance in achieving green goals. The principal avenue through which the government of the
ROK directly funds sustainable development projects is the MKCF 21 . While the ambit of
MKCF is laudable in its breadth, there is little mention of the region’s green industry. The focus
of the MKCF is thus too wide to devote sufficient attention to the goal of enhancing the region’s
green industry. Another important framework for regional investments planning is RIF 2022 22.
Though RIF 2022’s focus on attracting private finance is noteworthy, there is little emphasis
on sustainability related goals as the framework focuses more on boosting regional
development and connectivity. Finally, the ROK-Mekong Business Forum is a notable
platform used to boost trade and investments between businessmen from both sides (MOFA,
2019). Again, this platform lacks a clear focus on the role the private sector can play in
sustainable development, thus failing to highlight opportunities in the green industry. To plug
these gaps in existing institutions and to allow the ROK to further value-add in regional
frameworks, we propose the following innovations.

3.2 Building on current regional investment frameworks: ROK-Mekong Green Investment

Framework

To clarify investment goals in the green industry and to galvanize private sector finance, we
propose a ROK-Mekong Green Investment Framework (GIF). Drawing inspiration from RIF
2022, we envision such a framework could streamline funding requirements in the region while
attracting private investors and entrepreneurs through functioning as a marketing tool. Our
framework diverges from RIF 2022 in its focus on green industry development in the region.
Moreover, the adoption of such a framework can help to aggregate the different developmental
needs of the Mekong nations’ green industries, allowing potential investors to make well-
informed risk calculations. Given the ROK’s own experience in developing their domestic
green industry, the ROK can play an important role in such a framework by assisting in national

21
Stands for the Mekong-ROK Cooperation Fund (MKCF). Established in 2013, the MKCF supports projects in
seven priority areas ranging from information technology to environmental issues (Mekong Institute, 2021)
22
Stands for the Greater Mekong Subregion Regional Investment Framework 2022 (RIF 2022). Adopted in the
6th GMS Summit in 2018, the framework serves as an instrument for enhancing alignment between regional and
national development projects, and functions as a marketing tool to impel public and private financing (GMS,
2020).
and regional planning. Our framework can conceivably come under the administration of the
MKCF due to the institution’s expertise in planning development projects in the region. We
envisage this framework will give the nascent green industries in the Mekong a much-needed
kick-start, helping to prioritise the industry’s development in the years to come.

3.3 Building on current business networking initiatives: ROK-Mekong Cleantech Forum

Business networking is vital for the development and sustained growth of any industry but is
particularly important for fledgling industries. We thus propose a ROK-Mekong Cleantech
Forum by building on existing platforms for networking such as the ROK-Mekong Business
Forum. Currently, cleantech forums are all the rage worldwide, as investors seek to capitalize
on the industry’s growth on the back of various pledges to go green (Cheo, 2021). While there
already exists a Cleantech Forum Asia (Cleantech, 2021), a business forum that is focused on
the particularistic sustainable development challenges of the Mekong would be more ideal.
Thus, we propose the establishment of a Mekong-focused Cleantech Forum on the piggyback
of the ROK-Mekong Business Forum. For the initial iterations, our forum could take up the
last 2 or 3 days of the yearly business forum. The ROK-Mekong Cleantech Forum can then be
scaled up to a full week or more, depending on demand. Such a platform serves the dual
purposes of enhancing private-public collaboration, while also exciting private investors with
novel green industry innovations. An initiative like this would thus go a long way towards the
growth of the Mekong’s green industries.

4.0 Injecting ROK presence into key existing regional cooperation frameworks

Regional cooperation frameworks in the Mekong have proliferated in recent years 23. Even so,
clear gaps remain. In this section, we expound on ways that ROK can plug gaps in existing
regional frameworks in an inexpensive and mutually beneficial manner. ROK can value-add
through its comparative advantages in sustainable development and bioenergy generation, to
improve the region’s existing cooperation frameworks.

23
Zawacki (2019) notes the existence of 13 regional cooperation frameworks in the Mekong, ranging from
ACMECS and the MRC to the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) and the Mekong Japan Cooperation (MJC).
The regional architecture is thus becoming more complex and competitive, signalling the Mekong’s geopolitical
importance, and hinting at the rich political and economic dividends that will result should ROK be able to increase
its presence in regional frameworks.
4.1 Filling the gaps of regional cooperation frameworks

The MRC’s Council Study (2019) explored the viability of water resource development along
the Lower Mekong Basin 24. It generated a comprehensive list of potential benefits and adverse
impacts, as well as a non-binding list of policy recommendations. Most of these policy
recommendations have not been explored and are not included in the MRC Strategic Plan 2021-
2025 (MRC, 2021). Filling the gaps in the current strategic plans would immediately improve
resource-management and sustainable development.

A key area where ROK can contribute is the facilitation of project-by-project Environmental
Impact Assessments (EIAs), as current EIAs are only conducted at the national level. The
addition of project-by-project EIAs helps reframe investment impacts from a national scale to
a regional scale, as per the Council Study’s recommendation. The proposed ROK-Mekong
Institute and the Green Alliance could easily provide this service given their political neutrality
and impartial scientific focus. Project-by-project EIAs would optimise sustainable
development plans by accounting for any environmental impacts that spill over beyond national
borders. This would complement future ROK-Mekong sustainability and economic
partnerships – as outlined in the Mekong-Han River Agreement 25 (MOFA, 2019). An objective
third-party like ROK can offer more streamlined EIAs on a project-by-project basis, compared
to existing regional frameworks.

Many of the policy recommendations in the Council Study do not require huge costs. For
example, the abovementioned potential ROK contribution does not require vast capital, but
merely a strategic re-focus of existing institutions and research. The international and regional
expertise in transboundary environmental impact assessment generated in the proposed Green
Alliance can also be leveraged to bolster sustainable development. ROK will merely be
facilitating the achievement of the MRC Council Study policy recommendations for the benefit
of all. This would improve ROK’s expertise in this area and increase international recognition
of its sustainability efforts. Our proposal also improves relations between ROK and Mekong

24It was a thorough ecological study of the environmental conditions of the basin along with scenario projection
up until the year 2040.
25
This would also be in line with the MRC’s objective of balancing economic development and environmental
protection (MRC, 2021).
countries inexpensively, thereby paving the way forward for closer and more effective
sustainable development cooperation.

4.2 Supplementing ACMECS Bioenergy Network’s Biomass shortages

The enormous economic activity along the Mekong generates a high demand for energy.
Currently, the Mekong states are heavily dependent on biomass 26 (Tun et al., 2019). However,
ASEAN has not been able to maximise renewable biomass’s potential due to a lack of expertise
and improper usage, causing more environmental damage than benefit (Kazuyuki et al., 2021).
ASEAN and the Mekong’s potential for biomass is huge, due to the abundance of agricultural
land (Klimowicz, 2014). Therefore, ASEAN started the ACMECS Bioenergy Network to
improve biomass energy production practices for greater sustainability and energy generation,
such that deforestation and other environmental harms could be reduced. However, progress
has been relatively slow due to the lack of political will to improve renewable biomass
extraction proficiency as current biomass production methods are largely sufficient.

ROK is a global leader in biomass technology, with significant domestic production (Guynup,
2021). This puts ROK in a strong position to tap on the clean potential of biomass. Currently,
ROK is over-subsidising biomass production, resulting in the over-generation of biomass
energy and causing harmful structural changes 27 to the domestic renewable energy market.
Therefore, in the short-term, ROK could provide biomass to the Mekong countries at a lower
cost, thereby stabilizing ROK’s domestic renewable energy market while subsidising
renewable energy supply for the Mekong countries. In the long-term, ROK can explore
partnerships of developed biomass generation technologies to help build up Mekong nations’
capacities for sustainable biomass generation. This combination of short-term and long-term
biomass partnership could solve many sustainability related issues and boost the energy-
generation capacities of the Mekong states. Furthermore, this would improve ROK’s position
as a global leader for clean energy development, while progressing the science of renewable

26
Biomass is a term used to describe all organic matter. Biomass is also a significant renewable source of energy
– comprising 77% of global renewable energy supply. Examples of biomass used as renewable energy include
energy crops, forest and agricultural residues, animal wastes inter alia (Sriram & Shahidehpour, 2005).
27
The over-subsidization of biomass is hindering the development of other forms of renewable energy such as
solar and wind power, causing heightened uncertainty and severe disruptions in the renewable energy market
(Gaworecki, 2020).
energy to mitigate climate change. This is also in line with improving the MRC Council Study’s
recommendation of creating path dependency for renewable energy (MRC, 2019).

5.0 Conclusion

Evidently, the potential for ROK-Mekong cooperation in sustainability is significant. The

proposed solutions of R&D, green industry development and reinforcement of existing
frameworks will generate long-lasting impacts on relations, and mutual economic and
environmental benefit. Fortunately and unfortunately, they are only the first steps in a
promising partnership that could potentially herald a cleaner and more vibrant future. In the
end, the exciting question remains: What’s next?

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 Strengthening ASEAN-Korea Partnership in Overcoming the COVID-19 Challenges:
New Southern Policy Beyond the Pandemic
Hirzawati Atikah binti Mohd Tahir & Siti Noor Adillah binti Masrol

Abstract
When the pandemic Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) hit the world in the early 2020, as
South Korea identified a super-spreader cluster located in Daegu and became the country with
the largest number of confirmed infections after China on 22nd February 2020 (BBC News,
2020), the country’s past experience in managing series of epidemic outbreak also prompted
South Korea to develop the first COVID-19 Rapid Test Kit (RTK) in the world on 5th February
2020 (Lee, 2020). South Korea’s fast response in producing the test kits have all countries
around the world lining up to get their hands on the kits including ASEAN countries in the
Southeast Asian region. In the middle of New Southern Policy (NSP) implementation disrupted
by the pandemic outbreak, Republic of Korea (ROK)’s President Moon Jae In launched NSP
Plus in November 2020 to reorient the priority of ASEAN-ROK cooperation by prioritizing
public health diplomacy, swiftly adapting to global crisis.

This paper aims to identify the significance of global health diplomacy in forging better
diplomatic relations between ASEAN-ROK and how ASEAN and ROK can synergize their
exit strategy to overcome the COVID-19 pandemic. Health diplomacy or global health
diplomacy has prompted heated debates among the scholars in both the global health and
international relations fields. Both groups of scholars recognized the importance of global
health and foreign policies in making a health diplomacy among nations to work.
Simultaneously, ASEAN and ROK share common goals in their post-pandemic recovery that
allow for strengthened cooperation not just in health sector, but economic and environmental
as well. Through better synergy in ASEAN and ROK policy coordination and implementation,
they can jointly build regional resilience against future disruptions.

Keyword: COVID-19, Global Health Diplomacy, ASEAN-Korea, New Southern Policy,

ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework
 Strengthening ASEAN-Korea Partnership in Overcoming the COVID-19 Challenges:
New Southern Policy Beyond the Pandemic

Introduction
In November 2017, South Korea’s President Moon Jae In announced the New Southern Policy
(NSP) to deepen economic and diplomatic relations in Southeast Asia, particularly with the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members. This policy’s vision is to create a
“people-centered community of peace and prosperity” and it lies on three pillars which are
People, Prosperity and Peace, also known as 3Ps. The key milestones were celebrated in
November 2019 and more agreements were signed in Busan where the ASEAN-ROK
Commemorative Summit was held. Amidst deepening partnership, the progress of NSP
implementation was stalled due to the COVID-19 global pandemic. Amidst the outbreak, the
trade volume between ASEAN-ROK has decreased in 2020 28 and this has pushed ASEAN and
ROK to consider new forms of cooperation and exchanges among themselves.

After listening to ASEAN’s needs and demands, President Moon then introduced NSP Plus in
November 2020 to emphasis health diplomacy as part of the core pillars of NSP. Furthermore,
ROK’s successful response in managing COVID-19 has given ASEAN member states (AMS)
a heads-up towards ROK’s strategies as valuable examples. Therefore, this paper aims to
identify the significance of global health diplomacy in forging better diplomatic relations
between ASEAN-ROK and the synergy of NSP Plus and ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery
Framework (ACRF) in strengthening ASEAN-ROK’s cooperation and partnership in
recovering from COVID-19 pandemic.

The Definition of Global Health Diplomacy

In the recent decade, the use of “global health diplomacy” or “health diplomacy” has emerged
among researchers and policymakers in the field of public health and international relations
and it has also been used as a form of public diplomacy by countries including ROK in building
diplomatic engagements and exchange health-related expertise with other countries. While in
the United States, global health is one of the foreign policy agendas. 29 The outbreaks of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, the Influenza A (H1N1) or Bird Flu in 2009,

28From Key Updates of the 2020 ASEAN & Korea in Figures (ASEAN-Korea Centre, 2021)
29Katz, R., Kornblet, S., Arnold, G., Lief, E. & Fischer, J. E. (2011). Defining Health Diplomacy: Changing
Demands in the Era of Globalization. The Milbank Quarterly, 89 (3), pp. 503–523.
the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012 and the ongoing COVID-19 have
urged countries around the world to stay hand-in-hand and provide assistance when needed in
containing and managing the viruses. During the Oslo Ministerial Declaration in 2007,
Ministers of Foreign Affairs from seven countries had expressed their concern that health is
one of the most important, but yet neglected, foreign policy issues that should be put forward
as an international agenda. 30 However, what does global health diplomacy actually mean to
majority of the countries?

There are many conflicting literatures which interpreted global health diplomacy differently.
Majority of these literature are developed from the field of public health but there is less
literature about global health diplomacy among international relations scholars. Global health
diplomacy should be pursued by both public health scholars and international relations scholars
so that the strengths of both disciplinary knowledge can lead to strengthening of global health
diplomacy between nations.

Early advocators have long promoted the notion of global health diplomacy even before the
SARS, H1N1 and MERS outbreaks. From the public health perspective, Kassalow (2001) and
Drager and Fidler (2007) emphasized the importance of the relationship between global health
and foreign policy while Adams, Novotny and Leslie (2008) believed that global health
diplomacy is a field that acknowledges the importance of improving both global health and
international relations simultaneously.

Awareness among the developing countries remain low as they lack advanced resources and
relying on health aids. M. Fazal (2020) tried to introduce health diplomacy to international
relations scholars and defined health diplomacy as “international aid or cooperation meant to
promote health or that uses health programming to promote non-health-related foreign aims.”
M. Fazal believed that there are two dimensions in defining health diplomacy whereby one
focuses on pursuing both global public health and national interest while the latter focuses on
the means of health diplomacy, “particularly whether it is executed multilaterally, with a global
scope, on a regional basis, and/or bilaterally.” Whereas, Lee & Smith (2011) distinguishes
between international and “new diplomacy” and further explains that global health diplomacy

30 The concern was raised by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, France, Indonesia, Norway, Senegal,

South Africa, and Thailand. (2007).

is the “new diplomacy” as it involves “the global context, diverse actors and innovative
processes shaping contemporary international relations.”

Katz et. al (2011) defined global health diplomacy as “activities ranging from formal
negotiations to a vast array of partnerships and interactions between governmental and
nongovernmental actors” and these activities involved three underlying types of diplomacy in
international public health issues which are core diplomacy, multi-stakeholder diplomacy and
informal diplomacy. Their helpful outline is especially important under the current pandemic:
i) core diplomacy involves formal negotiations between governments; ii) multi-stakeholder
diplomacy involves international negotiations between various state, non-state, and multilateral
actors; while iii) informal diplomacy involves negotiations between international public health
actors and their counterparts, host country officials, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
private-sector companies, and the public. While the scholars in public health and international
relations agree that global health diplomacy require the principle of global health and foreign
policies among nations to negotiate on health issues, there is no doubt that this diplomacy can
also be used as a tool by these nations as a soft power. This is where South Korea’s role
becomes ever more important than before.

South Korea has long introduced public diplomacy as part of its foreign policy priority and has
a dedicated Department under Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Following the MERS
outbreak, Kickbusch and Kokeny (2013) argue that foreign affairs ministries are getting
involved with health issues due to “its relevance for soft power, security policy, trade
agreements and environmental and development policy”. This does not include trans-border
challenges but also national and economic interest. 31 Asides from the governments, other
actors like NGOs, foundations and companies too have begun to take part in global health
diplomacy. 32 Following globalization, “new donor–recipient relationships, new types of health
alliances and the rise of cooperation between low- and middle-income countries” have
increased the need for health diplomacy among nations (Kickbusch & Kokeny, 2013).

Hence, the demand for competent health diplomats in negotiating at different levels of
governance are on the rise. These health diplomats are called “health attachés” and they

31 Kickbusch, I. & Kokeny, M. (2013). Global health diplomacy: five years on. Bull World Health Organ, 91,
p. 159
32 Ibid.
“collects, analyzes, and acts on information concerning health in a foreign country or countries
and provides critical links between public health and foreign affairs stakeholders” (Brown et.
al., 2014). Therefore, health attachés play an important role in global health diplomacy as they
do not only need the skills in global health, but also knowledge and skills in diplomatic and
foreign affairs.

ASEAN and South Korea’s Post-Pandemic Recovery Strategy

At the 37th ASEAN Summit on November 2020, ASEAN leaders endorsed and adopted the
ASEAN Comprehensive Recovery Framework (ACRF) and Implementation Plan as the
ASEAN-led recovery strategy from the COVID-19 pandemic. As the whole-of-ASEAN-
community approach, the ACRF suggests five broad strategies which are enhancing health
systems, strengthening human security, maximizing intra-ASEAN market and broader
economic integration, accelerating inclusive digital transformation, and advancing towards a
more sustainable and resilient future. 33 As such, H.E Dato’ Lim Jock Hoi, the Secretary
General of ASEAN identified key areas for ASEAN-Korea cooperation post-pandemic era
which are public health infrastructure, digital transformation and green recovery. 34 These areas
of cooperation have already been embedded in the seven key areas of the NSP Plus which is
also introduced in the same month, which shows that the ROK has paid acute attention to
ASEAN’s needs in their joint efforts in promoting COVID-19 post-pandemic recovery.

I. ROK Global Health Diplomacy to ASEAN

When COVID-19 first hit Asia, the Southeast Asian Foreign Ministers quickly convened a
virtual meeting in April 2020 to set up ASEAN COVID-19 Response Fund. 35 One of the fastest
regional response to pandemic is the Special ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit on COVID-
19 via video conference on 14 April 2020, where China, Japan and South Korea pledge their
support for ASEAN including the COVID-19 Response Fund. The AMS have extended their
gratitude towards the ROK for contribution towards the ASEAN COVID-19 Response Fund,
medical supplies, and the additional pledge of USD 200 million to the COVID-19 Vaccines

33 ASEAN Secretariat (2020).

34 ASEAN Secretary General, Dato Lim Jock Hoi identified the three key areas of cooperation during the
virtual Second New Southern Policy Forum, hosted by The Mission of the Republic of Korea to ASEAN with
CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) Indonesia on 28 March 2021.
35 See “Terms of Reference: The Covid-19 ASEAN Response Fund”, ASEAN, https://asean.org/wp-

content/uploads/53-Finalised-and-APPROVED-TOR_COVID-19-ASEAN-Response-Fund.pdf
 36 37
Advance Market Commitment (COVAX AMC) to support ASEAN members.
Furthermore, Malaysia’s former prime minister, Tan Sri Muhyiddin Yassin had expressed how
beneficial it is for ASEAN to strengthen its cooperation with South Korea as the ROK
government can assist ASEAN amid this pandemic “through the sharing of information and
best practices with the republic to help better manage COVID-19 domestically and plan for
post-pandemic recovery.” 38 Malaysia’s current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dato’ Saifuddin
Abdullah mentioned that Malaysia should make health diplomacy as a priority in its foreign
policy to improve global health. 39 This demonstrates that in this pandemic era, health
diplomacy is now the new norm in forging and strengthening diplomatic relations between one
country to another and this diplomacy can be made a top priority in Southeast Asia region in
combatting the impacts of COVID-19.

ROK’s fast response towards COVID-19 has led South Korea to have one of the best testing
strategy and capabilities. South Korea was reported to have received requests from 121
countries in exporting and donating its high-demand test kits by April 2020. 40 ROK was one
of the earliest countries that supplied test kits to the world including to AMS. Dr. Khor Swee
Keng (2020) called this health diplomacy as “test-kit diplomacy”. Khor believes that COVID-
19 has given opportunities to South Korea “to incorporate health diplomacy into their broader
geo-strategic goals, through stronger public messaging and enhancing their long-term
scholarship and networking structure for health experts” and this can include in strengthening
the diplomatic relations between ASEAN-ROK.

Moreover, through ROK’s health diplomacy, South Korea’s emerging digital healthcare can
help AMS to manage COVID-19 in their countries. When Korean Disease Control and
Prevention Agency (KCDC) ramped-up the extensive bio-surveillance regimes of contact
tracing through individuals’ “location data (including location data collected from mobile
devices); personal identification information; medical and prescription records; immigration

36 The COVAX AMC was launched by the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation (Gavi) at the Global
Vaccine Summit on June 4, 2021. The COVAX AMC is a financing instrument that supports the participation
of 92 low- and middle-income economies in the COVAX Facility so that these countries can access safe
COVID-19 vaccines
37 From the outcome of 24th ASEAN-ROK Foreign Ministers’ Meeting.
38 As reported by BERNAMA in Astro Awani (2020).
39 As explained by Datuk Seri Saifuddin Abdullah in “Adapting to Covid-19: Malaysian Foreign Policy

Priorities for the New World” webinar which was hosted by the Institute of Strategic and International
Studies (ISIS) Malaysia.
40 As reported by Cho & Lee in ABC News (2020).
records; card transaction data for credit, debit, and prepaid cards; transit pass records for public
transportation; and closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage,” 41 it has raised concerns on the
privacy issue. However, KCDC has published an overview of the anonymized patient data on
Ministry of Health and Welfare’s website which has led researchers and private firms to make
use of these data to start and develop their own research & development (R&D) (Gillispie,
2021). This information technology-based tracing strategy can serve as an example for other
AMS to improve their contact tracing strategy so that when COVID-19 has become an endemic,
the government can use the data to control the disease faster and more efficient.

Since the second half of 2020, ASEAN countries have been moderately successful in
containing the virus spread and thus allowing for the greater people mobility and economic
activities to resume. The trend continues after December 2020 as these countries have begun
procuring and deploying the vaccines to their citizens. However, ASEAN should bear in mind
that vaccine rollout should not be the only recovery strategy as the vaccination program which
are lagging behind advanced economies and vaccine hesitancy that still loom large among its
people, resulting in the resurgence in cases in 2021. The virus resurgent is a grim reminder that
we have not beaten the virus and complacency will cost more lives and further damaging
economies.

Therefore, it is imperative for ROK to further strengthen its health diplomacy towards ASEAN
by leveraging on its excellent science and medical capabilities. After reclaiming its top spot in
Bloomberg Innovation Index 2021, the pandemic has highlighted the increase in patent activity
and a strong R&D intensity and value-added manufacturing in South Korea, making it the
global innovation leader. In fact, having the International Vaccine Institute headquarter in
Seoul is also a plus point for ROK to lead in public health domain.

Despite this remarkable achievement, ROK health cooperation with ASEAN has been quite
restrained. Up to date, ROK has only established joint biomedical research with Singapore with
regards to pharmaceutical manufacturing. 42 ROK has also pledged to donate more than 1
million doses of COVID-19 shots to Vietnam, marking it the first foreign nation to receive

41 According to Park, Choi & Ko (2020), there are privacy controversies regarding South Korea’s
information technology–based tracing strategy and it is important to balance the need of the collected data
with privacy concerns so that these data would not be misused.
42 During ROK-Singapore Summit 2019, ROK signed MoUs in a) standards and conformance; (b)

manufacturing of pharmaceuticals; (c) smart cities collaboration; and (d) cybersecurity cooperation.
direct COVID-19 vaccine from ROK government. 43 These types of health cooperation,
especially the vaccine and medicinal research should be expanded with other ASEAN member
countries in order to better develop and mass-produce the vaccine in Southeast Asia. Such
cooperation will not only fill in the gap of public health infrastructure in the region, but it also
helps fight against vaccine inequity in the region.

II. Building Economic Resilience Post-COVID-19 pandemic: Green and Digital

Pre-pandemic years, the buzzword in international community was sustainable development.
Despite this, most countries are still struggling to define their climate goals, let alone translating
the pledges into concrete climate actions, as more economic activities mean more
environmental destructions. The pandemic has revealed that human lives are deeply tied with
the environment and further environmental degradation will expose us to deadlier zoonotic
viruses in the future.

Moreover, ASEAN countries also have a fair share of extreme weather events but their limited
respond to COVID-19 recovery shows a missed opportunity to address health crisis and climate
change in tandem. As warned by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC),
Southeast Asia is unfortunately the most vulnerable region that will bear the brunt of worsening
climate change due to weak and vague climate defence (Hicks, 2021). The IPCC report also
highlights that the countries in this region need to have more ambitious climate targets and
carbon reduction strategies in place that will effectively mitigate the severity of the climate
risks. Without which, this region will not be able to meet the goal of keeping global warming
under 1.5 degree Celsius.

Although green recovery still makes up a small component of COVID-19 stimulus package,
this article believes that fostering greater green recovery will help materialize ASEAN and
South Korea’s aspiration to build back better within the means of the planetary boundaries. 44
The ACRF is the region’s pledge to ensure that the recovery strategy (both economic and
socioeconomic recovery) will place the environment and human at the core by enhancing
protection of its natural capitals and biodiversity among others. The goal is more than just

43 This pledge was made during President Moon Jae-in’s summit with Vietnamese President Nguyen Xuan
Phuc on the sideline of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2021.
44 According to DAC, 14 trillion USD was spent in 2020 for COVID-19 recovery in which most went to the

developed countries, leaving little amount for developing countries. This makes green recovery more
urgent as only 31% of total ODA was bilateral aid supporting environment.
recovering economies and livelihood, but to build a better future that is more inclusive and
resilient to external shocks.

The ACRF’s fifth strategy recognizes that the ‘business as usual’ is no longer a viable practice
given the predicament brought about the pandemic. According to Ventakachalam (2020), the
ACRF would deliver a new social contract between public organization, private sector and the
people – one that is geared towards job creations, accelerating economic growth, and
environment sustainability. Similarly, the ROK government announced the Korean New Deal,
a set of policies supporting national economic recovery post COVID-19. The Korean New Deal
(KND) is made up of Digital Growth and Green Growth whereby the former concerning the
expansion of South Korea’s digital infrastructure and services, whereas the latter focuses on
green transition to renewable energy, green infrastructure, and smart innovations. 45 Hoo (2020)
likewise has argued for a scienced-based policy response facilitated by vigorous innovation
and digitalization of supply chains, already achieved in South Korea, is evidence for a
guaranteed economic recovery.

In this time of great distress, ASEAN and Korea have to seize the opportunity to greening the
region and its relations. Traditionally, the Southeast Asia has been the primary target of the
ROK Official Development Assistance (ODA), which makes up 25.4% of Korean ODA. 46 As
pointed out by Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI) headquarter in Seoul, Korean ODA is
not green enough. In 2018, South Korea allocated 10% of its total ODA (below the DAC
average of 33%) for environment-related projects. 47 GGGI, together with KOICA has been
pushing the ROK government to increase green ODA in parallel with Korean ODA in ASEAN
that mainly focuses on infrastructure and sustainable development projects. As ROK
government pledges to increase ODA to ASEAN partner countries by 20% annually, it is only
sensible to increase the share of green ODA. This is in line with NSP Plus and the Green New
Deal whereby most of the funding will be allocated for development projects outside South
Korea.

45 Ministry of Economy and Finance, Republic of Korea (2020).

46 KOICA (2019)
47 OECD defines DAC as Development Assistance Countries. DAC Tracker track the amount of ODA by each

donor country.
Furthermore, Korean green ODA has been largely focusing on climate adaptation as compared
to the global trend that focuses primarily on mitigation (mostly reducing emission). While
mitigation is equally important, developing countries in Southeast Asia need more climate
adaptation funding going forward as these low to middle income countries have lower emission
rate as compared to high income developed countries. As has been evident in the successful
GGGI projects in African countries, climate adaptation funding combined with smart
agriculture can be replicated in ASEAN countries to support more sustainable and resilient
livelihood. Despite requiring less funding, climate adaptation projects such as reforestation are
labour intensive and low skilled, and this fits the profile of Mekong countries that are highly
dependent on agricultural and tourism sectors. Undeniably, climate adaptation financing is less
interesting to private sectors but it can generate more green jobs. This is where government
agencies like KOICA can help push more green ODA and promote blended funding and public
and private partnership. ROK thus can position itself as an equal partner in advocating for green
recovery and nature-based solutions that will safeguard the natural capitals as well as sustaining
livelihood. As more ASEAN countries are announcing to reopen their economy (especially
tourism industry), the NSP Plus is a flexible policy framework to boost economic and
environmental cooperation.

Through better synergy between KND and NSP Plus, ROK government can help ASEAN
countries to achieve its Sustainable Development Goals. ROK government will invest 30.1
trillion Won for green economy and an additional 58.2 trillion Won for digital economy. Under
the Green pillar, ROK government aims to promote further de-carbonization of the economy
and decentralized energy production. This can be achieved by enhancing smart grid
cooperation between ASEAN and ROK which will help ASEAN to transition to clean energy
and better energy management at the same time. AMS have been making commendable
progress in developing smart grids, with Singapore and Malaysia leading the region. Other
member countries such as Thailand, Indonesia, Brunei and Philippines have also been building
infrastructures to adopt smart grids.

Apart from reducing dependency on fossil fuel, smart grids are also essential for ASEAN Smart
City Network which will help bridging the rural and urban areas through digital infrastructure.
The Moon government has been constantly raising smart cities and information and technology
agenda on ROK bilateral partnership summits with AMS. Following through with its interest,
ROK has signed MoUs on smart cities with Thailand, Brunei, Singapore and, Myanmar as well
as MoUs on ICT with all AMS. As one of the main energy importers from the region, ROK
has a shared responsibility in pushing ASEAN to adopt more sustainable economic and energy
management practices. By accelerating the digital transformation of hard and soft
infrastructure, it can reduce the region carbon footprint and contribute to ASEAN effort in
greening the economy and the region.

Conclusion
The pandemic has taught ROK and ASEAN that they can manage any health issues if they do
it together. Most of AMS do not have the expert and financial capabilities and high-technology
facilities in managing COVID-19, however, if a country like South Korea is able to assist these
ASEAN countries, ASEAN countries definitely can do much more. South Korea can lead AMS
with its high technology facilities and health expertise while ASEAN can learn and further
lowering the impact of COVID-19 in their countries. As countries will continue to struggle to
recover from the pandemic, the governments will need to introduce more fiscal stimulus to
keep the economy and people afloat. Furthermore, this will increase government’s debt in the
long run and it warrants enough reason for international cooperation to take place in order to
improve fiscal health and national health care system.

Global health diplomacy between ASEAN and ROK strengthens “people” and “prosperity”
pillars under the NSP plus through the synergy of NSP Plus and ACRF. As both ROK-ASEAN
work together in recovering COVID-19, two main strategies of global health diplomacy and
the Green and Digital Growth will develop over time and will be the new norm of cooperation
between ROK-ASEAN in strengthening their existing partnership. There is so much more in
the NSP that can be used as a platform between ROK and ASEAN in recovering from the
pandemic. Therefore, the pandemic serves as a litmus test for both partners to exercise their
ability in policy innovation in time of triple crises: health, economy, and environmental crisis,
leaving global health diplomacy into one of each country’s foreign policies.

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 ASEAN-ROK: What does the future hold for Mekong's Climate Change?
THIM Rachna

Abstract

The Greater Mekong is well-known as Asia’s rice bowl and fish basket, and home to over 300
million people from across Southeast Asia. Endowed with diverse ecological features, natural
resources, and human resources, the Mekong Region has the potential to become one of the
biggest economic development areas in the world. However, the region is highly disaster-prone
and has been facing catastrophic impact from climate change. As the climate change issues are
becoming increasingly dire, there is an urgency for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) to address this problem effectively. Regional and international partnership plays a
crucial role in helping Mekong countries remedy climate change and environmental issues on
time. The Republic of Korea (ROK) has always maintained close relations with all ten member
states of ASEAN, and engaging the Mekong Region has always been a priority in their regional
diplomacy. As the region is growing into their potential in becoming one of the world’s fastest
growing areas, support from Korea is vital for the Mekong Region. This essay explores the
development of the Mekong region, the role of the Republic of Korea in the development, the
impending climate change issues that the region is facing, and what the cooperation between
Mekong countries and the Republic of Korea brings to the near future.
 ASEAN-ROK: What does the future hold for Mekong's Climate Change?

I - Introduction
The Republic of Korea (ROK) has always maintained close relations with all ten member states
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Having first established sectoral
dialogue relations back in November 1989, Korea has been fully recognised as the full
Dialogue Partner by ASEAN at the 24th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1991 in Kuala
Lumpur. Additionally, Republic of Korea remains the 4th largest trade partner of ASEAN and
the 5th largest Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflow with over USD160 billions and USD6.8
billions respectively (Khmer Times, 2021). The two regional continents have been joining
forces to promote aspiring regional issues, including political security, economic, social and
cultural cooperation, and one of the latest added priority, climate change.

Southeast Asia is one of the regions highly vulnerable to climate change. Despite its small
share of carbon emission, the region is very prone to impacts brought by climate change. The
Lower Mekong Basin (LMB), made up of Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam, is well-
recognised as one of ASEAN’s most vulnerable to climate change, which have put the countries’
economies, ecosystems, sustainability, and social harmony all at risk (MCR, n,d.). Beyond a
threat in the Mekong river basin, climate change continuously affects the livelihood of those
who make a living from the river’s natural resources.

The Mekong Region has always been a priority for the Korean constitution. For the past
decades, the Republic of Korea has invested tremendous effort to help Mekong countries
achieve prosperity and sustainability through promoting connectivity, emphasis on people-
centered development, sustainability, highlighting climate and environment dialogue at a
regional high-level, and knowledge transfer. However, with the climate in the Mekong region
becoming increasingly dire, what will the cooperation between Korea and Mekong countries
bring to the near future? And will it be sufficient?

I - Development in the Mekong Region

Widely recognised as Asia’s “rice bowl” or “fish basket”, the Mekong Region is the life and
blood of over 300 million people from Southeast Asia. Equipped with biodiversity and
ecosystems, skilled and non-skill labour, natural resources, production and consumption, the
region has always been a primary target for development ever since the colonial period. As
ASEAN is gradually established and making a name for itself, the Mekong Region has attracted
even more regional and international assistance, cooperation, and development
(Sangkhamanee, n.d.). During the 1980s, Post-colonial and civil wars Cambodia, Lao PDR,
and Vietnam were finally ready to get their economics back on track and engage with
international trade. In 1992, Asia Development Bank (ADB) established a subregional
economic cooperation called Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), which is to incorporate the
idea of regional development. The program covered a wide-range of topics, including
agriculture, energy, environment, human resource, investment, telecommunications, tourism,
transportation and infrastructure, and transportation and regional/international trade. GMS also
serves as a stepping stone for the Mekong countries to achieve the Millennium Development
Goals by promoting regional connectivity, competitiveness, and a greater sense of community
(Sangkhamanee, n.d.).

As the Mekong countries continuously share the resources from the river, the regional
cooperation was intended as an approach to enhance the effectiveness of riverine resource
management and promote mutual benefits among the neighboring countries by developing the
important above-mentioned sectors. The Republic of Korea has considered the GMS as one of
the most economic developments due to its emerging markets, natural resources, and labor
intensity.

III - Climate Situation in Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia is a region highly vulnerable to climate change. The region emits around 3
percent share of global emission, and is expected to reach 5 percent by 2030. In spite of its
small share of global emissions, Southeast Asia is rather prone to harmful impacts brought by
climate change. According to The Global Climate Risk Index 2018 by German Watch, four
Southeast Asian nations - Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, were listed as the
most affected countries regarding fatalities in climate disasters for the last two decades in the
world. With parts of the region situated along the coastlines, nineteen Southeast Asian cities
were listed by The Asia Development Bank as the world’s most exposed to rising sea level
among 25 cities across the world, and seven cities are in the Philippines.

One of the obvious impacts brought by climate change is immensely on economics. Even prior
to the coronavirus pandemic, it has been predicted that ASEAN economics will see a cutback
by 11 percent by 2100 under normal circumstances (ADB, 2021). Climate change is severely
affecting the agricultural sector, which still stands as the most important economic driving
factor for most of the region.

Across the Mekong Lower Basin, climate change impact is far-reaching. Rising temperatures,
intense rainfall, and severe floods damages the lives of the people, accommodations,
infrastructure, and agricultural products. Consequently, local people are constantly at risk of
facing food scarcity and diminished livelihood, according to the Mekong River Commission.

According to the Mekong River Commission, during the next 20 to 50 years, a wide range of
potential environmental problems are expected. Temperatures are expected to rise throughout
the basin and throughout the year. Depending on the trend of global greenhouse gas emissions,
the average annual basin-wide increase might range from 0.4°C to 3.3°C by 2060. In case of a
dry climate scenario, rainfall is expected to decrease by 16% in 2060, whereas in a wet climate
scenario, rainfall is expected to increase by 17%.
The river's ecosystem and biodiversity, as well as the economic, social well-being and living
conditions of millions of people, are all under jeopardy as a result of hydropower dam
constructions and climate change. The dams have a negative impact on the river's enriching
biodiversity, disrupt fish migration patterns, and trap nutrient-rich sediments.
Climate disasters are expected to have a significant influence on local communities' reliance
on natural resources. However, the effects will not be evenly spread since some people and
communities will be more vulnerable than others and will experience changes sooner or to a
higher extent. National borders have no bearing on the effects. Upstream effects can have
downstream consequences, and vice versa, and adaptive strategies used by one country may
have direct or major cross-border consequences for others.

Agricultural production is projected to suffer the most. By 2050, rice production in the region
is expected to drop by 6-12 percent while the yield of other crops by 3 - 26 percent. In
predominantly agricultural countries - Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, rice
production might decline by 50% due to climate change.

According to the The State of Southeast Asia 2020 Survey done by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak
Institute, climate change is ranked as the top security concern among Southeast Asians as
“serious and immediate threat to the well-being of their country”. The 2021 survey found that
concern over climate change has sharpened and people feel like their government is not doing
enough to mitigate the problems. However, studies have also suggested that people mostly feel
ambivalent about the regional effort to tackle climate change, based on a subsequent survey,
the Southeast Asia Climate Outlook: 2020 Survey Report. Only 31.3 percent of Southeast
Asians believe in ASEAN member states working together effectively and slightly over 32.9
percent do not share the same view while 35.9 percent of respondents feel indecisive over the
collaboration of ASEAN countries. Findings from studies have suggested that there is still
room for improvement for the region to better its attitude of ambivalence and empower its role
in alleviating and altering the consequences brought by climate change and environmental
issues.

IV- ASEAN-Mekong Commitments to tackle Climate Change - Gaps and Opportunities

In spite of its vulnerability to climate disasters, Southeast Asia also makes an ideal region for
climate action. All ten members of ASEAN have committed to reducing carbon emissions
under the Paris Climate Accords UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
and have shown political motivation to invest effort in various measures including, renewable
energy transition, disaster risk management, food and forest security, and more initiatives.
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change
recognizes that state parties are required to prepare, communicate and maintain successive
nationally determined contributions (NDC).

In the region, climate change falls under the branch of ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on
Environment (AMME) and ASEAN Senior Officials’ Meeting on Environment (ASOME).
While the main focus was on transboundary pollution caused by forest and peat fire, the
regional association began to pay more attention to climate change related issues since 2007
when the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment was
introduced at the 12th ASEAN Summit whereas climate change was included under AMME.
However, with climate change being a multifaceted problem, which is not confined to one
segment and requires all coordinated effort from all levels of society, the existing measures in
place are not even close to sufficient.

Along with several regional bodies dedicated to study climate change issues and make policy
recommendations, the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) Blueprint 2016-2025 has
categorized environmental issues into four key areas; biodiversity and natural resources,
environmentally sustainable cities, environmentally sustainable climate, and environmentally
sustainable production and consumption. With the four key areas translated into seven strategic
priorities, the ASCC Blueprint aims to encourage capacity-building of the sectoral institutions,
and urge ASEAN member states to strengthen global partnerships, improve GHG inventories,
and to implement initiatives that align with their commitment to the global climate change
frameworks. The ASEAN Working Group for Climate Change (AWGCC), formed in 2009
dedicated to study climate change issues and make policy recommendations, has identified
three priorities; enhance regional cooperation in climate change via its Action; promote
collaboration among ASEAN sectoral bodies; articulate ASEAN’s concerns and priorities at
international fora.

ASEAN as a whole is becoming increasingly aware of the region’s vulnerability to climate

disasters and risks. Over the years, there have been many dialogues, initiatives, and
programmes to promote climate change and some of them are organised by other sectoral
bodies beside AMME and ASCC. Many of those programmes have recognised climate threats
within the region. In fact, one of the most recognised issues and development within the region
is energy security and climate change. ASEAN has dedicated itself to promoting
renewable energy transition to strengthen the regional economic growth and energy security,
and to reduce carbon emissions caused by electricity generation from coal, natural gas, and oil,
single-handedly the biggest source of GHG emissions in Southeast Asia.

Climate change is also rapidly being recognized by decision-makers and strategists in the lower
Mekong countries, who are incorporating the subject into national strategies. Many actions, on
the other hand, have been aimed at national levels and have been focused on natural disaster
response rather than climate change adaptation.

Regional institutions are crucial in fostering regional cooperation and integration. The Mekong
River Commission (MRC), established in 1995 with support from international development
partners, and the Greater Mekong Subregion Cooperation (GMS) are the two main regional
institutions tasked with managing the Mekong River Basin and promoting regional
development (Chheang, 2017). To increase information sharing and foster an awareness of
climate change in a transboundary context, MRC actively supports its Member Countries
through technical assistance, research, and dialogue-based events through Basin-wide
strategies, technical guidelines, assessment and studies, and capacity development (MRC, n.d.).

Nevertheless, despite the commitments and effort invested to combat environmental threats,
ASEAN institutional structure on climate change proves to be rather puzzling. Priorities from
different sectoral bodies tend to clash together rather than working collectively. AWGCC is
still strictly limited to environmental mandate roles while ASEAN Economic Community
(AEC) is increasingly aware of the hazards and risks from climate change and the growing
urgency to improve climate resilience. However, this differs from the pillar of ASEAN
Political-Security Community (APSC), which oversees climate issues at marginal level.
Subsequently, climate change is not considered a timely crisis. As climate change dialogues
vary among sectoral bodies across the region, the role of AWGCC should be re-defined or there
is a need for a coordinating institution at the regional level.

V - Mekong-Korean Collaboration on Climate Change

ASEAN is no stranger to collaboration with the Republic of Korea (ROK). Cooperation
between South Korea and Mekong countries has long predated the initiation of the Greater
Mekong Subregion. Due to geographical proximity and cultural familiarity, the Mekong region
has always been a priority to Korea’s regional diplomacy. In 1991, Korea established the
Korean International Cooperation Agency, which is in charge of South Korea’s official
development assistance (ODA), with the aim to address global development issues and
empower partner countries’ socio-economics. In Southeast Asia, KOICA has been working to
strengthen development cooperation with ASEAN and Mekong countries according to their
familiar culture and close geographical proximity. With a focus on capacity training and
systematic infrastructure development, South Korea has given at least $3.4 billion to ASEAN,
with 72 percent of that going to the Mekong region's less developed economies, Cambodia,
Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (Chheang, 2017).

In 2017, Republic of Korea introduced the New Southern Policy (NSP), a signature foreign
policy of South Korean president Moon Jae-In, to strengthen the bonds with Southeast Asian
countries and elevate the relations with ASEAN to the same level as other powerhouse partners,
including the United States and Russia. This policy initiative has further consolidated more
dialogues on climate change and environmental issues within the two regions (VNA, 2021).

This year also sees the 10th anniversary of Mekong-ROK cooperation since its inauguration at
the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in 2021 until it rose to summit level in 2019 and became a
strategic partnership in 2020. The Mekong-Han River Declaration was established in 2011 to
achieve and continue with the cooperation to establish, “Partnership for People, Prosperity, and
Peace” and support narrowing the development gap and promote better connectivity in the
region (Khmer Times, 2021). With member states including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar,
and Thailand, the partnership focuses on seven newly-identified key areas, namely culture and
tourism, human resources development, agriculture and rural development, infrastructure,
information and communication technology (ICT), environment and non-traditional security
challenges. The two regional entities have promised to commit to “co-prosperity” and
“sustainable prosperity”, which promotes a fair, inclusive, environmentally sustainable, and
people-centered community building to continue improving local communities’ self-reliance
(Khmer Times, 2021).

During the first Mekong-ROK summit in 2019, leaders from Korea and Mekong countries
agreed on the establishment of the Mekong-Korea Biodiversity Centre, which will be situated
in Myanmar. The project, estimated to cost USD10 millions, aims to contribute to biodiversity
in the Mekong region and promote sustainable development of natural resources to achieve a
fair and impartial mutual cooperation between the Mekong countries. The leaders also agreed
on the establishment of the Mekong-ROK Water Resources Joint Research Centre in Korea,
which is for strengthening Mekong-ROK cooperation on the development of sustainable and
integrated water resources management. This is apparently good news for the Mekong River,
which is under heaps of pressure from ecological stress due to climate change and the
construction of hydropower dams.

ROK is only the third country to highlight such dialogues on climate change with all ten
members of Southeast Asia, after the European Union and Japan (By, 2020). The cooperation
between ASEAN Mekong countries and Korea is also devoted to bringing dialogues of climate
change and environment in the region to another level. ASEAN-ROK Dialogue on
Environment and Climate Change was adopted in 2021 as the region’s third bilateral
consultative mechanism on climate change and environment, and has now become an annual
event. Korea is seeking to enforce policy and technical collaboration on areas of interest,
including air pollution, marine pollution and plastic litter, circular economy, forests, and other
initiatives to fight climate change (MOFA, 2020). During the first dialogue held in September
2021, the Republic of Korea demonstrated their hope to enhance marine waste treatment,
double down on efforts to reduce carbon dioxide from the atmosphere, and restore forests
(VNA, 2021).

VI - What will the future hold?

With the Mekong river facing an extremely uncertain future, there is a growing urgency to
coordinate the addressing of water management at national, regional, and international levels.
In terms of climate change adaptation, there is room for improvement for coordination between
relevant ministerial bodies from provincial to national levels and from national to regional
levels. Global frameworks, including the Paris Agreement and Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs) also strongly support adaptation at undernational, national and regional levels.

Technology plays a very important role in fighting the green fight. Experts have long been
recommending the Mekong Delta to utilise cutting-edge technologies to minimise the impact
brought by climate change with one of the biggest hopes being using technology to restructure
the agricultural sector in face of severe climate disasters. Newly emerging technologies have
already been improving environmental management, including energy, water, and security.
The Republic of Korea is one of the world’s leaders in terms of digitalisation and technology
advancement. In this era of digitalisation and digital connectivity, Korea can certainly support
the Mekong countries to increase their effort in preparing their human resource and
infrastructure for the fourth industrial revolution through various areas, namely education,
Information Communication Technology (ICT), forestry conservation, and more.

Additionally, the hydrology of the Mekong river is constantly changing, which inevitably
impacts the ecosystems and biodiversity (Mekong Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan, 2021).
It has already been predicted that the basin-wide temperature will increase in the future, and
that will introduce a wide-range of possible changes that have enormous impact to the
livelihood of people in local communities and unavoidably ecosystems. In regards to this
matter, the South Korea - Mekong Water Resource Joint Research Center will serve as a
platform for knowledge and technology transfer with Korea’s experiences from managing the
Han River, which will be valuable lessons for ASEAN to manage the Mekong river with
inclusiveness, sustainability, and transparency.

As South Korea has expressed no ambition to compete with other mechanisms by regional or
global power, it is hopeful that this partnership will continue to achieve prosperous results of
capacity-enhancement for the Mekong region.

VI - Conclusion

With the Mekong Region becoming increasingly important as a growth centre and frontier of
Asia, there is no denying that South Korea is playing an extremely important role in supporting
and bridging the developmental gap between the Mekong countries through promoting
complementarity and increasing synergy among multilateral mechanisms in the region.

With the coronavirus pandemic accelerating many problems that were on the world’s
backburners, the Mekong region is in need of loyal partners, like the Republic of Korea, now
more than ever. Korea plays a crucial role in supporting the Mekong countries in the age of
digitisation and employing cutting-edge technologies to minimise the impact of climate change,
highlighting climate change and environmental problems at high-level dialogue, and
knowledge transfer through establishment of research centres. As a partner who shares many
of the same interests and values, cooperation of Mekong countries and Korea is vital as the
region is growing into one of the world’s fastest developing areas.

References

ASEAN State of Climate Change report. (n.d.). Retrieved November 14, 2021, from
https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ASCCR-e-publication-Final-12-Oct-
2021.pdf.

Chheang, V. (2017, February 23). THE MEKONG REGION: FROM A DIVIDED TO A

CONNECTED REGION. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Cambodia.

Eckstein, D., Schäfer, V. K. and L., Schäfer, C. P., & Schwarz, M. F. and R. (n.d.). Global
climate risk index 2018. Germanwatch e.V. Retrieved November 14, 2021, from
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Mekong River Commission. (n.d.). Mekong Adaptation Strategy and Action Plan . Mekong
River Commission. Retrieved November 14, 2021, from
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cooperation-on-environment-combating-climate-change/208144.vnp.
 Strengthening ASEAN-Korea cooperation in mitigating the impact of climate change
and promoting sustainable development in the Mekong region
Jongsung Lee and Sobin Cho

Abstract

Mekong region is drawing attention from the international community due to its high
developmental potential. However, it is one of the most vulnerable regions on earth due to
climate change. Korean government has been promoting mutual exchange with the Mekong
region since the first minister’s meeting in 2011 and has looked forward to further cooperation
with its ‘New Southern Policy’. This paper analyzed ways that Korea and ASEAN can
strengthen cooperation for the purpose of mitigating the global impact of climate change and
promoting sustainable development of the Mekong region in environmental, economic,
diplomatic perspectives. Mekong region is already facing the negative consequences of climate
change such as increase in the frequency of floods and droughts and water insecurity. However,
the region is still underdeveloped considering its fruitful resources and requires further business
infrastructure development. The trans-national characteristics of water resource and the
different stances on environmental policy between countries due to various development status
are raising diplomatic disputes around the region. This paper covered the details of these
ongoing issues and recommended several policies that ASEAN and Korean government can
execute to deal with those issues. Solutions are mainly based on sharing the experience,
providing financial and technical support, and solidifying the partnership between countries for
the sustainable development in the Mekong region.
 Strengthening ASEAN-Korea cooperation in mitigating the impact of climate change
and promoting sustainable development in the Mekong region

Introduction
Mekong region is a trans-national region of the Mekong River basin in the Southeast Asia, rich
of priceless natural and cultural resources. With the length of 4800km, the river runs through
6 Asian countries: China, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia, and Vietnam(Van Zalinge
et al., 2004). Since 1992, 6 countries in Mekong region have been working together under an
economic cooperation program named ‘Greater Mekong Subregion Program (GMS Program)’.
This program was launched with the purpose of promoting the economic infrastructure
development of the Mekong basin countries and strengthening cooperation between these
countries. The GMS program focuses on nine areas: transport, energy, telecommunications,
environment, human resource development, tourism, trade promotion, private investment, and
agriculture. From 1992 to the end of 2010, a total project cost of about $13.9 billion was
executed for 55 GMS projects including road, airport, railway, and hydroelectric power plant
construction and maintenance(Srivastava & Kumar, 2012). One of the most representative
projects was ‘Economic Corridor Promotion’, which aimed to build a transportation
infrastructure such as roads and railroads and improve the logistics environment step by step,
and ultimately aimed to build an economic zone to promote trade and private investment. The
GMS program is a core project among the various development projects currently being
promoted in the Mekong basin area.

Ever since, lots of developed countries and international organizations have been promoting
various development cooperation projects in this region. For developmental purpose, Mekong
region has been a target for large-scale constructions, such as mining, forestry, industrial
production, hydropower etc. This has become a significant threat to the vast nature of the
Mekong region. The Mekong region has diverse landscape and biodiversity. Especially the
Mekong River is considered the second most biodiversity after the Amazon River and new
species are constantly being discovered. According to ‘Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF)’,
total 115 new species were newly discovered in this region in 2016(WWF, 2017). Thanks to
these resources, the harvesting and hunting is a main source of income, with a retail value of
more than US $4 billion dollar every year(WWF, 2013). However, due to continued
deforestation, Mekong area has already lost one third of its forests. These environmental factors
have raised international concerns, and it is requiring global coordination to avoid conflict and
to find a reasonable solution that everyone can be convinced.

In late October 2011, the Korean government promoted the first ministers’ meeting with the
Mekong countries and announced the ‘Han River Declaration on Establishing a Comprehensive
Partnership between Korea and the Mekong for Mutual Prosperity’. By this declaration, which
includes scheduled annual ministerial-level talk, Korea’s cooperative project in the Mekong
region has been accelerated. This has sped up recently with the 1st Korea-Mekong Summit
being held to enhance cooperation in 2019. Until now mutual exchanges have been of a
sporadic nature, but from now on, continuous and solid cooperation is needed to respond to
climate change and achieve sustainable development.

Based on these backgrounds, this paper aims to seek ways that Korea and ASEAN can
strengthen cooperation for the purpose of mitigating the global impact of climate change and
promoting sustainable development of the Mekong region in environmental, economic, and
diplomatic perspectives.

1. South Korea-ASEAN partnership coping with the impact of climate change

Initially, South Korea and ASEAN can play an important role in dealing with the consequences
of climate change. Mekong region is already experiencing negative impacts of climate change
affecting the region’s people, biodiversity, and natural resources. For instance, the length of
rainy season is predicted to be shortened across the region, while the overall rainfall is expected
to rise due to intense rain events(Blate, 2009). Rise in temperature accelerates the glacial
melting in Himalayas, which also affects the river flow in the region(Blate, 2009).
Consequently, more frequent droughts and floods events may occur, bringing devastating
effects to people living around the basin(Blate, 2009). With its high dependence on agriculture,
Mekong region is facing the risk of food and water insecurity. The impact is not only limited
to reduced productivity, but also leads to social problems such as unequal resource distribution,
unemployment, and poverty. Thus, to deal with the impact of climate change, two-track
approach is needed: mitigating the climate change itself by avoiding and reducing emissions
of greenhouse gases and adapting to the climate change by precisely forecasting its impact and
appropriately supporting people suffering from the consequences.
In terms of climate change mitigation, worldwide consensus has been made. The Paris
Agreement is an international treaty on climate change which is adopted by 196 parties in
December 2015(UNFCC, 2021). It has a long-term temperature goal to restrict the global
warming to well below 2, preferably to 1.5 degrees Celsius(UNFCC, 2021). To achieve this
goal, parties involved have submitted their ‘nationally determined contributions (NDC)’ plans
including economic and social transformation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions(UNFCC,
2021). However, each nation’s ability to put these plans into practice vary. For the developing
countries, whose priority is economic growth, putting environment over development can be a
burden. Thus, the Paris Agreement encourages a financial, technical, and capacity building
support for the countries in need. South Korea can be a partner for the Mekong countries to
reach this goal. According to ‘Climate Action Tracker’, Thailand is one of the countries that is
rated ‘critically insufficient’ in reaching the target(CAT, 2021). Thailand has been putting an
effort to expand renewable energy and to cut emissions, but the demand for the development
is masking its effort. Japan is cooperating with the city of Bangkok through the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA)(Kim et al., 2019). As a mitigating method, Japan
supported Bangkok by promoting Metropolitan rail transit, improving backward facilities,
optimizing traffic signal control, and urban greening(Kim et al., 2019). As such, South Korea
can make an affiliation with cities of Mekong region and support their mitigating action.
Especially, Laos and Cambodia are vulnerable to climate risks due to their limited capacity to
focus on climate change over countries’ development. South Korea and ASEAN can help these
countries with financial aid, technical support, and exchange of human resources such as
scientists and legal experts. Yet South Korea still has a long way to go to reach its target. Thus,
it would not be a one-way support because the experience of mutual research and practice
between South Korea and Mekong region would also provide insight to improve nation’s
climate action policy.

It is important to slow down the ongoing climate change. However, managing the impact of
climate change already being present should also be considered as high priority. As mentioned
earlier before, risk of flood and drought has been increasing due to climate change. ‘Monitoring,
Forecasting and Dissemination of Basin Conditions in the Context of Low Flows, Floods, and
Droughts’ are one of the major outcomes that MRC has been working on(MRC, 2020). MRC
is running ‘Mekong-HYCOS Hydromet network’, which provides real-time water level and
rain fall data(MRC, 2020). Not only providing the data, but it also aims to collect this data to
create an appropriate modelling system to forecast natural phenomena in the region. Still, it
still has a limitation regarding the accuracy of prediction, trans-national alarm system,
coordination between parties, technology, and well-established policy. Recently, MRC has
requested consultations for the flood and drought management and forecast system through
Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP), which is a South Korean platform for development
cooperation(KSP, 2021). Korea Water Resources Corporation(K-water) has ‘K-water Hydro
Intelligent Toolkit(K-HIT)’ system, consisting of real-time hydrological data acquisition and
processing, precipitation forecasting, and flood analysis(Yi et al., 2020). Since 1967, it has
built up competence to enable the stable supply of water resources despite the flood and drought
by controlling storage of water in dams around the country. K-water can share valuable
experience for the water resource management. Also, South Korea has well-developed
information and communications technology, which can play a role in building an efficient
informing and alarming platform.

In addition, water stress is one of the important issues to resolve. According to 2009 ADB
research, 185 million people in Southeast Asia are likely to experience water stress by
2050(Raitzer et al., 2015). The annual flow of the Mekong River is estimated to decline by 16-
24%, while low-lying coastal cities like Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh will suffer from the rise in
sea level(Raitzer et al., 2015). In the countries in the lower Mekong basin, where freshwater
and seawater cross due to its low altitude, the situation is more severe. Providing clean water
for the people dwelling in the region is a critical problem. Seawater desalination process is one
of the promising solutions for the water shortage. While leading countries of desalination are
USA, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Australia, and China, South Korea is putting an effort to engage in
this race(Ziolkowska, 2016). The major trend in seawater desalination is focused on efficient
energy saving(Hwang & Kim, 2016). South Korea is competent in electric power storage
system (ESS) which is critical to sustainable renewable energy. As a partner, South Korea and
ASEAN can cooperate in this area to develop efficient desalination system based on renewable
energy system. South Korea and ASEAN scientists may exchange their knowledge and
experience and verify their projects in the Mekong region. The facility would directly help
people around the Mekong region, and in a long term the partnership would raise the
competitive power of South Korea and ASEAN in global water market.

2. ASEAN-Korea cooperation leading to Economic effects

There are lots of ways for ASEAN-Korea to cooperate and to lead to tremendous economic
effects. Initially, this could be done through ‘business infrastructure investment project’. The
Mekong River region is still evaluated as being underdeveloped for its size. In terms of energy,
the Mekong River region has the potential to generate 30,000 megawatts of electricity(Kuenzer
et al., 2013). This is expected to be the largest hydroelectric capacity in all East Asia, but the
actual development being made is less than 10%. Building an efficient hydroelectric power
plant to generate electricity can potentially provide many opportunities for further river
development. In addition, there are more economic growth possibilities besides hydropower.
In any country, an increase in the manufacturing share increases trade and market demand. In
particular, the economic growth potential of the Mekong River can be seen from the fact that
Britain chose the Mekong River as a trade route for trade with China in the past. Therefore, we
need to promote trade investment in the ‘border economic zone’, induce cooperation in
agriculture and industry, and connect transportation networks, while tourism cooperation and
human resource development being carried out together. If that is the case, economic growth
can be achieved with cheap labor, tax incentives, and the convenience of transport systems
with neighboring countries, and this is a huge merit for global industrial companies. This ‘zone’
is where South Korea, ASEAN, and Mekong region can cooperate as a business partner for
mutual benefit and growth in the process of manufacturing goods. For instance, South Korean
companies can technically support in the commercializing and exporting of primary products
that are produced in the Mekong region.

Secondly, as a country which achieved remarkable economic development at an unbelievable

pace, South Korea can share the experience of economic development with the Mekong region.
From 1960s, South Korea has greatly contributed to national economic growth and
improvement of people's living standards by implementing various projects related to the
comprehensive development of resources and their use and conservation. As a result, the
national income of only 45 dollars at the time of liberation grew to an economic scale of 20,000
dollars, creating a myth of reconstruction and growth called “the miracle of the Han
River”(Chung, 1993). As a role model for developing countries, South Korea can share
experience in key areas such as rural development, talent cultivation, industrial development
through technology sharing, and the 4th industrial revolution. More than that, we must
remember the fact that South Korea was able to leap from a middle-income country to a
developed country by achieving structural advancement into high value-added industries and
products by cultivating their own technological capabilities. Small countries' manufacturing
industry is highly dependent on overseas markets, so growth tends to slow down when it loses
the advantage of low wages in middle-income countries, whereas large-scale countries can
achieve more sustainable growth based on the domestic market. Therefore, besides the initial
level of the cooperation where South Korea can help the manufacturing industry of the Mekong
region, the ultimate goal should be seeking successful transformation from manufacturing
industry to their new growth driver. South Korea and ASEAN can cooperate to build a
multilateral platform that can efficiently transmit this unique experience and financially aid
their developmental projects. As there are geographical and cultural similarities that South
Korea and the Mekong region share, close cooperation between the two can create huge
synergistic effect.

3. Role of South Korea and ASEAN in diplomatic disputes

South Korea and ASEAN can help resolve ongoing diplomatic disputes among Mekong
countries. The main diplomatic issues going on in this area would be water competition and
different positions between countries in the controversy of ‘development versus environment’.
First, as the Mekong water resource development is estimated to have a tremendous ripple
effect, the surrounding parties are forming complex relationships. China, located in the upper
Mekong River, has already built or is under construction of several dams. As a result, water
drought has already occurred in a relatively downstream area. However, accurate numerical
analysis is hardly made since China has been uncooperative in providing sufficient data. This
is a huge diplomatic problem, especially for Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, which
account for 82% of the total watershed(Rossi et al., 2009). The decrease in the amount of water
is fatal to people in this area who rely on Mekong River as a water source of drinking, living,
agriculture, and transportation. Also, the construction of dams itself greatly affects the
agriculture and fisheries in the downstream region. For instance, Vietnam is said to have severe
soil erosion in the granary. United states, which has ‘Lower Mekong Initiatives’ with
downstream Mekong countries, is also involved in this matter from a competitive standpoint
to China. Fortunately, China has sent a positive signal to share water resources-related data
through the 2020 Lancang-Mekong Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. However, if China, located
upstream, tries to monopolize water resource recklessly, it would be difficult to resolve this
problem through negotiations between individual countries.

Such diplomatic disputes require the intervention of international organization, and this is
where ASEAN and South Korea can play a role in. Of course, it is impossible for South Korea
nor ASEAN to resolve all water conflicts among these countries. However, by sharing their
experiences, idea, and resources, they can help Mekong countries in raising their voices.
Historically, South Korea has experienced various political and diplomatic disputes with
surrounding countries such as China, Japan, Russia, and North Korea. Of course, coming up
with a solution that is clear enough to win the support of most people in foreign affairs is a
challenge, and successive governments have not been free from criticism of their foreign affairs
policy. However, experience itself is an asset regardless of success or failure, and South Korean
government is trying to build up flexible policies reflecting the shifting wave of political
landscape. In 2017, the Korean government declared its ‘New Southern Policy’, with the slogan
of ‘People, Peace, and Prosperity’(Kwak, 2018). Based on this framework, South Korea and
ASEAN can focus on stabilizing the conflicts for the peace around the Mekong region. Also,
South Korea has consistently raised its national status ever since its foundation. Along with
Australia, India, and South Africa, Korea was invited to the G7 summit in 2021, two years in
a row. Considering that the other three countries are the British Commonwealth, it can be said
that Korea's status has risen internationally. Thus, with the support of South Korea, downstream
countries would be able to have a power comparable to China in resolving international
conflicts on the Mekong River.

Aside from the issue of water competition, the conflict between development and
environmental preservation itself is also a significant diplomatic issue. As mentioned earlier,
as Mekong River has high biological value, the conservation of resources must be considered
in the development process. Unfortunately, according to the Mekong River commission, the
environmental degradation has been worsened over 25 years since the MRC was found(Nika,
2021). Although it may go against the global trend that emphasizes the conservation of natural
resources for future generations, for the countries whose economic independence and resource
development remains in priority, it is hard to include nature conservation in their
developmental plan. Despite the fact that the various councils have been created so far, the
reality is that the conflicts of opinion were never resolved, and they are drifting in the
conceptual aspect compared to the practical resolution.

South Korea and ASEAN can play a role in resolving these national disputes and
developmental gaps by setting the scope of development and intervening in the distribution of
interests between countries. For the effective cooperation, it is recommended for ASEAN to
empower Korea as a national partner, and Korea must deliver results that live up to these public
interest and expectations. South Korea has a ‘Foreign economic cooperation fund’, which has
a purpose of promoting economic cooperation by providing funds to economic development
projects in developing countries and supporting the overseas market entry of Korean companies.
By using this funds, South Korea can financially and technically support the Mekong countries
in establishing developmental strategies that balance development with the preservation of
nature. It is a mutual benefit, as Korean countries can expand their business in the Mekong
region, while the Mekong region can develop their infrastructure economically and eco-
friendly. With South Korea’s capital power, ASEAN’s checks within an appropriate range, and
the interaction between the two groups, cooperative agreement could be reached, and its net
function will be maximized. Climate change and ecosystem deterioration have highlighted the
need to take a closer look at the relationship between culture and the environment as well as
society and nature. Under the great threat from environmental pollution and climate change,
cross-border global cooperation is needed, and Korea and ASEAN countries are no exception.
Therefore, Korea and ASEAN must cooperate to promote socially and environmentally
sustainable development while balancing development and conservation.

Conclusion
Throughout this paper, we have examined the ways that Korea and ASEAN can strengthen
cooperation in dealing with the impact of climate change and promoting sustainable
development of the Mekong region. We aimed to seek solutions in three area: environment,
economy, and diplomacy.

First of all, in the area of mitigating and adapting to the consequence of climate change, South
Korea and ASEAN can support Mekong countries to achieve their NDC by sharing human
resources and promoting mutual research projects. Also, South Korea can share the experience
of water resource analysis program to forecast the flood and drought around the Mekong region.
Moreover, for the clean drinking water supply, South Korea and ASEAN can cooperate in
developing effective seawater desalination system with renewable energy.

In addition, in terms of economy, South Korea and ASEAN can promote ‘business
infrastructure investment project’ and build a ‘border economic zone’ in which global
companies can interact and cooperate in the Mekong region. Also, South Korea and ASEAN
can organize a multilateral platform to pass on the strategy that South Korea used to achieve
successful economic development.

Furthermore, in the area of diplomacy, we pointed out that water competition and controversy
of development versus environment are the main ongoing issues around the Mekong region.
As an international organization, South Korea and ASEAN can support the Mekong countries
to take a favorable position in the competition of water resources. Also, by facilitating ‘Foreign
economic cooperation fund’, South Korea and ASEAN can help the Mekong countries to
achieve balance between development and preservation of environment.

‘Mekong’ means ‘Mother of Water’ in the native language. Thanks to this water resource,
Mekong region has tremendous potential to achieve such development. As so, all related
countries and organizations, including Korea and ASEAN, must continue to improve their
mutual understanding and to cooperate more closely in alleviating the impact of climate change
and encouraging sustainable development in the Mekong region.

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 The Role of Youth in Promoting Mutual Understanding between ASEAN and Korea
towards a sustainable and future-oriented ASEAN-Korea Partnership

Li Wee Ann and Muhammad Azim bin Mahmood

Abstract
A partnership, in its simplest form, is a formal agreement between two or more parties for the
purpose of mobilizing resources, providing development assistance, sharing knowledge, and
cooperating in areas such as science, technology, and innovation, multilevel investment,
sustainable development, enhanced trading, imports and exports, policy development, and
security, to name a few. Following the 1989 dialogue, the Republic of Korea has developed
into a pivotal figure in ASEAN's relationship, and it is in everybody's interest for the alliance
to flourish for generations. Thus, youth is vital since they are critical drivers of a country's
development and future, as they will eventually lead the country. As a result, it is vital to
promote early and effective worldview comprehension. However, due to their limited exposure
to or lack of exposure to ASEAN culture, young Koreans' comprehension of the ASEAN region
and its culture is severely restricted. Meanwhile, as a result of K-Wave's influence, a large
number of Asian youths are now familiar with Korea and its culture. This essay will discuss
ways in which this relationship might be strengthened during their youth. Numerous concepts
have been researched and investigated in these works addressing how the ASEAN and Korean
youth might accomplish required reforms and solve these imbalances in order to ensure the
nations' long-term cooperation. The basic premise is that young may act as ambassadors,
innovators, entrepreneurs, and students, all of which contribute to the continued unification of
both parties.
 The Role of Youth in Promoting Mutual Understanding between ASEAN and Korea
towards a sustainable and future-oriented ASEAN-Korea Partnership

Introduction
ASEAN is perceived as a youthful, dynamic, and promising region, with youth accounting for
more than half of the population (15–35 years of age). Many Asian youth are familiar with
Korea and its culture as a result of the influences of K-Wave. However, as a result of their
limited exposure to or lack of exposure to ASEAN culture, young Koreans' understanding of
the region and its culture is severely restricted. As a result, there is a need to rectify this
imbalance, and youth may play a critical role in resolving this issue. This essay will discuss the
impact and involvement of youth as ambassadors or representatives for physical media, the
effective use of the Internet, student and cultural exchange programs, and youth involvement
in the worlds of entrepreneurship, innovation, technology sciences, and engineering in order to
address this imbalance and, additionally, to promote and pave the way for a sustainable and
future-oriented ASEAN-Korean partnership.

Youth as ambassadors
Mutual understanding is one of the most fundamental aspects of forming a long-term and
successful connection. Outsiders often disagree with what a nation is doing, including why
particular customs are still practiced, linguistic hurdles that seem impenetrable, and so on. This
obstructs and slows down the process, making collaboration difficult. As a result, it is critical
for partners to learn, understand, and accept one another without passing judgment or alienating
one another. This is even more vital to recognize and correct as soon as possible by involving
youth, who play such an important part in a society's future. To avoid misunderstandings and
promote mutual respect and tolerance in order to build a sustainable partnership, it is critical to
expose and make society aware of these differences and teach them different perspectives,
particularly in terms of the differences between social structures in different countries and their
way of life. This section will focus only on how youth may serve as cultural ambassadors and
how these fits into the larger narrative of increasing mutual understanding between Korea and
ASEAN.

What can be learn with K wave

The K wave is powerful in the ASEAN arena, as many people are aware. This Korean wave,
dubbed Hallyu, took the shape of music, dance, film, and Korean cuisine, exposing Southeast
Asians to Korean culture. To clarify, K wave is a Korean cultural product that arose mostly
from the country's music business, where young talents (under the age of 30) are massively
invested and transformed into idols (Moeran, 2021, pp. 144-166). Idols are a kind of influencer
whose job it is to promote a brand, in this instance Korean culture. Consumers identify more
with, feel more akin to, and are more accepting of influencers and celebrities, according to
research by Kelli S. Burns (2021, pp. 9-11). Furthermore, their physical appearance defines
their cultural identity; in other words, celebrities and idols are cultural ambassadors. In addition,
a Korean Idol's reach is vast, thanks to the governments and private business institutions'
support. As a result of their great impact in the ASEAN area, foreign people are becoming
increasingly interested in Koreans and their culture. As a consequence, colleges are offering
classes on Korean culture. Burapha University and Prince Songkhla University, for example,
both offer Korean language programs as well as lessons in society, culture, economics, politics,
history, and geography (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, pp. 256-257). Alumni of the Universiti
Brunei Darussalam may take Korean language classes. Other types of Korean media have
benefited greatly as a result of this increase in interest and will thus spawn a new variety of
influencers ranging from food influencers, athletes, film stars, artists, and so on, whose role
will act similarly to idols in that they will be able to reach new consumers in new markets,
generating more interest in the Korean culture.

Similarly, Southeast Asia (SEA) may learn from how Korean youth have had a significant
effect on the region. Youth from SEA may employ the same strategy, such as attend music
tours, cultural fairs and festivals, promote local arts, compete in tournaments, or have their own
films shown in Korean theaters. The following may assist in revealing the participants' culture.
Particularly if they have triumphed in competitions or won awards at fairs, since this will
increase their chances of attracting investors and distributors who will help them grow their
reach (Fuhr, 2016, pp. 143-144). All of these examples have previously been used. For example,
during the 22nd Bucheon International Fantastic Film Festival (BiFan) in South Korea, a
Bruneian named Abdul Khabir bin Zainidi won first place (Kon, 2018).

However, the difficulty is that the Southeast Asian creative industries do not have the same
potential to infiltrate other cultures as the Korean creative industries. This is clear since few
Koreans are familiar with ASEAN. The following are the reasons why Korean creative
industries, particularly the music business, are so strong. Music agencies have taken a
manufacturing strategy in which young people as young as their early teens are recruited and
taught for many years in a variety of activities such as singing, dancing, rapping, composing,
playing musical instruments, and studying foreign languages such as Chinese. Aside from that,
each talent might cost up to $60,000 USD to train fully (Fuhr, 2016, p. 76). Furthermore, the
market caters to a large number of young people. Finally, the K-pop industry has embraced
early online social media platforms such as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, which are
popular among young people. Finally, overseas fans help to increase the visibility of the Korean
sector. The latter is particularly important because international fans form clubs, create demand
for Korean goods, and can be instrumental in breaking down the language barrier through
techniques such as fansubbing, which involves inserting subtitles into a work so that it can be
viewed by people who are illiterate in Korean. These issues may be summarized as follows:
Southeast Asian creative industries lack the publicity power that is a fundamental element in
attracting followers, and they also lack the robust infrastructure that Koreans have.

To address the issue, lectures about Southeast Asia are offered to Korean students at Korean
universities. At Seoul National University, for example, a number of Southeast Asia-related
courses are offered by a variety of units including the Departments of Art History, Architecture,
Asian History, Law, and the College of Fine Arts, among others. Sungkonghoe University's
Graduate School of NGO Studies offers around 10 M.A. courses, with a portion of the time
spent on Southeast Asia and associated concerns (Chachavalpongpun, 2010, pp. 256-257).
Furthermore, Korean variety programs such as Battle Trip and Salty Tour send its young stars
to Southeast Asian nations to promote the cultures they encounter. As far as ASEAN is
concerned, it may need invest more in the creative industries. Additionally, there is a stigma in
certain countries, such as Brunei, Singapore, and Malaysia, where young people are
discouraged from pursuing the arts since it is considered that artists earn little money, which is
connected with failure and brings humiliation to the family (Chan-Naulli, 2018, pp. 39-44). As
a result, there is a need to make an effort to remove the stigma since it is established that artist
is representative of one’s culture.

The use of Internet and social media

The Internet is one of the technologies to which everyone is exposed to, but particularly
children and adolescents. It is one of the technologies that has contributed to a greater degree
of social integration. Within seconds, information may now be spread from person to person.
This suggests that a person may simply pick up a new skill or learn a thing quickly. And social
media is one of the inventions that came up as a result of the Internet. Social media has the
ability to facilitate communication and information sharing amongst individuals. Additionally,
it is social media that has paved the road for young people to get involved in local and global
events (Kim et al., 2021, p. 73). Additionally, social media empowers and encourages youth to
share their culture and other information. This is akin to conventional news and entertainment
in that it exposes the outside world to a culture, language, and others. The main difference is
that social media is now more popular than conventional news outlets and has witnessed
increased usage. And secondly, young people now have a dependable and easily available
platform for sharing. Young people may utilize and own social media profiles on platforms
such as YouTube, Twitter, TikTok, and Instagram to promote their culture to the rest of the
world. Numerous instances have already occurred. These include YouTubers such as
mrnigelng and TikTok alvinchong123 (Kobe, 2020), who are both actively promoting their
culture.

However, while the Internet's forces can be used to promote understanding and serve as a
medium for publicity, they can also serve the exact opposite purpose. Additionally, the Internet
offers a venue for individuals to spread falsehoods. Ignorance and, worst of all, hatred against
a culture are the result of misinformation (Kucuk, 2019, pp. 25-43). While those who are
unaware of the others are eventually exposed, it is not in a positive light, as they may be
uninformed or have a poor initial impression/bias against the culture. At this point, it serves no
purpose other than to erode mutual understanding.

Student Exchange Program

Another way of how youth act as ambassadors spring to mind: student exchange programs and
cultural exchange or sharing programs. Student exchange programs are reciprocal travel
programs in which students go to partner institutions and are hosted by them, and vice versa.
This curriculum provides students with the chance to learn about and immerse themselves in a
variety of cultures, so increasing their awareness, acceptance of cultural diversity, cultural
capital, and even intellectual curiosity. This provides participants with firsthand knowledge of
worldview, enabling them to evaluate things more objectively and develop a greater tolerance
for various cultures. Global exposure and international communication can assist students later
in life in their careers, particularly if they seek employment with multinational organizations.
The global perspective broadens participants' horizons, encouraging them to think outside the
box and honing their communication skills. Students' feeling of self-confidence will be boosted
by new situations.

This curriculum is perhaps the simplest approach to foster young comprehension of the
diversity and significance of various cultures and ethnicities. Simply understanding the origins
and causes of these disparities may help shape the minds of kids toward understanding and
tolerance, so improving international relations.
In summary, youth can act as ambassadors between countries by being participative on the
Internet or conventional news outlet. By being exposed to the public, the youth become a public
figure and becomes a representative of their nation’s identity. The youth can also engage in the
creative industry and establish connection internationally through the means of fairs, festivals,
or exchange studies.

Youth as innovators and entrepreneurs

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development's Sustainable Development Goals took effect
on January 1, 2016. The SDGs were a worldwide project adopted by all world leaders with the
goal of eradicating poverty, protecting the environment, and promoting long-term prosperity
for everyone. 17 objectives were established in addition to the 169 targets in order to achieve
the following. SDG 17 is an example of this kind of target. The aim underlines the critical need
of strengthening implementation mechanisms and reviving the global partnership for
sustainable development in particular (Bastien & Holmarsdottir, 2017, pp. 3-18). Given the
SDGs' scale, the project has proved very complex, requiring both creativity and
entrepreneurship. As a result, innovators, particularly grassroots innovators, are critical to the
SDGs' achievement. This part will address the relationship between youth and innovation and
entrepreneurship as grassroots innovators, as well as how that connection fits into the bigger
narrative of enhancing mutual understanding between Korea and ASEAN, which is aligned
with SDG 17.

To provide a more detailed explanation of the connection between youths as grassroot

innovators, consider that youth are some of the most creative and inventive people.
Additionally, youth are becoming increasingly aware of and engaged in global developments
in politics, economics, and social dynamics. These variables have allowed youth to devise a
variety of urgent and long-term answers to many of the difficulties confronting modern
societies, such as climate change and Covid-19, and to become pioneers of new technology. A
good example is the company LINECARE, which was founded by graduate students at Korea's
Hanyang University. The venture would be a medical information services company focused
on making hospital information more accessible and transparent and on digitizing patient data.
As of this writing, the firm has debuted in the Philippines and plans to expand to additional
regions in the next years, including Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand (UNDP, 2019). Indeed,
there are several such examples of innovation and entrepreneur success stories from various
nations. As evidenced by the examples above, youth have the capacity to innovate and bring
new solutions to the market that either address issues such as climate change or improve on
existing solutions in areas such as healthcare and others that would benefit not only their own
country but also other countries significantly.

As proven by the example above, young grassroots innovators are highly capable but requires
a place to develop. As a result, several institutions with relevant programs have been
established especially for that purpose. These include Youth Co:Lab and their yearly
Innovation Challenge, among other things. These organizations and initiatives might be seen
as an investment in youngsters, since they will be exposed to the nation's culture, influence,
philosophy, and ideology unwittingly. Additionally, young people may learn from one another
and have a better understanding of how individuals from diverse cultures approach innovation.
Thus, by investing in youth, whether it is in Korea or ASEAN, contributes to SDG 17, which
is improving understanding between Korea and ASEAN.
In summary, younger generations have the capability to create new start-ups that focus on new
solutions that can be applied internationally. This inadvertently helps to expose the cultural
identity of both communities.

Youth as students
Science, engineering, and technology are critical components of a country's and community's
growth, much more so in developing nations, such as several ASEAN members states. The
goal of sustainable development is to strike a balance between economic, environmental, and
social requirements, so ensuring prosperity for future generations and maybe subsequent
generations. This involves taking a long-term, integrated strategy to development and attaining
a healthy community by tackling economic, environmental, and social challenges together and
avoiding excessive use of critical natural resources. Technological advancements, fresh
scientific discoveries, and human inventiveness may give the blueprint for attaining sustainable
growth.

Environmentally sustainable economic growth refers to economic development that satisfies

everyone's needs and requirements without jeopardizing future generations' access to resources.
This may be accomplished by maintaining a consistent connection between resource demand
and natural resource output. A more fascinating scenario is one in which the pace of
reproduction and variety of natural resources surpasses the rate of consumption. It is critical to
demonstrate that collaboration, exchanging ideas, developing cooperation, and pooling
resources may be more efficient and successful than attacking an issue alone. After all, it is the
purpose of forming an organization or forming a partnership.

A few concepts may be employed to encourage sustainable growth among ASEAN and Korean
youth in the fields of technology, engineering, and science. Collaborative research at the high
school or university level may help foster creativity and generate new ideas. Youth are often
more inventive and receptive to new ideas, since their mental processes are less limited. Joint
research also benefits adolescents by providing them with an opportunity to see things from a
fresh viewpoint. Each country has unique difficulties and problems, necessitating the
development of unique techniques, laws, and regulations for resolving these issues. Another
strategy of collaborative growth is to encourage new businesses, internships, and employment
opportunities across borders. The next section will discuss some case studies.

Industrial internships are critical for building a solid foundation and linkage between
humanities and applied sciences, given the continuously expanding demand and need for
worldwide engineering talent. Internships are sometimes defined as less regimented than
academic studies; they provide hands-on education in areas such as collaboration,
communication, leadership, and project management. Through the overseas internship program,
undergraduate students will have exposure to a variety of various cultures and work ethics,
which will aid in the stimulation of considerable growth in the students' educational
development. Blumenthal and Grothus' study demonstrates that students who intern abroad
have vastly different experiences than those who do not (Umemoto, 2021). According to Beate
et al., multidisciplinary cooperation integrating language and engineering may be very fruitful
in the pursuit of global competence (Umemoto, 2021). Not only would this program assist the
student, but it would also enable the organization to acquire fresh job prospects without
conducting random interviews or screening out candidates solely on the basis of potential.
School activities and programs provide an excellent platform for student engagement. This is
where adolescents gain their outlook and perspective as they mature into maturity. As a result,
it is critical to instill positive ideals, respect, and an open mind during their years in school or
university. All of these skills and values will contribute to the development of an understanding,
courteous, open-minded, and inventive person, bringing countries closer to attaining
sustainable collaboration.

Conclusion
Youth can play a positive role in eliminating ignorance in Korea's society and developing
mutual understanding between Korea and ASEAN. Youth can serve as ambassadors and
broaden their reach through the use of social media and festivals. Additionally, youth can serve
as innovators, launching multinational startups. Finally, students should take advantage of
possibilities such as internships, which will benefit not just themselves but will also be critical
in building long-term mutual understanding. While youth may have taken on one of the
aforementioned responsibilities, there are a few concerns. These are the stigmas associated with
artists who do not earn a living. Additionally, there is internet hate and misinformation that
contributes to the erosion of understanding. Fortunately, mechanisms for promoting mutual
understanding have been established. For instance, for many years, universities have offered
lectures to their students on either Korea or ASEAN.

Acknowledgements
We would like to express my special thanks to our academic advisor, Dr Quentin Cheok for
his able guidance and support to the completion of this work.
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