SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
ABSORPTION AND REGULARISATION
A Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
of the Supreme Court held, respondents having been
appointed on a fixed term on a fixed salary in a
temporary unit, State could not have been directed to
absorb them in Government service and regularise their
services.
The Supreme Court held High Court has not
considered that out of 17 years, the respondents
continued in service for 10 years pursuant to the
interim order passed by the High Court. Even
according to Supreme Court’s decision in Umadevi’s
case, the period for which the employees had
continued in service pursuant to the interim order had
to be excluded and not to be counted.
The respondents herein were appointed on contractual
basis for a period of 11 months on a fixed salary and
on a particular project, namely, “Post-Earthquake
Redevelopment Programme” of the Government of
Gujarat. That the respondents herein were initially
appointed for a period of eleven months in the year
2004 to the post of drivers. On closure of the project
in which the respondents were appointed, instead of
terminating the services of the respondents herein, the
State Government took a decision to place them in the
services of Indian Red Cross Society . Instead of
joining the duties in the Indian Red Cross Society, the
respondents approached the High Court by filing Writ
Petition No. 17328/2011 for regularisation of their
services and absorption in Government service. The
original writ petitioners also challenged their placement
with the Indian Red Cross Society.
The Single Judge of the High Court on 25.11.2011
dismissed the said writ petition and thereafter appeal
was filed against the order passed by Single Judge.
The Division Bench directed the State/Department to
consider the cases of the respondents for absorption
and regularisation sympathetically and if necessary,
by creating supernumerary posts, solely on the ground
that the respondents by now have worked for 17
years.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment
of LPA Bench, the State preferred appeal before
Supreme Court.
OPERATIVE PART
“Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) and the
subsequent decision of this Court in the case of
Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra), relied upon by the
learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents is concerned, none of the aforesaid
decisions shall be applicable to the facts of the case
on hand. The purpose and intent of the decision in
Umadevi (supra) was, (1) to prevent irregular or
illegal appointments in the future, and (2) to confer
a benefit on those who had been irregularly
appointed in the past and who have continued for a
very long time. The decision of Umadevi (supra) may
be applicable in a case where the appointments are
irregular on the sanctioned posts in regular
establishment. The same does not apply to temporary
appointments made in a project/programme.
From the impugned order passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court it appears that the High
Court has observed hereinabove that in the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case, it is directed that
the order of absorption and regularisation and if
necessary, by creating supernumerary posts, will not
be treated as a precedent in other cases. Even such a
direction could not have been passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court as there were no peculiar
facts and circumstances which warranted the above
observation. No such order of absorption and/or
regularisation even if required for creating
supernumerary posts and not to treat the same as
precedent could have been passed by the High Court
in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.”
Reference: Supreme Court. The State of Gujarat
& Ors. Vs. R.J. Pathan & Ors., Civil Appeal No.
1951 of 2022 dt. 24.03.2022.
—————
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 263
CRIM INAL LAW S
MERE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY ITSELF DOES
NOT LEAD TO A CRIMINAL OFFENCE
A Bench of Justices S. Abdul Nazeer and Krishna
Murari of the Supreme Court held, mere breach of
contract, by itself, does not lead to a criminal
offence. In order for a breach of contract to amount
to an offence of cheating, there should be existence
of a fraudulent and a dishonest intention right from
the inception.
The Bench observed perusal of averments in the
complaints and even charge sheet do not prima facie
disclosed fraudulent or dishonest intention. It was
not prima facie established that due to such alleged
act of cheating respondent No. 2 suffered a wrongful
loss, resulting in a wrongful gain to the appellants.
Thus, no offence under Section 405 and 420 IPC was
made out and the two simultaneous proceedings
against the appellants were an abuse of process of
law. The impugned FIR and proceedings were
quashed.
The Bench held multiple complaints by same party
against same accused over same cause of action is
impermissible. Barring situation where a counter case
is filed, a fresh investigation or second FIR on the
basis of the same connected cognisable offence
would constitute an abuse of statutory power and
may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section
482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226/227 in view ofT.T. Antony’s
case.
The Bench interpreting the word ‘property’ held,
there is no reason to restrict the scope of the word
‘property’ to moveable property alone when the word
is used without any qualification.
The entire origin of the dispute emanates from an
investment made by respondent No. 2 amounting to
Rs. 2.5 crores in lieu of which 2,50,000 equity shares
on 25.03.2008, finally culminating into the MOU
dated 20.08.2009. Respondent No. 2 filed three
264 I June 2022
complaints two at Delhi and one at Calcutta based on
its MOU. Thus, two simultaneous proceedings, arising
from the same cause of action were initiated by the
respondent No. 2 amounting to an abuse of the process
of law which is barred, observed the Bench.
The Supreme Court quashed the proceedings against
the appellants for the offences under Section 406, 420,
120B IPC.
OPERATIVE PART
“The order of the High Court is seriously flawed due
to the fact that in its interim order dated 24.03.2017, it
was observed that the contentions put forth by the
Appellant vis-à-vis two complaints being filed on the
same cause of action at different places but the
impugned order overlooks the said aspect and there was
no finding on that issue. At the same time, in order to
attract the ingredients of Section of 406 and 420 IPC
it is imperative on the part of the complainant to prima
facie establish that there was an intention on part of
the petitioner and/or others to cheat and/or to defraud
the complainant right from the inception. Furthermore
it has to be prima facie established that due to such
alleged act of cheating the complainant (Respondent
No. 2 herein) had suffered a wrongful loss and the same
had resulted in wrongful gain for the accused(appellant
herein). In absence of these elements, no proceeding is
permissible in the eyes of law with regard to the
commission of the offence punishable u/s 420 IPC. It is
apparent that the complaint was lodged at a very
belated stage (as the entire transaction took place from
January 2008 to August 2009, yet the complaint has
been filed in March 2013 i.e., after a delay of almost 4
years) with the objective of causing harassment to the
petitioner and is bereft of any truth whatsoever.

In view of the above facts and circumstances, the
impugned order dated 01.10.2019 passed by the
High Court is set aside. The impugned FIR No. 168
dated 28.03.2013 and proceedings in the file of
CMM, Kolkata, West Bengal in pursuance of charge
sheet dated 14.02.2017 against the appellants for
CRIM INAL LAW S
the offences under Section 406, 420, 120B IPC stands
quashed.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Vijay Kumar Ghai &
Ors. Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors., Criminal
Appeal No. 463 of 2022 dt. 22.03.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
General and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where relatives of complainant’s
husband are forced to undergo trial. Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam & Ors. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors., Criminal
Appeal No. 195 of 2022 (SC).
Accused gave several blows/multiple blows on vital part of body - Case falls under Clauses thirdly
and fourthly of Section 300 IPC amounting to culpable homicide amounting to murder . State of Uttarakhand
Vs. Sachendra Singh Rawat, Criminal Appeal No. 143 of 2022 (SC).
Recovery in absence of substantive evidence, not sufficient to prove case beyond reasonable doubt.
Suryavir Vs. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 2022 (SC).
Confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of NDPS Act will remain inadmissible in trial of
offence. State by (NCB) BengaluruVs. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta & Anr., Petition for Special Leave toAppeal
(Crl.) No. 242 of 2022 (SC).
If personal search is vitiated by violation of Section 50 of NDPS Act, recovery made otherwise not
vitiated. Dayalu Kashyap Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 130 of 2022 (SC).
Section 69(2) of Partnership Act cannot bar enforcement by way of suit by unregistered firm in respect
of statutory right or common law right. Shiv Developers Throught its Partner Sunilbhai Somabhai Ajmeri Vs.
Aksharay Developers & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 785 of 2022 (SC).
Denial of pension by State to ad-hoc employee who continuously worked for 30 years is nothing but
unreasonable. State of Gujarat & Ors. Vs. Talsibhai Dhanjibhai Patel, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal
(C) No. 1109 of 2022 (SC).
Policy prevalent at time of conviction be taken into consideration for considering premature release of
prisoner. Mata Prasad Vs. State of UP & Anr., Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 256 of 2021 (SC).
Order of premature retirement required to be passed on basis of entire service records, though recent
reports would carry their own weight. Central Industrial Security Force Vs. HC (GD) Om Prakash, Civil
Appeal No. 5428 of 2012 (SC).
CSIR is Society under Societies Registration Act, 1860, authority owned or controlled by Central
Government. Sharada Dayadhish Shetty Vs. Director, CSIR-NCL & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 223 of 2022 (SC).
Punishment inflicted by disciplinary authority after upholding finding of guilt recorded by inquiry
officer, Disciplinary proceedings and punishment proper. General Manager (Operation-1) Vs. Krishna Kumar
Bhardwaj, Civil Appeal No. 1458 of 2022 (SC).

www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 265

ACCIDENTAL CLAIM
COMPENSATION TO BE ASSESSED ON THE
BASIS OF MINIMUM WAGES
A Bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V.
Ramasubramaniam of the Supreme Court held
compensation is to be assessed on the basis of
minimum wages on the assumption that the appellant-
victim would have earned the same on attaining
majority.
The Bench found minimum wages for 2010-11 in State
of Karnataka payable to a skilled workman in 2010-11
was Rs. 3708.70. The same is rounded off to Rs. 3700/
-. In addition to skilled minimum wages, appellant is
also entitled to 40% for future prospects. Thus
compensation works out to be Rs. 3700/- plus 40%,
which amounts to Rs. 5180/- p.m. Applying multiplier
of 18, as per appellant’s age, loss of future earnings
due to permanent disability for life works out to be
Rs. 11,18,880/- i.e. 3700+1480=5180) x 12 x18.
The Bench held in view of his physical condition,
appellant was entitled to one attendant for the rest of
his life though he may be able to walk with the help
of assistant device. As the device requires
replacement in every 5 years, it is reasonable to award
cost of 2 devices i.e. Rs. 10 lakhs. Amount towards
loss of marriage prospects is also required to be
awarded. The total compensation under aforesaid
heads and other heads works out to be Rs. 49,93,000/
- alongwith interest @ 7.5% p.a. already awarded by
the Tribunal and affirmed by High Court, from the date
of filing of the claim application till realization.
The present appeal has been preferred in Supreme
Court by a 5 years old victim of road accident which
occurred on 21.09.2010, challenging the order of the
High Court dated 07.09.2020 awarding a compensation
266 I June 2022
of Rs. 13,46,805/- as against Rs. 18,24,000/- awarded
by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal.
OPERATIVE PART
“Hence, the compensation comes out to be Rs.
49,93,000/- along with interest already awarded by
the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court i.e. 7.5%
p.a. from the date of filing of the claim application
till realization.
Since the appellant is a minor, in view of the judgment
of this Court in General Manager, Kerala State Road
Transport Corporation, Trivandrum v. Susamma
Thomas and Others [(1994) 2 SCC 176], the amount
of Rs.10,00,000/- would be disbursed to the father of
the appellant as his guardian. If however, an amount
more than Rs.10,00,000/- has already been disbursed,
the said amount shall not be adjusted. The rest of the
amount would be invested in one or more Fixed
Deposits Receipts so as to attract the maximum rate
of interest. The interest amount shall be payable to
the guardian of the appellant every month. It shall
be open to the guardian, during the minority of the
appellant, to seek orders for withdrawal of the
amount on the basis of medical opinion, if any major
medical expenses are required to be incurred.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Master Ayush Vs.
The Branch Manager , Reliance General
Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos.
2205-2206 of 2022 dt. 29.03.2022.
—————

MERE NON RECOVERY OF WEAPON, CANNOT BE
A GROUND TO NOT RELY UPON DYING
DECLARATION
A Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
of the Supreme Court held dying declaration of victim
proved respondent’s presence and participation in the
crime. Mere non recovery of weapon cannot be a
ground to not rely upon the dying declaration, which
was recorded before the Executive Magistrate.
The Supreme Court held medical evidence and
deposition of doctors show that deceased sustained
an injury by knife blow, which was inflicted by one of
the six to seven persons, who participated in
commission of the offence. From the dying declaration
it has been established and proved that the
respondent-accused was a part of the unlawful
assembly. He was specifically named by the deceased
in the dying declaration. Therefore, even if the role
attributed to him was of hitting the deceased by a
hockey stick, in that case also, for the act of inflicting
a knife blow by the other person, who was part of the
unlawful assembly, respondent-accused could be held
guilty with the aid of Section 149 IPC.
The Bench held as per Section 464 Cr.P.C., in case of
omission or error in framing a charge, accused has to
show failure of justice or prejudice caused thereby. If
ingredients of the section or obvious or implicit in the
charge framed then conviction in regard thereto can
be sustained, irrespective of the fact that the said
section has not been mentioned.
The Supreme Court found in this case, while framing
charges, Trial Court specifically observed that accused
did commit murder by knowingly and intentionally
causing death of the victim and thereby committed the
offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. He was also
charged for the offence under Section 148 IPC, in
CRIM INAL LAW S
which it was mentioned that he and others were
members of an unlawful assembly and in carrying out
the common object of that assembly i.e. murder of
victim, committed the offence of rioting with a deadly
weapon. From the aforesaid charges it can safely be
said that the ingredients for the offence under Section
302/149 and Section 148 IPC were specifically brought
to the notice of the accused and no prejudice was
caused to him.
One Hari Singh (PW-5) lodged the F.I.R. on 04.12.1980
at 05.15 PM at P.S. Firozabad (South) District, Agra,
against the respondent - Subhash @ Pappu, Pramod,
Munna Lal and three unknown boys. It was alleged
in the F.I.R. that on 04.12.1980 at 2:00 PM, Subhash @
Pappu, Pramod and Munna Lal along with three
unknown persons came to the shop of one Hari Om
situated in Gallamandi Firozabad, armed with sticks,
hockey stick and knife. They demanded to provide
them sugar and kerosene oil without having any ration
card but Bangali (the deceased) present at the shop
in the capacity of a servant refused to provide them
those articles, then one of the persons gave him a knife
blow and some other a hockey stick blow. Therefore,
it was alleged that the named accused persons and
other three unknown persons have committed the
offence under Sections 147, 148, 323, 324 IPC. Bengali,
the victim made his dying declaration on 05.12.1980 at
11:40 AM before Additional City Magistrate Agra at
S.N. Hospital Agra, where the victim Bengali was
taking treatment. That the injured Bengali died on
04.01.1981.
Relying upon the dying declaration, the Trial court
convicted the accused Subhash @ Pappu for the
offences punishable under Section 302 and 148 IPC
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CRIM INAL LAW S
and acquitted the accused Pramod and Munna Lal.
The Trial Court awarded sentence of life imprisonment
for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and
3 years RI for offence under Section 148 IPC so far as
accused Subhash @ Pappu is concerned.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment
and order of conviction the High Court acquitted the
accused Subhash @ Pappu for the offences on the
ground that in the dying declaration it was not stated,
who inflicted the knife blow in the stomach of the
deceased and on the contrary , it was stated that
Pappu S/o Baijnath hit him by a hockey stick.
The High Court acquitted the accused. Against the
judgment State of Uttar Pradesh filed Special Leave
Petition in Supreme Court.
OPERATIVE PART
“Now, so far as the conviction of the r espondent
accused for the offence under Section 148 IPC is
concerned, it is the case on behalf of the respondent
accused that in the facts and circumstance of the
case, Section 148 shall not be attracted as the number
of accused chargesheeted/ charged/tried were less
than five in number, the same has no substance. It to
be noted that right from very beginning and even so
stated in the dying declaration six to seven persons
attacked the deceased. Therefore, involvement of six
to seven persons in commission of the offence has been
established and proved. Merely because three persons
were chargesheeted/charged/tried and even out of
three tried, two persons came to be acquitted cannot
be a ground to not to convict the respondent accused
under Section 148 IPC.
It is the submission on behalf of the accused that the
weapon alleged to have been used by the respondent
accused was said to be a hockey stick, which cannot
be said to be a deadly weapon and therefore, the
respondent – accused cannot be punishable for the
offence under Section 148 also has no substance. As
268 I June 2022
per Section 148 of IPC, whoever is guilty of rioting,
being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything
which used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause
death, can be punished under that Section. The term
“rioting” is defined under Section 146 IPC. As per
Section 146, whenever force or violence is used by an
unlawful assembly, or by any member ther eof, in
prosecution of the common object of such assembly,
every member of such assembly is guilty of the offence
of rioting.
In the present case, six to seven persons were part of
the unlawful assembly and they used force or violence
and one of them used a deadly weapon, namely, knife
and therefore, being a part of the unlawful assembly,
the respondent accused can be held to be guilty for
the offence of rioting and for the use of force/violence
as a member of such an unlawful assembly. Therefore,
the respondent was rightly convicted by the T rial
Court for the offence under Section 148 IPC.
The respondent accused is held guilty for the offence
under Section 304 Part I r/w Section 149 IPC and for
the offence under Section 148 IPC. The respondent
accused is sentenced to undergo ten years R.I. for the
offence punishable under Section 304 Part I r/w
Section 149 IPC with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in
default to undergo further six months R.I.
The respondent accused is also sentenced to undergo
three years R.I. for the offence under Section 148 IPC
with fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo
further two months R.I.
Both the sentences to r un concur rently. The
respondent to surrender within a period of four weeks
to undergo the remaining part of the sentence as per
the present judgment and order.”
Reference: Supreme Court. The State of Uttar
Pradesh Vs. Subhash @ Pappu, CriminalAppeal
No. 436 of 2022 dt. 01.04.2022.
—————

STATUTE MUST BE READ AS A WHOLE
The two Judge Bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao
and B.R. Gavai of the Supreme Court held Court
should avoid an interpretation which will result in
consistency or repugnancy either within a section or
between two different sections. When one section of
an Act is not in a position to bring out the legislative
intent, recourse will have to be made to other sections
for gathering legislative intent. It is an “elementary
rule” of interpretation that statute must be read as a
whole. An attempt must be made to give effect to parts
of the statute even if they may, on first blush, appear
to be conflicting.
The Bench held provisions of one section of a statute
cannot be used to defeat other provisions unless the
court finds the reconciliation between them
impossible. If reconciliation is impossible, the two
conflicting provisions should be so interpreted that,
if possible, effect should be given to both. If court has
a choice between two interpretations, the narrower of
which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of
the legislation, such an interpretation will have to be
avoided.
The Bench ruled Section 39A of Maharashtra
Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 has to be read with
provisions of Section 56 and Sub Section (9) of Section
2. Clause (a) of the proviso to Sub Section (1) of
Section 56 enables the Commissioner, with previous
approval of the Corporation, to dismiss a municipal
officer or servant holding the post equivalent to or
higher in rank than the post of Assistant
Commissioner. Section 56 has also been amended by
the same amending act by which Section 39A was
brought in the statute. As such, the term “post
equivalent to or higher in rank than the post of
Assistant Commissioner” cannot be construed in a
narrow compass. Hence, Clause (a) of Sub Section (1)
of Section 56 would also include the post of AMC
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
(which is higher in rank to post of Assistant
Commissioner). Further, as per Clause (b) of the
proviso to Sub Section (1) of Section 56, the
Commissioner can suspend any officer or servant,
whether appointed by the Corporation or any other
competent authority, except Transport Manager being
a Government Officer on deputation, pending an order
of the Corporation.
The Bench held the High Court erred in reading
Section 39A in isolation. On reading Sub Section (9)
of Section 2, Sections 39A and 56 in reference to each
other, Commissioner would be a “competent authority”
to suspend an AMC and initial departmental
proceedings against him.
The Supreme Court held the High Court erred in
setting aside suspension and departmental
proceedings initiated against respondent No. 1.
Kalyan Dombivali Municipal Corporation (KDM
Corporation) and the State of Maharashtra challenged
the correctness of the judgment dated 06.04.2021,
passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of
Judicature at Bombay holding that the KDM
Corporation was not the competent authority to
suspend respondent No.1 Sanjay Gajanan Gharat. By
the impugned judgment, the High Court quashed the
departmental inquiry initiated against the respondent
No.1 and directed the KDM Corporation to reinstate
him forthwith to the post of Additional Municipal
Commissioner (AMC) of the KDM Corporation.
OPERATIVE PART
“We are therefore of the considered view that the High
Court has totally erred in setting aside the suspension
and the departmental proceedings initiated against
respondent No.1. The effect of the impugned judgment
is that the respondent No. 1, who has been, prima
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 269
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
facie, found to be involved in a serious misconduct,
has been left scot-free without requiring to face any
departmental proceedings and directed to be
reinstated in services.
We find that in the present case, it is the respondent
No.1 who, though called upon to participate in the
departmental proceedings, has on his own, chosen
not to participate therein. It is the respondent No.1,
who had objected to the initiation of the departmental
proceedings by the Commissioner on the ground of
jurisdiction and refused to participate in the
departmental proceedings. We therefore find that the
respondent No.1 cannot be permitted to take benefit
of his own wrong. In any case, we find that the issue
of prolonged suspension would be taken care of by
directing the departmental proceedings to be
completed within a stipulated period but the
suspension of respondent No.1 would continue till
then.
We find that the impugned judgment passed by the
High Court is not sustainable in law.
In the result, the appeals are allowed in the following
terms:
(i) The impugned judgment dated 6th April
2021, passed by the High Court of Judicature
at Bombay in Writ Petition (ST.) No. 3599 of
2020 is quashed and set aside;
(ii) The Writ Petition (ST.) No. 3599 of 2020
filed by the respondent No.1 before the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay is dismissed;
(iii) The departmental proceedings initiated
against respondent No.1 are directed to be
completed as expeditiously as possible and in
any case, within a period of four months from
the date of this judgment. The respondent No.1
would continue to be under suspension till the
conclusion of the said departmental
proceedings; and
(iv) Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of in the above terms. No order as to
costs.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Kalyan Dombivali
Municipal Corporation Vs. Sanjay Gajanan
Gharat & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 2643 of 2022 dt.
31.03.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Accused must be given opportunity to make representation against sentence imposed on him.
Bhagwani Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal Nos. 101-102 of 2022 (SC).
Rape with minor - Safe to convict accused relying upon deposition of independent witness before
whom victim girl narrated entire incident recorded in medical examination report. Nawabuddin Vs. State of
Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No. 144 of 2022.
High Court not required to reappreciate evidence and/or interfere with findings recorded by inquiry
officer accepted by disciplinary authority. Umesh Kumar Pahwa Vs. Board of Directors Uttarakhand Gramin
Bank & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 796-799 of 2022 (SC).
Repatriation of Prisoners Act - Sentence imposed by transferring State shall be binding on receiving
State i.e., India. Union of India & Anr. Vs. Shaikh Istiyaq Ahmed & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 71 of 2022
(SC).
No mandamus can be issued by Court directing State Government to provide for reservation. The
State of Punjab Vs. Anshika Goyal & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2022 (SC).

270 I June 2022


REASONABLENESS AND SUITABILITY TO BE SEEN
FROM THE PROSPECTIVE OF LANDLORD
A Bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M.
Sundresh of the Supreme Court while accepting the
appeal filed by the landlord held, the twin conditions
for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement
which have to be satisfied are (i) bona fide requirement
of landlord and (ii) Non availability of a reasonably
suitable residential accommodation. Reasonableness
and suitability are to be seen from the perspective of
the landlord and not the tenant.
The Bench observed according to Section 25B(5) of
Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, tenant shall be given
leave to contest and eviction application if tenant
discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord
from obtaining an order for recovery of possession.
Mere assertion by tenant, per se, would not be
sufficient.
Shri Haji Badrul Islam (since deceased) was the
original owner of two shops leased out to the
respondent orally way back in the year 1970. The lease
continued for decades. After the demise of the original
landlord, his son Shri Sajid-Ul-Islam became the owner
both by inheritance and by virtue of an award dated
11.03.1980. He too expired on 21.11.1986 and Abid-Ul-
Islam – the appellant, who claims through the award
and inheritance by operation of law, filed the eviction
petition under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B
of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 in the year 2014.
Inder Sain Dua – the respondent filed an application
seeking leave to defend, inter alia, raising three primary
contentions, namely (i) the appellant is not having title
over the property; (ii) the property actually belongs
to the Government of India under the Enemy Property
Act, 1968 and (iii) there are alternative
accommodations by way of other properties available
for carrying out the business of the appellant as such
the need of the appellant is not bona fide.
TENANCY
Rent Controller dismissed the application holding that
the title of the appellant cannot be questioned by the
respondent, the averments regarding the suitability of
alternative accommodation are vague and the embargo
under the Enemy Property Act would not be made
applicable to the properties in question.
The respondent being dissatisfied with the said
decision approached High Court of Delhi invoking the
proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act. Despite holding
that the respondent cannot question the title of the
appellant, having filed a suit acknowledging the said
factum, the revision was allowed on the premise that
there are triable issues.
Assailing the decision rendered by the High Court,
Special Leave to Appeal was filed by the landlord.
OPERATIVE PART
“Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of
a bona fide purpose. The contention regarding
alternative accommodation can at best be only an
incidental one. Such a requirement has not been found
to be incorrect by the High Court, though it is not
even open to it to do so, in view of the limited
jurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise.
Therefore, the very basis upon which the revision was
allowed is obviously wrong being contrary to the very
provision contained in Section 14(1)(e) and Section
25B(8).
We have alr eady discussed the scope of Section
14(1)(e) vis a vis Section 25B(8) of the Act. Therefore,
the mere existence of the other properties which are,
in fact, denied by the appellant would not enure to
the benefit of the respondent in the absence of any
pleadings and supporting material before the learned
Rent Controller to the effect that they are reasonably
suitable for accommodation.
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TENANCY
The respondent made substantial claims on the
judgment of this Court in Precision Steel and
Engineering Works Vs. Prem Deva [1982 (3) SCC
270]. We do not find the said decision helping the case
of the respondent, in the light of the discussion made
on the scope of the relevant provisions, as leave to
defend cannot be granted on mere asking. We can
only reiterate that we do not find any perversity in
the decision rendered by the learned Rent Controller
and the High Court has not only certainly abdicated
its jurisdiction, but also exceeded in a way.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Abid-Ul-Islam Vs.
Inder Sain Dua, CivilAppeal No. 9444 of 2016 dt.
07.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Unless and until borrower ready to deposit/pay entire amount payable together with all costs and
expenses with secured creditor, borrower cannot be discharged from entire liability outstanding. Bank of Baroda
Vs. M/s Karwa Trading Company & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 363 of 2022 (SC).
Writ petition against private financial institution under Article 226 of Constitution of India against
proposed action/actions under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act not maintainable. Phoenix Arc Pvt. Ltd. Vs.
Vishwa Bharati Vidya Mandir & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 257-259 of 2022 (SC).
Scheme providing backdoor entry into service contrary to Article 16 which guarantees equal opportunity
in matters of public employment. Chief Personnel Officer & Ors. Vs. A. Nishanth George, Civil Appeal No.
294 of 2022 (SC).
Grant of leave to defend (with or without conditions) is ordinary rule and denial of leave to defend is
exception. B.L. Kashyap and Sons Ltd. Vs. M/s JMS Steels and Power Corporatoin & Anr., Civil Appeal No.
379 of 2022 (SC).
Voluntariness and animus necessary for execution of valid gift deed - Donee to discharge burden of
proving that he exerted no influence for purpose of obtaining Gift deed. Keshav and Ors. Vs. Gian Chand &
Anr., Civil Appeal No. 364 of 2022 (SC).
Arbitrator is final arbiter of disputes between parties – Not open to party to challengeAward on ground
that he drew his own conclusions or failed to appreciate certain facts.Atlanta Limited thr. Its Managing Director
Vs. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 1533 of 2017 (SC).
If a female Hindu dies intestate without leaving any issue, then property inherited by her goes back
to heirs of her father. Arunachala Gounder (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Ponnusamy & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 6659 of
2011 (SC).
Limited estate given to Hindu Wife by way of Will can become absolute under Section 14(1) of Hindu
Succession Act only of property given for her maintenance. Jogi Ram Vs. Suresh Kumar & Ors., Civil Appeal
Nos. 1543-1544 of 2019 (SC).
Paramount consideration is welfare for minor child and rights of parties litigating over custody issue
are irrelevant. Vasudha Sethi & Ors. Vs. Kiran V. Bhaskar & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 82 of 2022 (SC).
Readiness and willingness to perform contract – Conduct of plaintiff is very crucial in suit for specific
performance. Shenbagam & Ors. Vs. K.K. Rathinavel, Civil Appeal No. 150 of 2022 (SC).

272 I June 2022


CONCEPT OF EQUALITY, NOT AN
INFLEXIBLE DOCTRINE
A Bench of Justices Sanjay Kishan Kaul and M.M.
Sundresh of the Supreme Court said concept of
equality is not an inflexible doctrine. When there is a
reasonable basis for a classification adopted by taking
note of the exigencies and diverse situation, absolute
equality cannot be insisted upon by taking a rigid and
pedantic view as against a pragmatic one. If there is
an intelligible differentia between the two groups
having a rational relation to the object, such a
discrimination would not be termed as arbitrary. The
question as to whether a classification is reasonable
or not is to be answered on the touchstone of a
reasonable, common man’s approach keeping in mind
the avowed object behind it.
The Bench held, filling the job of lecturer on
temporary basis did not make a Lecturer. It was just
an administrative convenience borne out of a
contingency. The decision of the appellant-State was
to adopt the revised pay-scale qua the Lecturers, who
formed a distinct group as against respondent No. 1
who held a higher position in the administration.
When the classification was distinct and clear having
adequate rationale with due relation to the objective,
Registrar could not have been treated at par with the
Lecturers. One is meant for administration and the
other for teaching.
The Supreme Court while accepting the appeal of State
of Uttarakhand held when a classification is made on
the recommendation made by a body of experts
constituted for the purpose, courts will have limited
scope of interference.
The State of Uttarakhand, on 16.06.2008, sent a
requisition to the State Public Service Commission for
the appointment of Registrars in the State
Universities, clearly indicating the essential
qualifications along with the pay scale.
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
The State of Uttarakhand thought it fit to accept the
recommended revised pay scale of the Government of
India dated 31.12.2008, meant to be applied for the
Central Universities and Central Government Colleges,
to its teaching faculties alone, except sub-clause (f)
in clause 8, which speaks of age of superannuation.
Sudhir Budakoti (respondent No. 1) was selected and
given the appointment to the post of Lecturer on
23.11.2009, which was notified in the advertisement
itself. After taking charge as an Assistant Registrar in
Kumaon University, respondent No. 1 filed writ
petition before High Court of Uttarakhand seeking the
pay scale meant to be applied for his counterparts in
the Central Universities.
The pay scale of respondent No. 1 was also revised
by the State of Uttarakhand on the recommendation
of Sixth Pay Commission through a Government Order
dated 05.04.2011. Resultantly, respondent No. 1 got his
prayer duly amended seeking to question it as
unconstitutional.
On 27.02.2012, the High Court of Uttarakhand issued
a direction to the Pay Anomaly Committee to look into
the matter afresh, which was accordingly complied
with, by not accepting the case of respondent No. 1,
finding no justification particularly when there is a
distinct difference in the qualification as prescribed by
the UGC and the State Government for the aforesaid
post.
The High Court of Uttarakhand allowed the writ
petition. An appeal was filed by the State against the
judgment of the High Court, and the same was
accepted.
OPERATIVE PART
“The High Court of Uttarakhand in our opinion has
completely misconstrued the facts. The Appellant
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 273
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
nowhere has made a decision to accept and adopt the
circular of the Central Government pertaining to the
Registrars working in the Universities coming under
its purview. In the absence of any legal right with the
corresponding duty, such a relief can never be asked
for, particularly when there are clear and specific rules
provided for the pay scale of Registrars by the
Appellant itself. The decision of the Appellant qua the
Lecturers who form a distinct group as against the
Respondent No. 1 who holds a higher position in the
administration has been lost sight of. Merely because
Respondent No. 1 was made to fill the gap by
temporarily taking up the job of a Lecturer, he would
never become one and so also a Lecturer, who might
undertake the job of a Registrar. This is nothing but
an administrative convenience borne out of a
contingency. When the classification is distinct and
clear having adequate rationale with due relation to
the objective, there is no reason to hold otherwise by
treating a Registrar at par with the Lecturers. One is
meant for administration and the other teaching. The
High Court has also not considered the financial
implications as any decision would not rest with
Respondent No. 1 alone, but the entirety of the
administrative staff.”
Reference: Supreme Court. State of
Uttarakhand Vs. Sudhir Budakoti & Ors., Civil
Appeal No. 2661 of 2015 dt. 07.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Resolution plan submitted by Guarantor cannot be entertained. Bank of Barod & Anr. Vs. MBL
Infrastructures Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 8411 of 2019 (SC).
Infringement of trademark deals with situations where trade mark is identical, but goods or services
are not similar to those for which trade mark is registered. Renaissance Hotel Holdings Inc. Vs. B. Vijaya Sai
& Ors., Civil Appeal No. 404 of 2022 (SC).
Even in absence of registered cancellation of power of attorney, there must be cancellation and it
must be brought to notice of third party at any rate. Amar Nath Vs. Gian Chand & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 5797
of 2009 (SC).
Award not a document of title to property hence it did not require registration. K. Arumuga Velaiah
Vs. P.R. Ramasamy & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 2564 of 2012 (SC).
Jurisdiction exclusively vests with High Court for execution of foreign decree under Section 44A.Messer
Griesheim GmbH (Now called Air Liquide Deutschland GmbH) Vs. Goyal MG Gases Pvt. Ltd., Civil Appeal
No. 521 of 2022 (SC).
CPC Rules as applicable to commercial dispute of specified value, do operate in manner that after
expiry of 120th day from date of service of summons, defendant forfeits right to submit his written statement.
Prakash Corporates Vs. Dee Vee Projects Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 1318 of 2022 (SC).
CPC indeed permits plaintiff to join causes of action but it does not compel plaintiff to do so. B.R.
Patil Vs. Tulsa Y. Sawkar & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 2652-2654 of 2013 (SC).
No independent suit maintainable against Compromise Decree. M/s Sree Surya Developers and
Promotes Vs. N. Sailesh Prasad & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 439 of 2022 (SC).

274 I June 2022


AFT CAN INTERFERE WHERE FINDING OF COURT
MARTIAL LEGALLY UNSUSTAINABLE
A Bench of Justices L. Nageswara Rao and B.R. Gavai
of the Supreme Court while dismissing the appeal filed
by Union of India held as per clauses (a), (b) and (c)
of Sub Section (4) of Section 15 of Armed Forces
Tribunal Act, 2007 (AFT), can interfere where finding
of Court Martial is legally unsustainable due to any
reason whatsoever, when there is a wrong decision on
a question of law or there is a material irregularity in
the course of a trial resulting in miscarriage of justice.
The Bench held if view taken by AFT is found to be
a plausible one, it would not be permissible for
Supreme Court to interfere with the same only because
another view appears to be more probable/plausible.
Equally, unless finding of AFT is found to be perverse
or impossible, an interference would not be justified.
The Bench held, AFT rightly acquitted respondent-
officer of the offence punishable under Section 7 of
the PC Act. The respondent-officer successfully
discharged the burden to prove how the aforesaid
amounts were deposited in his account and in account
of his father-in-law. Therefore, his conviction under
Section 63 and sentence of forfeiture of seniority of
rank and of severe reprimand was quashed and set
aside. He was directed to be reinstated forthwith with
continuity of service but he shall not be entitled to
back wages for the period during which he was out of
employment.
In the year 2008, Major R. Metri – the respondent-
officer was posted as the Recruiting Medical Officer,
Army Recruiting Office, Jhunjhunu, Rajasthan. At the
relevant time, PW-1 Col. Anil Singh Rathore was the
Director of the Army Recruiting Office.
Between 16th December, 2008 and 18th December, 2008,
an Army Recruitment Rally took place in Udaipur.
According to the prosecution, P.W.8-Major BSRK
ARM Y LAW S
Prasad as well as P.W.12-Major D. Srinivas, who were
also working as Recruiting Medical Officers, contacted
the respondent-officer and told him that they help the
candidates by making them medically fit and asked his
help for clearing certain candidates by declaring them
medically fit. It is the case of the prosecution that,
though, at first, the respondent-officer was reluctant,
at the insistence of P.W.8-Major BSRK Prasad, he
helped clearing certain candidates within acceptable
range.
Further prosecution case was that when the
respondent-officer went to his native place at Dharwad
on 28th December, 2008, he was informed by P.W.8-
Major BSRK Prasad that an amount of Rs.65,000/-
would be paid to him towards his share.
Still further case of the prosecution was that in another
Recruitment Rally in Dausa in January, 2009. P.W.12-
Major D. Srinivas requested the respondent-of ficer to
help some candidates and the respondent-of ficer,
though reluctant, helped in clearing some candidates
within the acceptable range.
On 14.12.2009, the Court of Inquiry proceedings were
convened. The General Officer in Commanding (GOC)
vide note dated 14.12.2009 directed disciplinary action
to be taken against the respondent-officer and two
other officers, namely P.W.12-Major D. Srinivas and
P.W.8- Major BSRK Prasad and three Junior
Commissioner Offices.
The respondent-officer and others challenged the
Court of Inquiry proceedings before the AFT, Jaipur.
The same were rejected on 09.04.2010. The GCM
proceedings were ordered to be instituted against the
respondent-officer and five others on 28.06.2012 on the
basis of three charges and the conclusions of the trial,
the GCM found respondent-officer guilty of charge
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 275
ARM Y LAW S
Nos. 1 & 2 and not guilty of charge No. 3. On
28.04.2013, the GCM sentenced the officer to be
cashiered from service and to suffer rigorous
imprisonment for one year. The GOC confirmed the
findings and sentence awarded by the GCM, but
remitted the unexpired portion of sentence of rigorous
imprisonment on 29.12.2013. Thereafter appeal was
filed before AFT, the same was partially allowed.
Being aggrieved thereby, the appeals were filed by
Union of India in Supreme Court.
OPERATIVE PART
“It could thus be seen that the extrajudicial
confession is a weak piece of evidence. Unless such a
confession is found to be voluntary, trustworthy and
reliable, the conviction solely on the basis of the same,
without corroboration, would not be justified.
It could thus be seen that a single officer like the
respondent-officer cannot declare a candidate
medically fit, if he is otherwise not. His evidence
would show that the team like the one of which the
respondent-officer was a member, only assists the
independent members in the conduct of tests,
measurements and the medical examination.
All the three witnesses have admitted that they had
no knowledge if any candidate, declared fit by the
respondent-officer, was subsequently found to have
been medically unfit. All the three witnesses have also
admitted that there was no material to establish that
the amount, which was deposited in the account of
the respondent-officer and his father-in-law was an
amount received as illegal gratification.
We are, therefore, of the view that no error could be
found with the findings of the learned AFT that the
respondent-officer deserves to be acquitted of the
offence punishable under section 7 of the P.C. Act.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Union of India &
Ors. Vs. Major R. Metri No. 08585N, Criminal
Appeal No. 2196 of 2017 dt. 04.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Insurance Company cannot have repudiated claim merely on ground of delay in intimating Insurance
Company. Jaina Construction Company Vs. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. &Anr., Civil Appeal No. 1069
of 2022 (SC).
Cancellation of allotment of plot obtained after filing false affidavit is legitimate ground of cancellation
of lease. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Vs. Ravindra Kumar Singhvi (Dead) Thr. Lrs., Civil
Appeal No. 382 of 2012 (SC).
Merely because on account of death of husband’s mother, wife visited her matrimonial home and stayed
there only for one day, cannot be said resumption of cohabitation amounts to desertion. Debananda Tamuli
Vs. Smti Kakumony Kataky, Civil Appeal No. 1339 of 2022 (SC).
Merely because trial court not granted relief in favour of plaintiffs, would not come in their way in
High Court allowing their claims. Azgar Barid (D) by Lrs. & Ors. Vs. Mazambi @ Pyaremabi & Ors., Civil
Appeal No. 249 of 2010 (SC).
Highest bidder has no vested right to have auction concluded in his favour and in given circumstances
under limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of Constitution of India. State of Punjab & Ors. Vs.
Mehar Din, Civil Appeal No. 5861 of 2009 (SC).
Court has no power to extend period of limitation on equitable grounds. Lingeswaran Etc. Vs.
Thirunagalingam, Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 2054-2055 of 2022 (SC).

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RIGHT TO SELL COULD NOT BE INFERRED
FROM THE DEED
The Bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V.
Ramasubramanian of the Supreme Court while
accepting appeal filed by one Mrs. Umadevi Nambiar
held, deed of Power of Attorney did not specifically
contain any power of sale, which fact has been
observed by both courts below. The contention that
Clause 22 of the deed which conferred right to execute
and register all documents, also included right to sell
was not acceptable. The deed only authorized the
power agent to sign all documents and present them
for registration. Right to sell could not be inferred from
the deed as same needed express mention. Since sister
of appellant has no power to sell the property, vendors
of the respondent could not have derived any valid
title.
The Bench held simple fact remains that the Power of
Attorney deed did not contain a clause authorizing the
agent to sell the property, even when it contained two
express clauses, one relating to leasing and another
enabling the agent to execute the necessary
documents for any borrowal made by her. Therefore,
power of sale could not be assumed on the basis of
punctuation marks.
The Bench held that High Court rightly found that had
respondent exercised reasonable care as required by
proviso to Section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882,
they could have easily found out that there was no
power to alienate in the Power of Attorney issued in
favour of appellant’s sister.
The suit for partition having been decreed by the Trial
Court, but reversed by the High Court in a Regular
First Appeal, the plaintiff (Mrs. Umadevi Nambiar) filed
appeal in Supreme Court.
OPERATIVE PART
“We do not know how the ratio laid down in the
aforesaid decisions could be applied to the
PROPERTY LAW S
advantage of the respondent. As a matter of plain and
simple fact, Exhibit A-1, deed of Power of Attorney did
not contain a clause authorizing the agent to sell the
property though it contained two express provisions,
one for leasing out the property and another for
executing necessary documents if a security had to be
offered for any borrowal made by the agent.
Therefore, by convoluted logic, punctuation marks
cannot be made to convey a power of sale. Even the
very decision relied upon by the learned counsel for
the respondent, makes it clear that ordinarily a Power
of Attorney is to be construed strictly by the Court.
Neither Ramanatha Aiyar’s Law Lexicon nor Section
49 of the Registration Act can amplify or magnify the
clauses contained in the deed of Power of Attorney.
As held by this Court in Church of Christ Charitable
Trust and Educational Charitable Society vs.
Ponniamman Educational Trust, (2012) 8 SCC 706
the document should expressly authorize the agent,
(i) to execute a sale deed; (ii) to present it for
registration; and (iii) to admit execution before the
Registering Authority.
It is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of
property that “no one can confer a better title than
what he himself has” (Nemo dat quod non habet). The
appellant’s sister did not have the power to sell the
property to the vendors of the respondent. Therefore,
the vendors of the respondent could not have derived
any valid title to the property. If the vendors of the
respondent themselves did not have any title, they had
nothing to convey to the respondent, except perhaps
the litigation.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Mrs. Umadevi
Nambiar Vs. Thamarasseri Roman Catholic
Diocese Rep By Its Procurator Devssia’s Son
Rev. Father Joseph Kappil dt. 01.04.2022.
—————
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 277
 LAW FOR YOU
‘NGT’ VESTED WITH SUO MOTU aspects, the NGT is not required to be triggered into
POWER IN DISCHARGE OF ITS action by an aggrieved or interested party alone. It
FUNCTIONS would therefore be logical to conclude that the
exercise of power by the NGT is not circumscribed by
NGT was conceived as a specialized forum not only
receipt of application. When substantial questions
as a like substitute for a civil court but more
relating to the environment aris e and the issue is civil
importantly to take over all the environment related
in nature and those relate to the enactments in
cases from the High Courts and the Supreme Court.
Schedule I of the Act, the NGT even in the absence
Many of those cases transferred to the NGT, emanated
of an application, can self-ignite action either towards
in the superior courts and it would be appropriate thus
amelioration or towards prevention of harm. The other
to assume that similar power to initiate suo motu
pertinent provisions relating to, inter-alia, jurisdiction,
proceedings should also be available with the NGT.
interim orders, payment of compensation and review,
The NGT is a Tribunal with sui generis characteristic,
do not require any application or appeal, for the NGT
with the special and all-encompassing jurisdiction to
to pass necessary orders. These crucial powers are
protect the environment. Besides its adjudicatory role
expected to be exercised by the NGT, would logically
as an appellate authority, it is also conferred with the
suggest that the action/orders of the NGT need not
responsibility to discharge role of supervisory body
always involve any application or appeal. To hold
and to decide substantial questions relating to the
otherwise would not only reduce its effectiveness but
environment. The necessity of having a specialized
would also defeat the legal mandate given to the forum.
body, with the expertise to handle multi-dimensional
Access to justice, may however be curtailed by
environmental issues allows for an all-encompassing
illiteracy, lack of mobility, poverty or even the lack of
framework for environmental justice. The technical
technical knowledge on the part of citizens. Another
expertise that may be required to address evolving
deterrence is the likelihood of polluters/violators being
environmental concerns would definitely require a
powerful entities with adequate wherewithal to skirt
flexible institutional mechanism for its effective
regulations. Thus, it may not always be feasible for
exercise. Given the multifarious role envisaged for the
individuals to knock on the doors of the Tribunal, and
NGT and the purposive interpretation which ought to
NGT in such exigencies must not be made
be given to the statutory provisions, it would be fitting
dysfunctional. The NGT Act, when read as a whole,
to regard the NGT as having the mechanism to set in
gives much leeway to the NGT to go beyond a mere
motion all necessary functions within its domain and
adjudicatory role. The Parliament’s intention is clearly
this, should necessarily clothe it with the authority to
discernible to create a multi-functional body , with the
take suo motu cognizance of matters, for effective
capacity to provide redressal for environmental
discharge of its mandate. The Section 14(1) of the NGT
exigencies. Accordingly, the principles of
Act deals with jurisdiction, and the jurisdictional
environmental justice and environmental equity must
provision conspicuously omits to specify that an
be explicitly acknowledged as pivotal threads of the
application is necessary to trigger the NGT into action.
NGT’s fabric. The NGT must be seen as a sui generis
In situations where the three prerequisites of Section
institution and not unus multorum, and its special and
14(1) i.e., Civil cases, involvement of substantial
exclusive role to foster public interest in the area of
question of environment and implementation of the
environmental domain delineated in the enactment of
enactments in Sch.I are satisfied, the jurisdiction and
2010 must necessarily receive legal recognition of
power of the NGT gets activated. On these material
Supreme Court. In circumstances where adverse

278 I June 2022


environmental impact may be egregious, but the
community affected is unable to effectively get the
machinery into action, a forum created specifically to
address such concerns should surely be expected to
move with expediency, and of its own accord. The
potentiality of disproportionate harm imposes a higher
obligation on authorities to preserve rights which may
be waylaid due to such restrictive access. It is also
noteworthy that the “global impacts of climate change
will fall disproportionately on minority and low income
communities”. Thus, an affirmative role, beyond mere
adjudication at the instance of applicant, is certainly
required for serving the ends of environmental justice,
as the statute itself requires of the NGT. The NGT, with
the distinct role envisaged for it, can hardly afford to
remain a mute spectator when no one knocks on its
door. The forum itself has correctly identified the need
for collective stratagem for addressing environmental
concerns. Such a society centric approach must be
allowed to work within the established safety valves
of the principles of natural justice and appeal to the
Supreme Court. The hands-off mode for the NGT, when
faced with exigencies requiring immediate and effective
response, would debilitate the forum from discharging
its responsibility and this must be ruled out in the
interest of justice. When the Registry of the NGT does
indeed receive a communication or letter, including
matters published in media, it may cause to initiate suo
motu action by inviting attention of NGT to such
matters in the form of office report. Such circumstances
would however require a notice to be given to the
sender of the communication or author of the news
item, as the case may be, to assist the NGT in the
course of hearing and to substantiate the factual
matters. It must also be said that exercise of suo motu
jurisdiction does not mean eschewing with the
principles of natural justice and fair play. In other
words, the party likely to be affected should be
afforded due opportunity to present their side, before
suffering adverse orders. It is accordingly declared
that the NGT is vested with suo motu power in
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LAW FOR YOU
discharge of its functions under the NGT Act.
Reference: Supreme Court. Municipal
Corporation of Greater Mumbai Vs. Ankita
Sinha & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 12122 of 2018.
CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL
CANNOT BE SET ASIDE ON PLEA OF
POSSIBILITY OF THE JOINT OR
SEPARATE TRIAL
Section 218 Cr.P.C. provides that separate trials shall
be conducted for distinct offences alleged to be
committed by a person. Sections 219-221 provide
exceptions to this general rule. If a person falls under
these exceptions, then a joint trial for the offences
which a person is charged with may be conducted.
Similarly, under Section 223, a joint trial may be held
for persons charged with different offences if any of
the clauses in the provision are separately or on a
combination satisfied. While applying the principles
enunciated in Sections 218-223 on conducting joint and
separate trials, the trial court should apply a two-
pronged test, namely, whether conducting a joint/
separate trial will prejudice the defence of the accused;
and/or whether conducting a joint/separate trial would
cause judicial delay. Possibility of conducting a joint
trial will have to be determined at the beginning of the
trial and not after the trial based on the result of the
trial. The Appellate Court may determine the validity
of the argument that there ought to have been a
separate/joint trial only based on whether the trial had
prejudiced the right of accused or the prosecutrix;
Since the provisions which engraft an exception use
the phrase ‘may’ with reference to conducting a joint
trial, a separate trial is usually not contrary to law even
if a joint trial could be conducted, unless proven to
cause a miscarriage of justice. A conviction or acquittal
of the accused cannot be set aside on the mere ground
that there was a possibility of a joint or a separate trial.
To set aside the order of conviction or acquittal, it
must be proved that the rights of the parties were
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 279
LAW FOR YOU
prejudiced because of the joint or separate trial, as the
case may be.
Reference: Supreme Court. Nasib Singh Vs.
State of Punjab & Anr., Criminal Appeal Nos.
1051-1054 of 2021.
ACCUSED, TO BE TRIED FOR THE
OFFENCES UNDER ATROCITIES ACT
BY SPECIAL COURT
Second proviso to Section 14 of Atrocities Act inserted
by Act 1 of 2016 conferring power upon the Special
Court so established or specified for the purpose of
providing for speedy trial also shall have the power
to directly take cognizance of the offences under the
Atrocities Act. Considering the object and purpose of
insertion of proviso to Section 14, it cannot be said
that it is not in conflict with the Sections 193, 207 and
209 of the Cr.P.C. It cannot be said that it takes away
jurisdiction of the Magistrate to take cognizance and
thereafter to commit the case to the Special Court for
trial for the offences under the Atrocities Act. Merely
because, Magistrate has taken cognizance of the
offences and thereafter the trial/case has been
committed to Special Court established for the purpose
of providing for speedy trial, it cannot be said that
entire criminal proceedings including FIR and charge-
sheet etc. are vitiated. It is advisable that the Court
so established or specified in exercise of powers under
Section 14 of the Atrocities Act, for the purpose of
providing for speedy trial directly take cognizance of
the offences under the Atrocities Act. But at the same
time, merely on the ground that cognizance of the
offences under the Atrocities Act is not taken directly
by the Special Court constituted under Section 14 of
the Atrocities Act, the entire criminal proceedings
cannot be said to have been vitiated and cannot be
quashed and set aside solely on the ground that
cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate after
insertion of second proviso to Section 14 which
confers powers upon the Special Court also to directly
280 I June 2022
take cognizance of the offences under the Atrocities
Act and thereafter case is committed to the Special
Court/Court of Session. The words used in second
proviso to Section 14 of the Atrocities Act that “Court
so established or specified shall have power to directly
take cognizance of the offences under Supreme Court”.
The word “only” is conspicuously missing. If the
intention of the legislature would have to confer the
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences under
the Act exclusively with the Special Court, in that case,
the wording should have been “that the Court so
established or specified only shall have power to
directly take cognizance of offences under this Act”.
Therefore, merely because additional powers have
been given to the Special Court also to take cognizance
of the offences under the Atrocities Act and merely
because the cognizance is taken by the Magistrate for
the offences under the Atrocities Act and thereafter
the case has been committed to the Special Court, it
cannot be said that entire criminal proceedings under
Sections 452, 323, 325, 504, 506(2), 114 of Penal Code
and under Section 3(1)(x) of the Atrocities Act vitiated
and same are required to be quashed and set aside.
The accused is to be tried for the offences under the
Atrocities Act by Special Court/Exclusive Special
Court constituted under Section 14 of the Atrocities
Act. Even those rights are also available to the victim
for the offences under the Atrocities Act in which the
trial is by the Special Court/Exclusive Special Court
constituted under Section 14 of the Atrocities Act.
Therefore, unless and until those rights which flow
from Section 14 of the Atrocities Act are affected, the
accused cannot make any grievance and it cannot be
said that taking cognizance by the Magistrate for the
offences under the Atrocities Act and thereafter to
commit the case to the Special Court, he is prejudiced.
Even considering Section 460 of the Cr.P.C., if any
Magistrate not empowered by the law to take
cognizance of an offence under Section 190(1)(a) or
(b), takes cognizance, such irregularities do not vitiate
proceedings. At the most, it can be said to be irregular

proceedings for which, it does not vitiate the
proceedings.
Reference: Supreme Court. Shantaben
Bhurabhai Bhuriya Vs. Anand Athabhai
Chaudhari & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 967
of 2021.
COUNTER CLAIM MAINTAINABLE,
UNDER MSMED ACT
The Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
Development Act, 2006 contemplates a statutory
arbitration when conciliation fails. A party which is
covered by the provisions of 2006 Act allows a party
to apply to the Council constituted under the Act to
first conciliate and then arbitrate on the dispute
between it and other parties. There are fundamental
differences in the settlement mechanism under the
2006 Act and Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The first difference is, the Council constituted under
the 2006 Act to undertake mandatory conciliation
before the arbitration which is not so under the 1996
Act. Secondly, in the event of failure of conciliation
under the 2006 Act, the Council or the centre or
institution is identified by it for arbitration. The 1996
Act allows resolution of disputes by agreed forum.
The third difference is that, in the event of award in
favour of seller and if the same is to be challenged,
there is a condition for pre-deposit of 75% of the
amount awarded. Such is not the case in the 1996 Act.
When such beneficial provisions are there in the
special enactment, such benefits cannot be denied on
the ground that counter-claim is not maintainable
before the Council. In any case. whenever buyer wish
to avoid the jurisdiction of the Council, the buyer can
do on the spacious plea of counter-claim, without
responding to the claims of the seller . When the
provisions of Sections 15 to 23 are given overriding
effect under Section 24 of the Act and further the 2006
Act is a beneficial legislation, then, even the buyer, if
any claim is there, can very well subject to the
LAW FOR YOU
jurisdiction before the Council and make its claim/
counter claim as otherwise it will defeat the very
objects of the Act which is a beneficial legislation to
micro, small and medium enterprises. Even in cases
where there is no agreement for resolution of disputes
by way of arbitration, if the seller is a party covered
by Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development
Act, 2006, if such party approaches the Council for
resolution of dispute, other party may approach the
civil court or any other forum making claims on the
same issue. If two parallel proceedings are allowed, it
may result in conflicting findings. Out of the two
legislations, the provisions of MSMED Act will prevail,
especially when it has overriding provision under
Section 24 thereof. Thus, MSMED Act, being a special
Statute, will have an overriding effect vis-a-vis
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is a
general Act. Even if there is an agreement between the
parties for resolution of disputes by arbitration, if a
seller is covered by Micro, Small and Medium
Enterprises Development Act, 2006, the seller can
certainly approach the competent authority to make
its claim. If any agreement between the parties is there,
same is to be ignored in view of the statutory
obligations and mechanism provided under the 2006
Act. Further, apart from the provision under Section
23(2A) of the 1996 Act, it is to be noticed that if
counter-claim is not permitted, buyer can get over the
legal obligation of compound interest at 3 times of the
bank rate and the “75% pre-deposit “contemplated
under Sections 16 and 19 of the MSMED Act.
Therefore, for the aforesaid reasons and on a
harmonious construction of Section 18(3) of the 2006
Act and Section 7(1) and Section 23(2A) of the 1996
Act, counter-claim is maintainable before the statutory
authorities under MSMED Act.
Reference: Supreme Court. M/s Silpi Industries
Etc. Vs. Kerala S tate Road T ransport
Corporation and Anr. Etc, Civil Appeal Nos.
1570-1578 of 2021.
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LAW FOR YOU
AUTHORIZATION UNDER PNGRB distribution network to ensure fair trade and
ACT CANNOT BE ASSUMED competition amongst entities; (4) The PNGRB has
adjudicatory powers under Sections 12 and 24; (5) The
The enacting part of Section 16 of Petroleum and
PNGRB has regulation making powers under Sections
Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006 prohibits
11 and 61; (6) Pursuant to its regulatory powers, and
anyone or any entity from starting or carrying on any
regulation making powers, PNGRB in fact has framed
activity covered by the PNGRB Act and requires
several regulations, including the CGD Regulations of
authorisation from it. The proviso then is meant to
2008; (7) Sections 16 and 17 are of crucial importance
operate in an extremely restricted manner, i.e., to deal
because they manifest Parliament’s intention of meting
with entities inter alia that were engaged in laying,
out uniform treatment, in regard to entities that were
building, operating etc., inter alia, gas pipelines “at the
in the process of laying, building, operating or
time when the Act came into force”. The proviso,
expanding any city or local natural gas distribution
unlike the main part of Section 16, was not intended
network or any pipeline as a common carrier or
to grant authorisation to entities which had not started
contract carrier; and (8) Section 17(4) itself alludes to
any activity thus far. Such entities had to now apply
the policies of the Central Government, which are to
for authorisation. In any case, by the combined
apply and guide the PNGRB, while considering
operation of Sections 16 and 17, the proviso to Section
applications under Section 17 (2). Petroleum was
16 is not unqualified the “deemed authorisation”
always within the exclusive domain of the Parliament
clause is subject to other provisions of Chapter IV.
and Central Government. The enactment of the
Section 17 is one such provision under Chapter IV. This
Petroleum Act, 1934 (pre-Constitutional law) and more
provision brings home clearly that only Central
importantly, the Petroleum and Natural Gas Rules, 1959
Government authorised entities were deemed to have
(1959 Rules) shows that Union primacy always existed
been authorised. The omission of any reference to
in this field. The Act creates a modern-day regulation
authorisation in Section 16 is significant because the
intended to create All-India guidelines and policies for
qualifier for application of the proviso is that it was
due implementation, ensuring that market dominance
subject to other provisions of the chapter. The scheme
in the field is not abused and fairness in dealings of
of Section 17 intrinsically classifies the two, i.e. Central
various entities takes place. PNGRB Act was intended
Government authorised entities, and others. In the
to have primacy in regard to grant of authorizations
overall scheme of the PNGRBAct, what appears clearly
on the subject over which it exercises jurisdiction. To
is that (1) After coming into force of the PNGRB Act,
facilitate due exercise of its jurisdiction, same role or
all activities covered by it (refining, processing,
space has been accorded to the States - which is
storage, transportation, distribution, marketing and
indicated again in clear terms under the Central
sale of petroleum products and natural gas) can be
Government’s policy of 2006. The role of the states in
carried out only with the authorization of the PNGRB,
granting no objection is limited taking into account
in accordance with provisions of the Act; (2) The
local factors - no more no less. In these circumstances,
PNGRB’s functions are delineated in Section 11 which
any contention on behalf of Adani or the intervenors
include granting authorization to entities to lay, build,
to the effect that no objection had been granted to
operate or expand common carriers, contract carriers
them by a State authority or orders of Court had
or local natural gas distribution network; (3) The
permitted any entity to either function or continue to
PNGRB’s functions also include the control through
function does not per se amount to an authorization
regulation, access to city or local natural gas
in terms of the PNGRB Act. It does not also follow

282 I June 2022


that authorization of the Central Government can be
assumed. Such entities had to secure authorization,
under the PNGRB Act, in respect of any area, after
coming into force of the Act.
Reference: Supreme Court. Adani Gas Limited
Vs. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos.
6008-6009 of 2021.
RELIEF OF SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE, NO LONGER A
DISCRETIONARY RELIEF
Even if the agreement is found to be duly executed
and the plaintiff is found to be ready and willing to
perform his part of the Agreement, grant of decree of
specific performance is not automatic and it is a
discretionary relief is concerned, the same cannot be
accepted and/or approved. In such a case, many a
times it would be giving a premium to the dishonest
conduct on the part of the defendant/executant of the
agreement to sell. Even the discretion under Section
20 of Specific Relief Act is required to be exercised
judiciously, soundly and reasonably. The plaintiff
cannot be punished by refusing the relief of specific
performance despite the fact that the execution of the
agreement to sell in his favour has been established
and proved and that he is found to be always ready
and willing to perform his part of the contract. Not to
grant the decree of specific performance despite the
execution of the agreement to s ell is proved; part sale
consideration is proved and the plaintiff is always
ready and willing to perform his part of the contract
would encourage the dishonesty. In such a situation,
the balance should tilt in favour of the plaintiff rather
than in favour of the defendant - executant of the
agreement to sell, while exercising the discretion
judiciously. Even amendment to the Specific ReliefAct,
1963 by which Section 10(a) has been inserted, though
may not be applicable retrospectively but can be a
guide on the discretionary relief. Now the legislature
has also thought it to insert Section 10(a) and now
LAW FOR YOU
the specific performance is no longer a discretionary
relief. As such the question whether the said provision
would be applicable retrospectively or not and/or
should be made applicable to all pending proceedings
including appeals is kept open. However, at the same
time, as observed hereinabove, the same can be a
guide.
Reference: Supreme Court. Sughar Singh Vs.
Hari Singh (Dead) Through LRs & Ors., Civil
Appeal No. 5110 of 2021.
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES
OF NATURAL JUSTICE MUST BE
OBSERVED AT EVERY STAGE
When the High Court entertained Criminal Appeal
against rejection of bail application, no notice was
given to appellant, complainant. The High Court
allowed the application for bail. When the appellant
moved the High Court for cancellation of bail, Court
took the view that compliance with the principles of
natural justice at that particular stage would cure the
deficiency. There has been a clear infraction of the
mandate of the statute, Sub-sections (3) and (5) have
been introduced by the Parliament to ensure a right
to be heard to the person against whom the offence
is committed or to the dependents. These provisions
must be scrupulously observed. It cannot be accepted
that defect in not issuing notice to the victim or their
dependent and depriving them of the opportunity to
be heard in the concerned proceedings for grant of
bail can be cured by providing them a hearing in a
proceeding that arose subsequently for cancellation
of bail. Compliance with the principles of natural justice
must be observed at every stage under the mandate
of the statute. Section 15A (3) of Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act
would entail that the notice is served upon victims or
their dependents at the first or earliest possible
instance. If undue delay is caused in the issuance of
notice, the victim, or as the case may be, their
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LAW FOR YOU
dependents, would remain uninformed of the progress
made in the case and it would prejudice their rights to
effectively oppose the defense of the accused. It
would also ultimately delay the bail proceedings or the
trial, affecting the rights of the accused as well.
Reference: Supreme Court. Hariram Bhambhi
Vs. Satyanarayan & Anr., Criminal Appeal No.
1278 of 2021.
‘OFFENDER’ UNDER SECTION 397
IPC, CONFINED TO ‘OFFENDER’
WHO USES ANY DEADLY WEAPON
To bring the case within Section 397 IPC, the offender
who uses any deadly weapon, or causes grievous hurt
to any person shall be liable for minimum punishment
under Section 397 IPC. Section 392 and Section 390
IPC are couched in different words. In Sections 390,
394, 397 and 398 IPC the word used is ‘offender’.
Therefore, for the purpose of Sections 390, 391, 392,
393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398 IPC only the offender/
person who committed robbery and/or voluntarily
causes hurt or attempt to commit such robbery and
who uses any deadly weapon or causes grievous hurt
to any person, or commits to cause death or grievous
death any person at the time of committing robbery
or dacoity can be punished for the offences under
Sections 390, 392, 393, 394, 395 and 397 and 398 IPC.
For the aforesaid the accused cannot be convicted on
the basis of constructive liability and only the
‘offender’ who ‘uses any deadly weapon....’ can be
punished. However, so far as Section 391 IPC ‘dacoity’
and Section 396 IPC- dacoity with murder’ is concerned
an accused can be convicted on the basis of
constructive liability, however the only requirement
would be the involvement of five or more persons
conjointly committing or attempting to commit a
robbery – dacoity/dacoity with murder. “Offender’
under Section 397 IPC is confined to the ‘offender’
who uses any deadly weapon and use of deadly
weapon by one offender at the time of committing
284 I June 2022
robbery cannot attract Section 397 IPC for the
imposition of minimum punishment on another
offender who has not used any deadly weapon. Even
there is distinction and difference between Section 397
and Section 398 IPC. The word used in Section 397
IPC is ‘uses’ any deadly weapon and the word used
in Section 398 IPC is ‘offender is armed with any
deadly weapon’. Therefore, for the purpose of
attracting Section 397 IPC the ‘offender’ who ‘uses’
any deadly weapon Section 397 IPC shall be attracted.
Reference: Supreme Court. Ganesan Vs. State
Rep. by The Inspector of Police, Criminal
Appeal No. 903 of 2021.
CHEQUE THOUGH ISSUED AS
SECURITY, COMPLAINT
MAINTAINABLE
A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial
transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece
of paper under every circumstance. ‘Security’ in its
true sense is the state of being safe and the security
given for a loan is something given as a pledge of
payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make
certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the
parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction,
a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay
the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a
cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the
loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the
due date or if there is no other understanding or
agreement between the parties to defer the payment
of amount, the cheque which is issued as security
would mature for presentation and the drawee of the
cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such
presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the
consequences contemplated under Section 138 and
the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow. When a
cheque is issued and is treated as ‘security’ towards
repayment of an amount with a time period being
stipulated for repayment, all that it ensures is that such

cheque which is issued as ‘security’ cannot be
presented prior to the loan or the instalment maturing
for repayment towards which such cheque is issued
as security. Further, the borrower would have the
option of repaying the loan amount or such financial
liability in any other form and in that manner if the
amount of loan due and payable has been discharged
within the agreed period, the cheque issued as
security cannot thereafter be presented. Therefore, the
prior discharge of the loan or there being an altered
situation due to which there would be understanding
between the parties is a sine qua non to not present
the cheque which was issued as security. These are
only the defences that would be available to the drawer
of the cheque in a proceedings initiated under Section
138 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, there cannot be a hard
and fast rule that a cheque which is issued as security
can never be presented by the drawee of the cheque.
If such is the understanding a cheque would also be
reduced to an ‘on demand promissory note and in all
circumstances, it would only be a civil litigation to
recover the amount, which is not the intention of the
statute. When a cheque is issued even though as
‘security’ the consequence flowing therefrom is also
known to the drawer of the cheque and in the
circumstance if the cheque is presented and
dishonoured, the holder of the cheque/drawee would
have the option of initiating the civil proceedings for
recovery or the criminal proceedings for punishment
in the fact situation, but in any event, it is not for the
drawer of the cheque to dictate terms with regard to
the nature of litigation. Cheque though issued as
security at the point when the loan was advanced, it
was issued as an assurance to repay the amount after
the debt becomes due for repayment. The loan was in
subsistence when the cheque was issued and had
become repayable and the cheque issued towards
repayment was agreed to be presented thereafter .
There was a transaction between the parties towards
which a legally recoverable debt was claimed by the
complainant and the cheque issued by the accused
LAW FOR YOU
was presented. On such cheque being dishonoured,
cause of action had arisen for issuing a notice and
presenting the criminal complaint under Section 138
of N.I. Act on the payment not being made. The further
defence as to whether the loan had been discharged
as agreed by accused and in that circumstance the
cheque which was issued as security not remained live
for payment subsequent thereto etc. at best can be a
defence for accused to be put forth and to be
established in the trial. Therefore, to contend that the
cheque should be held as security even after the
amount had become due and payable is not
sustainable. In any event, it was not a case for the
Court to either refuse to take cognizance or to
discharge the accused in the manner it has been done
by the High Court. Complainant under Section 138 of
N.I. Act, maintainable.
Reference: Supreme Court. Sripati Singh (since
Deceased) through his son Gaurav Singh Vs.
State of Jharkhand & Anr., Criminal Appeal
Nos. 1269-1270 of 2021.
RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES
BASED ON ACTUAL LOSS
In order to examine whether the delayed execution of
contract was liable for compensation, the tribunal
examined whether time was of the essence in the
contract. ‘Time not being the essence of the contract’,
as determined by the Arbitral Tribunal, was beyond
reproach. Reliance on the contractual conditions and
conduct of parties to conclude that existence of
extension clause dilutes time being the essence of the
contract, was in accordance with rules of contractual
interpretation. It is now settled that “whether time is
of the essence in a contract”, has to be culled out from
the reading of the entire contract as well as the
surrounding circumstances. Merely having an explicit
clause may not be sufficient to make time the essence
of the contract. As the contract was spread over a
long tenure, the intention of the parties to provide for
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LAW FOR YOU
extensions surely reinforces the fact that timely
performance was necessary . The fact that such
extensions were granted indicates ONGC’s effort to
uphold the integrity of the contract instead of
repudiating the same. Purchase Order makes it clear
that time is the essence of the contract, subject to
extension granted without prejudicing the right of
ONGC to recover damages. These damages, by one
reasonable interpretation, could be read as damages
based on actual loss. The Arbitral Tribunal construed
the aforesaid provision to interpret the term “loss” to
mean actual tangible loss provable by evidence,
instead of pre-estimated loss. Such interpretation, in
the facts and circumstances, could be held to be a
reasonable interpretation, as the other party was not
able to impugn the same by pointing to any documents
or correspondence to the contrary. When a standard
form of a contract is utilised, ONGC is assumed in law
to have the larger bargaining power to enter into a
contract, unless clear intention is shown to the
contrary. In this case at hand, a reasonable
interpretation against ONGC may be utilised. This
brings Court to the waiver. It may be noted that ONGC
waived liquidated damages twice before giving
extension with pre-estimated damages. The approach
of the Arbitral Tribunal was to hold that once
liquidated damages were waived in the first extension,
subsequent extension could not be coupled with
liquidated damages unless a clear intention flowed
from the contract, while Supreme Court recognizes the
autonomy of the party to engage in contractual
obligation. Such obligation must be contracted in clear
terms. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that
the promisee (ONGC) waived the liquidated damages
initially and the same cannot be imposed, unless such
imposition was clearly accepted by parties. In this
case, the interpretation of the Arbitral Tribunal could
not be faulted as being perverse. Court cannot
interfere with this award, as the award is a plausible
view for the following reasons, that the Arbitral
Tribunal’s interpretation of contractual clauses having
286 I June 2022
extension procedure and imposition of liquidated
damages, are good indicators that ‘time was not the
essence of the contract’. The Arbitral Tribunal’s view
to impose damages accrued on actual loss basis could
be sustained in view of the waiver of liquidated
damages and absence of precise language which
allows for re-imposition of liquidated damages. Such
imposition is in line with the 2 nd para of Section 55 of
the Indian Contract Act.
Reference: Supreme Court. Welspun Specialty
Solutions Ltd. (Formerly known as Remi Metals
Gujarat Ltd.) Vs. Oil and Natural Gas
Corporation Ltd., Civil Appeal Nos. 2826-2827
of 2016.
EQUALITY IS AMONGST EQUALS
Equality is a definite concept. The concept of equality
has an inherent limitation arising from the very nature
of the constitutional guarantee. Those who are
similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal
treatment. Equality is amongst equals. Classification
is therefore to be founded on substantial differences
which distinguish persons grouped together from
those left out of the groups and such differential
attributes must bear in just and rational relation to the
object sought to be achieved. Article 14 of the
Constitution may permit a valid classification.
However, a classification to be followed must
necessarily satisfy two tests. Firstly , the
distinguishing rationale has to be based on a just
objective and secondly, the choice of differentiating
one set of persons from another must have a
reasonable nexus to the objects sought to be achieved.
Reference: Supreme Court. Modified Voluntary
Retirement Scheme of 2002 of Azam Jahi Mill
Workers Association Vs. National Textile
Corporation Limited & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos.
6260-61 of 2021.
ooooooo

CHANCELLOR ACTED BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF REMAND
A Bench of Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Subramanian
of the Supreme Court while accepting the appeal filed
by Dinesh Chandra Shukla held Chancellor went
beyond the scope of order of remand. Initially the
Executive Council had vitiated appellant’s selection
due to non-inclusion of subject experts of ‘Karmkand’
in selection committee and not due to non-possessing
of prescribed qualifications. The High Court had
remanded the matter back to the Chancellor to consider
if there were subject experts in ‘Karmkand’ to be
included in the Selection Committee. Instead of
confining himself to the said question, Chancellor took
opinion of experts and also collected information to
conclude that Dinesh Chandra Shukla - the appellant
did not possess requisite qualifications. Act of
consultation and collection of information beyond the
scope of order of remand and enlarged the original
objection to appellant’s selection.
The Bench found that in his order , Chancellor
conceded that no statute prescribed any requirement
for the post of Lecturer in ‘Karmkand’. Before vitiating
selection of appellant, Chancellor and High Court
should have verified if statutes prescribed any
specific qualification of the post of Lecturer in
‘Karmkand’ and if not, then what should be considered
as ‘relevant subject and by whom’. Undisputedly,
advertisement also did not prescribe any specific
qualification for appointment to the post of Lecturer
in ‘Karmkand’.
The Bench directed the University to regularize the
service of the appellant as he had been teaching
‘Karmkand’ for past 16 years and Selection Committee
comprising of Professors from Department of Sanskrit
of which Diploma course in ‘Karmkand’ was a part,
found him eligible.
On 22.10.1996, the State of UP sanctioned one post of
Lecturer in ‘Karmkand’ in the Department of Sanskrit
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
in the University which is 5 th respondent herein. One
Sh. Jai Prakash Pandey was initially appointed to the
said post and his services were regularized. On
19.08.2006 the regularization of Jai Parkash Pandey was
set aside by High Court. Thereafter Dinesh Chandra
Shukla – the appellant was engaged by the University
as a Guest Lecturer to teach ‘Karmkand’ to the
students in the Department of Sanskrit.
A proposal to fill up the post on regular basis was
submitted and the Vice Chancellor approved the same.
Pursuant thereto, advertisement inviting applications
to one post of Lecturer in ‘Karmkand’ was issued.
Unfortunately, a controversy erupted, when the
Chancellor issued an oral order restraining Vice
Chancellor from convening the meetings of Selection
Committee pursuant to aforesaid advertisement, on the
ground that the Vice Chancellor was due to retire on
31.12.2007. But the High Court on 04.10.2007 issued
order in a writ petition clarifying that statutory
functions performed by the Vice Chancellor cannot be
put on hold by oral orders of the Chancellor .
Thereafter, written order was issued by the Chancellor
on 14.12.2007. The said order was stayed by the
Allahabad High Court in another writ petition paving
the way for the Selection Committees to proceed
further pursuant to the advertisement No. 02 of 2006.
Since the Vice Chancellor retired in the meantime
before the recommendations by the Selection
Committee were implemented, number of writ petitions
were filed. The Executive Council decided to refer the
recommendation of the Selection Committees to the
Chancellor under the UP State Universities Act, 1973.
Agreeing with the decision of Executive Council, the
Chancellor passed an order annulling the
recommendations made by the Selection Committee.
The appellant challenged the said order in Writ
Petition No. 6389 of 2011. On 02.12.2011 writ petition
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SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
was accepted and the matter was remanded back to
the Chancellor. The Chancellor considered the matter
and passed a fresh order on 24.08.2012, rejecting the
recommendation of the Selection Committee. This order
was challenged by the appellant in Writ Petition No.
63137 of 2012. The Division Bench dismissed the writ
petition filed by the appellant. It is against this order
of the High Court that appeal was filed in Supreme
Court.
OPERATIVE PART
“Under Section 25(1)(c) of the U.P. University Act,
the Academic Council is empowered to advise the
Executive Council with regard to the qualifications
required to be possessed by persons imparting
instructions on particular subjects. Therefore, the
minutes of the meetings of the Academic Council dated
22.08.2013 has clinched the issue in favour of the
appellant. Hence it is time for the University to put
an end to this ‘Yuddh Kand’ and allow the appellant
to move from ‘Karm Kand’ to ‘Karm Phal Kand’.
Therefore, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order
of the High Court is set aside and the writ petition
filed by the appellant before the High Court is
allowed, as prayed for. In view of the fact (i) that the
appellant has been teaching the very same subject for
the past nearly 16 years; and (ii) that the original
Selection Committee which found him eligible for
appointment, comprised of Professors from the
Department of Sanskrit of which the diploma course
in ‘Karm Kand’ was a part, a direction is issued to
the 5 th respondent-University to regularise the
services of the appellant. There shall be no order as
to costs.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Dinesh Chandra
Shukla Vs. State of UP & Ors., Civil Appeal No.
1913 of 2022 dt. 24.03.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
No writ of mandamus can be issued virtually granting writ for specific performance of contract/work
order in writ petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India. Municipal Council Gondia Vs. Divi Works &
Suppliers, HUF & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1538 of 2022 (SC).
High Court has no jurisdiction to remand matter to same Arbitrator unless it is consented by both
parties that matter be remanded to same Arbitrator. Dr. A. Parthasarathy & Ors Vs. E. Springs Avenues Pvt.
Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1463 of 2022 (SC).
No straight jacket formula for aw arding amount of compensation under heads, pain and suf fering and
loss of amenities and happiness and depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. Sri Benson George
Vs. Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 1540 of 2022 (SC).
Unless Bank and Insurance Company able to establish on cogent basis that special conditions of
policy issued by Insurance Company to bank were drawn to notice of account holder for whose benefit
insurance cover extended, claim cannot be rejected. Anju Kalsi Vs. HDFC Ergo General Insurance Company
Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 1544-1545 of 2022 (SC).
Retrospective enforcement of unintentional omission/mistake or arithmetic/typographical error in
agreement permissible but retrospective enforcement of substantial alteration in commercial agreement
impermissible. Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 4124 of
2009 (SC).

288 I June 2022


OPPORTUNITY TO DEFEND THE SUIT
A Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
of the Supreme Court while accepting appeal filed by
M/s Jersey Developers (P) Ltd. held Directors of
appellant company were staying in USA for last 40
years. As summons of suit and notices were sent to
address at Chennai, which was closed, the same were
returned ‘unclaimed’. Accordingly, Trial Court had to
order substituted service by newspaper publication.
Even notice dated 07.06.2013 issued by DRT (Debt
Recovery Tribunal), calling upon appellants to pay a
sum of Rs. 47,21,320.53 was sent to the address at
Chennai, by which time property had been sold. By
now appellants have deposited entire decretal amount.
Thus, they deserve one more opportunity to defend
the suit.
The Supreme Court held the appellants deserve one
more opportunity to defend the suit.
M/s Jersey Developers (P) Ltd. - the appellant No. 1
who availed the loan facility from Canara Bank –
respondent and appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are the
Directors who are staying along with their family in
United States of America (USA) for last 40 years. The
respondent-Bank instituted suit being OS No.3749 of
2003 before the learned Trial Court for recovery of the
amount. The summons of the suit and the notices were
sent to the address at Chennai which remained closed
as the appellants herein original defendants are staying
in USA. The summons and the notices were returned
‘unclaimed’. Therefore, the Court below ordered
substituted service by newspaper publication.
Thereafter the suit proceeded ex-parte and an ex-parte
decree came to be passed vide judgment and decree
dated 12.02.2004. The Bank subsequently approached
the Debts Recovery Tribunal for issuance of the
recovery certificate. The DRT, Chennai issued a notice
dated 07.06.2013 in the name of the appellants calling
upon them to pay a sum of Rs.47,21,320.53. The said
notice was also sent to the address at Chennai which
D EBT RECOVERY
property according to the appellants was already sold
in the year 2002. According to the appellants when
appellant no.2 visited India in the year 2014, he
become aware of the recovery certificate on 29.03.2014
and the ex-parte decree. The appellants here-in-
original defendants therefore filed the application
before the learned Trial Court to set aside the ex-parte
judgment and decree dated 12.02.2004. The said
application came to be dismissed by the learned Trial
Court. The revision application against the order
passed by the learned Trial Court dismissing the
application to set aside the ex-parte judgment and
decree has also been dismissed by the High Court by
the impugned judgment and order.
OPERATIVE PART
“Having heard learned counsel for the respective
parties and considering the fact that summons/notices
issued by the learned T rial Court were returned
‘unclaimed’ as the same were sent at the address at
Chennai and the house was closed as the appellants
herein original defendants were staying in USA and
thereafter the said house was sold and so as to give
one additional opportunity to the defendants to
defend the suit and as by now entire decretal amount
is deposited by the appellants to show their bonafides
and therefore the amount alleged to have been due
and payable to the Bank is secured, we are of the
opinion that if the appellants are given one additional
opportunity to defend the suit it will be in the fitness
of things and meet the ends of justice.
Now so far as the amount already deposited by the
appellants herein (50% of the amount pursuant to the
order passed by the High Court and the balance 50%
of the decretal amount pursuant to the order passed
by this Court) is concerned, it will be open for the
respondent – Bank original plaintiff to withdraw the
same and keep it in an interest bearing fixed deposit
which shall be dealt with subject to the ultimate
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D EBT RECOVERY
outcome of the suit. In case the plaintiff succeeds in
the suit and the decree is passed the said amount
shall be appropriated towards the decree and if the
suit is dismissed the same shall be repaid to the
defendants subject to the further order to be passed
by the Appellate Court. The Bank shall retain the
amount as ordered hereinabove without prejudice to
the rights and contentions of the respective parties
in the suit.”
Reference: Supreme Court. M/s Jersey
Developers (P) Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Canara Bank,
Civil Appeal No. 2708 of 2022 dt. 13.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
No compensation shall be awarded under Section 21, unless plaintif f has claimed compensation in his
plaint. Universal Petro Chemicals Ltd. Vs. B.P. PLC & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3127 of 2009 (SC).
Permanent injunction cannot be granted against true owner . Padhiyar Prahladji Chenaji (Deceased)
Through LRs Vs. Maniben Jagmalbhai (Deceased) Trough LRs & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1382 of 2022 (SC).
Relation between complainant and Bank purely “business to business” relationship and transactions
were for ‘commercial purpose’ cannot be construed as consumer disputes. Shrikant G. Mantri Vs. Punjab
National Bank, Civil Appeal No. 11397 of 2016 (SC).
Open to District Magistrate or Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to appoint advocate and authorise him/
her to take possession of secured assets and documents relating thereto and to forward same to secured creditor
within meaning of Section 14(1A) of Act. NKGSB Cooperative Bank Ltd. Vs. Subir Charavarty & Ors., Civil
Appeal No. 1637 of 2022 (SC).
Financier of motor vehicle/transport vehicle in respect of which a hire-purchase or lease or
hypothecation agreement entered liable to tax from date of taking possession of vehicle under agreement.
Mahindra and Mahindra Financial Services Ltd. Vs. State of UP & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1217 of 2022 (SC).
Grant of Letters of Administration may be revoked for “just cause” under Section 263 of Succession
Act. Swaminathan & Ors. Vs. Alankamony (Dead) Through Lrs., Civil Appeal No. 798-799 of 2013 (SC).
Mere findings of fact cannot be interfered with in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction given three
limbs of jurisdiction available under Section 41 of Punjab Courts Act. Hardial Singh Vs. Balbir Kaur & Anr.,
Civil Appeal No. 1925 of 2022 (SC).
National Consumer Commission can interfere with order of State Commission if State Commission
exercised jurisdiction not vested in it by law or failed to exercise its jurisdiction so vested. M/s Narendran
Sons Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 3 Middleton Street & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 1831-1832 of 2022 (SC).
Admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon relevancy to issue on hand but it depends
upon whether or not appellate court requires evidence sought to be adduced to enable it to pronounce judgment
or for any other substantial cause. Sanjay Kumar Singh Vs. State of Jharkhand, Civil Appeal No. 1760 of
2022 (SC).
Contemnors cannot claim that requirement of deposit not mandatory, but directory, therefore non-
compliance would not constitute contempt. Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund Vs. Dharmesh S. Jain &
Anr., Contempt Petition (C) No. 940 of 2021 in Miscellaneous Application No. 1668 of 2021 (SC).

290 I June 2022


OBTAINING DEGREE IN ONE OF THE BRANCHES
OF HISTORY, CANNOT BE SAID DEGREE IN
HISTORY
A Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by
Indresh Kumar Mishra and others holding that
obtaining degree in one of the branches of History
cannot be said, to be obtaining degree in History as a
whole. A History teacher has to teach all subjects of
History, namely Ancient History, Indian Ancient
History and Culture, Medieval/Modern History, Indian
Ancient History, Culture and Archaeology etc. The
Bench held Expert Committee having answered the
issue in the negative, no interference is needed. In
field of education, Courts cannot act as experts.
The Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms
and Rajbhasha, Government of Jharkhand vide its
letter dated 24.07.2017 forwarded requisition of the
Department of School Education and Literacy
(Secondary Education Directorate) Government of
Jharkhand to the Jharkhand Staff Selection
Commission (“J.S.S.C.”) in terms of the Appointment
Rules, 2012 for starting the selection process for
appointment to the post of Postgraduate Trained
Teachers in the High School of the State of Jharkhand
for different subjects under different categories.
The J.S.S.C. after receiving the request, started the
selection process for appointment to the post of
Postgraduate Trained Teachers (P.G.T.T.) in the State
of Jharkhand in different subjects, i.e., Chemistry,
Physics, History etc. Accordingly, advertisement
No.10/2017 was issued by which applications were
invited from the eligible candidates for considering
their candidature for appointment to the post of
Postgraduate Trained Teachers. It was a combined
advertisement for the post of Postgraduate Trained
Teachers for dif ferent subjects under dif ferent
categories. The advertisement provided the pay-scale
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
and minimum educational qualification for the posts.
That as per the advertisement, the eligibility criteria
for the post of Postgraduate Trained Teachers in the
subject History was that a candidate must have
obtained a Postgraduate degree with 50% marks in the
related subjects (in the subject of History).
Pursuant to the advertisement, the respective original
writ petitioners applied for the said posts and
participated in the selection process. All of them
submitted their application forms online and in their
forms, they also mentioned their respective
educational qualifications as Postgraduates in Hindi.
They were allowed to appear in the examination, who
were also declared successful on the basis of their
performance in the examination. After publication of
the result, successful candidates were required to get
verification of their testimonials. At the time of
verification of the testimonials, the respective original
writ petitioners submitted their Postgraduate degree
certificates. It was found that the respective original
writ petitioners were having a Postgraduate degree in
Medieval History; Ancient History; Ancient History
and Culture; Ancient History, Culture and
Archaeology etc. respectively from different
universities and as such they failed to submit the
Postgraduate degree in History in terms of the
advertisement. It was found that the respective
petitioners had Postgraduate degrees in one of
branches of History in place of History as a whole and,
therefore, show-cause notices were issued to them by
J.S.S.C. to show-cause why their candidatures may not
be cancelled as they failed to submit the certificate of
Master of Arts (Postgraduation) with the subject
“History”.
At that stage, some of the writ petitioners filed the writ
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 291
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
petitions before the High Court and some filed writ
petitions after their candidatures were cancelled. The
learned Single Judge dismissed their respective writ
petitions holding that the original writ petitioners were
ineligible for the selection and appointment as
Postgraduate Teacher in History subject.
The original writ petitioners preferred letters patent
appeals before the Division Bench of the High Court,
and the same were dismissed. Thereafter leave to
appeal was filed.
OPERATIVE PART
“As per the settled proposition of law, in the field of
education, the Court of Law cannot act as an expert
normally, therefore, whether or not a student/
candidate is possessing the requisite qualification
should better be left to the educational institutions,
more par ticularly, when the Exper t Committee
considers the matter.
In the present case, the educational qualifications
required has been specifically mentioned in the
advertisement. There is no ambiguity and/or
confusion in the advertisement providing educational
qualification and the post for which the applications
were invited (History/Civics). There cannot be any
deviation from the educational qualifications
mentioned in the advertisement. Once having found
that the respective writ petitioners – appellants herein
were not having the requisite qualification as per the
advertisement, namely, the Postgraduate/Bachelor
degree in History, which was the requirement as per
the advertisement and thereafter their candidature
was canceled, both the learned Single Judge as well
as the Division Bench of the High Court have rightly
refused to interfere with the same. We are in complete
agreement with the view taken by the learned Single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court.
As observed hereinabove in the online applications,
it was stated by the respective petitioners that they
are having the Postgraduate/Bachelor degree in
History and only at the time of verification of the
documents, when the respective certificates were
produced, at that time only, the authorities came to
know that the respective writ petitioners have the
degrees in one branch of History and not in History
as a whole and therefore the show-cause notices were
issued so that the respective petitioners can clarify
and satisfy that they are having the requisite
qualification of Postgraduate/Bachelor degree in
History and after giving them the oppor tunity, the
decision has been taken and that too after obtaining
the Expert Committee’s opinion.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Indresh Kumar
Mishra & Ors. Vs. The State of Jharkhand &
Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 2217-2218 of 2022 dt.
13.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Order de hors reasoning or bereft of relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. Manoj Kumar
Khokhar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 36 of 2022 (SC).
Ad valorem Court-fees would be payable on amount of damages claimed. State of Punjab & Ors. Vs.
Dev Brat Sharma, Civil Appeal No. 2064 of 2022 (SC).
Daughter does not want to maintain any relationship with father not entitled to educational and marriage
expenses. Ajay Kumar Rathee Vs. Seema Rathee, Civil Appeal No. 5141 of 2011 (SC).
Consent award cannot be basis to award and/or determine compensation in other acquisition, more
particularly, when there are other evidences on record. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Ors. Vs. N. Savitha,
Civil Appeal Nos. 2052-2053 of 2022 (SC).

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JUVENILE IN MURDER CASE, GETS
RELEASE FORTHWITH
A Bench of Justices A.N Khanwilkar and Abhay S. Oka
of the Supreme Court held Sanjay Patel, the accused
in a murder case be forthwith set at liberty, if not
required to be detained under any other order of the
competent court.
The Bench held as per Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection) Act, 2000 which was in force at the time
of commission of the offence, only Juvenile Justice
Board constituted under Section 4 had the jurisdiction
to try a juvenile. In terms of Sub Section (2) of Section
7A, the Court was under a mandate to forward the
juvenile to Juvenile Justice Board for passing of
appropriate orders. Further, sentence passed by
Criminal Court was to be deemed to be having no
effect. However, under Section 15, the most stringent
action which could have been taken against the
accused was to send him to a special home for a
period of 3 years. Since, till 01.08.2021, the accused
had already undergone sentence of 17 years and 3
days, it will be unjust to send him to Juvenile Justice
Board.
The applicant-petitioner was convicted by Sessions
Court on 16.05.2006 for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
to undergo life imprisonment. The offence was
committed on 08.01.2004. Appeals preferred by the
applicant and others before the High Court of
Allahabad were dismissed. Being aggrieved, Special
Leave Petition was filed by the applicant and others
and on 13.08.2009, Special Leave Petition was
dismissed by the Supreme Court.
Thereafter application was filed by the accused
contending that the date of his birth is 16.05.1986 and,
therefore, on the day of commission of the offence,
he was a juvenile. By relying upon various documents
such as High School result declared by the Board of
JUVENILE JUSTICE
High School and Intermediate Education, Uttar
Pradesh, the applicant claimed that he was a juvenile
on the date of the incident.
On 31.01.2022, the Supreme Court directed the Juvenile
Justice Board to hold an inquiry into the claim of the
applicant that he was a juvenile on the date of
commission of offence. In terms of the said order, the
Juvenile Justice Board passed an order dated
04.03.2022 holding that the correct date of birth of the
applicant is 16.05.1986. Therefore, on the day of
commission of offence, his age was 17 years 7 months
and 23 days.
OPERATIVE PART
“When the offence was committed, the provisions of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection) Act, 2000
(‘the 2000 Act’) were in force. As per the 2000 Act,
only the Juvenile Justice Board constituted under
Section 4 thereof had jurisdiction to try a juvenile in
conflict with the law. Under Section 7A of the 2000
Act, an accused was entitled to raise a claim of
juvenility before any Court, even after the final
disposal of the case. Such a claim was required to be
determined in accordance with the provisions of the
2000 Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 7A provided that
if after holding an inquir y, the Cour t found the
accused to be juvenile on the date of commission of
the offence, the Court was under a mandate to
forward the juvenile to the Juvenile Justice Board for
passing appropriate orders. Sub-section (2) of
Section 7A further provided that in such a case, the
sentence passed by Criminal Court shall be deemed
to have no effect in such a case.
In view of the categorical finding recorded in this case
by the competent Juvenile Justice Board, which is
based on documentary evidence, in view of sub-section
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JUVENILE JUSTICE
(2) of Section 7A, the applicant is required to be Reference: Supreme Court. Sanjay Patel & Anr.
forwarded to the Juvenile Justice Board. Under Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh, M.A. No. 1997 of
Section 15 of the 2000 Act, the most stringent action 2021 in SLP (Crl.) No. 5604 of 2009 dt. 13.04.2022.
which could have been taken against the applicant, —————
was of sending the applicant to a special home for a
period of three years.”

IN B R IE F
Letters Patent Appeal not maintainable against order which does not contain traits and trappings of
finality. Shyam Sel and Power Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Shyam Steel Industries Ltd., Civil Appeal No. 1984 of 2022
(SC).
Merely because in document purpose of sale of property stated to be for marriage expenses, document,
will not become loan agreement and/or security document. Kirpal Kaur & Anr. Vs. Ritesh & Ors., Civil Appeal
No. 1991 of 2022 (SC).
Land owners having benefit of interim orders granted in their favour in proceedings initiated by them
against acquisition cannot take benefit under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. Agricultural Produce Marketing
Committee Vs. State of Karnataka & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 1345-1346 of 2022 (SC).
Only averments in plaint to be referred and defence taken by defendant in written statement not be
considered for invoking Order 7, Rule 1 1 (d), on ground of suit barred by any law . Saranpal Kaur Anand Vs.
Praduman Singh Chandhok & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 2573 of 2022 (SC).
No lapse in Acquisition proceedings when direction/stay granted by High Court while passing order
in writ petition continued when Act, 2013 came into force. Delhi Development Authority Vs. Rajan Sood &
Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1927 of 2022 (SC).
Exclusion of one of natural heirs from bequest, cannot by itself be ground to hold that there are
suspicious circumstances in Wills. Swarnalatha & Ors. Vs. Kalavathy & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1565 of 2022
(SC).
Ghastly murders of three youngsters which are honour killings squarely falls under head of anti-social
and abhorrent nature of crime. Hari & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 186 of 2018 (SC)
Evidence of hostile witnesses can be accepted, even if they are natural and independent witnesses.
Hari & Anr. Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 186 of 2018 (SC)
Criminal procedure – Fabrication of documents permissible if it does not cause loss to revenue set
aside. Missu Naseem & Anr. Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 160 of 2022 (SC).
Once presence of accused established and proved and specific role of exhortation assigned to him,
High Court ought to have confirmed conviction of accused. Omkar Singh Vs. Jaiprakash Narain Singh &
Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 84 of 2022 (SC).
Conviction cannot be merely on basis of suspicion, conjecture and surmises. Satye Singh & Anr. Vs.
State of Uttarakhand, Criminal Appeal No. 2374 of 2014 (SC).

294 I June 2022


RIGHTS OF PARTIES BE DETERMINED ON THE
DAY OF FILING OF SUIT
The Supreme Court held once the question of law is
answered in one matter, all other matters, pending at
various stages will follow suit. The Bench consisting
of Justices Hemant Gupta and V. Ramasubramanian
held Section 18 of Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001
does not talk about validity of any decree of the Civil
Court but only restricts the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court from the date the Act became applicable. The
Act came into force on 11.05.2015 i.e. after the civil
suit was filed. Hence, decree could validly be passed
and executed. A suit filed in Civil Court prior to the
applicability of the act had to be decided by the Civil
Court and the decree passed by the Civil Court was
not interdicted by the applicability of the act to the
area in question. Further, rights of the parties have to
be determined on the date when lis commences i.e.,
on the date of filing of the suit.
The father of the appellant (Shankarlal Nandini) was
the tenant of Shop No. 4 situated at Jain Katla, Bikaner
Road, Suratgarh since 1982, whose owner was the
father of the respondent herein at that time. The
premises were let out on lease for monthly rent of
Rs.583.33. After the death of the appellant’s father, the
shop was continuing for monthly tenancy of the
appellant. The premises in question was not in the
urban area when the suit for possession was filed on
18.4.2013 after serving a notice of termination of
tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property
Act, 18821. During the pendency of the suit, the State
Government issued a notification on 11.7.2014
extending the provisions of the Rajasthan Rent Control
Act, 20012 w.e.f. 11.5.2015.
The Civil Court passed the decree for possession
against the appellants on 28.5.2015 even though the
Act became applicable to the area in question w.e.f.
EVICTIO N
11.5.2015. Aggrieved against the said judgment and
decree, the appellants filed first appeal before the
Additional District Judge, Suratgarh which was
dismissed on 5.10.2021. In the second appeal before
the High Court, the appellants relied on the Division
Bench judgment of the Rajasthan High Court reported
as K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal v . Shri Pukhraj
Banthiya, 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 4178 wherein it has
been held that the decree in civil suit could not be
passed after the applicability of the Act to the area in
question. The High Court in the impugned judgment
found that such judgment has been stayed by Supreme
Court in Special Leave Petition, therefore, the
judgment is not binding. In view of the said fact, the
High Court held that the decree in civil suit could be
passed as the same view was adopted by another co-
ordinate Bench of the High Court in another case
Mohd. Rafiq v. Hanuman Sahai & Ors. (SBCWP No.
16681 of 2019) and consequently , dismissed the
appeals filed by the appellants.
Thereafter special leave petition was filed in Supreme
Court.
OPERATIVE PART
“Under the Act in question, Section 18 does not talk
about the validity of any decree of the civil court but
only restricts the jurisdiction of the civil court from
the date the Act became applicable. The Act has come
into force in respect of the premises in question on
11.5.2015 i.e., after the civil suit was filed, therefore,
the decree could validly be passed and executed. After
the applicability of the Act to the area in question,
the landlord and tenant dispute can be raised only
before the Rent Tribunal but not before the civil court.
However, a suit filed before the civil court prior to
the applicability of the Act has to be decided by the
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 295
EVICTIO N
civil court. A decree passed by the civil court is valid
and executable which is not interdicted by the
applicability of the Act to the area in question. The
Act is applicable to the area in question from the date
the notification came into force and it does not bar
the decree of the civil court or the pendency of such
civil suit.
Still further, one of the principles is that the rights of
the parties have to be determined on the date when
lis commences i.e., on the date of filing of the suit. The
plaintiff is entitled to decree on that day when he
initiated the proceedings, therefore, rights of the
parties have to be examined as on the said day .
Recently, this Bench in a judgment reported as ECGC
Limited v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV, 2022 SCC OnLine
SC 184 was examining the question as to whether the
condition of deposit while filing appeal under the
Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would be applicable
or the provisions as it existed under the Consumer
Protection Act, 1986 when the complaint was filed
would be applicable. This Bench considering the
Constitution Bench judgments in Garikapati Veeraya
v. N. Subbiah Choudhry & Ors., AIR 1957 SC 540,
Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales
Tax, M.P., Nagpur, AIR 1967 SC 344 and Hardeodas
Jagannath v. The State of Assam, AIR 1970 SC 724
held that the provisions of the Consumer Protection
Act, 2019 would not be applicable to the complaints
filed prior to the commencement of the 2019 Act.
Therefore, the Judgement and Decree passed in the
suit for possession does not suffer from any illegality.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Shankarlal Nadani
Vs. Sohanlal Jain, CivilAppeal No. 2816 of 2022
dt. 12.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Birth certificate issued by corporation or municipal authority or panchayat is relevant document to
prove juvenility instead of school leaving record. Manoj @ Monu @ Vishal Chaudhary Vs. State of Haryana
& Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 207 of 2022 (SC).
Applications under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., 1973 are to be supported by affidavit duly sworn by
complainant who seeks invocation of jurisdiction of Magistrate. Babu Venkatesh & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka
& Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 2022 (SC).
Quantity of neutral substance is not to be excluded and to be taken into consideration along with
actual content of weight of offending drug while determining small and commercial quantities. State of Himachal
Pradesh Vs. Karuna Shanker Puri, Criminal Appeal No. 912 of 2010 (SC).
Section 17A of Prevention of Corruption Act not retrospective and not applicable to FIRs before 2018
amendment. State of Rajasthan Vs. Tejmal Choudhary, Criminal Appeal No. 1647 of 2021 (SC).
Proof of demand by bribe by public servant and its acceptance by him is sine quo non for establishing
offence under Section 7 of PC Act. K. Shanthamma Vs. State of Telangana, Criminal Appeal No. 261 of 2022
(SC).
Complaint filed by authorized person of company sufficient for Magistrate to take cognizance of
offence. M/s TRL Krosaki Refractories Ltd. Vs. M/s SMS Asia Private Ltd. & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 270
of 2022 (SC).

296 I June 2022


‘COGNIZANCE’ OUGHT TO BE TAKEN WITHIN
THE SPECIFIED PERIOD
A Bench of Justices Uday Umesh Lalit and
Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha of the Supreme Court
while assessing scope of the Section 468 Cr.P.C., held
in terms of Section 468, cognizance of an offence of
categories specified in Sub Section 2 cannot be taken
after expiry of period specified therein. ‘Cognizance’
ought to be taken within the specified period from the
commission of the offence. However, a complainant
should not be put to prejudice, if for reasons beyond
the control of the prosecuting agency or the
complainant, the cognizance was taken after the period
of limitation. If filing of the complaint or initiation of
the proceedings was within the prescribed period from
the date of commission of an offence, the Court would
be entitled to take cognizance even after the prescribed
period was over.
The Supreme Court held provisions of Domestic
Violence Act contemplate filing of an application under
Section 12 to initiate proceedings before the concerned
Magistrate. Magistrate can pass an appropriate order
after hearing both sides and after considering material
on record. It is only breach of such order which
constitutes an offence as is clear from Section 31 of
the Act. Therefore, when an application under Section
12 of the Act is filed, there is no commission of
offence in terms of Domestic Violence Act and hence
no question of applying limitation prescribed under
Section 468 Cr.P.C. arises. This is because limitation
prescribed under Section 468 Cr.P.C. can apply only
from the date of commission of offence.
The Supreme Court while setting aside the High
Court’s order under Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005 held that the matter has
to be considered by the Magistrate after noting
response of the husband, rival contentions and all
factual aspects, including whether the allegations
CRIM INAL LAW S
constitute a continuing wrong.
On account of application preferred by the appellant
under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005, the proceedings under
Sections 17 and 18 were initiated against the
respondent-husband as well as the father-in-law and
sister-in-law of the appellant. Soon thereafter, father-
in-law and sister-in-law of the appellant filed petition
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
seeking quashing of the proceedings. Another petition
was filed by the respondent-husband seeking
identical relief under Section 482 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. Both the original petitions came
up for hearing before the High Court on 16.03.2020.
The petition filed by the father-in-law and the sister-
in-law was allowed and proceedings against them were
quashed. However, with regard to the petition filed by
the respondent, the high Court took the view that the
application ought to have been filed within one year
of the incident and since the appellant has left the
matrimonial home in the year 2008, the application was
abuse of process of the Court. Thereafter instant
appeal was preferred by the appellant against order
allowing the petition filed by the respondent.
OPERATIVE PART
“It is thus clear that the High Court wrongly equated
filing of an application under Section 12 of the Act
to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution.
In our considered view, the High Court was in error
in observing that the application under Section 12
of the Act ought to have been filed within a period of
one year of the alleged acts of domestic violence.
It is, however, true that as noted by the Protection
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CRIM INAL LAW S
Officer in his Domestic Inspection Report dated
2.08.2018, there appears to be a period of almost 10
years after 16.09.2008, when nothing was alleged by
the appellant against the husband. But that is a
matter which will certainly be considered by the
Magistrate after response is received from the husband
and the rival contentions are considered. That is an
exercise which has to be undertaken by the Magistrate
after considering all the factual aspects presented
before him, including whether the allegations
constitute a continuing wrong.
We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the view
taken by the High Court. Crl. O.P. No.28924 of 2018
is accordingly, dismissed. The husband shall file his
response before the Magistrate within two weeks and
the matter shall thereafter be considered by the
Magistrate in terms of the provisions of the Act.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Kamatchi Vs.
Lakshmi Narayanan, CriminalAppeal No. 627 of
2022 dt. 13.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Prosecution required to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, which it has done, and not beyond
all iota of doubt – Order of conviction proper. Karan Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., Criminal
Appeal No. 327 of 2022 (SC).
It would not be safe to uphold conviction on basis of recovery of stolen article. Tulesh Kumar Sahu
Vs. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No. 753 of 2021 (SC).
Merely because accused lost in elections that by itself cannot be categorized as motive to be foundation
for crime. Taqdir Vs. State of Haryana, Criminal Appeal No. 1537 of 2018 (SC).
Confiscation of truck when accused already acquitted in criminal prosecution, amounts to arbitrary
deprivation of property and violates right guaranteed to each person under Article 300A of Constitution of
India. Abdul Vahab Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 340 of 2022 (SC).
Complete absence of motive assumes different complexion and such absence definitely weighs in favour
of accused. Nandu Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh), Criminal Appeal No. 285 of 2022
(SC).
If criminal offence is distinctly remote and unconnected with common intention. Section 34 would not
be applicable. Krishnamurthy @ Gunodu & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal No. 288 of 2022
(SC).
No evidence to establish that accused informed Bank about loss of cheque book containing blank
cheque – Accused has no case that signature on cheque on question was not put by him. Tedhi Singh Vs.
Narayan Dass Mahant, Criminal Appeal No. 362 of 2022 (SC).
Cancellation of regular bail – Court deciding bail application cannot completely divorce its decision
from material aspects of case. Kamla Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 342 of 2022
(SC).
High Court cannot issue direction that “no arrest” or “no coercive action” till final report is filed,
despite High Court refused to quash criminal proceedings. Priyanka Yadav Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors.,
Criminal Appeal No. 292 of 2022 (SC).

298 I June 2022


VENDOR HAVING ADMITTED EXECUTION OF
AGREEMENT AND RECEIPT OF ADVANCE,
NOTHING FURTHER REMAINED FOR
THE VENDEE TO PROVE
A Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagrathna of
the Supreme Court held vendor having admitted
execution of agreement and receipt of substantial
advance sale consideration, nothing further remained
for the plaintiff-vendee to prove. High Court, was not
required to go into the aspect of execution of the
agreement and payment/receipt of substantial advance
sale consideration, in view of vendor’s admissions.
The Supreme Court observed defendant no. 2 was also
present when the agreement was being entered into.
On appreciation of evidence, Trial Court specifically
found that the stamp paper of agreement to sell was
purchased in the name of the defendant No. 2 and
therefore defendant No. 2 had knowledge of the
agreement. Further, defendants did not reply to the
legal notice served by the plaintiff, which was issued
before filing the suit. Defendant Nos. 2 to 4 failed to
prove that agreement to sell dated 12.04.2005 was a
created document and that no consideration was paid
in respect of it.
The Court further held Trial Court recorded specific
findings that defendant No. 1-vendor had admitted the
execution of agreement to sell in favour of plaintiff by
accepting a substantial advance consideration and
despite defendant No. 2 being aware of the agreement,
had sold the same in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and
4, who were his sisters-in-laws. The sale deeds dated
03.05.2010 in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were
found to be nominal sale deeds. Therefore, Trial Court
rightly decreed the suit for specific performance and
declared sale deeds dated 03.05.2010 to be not binding
upon the plaintiff and defendant No. 1.
That P. Ramasubbamma – the appellant herein –
SPECIFIC PERFORM ANCE
original plaintiff filed the suit for specific performance
of agreement to sell dated 12.04.2005. It was the case
on behalf of the plaintiff that she had entered into an
agreement with V. Vijayalakshmi & Ors. – respondent
No. 1 herein original defendant No. 1 to purchase the
suit schedule property for a sale consideration of Rs.
29 lakhs. An advance amount of Rs. 20 lakhs was paid
under the said agreement. Defendant No. 1 had earlier
executed a general power of attorney in favour of
respondent No. 2 herein original defendant No. 2.
However, defendant No. 2 was present when the
plaintiff entered into an agreement to sell with
defendant No. 1. It was the case on behalf of the
plaintiff that thereafter, on 25.03.2008, defendant Nos.
1 and 2 approached the plaintiff and her husband and
sought payment of Rs. 6 lakhs. On 25.03.2008, the
plaintiff made further payment of Rs. 6 lakhs towards
sale consideration and an endorsement was made by
defendant No. 1 on the agreement, acknowledging the
receipt of Rs. 6 lakhs. According to the plaintif f,
thereafter, despite repeated requests and demands,
defendant No. 1 did not execute the sale deed in
favour of the plaintiff. They learnt that defendant No.
2 by misusing the power of attorney executed by
defendant No. 1 in favour of defendant No. 2,
clandestinely executed two sale deeds in favour of
defendant Nos. 3 and 4 only to defraud the plaintiff.
The plaintiff got served a legal notice to the
defendants on 17.06.2010 calling upon defendant No.
1 to execute the sale deed in her favour by receiving
balance sale consideration of Rs. 3 lakhs. Further ,
thereafter defendant No. 1 did not execute the sale
deed, the plaintiff filed the present suit for specific
performance of the contract/agreement to sell dated
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 299
SPECIFIC PERFORM ANCE
12.04.2005.
The Trial Court decreed the suit and passed a decree
of specific performance. Feeling aggrieved and
dissatisfied with the judgment and decree defendant
Nos. 3 and 4 only preferred an appeal before the High
Court. The High Court allowed the said appeal and
set aside the decree passed by Trial Court. The High
Court has also observed that as there was no prayer
or a particular relief to declare that the sale deed in
favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 is null and void and
not binding on the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, such
a relief could not have been granted by the learned
Trial Court.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order, the plaintiff preferred special
leave petition.
OPERATIVE PART
“In light of the aforesaid factual aspects and the
findings recorded by the learned Trial Court, the
decision of this Court in the case of Lala Durga
Prasad & Ors., 1954 SCR 360 is required to be
referred to. In paragraph 42, it is observed and held
as under:
“42. In our opinion, the proper form of decree
is to direct specific performance of the contract
between the vendor and the plaintiff and direct
the subsequent transferee to join in the
conveyance so as to pass on the title which
resides in him to the plaintiff. He does not join
in any special covenants made between the
plaintiff and his vendor; all he does is to pass
on his title to the plaintiff. This was the course
followed by the Calcutta High Court in
Kafiladdin v. Samiraddin [AIR 1931 Cal 67]
and appears to be the English practice. See
Fry on Specific Performance, 6th Edn., p. 90,
para 207; also Potter v. Sanders [67 ER 1057].
We direct accordingly.”
300 I June 2022
The aforesaid decision has been subsequently referred
to and followed by this Court in the subsequent
decision in the case of Rathnavathi & Anr. (supra).
From the impugned judgment and order passed by the
High Court, it appears that the High Court has
heavily relied upon Section 34 of the Specific Relief
Act. However, considering the fact that specific issues
were framed with respect to sale deeds dated
03.05.2010 executed by original defendant No. 2 in
favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 and the parties led
the evidence also on the aforesaid issues and
thereafter, when the learned Trial Court had given
findings on the said issues and thereafter, had granted
the declaration that the sale deeds executed by
original defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant Nos.
3 and 4 are not binding on defendant No. 1 and the
plaintiff and those sale deeds are nominal sale deeds
and that defendant Nos. 2 to 4 have failed to prove
that agreement to sell dated 12.04.2005 is a created
document and by virtue of the same no consideration
has been paid, Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,
upon which the reliance has been placed by the High
Court will have no application.
The High Court has set aside the judgment and decree
passed by the learned Trial Court on the ground that
the relief under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act,
is a discretionary relief and therefore, in view of the
fact that original defendant No. 2 had executed sale
deeds in favour of defendant Nos. 3 and 4, the learned
Trial Court ought not to have exercised discretion in
favour of the plaintiff for passing the decree for
specific performance. However, in the facts and
circumstances of the case narrated hereinabove and
when the learned Trial Court specifically gave the
findings that defendant No. 1 – vendor specifically
admitted the execution of agreement to sell dated
12.04.2005 in favour of the plaintiff by accepting a
substantial advance consideration and that defendant
No. 2 was in the knowledge of the agreement to sell

and despite the same, he sold the same in favour of
defendant Nos. 3 and 4, who are his sisters-in-law and
that too the sale deeds found to be nominal sale
deeds, the learned Trial Court as such rightly decreed
the suit for specific performance and also rightly
declared that sale deeds dated 03.05.2010 executed
by original defendant No. 2 in favour of defendants
No. 3 and 4 are not binding upon the plaintiff and
SPECIFIC PERFORM ANCE
defendant No. 1. The High Court has committed a
grave error in reversing the judgment and decree
passed by the learned Trial Court by ignoring the
vital facts of the case which are either admitted or
proved in the instant case.”
Reference: Supreme Court. P. Ramasubbamma
Vs. V. Vijayalakshmi & Ors., Civil Appeal No.
2095 of 2022 dt. 11.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Necessary for Magistrate, to have due regard to both initial report submitted under Section 173(2) as
well as supplementary report submitted after further investigation under Section 173(8) of Criminal Procedure
Code. Luckose Zachariah @ Zak Nedumchira Luke & Ors. Vs. Joseph Joseph & Ors., Criminal Appeal No.
256 of 2022 (SC).
Once established and proved that accused persons shared common intention, immaterial whether any
of accused who shared common intention used any weapon or not and/or any of them caused any injury on
deceased or not. State of MP Vs. Ramji Lal Sharma & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 293 of 2022 (SC).
Mere fact that view other than one taken by trial court can be legitimately arrived at by appellant
court on reappraisal of evidence cannot constitute valid and sufficient ground to interfere with order of acquittal.
Sanjeev & Anr. Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, Criminal Appeal No. 870 of 2016 (SC).
Crucial test has to be applied which is more than prima facie case as exercised at time of framing of
charge. Sagar Vs. State of UP & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 397 of 2022 (SC).
Mens rea or actus reus not essential element for imposing penalty/damages for breach of civil
obligations/liabilities. Horticulture Experiment Station Gonikoppal, Coorg Vs. Regional Provident Fund
Organization, Civil Appeal No. 2136 of 2012 (SC).
Employer’s preference for person with clean service record can be well appreciated. Rama Negi Vs.
Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 1713-1714 of 2022 (SC).
Not belonging to Scheduled Tribe community is crucial fact which deprives employer of any discretion
in matter of terminating her services. Jayashree Vs. Director Collegiate Education, Civil Appeal No. 1559 of
2022 (SC).
Functional loss of 100% of right upper limb and cannot perform job of driver forever – Reduction of
compensation set aside. Arjun S/o Ramanna @ Ramu Vs. Iffco Tokio General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.,
Civil Appeal No. 1555 of 2022 (SC).
Dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement till date of his reinstatement, is to be treated as period
spent on duty and employee entitled for salary for period till reinstatement. Sukhdarshan Singh Vs. The State
of Punjab & Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 811-812 of 2022 (SC).

www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 301

 TOO TRUE
"In a case where the Bar Council is not taking appropriate action against the advocate, it would be open to
the High Court to entertain the writ petition and to issue appropriate directions to the Bar Council to take
action in accordance with the law in the discharge of duties enjoined upon it."
Arun Mishra, J. in
R. Muthukrishnan v. High Court of Judicature at Madras, Writ Petition (C) No. 612 of 2016.

"In a country, which follows the Rule of Law, independence of the judiciary is sacrosanct. There can be no
Rule of Law, there can be no democracy unless there is a strong, fearless and independent judiciary. This
independence and fearlessness is not only expected at the level of the Superior Courts but also from the
District Judiciary."
Deepak Gupta, J. in
Krishna Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 8950 of 2011.

"In terms of Section 22(1) of the UGC Act, right to confer degrees can be exercised only by a university
established or incorporated by or under a Central Act. a Provincial Act or a State Act or by an institution
deemed to be a university under Section 3 of the UGC Act or by an institution specially empowered by an
Act of Parliament to confer or grant degrees. The intent of Parliament is clear that it is only that body
which is referred to in Section 22(1), that is competent to confer or grant degrees."
Uday U. Lalit, J. in
Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India) v. State of Punjab, Miscellaneous Application No. 2367 of 2018
in Civil Appeal No. 17922 of 2017.

"In the area of environmental governance, the means are as significant as the ends. The processes of
decision are as crucial as the ultimate decision. The basic postulate of the 2006 notification is that the path
which is prescribed for disclosures, studies, gathering data, consultation and appraisal is designed in a
manner that would secure decision-making which is transparent, responsive and inclusive."
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. in
Hanuman Laxman Aroskar Vs. Union of India, Civil Appeal No. 12251 of 2018.

"In the case in hand, there are allegations of laundering the proceeds of the crime. The Enforcement
Directorate claims to have certain specific inputs from various sources, including overseas banks. Letter
rogatory is also said to have been issued and some response have been received by the Department.
Having regard to the nature of allegations and the stage of the investigation, the investigating agency has
to be given sufficient freedom in the process of investigation. Considering the facts and circumstances of
the case, grant of anticipatory bail to the appellant [former Finance Minister of India] will hamper the
investigation and this is not a fit case for exercise of discretion to grant anticipatory bail to the appellant."
R. Banumathi, J. in
P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, Criminal Appeal No. 1340 of 2019.

"In the utilities, tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint if not
judicial deference to legislative judgment. The legislature after all has the affirmative responsibility. The

302 I June 2022

 TOO TRUE
courts have only the power to destroy, not to reconstruct."
Ashok Bhushan, J. in
ALD Automotive (P) Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, Civil Appeal Nos. 10412-10413 of 2018.

"It is more than well settled that the exemption granted, even when the notification granting exemption
prescribes a particular period till which it is available, can be withdrawn by the State, if it is found that such
a withdrawal is in the public interest. In such a case, the larger public interest would outweigh the
individual interest, if any. In such a case, even the doctrine of promissory estoppels would not come to the
rescue of the persons claiming exemptions and compel the State not to resile from its promise, if the act of
the State is found to be in public interest to do so."
B.R. Gavai, J. in
Union of India Vs. M/s Unicorn Industries, Civil Appeal No. 7432 of 2019.

"In the practice of medicine, there could be varying approaches to treatment. There can be a genuine
difference of opinion. However, while adopting a course of treatment, the medical professional must ensure
that it is not unreasonable. The threshold to prove unreasonableness is set with due regard to the risks
associated with medical treatment and the conditions under which medical professionals function. This is to
avoid a situation where doctors resort to “defensive medicine” to avoid claims of negligence, often to the
detriment of the patient. Hence, in a specific case where unreasonableness in professional conduct has
been proven with regard to the circumstances of that case, a professional cannot escape liability for medical
evidence merely by relying on a body of professional opinion."
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. in
Arun Kumar Manglik Vs. Chirayu Health and Medicare Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal
Nos. 227-228 of 2019.

"In the process of sentencing, any one factor, whether of extenuating circumstance or aggravating, cannot,
by itself, be decisive of the matter. In the same sequence, mere passage of time, by itself, cannot be a
clinching factor, though, in an appropriate case, it may be of some bearing, along with other relevant
factors. Moreover, when certain extenuating or mitigating circumstances are suggested on behalf of the
convict, the other factors relating to the nature of crime and its impact the social order and public interest
cannot be lost sight of."
Dinesh Maheshwari, J. in
State of M.P. v. Suresh, Criminal Appeal No. 319 of 2019.

"In the quest towards ensuring the rights guaranteed to every individual, a constitutional court such as
ours is faced with an additional task. Transformative adjudication must provide remedies in individual
instances that arise before the court. In addition, it must seek to recognise and transform the underlying
social and legal structures that perpetuate practices against the constitutional vision. Subjecting personal
laws to constitutional scrutiny is an important step in this direction."
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, J. in
Indian Young Lawyers Association Vs. State of Kerala & Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 373 of 2006.

www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 303

CRIM INAL LAW S
EXECUTIVE POWER CANNOT BE
EXERCISED ARBITRARILY
A Bench of Justices Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud
and Aniruddha Bose of the Supreme Court while
allowing petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
held, while a discretion vests with the government to
suspend or remit the sentence, this prerogative of the
executive is subject to the rule of law and fairness in
state action embodied in Article 14. Executive power
cannot be exercised arbitrarily. The decision to grant
remission should be informed, fair and reasonable.
Though Court can review the decision of the
government to determine if it was arbitrary, it cannot
usurp the power of the government and grant
remission itself.
The Top Court further ruled that the opinion of the
presiding judge was in the teeth of the provisions of
Section 432 (2) CrPC which require such opinion to be
accompanied by reasons. An opinion without adequate
reasons would not serve the purpose for which the
exercise under Section 432(2) is to be undertaken,
which is to enable the executive to make an informed
decision taking into consideration all relevant factors.
The Supreme Court thus directed to reconsider the
application for grant of remission to the life convict.
The petitioner (Ram Chander) and co-accused came in
a tractor carrying deadly weapons and assaulted the
complainant and killed his father and brother, when
they were sitting near a village pond along with other
villagers. The cause of the enmity between the parties
was the confiscation of shisham wood belonging to
one of the co-accused by the forest department and
the damage caused to his motorcycle and tractor, for
which the accused persons suspected the complainant
and his family. The trial court in ST No 16/2006
convicted the petitioner and the other accused on 7
December 2010. The petitioner was convicted of
304 I June 2022
offences under Sections 147, 148, 302/149 and 324/149
of the IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment. While
a charge was also framed under Section 3(2) (5) of the
Scheduled Castes and Tribes Act 1989 since the
complainant and his family belonged to a Scheduled
Caste, the trial court acquitted all the accused of the
charge because no evidence was found to show that
the complainant or the deceased were humiliated or
intimidated on the basis of their caste. The sentence
was confirmed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in
Criminal Appeal No. 933/2010 on 10 May 2013.
Aggrieved by the judgement of the High Court, the
petitioner preferred a Special Leave Petition (Criminal)
No. 1348-49 of 2015 before Supreme Court which was
dismissed.
On 25.09.2021, the petitioner completed 16 years of
imprisonment without remission and submitted an
application for premature release to the respondent
under Rule 358 of the Chhattisgarh Prisons Rules,
1968.
By a letter dated 01.05.2021, the Jail Superintendent
sought the opinion of the Special Judge, Durg on
whether the petitioner can be released on remission.
On 02.07.2021, the Special Judge gave his opinion that
it would not be appropriate to allow remission of the
remaining sentence of the petitioner. The application
for remission along with opinion was forwarded to the
Director General Jail. On 30.09.2021, the matter was
considered by the Home Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh.
On 02.03.2022, the Director General, Jail forwarded the
case of the petitioner to the Additional Chief
Secretary, Jail Department for remission since the
petitioner had completed 20 years of imprisonment
with remission. The Jail Department sought the

opinion of the Law Department, which stated that
since the presiding judge of the sentencing court has
not given a positive opinion with regard to the release
of the petitioner, he cannot be released.
In his opinion dated 21.07.2021 the Special Judge,
Durg referred to the crime for which the petitioner was
convicted and simply stated that in view of the facts
and circumstances it would not be appropriate to grant
remission.
OPERATIVE PART
“In Sriharan (supra), the Court observed that the
opinion of the presiding judge shines a light on the
nature of the crime that has been committed, the
record of the convict, their background and other
relevant factors. Crucially, the Court observed that
the opinion of the presiding judge would enable the
government to take the ‘right’ decision as to whether
or not the sentence should be remitted. Hence, it
cannot be said that the opinion of the presiding judge
is only a relevant factor, which does not have any
determinative effect on the application for remission.
The purpose of the procedural safeguard under
Section 432 (2) of the CrPC would stand defeated if
the opinion of the presiding judge becomes just
another factor that may be taken into consideration
by the government while deciding the application for
remission. It is possible then that the procedure under
Section 432 (2) would become a mere formality.
However, this is not to say that the appr opriate
government should mechanically follow the opinion
of the presiding judge. If the opinion of the presiding
judge does not comply with the requirements of
Section 432 (2) or if the judge does not consider the
relevant factors for grant of remission that have been
laid down in Laxman Naskar v . Union of India
(supra), the government may request the presiding
judge to consider the matter afresh.
In the present case, there is nothing to indicate that
CRIM INAL LAW S
the presiding judge took into account the factors
which have been laid down in Laxman Naskar v .
Union of India (supra). These factors include
assessing (i) whether the offence affects the society at
large; (ii) the probability of the crime being repeated;
(iii) the potential of the convict to commit crimes in
future; (iv) if any fruitful purpose is being served by
keeping the convict in prison; and (v) the socio-
economic condition of the convict’s family. In Laxman
Naskar v. State of West Bengal (supra) and State of
Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216, this Court has
reiterated that these factors will be considered while
deciding the application of a convict for premature
release.
Thus, an opinion accompanied by inadequate
reasoning would not satisfy the requirements of
Section 432 (2) of the CrPC. Further, it will not serve
the purpose for which the exercise under Section 432
(2) is to be undertaken, which is to enable the
executive to make an informed decision taking into
consideration all the relevant factors.
In view of the above discussion, we hold that the
petitioner’s application for remission should be re-
considered. We direct the Special Judge, Dur g to
provide an opinion on the application afresh
accompanied by adequate reasoning that takes into
consideration all the relevant factors that govern the
grant of remission as laid down in Laxman Naskar v.
Union of India (supra). The Special Judge, Durg must
provide his opinion within a month of the date of the
receipt of this order. We further direct the State of
Chhattisgarh to take a final decision on the
petitioner’s application for remission afresh within a
month of receiving the opinion of the Special Judge,
Durg.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Ram Chander Vs.
The State of Chhattisgarh & Anr., Writ Petition
(Crl.) No. 49 of 2022 dt. 22.04.2022.
—————
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ARBITRATION
CAUSE OF ACTION TO FILE APPLICATION
UNDER ARBITRATION ACT
A Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
of the Supreme Court held merely because legal notice
calling upon the respondent to pay the amount due
and payable or to refer the dispute to the arbitrator
was made in the year 2018, it cannot be said that cause
of action to file the application under Section 11(6) of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 accrued in
the year 2018/2019. The legal notice was served after
a period of approximately 30 years from the date of
completion of work.
That Vishram Varu & Co. – the appellant herein was
issued work order in the year 1982. That the work was
executed in the year 1986. According to the appellant
herein, he executed excess quantity of work beyond
the schedule quantity of work to be done. Therefore,
he was entitled to the additional amount for the excess
quantity of work done. It is the case on behalf of the
appellant that a lot of correspondence was made by
the appellant, however, the amount due and payable
with respect to the excess quantity of work done was
not paid. The appellant through letter dated 31.05.2018
requested the General Manager of South Eastern
Railway to release the amount due or refer the dispute
to the arbitrator under clauses 63 & 64 of General
Conditions of Contract (GCC) under the 1996 Act,
however, no action was taken on the said letter .
Thereafter vide letter/communication dated 22.10.2018,
again the same request was made to the General
Manager, South Eastern Railway either to pay the
amount which was overdue or refer the dispute to the
arbitrator, which was repeated vide communications
dated 11.01.2019 and 11.03.2019. According to the
appellant, thereafter the appellant sent the Statement
of Claim which was payable to him as per the work
order dated 7.4.1982 issued by the railway authorities,
which was executed up to 11.05.1986 and the work
order dated 15.01.1984, which was executed up to
306 I June 2022
26.08.1985. According to him, as per the statement of
claim, the total amount due and payable was Rs.
1,19,46,297/-.
Thereafter, the appellant sent a legal notice through
his advocate on 31.07.2019 invoking the arbitration
clause and seeking appointment of an arbitrator by the
office of the General Manager. However, the arbitrator
was not appointed as per clauses 63 & 64 of GCC. The
appellant hereafter filed the present Arbitration
Petition before the High Court under Section 11(6) of
the 1996 Act and prayed to appoint the arbitrator to
resolve the dispute between the parties. By the
impugned order, the High Court has dismissed the said
application on the ground that the arbitration petition
in 2019 is hopelessly barred by limitation.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
order passed by the High Court dismissing the
arbitration petition under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act
on the ground that it is barred by limitation, the original
applicant has preferred the present appeal.
OPERATIVE PART
“Now, so far as the reliance placed upon the decision
of this Court in the case of Bharat Sanchar Nigam
Limited (supra) is concerned, the said decision shall
not be applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In
the aforesaid decision, the Court was not dealing
with such a situation where the legal notice was
issued and served and the arbitration clause was
invoked after a period of thirty-two years. In the
aforesaid decision, this Court has not stated and/or
observed and/or held that despite the fact that the
legal notice invoking the arbitration clause and/or
request for referring the dispute to the arbitrator is
made after 20/30 years, still the application under
Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act can be entertained.

Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case,
narrated hereinabove, the High Court has not
committed any error in dismissing the application
under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act on the ground
that it is hopelessly barred by limitation and is a stale
claim. We are in complete agreement with the view
ARBITRATION
taken by the High Court.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Vishram Varu & Co.
Vs. Union of India, represented by the General
Manager, South Eastern Railway, Kolkata, Civil
Appeal No. 2964 of 2022 dt. 21.04.2022.
—————

IN B R IE F
Child of second wife of employee cannot be denied compassionate appointment. Mukesh Kumar &
Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1620 of 2022 (SC).
Jurisdiction of High Court to issue writ of quo warranto is a limited one, which can only be issued
when appointment is contrary to statutory rules. Gambhirdan K. Gadhvi Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors., Writ
Petition (Civil) No. 1525 of 2019 (SC).
Non disclosure of criminal case – Candidate juvenile on date when complaint made and discharged by
trial Judge not noticed by authorities while exercising its judicious discretion and no opportunity of hearing
granted – Cancellation of appointment set aside. Umesh Chandra Yadav Vs. Inspector General and Chief
Security Commissioner, RPF, Civil Appeal No. 1964 of 2022 (SC).
If employee is not at all at fault and kept out of work by reasons of decision taken by employer , denial
of fruits of her being vindicated at end of day would be unfair to employee. Gowramma C (Dead) by Lrs. Vs.
Manager (Personnel) Hindustan Aeronautical Ltd. & Anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 1575-1576 of 2022 (SC).
Liability to pay interest on amount of arrears/compensation be from date of accident and not from
date of order passed by Commissioner. Shobha & Ors. Vs. Chairman, Vithalrao Shinde Sahakari Sakhar
Karkhana Ltd. & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 1860 of 2022 (SC).
Suspension from service – Courts would not interfere unless grossly disporportionate. Union of India
& Ors. Vs. Managobinda Samantaray, Civil Appeal No.s 1622-1623 of 2022 (SC).
Seniority either inter se or between direct recruits and promotes or recruitment made by different
sources is being governed by statutory scheme of rules. M. Kendra Devi Vs. Government of Tamil Nadu &
Ors., Civil Appeal Nos. 1918-1919 of 2022 (SC).
Employer has right to withhold payment of gratuity during pendency of disciplinary proceedings. The
Secretary, Local Self Government Department & Ors. Vs. K. Chandran, Civil Appeal No. 7437-7438 of 2021
(SC).
Discharge from service – Merely passing of wrong order does not warrant initiation of disciplinary
proceedings against judicial officer – Negligence cannot be treated to be misconduct. Abhay Jain Vs. High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan & Anr., Civil Appeal No. 2029 of 2022 (SC).
Fixation of inter se seniority between direct recruits and promotes – Seniority of promotes functioning
in temporary posts not forming part of cadre, is to be fixed from date of promotion/appointment. B.S. Murthy
& Ors. Vs. A. Ravinder Singh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 3968 of 2009 (SC).

www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 307

SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
INTERFERENCE BY COURTS IMPERMISSIBLE
UNLESS ORDER IS CONTRARY TO LAW
A Bench of Justices M.R. Shah and B.V. Nagarathna
of the Supreme Court while upholding the judgment
of Gauhati High Court held question of quantum of
punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the
disciplinary authority to decide and the jurisdiction of
the High Courts under Article 226 or of the
Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to
the applicability of one more or other well known
principles known as ‘W ednesbury principles’.
Interference by courts is impermissible unless the
order is contrary to law or is passed without
considering relevant factors or by considering
irrelevant factors or the decision is one which no
reasonable person can take.
The Supreme Bench held nature of allegations were
grave. Appellant might have entered the Mahila
Barrack to meet his alleged female friend, but the
indisciplined act leading to compromising the security
of the Mahila Barrack could not be tolerated. As a
member of the disciplined force, he was expected to
follow the rules and have controlled over his mind and
passion. Appellant’s misconduct was found proved in
the disciplinary enquiry which was held after following
prescribed procedure under the SSB Rules. Earlier
punishment of dismissal was imposed but same was
rightly converted to punishment of ‘removable from
service’ as unpardonable. The punishment was
confirmed by the appellate authority. In view of these
facts, it was not open for the Single Judge to interfere
with the order of punishment.
The Bench held Single Judge failed to appreciate that
the misconduct of a male constable entering the
Mahila Barrack at midnight was more serious and could
not be equated with the misconduct committed by a
308 I June 2022
female constable. Even otherwise, merely because one
of the employees was inflicted with a lesser
punishment cannot be a ground to hold the
punishment imposed on another employee as
disproportionate, if in case of another employee higher
punishment is warranted and inflicted by the
disciplinary authority after due application of mind.
There cannot be any negative discrimination. Penalty
to be imposed on a particular employee depends upon
various factors.
Anil Kumar Upadhyay – the appellant herein was
serving as a Head Constable (Ministerial) in the 15 th
Battalion of the Sashastra Seema Bal (SSB),
Bongaigaon. He was charged with violation of good
order and discipline under Section 43 of the Shashastra
Seema Bal Act, 2007 (SSB Act), for having entered the
Mahila Barrack of the Battalion at around 00:15 hours,
on the intervening night of 14th - 15 th April, 2013. He
was charged with indiscipline and misconduct leading
to compromising the security of the occupants of the
Mahila Barrack. He was apprehended inside the Mahila
Barrack by six female constables. The matter was
reported to the superiors. He was placed under
suspension. A departmental enquiry was initiated
against him. The appellant pleaded not guilty to the
charges and the Deputy Commandant of the Battalion
was ordered to ensure the Record of Evidence (ROE).
During the ROE, the statements of prosecution and
defence witnesses were recorded. He was afforded an
opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution
witnesses. That the ROE was submitted by the Deputy
Adjutant and after due consideration of the same, the
Battalion Commandant heard the appellant and under
the SSB Rules, the Summary Force Court (SFC) was

ordered against the delinquent – Head Constable.
Before the SFC, the appellant pleaded not guilty to
both the charges and accordingly the evidence was
recorded. Thereafter, the SFC found the appellant
guilty of the charges and initially ordered for his
dismissal on 29.04.2013. But, subsequently , the
penalty of dismissal was converted to ‘removal from
service’ on 21.06.2013 by the Commandant of the
Battalion. The departmental appeal filed by the
delinquent – Head Constable came to be rejected at
first, as time barred on 06.12.2013, but later on, the
Appellate Authority upheld the disciplinary action
under its order dated 24.01.2014.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order of
removal from service passed by the disciplinary
authority, the appellant – delinquent preferred a writ
petition before the High Court.
The Single Judge held that all due opportunities was
afforded to the delinquent and the finding of guilt is
found to have been based on cogent material and the
evidence on both side received due consideration and
hence under test of preponderance of probability the
delinquent has been held guilty.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment
and order passed by the learned Single Judge, the
disciplinary authority preferred writ appeal before the
Division Bench. By the impugned judgment and order,
the Division Bench of the High Court has set aside
the judgment and order passed by the Single Judge.
Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied the appellant filed
special leave petition.
OPERATIVE PART
“Even otherwise, merely because one of the employees
was inflicted with a lesser punishment cannot be a
SERV ICE & LABO UR LAW S
ground to hold the punishment imposed on another
employee as disproportionate, if in case of another
employee higher punishment is warranted and
inflicted by the disciplinary authority after due
application of mind. There cannot be any negative
discrimination. The punishment/penalty to be imposed
on a particular employee depends upon various
factors, like the position of the employee in the
department, role attributed to him and the nature of
allegations against him. Therefore, the Division Bench
of the High Court is absolutely justified in interfering
with the judgment and order passed by the learned
Single Judge, interfering with the order of punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority removing the
appellant from service. If the conduct on the part of
the appellant entering the Mahila Barrack of the
Battalion in the midnight is approved, in that case, it
would lead to compromising the security of the
occupants of the Mahila Barrack. Therefore, the
disciplinary authority was absolutely justified in
imposing the punishment/penalty of ‘removal from
service’ by modifying the earlier punishment of
dismissal. The same cannot be said to be
disproportionate at all to the misconduct held to be
proved against the appellant – delinquent.
In view of the above and for the reasons stated above,
the present appeal fails and the same deserves to be
dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. However, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall
be no order as to costs.”
Reference: Supreme Court. Anil Kumar
Upadhyay Vs. The Director General, SSB &
Others, Civil Appeal No. 2707 of 2022 dt.
20.04.2022.
—————
www.lawteller.com I June 2022 I 309
A man chosen for jury duty really wanted to be D I D Y OU K N OW ?
dismissed from serving. He tried every excuse he could
think of but none of them worked. On the day of the Ken t u ck y, U.S.
trial, he decided to give it one more shot. As the trial A person can be sent to jail for five years
was about to begin, he asked if he could approach the for merely sending a bottle of beer, wine or
bench. spirits as a gift to a friend.
“Your Honor”, he said, “I must be excused from this trial
because I am prejudiced against the defendant. I took
Fl o r i d a, U.S.
one look at the man in the blue suit with those beady
Beer m ay not be sold bet ween 2am and
eyes and that dishonest face and I said “He’s a crook!
7am.
He’s guilty!” So, Your Honor, I cannot possibly serve
on this jury.”
To which the Judge replied, “Get back in the jury box, In d i an a, U.S.
you fool. That man is the defendant’s lawyer.” You can get out of paying for a dependent’s
m edical care by praying for him / her.

As the lawyer awoke from surgery, he asked, "Why are

Fl o r i d a, U.S.
all the blinds drawn?" The nurse answered, "There's a
Rat s are forbidden from leaving t he ships
fire across the street, and we didn't want you to think
docked in Tam pa Bay.
you had died."
Disclaimer - Lawteller Team is not responsible for the
actuality of the above information as available in the
public domain.
An elderly patient needed a heart transplant and
discussed his options with his doctor.
The doctor said, “We have 3 possible donors; the 1st is
a young, healthy athlete who died in an automobile
accident, the 2nd is a middle-aged businessman who
never drank or smoked and who died flying his private
jet. The 3rd is an attorney who died after practicing law
for 30 years. Which do you want?”
“I’ll take the lawyer’s heart,” said the patient.
After a successful transplant, the doctor asked the
patient why he had chosen the donor he did. “It was
easy,” said the patient, “I wanted a heart that hadn’t
been used much.”

Judge: Did you kill him?

Accused: No!
Judge: You know what the punishment is for committing
"Consultation fee?... But I only asked you
perjury?
how you were!""
Accused: Much less than murder.
Courtesy - www.cartoonstock.com

310 I June 2022

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