International Phenomenological Society

Review
Author(s): Felix Kaufmann
Review by: Felix Kaufmann
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Mar., 1947), pp. 461-466
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2102800
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 REVIEWS

A History of WesternPhilosophy and its Connectionwith Political and Social

Circumstancesfrom the Earliest Times to the Present Day. BERTRAND
RUSSELL.New York, Simon and Schuster,1945. Pp. xxiii, 895.
There will be thousandsof enthusiasticreadersof Russell'sbook, par-
ticularlyoutsidethe circleof professionalphilosophers;forit is a treasureof
valuable informationabout the milieu in which the great philosophers
flourished,it containsskilfullycondensedaccountsof theirlives enrichedby
characteristicanecdotes,andit drawsoutlinesof theirdoctrineswith critical
comments. Writtenin Russell'sinimitableprose,which combineslucidity
with brillianceof wit, it aboundsin strikingobservationson a greatvariety
of topics rangingfromlogic and mathematicsto politics and poetry.
I doubt,however,whetherthe book will promotegenuineunderstanding
of the philosophicachievementsof the past. It seems to me that the
interpretationsof paramountphilosophicaldoctrines(particularlythose of
Plato, Aristotle,Kant) are inadequate,and I wonderwhetherthey will not
discouragereadersfrom a more thoroughstudy of these doctrines. The
signposts which Russell erects in front of them are, indeed, warnings
rather than guides. Chiefly responsiblefor this fact is Russell's general
view of philosophy. In what follows I shall bring into relief and examine
this basic point.
Russell formulateshis conceptionof philosophyon the first page of his
introductorychapter, where he says:
"Philosophy,as I shall understandthe word, is somethingintermediate
betweentheologyand science. Liketheology,it consistsof speculationson
matters as to-which definiteknowledgehas, so far, been unascertainable;
but like science, it appeals to human reason rather than to authority,
whetherthat of traditionor that of revelation. All definiteknowledge-so
I should contend-belongs to science; all dogma as to what surpasses
definite knowledge belongs to theology. But between theology and
sciencethere is a No Man's Land, exposedto attacks fromboth sides;this
matter?" "Has No Man's Landis philosophy"(p. XIII).
Amongthe representativesamplesof philosophicalproblemsmentioned
by Russell in developingthis point are these: "Is the world divided into
mind and matter, and, if so, what is mind andwhat is matter?" "Hasthe
universeany unity or purpose? Is it evolving towards some goal? Are,
there reallylaws of nature, or do we believe in them only because of our
innate love of order?" "Is there a way of living that is noble and another,
461

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462 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

that is base, or are all ways of living merely futile? If there is a way of
living that is noble, in what does it consist, and how shall we achieve it?"
(p. XIII). "To such questions," Russell states, "no answer can be found
in the laboratory. Theologies have professed to give answers, all too
definite; but their very definiteness causes modern minds to view them with
suspicion. The studying of these questions, if not the answering of them,
is the business of philosophy" (p. XIV).
This appraisal of philosophy bears strong resemblance to August Comte's
account of metaphysics in the presentation of his law of the Three Stages;
it is in tune with the traditional positivist view of philosophy. Acceptance
of this view suggests a treatment of the history of philosophy along the
following lines: The first task in dealing with the philosophical doctrines
of the past is to refute their claims that they provide absolutely certain
knowledge and solutions of problems which cannot be obtained by scientific
method. After discarding these claims the positivist historian of philoso-
phy will uncover the psychological and sociological roots of the doctrines
and explain why they have had a strong impact on human thought and
action in spite of their errors and shortcomings. Following this pattern
of argument, Russell elaborates on the thesis that philosophy may be
regarded as a compromise between religion and science. With science it
shares the belief in the power of the rational faculty of man and the reluc-
tance to accept dogmas issued by an authority without subjecting them to
rational examination; with religion it shares the belief in immutable truth
attainable by methods other than those of empirical research, i.e. of planned
and properly interpreted observation. This compromise reflects man's
persistent attempt to reconcile two opposite attitudes toward society; his
desire for both an order, which means social cohesion, and for individual
liberty. Traditional religious beliefs are powerful tools in establishing
and preserving social cohesion, but the scientific spirit which is the spirit
of individual liberty, is steadily at work in undermining these beliefs by
showing that they do not square with its own findings.
This general pattern of conflicts can be traced through the history of
mankind from the first beginnings of scientific thinking down to our own
time, but their peculiar shape has been determined by the specific condi-
tions of social life in different ages and in different countries. This fact
accounts to some extent for the diversities of philosophical doctrines which
tried to resolve those conflicts. Russell's pertinent view has no doubt
been strongly influenced by Marxian teachings, but he does not unre-
servedly endorse Marx' dictum that it is not man's thought which deter-
mines his existence, but rather his social existence which determines his
thought. "There is here a reciprocal causation: the circumstances of men's
lives do much to determine their philosophy, but, conversely, their philoso-

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 REVIEWS 463'

phy does much to determine their circumstances" (p. XIV). Accordingly

it is the author's avowed purpose "to exhibit philosophy as an integral part
of social and political life: not as the isolated speculations of remarkable
individuals, but as both an effect and a cause of the character of the various
communities in which different systems flourished" (Preface).
Russell does not consistently stick to this plan, and I think that this is
fortunate. Where he does his conclusions are often debatable. A striking
example is his interpretation of Dewey's Instrumentalism as a philosophy
of social power in harmony with the age of industrialism and collective
enterprise of which the United States is the foremost embodiment. It does
not require a very thorough study of Dewey's works on the theory of inquiry
(which are of central philosophical interest) to recognize how little such a
characterization can help us in an attempt to grasp the gist of his argument.
Nor does it promote an understanding of his theory of valuation. The
pivotal point of this theory, which is that the valuation of ends depends on
the valuation of means no less than the latter depends upon the former,
might in fact be most readily grasped in examining the principles of valua-
tion prevailing in modern industrial society. But the principle holds
wherever valuation has reached a certain level of rationality, in other
words, wherever consistent attempts toward organisation of valuations
are being made. Even if we may find in Dewey's view a predilection for
the industrial age, this does not affect his argument and is therefore irrele-
vant for an analysis of his philosophical view.
We have dwelt upon this point because it suggests some general observa-
tions concerning the sociological interpretation of philosophical doctrines.
In shedding light on the motives "behind" a particular philosophical
analysis it may provide some important clues for an examination of the pro-
cedure followed and the results obtained. Many ethical doctrines (for
instance those of natural law) have been established with the end-in-view
either of supporting or of attacking social conditions prevailing at the time
of their establishment, and the resulting bias is sometimes responsible for
flaws in the argument. As a consequence it is possible to explain errors by
tracing them to this source. One may even be aided in discovering errors
by focusing attention upon such points of a philosophical argument as are
most likely to be affected by a certain bias. But all this is secondary to the
task of telling error from genuine insight. The theory of knowledge is
logically prior to the sociology of knowledge and cannot be supplanted by
it.
Russell might be ready to grant this as far as scientific thinking is con-
cerned but he would probably refuse to admit that the statement is appli-
cable to a critical examination of philosophy. He may be supposed to
contend that philosophy, as severed from science, is eo ipso erroneous,,

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464 RESEARCH
PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL

because it makes the unwarrantable basic claim that it provides a peculiar

kind of knowledge unattainable by scientific method. The question
whether this claim is essential for philosophy as represented by the great
majority of doctrines discussed in Russell's book is therefore of prime
relevance in an appraisal of his position.
I think that the claim is not essential, and I submit, accordingly, that to
discard the claim of irrefutable knowledge of fact is not tantamount to
rejecting most of the philosophical doctrines of the past, lock, stock and
barrel, not even those usually labeled "rationalistic" or "aprioristic",
which are the chief targets of Russell's criticism.
The fundamental epistemological distinction made by all rationalist
(as well as some empiricist) doctrines is the one between rational knowledge
as we have it in pure mathematics and logic, and empirical knowledge
which is linked to perceptual experience. The chief error of extreme
rationalism lies in its contention that statements of fact (synthetic proposi-
tions) can be derived from the results of "reasoning" (analytical proposi-
tions). The error is aggravated by contrasting empirical knowledge as
merely probable with absolutely certain and "therefore superior" rational
knowledge. Epigones have distorted the paramount rationalist doctrines
and misused them for "philosophical refutations" of scientific findings
(like Galileo's discovery of the Jupiter satellites). These errors were
bound to arouse the wrath of those who endorse the cause of science. But
they should not make us overlook the fact that the works of the great
philosophers from Plato and Aristotle down to Kant and Husserl (who is not
mentioned by Russell) were primarily concerned with clarification of mean-
ings rather than with matters of fact. In analyzing the meanings of
"time," "space," "motion," "substance," "causality," of "virtue" and
"justice" they pursued what Russell calls "logical analysis" and they did
pretty well at it, too. This is not to impose philosophy upon science as a
superscience-it is rather to lay the foundation to a genuine understanding
of science,
Russell himself deals with this point in the last chapter of his book in
which he elaborates the fundamentals of his own approach. He states:
(pp. 830 f.) "It gradually became clear that a great part of philosophy can
be reduced to something that may be called syntax, though the word has
to be used in a somewhat wider sense than has hitherto been customary.
Some men, notably Carnap, have advanced the theory that all philosophical
problems are really syntactical, and that, when errorsin syntax are avoided,
a philosophical problem is thereby either solved or shown to be insoluble.
I think this is an overstatement, but there can be no doubt that the utility
of philosophical syntax in relation to traditional problems is very great."
The crucial question suggested by this statement is obviously: What

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 REVIEWS 465

is meant by "errors in syntax," in other words, what are the criteria for
the distinction between a correct and an incorrect syntax? Russell does
not ask this question nor does he offer any hint toward answering it. lie
merely illustrates his point by reference to his theoryof descriptions. "Ac-
cording to this theory, when a statement containing a phrase of the form
'the so-and-so' is rightly analyzed, the phrase 'the so-and-so' disappears.
For example, take the statement Scott was the author of Waverley. The
theory interprets this statement as saying: 'One and only one man wrote
Waverley,and that man was Scott.' Or, more fully: 'There is an entity c
such that the statement 'x wrote Waverley'is true if x is c and false other-
wise; moreover c is Scott.' The first part of this, before the word 'more-
over' is defined as meaning: 'The author of Waverleyexists (or existed or
will exist)'."
After having disposed, by application of his theory of description, of the
puzzle as to what is meant when we say 'The golden mountain does not
exist' Russell adds: "Existence according to this theory, can only be asserted
of descriptions. We can say 'The author of Waverley exists,' but to say
'Scott exists' is bad grammar, or rather bad syntax. This clears up two
millenia of muddle-headedness about 'existence' beginning with Plato's
Theaetetus" (p. 831). These are bold words, but they do not indicate how
we are to tell good syntax from bad syntax.
Russell's disciple and penetrating critic Ludwig Wittgenstein was fully
aware of the significance of this problem. Crediting Russell with having
shown "that the apparent logical form of the proposition need not be its
real form" (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 4.0031) he postulates a lan-
guage which is isomorphous with reality. "The propositions show the
logical form of reality. They exhibit it" (Ibid., 4.121). But this, again,
gives rise to the question: How do we apprehend the form of reality which
is presupposed in distinguishing between the apparent form of a proposition
and its real form? In other words: Granted that the core of philosophy is
"critique of language," what are the standards in terms of which wre
criticize a language? By what kind of experience are they given? This
question was uppermost in Plato's and Aristotle's thought. We cannot
properly appraise their work, nor that of the philosophers who followed in
their footsteps, if we fail to keep this in mind. We are then prone to take
their problems and arguments too lightly and to dismiss philosophical
problems of the first order as pseudo-problems.
The problem of "existence" is a case in point. This problem is by no
means solved or disposed of if we recognize that "existence" can only be
asserted of descriptions. It is certainly important to realize that "Scott
exists" is bad grammar, and that "the author of Waverley exists" is good
grammar, but the fundamental philosophical issue concerning "existence"

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466 PHILOSOPHYAND PHENOMENOLOGICAL
RESEARCH

is raised when we ask: What is it that we assert of the author of Waverley

in stating: "The author of Waverley exists"? The question of what we
mean by positing existence is not only at the root of the issue between
conceptual realists and nominalists; it underlies as well the persistent
controversy between proponents of coherence theories and proponents
of correspondence theories of truth, a controversy in which Russell has been
engaged by endorsing a correspondence theory. We cannot thoroughly
understand Plato's and Aristotle's reflections on the relation between mind
(or form) and matter, which had a major impact on medieval philosophical
thought, if we disregard this question.
Similar considerations apply to other time-honored problems of philoso-
phy which positivists would reject as pseudo-problems. But signs of a less
intransingent attitude are already discernible in recent positivist writings.
Let us hope that they will multiply before long and that we shall encounter
them in forthcoming new editions of A History of WesternPhilosophy.
FELIX KAUFMANN.
NEW SCHOOL FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH.

Psychology and Logic. J. R. KANTOR. Bloomington, Indiana, The Prin-

cipia Press, 1945. Vol. I, pp. xviii, 363.
I
Professor Kantor's logical theory, summarized as ffir as possible in his
own words, is as follows.
Logic is a series of operations whereby things are ordered. The things
ordered need not be propositions or symbols, and the operation need not
involve thinking or inference. The materials operated upon likewise
"perform operations coordinate with those of the logician. Logical enter-
prises, therefore, constitute interbehavioral fields" (p. 5). Logical
theory, the study of these enterprises, is continuous with logical practice,
-which is the systematizing operation itself. There 's consequently a
"pragmatic operational continuum" from the simplest ordering, e.g., con-
structing a machine, to the most technical and abstract logical procedures.
At each stage, however, logical interbehavior is specific to the kind of ma-
terial organized, and every logical enterprise is uniquely related to the
culture of the logician (9-11). There is, therefore, no universally signif-
icant logic (168, 209, 293, 314, etc.). Logic is "inseverably connected"
with psychology, since the interbehavior called logical is an operation of a
psychological organism (13). Logic is a special science, not a part of
philosophy, and it does not give us an insight, like that claimed by philos-
ophy, into the true cosmic order.

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