Written Submissions Respondents School of Excellence in Law The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar La6224

THE 7TH ANNUAL ADV. B. P.
APTE MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL, MOOT COURT

& JUDGEMENT WRITING COMPETITION, 2019.
BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

[EXTRAORDINARY ORIGINAL JURISDICTION]
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO……….. OF 2019
A PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED UNDER ART 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF FINDIA,

1950
-------IN THE MATTER BETWEEN-------
KISHU RADO, MAA LIELA & ORS …………………PETITIONERS
v.
UNION OF FINDIA …………………RESPONDENT
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

COMPANION JUSTICES OF THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF FINDIA
WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS
Page 1 of 42
WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS
THE 7TH ANNUAL ADV. B. P. APTE MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL, MOOT COURT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES................................................................................................................... 3
TABLE OF CASES…………………………………………………………………………………….5
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 9

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..................................................................................................... 11
STATEMENT OF BRIEF FACTS ....................................................................................................... 12
STATEMENT OF ISSUES .................................................................................................................. 14
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS .......................................................................................................... 15
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .............................................................................................................. 17
1. Whether the instant Public Interest Litigation is maintainable before this Hon’ble Court? ..... 17
1.1 A. No Public Interest is involved: ..................................................................................... 17
1.2 No Fundamental Right has been violated: ........................................................................ 20
2. Whether The Sections 8(c) & 27 of the NDPS Act, 1985 Suffer From Any Constitutional
Infirmities And Are Therefore Ultra Vires The Constitution of Findia? .......................................... 20
2.1. Art 14 is not breached ....................................................................................................... 21
2.2. Art 19 (1) (g) is not breached ........................................................................................... 22
2.3. No Violation of Art 21 ..................................................................................................... 23
3. Whether Section 35 of the NDPS Act, 1985, which Attaches A Presumption Of Culpability, Is
Ultra Vires the Constitution Of Findia? ............................................................................................ 23
3.1. Proper Legislative Competence ....................................................................................... 24
3.2. Constitutional Validity of S. 35 ....................................................................................... 25
3.3. Article 14 is not violated .................................................................................................. 27
3.4. Differential Treatment is not Violative Per se ................................................................. 28
3.5. Test of Arbitrariness.......................................................................................................... 31
3.6. Presumption of Constitutionality- Doctrine of Legitimacy.............................................. 33
4. Whether the consumption of drugs can fall within the protective cover of Art 25 of the Findian
Constitution? ..................................................................................................................................... 33
4.1. CORE OF ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE ......................................................... 34
4.2. CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE THE TOUCHSTONE FOR ANY PRACTICE TO BE
REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL: ................................................................................................... 38
4.3. TEST OF RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION ..................................................................... 40
PRAYER ............................................................................................................................................... 42
Page 2 of 42
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
STATUTES
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860

2. The Constitution of India , 1950
3. Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1947 (Adopted on December 10, 1948)

2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Adopted by United Nations)
BOOKS, COMMENTARIES & LEXICONS

1. Seervai H.M., Constitutional Law Of India, 4th Edition 2002, Volume Universal Book
Traders.
2. Shukla V.N., Constitution Of India 11th Edition 2008, Eastern Book Company.
3. Jain M.P, Indian Constitutional Law, 6th Edition 2011, Lexisnexis Butterworth Wadhwa
Nagpur.
4. Basu D.D., Constitution Of India 14th Edition 2009, Lexisnexis Butterworth’s Wadhwa
Nagpur.
5. Dr.M.C.Mehanathan, Law on Control of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in
India, 3rd edition, 2015
6. Chandra Satish, “Indian Evidence Act, 1872”, Allahabad Law Agency, Faridabad, 2012.
7. Gaur, K.D, “Textbook on Indian Penal Code”, Universal Law Publishing Co, New
Delhi, 5 th ED. 2014.
8. R.P.Kataria, Law Relating to Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in India, 3rd
edition 2010, reprint 2013 (with latest Case-law)
9. Sharma &Mago, Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Laws, 3rd edition, 2016
10. N.K.Rastogi , An Exhaustive Commentary on The Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic
Substances Act & Rules, 2002
11. Malik , Law of Juvenile justice in India , 1st edition 2018
12. Bhattacharya, Sunil K., Juvenile Justice: An Indian Scenario, 2000
Page 3 of 42
13. Prof. VedKumari, with a foreword by UpendraBaxi, The Juvenile Justice System in
India - From Welfare to Rights, 2004
DICTIONARIES
1. Aiyar, Ramanatha P.: “The Law Lexicon”, Wadhwa& Company, 2ndEdn., Nagpur (2002).
2. Black, Henry Campbell: Blacks Law Dictionary ‟6th Edn., Centennial Ed. (1891-1991).
3. Curzon. L. B: “Dictionary Of Law”, Pitman Publishing, 4th Edn., New Delhi (1994).
4. Garner, Bryan A.: “A Dictionary Of Modern Legal Usage”, Oxford University Press 2nd
Edn., Oxford (1995).
5. Greenberg, Daniel And Alexandra, Millbrook: “Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary Of Words &
Phrases”, Vol. 2, 6th Edn., London: Sweet & Maxwell (2000).
6. Justice Desai, M.C. And Aiyar, Subramanyam: “Law Lexicon & Legal Maxims”, 2nd
Edn., Delhi: Delhi Law House (1980).
7. Mitra, B.C. &Moitra, A.C., “Legal Thesarus”, University Book, Allahabad (1997).
8. Moys, Elizabeth M., “Classification & Thesaurus For Legal Material”, 3rd Edn., London:
Bowker Saur (1992).
9. Oppe., A.S., “Wharton’s Law Lexicon”, 14th Edn., New Delhi: Sweet & Maxwell (1997).
10. Prem, Daulatram, “Judicial Dictionary”, 1st Edn., Jaipur: Bharat Law Publication (1992)
Page 4 of 42
TABLE OF CASES
1. A. K. Roy vs Union Of India And Anr, 1982 SCR (2) 272 ................................................. 22
2. Abdul Rashid vs. State of Gujarat [AIR 2000 SC 821] ....................................................... 27
3. Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2016) 2 SCC 725
.............................................................................................................................................. 38
4. Ameeroonissa Begum v. Mahboob begum, 1953 SCR 404 (417)....................................... 33
5. Ameeroonissa Begum v. Mehboob Begum, 1953 SCR 404(414 ........................................ 28
6. Ameeroonissa v. Mahboob, AIR 1953 SC 951.................................................................... 30
7. Anil Verma v. Harish Kumar, Cr. Appeal No.453 of 2018 ................................................. 27
8. Ashok Kumar Pandey v. The State Of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349 ............................ 17
9. Ashok Kumar Pandey v. The State Of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349. ........................... 18
10. Ashok Leyland Ltd. V. Union of India, (1997) 9 SCC 10 ................................................. 30
11. Babu Ram v. State of U.P(1995) 2 SCC 689 ..................................................................... 29
12. Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. Collector of customs, Calcutta, (1957) SCR 1110 ................ 30
13. Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1957 SC 877, .............. 29
14. Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Others, 1984 SCR (2) 67............................ 17
15. Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.230-231 OF 2019 .................. 28
16. Board of Trustees v. State of Delhi, AIR 1962 SC 458 ..................................................... 33
17. Board of trustees v. State of Delhi, AIR 1962 SC 458(471).............................................. 33
18. Budhan Chowdry v. State of Bihar, 1955(1) SCR 1045 (1049) ........................................ 29
19. Central.Elecricity.Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo & Ors.,(2013) SCC 1005.
.............................................................................................................................................. 17
20. Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 SC 2042 ........... 31
21. Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti v. State of U.P & Ors.,AIR (1990) SC 2060......................... 17
22. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India And Others, 1950 SCR 869 ................... 33
23. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri vs The Union Of India 1951 AIR 41 ......................................... 29
24. Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India. (1950) S.C.R.869 ............................................................ 20
25. Chirendra v. Legal Remembrancer, AIR 1954 SC 424. .................................................... 29
26. Cochin Devaswom Bd. V. Vamana Setti, AIR 1966 SC ................................................... 33
27. Cochin Devaswom Bd. V. Vamana Setti, AIR 1966 SC 1980 .......................................... 33
28. Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770,
782-83................................................................................................................................... 35
29. Commissioner of Police Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770,
782-....................................................................................................................................... 38
Commissioner of Police Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770,
782-83................................................................................................................................... 35
30. Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, 1954 AIR 282, (1954). ........................................................... 41
31. Common Cause (A Regd. Society) vs Union Of India & Ors, Writ Petition (civil) 580 of
2003 ...................................................................................................................................... 17
Page 5 of 42
32. Dargah Committee vs. Syed Hussain Ali , AIR 1961 SC 1402................................... 36, 37
33. Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.,(2005) 1 SCC 590 ................. 17
34. Dhanapal & Ors vs State By Public Prosecutor, 1985 (1) MLJ (Crl) 207 ......................... 26
35. Dharam Dutt & Ors v. Union Of India & Ors, (2004) 1 SCC 712 ................................... 39
36. Dlamini; S v. Dladla and others 1999(7) BCLR 771 ......................................................... 26
37. Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India & Ors.,(2004) 3 SCC 363................................................. 17
38. Dr.Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Cbi & Anr, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 21 OF
2004 ...................................................................................................................................... 21
39. Dr.Surbahmaniam Swamy v. State of Kerala, WP(C).No. 35180 of 2009........................ 17
40. Durand Didier v. Chief Secretary, Union Territory of Goa 1989 AIR (1966) .................. 31
41. Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd v. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors.,AIR (2006) SC
1489 ...................................................................................................................................... 17
42. East India Tobacco Ltd. V. State of A.P., AIR 1962 SC 1733 .......................................... 32
43. Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors,
[1981] 1 SCC 568................................................................................................................. 18
44. Gian Singh v. State Of Punjab & Anr, (2012) 10 SCC 303.............................................. 19
45. Gopi chand v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1959 Supp. (2) SCR 87................................... 28
46. Government of Andhra Pradesh &Ors. V. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi,(2008) 4 SCC 720. ......... 33
47. Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCALE 72 .............................. 39
48. Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank Ltd v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd Appeal (civil) 432
of 2004.................................................................................................................................. 24
49. Hanif v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731 ........................................................................ 29
50. Har Shankar & Ors. v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr, 1975 SCR (3) 254 .............. 40
51. Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 166 ........................... 29
52. Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto & Ors.,(2010) 9 SCC 655. ............................... 19
53. Harnam Singh v. R.T.A, 1954 SCR 37 ............................................................................. 33
54. Harnam Singh v. R.T.A., 1954 SCR 371 ........................................................................... 32
55. Hinsa Virodhak Sangh v. Mirzapur Moti Kuresh Jamat & Ors. [(2008) 5 SCC 33] ......... 33
56. Holicow Pictures Pvt.Ltd v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors.,AIR (2008) SC 913 .............. 17
57. Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. State Of Kerala & Ors., Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 373 of 2006 ........................................................................................................ 35
58. IndraSawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477. ........................................................ 28
59. Jagdish Negi v. State Of U.P. And Anr, (1997 (7) SCC 203) ........................................... 28
60. Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary, (1992) (4) SCC 305 .......................................................... 17
61. Justice K.S. Puttasamy (Retd) V. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1 ................................. 22
62. K. Veeraswamy v. Union of India, [1991] Insc 164 .......................................................... 27
63. Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1995) 4 SCC 51 ................. 21
64. Kansing Kalusing Thakore & Ors.v. Rabari Maganbhai Vashrambhai, (2006) 9 SCR 196
.............................................................................................................................................. 17
65. Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (1994) 3 SCR 201..................... 17
66. Kedar Nath Bajoria And Anr v. The State Of West Bengal , AIR 1954 SC 660 .............. 21
67. Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 404 ................................................... 30
68. Kewal singh v. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161 ..................................................................... 31
69. Krishna A.S v. State of Madras, 1957 SCR 399 (414) ..................................................... 30
Page 6 of 42
70. Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605. ...................................................... 18
71. Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, AIR 1965 SC 1561 ................................... 32
72. Kushum Lata v. Union of India & Ors., AIR (2006) SC 2643 .......................................... 17
73. LaxmiKhandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 2 SCC 600 ......................................... 30
74. M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 226 ......................................... 28
75. M/S Swastik Gases P.Ltd vs Indian Oil Corp.Ltd, [2013] 7 S.C.R. 581 ........................... 21
76. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248 ........................................ 33
77. Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur V. Punjab State Electricity Board. & ors., (2010) 13
SCC 216 ............................................................................................................................... 19
78. N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others, (2002) 8 SCC 106 ................ 41
79. N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others, (2002) 8 SCC 106. ............... 41
80. Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745......................................................... 33
81. Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State Of Maharashtra, AIR (1967) SC 1 .................. 19
82. National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1863 ....................... 20
83. Neetu v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR (2007) SC 758 ....................................................... 17
84. Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State Of Punjab & Ors, (2009) 1 SCC 441................................. 17
85. Noor Aga vs State Of Punjab &Anr, (2008) 16 SCC 417 ................................................. 26
86. P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187 .......................................... 28
87. P.Seshadri v. S.Mangati Gopal Reddy & Ors.,(2011) 5 SCC 484 ..................................... 17
88. Pannalal Bansilal Pitti v. State of A.P., (1996) 2 SCC 498 ............................................... 29
89. Parayankandiyal Erkavath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi, (1996) 4 SCC 76 .... 32
90. Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC 771;.............................................................. 29
91. People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India & Others, AIR (1982) SC 1473
.............................................................................................................................................. 18
92. Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner Of Police, 1988 SCR Supl. (3)1081 ................. 22
93. Prabu das Morarjee Rajkotia v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1044 ................................ 33
94. Prabu Das Morarjee Rajkotia v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1044 ............................... 33
95. R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138 .............................................................. 33
96. Raj Kumar v. UOI AIR 1991 45 ....................................................................................... 25
97. Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa(1964) 7 SCR 32 ............................................... 42
98. Rajasthan v. Shankar LalParmar, AIR 2012 SC 1913 ....................................................... 28
99. Rajbala & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Ors writ petition (civil) no. 671 of 2015 ............. 32
100. Rajiv Ranjan Singh Lalan & Anr v. Union of India & Ors.,(2006) 6 SCC 613 .............. 17
101. Rajpal Sharma And Others vs State Of U.P.Thru Principal (WRIT - A No. - 5731 of
2013)..................................................................................................................................... 24
102. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. State of Bihar,AIR 1958 SC 53................................................. 24
103. Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan , AIR 1967 SC 603 ............................................ 33
104. Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State Of Maharashtra, 1965 SCR (1) 65 ......................................... 22
105. Ranju Gopal Mukherjee & Anr. v. State Of West Bengal & Ors.,W.P 441 of 2018....... 18
106. Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. State Of Bombay (1954) SCR 1055 ............................... 37
107. Raunaq International ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 492 ...................... 18
108. Ritu Prasad Sharma v. State of Assam, (2015) 9 SCC 461 ............................................. 35
109. Rohit bhai J Patel v. The State of Gujarat, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 508 OF 2019 .... 27
110. Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado. v. Richard G. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 ........................ 20
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111. Royappa E.P v. State of T.N., AIR 1974 SC 555 ............................................................ 28
112. S.P Gupta v. Union of India, AIR (1982) SC 149 ........................................................... 17
113. S.P Mittal v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (1) 729, (1983) ................................................. 41
114. Salabiaku v. Grance [1988] 13 ECHRR 379 at 388 ........................................................ 26
115. Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay 1962 AIR 853 .............. 37
116. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496 ... 42
117. Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay, 1962 AIR 853 ............. 35
118. Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P(2002) 2 SCC 188. .......................................... 32
119. Shastri Yagnapurushadiji and others v. Muldas Bhundardas Vaishya and another (1966)
3 SCR 242 : AIR 1966 SC 1119 .......................................................................................... 42
120. Shyara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1. ............................................................ 34
121. Smt. Angoori Devi For Ram Ratan vs Union Of India & Ors, 1989 AIR 371 ................ 40
122. Smt. Sunita Bugga vs Director Of Education And Others2010 (7) AD (Del) 727 .......... 28
123. State of A. P. &Ors. v. McDowell & Co. &Ors [(1996) 3 SCC 709].............................. 25
124. State of A. P. &Ors. v. McDowell & Co. &Ors[(1996) 3 SCC 709 ................................ 25
125. State of A.P. v. McDowell (1996) 3 SCC 709 ................................................................. 32
126. State of A.P. v. McDowell(1996) 3 SCC 709 .................................................................. 32
127. State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr vs Nalla Raja Reddy & Ors, 1967 SCR (3) 28 ............ 21
128. State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Challa Ramkrishna Reddy & Ors, (2000) 5 SCC 2 ........... 22
129. State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453............................................... 32
130. State of Bombay v. Balsara F.N 1951 SCR 682 .............................................................. 33
131. State Of Kerala & Anr v. N. M. Thomas & Ors, 1976 SCR (1) 906 ............................... 32
132. State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for civil Liberties. Civil Appeals Nos. 104-105 of
2001. ..................................................................................................................................... 29
133. State of Punjab & Ors v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga JT 1997 (1) SC 416 ............................... 39
134. State of Uttranchal v. Balwanth Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402 ................................ 17
135. State ofU.P v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1964 SC ...................................................................... 32
136. Syed Md. V. State of Andhra, 1954 SCR 1117 ............................................................... 32
137. T.M.A .Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State Of Karnataka and Ors, AIR 2003 SC 355 ...... 20
138. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Swamiar
of Shirur Mutt, AIR 1954 SC 282 .................................................................................. 35, 38
139. The State of Gujarat & Anr., v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., AIR (1974) SC 1300. ............. 19
140. The State of West Bengal V. Anwar All Sarkarhabib Mohamed, [1952] INSC 1 .......... 20
141. Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638 ................ 38
142. Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H.B. Munshi & Anr., AIR (1979) SC 898.................. 19
143. V.S. Rice and Oil Mills v. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1781.......................................... 33
144. Vivian Joseh Ferreira & Anr vs Municipal Corporation, 1972 SCR (2) 257 .................. 21
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
& : And
§ : Section
¶ : Paragraph
AIR : All India Report
Anr : Another
All : Allahabad
AP : Andhra Pradesh
Art. : Article
Bom : Bombay
Cal : Calcutta
Del : Delhi
Act : Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
Edn : Edition
Govt : Government
HC : High Court
ICCPR : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IT Act : Information Technology Act
Kar : Karnataka
Ltd : Limited
Ors : Others
PIL : Public Interest Litigation
S. : Section
SC : Supreme Court
SCC : Supreme Court Cases
SLP : Special Leave Petition
u/s : Under Section
UDHR : United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
Page 9 of 42
UOI : Union of India
US : United States
UK : United Kingdom
v : versus
Page 10 of 42
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Petitioners have approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Findia under Art 32 of the
Findian Constitution, 19501, through a Public Interest Litigation. The Respondent reserves
the right to contest the maintainability of the present litigation.
1
32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clause ( 1 ) and ( 2 ), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause ( 2 )
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution
Page 11 of 42
STATEMENT OF BRIEF FACTS
About the Country:
(i) Union of Findia is a unique entity following the Centre-biased form of a federation with
morality and cultural norms influencing the state and where all the socio-cultural and
religious sects have one common aspect– the use of recreational drugs. Noticing this, the
Parliament of Findia brought in the NDPS Act in 1985.
The Cult:
(ii) Since 1950s, there existed a religious cult in the State of Maharashtra headed by Kishu
Roado which believed in attaining the state of nirvana by a “technique of transformation”.
The cult took pride in defying societal norms and appealed to the humans to live authentically
without shunning themselves from the natural joyful experiences. The cult indulges in
practices contravening the law; propagate immoral behaviors including promiscuity and
usage of certain substances to attain nirvana.
The Issue:
(iii) Barty Junior, a law student, came in contact with an active member of the cult called
Maa Liela through social media who promised to guide him to attain nirvana. Upon her
persistence, Barty met Kishu at her residence on May 2019 to start the process. Impressed by
the views, he visited Maa Liela’s residence on 11.06.19 and decided to meet on 25.06.19 for
the next session. On 23rd June, the police received an anonymous tip relating to the usage of
drugs at the residence of Maa Liela.
Consumption of Drugs:
(iv) On 25.06.19, Barty arrived at her residence at around 9:00 am and they began the session
at around 9:30 am. Maa Liela offered Barty a brownish white powder called “essence of
heaven” in order to help him focus on his mediation. At first, he was hesitant, but at Kishu’s
persistence, Barty consumed the powder. At 10.15 am, PI Kiran Desai along with his raiding
unit arrived at the residence.
(v) On entering, they saw Barty, Kishu and Maa Liela sitting on the floor and saw lines of
brownish white powder on the dining table and an open packet which they suspected to be
Page 12 of 42
heroin, an addictive substance. Maa Liela said that the powder was used for meditation. They
also came across a brief case on the 1st floor of the house with 2 packets of the similar
powder which were seized, sealed and sent for chemical analysis. The trio was arrested
complying with the due procedure specified under the NDPS Act, 1985. Charges were
framed against the three of them under the Act.
Filing of PIL:
(vi) Aggrieved, Kishu and Maa Liela took the defense of Right to Privacy as the activities
were within the four corners of their house, didn’t disturb any third person and hence the
State has no right to interfere. They filed a PIL in the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Findia
challenging to constitutionality of S.27 of the NDPS Act along with several other petitions
challenging various other provisions. The petitions were clubbed to be heard together. They
also prayed for a stay on the trial till the Supreme Court decided on the said PIL. However,
the Supreme Court allowed the trial to proceed on its own accord.
Page 13 of 42
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1. WHETHER THE INSTANT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE

BEFORE THIS HON’BLE COURT?
2. WHETHER THE SECTIONS 8(C) & 27 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 SUFFER FROM
ANY CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES AND ARE THEREFORE ULTRA VIRES THE
CONSTITUTION OF FINDIA?
3. WHETHER SECTION 35 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 WHICH ATTACHES A

PRESUMPTION OF CULPABILITY, IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF
FINDIA?
4. WHETHER THE CONSUMPTION OF DRUGS CAN FALL WITHIN THE PROTECTIVE

COVER OF ARTICLE 25?
Page 14 of 42
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. WHETHER THE INSTANT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE

THIS HON’BLE COURT?
It is most reverently contended before this Hon’ble Apex Court of Findia that the instant
Public Interest Litigation is not maintainable before this Hon’ble Court as the interest
litigation is filed at the garb of private interest, rather than public interest, that violates the
“relaxation of locus standi” principle that is given to public interest litigations. Further, it also
submitted that the “impugned provisions” of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
Act, 1985 do not violate any fundamental rights; thereby this current petition cannot be
engaged by this Hon’ble Supreme Court.
2.WHETHER THE SECTIONS 8(C) & 27 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 SUFFER FROM ANY
CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES AND ARE THEREFORE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION
OF FINDIA?
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that S. 8 (c) of the Act and S. 27 of the
Act are intravires the Findian Constitution and do not suffer from any infirmities. This is
because the sale, consumption and usage of drugs are directly related to financing of
organized crimes and terrorism as a whole. This was the very intent behind the legislation of
the Narcotic Drugs and the Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 and also the same was the
rationale behind adoption of the Single Convention on the usage of Drugs, by the United
Nations that laid international pressure to curb the usage of drugs. Since it is a matter of
national security, it is submitted with utmost reverence that the usage and consumption of
drugs cannot be legalized.
3. WHETHER SECTION 35 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 WHICH ATTACHES A PRESUMPTION

OF CULPABILITY, IS ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF FINDIA?
It is humbly submitted that S. 35 of the narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act,
1985 is not ultra vires the Findian Constitution. It is submitted that the initial burden still lies
on the Prosecution to establish a prima facie case, upon which the onus probandi is
transferred to the accused to prove that he is innocent. It is submitted that “innocent until
proven guilty” still prevails and therefore, this provision does not violate the cardinal rule of
criminal jurisprudence. Further, it is also submitted that this classification of drugs alone does
Page 15 of 42
not violate Art 14 of the Findian Constitution as it a “reasonable classification” based on
intelligible differentia, and this classification has a rational nexus to the object of the Act,
without which the object of the Act cannot be achieved. Therefore, it is submitted that this
provision is not arbitrary.
4. WHETHER THE CONSUMPTION OF DRUGS CAN FALL WITHIN THE PROTECTIVE COVER OF
ARTICLE 25?
The Respondent submit with utmost venerance that only religious practices that are “essential
to the religion” will receive protection under the umbrella of Art 25 of the Findian
Constitution. It is contended that the usage of “drugs” does not constitute the essential
religious practice of any religion, in fact all religions view the usage of drugs with utmost
contempt. Further, it is also submitted that “public order, morality and health” are exceptions
to soliciting protection under Art 25 of the Findian Constitution and all the three restrictions
apply in the present context, thereby making it impossible for the consumption of drugs to be
protected under Art 25 of the Findian Constitution.
Page 16 of 42
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. Whether the instant Public Interest Litigation is maintainable before this

Hon’ble Court?
The Petitioner has filed a Public Interest Litigation by invoking Art 32 of the Findian
Constitution2. The Respondent humbly submits that the PIL is not tenable in the eyes of law
as there is not an iota of “public interest” [A] in the given case, rather only private interest is
involved and no fundamental right has been repugnantly violated [B].
1.1 A. No Public Interest is involved:
(a) Lexically, the expression "PIL" means the legal action initiated in a Court of law for the
enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the
community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities
are affected.3 However, this has become a procedure that is widely abused.4 It has evolved to
become "publicity interest litigation5" or "private interest litigation6" or "politics interest
litigation7" or the latest trend being "paise income litigation".8
(b) If not properly regulated and abuse averted it also becomes a tool in unscrupulous hands
to release vendetta and wreck vengeance9. There must be real and genuine public interest
involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errantor poke ones into for a
probe10. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by
2
Page 6, Moot Court Proposition
3
Janata Dal v. H.S. Choudhary, (1992) (4) SCC 305.
4
Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State Of Maharashtra & Ors.,(2005) 1 SCC 590. Also in: Kansing Kalusing
Thakore & Ors.v. Rabari Maganbhai Vashrambhai, (2006) 9 SCR 196; Rajiv Ranjan Singh Lalan & Anr v.
Union of India & Ors.,(2006) 6 SCC 613.
5
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Others, 1984 SCR (2) 67.
6
Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State Of Punjab & Ors, (2009) 1 SCC 441
7
Common Cause (A Regd. Society) vs Union Of India & Ors, Writ Petition (civil) 580 of 2003
8
Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India & Ors.,(2004) 3 SCC 363.
9
S.P Gupta v. Union of India, AIR (1982) SC 149.
10
Kazi Lhendup Dorji v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (1994) 3 SCR 201.
Page 17 of 42
resorting to this extraordinary jurisdiction11. It is a tool that should not be employed
extraneously and should be used carefully with circumspection.12
(c) The question of when a PIL can be filed is not res integra and guidelines have been laid
down time and again by the Apex Court, which are as follows:
• The court should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before
entertaining the petition. 13
• The court should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity
and urgency must be given priority over other petitions.14
• The courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal
of genuine public harm or public injury.15
(d) The Respondent humbly contends that none of these limbs stand satisfied in the given
case. The petition is very frivolous16 and the Respondent submits that the Petitioner is trying
to obstruct justice and public order by filing such a petition under the veil of a “public interest
litigation17”. The ill effects of consumption of drugs are well known18 and curbing the usage
of the drugs, thereby preventing violence was the very intent of the legislature while enacting
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 198519. Challenging the main
provisions of the Act through a PIL20, lacks merits and goes against the very intent of the
Legislature in enacting such a legislation, in the Respondent’s considered view.
(e) Going verbatim by the definition of a PIL, the Respondent contends that there is no
substantial public interest involved in the present case, thereby making this petition untenable
in the eyes of law21. In fact, the Respondent deferentially submits that if the present petition is
allowed and the “impugned” provisions that are challenged are struck down22; if this Hon’ble
11
Holicow Pictures Pvt.Ltd v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Ors.,AIR (2008) SC 913. Also in: Kushum Lata v.
Union of India & Ors., AIR (2006) SC 2643.
12
Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti v. State of U.P & Ors.,AIR (1990) SC 2060. Also in: P.Seshadri v. S.Mangati
Gopal Reddy & Ors.,(2011) 5 SCC 484, Central.Elecricity.Supply Utility of Odisha v. Dhobei Sahoo &
Ors.,(2013) SCC 1005.
13
Bombay Dyeing & Mfg. Co. Ltd v. Bombay Environmental Action Group & Ors.,AIR (2006) SC 1489.
14
State of Uttranchal v. Balwanth Singh Chaufal, (2010) 3 SCC 402.
15
Ibid. Also in: Dr.Surbahmaniam Swamy v. State of Kerala, WP(C).No. 35180 of 2009., Ashok Kumar Pandey
v. The State Of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349.
16
Neetu v. State of Punjab & Ors., AIR (2007) SC 758.
17
Ashok Kumar Pandey v. The State Of West Bengal, (2004) 3 SCC 349.
18
https://www.nhs.uk/live-well/healthy-body/the-effects-of-drugs/
19
Preamble of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
20
Page 4, Moot Court Proposition.
21
Krishna Swami v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 605.
22
S. 8 (c), S. 27 and S. 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.
Page 18 of 42
Court decides to rule for the Petitioners in the instant case, there will be more “public harm”
and “public injury” than “public good”, which is the very essence of a Public Interest
Litigation23. The Respondent submits that the instant litigation is against public interest itself
and if allowed will cause gross miscarriage of justice and thereby stands untenable in the eyes
of law.
(f) For a PIL to be maintainable the interest of a substantial segment of the population should
have been affected and they should not be in a position to approach this Apex Court owing to
their down-trodden social and economic conditions, due to which the Petitioner will acquire
locus standi to file the PIL.24 The public interest litigation should not be merely a cloak for
attaining private ends of a third party or of the party bringing the petition25. In the instant
case, it is pertinent to note that the Petitioners have already been arrested for the illegal usage
of drugs under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 198526 and the trial is
taking place.
(f) They decided to file this Public Interest Litigation right after their arrest, which ipso facto
demonstrates the private interest involved in this case, under the garb of public interest. This
clearly is an abuse of process27 that is being done by the Petitioners and clearly in violation of
the principles of when a PIL can be filed. The Respondent humbly submits that this is a
“private interest litigation” clothed as a “public interest litigation” which is clearly against the
settled principles of law. If the “impugned provisions28” that are being challenged are struck
down, the Petitioners will be hugely benefitted as they will be discharged from their liability
under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 under which they have
been arrested and this clearly shows the “private interest involved” in the instant litigation.
(g) Such frivolous petitions bring down the very sanctum and purity attached to the process
of filing a PIL that is meant to be allowed by this Court only after extreme circumspection
and scrutiny29, in the Respondent’s humble submission. So, The Respondent reverently
contends that viewed from any angle, this PIL stands untenable in this Hon’ble Apex Court
because there is an absence of “substantial public interest” and involves only private interest.
23
Fertiliser Corporation Kamgar Union (Regd.), Sindri and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors, [1981] 1 SCC 568
24
People's Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India & Others, AIR (1982) SC 1473. Also in: Ranju Gopal
Mukherjee & Anr. v. State Of West Bengal & Ors.,W.P 441 of 2018.
25
Raunaq International ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd., (1999) 1 SCC 492.
26
Page 6 of the Moot Court Proposition.
27
Gian Singh v. State Of Punjab & Anr, (2012) 10 SCC 303.
28
29
Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur V. Punjab State Electricity Board. & ors., (2010) 13 SCC 216.
Page 19 of 42
1.2 No Fundamental Right has been violated:
(a) The powers of the Supreme Court of Findia under Art.32 of Findian Constitution is wide
and it can be used to reinstate the fundamental rights of individuals when they have been
denied.30 PIL’s can be entertained when the rights of individuals guaranteed by Part III of the
Findian Constitution have been grossly violated.31
(b) The Respondent deferentially submits that there is no fundamental right of the Petitioners
that is violated in the present case as the Respondent will be establishing by virtue of the
forth coming issues. The Sections that are being challenged in the instant case32 are
constitutionally valid and there is no legal nexus or basis to contend them as being
unconstitutional; this will be proved by the Respondents in the forth coming issues.
(c) Any writ petition becomes unsustainable in this Hon’ble Court where it has been
satisfactorily established that no fundamental right is violated33. Moreover, there is no
element “genuine public harm” or “genuine public injury”34 that has to be redressed in the
present case. In fact, the Respondent fails to see the essence of any “public interest” being
present in the instant matter at all. Moreover, as already explained, admission of the present
litigation will lead to more public harm than good; the instant litigation if allowed will go
against public order, morality and health, which are reasonable restrictions on Fundamental
Rights laid down by the Findian Constitution.35 Hence, by virtue of this fact also, this PIL is
not maintainable, in the Respondent’s considered view.
2. Whether The Sections 8(c) & 27 of the NDPS Act, 1985 Suffer From Any
Constitutional Infirmities And Are Therefore Ultra Vires The Constitution of
Findia?
The Respondent submit with utmost reverence before this Hon’ble Court that S. 8 (c) and S.
27 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 are intra vires the Findian
30
Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar & Ors. v. State Of Maharashtra, AIR (1967) SC 1.
31
Tilokchand Motichand & Ors. v. H.B. Munshi & Anr., AIR (1979) SC 898.
32
33
The State of Gujarat & Anr., v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., AIR (1974) SC 1300.
34
Hari Bansh Lal v. Sahodar Prasad Mahto & Ors.,(2010) 9 SCC 655.
35
T.M.A .Pai Foundation and Ors. v. State Of Karnataka and Ors, AIR 2003 SC 355.
Page 20 of 42
Constitution and do not suffer from any Constitutional infirmities as they do not violate any
of the Fundamental Rights vested in Part III of the Findian Constitution.
2.1. Art 14 is not breached
(a) The Constitution of Findia envisages the Right to Equality.36 Article 14 has in itself
two limbs, “equality before law37” and “equal protection of law38. The guaranty of
the equal protection of the laws means “the protection of equal laws39”. It forbids class
legislation, but does not forbid classification which rests upon reasonable grounds of
distinction40. It does not prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the objects to
which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.41 It merely requires
that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike under like
circumstances and conditions both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities
imposed.42
(b) The Learned Counsel for the Petitioner may contend that Art 14 stands violated in the
instant classification of drugs, wherein consumption and selling of drugs is made a penal
offence by virtue of the “impugned provisions”43. However, the Respondents most reverently
submit that there is a presence of “intelligible differentia44” and “rationale nexus to the object
of the Act45” by virtue of this classification. Therefore, this classification of “narcotic drugs”
alone will amount to “reasonable classification46”, thereby falling within the scope of Art 14.
(c) It is a proven fact that violence increases as a repercussion of people consuming drugs, it
in fact increases manifold that it contributes as a factor to terrorism also47. The United
Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes has presented a detailed report and analysis as to how
the inflow of illicit drugs and its usage contributes to organized crime and terrorism in a
country.48 “We need to integrate our work to build up more effective and efficient networks
36
Art 14 to 18 of the Findian Constitution.
37
The State of West Bengal V. Anwar All Sarkarhabib Mohamed, [1952] INSC 1
38
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India. (1950) S.C.R.869
39
Roy Romer, Governor of Colorado. v. Richard G. Evans, 517 U.S. 620.
40
National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, AIR 2014 SC 1863
41
M/S Swastik Gases P.Ltd vs Indian Oil Corp.Ltd, [2013] 7 S.C.R. 581
42
Kedar Nath Bajoria And Anr v. The State Of West Bengal , AIR 1954 SC 660
43
S. 8 (c) and S. 27 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
44
Dr.Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Cbi & Anr, WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 21 OF 2004
45
Vivian Joseh Ferreira & Anr vs Municipal Corporation, 1972 SCR (2) 257
46
State Of Andhra Pradesh & Anr vs Nalla Raja Reddy & Ors, 1967 SCR (3) 28
47
https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gashc4228.doc.htm
48
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/drug-trafficking-and-the-financing-of-terrorism.html
Page 21 of 42
so that we may defeat these illegitimate networks that perpetuate so much destruction
throughout the world” was the conclusion that was propounded and communicated to the
world community at the end of this report.49 It is a well-established fact, worldwide that that
the money from the sale of drugs is directed towards financing of terrorism and other sectors
in organized crimes.50
(d) Therefore, it is the humble submission of the Respondents that the decriminalizing and
further allowance of consumption and sale of drugs will contribute it to being an issue of
national security and national concern. National security and national concern is a said
exception for all fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Findian Constitution51.
Therefore, the intent of the Legislation is catogerzing drugs as a separate class is satiated as it
becomes a matter of “national security” and therefore, falls under “reasonable classification”,
in the humble submission of the Respondents.
2.2. Art 19 (1) (g) is not breached
(a) The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 198552 imposes a blanket ban on
the sale of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. However, the Respondents submit
that this will not amount to being a violation of Art 19 (1) (g) of the Findian Constitution.
(b) Art 19 (1) (g) of the Findian Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice any
profession, trade or occupation. However, Art 19 (2) of the same Article imposes “reasonable
restrictions” on this particular right. The interests of the sovereignty and integrity of Findia53,
the security of the State54, friendly relations with foreign States, public order55, decency or
morality56 or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence57 have
been laid down as “reasonable restrictions” that can be levied on the “freedom to practice of
any profession or business.
(c) As submitted earlier, drugs, its consumption, use and sale becomes a subject matter of
national security concern, which is a clear exception to the freedom granted under Art 19 (1)
49
Ibid
50
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-107shrg85660/html/CHRG-107shrg85660.htm
51
Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1995) 4 SCC 51]
52
S. 8 (c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
53
State Of Andhra Pradesh vs Challa Ramkrishna Reddy & Ors, (2000) 5 SCC 2
54
A. K. Roy vs Union Of India And Anr, 1982 SCR (2) 272
55
Piyush Kantilal Mehta v. Commissioner Of Police, 1988 SCR Supl. (3)1081
56
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State Of Maharashtra, 1965 SCR (1) 65
57
Art 19 (2) of the Findian Constitution
Page 22 of 42
(g) by Art 19 (2). Therefore, it is most reverently submitted that there can be no violation of
Art 19 (1) (g) also in the instant matter, through the impugned provision.
2.3. No Violation of Art 21
(a) Through a landmark verdict, this Hon’ble Court declared that right to privacy is an
intrinsic part of Art 21 of the Findian Constitution.58 In the words of the Hon’ble Justice D.Y.
Chandrachud, Privacy includes at its core the preservation of personal intimacies, the
sanctity of family life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy
also connotes a right to be left alone. Privacy safeguards individual autonomy and
recognises the ability of the individual to control vital aspects of his or her life. Personal
choices governing a way of life are intrinsic to privacy. Privacy protects heterogeneity and
recognises the plurality and diversity of our culture. While the legitimate expectation of
privacy may vary from the intimate zone to the private zone and from the private to the
public arenas, it is important to underscore that privacy is not lost or surrendered merely
because the individual is in a public place. Privacy attaches to the person since it is an
essential facet of the dignity of the human being.” 59
(b) It is the contention of the Learned Counsel for Petitioners that S. 27 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 violates one’s privacy as what is done
within the four walls of one’s house is not a matter of concern for the State. 60 However, as
explained earlier, it is contend that a matter of national security is involved cases of drugs
and drug dealing, thereby granting the State every right to enact Legislations to curb and
prevent the same. Therefore, it is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that viewed
from any angle, S. 8 (c) and S. 27 of the Act are intravires the Findian Constitution and
should not be read down by this Hon’ble Court.
3. Whether Section 35 of the NDPS Act, 1985, which Attaches A Presumption

Of Culpability, Is Ultra Vires the Constitution Of Findia?
The Petitioners submit with utmost respect before this Hon’ble Court S. 35 of the Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is constitutionally valid as the Legislature has
the competence to enact the same. (A) Further, the “impugned section” does not violate any
58
Justice K.S. Puttasamy (Retd) V. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1
59
Ibid
60
Moot Court Proposition, Page
Page 23 of 42
fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution (B). Moreover, it is also submitted that
there is a presumption of constitutionality of legislation, unless it is proved otherwise by the
person attacking it.61 (B)
(a) It is a settled principle of law that the constitutional validity of a provision or an Act, in its
entirety can be challenged only on two grounds viz62.
(i) Lack of legislative competence; and

(ii) Violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the
Constitution or of any other constitutional provision.63
(b) Further, in a judicial pronouncement of this Hon’ble Court,64this Court has opined that
except on the aforementioned two grounds, there is no third ground on the basis of which the
law made by the competent legislature can be invalidated and that the ground of invalidation
must necessarily fall within the four corners of the afore-mentioned two grounds. So, the
Petitioners would like to elucidate on these grounds further to prove that S. 35 is intra vires
the Findian Constitution.
3.1. Proper Legislative Competence
(a) The Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, was enacted by the
Parliament in consonance with the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, which is a
United Nations Treaty, to which Findia is a signatory.
(b) It is a clear picture that this act was enacted by the parliament and there is no rebuttable
substance about it. This Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the law relating to
narcotic drugs to make stringent provisions for the control and regulation of operations
relating to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. It was enacted to implement the
provisions of the International Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
and the matters connected therewith.65 The Central Government is charged with the duty of
taking all such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for preventing and combating the
61
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 538
62
Greater Bombay Co-operative Bank Ltd v. United Yarn Tex (P) Ltd Appeal (civil) 432 of 2004
63
Rajpal Sharma And Others v. State Of U.P.Thru Principal (WRIT - A No. - 5731 of 2013)
64
State of A. P. &Ors. v. McDowell & Co. &Ors [(1996) 3 SCC 709]
65
Preamble of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
Page 24 of 42
abuse of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances and the menace of illicit traffic
therein.66
3.2. Constitutional Validity of S. 35
(a) It is the humble submission of the Petitioners that S. 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 is intra vires the Findian Constitution as it does not
violate Art 21 or Art 14 or any other fundamental right guaranteed by Part III of the Findian
Constitution.
3.2.1. Art 21 is not violated
(a) Art. 21 of the Findian Constitution guarantees right to life and personal liberty of person,
unless through a procedure established by law. The presumption of innocence means that a
suspect is supposed innocent when the interrogation begins and will not be convicted unless
there is proof to prove his guilt.67 It is the fundamental principle of Criminal Jurisprudence
that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent
court of law.68
(b) Presumption of innocence is also a basic human right as envisaged under the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights69. It, however, cannot per se be equated with the
fundamental right and liberty adumbrated in Article 21 of the Constitution of Findia.70 The
constitutionality of a penal provision placing burden of proof on an accused, thus, must be
tested on the anvil of the State's responsibility to protect innocent citizens. 71 The court must
assess the importance of the right being limited to our society and this must be weighed
against the purpose of the limitation. The purpose of the limitation is the reason for the law or
conduct which limits the right.72
(c) It must, however, be borne in mind that the Act was enacted having regard to the mandate
contained in International Conventions on Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances. Only
because the burden of proof under certain circumstances is placed on the accused, the same,
66
Raj Kumar v. UOI AIR 1991 45
67
Law Commission, Article 20(3) of the Constitution and the right to Silence,(law Commission No. 180)
68
Dhanapal & Ors vs State By Public Prosecutor, 1985 (1) MLJ (Crl) 207
69
Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
70
Noor Aga vs State Of Punjab &Anr, (2008) 16 SCC 417
71
Ibid
72
Dlamini; S v. Dladla and others 1999(7) BCLR 771
Page 25 of 42
by itself, in our opinion, would not render the impugned provisions unconstitutional.73
Section 35 of the NDPS Act74 provides for presumption of culpable mental state. It also
provides that an accused may prove that he had no such mental state with respect to the act
charged as an offence under the prosecution.
3.2.2. International Jurisprudence
(a) The European Court of Human Rights75 while dealing with the scope of Article 11 of
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the scope of the burden of proof on the prosecution
and also its placement on the accused, held that presumption of fact or of law operate in every
legal system. Clearly, the Covenant on Civil and Political rights does not prohibit such
presumption in principle.
(b) It does, however, require the contracting states to remain within certain limits in this
respect as regards criminal law. It was therefore held that providing exceptions or to place
partial burden on the accused was not violative of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
3.2.3. Parlance to other Statutes that Shift the Burden of Proof
(a) Quite similar to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 also shifts the burden of proof on the accused 76. The
Supreme Court affirmed and ascertained that this provision is constitutionally valid, by
justifying that a statute placing the burden on the accused cannot be regarded as
unreasonable, unjust or unfair nor can it be regarded as contrary to Article 21 of the
Constitution as contended for the Appellant77.
(b) Sections 35 of the Act, no doubt, raise presumptions with regard to the culpable mental
state on the part of the accused as also place burden of proof in this behalf on the accused; but
a bare perusal the said provision would clearly show that presumption would operate in the
trial of the accused only in the event the circumstances contained therein are fully satisfied 78.
73
Noor Aga vs State Of Punjab &Anr, [(2008) 16 SCC 417]
74
S. 35.of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
75
Salabiaku v. Grance [1988] 13 ECHRR 379 at 388
76
S. 5 (1) (e) and S. 5 (3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
77
K. Veeraswamy v. Union of India, [1991] Insc 164
78
Narcotics Control Bureau v. Sukh Dev Raj Sodhi (2011) 6 SCC 392
Page 26 of 42
This Hon’ble Court has time and again reiterated that an initial burden exists upon the
prosecution and only when it stands satisfied, the legal burden would shift79.
(c) Even then, the standard of proof required for the accused to prove his innocence is not as
high as that of the Prosecution. Whereas the standard of proof required for proving the guilt
of accused on the prosecution is "beyond all reasonable doubt" but it is `preponderance of
probability' on the accused80. If the Prosecution fails to prove the foundational facts so as to
attract the rigours of S.35 of the Act, the actus reus which is in possession of contraband by
the accused cannot be said to have been established.81
(d) It is a clear fact that the burden of proof shifts on the side of accused only when the
prosecution has established certain basic facts82. So, the Respondents submit that this
provision is not arbitrary or draconian as it gives equal chance to the accused to prove himself
as innocent and the initial burden lies on the Prosecution83.
(e) It is humbly contended that all the accused are treated as a class84 and there is reasonable
nexus between the offence created and the case to be dealt with the procedure, presumption
and burden of proof placed on the accused, this is not unjust, unfair or unreasonable as to
offending Articles 21 and 14. It also does not violate Article 20(3).85 So it is explicit that this
doesn’t violate Art. 21 of the Findian Constitution as this is made in order to curb the illegal
activities which will affect the public order.
3.3. Article 14 is not violated
(a) It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Right to Equality, vested under
Art 14 is not violated due to this Act. The Right to Equality is regarded as one of the corner-
stones of Indian democracy,86 and the ‘fon juris’ of our Constitution.87 Art. 14 has in itself
two concepts: ‘equality before law’ and ‘equal protection before law.’ The first is a negative
concept which ensures that there is no special privilege for a particular person and none is
above the law. The latter is positive in content, and postulates the application of the same
79
Hanif Khan @ Annu Khan v. Central Bureau Of Narcotics, Criminal Appeal No(s). 1206 of 2013
80
Anil Verma v. Harish Kumar, Cr. Appeal No.453 of 2018
81
Abdul Rashid vs. State of Gujarat [AIR 2000 SC 821]
82
Rohit bhai J Patel v. The State of Gujarat, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 508 OF 2019
83
Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.230-231 OF 2019
84
Jagdish Negi v. State Of U.P. And Anr, (1997 (7) SCC 203)
85
P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187,( ¶ 53)
86
Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 477.
87
Smt. SunitaBugga v. Director Of Education And Others 2010 (7) AD (Del) 727
Page 27 of 42
laws alike and without discrimination to all persons similarly situated.88 Hence equals should
be treated as equals and un-equals should not be treated as equals.89
The Right to Equality does not imply that reasonable classification cannot exist90. Therefore,
it is submitted before this Hon’ble Court that that the S. 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 amounts to a reasonable classification and therefore does
not violate Art 14.
3.4. Differential Treatment is not Violative Per se
(a) Differential treatment is not per se amount to violation of Art. 14, 91 it denies equal
protection only when there is no reasonable basis for the differentiation,92 based on the
simple fact that every law needn’t have universal application.93 The principle of equality does
not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by
nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, as the varying needs of different
classes of persons often require separate treatment.94 It would be inexpedient and incorrect to
think that all laws have to be made uniformly applicable to all people in one go.95
(b) Thus, it is submitted that the mere fact that S. 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 is not violative of Art.14 merely because it presumes the culpable
mental state of the accused and places the burden on the accused. Considering the seriousness
as well as the gravity of the offence this classification is made. Moreover, the Court has
pronounced a self-imposed restraint, that ordinarily it will not determine the merits of
legislation and arrive at a conclusion that is arbitrary, violating Art. 14, 96 and if anybody
raises a contrary contention it would be for him to bring on record sufficient material to lead
the Court to arrive at a conclusion that ‘State’s action was arbitrary97
88
Royappa E.P v. State of T.N., AIR 1974 SC 555
89
M.G. Badappanavar v. State of Karnataka, (2001) 2 SCC 226
90
Pathumma And Others v. State of Kerala And Others, 1978 SCR (2) 537
91
Rajasthan v. Shankar LalParmar, AIR 2012 SC 1913, page 7, para 3.
92
Ameeroonissa Begum v. Mehboob Begum, 1953 SCR 404(414); Gopichand v. Delhi Administration, AIR
1959 Supp. (2) SCR 87
93
Chirendra v. Legal Remembrancer, AIR 1954 SC 424.
94
Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. Collector of Customs, Calcutta, AIR 1957 SC 877,
95
PannalalBansilalPitti v. State of A.P., (1996) 2 SCC 498, (para 12)
96
ChiranjitLalChowdhurivs The Union Of India 1951 AIR 41
97
State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for civil Liberties.Civil Appeals Nos. 104-105 of 2001.
Page 28 of 42
3.4.1. Test of Reasonable Classification:
In order to pass the test of reasonable classification two conditions must be fulfilled,98
namely,
(i) That the classification must be found on an intelligible differential which

distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of
the group?99
(ii) That, differential must have a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved
by the statue in question.100
3.4.2. The Classification Made by Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985 is reasonable
Presence of Intelligible Differentia
(a) The expression intelligible differentia means a difference capable of being understood. It
is a factor that distinguishes one in different state or class from another which is capable of
being understood.101 The differentia is made in order to stop the usage of narcotic drugs.
When, the legislature enacts a statutory presumption in respect of certain acts or a burden of
proof upon certain persons, the statute cannot be challenged as discriminatory if the rule of
evidence has a rational relation to the object to be achieved by the act.102
(b) The differentia on the basis of which the goods have been classified and the presumption
raised by the section obviously has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the Act103. The presumption only attaches to goods of the description mentioned in the
section and it directly furthers the object of the Act, namely, the prevention of narcotic drugs,
and that being the position the impugned section is clearly within the principle enunciated
above, not hit by Art. 14.104
98
Harakchand Ratanchand Banthia v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 166
99
Hanif v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731
100
Budhan Chowdry v. State of Bihar, 1955(1) SCR 1045 (1049) , Pathumma v. State of Kerala, AIR 1978 SC
771;Babu Ram v. State of U.P(1995) 2 SCC 689 (para 37)
101
Laxmi Khandsari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1981) 2 SCC 600
102
Babulal Amthalal Mehta v. Collector of customs, Calcutta, (1957) SCR 1110
103
Gorantla Butchaiah Chowdary v. State Of Andhra, 1958 9 STC 104 AP
104
Krishna A.S v. State of Madras, 1957 SCR 399 (414)
Page 29 of 42
(c) The legislature, out of necessity, has large powers of selection or classification of persons
and things to deal with the different problems arising out of an infinite variety of human
relations.105 It is a settled principle of law that “so long as classification could withstand the
test of Art. 14, the same couldn’t be questioned as to why one subject was included and other
left out and why one was given more benefit than the other,106” thereby supporting the
Respondents claim in the instant matter.
3.4.3. Direct Rationale Nexus to the Object of the Act
(a) When a law is challenged as offending against the guarantee in Art.14, the first duty of the
court is to examine the purpose and policy of the Act and then to discover whether the
classification made by the law has a reasonable relation to the object which the legislature
seeks to obtain.107 The reasonableness is to be judged with reference to the object of the
legislation and not moral consideration.108
(b) Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 was enacted to make stringent
provisions for the control and regulation of operations relating to narcotic drugs and
psychotropic substances109. The object of the act points out that an urgent need was felt for
the enactment of a comprehensive legislation on narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances,
which, inter--alia, should consolidate and amend the existing laws relating to narcotic drugs,
strengthen the existing controls over drug abuses, considerably enhance the penalties
particularly for trafficking offences, make provisions for exercising effective control over
psychotropic substances.110
(c) The anguish of the Supreme Court of India was expressed in case Durand Didier v. Chief
Secretary, Union Territory of Goa,111 wherein the Apex Court held that “With deep concern,
we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine
smuggling of Narcotic drugs and Psychotropic substances into this country and illegal
trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizable section of
the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has
105
Ameeroonissa v. Mahboob, AIR 1953 SC 951
106
Omblika Das v. Husila Shaw AIR 2002 SC 1685
107
Kedar Nath Bajoria v. State of W.B., AIR 1953 SC 404
108
Ashok Leyland Ltd. V. Union of India, (1997) 9 SCC 10 (para 20)
109
Preamble of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
110
Law Commission, One Hundred and Fifty Five, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance.
111
Durand Didier v. Chief Secretary, Union Territory of Goa 1989 AIR (1966)
Page 30 of 42
assumed serious and alarming pro- portions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to
effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing
deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, the Parliament in its wisdom,
has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 1981 of 1985 specifying mandatory
minimum imprisonment and fine.”
(d) Drug addiction has become one of the curses of our times, a menace which threatens
public health and results in the dissolution of human personality, promoting conditions for
various forms of human degradation, whose consequences spread to crime and
lawlessness.112 So, in order to curb such illegal activities, stringent rules are made, and that is
the very reason why burden of proof is on the accused. This clearly establishes that the
classification was made in order to achieve the object of the legislation.
(e) A procedure different from that laid down by the ordinary law can be prescribed for a
particular class of persons if the discrimination is based upon a reasonable classification113
having regard to the objective which the legislation has in view and the policy underlying
it.114It is a reasonable classification to sub serves the social good115, in the considered view of
the Respondents and thereby does not violate the Findian Constitution.
3.5.Test of Arbitrariness
3.5.1THIS ACT AND ITS PROVISIONS ARE NOT ARBITRARY
(a) The expression ‘arbitrarily’ means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done

capriciously or at pleasure, without adequate determining principle, not founded in the nature
of things, non-rational, not done or acting according to reason or judgment, depending on the
will alone.116
(b) An Act of Legislature or its provisions cannot be struck down merely by saying that it is
arbitrary.117 The burden of showing that a classification rests upon an arbitrary and not
112
Law Commission, One Hundred and Fifty Five, the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substance.
113
Kewalsingh v. Lajwanti, AIR 1980 SC 161
114
Chandra Bhawan Boarding and Lodging v. State of Mysore, AIR 1970 SC 2042
115
State Of Kerala & Anr v. N. M. Thomas & Ors, 1976 SCR (1) 906
116
Sharma Transport v. Government of A.P(2002) 2 SCC 188.
117
State of Bihar v. Bihar Distillery Ltd., (1997) 2 SCC 453 (para 22)
Page 31 of 42
reasonable basis118 or the discrimination is apparent and manifest119 is upon the person who
impeaches the law as a violation of the guarantee of equal protection.120 In the case of State
of A.P. v. McDowell,121 Reddy J, on behalf of a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court, laid
down that “no enactment or provision can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or
unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an
Act.
(c) It is clear that courts in this country do not undertake the task of declaring a piece of
Legislation or its provisions as unconstitutional on the ground that the legislation is
“arbitrary” since such an exercise implies a value judgment and courts do not examine the
wisdom of legislative choices unless the legislation is otherwise violative of some specific
provision of the Constitution.122
(d) The allegation must be specific, clear and unambiguous123 and must give particulars.124
Throwing out vague hints that there may be other instances of like nature which the
impugned legislation has left out, is not enough; such instances must be specified 125 and it
must be proved that the selection by the legislature has been arbitrary,126 and has no relation
to the object to be achieved by the statue.127
(e) In the instant Act, S. 35 does not violate any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under
the Findian Constitution. It is submitted that the Learned Counsel arguing on behalf of the
Petitioner has not satisfactorily established that the Act is arbitrary or that it violates the any
of the Constitutional Guarantees under Part III. So, merely based on an apprehension that
these provisions may be arbitrary, it is submitted that this provision, which is of significant
importance to the Act, per se cannot be read down by this Hon’ble Court.
118
State of U.P v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1964 SC 1135; Ajay Kumar Mukherjee v. Local Board of Barpeta, AIR
1965 SC 1561; East India Tobacco Ltd. V. State of A.P., AIR 1962 SC 1733
119
Parayankandiyal Erkavath Kanapravan Kalliani Amma v. K. Devi, (1996) 4 SCC 76 (para 67)
120
Harnam Singh v. R.T.A., 1954 SCR 371; Syed Md. V. State of Andhra, 1954 SCR 1117
121
State of A.P. v. McDowell (1996) 3 SCC 709
122
Rajbala & Ors vs State Of Haryana & Ors 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1260
123
V.S. Rice and Oil Mills v. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1781; Cochin Devaswom Bd. V. VamanaSetti, AIR
1966 SC 1980; RamnathVerma v. State of Rajasthan , AIR 1967 SC 603 ; Prabu Das MorarjeeRajkotia v.
Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1044
124
Cochin Devaswom Bd. V. VamanaSetti, AIR 1966 SC
125
Board of Trustees v. State of Delhi, AIR 1962 SC 458
126
Ameeroonissa Begum v. Mahboob begum, 1953 SCR 404 (417): Harnam Singh v. R.T.A, 1954 SCR 371,
Prabu das Morarjee Rajkotia v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1044, Board of trustees v. State of Delhi, AIR
1962 SC 458(471)
127
V.S. Rice and Oil Mills v. State of A.P., AIR 1964 SC 1781
Page 32 of 42
3.6. Presumption of Constitutionality- Doctrine of Legitimacy
(a) The doctrine of legitimacy128, also known as the presumption of constitutionality129, is

always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and its subsequent provisions,130
since it must be assured that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of
its people and that its laws are intended to eradicate problems made manifest by experience
and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.131If two views are possible, one
making the Statute Constitutional, and other making it unconstitutional,132 the former view
must prevail and the Court must make efforts to uphold the Constitutional validity of a
Statute.133
(b) Placing reliance on this doctrine also, as an arguendo, even assuming but not conceding to
the Petitioner’s argument that there might be an unconstitutional aspect or interpretation of
this provision, even then, since the Respondents today, have proven that there is another side
to the coin, thereby granting it a constitutional interpretation, the constitutional interpretation
will prevail over the unconstitutional one, thereby validating S. 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. Therefore, it is submitted with utmost reverence before
this Hon’ble Court that viewed from any angle, S. 35 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985 is intra vires the Findian Constitution.
4. Whether the consumption of drugs can fall within the protective cover of Art
25 of the Findian Constitution?
It is most deferentially submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the usage of drugs will not
receive the protective cover of Art 25 as [A]. It does not constitute an essential religious
practice of any religion; [B]. It falls under the category of “reasonable restrictions” that can
be imposed on any fundamental right and subject to the limitations laid down by Art 25 (1);
[C]. A cult will not amount to being a “religious denomination” that can dictate what
constitutes the core practices of being “essentially religious”.
128
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745.
129
Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of India And Others, 1950 SCR 869
130
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Anr. (1978) 1 SCC 248
131
State of Bombay v. Balsara F.N 1951 SCR 682; R.K. Garg v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 2138, Prabu Das
MorarjeeRajkotia v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 1044
132
HinsaVirodhakSangh v. MirzapurMotiKureshJamat&Ors. [(2008) 5 SCC 33]
133
Government of Andhra Pradesh &Ors. V. Smt. P. Laxmi Devi,(2008) 4 SCC 720.
Page 33 of 42
4.1.CORE OF ESSENTIAL RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
(a) To fall under the protective umbrella of Art 25 of the Findian Constitution, any practice
should be regarded as an “essential religious practice” of that particular religion134 and as a
touchstone of that particular religion. What tantamounts to being “essential religious” is a
question of law that we have to examine based on judicial interpretations.
(b) The Genesis of the phrase “essential religious practice” is found in the Constitutional
Assembly debates and in the observations of the father of the Indian Constitution, Dr. B.R.
Ambedkar.135 Essential practices of religion refer to the core belief upon which a religion is
founded136. Essential practices mean those practices that are fundamental to follow a religious
belief. It is upon the cornerstone of essential pars or practices that the superstructure of a
religion is built, without which a religion will be no religion.137
(c) In Shirur Mutt138, the court mentioned for the first time that what constitutes an essential
part of a religion will be ascertained with reference to the tenets and doctrines of that religion
itself. The question is where must a line be drawn between what are matters of religion and
what are not. The test is to determine whether a part or practice is essential to a religion is to
find out whether the nature of religion will be changed without that part or practice139.
(d) If the taking away of that part or practise could result in fundamental change in the
character of that religion or in its belief, then such part could be treated as an essential or an
integral part. What constitutes an integral part or essential part off religion has to be
determined with reference to the doctrines, practices, tenets, historical background, etc. of the
given religion. In a given case, it is for this Hon’ble Court to decide whether a practise is an
essential part and parties of a given religion.140
(e) The Constitution must be interpreted to protect not only religious beliefs but also acts
done on pursuance of that belief.141 It is the reverent submission of the Respondents that the
134
Shyara Bano v. Union of India, (2017) 9 SCC 1.
135
Parliament of India, Constitutional Assembly Debates, Vol. VII, 2 December 1948, (speech of Dr.
Ambedkar), available at http://164.100.47.132/ LssNew/constituent/vol7p18.html
136
Ritu Prasad Sharma v. State of Assam, (2015) 9 SCC 461
137
Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770, 782-83 ¶ 9
138
The Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Swamiar of Shirur Mutt, AIR
1954 SC 282
139
Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors. v. State Of Kerala & Ors., Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006
140
Commissioner of Police Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770, 782-83 ¶ 9 and ¶11
141
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay, 1962 AIR 853.
Page 34 of 42
differences between what are religious and what is Secular nature is to be adjudicated by
Judicial Balancing.142 The individual rights under Article 25 would prevail over anything,
which is not essential to the religion.
(f) In the factual matrix of the present case, for the consumption of drugs to be shielded by
Art 25 of the Findian Constitution, it is pressing to prove that it is an “essential religious
practice” of that particular religion which constitutes the fulcrum of the religion and the
religion fails to exist without this practice.143
4.1.1. THE TRANSFORMATION FROM “ESSENTIALLY RELIGIOUS”

TO “ESSENTIAL TO THE RELIGION”
(a). It is the contention of the Respondents that for any practice to be tested whether or not
Essential, has to be “Essential to the Religion”. This shift144 here, from determining whether
it is Essential went from qualifying the nature of the practice (whether religious or secular) to
qualifying its importance (within the Religion) i.e. if the practice is essentially religious to the
religion.
(b) This significant Transformation has expanded the scope of Court in determining the
questions intended to Religion. This test was further affirmed by the Supreme Court where
the court upheld the Law prohibiting Cow Slaughter.145 Thus the two distinct tests to
determine whether any practice is protected by virtue of Article 25 are:
Is the Practice of a Religious or Secular nature? (Or) Is it Essential to the Religion?
(c) For the same reasons, the test of “Essentially Religious” as laid in Shirur Mutt 146 creates
two propositions in tension with one another, that the Religious freedom clause extends to
practice and conduct; and what practice or conduct was protected was to be judged from the
internal stand point of the Religion itself. This along with the words of Dr. Ambedkar in the
Constitution Assembly Debates has transformed the said test from “Essentially Religious” to
“essential to the religion”, which was further tread as one test in the Obiter of Justice
142
Jared.A. Goldstien, Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine? Judicial Authority to Examine Religious
Practices and Beliefs, Catholic University Law Review , Volume 54 Issue 2 Winter 2005.
143
144
Ram Prasad Seth Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1957 ALL 411 para 12, relying on State of Bombay Vs.
Narasu Appa Mali, AIR 1952 Bom. 84
145
Mohd. Hanif Qureshi Vs. State of Bihar 1959 SCR 629, ¶ 13
146
1954 SC 282
Page 35 of 42
Gajendragadkar in deciding the Constitutionality of an Act stipulating control over the
managing committee of a Muslim Durgah147
(d) Thus, the settled proposition is a combination of two distinct tests i.e. religious/secular
and essential/inessential into a single one. With respect to the first step, the question must be
whether the said practice is to be viewed from the internal point of view i.e the community’s
determination of the scope of what constitutes religion, while determining the question by
Judicial fiat148.
(e) The Court in Durgah Committee149 for the first time, distinguished between “Superstitious
beliefs” and “religious practice.” The Court apart from engaging in Judicial Enquiry to
determine whether a practice claimed to be essential was in fact grounded in Religious
Scriptures, beliefs and tenets, the Court would “Carefully Scrutinize” that the practice
claiming constitutional protection does not claims Superstition as its base. This was
considered necessary safeguard to ensure that superstitious beliefs would not be afforded
constitutional protection in the grab of an essential religious practice. Thus, matters which are
purely Secular clothed with a religious form, do not enjoy protection as an essential part of
Religion.
(f) The test was further narrowed down in Saifuddin150, where by 4:1 majority, the court
struck down the Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act, 1949, which prohibited
Excommunication within Religious Communities. The strong Dissent of Justice Sinha151,
who opined that the Excommunication was not wholly a Religious nature, but to be
associated with the Civil Rights of the members of the Community, has a far-reaching
consequence. Further, the consequences that follow excommunication were noted in the
dissent by the Hon’ble Judge.152
(g) Given this well settled legal position, in the instant matter, to accord to protection under
Art 25 of the Findian Constitition, the interpretations of this Hon’ble Court have made it
evident that it is not enough if it is proven to be an “essentially religious practice”, but it
should be a practice that is “essential to the religion”. With regard to drug usage and
147
Dargah Committee vs. Syed Hussain Ali , AIR 1961 SC 1402 ¶ 33
148
Ratilal Panachand Gandhi Vs. State Of Bombay (1954) SCR 1055
149
Dargah Committee vs. Syed Hussain Ali , AIR 1961 SC 1402
150
Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay 1962 AIR 853
151
Para 11
152
Sardar Syadna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. The State of Bombay 1962 AIR 853
Page 36 of 42
consumption of drugs, no particular religion regards it as a hinge of the religion, and so
fundamental that the religion ceases to exist sans this practice.
(h) Most of the religions view regular consumption of drugs as a sin and as a practice that is
highly condemned and derogatory to one’s health. Religions uphold strict values against
practises like usage of alcohol and consumption of drugs and hence the Respondent humbly
submits there is no way that this practice will constitute the fundamentals of any religion, and
therefore, cannot be regarded as an “essential religious practice” that is protected vides Art 25
of the Findian Constitution.
4.1.2. ESSENTIALITY OF A PRACTICE HAS TO BE DETERMINED BY

THE COURTS.
(a). The Respondents contend that, assuming but not conceding to the contention of the
Petitioner that the impugned practice is one Essential, the said practice has to be tested for
Judicial Scrutiny by this Hon’ble Court. In Tilkayat153 case, the Court while determining the
Constitutional validity of Nathdwara Temple Act 1959, underlined why the claims of any
community regarding their religious practices could not be accepted without scrutiny.
(b) For the same reasons, the Respondent submits that, blind application of Shirur Mutt154
formula cannot be applied to cases because, persons within a community have diverse and
contrasting conceptions of what is essential to their religion. Thus, it is this Hon’ble Court
which has the power to determine not only whether a practice is religious in character, but
also whether it could be considered an essential part of Religion. In a given case, it is for the
court to decide whether apart practise is an essential part or practise of a given religion.155
(c) Thus, from determining what is essential to religion would be determined by the
“adherents to the faith”, the Court moved towards a doctrine that what is essential “will
always have to be determined by the Court.” In this regard, the Respondents also contend
that, the Court must determine, whether a statute seeks to regulate what is “essentially and
absolutely secular.” Both these boundaries are subject to adjudication by the Court.156
153
Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638 ¶ 57
154
1954 SC 282
155
Commissioner of Police Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770, 782-83 (¶ 9 and
11); Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638
156
Commissioner of Police Vs. Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta, (2004) 12 SCC 770, 782-83 (¶ 9 and
11); Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1963 SC 1638
Page 37 of 42
4.2.CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE THE TOUCHSTONE FOR ANY
PRACTICE TO BE REGARDED AS ESSENTIAL:
(a) In Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu,157 the court held that
the Constitutional legitimacy, naturally, must supersede all religious beliefs or practices. Any
practice to be regarded as essential to a religion, apart from being essential to the religion,
must be in conformity with the fundamental Constitutional values, guarantees and accords
with Constitutional morality and Ethos. The Respondents contend that the Essential Religious
Practices must be understood without prejudice to the “public order, morality and health”
which constitutes the trinity of the right to freedom of religion158.
(b) Practices or beliefs which detract from these foundational values cannot claim legitimacy.
In, Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India 159 the Apex Court observed the importance
of Constitutional Morality as a governing ideal and that it highlights the need to preserve the
trust of people in institutions of democracy.
(c) The dignity of every individual enjoins upon the Court, a duty to resolve the inherent
tensions between the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom accorded to religious
denominations and the reasonable restrictions that is imposed on this freedom by the
Constitution itself. The submission of the Respondent is that the balance between the right
and restrictions should be ascertained with necessary limitations.
(d) Any right will be subject to reasonable restrictions160 and no right stands on an absolute
footing161. Even assuming, but not conceding to the argument of the Learned Petitioners that
drug usage and consumption is protected by Art 25 of the Findian Constitution, it will be a
practice that is barred by the reasonable restrictions laid down to avail the freedom of religion
under Art 25 itself, namely “public order, morality and health”. Art 25, verbatim begins with
“subject to public order, morality and health162”. Therefore, it is crystalline that the right is
existent only if it does not curtail the public order, morality or one’s health.
157
Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam v. Government of Tamil Nadu (2016) 2 SCC 725
158
Art 25 (1) of the Findian Constitution.
159
Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India (2018) 8 SCALE 72
160
Justice K.S Puttasamy (Retd) v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
161
Dharam Dutt & Ors v. Union Of India & Ors, (2004) 1 SCC 712
162
Art 25 (1) of the Findian Constitution
Page 38 of 42
(e) Findian citizens have the right to health guaranteed under Art 21 of their Constitution, as
the substance of life lies in health in itself.163 Further, the State also has obligations to sustain
conditions congenial to good health of its citizens which are enshrined in the Findian
Constitution164. It is well settled in medical jurisprudence that regular consumption of drugs
has its own ill effects and can lead to turning fatal also. Therefore, according protection to
usage of drugs under Art 25 clearly contravenes the basic principles enshrined in the Findian
Constitution.
(f) It is not only a national obligation, Findia is a signatory to a number of international

conventions like the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights165 and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights166 that guarantee the right to health to
individuals. Further, Findia is also a signatory to the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs
that explicitly bans the usage and consumption of drugs.
(g) Therefore, the Respondents most reverently contend that according protection to usage of
drugs under Art 25 of the Findian Constitution is not possible as it clearly contravenes the
basic principles enshrined in the Findian Constitution, violates the obligation of the State to
protect the health of its citizens both at a national and an international front.
(h) Moving on further, to the next aspect of morality, it can be simply defined as principles
concerning the distinction between right and wrong or good and bad behaviour.167 It is well
settled that continuous usage of drugs makes a person intoxicated, wherein he loses his sense
of rights and wrong and starts acting negligently and carelessly and in the due process, man
does not know what he is doing. This is the very reason that intoxicated men are considered
to be unfit in the legal sphere168 as they lose their sense of right and wrong. In such a
scenario, legalising the usage of recreational drugs and allowing it to be used for religious
purposes will lead to people indulging in activities which may turn out to be façade for the
society, in the Respondent’s considered view.
(i) The next restriction laid down by the Constitution169 is “public order170”. Continuing the
prefix argument, a deterioration of morality will also lead to a deterioration of public order.
163
State of Punjab & Ors v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga JT 1997 (1) SC 416
164
Art 39, 42 and 47 of the Findian Constitution
165
Art 25 of the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights
166
Art 12 of International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
167
P Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced Law Lexicon, Volume 1, Lexis Nexis Publications.
168
Har Shankar & Ors. v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr, 1975 SCR (3) 254.
169
Art 25 (1) of the Findian Constitution.
Page 39 of 42
The very intent of the Legislature behind enacting the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances Act, 1985171 was to bring about stringent regulations on the usage of drugs so as
to reduce violence in the community. This, prima facie, proves the contention of the
Respondent that increased usage of drugs leads to increased violence and anti-national crimes
in the society.
THEREFORE, the Respondents most humbly submit that the legalizing of the usage of drugs
by using Art 25 of the Findian Constitution is not possible as it is barred by the Reasonable
Restrictions of “public order, morality and health” laid down in the article itself.
4.3.TEST OF RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION
(a) For any group of people to dictate their own religious practices, they should be protected
vide Art 26 of the Findian Constitution that gives the right to religious denominations to
profess and practice religion in their own way, subject to certain restrictions. Now, the
question is what constitutes a “religious denomination”. This question is not res intergra and
there are judicial interpretations explaining the same.
(b) It is humbly presented before this Supreme Court, that a denomination is a “collection of
individuals classed together under the same name”172. Further it is pertinent to note that the
nature of "religious denomination" must take their colour from the word 'religion' and if this
be so, the expression "religious denomination" must also satisfy two conditions which in the
instant case are not met with as under173:
(c) It must be a collection of individuals who have a system of beliefs or doctrines which they
regard as conducive to their spiritual well-being, that is, a common faith174: In the factual
matrix of the instant case, the group is a “cult175”, which is defined as a “religious veneration
that has devotion directed towards a particular object”.176 Therefore, if the practice of drug
usage is to be regarded as ‘essential to the religion’, then drug usage per se, should be
completely allowed in all tenets, but as proved earlier, it is contravening the ethos of the
constitution and is condemned by the religions itself, therefore, not being in accordance to the
170
Smt. Angoori Devi For Ram Ratan vs Union Of India & Ors, 1989 AIR 371
171
Preamble of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
172
Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur
Mutt, 1954 AIR 282, (1954).
173
S.P Mittal v. Union of India, 1983 SCR (1) 729, (1983)
174
N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others, (2002) 8 SCC 106.
175
176
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
Page 40 of 42
well- recognized constitutional and religious principles. It is further essential to note that
There cannot be additions or subtractions to such part, which is not true in the present case.177
(d) Common organization – It is essential to note that there is no separate organization of the
tenets of the religion, Designations by a distinctive name. Considering that a
"denomination"178 collection of individuals classed together under the same name, the “cult”
in the instant case, will not fall under this category. In furtherance, the Courts179 hold a
Religious Denomination180 to be one in which the sects or sub-sects can certainly be balled
out distinctly181, in the present factual matrix, there is no common organization also as a
“cult” cannot be legally recognized as a common organization.
Hence, it is crystalline that this cult will not amount to being a religious denomination that
can dictate its own norms of practice and avail the right under Art 26 of the Findian
Constitution.
(e) Therefore, it is the reverent submission of the Respondent that viewed from any angle, the
consumption and usage of drugs will not be shielded by Art 25 of the Findian Constituion as
it is not an essential religious practice and is infact a practice condemned by religions itself.
Further, it is also violating of the “health factor” that stands as a restriction to avail any
protection under Art 25. Moreover, it is also submitted that the cult headed by one, Kishu
Rado182 will not amount to being a “religious denomination” as it does not satiate the
essentials of the same and cannot exercise any right183 of dictating its own norms of religion.
177
N. Adithayan v. Travancore Devaswom Board and others, (2002) 8 SCC 106.
178
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/
179
Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb v. State of Bombay [1962] Suppl. 2 SCR 496.
180
Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa(1964) 7 SCR 32, Shastri Yagnapurushadiji and others v. Muldas
Bhundardas Vaishya and another (1966) 3 SCR 242 : AIR 1966 SC 1119.
181
Commr., Hindu Religious Endowments v. Shirur Mutt AIR 1954 SC 282.
182
183
Art 26 of the Findian Constitution.
Page 41 of 42
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in the lights of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited it
is most humbly and respectfully prayed before this Hon’ble Court that it may be pleased to
adjudge and declare that:
• The present petition is devoid of all merits and to dismiss the same.
AND/OR pass any other order/orders as this Hon’ble Court deems fit and proper in the
circumstances of the given case and in the light of Justice, Equity and Good Conscience and
thus renders justice.
The Counsel pleads this Hon’ble Court to bind “Sacramentum habet in se tres comites,
veritatem, justitiam et judicium veritas habenda est in jurato, justitia et judicium in judice”
And for this act of kindness and justice the RESPONDENT shall be duty bound and
forever pray
All of which is submitted with utmost reverence
Place: ________ ,Findia S/d_____________

Date: September 2019 COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS
Page 42 of 42

Written Submissions Respondents School of Excellence in Law The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar La6224

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Written Submissions Respondents School of Excellence in Law The Tamil Nadu Dr. Ambedkar La6224

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THE 7TH ANNUAL ADV. B. P.

APTE MEMORIAL MOCK TRIAL, MOOT COURT

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION

WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO……….. OF 2019

A PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION FILED UNDER ART 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF FINDIA,

-------IN THE MATTER BETWEEN-------

KISHU RADO, MAA LIELA & ORS …………………PETITIONERS

UNION OF FINDIA …………………RESPONDENT

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS LORDSHIP’S

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................................. 9

1. Indian Penal Code, 1860

1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1947 (Adopted on December 10, 1948)

BOOKS, COMMENTARIES & LEXICONS

AIR : All India Report

Act : Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

ICCPR : International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

IT Act : Information Technology Act

PIL : Public Interest Litigation

SCC : Supreme Court Cases

SLP : Special Leave Petition

u/s : Under Section

UDHR : United Nations Declaration of Human Rights

UOI : Union of India

About the Country:

1. WHETHER THE INSTANT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE

3. WHETHER SECTION 35 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 WHICH ATTACHES A

4. WHETHER THE CONSUMPTION OF DRUGS CAN FALL WITHIN THE PROTECTIVE

1. WHETHER THE INSTANT PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE

3. WHETHER SECTION 35 OF THE NDPS ACT, 1985 WHICH ATTACHES A PRESUMPTION

1. Whether the instant Public Interest Litigation is maintainable before this

1.1 A. No Public Interest is involved:

2.1. Art 14 is not breached

2.2. Art 19 (1) (g) is not breached

2.3. No Violation of Art 21

3. Whether Section 35 of the NDPS Act, 1985, which Attaches A Presumption

(i) Lack of legislative competence; and

3.1. Proper Legislative Competence

3.2. Constitutional Validity of S. 35

3.2.1. Art 21 is not violated

3.2.2. International Jurisprudence

3.2.3. Parlance to other Statutes that Shift the Burden of Proof

3.3. Article 14 is not violated

3.4. Differential Treatment is not Violative Per se

(i) That the classification must be found on an intelligible differential which

3.4.2. The Classification Made by Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Presence of Intelligible Differentia

3.4.3. Direct Rationale Nexus to the Object of the Act

3.5.1THIS ACT AND ITS PROVISIONS ARE NOT ARBITRARY

(a) The expression ‘arbitrarily’ means: in an unreasonable manner, as fixed or done

(a) The doctrine of legitimacy128, also known as the presumption of constitutionality129, is

4.1.1. THE TRANSFORMATION FROM “ESSENTIALLY RELIGIOUS”

Is the Practice of a Religious or Secular nature? (Or) Is it Essential to the Religion?

4.1.2. ESSENTIALITY OF A PRACTICE HAS TO BE DETERMINED BY

(f) It is not only a national obligation, Findia is a signatory to a number of international

4.3.TEST OF RELIGIOUS DENOMINATION

All of which is submitted with utmost reverence

Place: ________ ,Findia S/d_____________

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Place: ,Findia S/d_____