British Politics since 1945

LP1020
Christopher Collins
945420
Evaluate the causes of Britain’s failure in the Suez Crisis
 Evaluate the causes of Britain’s failure in the Suez Crisis

In the following essay, I will attempt to assess the history of the Anglo-Egyptian relations
post-WW2 so that I may determine the underlying causes to the breakdown of the accordance
between the 2 countries, which ultimately led to the Suez Canal Crisis. I wish to assess key
political policies which both countries implemented surrounding the time of the crisis so that
I may evaluate its impacts and in some cases failures, in which Britain conceded involving its
relations with Egypt. This will also be done while maintaining an overall view of the inter-
relations and other key influencers to the Crisis, I also intend on addressing wider issues that
had effects on the overall political relations among different states will be critical in my
evaluation of the Crisis.
In the early 1950’s, where cold war tensions between east and west were certainly prominent,
Britain still found itself in a very dominant geopolitical position within the west. Even though
Britain, at the time, was going through a phase of decolonisation, they still controlled major
assets and resources that was directly linked to the British and Western economies, especially
in the case of oil but also in the form of general trade with countries which were a part of the
commonwealth. This made the Suez Canal a crucial part of the trade route between Britain
and its trade partners, as it meant that transportation costs were cut due to the length of time
shipments took to reach Britain shortened by 14 days; sailing through the Canal aided
shipments as they no longer had to sail around the continent of Africa. This arguably was one
of Britain’s most valuable assets as it held such geopolitical power which resulted in ‘80,000
British troops being deployed in Egypt’ ( LP1020, 2017) so that they could police the canal
and Egypt. This, in my opinion, was one of the first failures of British Foreign Policy. In such
a volatile time in the Middle East, the British occupation of Egypt, even after the Anglo-
Egyptian Treaty, did not sit well with the Egyptian people. This tension between the
occupancy and the viewed corruption of King Faruq, who was viewed by the people as
Britain’s ‘Puppet’, gave birth to the rise of Colonel Abdel Nasser. A man which would rise to
political power through the help of local police/army officers to topple the ‘corrupt’
government and would pose to be a contributor to the demise of the British Empire.
The ascension of Nasser, through the empowerment of the people, as Nasser fought for
Egyptian Nationalism something which was widely accepted at the time, as the reign of King
Faruq didn’t seem prosperous for the Egyptian people, was one which was founded on an
anti-western basis. This was always going to be problematic for Britain’s position especially
when in 1952 Nasser had overthrown the monarchy with aims to abolish constitutional
monarchy and aristocracy powers within the country and adopt a position of anti-imperialism
and non-alignment. This looked to be met with acceptance by the British government at the
time who did not oppose the subversion of King Faruq, who supported and allowed the
British occupancy. This can be viewed as another point of failure that the British conceded.
They not only influenced the popular anti-western views by the mistreatment of the Egyptian
people but also allowed the ascension of a nationalist leader who aimed to adopt an opposing
position of British rule/occupancy within the country. On the 25th of January in 1952, an
Egyptian Holy day, Operation Eagle was implemented, where British troops surrounded the
Ismailia police station forcing them to surrender, the Egyptian police attempted to fight back
but were inherently outnumbered, ‘50 police officers were killed with more wounded (The
West, 1952). This incited anger and riots throughout Egypt and on the following day, known
as ‘Black Saturday’, there was an outburst by Egyptian people, where western owned
businesses were burnt down and 26 westerners were killed including 9 British nationals. In
this instance you can definitely realise the direct impact of British occupancy and British
foreign policy in the form of loss of lives as a consequence of the British army’s actions.
Britain failed to provide a safe environment for its British foreign nationals in a very unstable
time. This also further deepened the opposition of the Egyptian people to the British
occupancy and created an unsafe ambiance among the British troops, many at the time
receiving death threats which were aimed at family members of those deployed in Egypt.
This naturally left troops uneasy and put pressure on the British Foreign Secretary at the time,
Anthony Eden.
The threats made to the welfare of troops and their families, along with the high costs for
Britain to maintain such a military presence in Egypt forced Eden to negotiate an agreement
with, now recognised to be in executive office, after he put ‘President Muhammed Naguib
under house arrest’ (Chronicles of Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath, 2011), Abdel
Nasser, this agreement would involve the vacation of British troops within Egypt within a 20
month period. This was another concession of Britain’s, which further enforced Nasser’s
political power, as Nasser showed the Egyptian people that he was ready to lead the country
and deliver on his intended nationalised, non-aligned agenda. A clause of the agreement was
that the British army could only occupy the country again if Turkey ever attacked Egypt.
Distrust and animosity came from the meeting of Eden and Nasser in February 1955 as Eden
tried to get Nasser to join the Baghdad Pact, an agreement among Middle Eastern countries
and Britain, which had an anti-Soviet Union position with aims to prevent infiltration from
the Soviet Union into the Middle East. However, Britain were also in negotiations with Israel
in regards to joining the Pact, Nasser who naturally opposed Israel, with a Pan-Arab mind set,
was aware that Britain had been in these negotiations, Nasser would not join a Pact with
Israel while the Jewish community were killing ‘Arab Brothers’ within Israel. This brought
further hostility to the relationship between Nasser and Britain and after Nasser had sought to
purchase arms from Britain, who instinctively would not want to supply a nation who in all
instants were viewed as opposing Britain, so much so that national radio stations at the time
were being allowed to publicise anti-British propaganda, it then meant that Nasser turned to
the only other major military force that would negotiate arms deals with the country, the
Soviet Union Bloc. This brought fears that communism could spread across the Middle East
and the Soviets political influence could impact the Suez Canal and subsequently its control.
This was difficult for Britain but was ultimately a failure in the sense that it pushed Nasser
and Egypt further from Britain causing a relationship that could have major repercussions for
Britain but it generally couldn’t be avoided as Britain were not going to supply arms to
arguably, Egypt’s first modern dictator.
Ten days before the last British troops left Egypt Colonel Abdel Nasser became the president
of Egypt, Nasser had ideas of modernisation of the Egyptian economy who at the time were
practically bankrupt and who along with Sudan were suffering from food insecurity, Nasser
wanting to promote Arab prosperity but could not do so as he did not have access to the
resources to make this viable, his own country had problems which needed addressing before
he could strive to aid other Arab states. Nasser sought to construct what he would call the
Aswan High Dam on the River Nile so that he could generate electricity to the region also
creating much needed revenue which would help the Egyptian economy. The lack of finance
was the first hurdle that Nasser had to overcome, Nasser obtained ‘$200 Million equating to a
fifth of the total revenue needed from the World Bank’ (Britain in Transition, 1979), along
with US and British private investment, Nasser would have the revenue to build the dam.
However after Nasser’s acquisition of arms from Czechoslovakia the US and subsequently
the British refused to invest into the dam as the region was seen to be ‘volatile’ and unstable
at the time. This left Nasser humiliated and ready for vengeance, he planned to nationalise the
biggest ‘asset’ in the country, the Suez Canal Company. On the 26th of June 1956 Nasser gave
a speech to Egypt explaining his plans for the nationalisation of the Canal while operation
‘Dignity and Glory’ was undergone during the speech, this was a military operation taken by
officers in the Egyptian army who would seize the offices and takeover the Canal. Twelve
Egyptians were to be appointed members of a special board which would manage the newly-
nationalised company. Legally, the Suez Canal Company was owned by Egypt however in
‘1869 it was granted a 99 year concession’ (BBC, 1956) which meant it was due to revert
back to the Egyptian Government in 1968. Prior to the acquisition, Eden had made it clear
that the Suez Canal was always a resource that Britain would be willing to go to war for.
Here we can see the direct knock on effect that the withdrawal of British and US investment
had in the form of the nationalisation of the Suez. The investment was a potential relationship
builder that could have strengthened the breaking links with Egypt and the West which could
have meant that Nasser owed some allegiances to the West as it would support their economy
through the contribution to the Aswan High Dam. Instead Nasser felt deeply disrespected,
especially through the nature in which he found out; through US media instead of the US and
British investors respectively. This act, along with the prior breakdown in relations between
Egypt and the British would consequently lead to a war. Whenever relations between
countries lead to a state of war, it inherently suggests that there is a practise of poor politics.
An Anglo-French alliance was formed as a result of Nasser’s nationalisation of the Suez
Canal Company. The British and French had been the two biggest stake holders of the Suez
and had the most to lose. Two parties met in a secret location as representatives for Britain
and France where they had arranged to meet with the first Prime Minister of Israel David
Ben-Gurion, on the 22nd of October 1956, so that they may persuade Israel to attack the Sinai
Peninsula. This would give the pre-text for the British to send troops to the Suez Canal in
order to ‘Protect’ the Canal’s security. On the 26th of October the Israeli’s struck at the Sinai
Peninsula, two days later they were joined by the British and French forces, by October 31st,
the forces had managed to invade the Canal Zone. But had been halted under a ceasefire
ostensibly ordered by the United Nations, but in fact was dictated by the US. The operation
was seen as counterproductive and executed the complete opposite of bolstering the Anglo-
French interest in the Canal, it was said to badly undermine the political and military prestige
of both countries, most of all this left the World outraged by the British’s atrocious political
power plays, so much so that Britain’s biggest ally, the US, under the Eisenhower
administration showed condemnation and disapproval of the Eden’s actions. John Foster
Dulles’s, then the US Foreign Secretary, supposed approval had ‘misled’ Eden to going
ahead with the invasion which looked to ruin the ‘special relationship’ between the US and
Britain. Threats of the US treasury selling its sterling reserves, which could have crippled the
British economy at this time of post-war austerity, forced the halt and the evacuation of
British troops from the Canal. The failure for Britain lied in the Worlds’ revulsion against
imperial aggression, nations had not gotten over the Second World War and currently were
suffering from its effects, and an imperialist stance from Britain was a very unpopular
ideology which was not received well by the World. Eden had been compelled to act by his
cabinet and was pressured to do so through military action. This led to a loss in political
power for Britain among the World as they were seen as conniving and untrustworthy in its
political approach. Especially due the secrecy and the nature of the acts, it had ultimately left
Britain in a floundering position, it could be argued that this was the beginning of the demise
of the British Empire and its World influence.
In conclusion, Britain in most instances failed to act appropriately in a political manner that
would ensure that its foreign relations and interests were kept within Egypt. Eden’s outdated
stance of imperialist rule rather than cooperation in the form of Bilateral Trade Agreements
led to the Crisis realised within the region. From the occupancy of Egypt by the British army
to the Invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal the British Foreign Policy implemented by
Eden’s Conservative Government was ultimately flawed and subsequently failed, which
directly linked to the loss of British influence in the world and arguably the start of the end to
the British Empire.
Bibliography

1. LP1020- British Politics since 1945, Dr Jorg Mathias, January 2017

2. http://trove.nla.gov.au/newspaper/article/49012152 , The West, 26 th of January 1952

3. Chronicles of the Egyptian Revolution and its Aftermath, M. Cherif Bassiouni, 2011

4. Britain in Transition: the Twentieth Century, Alfred F. Havighurst, 1979

5. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/26/newsid_2701000/2701603.stm ,
BBC, 1956