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A Technocritical Review of Drones Crash Risk Probabilistic Consequences and its

Societal Acceptance

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LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications 27

A Technocritical Review of Drones Crash Risk Probabilistic

Consequences and its Societal Acceptance

Alberto Susini
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Kartographie (DGfK) - Risk Commission Member
1290 Versoix, Switzerland.
alberto.susini@geneva-link.ch

Abstract.
Since their massive military use in Afghanistan and Iraq, drone operations are expanding in scientific use
and in civil use by private individuals who want the civil sky traffic to be open to a large variety of appli-
cations. This occurs in a situation with a patchwork of national regulatory frameworks which need further
differentiation and legitimation especially from the safety perspective, since no public database recording
drone crashes is publically available, in order to facilitate the decision making process by providing objec-
tive data for the public and the stakeholders. Nevertheless, estimations mainly limited to recently
declassified military drones data, have revealed thousands of crashes around the world since 2001. Since
the outbreak of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, military drones have malfunctioned in many ways,
crashing to earth because of mechanical breakdowns, human error, bad weather, loss of communication
and other reasons. Military drones slammed into homes, farms, runways, highways, waterways and in one
case, into an Air Force C-130 Hercules transport plane. Commercial drone flights are said to become a
widespread reality, therefore the comparison with the safety of manned jet aircraft need to be established
by facts. New potential mapping and cartographic needs will emerge from this new sky opening. Unidenti-
fied civil drones have flown above nuclear power plants in France and Belgium and a drone crashed in the
middle of a street in Geneva Switzerland, raising public debate about safety issues and protection of priva-
cy. The controversial collection and treatment of metadata by drones is also discussed, together with their
involvement inside the new strategy of control of the global commons. The paper will conclude by point-
ing out that without a critical debate among stakeholders and the public on the lack of the necessary regu-
latory framework in the civil/public domains, no proper risk management strategies can be developed for
introducing drones into civil airspace, also if recently the European aviation safety agency (EASA) starts
to study the subject. Even though no serious fatal drone accident was recorded, many catastrophes have
been narrowly averted, opening the debate of public perception of the introduction of a new technology.

Keywords. drone crash, UAV and UAS accident, aircraft accidents probability, aircraft accident damage,
probabilistic risk analysis, opening NAS to UAS, risk management strategy, public perception, patterns of
life, global commons.

1 Introduction

The first mention of drones was made during the first world war in 1918.They were treated with curiosity
during the years 1920, and gained their legitimacy during the Vietnam conflict during 1964 and 1975, with
more than 3435 recognised flight missions (1). A massive use of military drones was made since 2001 in
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia, while a first drone battle between Israel and the Hezbollah was identified
in 2006. With these lethal uses of drones in war zones opening a new kind of war similar to a modern version
of a man hunt (2), their civil use for scientific purposes was also developed for such objectives as obtaining
accurate photogrammetry data of archeological sites and helping rescue operations observation after the
Hayan typhoon. Newspaper paparazzi used them in 2013 for flights over Hollywood and a first commercial
flight in 2014 with DHL took place on the island of Juist (3).
Size of drones can be extremely variable, from play tools of a few kg to the biggest military drone, called
the Predator which has a length of 8.22 meters, a weight of 1022 kg, a cruising altitude of 7620 km and a
speed of a range between 135 km/h and 217 km/h, plus an autonomy which can reach 30 to 40 hours, all for a
global cost of 20 million US dollars. Other big models of drones are the Black Hawk and the Reaper. To ex-
plaining this massive drone use, it is important to say that buying and operating these drones is still less ex-
28 LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications

pensive than flying real planes with real pilots who must have costly training and long term veteran's pay-
ments.
Drones can also be referenced in the literature under the abbreviation UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) or
unmanned air vehicles. The abbreviations NAS (national airspace system) and ELOS (equivalent level of
safety) will also be used in the present paper.

2 Facts and results

Currently there exists no publicly available site recording the various civil and military drone crash acci-
dents that occurred in the past decades. The first attempt to analyse recently declassified US military data was
made in an article published by the Washington Post (4), after consultation of over 50'000 pages of declassi-
fied documents of military investigative reports and other records and the conclusions can therefore be con-
sidered as reliable and correct.
The Washington Post article reported that 400 large US military drones have crashed in major accidents
since 2001. The annual number of crashes has risen over the past decade as the military has expanded the
frequency of drone missions. They record 26 crashes in 2012 and 21 in 2013. On the war crash location, for
example, nearly one third of all crashes were located in Afghanistan (67) and in Irak (41). However, crashes
also occur outside military operating zones: 47 in training in the USA, 2 in Seychelles and one in Italy. In 18
cases, the details of the drone crashes were so sensitive that the military classified both the names of the coun-
tries where they occurred and the details of what happened. The crash data about the different drone types
gives the following numbers: 102 (Predator); 22 (Reaper); 26 (Hunter); 22 (Grey Eagle), 9 (Phantom); 5
(Black Hawk).

The accidents can be grouped into two main categories :

1. Class A accidents : complete destruction of the UAV and 2 million US dollars damage caused by
192 crashes.
2. Class B accidents : complete or partial destruction of the UAV and between 2 million and 5 mil-
lion US dollars damage caused by 224 crashes

Since the drone use began, the USAF has acquired 269 Predators, of which 40% have crashed in Class A
accidents and 8 % in class B accidents. USAF acknowledged that Predators crash more frequently than regu-
lar military aircraft (which in turn crash more frequently than civil aviation). Recently the drones’ safety has
improved, as is shown by the following accident statistic data: the mishap rate for Predators from 2009 to
2014 dropped from 13.7 to 4.79 Class A/100'000 flight hours. The data for the Reaper drone are 3.17 Class
A/100'000 flight hours.

The Washington Post's analysis of a list of accident records shows that the drone manufacturers have to over-
come the following fundamental safety gaps:

 A limited ability to detect and avoid inanimate objects (cameras cannot replace a pilot eyes and
navigation sense of feeling in the cockpit: human anti-collision ways to prevent mid-air disasters)

 Pilot errors : particularly during landings

 Persistent mechanical defects : insufficient years of testing before bringing drone models into war
operations, mostly basic electric malfunctions caused by bad weather

 Unreliable communication links leading to fragility of connections. Drones are extremely de-
pendent on wireless transmissions to relay commands and navigational information, usually via
satellite. Satellite connections can be lost when a drone banks too sharply or drops in altitude too
quickly, whilst electrical problems on the ground can also disrupt links
LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications 29

Other publications gives the following statistical data (5):

 UAV mishaps rate is 100 times higher than manned aircraft : 1 mishap for every 1000 flight
hours
 50% of these mishaps are attributed to aircraft failure (relaxed design methods and system relia-
bility)
 Unreliable communication links: dependence on wireless transmissions to relay commands and
navigational information via satellite
 Component failure patterns linked to software

Principal source of failures for US (*) and Israel (**) military UAS (6) :
Power propulsion: 38% (*) ; 32% (**)
Flight control: 19% (*) ; 28% (**)
Communications: 14% (*) ; 11% (**)
Human/ground: 17% (*) ; 22% (**)
Miscellaneous: 12% (*) ; 7% (**)

This rapid assessment of accident records shows that the military and drone manufacturers have yet to over-
come some fundamental safety hurdles: a limited ability to detect and avoid trouble; pilot error; persistent
mechanical defects; unreliable communications links.

Military drones have crashed into homes, farms, runways, highways, waterways and in one case into a mil-
itary transport plane (C-130 Hercules); in another case a drone crashed next to an elementary school play-
ground in Pennsylvania. Different images found with a Google search show cases of problematic crash situa-
tions.

Figure 1: drone crash in the street of Geneva (Switzerland) 08.09.2014

Figure 2: drone crash in a private garden

30 LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications

Figure 3: drone crash near a civil house in Seychelles

Figure 4: rare image on a military airport of a drone collision with an airplane

Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8: examples of drone crashes on military bases

LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications 31

Risk calculation methods

The high mishap rate of UAV's in operational service is frequently cited as a deterrent to more widespread
deployment and one limiting factor toward utilization of UAV's to operate in civil airspace. An equivalent
level of safety concept (ELOS) was developed (5) and proposed safety standards for manned aircraft related
to unmanned flight by defining a catastrophic condition as a UAV system failure that results in a least one
third-party casualty via a mid-air collision or via a ground injury. ELOS analysis is based on a falling object
model derived from commercial space transport safety assessment methodology and is validated through
comparisons with airplane accident data using air traffic density data and population density data for various
flight paths corresponding to potential applications. The study concluded that the existing UAV failure rate is
unacceptable for operations over heavily populated areas, with critical system failure rate ranging from
6.5*10-6 per flight hour for tilt rotor UAV's for an intercity ferry flight to 1.0*10-7 per flight hour for UAV's
operating over densely populated areas. This study leads to the mapping of exclusive no flight zones for
UAV's. Further ELOS requirements (6) proposed an ELOS baseline of 10-6 per flight hour. With the historical
involuntary ground fatality accident analysis for all conventional human piloted aircraft operations at 7.6*10-
8
, an arbitrary value was set to 10-9.

The UAS community lacks the knowledge of the UAS risk paradigm necessary to support effective deci-
sion making. The risk analysis of a UAS differs from classical aviation risk analysis by the use of different
input paradigms linked to the specificity of the UAS. For the classical human piloted aviation, risk manage-
ment strategies have taken the form of prescriptive bodies of regulations. For UAV's, rather than develop a
new risk management framework and under heavy commercial pressure, safety regulators propose to adapt
the existing risk management framework developed for conventional human piloted aviation and apply it to
UAS. However, UAS is not like a conventional aircraft system and possess its own unique risk features,
which are the following (7) :
 New and complex systems and architectures relative to platforms, communication links, automa-
tion and artificial intelligence
 Different performances and capability required for extreme long endurance, such as flying into
hurricanes for collecting data
 Complexity of human roles and behaviour of ground personnel, operational roles, crew resource
management, human machine interface
 Society's perceptions of the risk
 Market and commercial pressure
 Integration into the NAS

The following simple model of risk analysis is proposed (7) :

Evaluation of expected number of casualties per flight hour of operation:
 CE = expected number of casualties per flight hour
 CE = UFR X P(casualty/strike) X P(strike/impact) X P(impact)
 UFR=unrecoverable failure rate of the UAV per flight hour (10 -5)
 P(casualty/strike) : conditional probability that a strike results in a casualty
 P(strike/impact) : conditional probability that an impact at a specific location strikes a person
 P(impact) : probability of the platform impacting at a specific location
 P(impact) = p X LA
 p = density of population at the impact location
 LA = lethal area at the airborne platform
32 LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications

Several methods for area determination in order to define the areas where UAS are allowed to overfly with
respect to ground impact occurrence:
• vertical crash, frontal area crash, crash with an angle;
• importance of the kinetic energy on impact (sometimes the impact energy may be absorbed by
buildings, trees, vehicles or other obstacles
• P(fatality/exposure) as a function of kinetic energy on impact (Eimp)

Another complementary approach uses target level of safety with fatality rates (and ground impact deter-
mination (6)
• Fatality rate proposed to UAS from NTSB data;
• fF (accident rate/hour) = 10-7, data consistent with that of manned aircraft
• Fatality rate proposed by the study fF=10-8 (accident rate/hour) due to the fact that the benefits of
UAS operations are not evident to the general public

The Maximum acceptable frequency of accidents resulting in ground impact can be calculated using the
following needs (6):
• Kinetic energy imparted at impact, a function of the impact speed that may vary depending on the
UAS and the trajectory of descent
• Sheltering like building, trees or other obstacles
• Population density
• Aircraft frontal area or angle crash

The calculations will be done using following formulas (6) :

• f(impact, max) = E(fatalities/impact)-1 fF,max
• E(fatalities/impact) : expected number of fatalities
• E(fatalities/impact) = Nexp X P(fatality/impact)
• Nexp = number of people present in the crash area and as a result exposed to the accident ; assuming
a uniform population density
• Nexp = Aexp X p; p = population density
• Aexp=area of crash; W: weight UAS; L: length UAS
• Aexp=Waircraft (Laircraft + (Hperson/sin(glide angle))

The cost of a UAS ground impact includes the cost of damages to other property and damages due to dan-
gerous payloads (chemicals) and quantities of fuel. A high accident frequency of UAS, even if not accompa-
nied by injuries, can create anxiety to the general public and influence UAS movement in general.
Possible crash risk calculations on sensitive industrial chemical plants, nuclear power plants, energy trans-
portation infrastructure such as oil and gas storage tanks and pipelines must be investigated. In the field of
civil aviation, calculation methodologies have been developed in order to take account of domino catastrophic
scenarios linked with crashes of aircraft and calculation methodologies have been successfully developed (8,
9). These methods, which can easily be adapted for drones, work with the hypothesis that the specific risk
linked to an aircraft accident on a particular entity inside an industrial site is defined as the product of the
maximized damage multiplied by the probability per square hectometre of that accident. There is then the
need to compare the effects of a maximized site damage due to an aircraft accident per hectare with the latent
site risk independent of air traffic operations (e.g. that due to human error scenario, design failure, corrosion,
etc.).

Technocritical review of societal acceptance linked to the risks

European data and recent facts about UAV's have raised attention linked to media reports of these recent
cases in France, Belgium and Switzerland between September and December 2014. In France, between 30
October and 7 November 2014, there were 20 unidentified overflights of UAV's over 5 different French nu-
clear power plants (Penly, Flamanville, Saint-Laurent-des-Eaux, Dampierre-en-Burly and Fessenheim) and
also over an industrial nuclear industrial site (Marcoule) (10). The highest safety level of alarm in French
LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications 33

police and military air force was declared. However, despite these efforts, the authorities were unable to find
who was behind the flights and to have the UAV's shot down by French air force. The same situation occurred
also in Belgium with the nuclear power plant of Doel on the 21 of December 2014 (11). In the city of Geneva
in Switzerland on the 8 of September 2014, there was a drone crash on a major highway in the middle of the
city, near people and cars, caused by loss of control (12).

These situations put into media focus all the debate of how authorities will regulate this new expanding
aviation field. On the internet site of the Swiss federal board of civil aviation, it is only possible to discover
that a special flight authorization will be obligatory for drones having a weight greater than 30 kg and their
use is forbidden within 100 m of public meetings. In the city of Geneva, for drones having a weight greater
than 500 gr, a civil responsibility insurance is mandatory, whilst in the city of Zurich, due to safety reasons
and protection of privacy, the use of drones in the public domain is forbidden since August 2014 (13).

Now we can expect to see a global race for a drone regulation. Despite big commercial pressure, the US
Federal Aviation administration (FAA) stated that the delivery of packages by model aircraft for commercial
purpose has not been allowed since 2007. However, regulatory measures are already taking shape in the US,
with the Congress directing the FAA to issue rules legalizing the situation by the end of 2015 (14). 15 cases of
drones flying dangerously close to airports or passenger aircraft have been noticed in the US since 2012.The
European Union is also working toward this direction of issuing rules for creating a legal framework inside
the EU(15).
In the US, the drone industry complains of losing 27 million US dollars every day. Published data from the
10th of July 2014 foresees that the drone market inside the European Union in the next 10 years will reach an
amount of 15 billion Euros, whilst the worldwide estimate will be 130 billion US dollars (16). In France the
French postal office, together with the GeoPost entreprise, stated on the 30 of December 2014 that they will
begin with a program of global testing for postal delivery with drones of 4 kg traveling up to a maximum
distance of 20 km (17).

Figure 9 : French newspaper cover on drone traffic jam in the civil sky (2014)

The surveillance and privacy problems of images captured by drones is one of the most conflictual problem
perceived by the general public and also one of the most complex judicial problems to solve in a legislative
way. Harassment problems have also recently been noticed. Last year in Hermosa Beach LA, a n indignant
lady complained to a lifeguard about a drone which was taking pictures of her and her daughter sunning
themselves on the beach. In Connecticut, a man who was flying a drone over a beach was attacked by a wom-
an who accused him of taking pictures of her (4).
34 LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications

Serbia and Albania face heavy sanctions from UEFA in the fallout from the extraordinary fight sparked by
a low-flying drone on Tuesday night, 15 of October 2014, which caused their football match in Belgrade to be
abandoned. The Serbs accused their rivals of a “pre-planned terrorist action” after a remote-controlled drone
carrying the insignia of so-called “Greater Albania” flew low over the pitch, sparking a brawl involving play-
ers, fans and stewards (18).

To help in understanding the important points of this debate, many technical aspects linked to data capture
and informatics treatment by drones, must be worked out, such as the persistent eye view of zones overflown
by drones, what to do with the huge amount of data collected (rules of data storage/archive), data fusion (au-
dio, video, GPS position, phone calls), restrictions of privacy through social media and finally the most prob-
lematic: the construction of patterns of life.

For better understanding that specific aspect of military use of drones which is this construction and use of
patterns of life, it is important to explain some features of drones linked to software architecture. Data storage
and software design consideration are unique to UAVs (19, such as the 1.4 Terabyte storage capability, cou-
pled with an imagery index system and IP-enabled interface which is built into the Global Hawk.
UAV uses a software framework, which is a domain specific software architecture that provides the capa-
bility necessary to integrate software at different levels of abstraction. A framework provides partially imple-
mented patterns of behavior which are finalized for a particular application. Software is developed at various
levels of functionalities. At the lowest level are the software drivers that interface with the hardware. The
middle level is that of the low-servo controls necessary to achieve primitive control behaviors. The upper
level adds higher levels of intelligence and controls. Typically, these are event driven behavior, conditional
logic and sensor based decision making.

The use of drones leverages advanced inter-domain technologies for knowledge production in situations
where the enemy is deeply embedded in the local civilian community in order to detect what are termed "pat-
terns of life". Watching the same site dynamically during 15 hours by drones, better dynamic relevant infor-
mation than static satellite imagery can be used, so that they can reveal patterns of life. This new kind of intel-
ligence gained by drones can give relevant information, for example on how equipment will be used. Such
patterns provide unique fingerprints that can be compared to existing databases on human patterns (20).

Using drones programmed on behavior control with patterns of life (21), can be transformed to the techno-
logical version of classical man-hunt behaviour and act killings in an industrial repetitive way. This new tar-
geting regime led to a rapid escalation of drone strikes and an increase of the number of people that were
killed in contemporary war zones (and also non-war zones) which escape any democratic control under exclu-
sive military use.

Most strikes are ‘signature strikes‘ against individuals whose names are mostly unknown but for whom a
‘pattern of life analysis‘ has supposedly detected persistent anomalies in normal rhythms of activity, which
are then read as signs (‘signatures’) of an imminent threat and act under specific parameters in order to identi-
fy their human targets. These constructions are based on schematic views (which can correspond to very dif-
ferent realities) mixed with the linking of tapped phone conversations which allows to put somebody rapidly
on a suspect list.

The phone numbers and call histories from those phones go into the database which is used to “map” the
networks. But the link analysis methodology employed by intelligence analysis is incapable of qualitative
distinctions among relationships depicted on their maps of links between “nodes.” It operates exclusively on
quantitative data, in this case, the number of phone calls to or visits made to an existing target or to other
numbers in touch with that target. The inevitable result is that more numbers of phones held by civilian non-
combatants show up on the charts of insurgent networks. If the phone records show multiple links to numbers
already on the “kill/capture” list, the individual is likely to be added to the list (20).

This new kind of global new surveillance has now its own vocabulary, like the term "signature strikes"
(22). For these signature strikes there is a massive use of metadata collected by drones, such as a phone num-
ber, IMEI number or use of a specific SIM-card. The NSA General Councillor Steward Baker said also that
LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications 35

"metadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody's life. If you have enough metadata, you don't
really need content. It allowed General Michael Hayden, former NSA director to say "we kill people based on
metadata” (23).The London bureau of investigative journalism gives the following data only for Pakistan:
from 2004 until 2014 there were 400 drone strikes killing between 2379 and 3851 people (22).

During a long range of time, the US had the exclusive control over this drone killing technology, but now
these times are rapidly ending. Therefore, un-controlled proliferation of this killing drone techniques and
practices, outside US control and hopefully not by non-democratic countries and without any international
agreement, is also part of growing public concern (24).

In the actual transnational phase of capitalism, technologies are used for many purpose, in particular to co-
erce militarily those areas of the globe that act as a barrier to capital accumulation, for instance through the
coercive use of drone technology, and to maintain the hegemonic power of a global elite, including the secular
control of that elite of the consumption of media, politics, and social life in the global North. To argue for
emancipation through technological innovation, like drones, there is the tendency to fetishize technology and
to misunderstand how the technology is shaped by the clash of social forces and the desire of capitalism to
escape the barriers imposed by labor (25). The transnational capitalist class can be analytically divided into
four main fractions : (26)
(i) owners and controllers of TNCs and their local affiliates;
(ii) globalizing bureaucrats and politicians;
(iii) globalizing professionals;
(iv) consumerist elites (merchants and media).

These depicted uses of drones are also part of a new geo-strategic implementation by the TNC (transna-
tional capitalist class). This TNC uses drones for the perpetuation of low-intensity conflicts in the periphery of
the developed world (27) and for securing the global commons and global material flows.

As already stated, a new and vital challenge will be securing the access of the so-called global commons
which will allow the continuation of the material flow. Under global commons fall domains that are outside
the direct jurisdiction of sovereign states like the high seas, air, space and most recently the cyberspace. The
recent dynamics of global political economy are making global maritime flows increasingly important. Global
production in terms of consumer and industrial goods is outsourced to a number of developing countries,
while financial knowledge capacities continues to reside within western countries and US. Based on techno-
logical innovations that force the hands of others allow US centric coalition institutions and actors to control
how the global arteries of interdependency function. It will be based on supporting and protecting, even by
violent methods, the constancy of global flows. The framing of integrated sea, air, space and cyber-mobility is
helpful in discerning the wide power related entanglements in the global commons (20). As a non-sovereign
state, the global commons is defined by the global flow of people and raw material on which most sovereign
states and alliances increasingly depend. One of the most important techniques which represent both practical-
ly and symbolically the future of human terrain mapping, is the advanced drone technology that operates in
the aerial domain by leveraging on various other domains, including cyberspace (20).
36 LNIS Vol. 7 RIMMA Risk Information Management, Risk Models, and Applications

Conclusions
As described, despite many promising civil uses, the drone technology still lacks studies regarding various
dimensions of quantitative probabilistic risk analysis. Their higher failure rate and crash risks need rapidly
further studies, crash statistics and accident reports, which must be open for the public and independent re-
search institutions. In particular research directions must be focused with transversal domains like mixing
with civil / military manned aviation and land-use planning practices.

The controversial trend of commercial drone flights will rapidly bring to review all the existing air flight
mapping methodology, so that what will be the end result on a standardized international level is still unclear.
A huge potential of new cartographic mapping research will be better no-flight zones due to risks linked to the
intensive use of drones and also the study of possible crashes of drones on industrial facilities. National and
international legal framework for drones must be implemented with public participation in the decision mak-
ing process. Authorities have to take account of drone commercial traffic inside land use planning, including
not only the risk problematic but also noise and privacy issues which are extremely important for the public
perception.

Controversial massive use of data collection analysis of metadata by drones with lethal use of metadata use
for perpetuation of the new trend of domination of global commons and securing of material flow inside a
globalised economy by a transnational capitalist class is also a factor that must be integrated in the public
debate.

From a technocritical point of view, the public acceptance of the risks due to drone operations is a complex
function involving the following entities: knowledge, awareness of the risks; benefits attributed to the tech-
nology; debate on the social transformation induced by the introduction of this new technology and finally
surveillance and privacy problems induced by drone flights. Therefore a mature and realistic analysis of the
social transformation induced by this introduction of a new controversial technique, must overthrow the actual
fetishist media analysis of massive introduction of drone technology.

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[014] http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/06/faa-grounds-amazons-drone-delivery-plans/;
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[015] http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/aerospace/uas/

[016] http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/tecnologie/2014-07-10/droni-europa-vuole-regole-e-italia-risponde--
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[017] http://www.nzz.ch/mehr/digital/geopost-drohne-paket-la-poste-1.18452866

[018] http://www.theguardian.com/football/2014/oct/15/albania-charged-uefa-serbia

[019] Meyer, J., du Plessis, F., Clarke. (2009): Design Considerations for long endurance unmanned aerial ve-
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[020] Aaltola, M. (2014): The Challenges of global commons and flows for US power, Finnish institute of in-
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[024] Edward Luce, published by the Financial time, 29.06.2014 and extracts cited in a french translation in :
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[025] Hall, R (2013): Monthly Archives: February 2013, The University and the globalised learning landscape,
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Acknowledgement : A very special debt is owed to all of those who assisted me with their helpful comments and encouragement
and in particular to Mike Gérard who corrected the english version and to Prof. Hartmut Fricke who helped me with his useful com-
ments.

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