Whenguardiansmattermost

Irish Political Studies
ISSN: 0790-7184 (Print) 1743-9078 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fips20
When Guardians Matter Most: Exploring the

Conditions Under Which Electoral Management
Body Institutional Design Affects Election Integrity
Carolien van Ham & Staffan Lindberg
To cite this article: Carolien van Ham & Staffan Lindberg (2015): When Guardians Matter Most:
Exploring the Conditions Under Which Electoral Management Body Institutional Design Affects
Election Integrity, Irish Political Studies, DOI: 10.1080/07907184.2015.1099097
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2015.1099097
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Download by: [UNSW Library] Date: 26 November 2015, At: 21:08

Irish Political Studies, 2015
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2015.1099097
When Guardians Matter Most: Exploring

the Conditions Under Which Electoral
Management Body Institutional Design
Affects Election Integrity
Downloaded by [UNSW Library] at 21:08 26 November 2015
CAROLIEN VAN HAM∗ ,∗∗ & STAFFAN LINDBERG∗∗

∗
School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia; ∗∗ Department of
Political Science, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden
A BSTRACT Problems with election fraud and election integrity are of increasing interest in
both established and transitional democracies. In many transitional democracies, independent
electoral management bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional reform
measure to successfully strengthen election integrity. However, empirical findings regarding
the impact of EMB institutional design on election integrity are mixed. While regional
studies have found a positive impact of independent EMBs on election integrity in Latin
America and Africa, global comparative studies appear to show that EMB institutional
design is either negatively, or only very weakly related to election integrity. In this paper,
we examine the effects of EMB institutional design on election integrity using the new Varieties
of Democracy dataset and data from the International IDEA. We find that the mixed findings on
EMB institutional design are due to the differences between transitional and established
democracies on the one hand, and regimes with low and high quality of government on the
other. The paper concludes with a reflection on results and a discussion of implications of
these findings for the debate on electoral reform in Ireland.
Keywords: election integrity; electoral malpractice; election management body; institutional

design
Introduction
Problems with election fraud and election integrity are of increasing concern in both
established and transitional democracies (Lehoucq, 2003; Alvarez et al., 2008, 2012;
Birch, 2011; Norris, 2014, 2015). In many transitional democracies, independent
Correspondence Address: Carolien van Ham, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia and
Department of Political Science, V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden.
Email: c.vanham@unsw.edu.au
# 2015 Political Studies Association of Ireland

2 C. van Ham & S. Lindberg
electoral management bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional

reform measure to successfully strengthen election integrity, and as a result indepen-
dent EMBs are now the most common institutional model for electoral management
in the world (Lopez-Pintor, 2000; IDEA, 2006, 2014). In established democracies as
well, the role of electoral management in safeguarding election integrity and promot-
ing citizens’ trust in elections is a topic of increasing concern. The 2000 presidential
elections in the USA sparked a debate on the need for improved electoral manage-
ment and restoring citizen trust in electoral processes (Alvarez et al., 2008; Hall,
2012; Bowler et al., 2015), and electoral management failures in Britain have
drawn increasing attention too (James, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Clark, 2015).1
Likewise in Ireland deficiencies in the electoral process have been noted, ranging
from the fragmented organisation of elections to problems with the accuracy of the
voter registry, lack of centralised voter information, insufficient scrutiny of campaign
finance, and lack of equal opportunities for minorities to run for office (Reidy, 2014;
Electoral Integrity Project, PEI-data on Ireland).2 This has led to calls for the estab-
lishment of an independent electoral commission (Farrell, 2013, 2014; Reidy, 2014).
However, despite the special report commissioned by the Department of the Environ-
ment, Heritage and Local Government in 2008 that outlined a structure for the cre-
ation of an Irish Electoral Commission (Sinnott et al., 2008), and promises of
successive governments to implement the report’s recommendations, Ireland is still
without an independent electoral commission.
Yet, despite the global appeal of independent electoral management as a key insti-
tutional reform measure to strengthen election integrity, empirical findings regarding
the impact of EMB institutional design on election integrity are mixed. While
regional studies have found a positive impact of independent EMBs on election integ-
rity in Latin America and Africa (Hartlyn et al., 2008; Fall et al., 2012; Hamberg &
Erlich, 2013), global comparative studies appear to show that EMB institutional
design is either negatively, or only very weakly related to election integrity (Birch,
2011; Birch & van Ham, 2014; Norris, 2015).
In this paper, we hypothesise that this apparent non-effect of EMB institutional
design is due to the differences between transitional and established democracies
on the one hand (Lindberg, 2006, 2009) and regimes with low and high quality of
government (QoG) on the other hand (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Rothstein,
2011). We propose that in contexts of high QoG and higher levels of democracy,
EMB institutional design is inconsequential for election integrity, because the
bureaucracy already operates professionally and other partial regimes of democracy
are well established. The ‘governmental’ EMBs in regimes like Sweden and Norway
are examples. In countries with low QoG and sturdy electoral autocracy on the other
hand, EMB institutional design may not affect election integrity either. If the bureauc-
racy and other political institutions are captured and controlled by authoritarian
incumbents, the particular institutional design of EMBs should make little difference.
The ‘independent’ EMBs in regimes like DR Congo and Russia are cases in point.
However, in contexts of medium QoG and medium levels of democracy, EMB insti-
tutional design should be expected to strengthen election integrity, as in these cases,
When Guardians Matter Most 3
formally independent EMBs should have both stronger de facto autonomy and
greater capacity to administer and monitor elections.
We test whether these expectations hold up empirically using data from the new
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset, that includes data on almost 400 indicators
of democracy in 173 countries around the world from 1900 until 2012 (Coppedge
et al., 2015b). Many of the variables are based on multiple expert ratings aggregated
using a Bayesian latent variable measurement model (Pemstein et al., 2015). For this
paper we use the indicators on election integrity, de facto EMB autonomy and EMB
capacity for over 274 elections held between 2007 and 2012 in 151 countries world-
wide. The data on EMB institutional design derive from IDEA (IDEA, 2006, 2014).
The paper is set-up as follows: the next section provides a short review of research
on election integrity and the role of EMBs. It also presents descriptive data on the
relationship between election integrity and EMB institutional design. The section
then develops the theoretical argument and hypotheses regarding the differential
effects of EMB institutional design in contexts of varying levels of democracy and
QoG. The third section presents the data and methods used to test the hypotheses.
The fourth section presents the results, and finally section five concludes with a dis-
cussion of the implications of these findings for electoral administration in both tran-
sitional and established democracies, in particular electoral management reform in
Ireland.
EMB Institutional Design and Election Integrity

In the wake of the third wave of democratisation and the end of the Cold War, an
increasing number of countries around the world started holding multi-party elec-
tions. By now, over 90 per cent of the world’s states hold national elections that
are, at least de jure, multi-party (Hyde, 2011). However, many of these elections
still suffer from irregularities that affect their integrity, ranging from outright electoral
fraud and manipulation to administrative problems and irregularities (Global Com-
mission, 2012; Year in Elections, 2014). Moreover, cases such the 2000 presidential
elections in the USA demonstrate that election integrity is not only a topic of concern
in transitional democracies, but also in established democracies. Hence, election
fraud and election integrity are increasingly topical in both established and transi-
tional democracies (Lehoucq, 2003;Alvarez et al., 2008; Birch, 2011; Norris, 2014,
2015).
In many transitional democracies, independent EMBs have been championed as a
key institutional reform measure to successfully strengthen election integrity. As a
consequence, independent EMBs have been adopted in many countries around the
world (López-Pintor, 2000; IDEA, 2006, 2014). In established democracies as
well, researchers increasingly question the quality of electoral administration and
seek ways to improve electoral processes (Alvarez et al., 2008, 2012; Hall, 2012;
James, 2013; Clark, 2015). In Ireland this discussion has aligned with the inter-
national trend and focuses on the creation of an independent electoral commission
(Sinnott et al., 2008; Farrell, 2013, 2014).
Yet, despite the intuitively appealing assumption that independent EMBs will be
better at their task of organising and monitoring elections in an impartial manner,
empirical evidence is mixed. Case studies and regional comparative studies on
Latin America and Africa have found that independent EMBs indeed strengthen elec-
tion integrity. Hartlyn et al. (2008) demonstrate that independent EMBs increase the
quality of presidential elections from 1980 to 2004 in 19 regimes in Latin America;
Rosas (2010) shows that autonomous EMBs increase elites’ confidence in electoral
processes in 18 Latin American countries; and research on EMBs in Sub-
Saharan Africa also appears to underscore the importance of independent EMBs
for election integrity (Fall et al., 2012; Hamberg & Erlich, 2013). However
broader cross-national analyses find either a negative effect of independent EMBs
on election integrity and citizen perceptions of election integrity (Birch, 2011,
2008), only a very weak effect on election integrity (Birch & van Ham, 2014), or
no effect at all (Norris 2015).

In addition to these mixed empirical findings, it is quite puzzling that most govern-
mental EMBs are found in Western Europe and North America where the integrity of
elections is generally higher than elsewhere in the world (though also facing chal-
lenges). Table 1 shows the proportion of states with an independent EMB, a mixed
EMB, or a governmental EMB in 2014 (IDEA, 2014).3 Independent EMBs constitute
the preferred model worldwide. Almost 70 per cent of countries have a formally inde-
pendent EMB as of 2014. Governmental EMBs are most frequent in Western Europe
and North America, and to a lesser extent in the Middle East and North Africa and in
the Pacific. Moreover, the proportion of countries with governmental and mixed
EMBs has declined since 2006, while the proportion of independent EMBs increased
(from 62 per cent in 2006 to 69 per cent in 2014).4
Table 1. EMBs around the world 2014
Region Government Mixed Independent N
CEE&FSR 3 7 90 30
LA 0 5 95 19
MENA 39 6 56 18
SSA 2 16 82 49
WENA 61 21 18 28
Asia 17 13 70 23
Pac 33 8 58 12
Car 14 14 71 14
Total 19 12 69 193
Source: IDEA (2014). CEE & FSR ¼ Central and Eastern Europe & Former Soviet Republics;
LA ¼ Latin America; MENA ¼ Middle East and North Africa; SSA ¼ Sub-Saharan Africa;
WENA ¼ Western Europe & North America; Asia ¼ Asia; Pac ¼ Pacific; Car ¼ Caribbean.
N ¼ 193 countries.
Yet, the effects of institutional design of EMBs for election integrity are not well
understood. Perhaps what matters more is whether EMBs operate autonomously in
practice, rather than their formal institutional design (Elklit & Reynolds, 2001;
Pottie, 2001; IDEA, 2006, 2014; Carter & Farrell, 2010; Norris, 2015).5 Alterna-
tively, countries that experienced problems with the integrity of elections may
have been more prone to establish independent EMBs, and hence EMB institutional
design may be rather a consequence of low election integrity (Birch, 2011). While
both of these explanations may be valid, the results of global comparative studies
may have been affected by the inclusion of established democracies with the odd
combination of governmental EMBs and elections of high integrity as well.
Figures 1 and 2 show the descriptive relationship between election integrity and
EMB institutional design.6
Since we are interested in the potential causal relationship between EMB insti-
tutional design and election integrity, we use the EMB data for 2006 here, and
show the average election integrity of elections having taken place after 2006. As
V-Dem data on the free and fairness of elections is available until 2012 for most
countries, this means we include elections held from 2007 to 2012.
Figure 1 appears to confirm the large-N comparative studies: there does not appear
to be much of a relation between EMB institutional design and election integrity. If
anything, Figure 1 points towards the opposite relation between formal institutional
EMB design and election integrity than the one championed by proponents of
Figure 1. EMBs and election integrity.

Source: V-Dem, version 4.2. and IDEA (2006). Note that the graph presents average
election integrity for all elections that took place between 2007 and 2012 (N¼280 elections
and 153 countries)
Figure 2. EMBs and election integrity by region.

Source: V-Dem, version 4.2. and IDEA (2006). Note that the graph presents average
election integrity for all elections that took place between 2007 and 2012 (N ¼ 280 elec-
tions and 153 countries)
independent EMBs: independent EMBs appear to be associated with the lowest

average election integrity.7
Figure 2 gives a possible explanation for this finding: in Western Europe and North
America, formal EMB design appears to matter little for election integrity, while the
pattern in other regions of the world appears to show that independent EMBs, and to a
lesser extent mixed EMBs, fare better than governmental EMBs in guaranteeing elec-
tion integrity.
This leads us to our theoretical argument about the conditional impact of EMB
institutional design on election integrity. EMBs are crucial for election integrity
due to their dual task of organising elections and monitoring electoral conduct
throughout the electoral cycle. Election integrity is likely to be strengthened when
EMBs carry out these tasks in an impartial manner, guaranteeing both a level
playing field for parties and candidates contesting elections as well as freedom of
choice for voters. EMBs that are formally independent from the executive should
be better able to function as such impartial arbiters of the electoral contest and guar-
dians of the electoral process than EMBs that form part of the government.
However, as experts on EMBs have noted, whether EMBs operate impartially
in practice is not necessarily related to their formal institutional design (Elklit &
Reynolds, 2001; Pottie, 2001; IDEA, 2006, 2014). The descriptive findings presented
above suggest that the impact of EMB de jure institutional design on its functioning
in practice is likely to depend on the context in which EMBs operate.
In contexts of high QoG, the bureaucracy operates impartially, professionally and
efficiently (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008; Rothstein, 2011). In such countries, having an
EMB that is formally part of the government does not necessarily compromise the
EMBs impartiality as it functions in practice (Norris, 2015). The governmental
EMBs in countries like Sweden and Norway are good examples. Likewise, in con-
texts of high levels of democracy, partial regimes other than elections, such as inde-
pendent judiciaries and independent media, are so well established that they function
as checks and balances that strengthen the degree to which EMBs operate impartially
in practice, regardless of their formal institutional design (Birch & van Ham, 2014).
Hence, both the impartial functioning of the wider state bureaucracy in high QoG
contexts, as well as the presence of checks and balances in high level of democracy
contexts, ensure that EMBs function impartially in practice. As a consequence, EMB

formal institutional design is unlikely to make much of a difference for election integ-
rity in these cases.
At the other extreme, in countries with low QoG and/or electoral autocracy, we
expect that even formally independent EMBs may not be able to organise elections
and monitor electoral conduct impartially in practice. On the one hand, organising
elections is likely to be complicated if the QoG is so low that the bureaucracy operates
partially and inefficiently. EMBs, even if independent, often still rely on bureaucratic
personnel for the organisation of elections. Moreover, in contexts of low-quality gov-
ernment, EMBs are often under-resourced, whether deliberately or not, further under-
mining their capacity to organise elections. At the same time, the absence of
meaningful levels of democracy in electoral autocracies is likely to affect EMB’s
capacity to monitor electoral conduct. If electoral commission members and other
EMB personnel know that monitoring electoral conduct may cause persecution or
imprisonment, or retaliation by government supporters after the elections, EMBs
are unlikely to operate as guardians of a free and fair electoral process. Likewise,
if other political institutions such as the judiciary and the media are controlled by
the incumbent, monitoring and enforcing electoral rules to guarantee a level
playing field makes little sense as actors engaging in electoral manipulation are unli-
kely to be punished either through legal means or through public opinion. Hence, in
contexts of low-quality government and/or electoral autocracy, we expect that EMB
formal institutional design is unlikely to affect election integrity. The nominally inde-
pendent EMBs in regimes like DR Congo and Russia are cases in point.
However, in contexts of medium QoG and medium levels of democracy, EMB
institutional design should be able to strengthen election integrity. In these intermedi-
ate cases – such as often found in transitional democracies – incumbents do not fully
control the state coercive apparatus, and hence, potential personal consequences for
EMB personnel monitoring electoral conduct are less daunting. Moreover, EMBs
may be helped in their task of monitoring electoral conduct and guaranteeing a
level playing field in elections by the presence of relatively independent judges
and journalists that may detect and sanction electoral irregularities. Likewise, at
medium levels of QoG, the bureaucracy is neither so corrupt nor so starved for
resources that it is incapable of organising elections, nor is it professional and impar-
tial enough to be able to organise elections without independent scrutiny (as govern-
mental EMBs in high QoG contexts are). Hence, we expect that in these contexts,
establishing an independent EMB may be a crucial intervention that can strengthen
both de facto autonomy and capacity of EMBs to administer elections. It is in
these contexts that we expect to find the formal institutional structure of EMBs to
matter most in supporting their role as guardians of electoral conduct.
Data and Methods

In order to test our hypotheses we use new data from the V-Dem project (dataset
version 4.2). The V-Dem dataset is a new dataset on democracy that includes data
on almost 400 indicators of democracy in 173 countries around the world from
1900 until 2012 (for 60 countries also 2013 – 2014), engaging over 2,500 country
experts worldwide to collect data (Coppedge et al., 2015b).8 The country-expert
data are combined into country-year estimates using a state-of-the-art Bayesian
ordinal item-response theory (IRT) model developed by a set of specialised metho-
dologists (Pemstein et al., 2015). In this paper we use the V-Dem data v4 (Coppedge
et al., 2015a) on election integrity, EMB autonomy and EMB capacity, using the vari-
able asking experts about the free and fairness of the election as our first dependent
variable and the variable asking experts about de facto EMB autonomy as our second
dependent variable.9 We use the IRT converted continuous variables for our models,
both ranging from low to high election integrity and de facto EMB autonomy
respectively.10
Our main independent variable, EMB institutional design, is based on data from
the International IDEA (2006, 2014). This is a categorical variable coding EMBs
as governmental, mixed, or independent. Since the IDEA coding was first carried
out in 2006, we use the IDEA data for 2006 and only include elections that took
place after 2006. This leaves us with a sample of 280 elections in 153 countries
worldwide. Due to a few missing cases for data on corruption and economic devel-
opment, the analyses are carried out on a sample of 274 elections in 151 countries.
To test our hypothesis regarding an interaction between EMB institutional design
and level of democracy, we use the Freedom House classification of democracies as
Free, Partly Free, and Not Free. Since this classification includes the quality of elec-
tions as one of its elements however, which introduces endogeneity into our analyses,
we also test our hypothesis using the Freedom House civil liberties score for each
country. This score does not include elections, and is therefore conceptually distinct
from our dependent variable (see also Lindberg, 2006; van Ham & Lindberg, 2015).
We recoded the civil liberties score into three categories, varying from free, to partly
free, to not free. To further test the robustness of our results we also run models using
the lagged value of civil liberties in the year before the elections took place. Results of
these models are reported in the Appendix.
To test our hypothesis regarding an interaction between EMB institutional design

and the QoG, we use Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, as
provided by the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2013). The CPI index measures ‘percep-
tions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people, risk analysts and the
general public and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt)’. As
the essence of QoG is impartiality (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008), and corruption of
government implies partiality, we feel this is a good proxy of QoG. In line with
our hypotheses, we recode the CPI data into three categories: high QoG (0.66 – 1),
medium QoG (0.33 – 0.66), and low QoG (0– 0.33).
As control variables we include factors that previous research has shown to be
important determinants of election integrity: poverty, history of civil war, presidenti-
alism, and majoritarian electoral systems (Birch, 2011; van Ham, 2012; Lehoucq &
Kolev, 2015; Norris, 2015). We measure these variables using data from the QoG
dataset, data from the World Development indicators to measure level of economic
development (GDP per capita), data from Peace Research Institute Oslo to measure
whether a country had a history of civil war before 2006, and data from Database
of Political Institutions to measure whether countries had a parliamentary or presiden-
tial political system and whether they had a majoritarian or proportional electoral
system in their legislative elections. Missing data on the last two variables were
updated by the authors using data from the IPU Parline Database, the CIA World Fact-
book, and the Nohlen data handbooks on elections. Finally, we also included the type
of election (legislative, presidential or concurrent) and region as control variables.
Note that, since we are interested in the effects of formal EMB institutional design
on election integrity, we do not include measures of EMB de facto autonomy in these
models, as they are causally more proximate to election integrity and hence, including
them would not allow us to test for the effect of formal EMB institutional design as
illustrated in Figure 3. Instead, we test the direct effect of EMB institutional design on
election integrity first (results reported in Table 2), and then test the effect of EMB
institutional design on de facto EMB autonomy (results reported in Table 3). In
the models predicting EMB autonomy, we include EMB capacity as an additional
control variable.11
Since our data consists of elections clustered within countries, we use multi-level
ordinary least squares regression models. We also run analyses using time series cross
sectional analyses with random effects, and ordinary least squares regression with
robust clustered standard errors, and find very similar results. These models are
reported in the Appendix. Finally, as mentioned above we also checked the
Figure 3. EMB institutional design, EMB autonomy and election integrity

robustness of our findings by using a measure of democracy that excludes elections,

that is, Freedom House’s civil liberties, and by using a lagged value of this variable to
separate it even more from our dependent variable. These models are also reported in
the Appendix and again the results are substantially similar to the results reported in
the next section.12
Results
Table 2 shows the results of the statistical analyses. Model 1 is a simple model that
only includes the main effects of EMB institutional design, level of democracy and
QoG. Clearly the descriptive findings presented in Figure 1 are confirmed here:
when taking the full sample of countries that held national level elections from
2007 to 2012, EMB institutional design does not significantly affect election integ-
rity. Election integrity is strongly affected by both the QoG and level of democracy
however: election integrity is significantly lower in partly free and not free regimes as
well as regimes with low QoG.
Turning to the hypothesised interactions with level of democracy and QoG, these
are tested first in separate models presented in model 2 and model 3. Model 2 shows
that the hypothesised effect of the level of democracy on the association between
EMB institutional design and election integrity is confirmed. Independent EMBs
are associated with significantly higher levels of election integrity in partly free
regimes. However, independent EMBs are also associated with significantly higher
levels of election integrity in not free regimes, suggesting that independent EMBs
can even make a difference in electoral authoritarian contexts. Model 4 that intro-
duces the control variables, and the full model 6 show that in fact, once controlling
for other explanatory factors that predict election integrity, only the interaction
effect with not free regimes remains. The coefficients for partly free regimes
remain close to one-tailed significance, but are no longer significant. Hence it is
not the intermediate regimes where independent EMBs make the most significant
difference for election integrity, but in fact the most repressive regimes. This is a sur-
prising finding, to which we will return later.13
Turning to the interaction effect with QoG, the model without controls is shown in
model 3. Model 3 appears to also confirm our second hypothesis: in regimes with
medium QoG, independent EMBs, and also mixed EMBs, have a significant and
positive effect on election integrity. Yet, also here, it seems that the positive
impact of independent EMBs is even stronger in low QoG regimes. However,
neither interaction effects remain significant once control variables are included in
model 5 and 6, suggesting that the QoG affects election integrity only directly, and
does not affect the impact of EMB institutional design on election integrity.
Finally, the control variables behave as expected: election integrity is higher when
economic development is higher, in countries with a history of civil war election
integrity is lower, in countries with a parliamentary political system election integrity
is higher, and when parliamentary elections are held under a majoritarian electoral
system election integrity is lower. In the full model presented in model 6 only
Table 2. The impact of EMB institutional design on election integrity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

EMB institutional designa

Mixed 0.073 20.158 0.057 0.201 0.120 0.059
Independent 20.007 20.687∗∗∗ 20.614+ 0.048 0.128 0.055
Democracyb
Partly free 20.790∗∗∗ 21.759∗∗∗ 21.268∗∗∗ 21.205∗∗∗
Not free 21.731∗∗∗ 22.763∗∗∗ 22.284∗∗∗ 22.178∗∗∗
QoGc
Medium 20.624∗∗∗ 21.456∗∗∗ 20.381 20.268
Low 21.077∗∗∗ 22.346∗∗∗ 21.017∗ 20.576+
Interaction EMB ∗ Democracy
Mixed∗ Partly free 0.029 0.053 0.364
Mixed∗ Not free 0.169 0.283 0.545
When Guardians Matter Most

Independent∗ Partly free 0.826∗∗ 0.458 0.548
Independent∗ Not free 0.918∗∗∗ 0.623+ 0.690+
Interaction EMB ∗ QoG
Mixed∗ Medium QoG 1.015+ 0.689 0.289
Mixed∗ Low QoG 20.028 20.136 20.099
Independent∗ Medium QoG 0.785+ 0.095 20.051
Independent∗ Low QoG 1.039∗ 0.192 20.101
GDP per capita (current USD) 1.40e206∗∗ 1.39e206∗ 8.28e206
Civil war history 20.267 20.513∗ 20.207
(Continued)
11
12
Table 2. (Continued ).
C. van Ham & S. Lindberg

0.316∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.257∗

Political system parliamentaryd

Electoral system majoritariane 20.150+ 20.286∗∗ 20.160∗
Type electionf
Executive 0.087 0.041 0.094+
Concurrent 0.051 0.022 0.026
Regiong
Latin America 0.526∗∗∗ 0.990∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
Middle East and North Africa 0.801∗∗ 0.196 0.739∗∗
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.250+ 0.388∗ 0.267∗
W. Europe and N. America 0.344 0.463 0.277
Asia 0.477∗∗ 0.521∗ 0.491∗∗
Pacific 20.073 0.290 0.110
Caribbean 0.101 0.518 0.154
Constant 1.961∗∗∗ 1.863∗∗∗ 2.058∗∗∗ 0.691∗∗ 0.468 1.146∗∗∗
N level 1 (elections) 274 274 274 274 274 274
N level 2 (countries) 151 151 151 151 151 151
Note: Multi-level OLS regression. P-values: + 0.1, ∗ 0.05, ∗∗ 0.01, ∗∗∗ 0.001 (two-sided).
a
Reference category is governmental EMB.
b
Reference category is free democracy.
c
Reference category is high QoG.
d
Reference category is presidential systems.
e
Reference category is proportional and mixed.
f
Reference category is legislative elections.
g
Reference category is Central and Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics.
Table 3. The impact of EMB institutional design on EMB autonomy

Mixed 0.153 20.147 0.048 0.011 0.096 0.054

Independent 0.191 20.554∗∗∗ 20.616∗ 0.067 0.211 0.094
Democracyb
Partly free 20.693∗∗∗ 21.818∗∗∗ 21.188∗∗∗ 21.311∗∗∗
Not free 21.436∗∗∗ 22.567∗∗∗ 21.720∗∗∗ 21.855∗∗∗
QoGc
Medium 20.532∗∗∗ 21.583∗∗∗ 20.230 20.134
Low 20.865∗∗∗ 21.918∗∗∗ 20.394 20.144
Mixed∗ Partly free 0.278 0.493 0.823+
Mixed∗ Not free 0.543 0.737∗ 1.059∗
Independent∗ Partly free 1.133∗∗∗ 0.727∗ 0.906∗∗

Independent∗ Not free 1.180∗∗∗ 0.643∗ 0.824∗
Mixed∗ Medium QoG 1.217∗ 0.332 20.007
Mixed∗ Low QoG 20.031 0.009 20.384
Independent∗ Medium QoG 1.149∗∗ 0.169 20.041
Independent∗ Low QoG 1.109∗∗ 0.117 20.259
EMB capacity 0.558∗∗∗ 0.742∗∗∗ 0.509∗∗∗
GDP per capita (current USD) 22.83e206 23.81e206 25.46e206
Civil war history 0.164 0.069 0.196
Political system parliamentaryd 0.084 0.185 0.044
13
(Continued)
14
Table 3. (Continued ).

Electoral system majoritariane 20.129∗ 20.180∗ 20.128∗

Type electionf
Executive 0.039 0.009 0.040
Concurrent 0.055 0.006 0.037
Regiong
Latin America 0.276+ 0.523∗∗ 0.275+
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.446∗∗∗ 0.615∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗
W. Europe and N. America 0.521∗ 0.671∗ 0.485∗
Asia 0.409∗∗ 0.420∗ 0.396∗∗
Pacific 0.319 0.627+ 0.395
Caribbean 0.595∗∗ 0.972∗∗∗ 0.577∗∗
Constant 1.879∗∗∗ 1.909∗∗∗ 2.050∗∗∗ 0.434∗ 20.123 0.746∗∗
Note: Multi-level OLS regression. P-values: +0.1, ∗ 0.05, ∗∗ 0.01, ∗∗∗ 0.001 (two-sided).
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
political system and electoral system are still significant however. In summary, it
seems that EMB institutional design only affects election integrity in certain contexts:
in free regimes, EMB institutional design does not affect election integrity. It is in
partly free regimes, and contrary to our expectations, especially in not free
regimes, that formally independent EMBs contribute to strengthening election integ-
rity. Also, we found that QoG does not seem to affect the impact of EMB institutional
design on election integrity: we only found evidence for a direct effect of QoG on
election integrity.
If EMB institutional design affects election integrity, presumably it does so by
shaping the way EMBs operate in practice, most notably EMB de facto independence
or autonomy. In Table 3, we test to what extent EMB institutional design affects de
facto EMB autonomy. Again, model 1 appears to indicate that the differences
between different institutional EMB models in terms of the degree of EMB autonomy
are insignificant. Yet, once we take the interaction with level of democracy into
account in model 2, it becomes apparent that formally independent EMBs in partly
free and not free regimes significantly increase the degree to which EMBs can
operate autonomously in practice. This interaction effect remains significant even
when controls are included in model 4, and in the combined model 6. In the full
model 6 it also appears that both mixed and independent EMBs do better at generat-
ing EMB autonomy in practice in partly free and not free regimes.
Regarding the impact of QoG, model 3 shows that independent EMBs especially
appear to strengthen EMB autonomy in medium and low QoG regimes. Yet, when
control variables are included in model 5 and in the combined model 6, these
effects are no longer significant, suggesting that the QoG is relatively less important
for EMB autonomy. Finally, most control variables in Table 3 are insignificant, with
the exception of majoritarian electoral systems, and EMB capacity, underscoring the
importance of EMB capacity for EMB autonomy.
Concluding, does EMB institutional design matter for the degree to which EMBs
operate autonomously in practice, and does EMB institutional design thereby
strengthen election integrity? The analyses presented here seem to indicate that our
expectations are partially confirmed. In contexts of high quality of democracy and
high QoG, EMB institutional design has limited consequences for election integrity,
because the bureaucracy already operates so professionally and other partial regimes
of democracy are already so well established, that EMB institutional design makes
little difference to its functioning in practice. However, in contexts of low quality
of democracy, EMB institutional design does matter for election integrity, as formally
independent EMBs in these cases have stronger de facto autonomy to administer and
monitor elections. It is in these contexts that the formal institutional structure of
EMBs matters most in supporting their role as guardians of electoral conduct.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the effects of EMB institutional design on election integ-
rity and on de facto EMB autonomy using the new V-Dem dataset. We find that the
apparent non-effect of EMB institutional design is due to the differences between

transitional and established democracies on the one hand, and regimes with low
and high QoG on the other hand. In contexts of high levels of democracy and high
QoG, EMB institutional design has limited consequences for election integrity,
because the bureaucracy already operates so professionally and other partial
regimes of democracy are already so well established, that EMB institutional
design makes little difference to its functioning in practice.
However, in contexts of low levels of democracy, EMB institutional design does
matter for election integrity, as formally independent EMBs in these cases have stron-
ger de facto autonomy to administer and monitor elections. In the least democratic
regimes, formally independent EMBs have a strong direct effect on election integrity,
and in both ‘not free’ and ‘partly free’ regimes formally independent EMBs
strengthen de facto EMB autonomy. It is in these contexts that the formal institutional
structure of EMBs matters most in supporting their role as guardians of electoral

conduct. However, while the impact of EMB institutional design appears to be
strongly conditional on the level of democracy, contrary to our expectations, the
QoG appeared to be less relevant.
Do these empirical findings suggest that Ireland should not establish an indepen-
dent electoral commission? We would argue against such a conclusion based on
the results presented here. First of all, within Europe Ireland scores comparatively
low on both election integrity and de facto EMB autonomy (see Figure A1 in the
appendix), and a formally independent EMB could potentially contribute to strength-
ening both, even in an established democracy such as Ireland. Secondly, while many
of the deficiencies in the electoral process may appear to be merely organisational
problems, problems such as inaccurate voter registers can create opportunities for
electoral manipulation. As Pastor (1999: 2) notes ‘the boundary line separating pol-
itical manipulation and technical incapacity is rarely surveyed, and elections can fail
for one or both reasons’.
Thirdly, the results presented here should be taken with some caution, as our data
on EMB institutional design are limited to cross-national data from 2006. Ideally, we
would know for each country in what year independent EMBs were established,
which would allow us to look at the effects on election integrity before and after.
Not having those more precise data limits us to more descriptive analyses such as
those presented here. Moreover, as the practitioner publications on EMBs warn
time and again (Lopez-Pintor, 2000; IDEA 2006, 2014), EMB organisational struc-
ture is vastly more complex than the three broad categories used here. Much better
understanding and comparative data are needed about aspects like appointment pro-
cedures and tenure, formal accountability structures, budgets and the scope of tasks of
EMBs, to understand which aspects of EMB institutional design are crucial for
strengthening election integrity.
Yet, even with these caveats in mind, if the finding that formally independent
EMBs matter most in contexts where they are most needed, that is, electoral autocra-
cies and electoral democracies, holds up to further research, that is indeed good news
for practitioners seeking to strengthen election integrity by redesigning electoral
management institutions. Moreover, we hope the current paper has shown the impor-
tance and need of further research into EMB institutions: their formal structures of
power and accountability as well as their performance in practice.
Notes
1. Election integrity is a complex concept and as a consequence many different definitions abound. As
such, conceptualisations vary from ‘positive’ definitions (emphasising the presence of desirable prop-
erties of elections) such as the free and fairness of elections, election quality or election integrity
(Elklit & Svensson, 1997; Elklit & Reynolds, 2005; Lindberg, 2006; Norris, 2014, 2015) to ‘negative’
definitions (emphasising the absence of desirable properties) such as electoral manipulation, electoral
malpractice, and election fraud (Schedler, 2002, 2013; Lehoucq, 2003; Birch, 2011;Simpser, 2013).
Conceptualisations also differ in the normative criteria used to evaluate the quality of elections,
ranging from international legal norms, to national law, to democratic theory (Lehoucq, 2003;
Munck, 2009; Davis-Roberts & Carroll, 2010; Norris, 2014, 2015). See van Ham (2014) for an over-
view and discussion of the different conceptualisations and measurements used to study election
integrity. Since our current analysis includes electoral regimes worldwide, ranging from electoral
autocracies to liberal democracies, we use the term election integrity as it is based on international
standards for elections. Election integrity refers to elections that ‘respect international standards
and global norms governing the appropriate conduct of elections’ (Norris, 2015: 4).
2. The Electoral Integrity Project collects data on 49 indicators of election integrity worldwide, based on
country expert ratings. The data for Ireland and other countries can be found here: Perceptions of
Electoral Integrity dataset: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/PEI. For further information
about the project, see: https://sites.google.com/site/electoralintegrityproject4/home.
3. IDEA distinguishes three models of electoral management: governmental, mixed and independent.
Under the governmental model of electoral management, ‘elections are organised and managed by
the executive branch through a ministry (such as the Ministry of the Interior) and/or through local
authorities’ (p. 7). The independent model of electoral management implies that ‘elections are organ-
ised and managed by an EMB that is institutionally independent and autonomous from the executive
branch of government.’ (p.7). This means that EMBs manage their own budget and are not accoun-
table to the executive, though they are in practice often accountable to the legislature, the judiciary or
the Head of State. Finally, in the mixed model of electoral management, the organisation of elections
and implementation of electoral legislation will generally lie with a government department and/or
local government, while policy, monitoring and supervisory functions are located in an organisation
that is independent of the executive (p. 8). Note that this is a very rough classification of EMBs, and in
practice many more differences in functions and accountability exist between different countries, as
studies by IDEA (2006, 2014), Lopez-Pintor (2000) and Elklit & Reynolds (2001) illustrate. For the
purpose of this paper however, we will follow this coarse distinction.
4. Of the 20 countries that changed the formal institutional structure of their EMB between 2006 and
2014, 16 changed towards increased formal EMB independence. This includes seven countries that
went from a governmental EMB to an independent EMB (Egypt, Jordan, New Zealand, Sri Lanka,
Syria, Tonga, and Tunisia); eight countries that changed from a mixed EMB to an independent
EMB (Burundi, Cuba, Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Maldives, Togo and Cameroon); and
one country that moved from a governmental EMB to a mixed EMB (Iran). Four countries
changed in the opposite direction though: Saint Kitts and Nevis and Vanuatu changed from an inde-
pendent EMB to a mixed EMB, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines changed from independent to gov-
ernmental, and Monaco changed from mixed to governmental (IDEA 2006, 2014).
5. As Wall et al. (IDEA 2006: 11) note: ‘The performance of EMBs also depends on whether there is
political will and commitment to allow the EMB to act freely and impartially, and on how the
members of the EMB actually behave’.
6. Election integrity was measured using the V-Dem expert data, asking experts: ‘Taking all aspects of
the pre-election period, election-day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider
this national election to be free and fair?’ Answer categories were the following:0: No, not at all.
The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the
‘will of the people’ (i.e. who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 1: Not really.
While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome
of the election (i.e. who became president; or who won the legislative majority). 2: Ambiguous.
There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregula-
rities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above). 3:
Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in
the end affect the outcome (as defined above). 4: Yes. There was some amount or human error and logis-
tical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences. Coppedge
et al. (2015a). For more information about the project, codebook and data, see: https://v-dem.net.
7. Note that this pattern is strengthened if we consider election integrity for elections having taken place
between 1990 and 2012: in such a larger sample, independent EMBs appear to score even lower in
terms of average election integrity.

8. For more information about the project, codebook and data, see: https://v-dem.net.
9. EMB autonomy is measured by asking experts ‘Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have
autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national
elections?’.
10. Election integrity and malpractice has been measured in many different ways, ranging from election
observation reports to media analyses, to ‘fraud forensics’ to perceptions by experts and citizens. In
recent years several cross-national datasets have been developed that measure election integrity,
mostly based on coding election reports, news media and historical sources (Elklit & Reynolds,
2005; Lindberg, 2006; Kelley & Kiril, 2010; Birch, 2011;Hyde & Marinov, 2012; Van Ham,
2012; Donno, 2013; Schedler, 2013; Simpser, 2013). Assessments of electoral malpractice based
on ‘election forensics’, as well as citizen surveys that measure perceptions of election integrity –
are also increasingly common (Levin & Alvarez, 2012; Norris, 2013). Finally, most recently
several datasets that collect expert perceptions of election integrity have been developed, including
the Perceptions of Electoral Integrity data (Norris et al., 2014), and the Varieties of Democracy
dataset (Coppedge et al., 2015b). While expert judgments can have validity problems, such as insuf-
ficient expertise or ideological bias, a recent study analysing potential sources of bias in expert evalu-
ations of election integrity found very little evidence of systematic bias (Martinez i Coma and van
Ham, 2015). Moreover, the V-Dem data used here are based on multiple expert ratings that have
been aggregated using a Bayesian latent variable measurement model, in order to correct for potential
coding error by experts (Pemstein et al., 2015). Finally, the correlation between the V-Dem measure
of election integrity used here and the Freedom House electoral process indicator is 0.9, further
increasing our confidence in the validity of our dependent variable.
11. EMB capacity is measured by asking experts ‘Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have suf-
ficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?’. For more information, please
see the V-Dem codebook (Coppedge et al., 2015a).
12. The replication data and do-file are available upon request from the authors.
13. Note that in model 2 and 3, EMB institutional design appears to have a significant effect on election
integrity. In model 2, the coefficient for the main effect of EMB institutional design shows its effect in
the base category for democracy: free regimes. Without control variables, it seems that in free
regimes, the difference between independent EMBs and governmental EMBs is significant, and in
the opposite direction: independent EMBs are associated with lower levels of election integrity.
Yet once control variables are added in model 4 (and the combined model 6), it becomes clear that
the differences between EMBs of different institutional design are not significant (if anything,
even in free regimes independent EMBs are associated with slightly higher levels of election integrity
than governmental EMBs). A similar pattern can be seen in the quality of government models pre-
sented in models 3 and 5 (and the combined model 6).
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Appendix
Figure A1. Election integrity and EMB autonomy in W. Europe and N. America. Source:
V-Dem, version 4.2. Elections between 2007 and 2012 (N¼ 43 elections and 22 countries)
Table A1. The impact of EMB institutional design on election integrity – TSCS

Mixed 0.067 20.162 0.056 0.199 0.122 0.060

Independent 20.010 20.701∗∗∗ 20.634+ 0.037 0.105 0.037
Democracyb
Partly free 20.785∗∗∗ 21.770∗∗∗ 21.272∗∗∗ 21.201∗∗
Not free 21.720∗∗∗ 22.759∗∗∗ 22.267∗∗∗ 22.157∗∗∗`
QoGc
Medium 20.619∗∗∗ 21.46∗∗∗ 20.387 20.268
Low 21.074∗∗∗ 22.341∗∗∗ 21.016∗ 20.591
Mixed∗ Not free 0.163 0.270 0.526
Independent∗ Partly free 0.854∗∗ 0.478 0.552
Independent∗ Not free 0.943∗∗∗

0.634+ 0.684+
Mixed∗ Medium QoG 1.019+ 0.689 0.281
Mixed∗ Low QoG 20.035 20.141 20.091
Independent∗ Medium QoG 0.801+ 0.107 20.042
Independent∗ Low QoG 1.060∗ 0.222 20.077
GDP per capita (current USD) 1.37e206∗∗ 1.35e206∗∗ + 8.02e206
Civil war history 20.275 20.516+ 20.210
Political system parliamentaryd 0.322∗∗ 0.540∗∗∗ 0.261∗
Electoral system majoritariane 20.157+ 20.284∗∗ 20.163∗
23
(Continued)
Table A1. (Continued).
24

Type electionf
Executive 0.084 0.040 0.092+

Concurrent 0.048 0.014 0.024
Regiong
Latin America 0.537∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗
Sub-Sahara Africa 0.248+ 0.385∗ 0.266+
W. Europe and N. America 0.356 0.478 0.284
Asia 0.475∗∗ 0.515∗ 0.487∗∗
Pacific 20.074 0.270 0.108
Caribbean 0.106 0.515 0.154
Constant 1.958∗∗∗ 1.865∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗ 0.473 1.152∗∗∗
Note: Time series cross sectional analyses with random effects. P-values: +0.1, ∗ 0.05, ∗∗ 0.01, ∗∗∗ 0.001 (two-sided).
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
Table A2. The impact of EMB institutional design on election integrity – Robust

Mixed 0.180 20.064 0.072 0.234 0.057 0.038

Independent 0.008 20.557∗∗∗ 20.062 0.148 0.434 0.273
Democracyb
Partly free 20.824∗∗∗ 21.567∗∗∗ 21.180∗∗∗ 21.171∗∗∗
Not free 21.837∗∗∗ 22.791∗∗∗ 22.373∗∗∗ 22.300∗∗∗
QoGc
Medium 20.649∗∗∗ 21.349∗∗∗ 20.293 20.230
Low 21.070∗∗∗ 22.529∗∗∗ 20.998∗ 20.401+
Mixed∗ Not free 0.222 0.395 0.645
Independent∗ Partly free 0.507∗ 0.279 0.451
Independent∗ Not free 0.694∗∗ 0.551∗ 0.718∗

Mixed∗ Medium QoG 1.016∗ 0.792∗ 0.432
Mixed∗ Low QoG 0.330 0.016 20.072
Independent∗ Medium QoG 0.417 20.019 20.166
Independent∗ Low QoG 0.485 20.203 20.333
GDP per capita (current USD) 1.78e206∗∗∗ 2.00e206∗ 1.30e206∗
Civil war history 20.205 20.551∗ 20.185
Political system parliamentaryd 0.271∗ 0.445∗ 0.213+
Electoral system majoritariane 20.133 20.358∗∗ 20.165+
25
(Continued)
26

Type electionf
Executive 0.120+ 0.076 0.126+

Concurrent 0.078 0.201 0.052
Regiong
Latin America 0.408∗ 0.899∗∗∗ 0.456∗
Middle East and North Africa 0.858∗∗∗ 0.222 0.810∗∗∗
West Europe and North America 0.226 0.320 0.192
Asia 0.549∗∗ 0.703∗∗ 0.591∗∗
Pacific 20.029 0.586+ 0.168
Caribbean 0.137 0.648∗ 0.227
Constant 1.967∗∗∗ 1.820∗∗∗ 2.007∗∗∗ 0.617∗∗ 0.343 0.989∗∗∗
R-squared 0.773 0.733 0.547 0.799 0.670 0.815
Note: OLS regression, with robust clustered standard errors. P-values: + 0.1, ∗ 0.05, ∗∗ 0.01, ∗∗∗ 0.001 (two-sided).
a
b
c
d
e
f
g
Table A3. The impact of EMB institutional design on election integrity – lagged
Combined model with

Combined Combined model with lagged civil liberties
model civil liberties categories categories

Mixed 0.060 0.053 0.030
Independent 0.037 20.046 20.079
Democracyb
Partly free 21.201∗∗ 21.171∗∗ 21.305∗∗
Not free 22.157∗∗∗ 22.073∗∗∗ 21.914∗∗∗
QoGc
Medium 20.268 20.287 20.289

Low 20.591 20.603 20.697+
Mixed∗ Not free 0.526 0.942 0.973+
Independent∗ Partly free 0.552 0.548 0.643
Independent∗ Not free 0.684+ 0.797+ 0.751+
Mixed∗ Medium QoG 0.281 0.365 0.416
Mixed∗ Low QoG 20.091 20.351 20.348
Independent∗ Medium QoG 20.042 0.056 0.054
Independent∗ Low QoG 20.077 20.002 0.062
GDP per capita (current 8.02e206 6.91e206 6.19e206
USD)
Civil war history 20.210 20.204 20.251
Political system 0.261∗ 0.265∗ 0.275∗
parliamentaryd
Electoral system 20.163∗ 20.175+ 20.185∗
majoritariane
Type electionf
Executive 0.092+ 0.083 0.051
Concurrent 0.024 0.006 20.004
Regiong
Latin America 0.535∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.779∗∗∗
Middle East and North 0.734∗∗ 0.737∗∗ 0.764∗∗
Africa
Western Europe and North 0.284 0.365 0.366
America
Asia 0.487∗∗ 0.591∗∗ 0.672∗∗∗
Pacific 0.108 0.140 0.203
(Continued )
Combined model with

Combined Combined model with lagged civil liberties
model civil liberties categories categories
Caribbean 0.154 0.602∗ 0.618∗

Constant 1.152∗∗∗ 1.129∗∗ 1.164∗∗
N level 1 (elections) 274 274 274
N level 2 (countries) 151 151 151
Note: Time series cross sectional analyses with random effects. P-values: + 0.1, ∗ 0.05, ∗∗ 0.01,
∗∗∗
0.001 (two-sided).
a
b

c
d
e
f
g

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Irish Political Studies

ISSN: 0790-7184 (Print) 1743-9078 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fips20

When Guardians Matter Most: Exploring the

Carolien van Ham & Staffan Lindberg

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07907184.2015.1099097

Published online: 23 Oct 2015.

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Download by: [UNSW Library] Date: 26 November 2015, At: 21:08

When Guardians Matter Most: Exploring

CAROLIEN VAN HAM∗ ,∗∗ & STAFFAN LINDBERG∗∗

Keywords: election integrity; electoral malpractice; election management body; institutional

# 2015 Political Studies Association of Ireland

electoral management bodies (EMBs) have been championed as a key institutional

EMB Institutional Design and Election Integrity

no effect at all (Norris 2015).

Table 1. EMBs around the world 2014

Region Government Mixed Independent N

Figure 1. EMBs and election integrity.

Figure 2. EMBs and election integrity by region.

independent EMBs: independent EMBs appear to be associated with the lowest

contexts, ensure that EMBs function impartially in practice. As a consequence, EMB

Data and Methods

To test our hypothesis regarding an interaction between EMB institutional design

Figure 3. EMB institutional design, EMB autonomy and election integrity

robustness of our findings by using a measure of democracy that excludes elections,

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

EMB institutional designa

When Guardians Matter Most

C. van Ham & S. Lindberg

0.316∗∗ 0.534∗∗∗ 0.257∗

Political system parliamentaryd

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

EMB institutional designa

Mixed 0.153 20.147 0.048 0.011 0.096 0.054

When Guardians Matter Most

C. van Ham & S. Lindberg

Electoral system majoritariane 20.129∗ 20.180∗ 20.128∗

apparent non-effect of EMB institutional design is due to the differences between

structure of EMBs matters most in supporting their role as guardians of electoral

terms of average election integrity.

elections, Electoral Studies, 38, pp. 1 –9.

(Stockholm: International IDEA).

Implications (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

EMB institutional designa

Mixed 0.067 20.162 0.056 0.199 0.122 0.060

When Guardians Matter Most

C. van Ham & S. Lindberg

Executive 0.084 0.040 0.092+

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6

EMB institutional designa

Mixed 0.180 20.064 0.072 0.234 0.057 0.038

When Guardians Matter Most

C. van Ham & S. Lindberg

Executive 0.120+ 0.076 0.126+

Combined model with

EMB institutional designa

Medium 20.268 20.287 20.289

Table A3. (Continued).

Combined model with