Si HOLBRAAD - Middle Powers in International Politics (1984)

MIDDLE POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
The book traces the history of the idea of middle-ranking powers

through several centuries of European political writings, examines
the position of such powers in the League of Nations and the United
Nations, and defines the concept of middle powers in the con
temporary context.
The major part of the book, however, is devoted to an exam
ination of the conduct and an analysis of the role of middle powers in
several typical situations of the four principal forms of the states
system: namely, the unifocal, the dualistic, the triangular and the
multiple system. On the basis of historical material drawn mainly
from the inter-American system of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, the German and the European systems of the nineteenth
century and the European and global systems of the twentieth
century, various patterns are established and certain tendencies
noted in the international conduct and role of such powers.
The main conclusions reached are that the systemic roles of
middle powers have not always been quite so important or
beneficial as claimed on their behalf in both the older and the more
recent literature on the subject; that their parts generally have been
conditioned by the form and state of the international system; that
their scope usually has been greatest when relations between the
great powers in the system have been ambiguous, i.e. neither too
hostile nor too co-operative; and that their most significant parts in
most situations have been in regional and local affairs rather than at
the central or global levels of international politics.
The last chapter of the book is rounded off with some speculations
about the likely roles of middle powers in the global states system of
the future.
Carsten Holbraad is Deputy Director of the Centre for

International Relations, Queen's University, Canada. He has
previously been Senior Fellow in the School oflnternational Affairs,
Carleton University, Ottawa, and Research Fellow and Senior
Research Fellow in the Department of International Relations,
Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National University. He
took his B.Sc. (Econ.) at the London School of Economics and his
D. Phil. at the University of Sussex.
By the same author
THE CONCERT OF EUROPE: A Study in German and British

International Theory 1815-1914
SUPER POWERS AND WORLD ORDER (editor)
SUPERPOWERS AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT
Middle Powers in
International Politics
Carsten Holbraad
M
MACMILLAN PRESS
LONDON
© Carsten Holbraad 1984
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means,
without permission.
First published 1984 by

THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
London and Basingstoke
Companies and representatives
throughout the world
ISBN 0 333 �5443 5
Printed in Hong Kong

For Sonya and Martin
Contents
Preface lX
Introduction
1 The History of the Idea 10

1.1 Before 1814 10
1.2 European Restoration 19
1.3 German Confederation 27
1.4 From the Crimean War to the First World War 33
2 The League of Nations and the United Nations 45

2.1 The League of Nations 46
2.2 The United Nations 56
3 The Hierarchy of Powers 67

3.1 Characterisation of Middle Powers 68
3.2 Ranking of Powers 75
' The Unifocal System. 92

4.1 Dominance 100
j 4.2 Primacy 104
· 4.3 Hegemony 107
5 The Dualistic System. 117

5.1 Cold War 119
5.2 Diplomatic Concert 134
5.3 Rivalry and Co-operation 140
6 The Triangular System. 159

6.1 Equilateral Triangles 163
6.2 Non-Equilateral Triangles 168
7 The Multiple System. 177

7.1 Diplomatic Concert 179
Vlll Contents
7.2 Intense Rivalry 188

7.3 Moderate Rivalry 196
Conclusion 205
Notes 214
Index 229
Preface
The fitful relaxation of tension between the super powers after the
Cuban missile crisis, the widening rift between China and the Soviet
Union in the early 1960s and the greater independence of French
diplomacy under de Gaulle loosened the Cold War pattern of East
West relations enough to enlarge the diplomatic scope of many of
the lesser powers in the global states system. One result was a revival
of interest in the international role of the growing number of
middle-ranking powers. In the 1960s and 1970s books and articles
about the place of middle powers in international politics appeared
in various parts of the world. Most of them discussed these powers
strictly in the context of the immediate situation, usually relating
their policies and conduct to a narrow range of current issues. This
!',book presents middle-ranking powers in a wider perspective.
Setting out the concept of the middle power against the background
';of the earlier history of ideas about such powers, it examines the
conduct of past and present middle powers in a variety of systemic
contexts . Drawing on historical as well as contemporary material, it
analyses the roles of these powers in several typical situations of the
most familiar forms of the states system. This approach makes it
possible to attempt a general assessment of the contribution of
middle powers to the international political process.
Most of the material for the book was collected when I was a
member of the Department of International Relations in the
Research School of Pacific Studies at the Australian National
University. Some of the first ideas on the subject were developed in
conversations with my friend and colleague there, the late Sisir
Gupta. Several other former colleagues in Australia read various
draft chapters and made useful suggestions. I am particularly
grateful to Professor J . L. Richardson at the ANU , who commented
critically on an early draft of a substantial part of the book. Chapter
5 incorporates sections of my contribution to a volume of essays
published in memory of Sisir Gupta ('The Role of Non-Aligned
Middle Powers', in M. S. Rajan and Shivaji Ganguly (eds), Great
lX
X Preface
Power Relations, World Order and the Third World, New Delhi, Vikas
Publishing House, 1981), and I am obliged to the editors for
allowing me to use this material here. Chapter 6, with the kind
permission of the editor and the publishers of the Year Book of World
Affairs, is based on 'Middle-Power Roles in Great-Power
Triangles', my contribution to the 1976 volume (London, Stevens
& Son).
Copenhagen C. H.
Introduction
In the 1 960s and 1 970s, a number of departures from the traditional

concern with the policies and interaction of the great powers marked
the academic study of international politics. One was a revival of
interest in the nature and role of small states. This development, the
.first signs of which appeared already in the late 1 950s, was due to
JeVeral sets of circumstances. The most obvious was the proliferation
of new states in Asia and Africa after the Second World War, which
greatly changed the numerical proportion in the world between
great powers and lesser states. A more profound cause was the
detente in East-West relations in the 1 960s, which presented new
diplomatic opportunities as well as new difficulties for many small
states. On a less general level, the international drama surrounding
�me small states, especially in the Middle East and South East Asia,
apd the spectacular performance of a few ofthem, notably Israel and
North Vietnam, demanded the attention of students of international
�litics. Finally, the opening or expansion of departments of
international relations at universities in a number of small countries
in various parts of the world made it possible for political scientists of
diverse national backgrounds to respond to the new challenges.
Their efforts resulted in a fairly substantial number of books and
articles, most of them published in the late 1 960s and early 1970s.
While this literature often throws a good deal of light on the
behaviour of certain kinds of small states in particular types of
international situations, as a general treatment of the nature and
role of small states it has several shortcomings. In the first place, it
more often than not fails to take account not only of earlier writings
on the topic, especially those of the inter-war period, but also of
relevant work carried out by contemporary scholars in other fields. 1
Second, though it explores the concept of the small state from many
angles, it does not provide an entirely adequate and broadly agreed
definition of the subject-matter. Third, few of the studies reach
generalisations about the international conduct of small states that
apply to the category as a whole and seem of a certain importance.
2 Middle Powers in International Politics
Yet, despite the rather limited achievements of the first spate of

writings, the new interest in the behaviour of these states helped to
broaden the perspective on the society of states and to redress the
balance in the study of international politics, which during the
period of the Cold War had been tilted too heavily in favour of
the great powers.
The revival of interest in small states was not accompanied by an
equally serious study of middle-sized powers. Most of the small
number of symposia and articles about the role of such powers that
in the 1960s and 1970s appeared in various countries, including
Canada, West Germany and India, were quite limited in scope,
often focusing on a narrow range of current issues and sometimes
propounding particular ideas of foreign policy. This had been true
also of some of the earlier literature on the subject, for example of
certain German writings of the early nineteenth century equally
limited in relevance and linked with a political programme. 2
Though much has been written about the problems and policies of
individual middle-sized powers, little work of substance has been
done on the nature and role of these states as a group or a class of the
international system . Some of the reasons for this are obvious. First,
there is the difficulty of defining the subject-matter of such a study.
'Middle powers', as they have been called, have no special standing
in international law that could serve as a guide to their identity. 3
Though various middle-ranking powers enjoyed certain privileges
in the great post-war conferences of modern history, their attempts
to secure institutional status within the League of Nations and the
United Nations were not particularly successful and left no lasting
result of real significance. 4 While some political scientists have
suggested criteria for distinguishing three or more classes of states
and a few have drawn up lists of middle-ranking powers, nobody has
quite overcome the serious difficulties of providing an entirely
satisfactory definition of the type of power that is neither great nor
small. Second, there is the problem of reaching valid and significant
generalisations about the international conduct of such powers.
Whichever criteria are used for distinguishing middle-ranking
powers from those above and below them, the category is likely to
include a range of highly heterogeneous powers. Idiosyncracies of
political character and differences in international position are
bound to affect their behaviour and are likely to make it difficult to
detect more than broad tendencies in their responses to various
international situations.
Introduction 3
Yet there are good reasons why attempts should be made to come
to grips with this subject. Given that the existing states system, in
·common with many earlier systems of modern history, contains a
substantial number of units which obviously are neither great
powers nor small states, a study of the role of middle-sized powers
seems a natural complement of the traditional concern with great
powers and the more recent work on small states. What is more, the
intermediate category of states usually comprises a particularly
interesting and rather important group of powers. It is the meeting
place of once great but declining powers, tired from generations of
power politics at the highest level but rich in experience, and oflesser
:but ascending powers, conscious of their potential and stirred by
:� bition. Together with states long established at intermediate
)evels, they form a range not unlike that of the middle classes of some
�mestic societies. Indeed, their recurrent preoccupation with the
�gers of great-power oligarchy and their tendency occasionally to
claim superior wisdom and virtue bring to mind the traditional case
�for the middle class as put by political philosophers, from Aristotle to
James Mill. 5
f; Focusing on the political relations of the middle-sized powers,
)With the great powers and the small states as well as among
themselves, is in some respects a particularly suitable approach to
the study of the states system and its processes. It allows one to look at
�e system from within. Those who concentrate exclusively on the
.interrelations of the great powers enjoy the obvious advantages of
dealing with the chief actors but are in danger of taking a too
Olympian view of international politics. Some of the charges of
distortion that have been levelled at historians of earlier times, who
were disposed to concern themselves almost entirely with popes and
emperors, kings and generals and the ruling classes, and to ignore
the lower orders of society, could be laid also against some modern
writers on international relations. On the other hand, those who
approach the subject from the angle of small states can be at a serious
disadvantage. Moving among states which, even when they are
neither mere pawns in great-power relations nor outright depen
dents of a major power, tend to be objects rather than subjects, in the
sense that their international behaviour is highly conditioned by the
policies and relations of stronger powers, they sometimes find it hard
to come to grips with a process which, so to speak, is decided at
.higher levels. Thus, an analysis of the conduct of middle-ranking
powers may not only illuminate the international system from an
unfamiliar angle but may also present some of its processes in a

perspective truer than those frequently associated with either
traditional or more novel approaches.
A final, and more pertinent, reason for taking up the study of these
powers is that their role in international politics appears to have
become more important in recent decades. For most secondary
powers, aligned as well as unaligned, the East-West detente meant a
widening of diplomatic scope. While the improvement in super
power relations allowed some middle-sized powers to take initiatives
of their own in regard to the central relationship of international
politics, it permitted other such powers to assume roles in regional
politics which in the years of the Cold War had been less possible. As
a result, the general state of international relations in many parts of
the world came to depend rather more than before on the conduct
of these powers. With their scope enlarged and their influence
enhanced, some of them became increasingly conscious ofboth their
identity and their potential as intermediate powers. Soon the term
'middle powers' and its various synonyms, which had enjoyed little
currency since the onset of the Cold War, were brought into use
again, while speculation about a special role for such powers, which
had languished since the early years of the United Nations, was
revived. 6
The aim of the present study is to examine the actual conduct and
determine the typical roles of middle powers in international
politics. If for the moment we leave aside the difficulties of
measuring the strength ofstates and drawing dividing lines in a list of
powers arranged according to force at their disposal, we may define
the subject-matter provisionally as states that are weaker than the
great powers in the system but significantly stronger than the minor
powers and small states with which they normally interact. By
surveying and analysing the behaviour of such powers in character
istic situations of various forms of the states system, it may be possible
to detect certain tendencies in their international conduct which,
when related to the processes of the systems to which they belong,
may point to their typical roles in international relations. In very
large systems, particularly the global system of the second half of the
twentieth century, middle powers often play their most conspicuous
parts within their own regions, where their immediate interests
usually lie. In such cases, the more typical of their regional, or sub
systemic, parts will be outlined and discussed. But the study will
focus on the systemic roles of middle powers, especially on their
Introduction 5
condu ct in regard to the central relationship of each system. Though

of varying, and sometimes perhaps minimal, importance to the
processes of the system as a whole, such roles must be central to an
enquiry that is aimed at providing a general picture of the
performance of middle powers in diverse systemic conditions.
The basic theme of this work is the connection between the form
and state of the international system and the conduct of the middle
powers in it. The number of great powers in the system and the
political relations that exist between these chiefactors determine the
international environment of the lesser states and influence their
behaviour, towards the great powers as well as among themselves.
The middle powers, closer to the top level of international politics,
tend to be particularly sensitive to the conditions that prevail there.
For them, each systemic situation presents its own set of difficulties
and opportunities. Just how each of them perceives the elements of
the situation is bound to depend on a variety of subj ective factors,
NCb as the political ideas and passions of its leaders; and how it
J/jiiSponds to the situation must to some extent reflect also other such
factors, for example its diplomatic tradition and its domestic
�titutions. Yet, despite all subjective influences, the reactions of
!niddl e powers in comparable international situations may be
CX:pected to show some similarities. All of them exposed to the
:competitive conditions of international society and determined to
JUrvive and prosper, they can neither afford persistently to ignore
.dle threats and encouragements presented by the structure of the
�tem and the interaction of its principal actors, nor repeatedly fail
,,_, exercise a degree of rationality in their response to them.
Variously threatening their interests and offering possibilities of
�uring some of their goals, these pressures can sometimes be strong
and general enough to produce observable tendencies in the
systemic conduct of the middle powers. What is more, they may
affe ct their sub-systemic behaviour as well. By setting the broad
parameters of-their activities at this level and shaping the general
circumstances under which they must defend their interests and
pursue their aims in regional affairs, the systemic factors may help to
create various patterns of sub-systemic conduct. But the inter
national conduct of the middle powers, at both the systemic and
the sub-systemic level, in turn has effects of its own on the politi
cal processes of the system. It is the nature and magnitude of these
effects that determine the role of middle powers in international
politics. 7
In both its aim and its theme, the present study obviously reflects
a 'state-centric' view of the affairs of the world. Until fairly recently,
this would require no special justification. But in the 1960s and
1970s, approaches to the study of international relations that
followed the tradition of focusing on the states and their political
interaction became the subject of sustained criticism. Drawing
attention to the presence and influence of various non-state actors
on the world scene, a group of writers argued that states were
becoming relatively less important and, therefore, less worthy of
attention. The actors to watch, according to this school of thought,
were the several sorts of transnational organisations, most of which
tended to ignore international boundaries in their operations and
some of which, particularly the multinational corporations, occa
sionally secured a dominating influence on the affairs of individual
states. Like some of the other departures from tradition that took
place in those decades, this approach reflected, though with some
distortions, the particular international circumstances of the period
in which it emerged and developed. The detente in relations
between the superpowers made it possible for a while to shift
attention from matters of national security to broader economic
issues. The prosperity of large parts of the world allowed some
transnational forces and most multinational organisations con
siderably freer play than they had enjoyed in the period of the Cold
War. And the growing number of recently emerged states in the
Third World included some that were willing, or obliged, to let
themselves be influenced or dominated by multinational corpor
ations. This situation led some political scientists to concern
themselves largely with the economic factors of international
politics, especially with those that transcended the boundaries of
states and enjoyed a global range, and to take little account of the
political-strategic context in which such factors operated. Though
they threw light on interesting aspects of the contemporary scene,
particularly on relations between the rich and the poorer parts of
the world, these writers did not succeed in showing that the revival
in the influence of transnational actors had seriously undermined
the states system. The activities of the multinational corporations,
on which so much of their case rested, at no time eclipsed the role of
states. Though a few of the less viable states, for periods, submitted
to domination by foreign organisations, others deliberately used
them for the development of their economies or for other purposes of
their own. And most of the stronger states either regulated their
Introduction 7
operations or, like the communist states, kept them out altogether.
States are still the major actors, and principal powers still the chief
actors on the world stage. Hence, the case for viewing the role of
middle powers in the context of the states system, and for regarding
their conduct as conditioned by the form and state of this system, is a
strong one. That the present study is intended to deal with certain
more lasting tendencies in international politics, rather than with
various novel, and possibly transient, features of the contemporary,
or recent, situation, reinforces the case for a state-centric approach.
The analytical part of this study rests on material drawn from a
number of historical systems, namely the European system from the
Congress of Vienna to the First World War, the German states
system from 1816 to 1866, the inter-American system of the late
nineteenth and the twentieth century, the global and the European
system of the inter-war years, and the global system since 1945 .
Between them, these systems present structures of one, two, three
and more than three great powers. What is more, each of them,
�rough a series of marked changes in the political relations of the
great powers, offers a variety of typical situations for the other
powers in the system. Finally, each of the systems contains a number
of states, ranging from a few to many, which may be defined as
middle powers.
Yet, though in some ways rich and varied, the material presented
by these historical systems is inadequate for a strictly inductive
analysis of the conduct and role of middle powers. In several of the
situations to be distinguished, there simply were not enough such
powers in the system to permit generalisations about their be
haviour. In some cases, one or more of a small number of middle
powers behaved, generally for domestic reasons, so erratically as to
exclude them from the analysis. In other cases, two or more middle
powers, while moved by the same systemic forces, were situated,
geographically or otherwise, so differently as to make comparisons
problematic. A further difficulty is that where the analysis rests on
two or three structurally similar systems, these may be in other
respects so dissimilar that comparisons can be made only with
reservations. For such reasons, most generalisations about middle
powers based merely on facts drawn from the historical material
available must be highly tentative.
To give a clearer picture of the ways middle powers are inclined
to behave, the inductive process has to be combined with a good
deal of deduction . If the international conduct of middle powers
tends to be conditioned by the prevailing forces in the system to

which they belong, the starting-point for a process of deduction
must be the interaction of the great powers. Each type of situation
created by the dynamics of this interaction, determined as it is by
the number of great powers and the state of their relations, presents
a range of theoretically possible roles for the middle powers in the
system. It also produces a set of constraints and incentives likely in
some way to influence their response to the situation. By listing the
various conceivable roles and assessing the probable effect of the
particular systemic influences at work, it is possible to formulate
hypotheses about the types of role most likely to be attempted .
These hypotheses then may be tested against the actual behaviour
of middle powers in relevant historical situations.
The inductive and the deductive method can go hand in hand.
While abstract analysis of the system and its processes may be
brought in to clarify generalisations made from historical material,
recorded facts can be used to try out hypotheses based on deduction
from implicit models. The extent to which it is possible to marry the
generalisations and the hypotheses without doing violence to the
facts or infringing the rules of logic depends on the degree of
systemic conditioning of the behaviour of middle powers, and is thus
a test of the basic assumption of the present study. As we shall see,
the issue of this marriage of the inductive and the deductive
approach is a series of propositions about the typical conduct and
likely role of middle powers in certain kinds of international
situations. A combination of vague generalisations from limited
material and abstract analysis of implicit models is useful also when
it comes to assessing the effect that the efforts of middle powers are
likely to have on the processes of international politics. By
estimating the actual achievements of such powers in a number of
concrete situations as well as exploring the limitations on their
influence inherent in the system, it is possible to gain an indication of
the importance of their various roles. Here again, as we shall see, the
outcome of the two-pronged investigation is a set of observations
about tendencies in diverse situations of the several systems.
The first three chapters of this book trace the development of the
concept of middle powers. Starting with the initial emergence and
occasional reappearances of the idea in European political writings
of earlier centuries, the story continues with the attempts after the
First and the Second World Wars to secure a special status for such
powers in the League of Nations and the United Nations. The last
Introduction 9
stage takes in various scholarly efforts of more recent decades to

define middle powers and classifY states, which lead up to a
discussion of the definition and classification used in this work. The
last four chapters, which constitute the main part of the study,
outline certain patterns of conduct and point to some characteristic
roles of middle powers in various typical situations of each of the
four basic forms of the states system, namely the unifocal, the
dualistic, the triangular, and the multiple. The discussion of the
latter form of system is rounded off with some brief speculations
about the various imaginable roles of middle powers in a global
multiple system, one of the most frequently canvassed possibilities
for the future of the international political system. The analysis of
the four sorts of system allows us to identify the kind of systemic
conditions that have proved most favourable to middle powers set
on taking an active part in international politics, whether at the
systemic or at the sub-systemic level. The book concludes with an
attempt to estimate the quality of the contribution of middle powers
to the international political process. Bearing in mind the claims
that have been made on behalf of such powers, in the earlier as well
as in some of the more recent literature on the subject, we shall try to
decide, on the basis of their record, whether, how, and to what
extent middle powers tend to take a constructive part in the pursuit
of the basic goals ofinternational society - order and security, peace
and j ustice.
1 The History of the Idea
Since the focus in both the older and the newer literature of
international politics generally has been on the principal powers, the
basic distinction in writings about the modem states system has
always been between great powers and others. More often than not
the latter have been grouped together under the label of minor
powers or small states and given only little attention. But many
writers of the past have divided the non-great states according to size
and importance into two, and sometimes three or more, classes.
Some of them have gone out of their way to comment on the nature
and speculate about the role of the powers in the category
immediately below the great powers. And a few have actually made
this intermediate level in the hierarchy ofpowers their chief concern.
Far from amounting to a continuous tradition of thought on the
subject, the observations on the character and discussions of the
function of secondary or middle powers to be found in earlier
political writings can be described as scattered and isolated . Yet, the
fact that the part played by these powers in the international system
has been for centuries an occasionally recurring subject of the
literature makes it worth tracing the history of the idea. For the
earlier period it may suffice simply to note some of the ideas that
have been advanced and trace any development of thought that
may be observed. But for the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
from the states systems of which most of the material for the analysis
of the conduct and role of middle powers to be set out in later
chapters is drawn, there is more point in presenting the ideas in the
systemic and political contexts in which they arose.
1.1 BEFORE 1814
A sketch of the earliest history of the notion of middle powers in

European political thought may be found in a fragment of a draft
chapter on the grading of powers left by the late Martin Wight. 1
lO
The History of the Idea 11
Here Wight showed how the grading of powers started with the
simple recognition that states are of different kinds and magnitudes
and developed into the doctrine that they accordingly have different
roles in international society. Some of the early writers he found
it particularly worth looking at were Aquinas, Bartolus and
Botero.
When Thomas Aquinas, writing more than seven hundred years
ago, tried to formulate the concept of the state, he came up against
the difficulty that states are heterogeneous. His response was to
distinguish three classes of political units: city, province and
kingdom. He did not define his intermediate category, and it is not
clear from his usage what exactly he meant by the term 'provincia'. 2
Yet by introducing three classes of states he prepared the way for
future speculation about the nature and role of the members of the
middle class.
In the following century Bartolus ofSassoferrato, the Italian post
glossator, took the division into three classes one step further. By
fitting the Aristotelian triad of constitutions into a grading of states,
he arrived at the following order. First, magna in primo gradu
magnitudinis, came city-states, which, in his view, ought to be ruled
by the whole people. Next, major, et sic in secundo gradu magnitudinis,
were states too large in territory for direct democracy and best
governed by aristocracies. His examples were Venice and Florence.
Last, maxima, et sic in tertio gradu magnitudinis, came a people or nation
so wide in dominion that only monarchy could provide it with unity
and good government. Here the Roman Empire would be a good
example, he suggested. 3 Bartolus's criterion for classifying states, we
may note, was territorial size, and his concern constitutional form
rather than international role. But by associating a particular type of
government with each class of state he helped to bring out the point
that differences of size between the three classes go with differences
of kind.
Surveying the following centuries, Martin Wight did not find
anyone before Botero who developed the grading of powers and
gave substance to the class of middle powers. Giovanni Botero was a
Jesuit-trained Piedmontese teacher of philosophy and rhetoric who
became archbishop of Milan. His Ragion di Stato appeared in 1589.
At the outset of the book, he divided states into three classes:
some dominions are small, others large, others medium; and these
are not absolute but comparative, and with respect to their
neighbours. So a little state is one that is not able to maintain itself

alone but has need of protection and of the support of another, as
the Republic of Ragusa, and of Lucca. A medium one is that
which has force and authority sufficient to maintain itself without
the need of the help of another, as the Dominion of the Signory of
Venice, the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Duchy of Milan, and the
County of Flanders. Then we call those states great which have
notable advantage over their neighbours, as the Turkish Empire,
and that of the Catholic King. 4
A few pages later Botero asked which states, large, small or middle
sized, are most lasting. After discussing the effects of the weakness
of small states and the dangers of being large, he turned to the
advantages of the middle-sized states:
Middle-sized states are the most lasting, since they are exposed
neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy by their
greatness, and their wealth and power being moderate, passions
are less violent, ambition finds less support and licence less
provocation than in large States. Fear of their neighbours
restrains them, and even if feelings are roused to anger they are
more easily quieted and tranquillity restored. . . Thus some
middle-sized powers have lasted far longer than the greatest, as
we see in the case of Sparta, Carthage and above all Venice, for
there has never been an empire in which mediocrity of power
went with such stability and strength. Yet although this medio
crity is more conducive to the preservation of an empire tha'n
excessive power, middle-sized States do not last long if their
leaders are not content but wish to expand and become great,
and, exceeding the bounds of mediocrity, leave behind also those
of security . . . So long as the ruler recognises the limits of
mediocrity and is content to remain within them his rule will be
lasting. 5
Obviously preferring states of middle size, for which he used the

terms me<;ano and mediocro, Botero was among those writers who
devoted more attention to the intermediate class than to other
classes of powers. By defining this type of state in terms of 'strength
and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from
others' , he linked size with international power and security. This
took the thinking about middle powers a good deal further than the
position of Bartol us and other earlier writers, who had connected

size with constitutional form and domestic politics.
The line of thought that Botero had started, Martin Wight
observed, was apparently not taken up again until the middle of the
eighteenth century. Here he was referring to the writings of the Abbe
de Mably, which however he did not discuss in this draft. 6 The
relevant ideas of this writer are contained in a work first published in
1 7 57, under the title Principes des negociations, pour servir d'introduction
au droit publique de l' Europe, jonde sur les traites. Mably not only
distinguished powers of the first, the second and the third order but
also prescribed how each type of power ought to conduct its affairs in
various situations. In doing so, he came close to generalising about
the roles of secondary powers.
He was interested mainly in the dualistic system of international
politics. Having presented the principles that guided, or, rather,
ought to guide, the international conduct of the two dominant
powers in such a system, he turned to the powers of the second order.
Their conduct and role, he realised, depended very much on the
type of relationship existing between the dominant powers. When
Austria and France, in their time as dominant powers, unwisely had
found themselves in severe conflict with each other, they had needed
the help of their neighbours and had tended to involve them in their
disputes. While the dominant powers had regarded these allies
as instruments to be used for their own purposes, their allies had
perceived an opportunity to aggrandise themselves at the expense of
the dominant powers. But not all of them had succeeded . 'Si quelques
uns ont en effe t augmenti leur fortune en vendant leurs secours, d'autres, en
suivant La meme politique, n'ont eli que joiblement didommages par leurs
conquetes des maux que La guerre leur avo it causes.' 7
Within the category of secondary powers, Mably distinguished
two classes. Some secondary powers were almost able to play the role
of dominant powers. The more important they were, the more such
powers ought to conduct themselves in accordance with the
principles that he had recommended for the dominant powers. To
do so was in their own interest:
Leur moderation leur Jera des allies; leur amour pour La justice les rendra
meme souvent arbitres entre les puissances du premier ordre. Pendant que
celles-ci se jont Ia guerre et s'ajjoiblissent, il est de /'interet des autres de
conserver La paix, parce qu'elles s'enrichiront; et des-tors l'intervalle qui les
separe des premieres -sera moins grand. 8
A decline in the influence of the dominant powers presented a

special opportunity for such secondary powers. If, perhaps through
the incompetence of their ministers and princes, the governments of
the principal powers became paralysed, a prince of the second order
ought to take advantage of the situation by assuming the lead in
European affairs, which position might give him the opportunity to
enhance his reputation by giving proof of his wisdom. But he should
be careful to distinguish between a temporary set-back, and the
more lasting decline in the fortunes of dominant powers which alone
would give the secondary power a chance to satisfy its ambition for
leadership.
The members ofMably's other class of secondary powers were less
close to the dominant powers in the hierarchy of states. They needed
to strengthen their position before they might be able to take a
leading role. Yet, in some respects, Mably observed sadly, the lesser
secondary powers enjoyed considerable advantages:
Elles peuvent profiter des querelles qu'ont les puissances supirieures, et

s'accroftre a leurs dipens. Il est facheux, pour le bonheur de l'humaniti,
qu'on ne puisse opposer a ['ambition de ces itats que des raisonnemens de
morale et non de politique. En travail/ant a s'agrandir, ils ne courent aucun
des dangers auxquels la meme ambition expose des princes plus puissans.
Comme ils ne font dans les aifaires qu'un role subalterne, la principale
attention ne sejixe point sur eux: ils ne sont point !'objet de Ia jalousie; et la
haine publique qui les ipargne se tourne toute entiere contre les puissances qui
lesfont agir et qui achetent leurs secours. Souvent, et l'experience le prouve,
ils ne se sont point rendus odieux en ne se servant pas pour ilever leurfortune
de moyens autorises par la justice et la bonnefoi. Leurfoiblesse leur sert en
quelque sorte d'excuse; tanto! ils semblent ne cider qu'a la nicessiti; tantot
un hasardfavorablefournit quelque pritexte spicieux a leur politique. Etant
soutenus par la puissance enfaveur de qui ils ont commis une irifidiliti, ils
n'en craignent point de reproches; et les plaintes que fait la puissance qu'ils
ont trahie sont prises quelquefois pour un eloge ( tant on est deprave!) ou ne
passent que pour l'if.fet de son ressenti ment. 9
Mably went on to explain how such secondary powers should

conduct themselves in order to benefit fully from their natural
advantages:
L'interet de ses itats, pour se rendre recommandables pendant la paix, c'est

d'entretenir la division entre les grandes puissances, de.flatter leurs passions;
et par de doubles negociations, conduites avec finesse et d'une maniere

equivoque, de paro£tre entrer dans leurs vues, et de donner des esperances a
tous les partis, sans prendre cependant aucun engagement decide. Par cette
conduite, un prince ne se concilie pas, il est vrai, l'amitie des puissances
superieures; mais cette amitie lui seroit inutile, et il les accoutume a ne se
point passer de lui, il les tient dans La disposition de le servir, et leur donne
meme a eel egard une sorte d'emulation dont il prqfitera suivant les
circonstances. La guerre, qui "est unfieau pour tous les autres etats, est un
bonheur pour lui. II doit y prendre part, a mains que quelque raison
particuliere ne sy oppose; car, en general, Ia guerre ne se fait point a ses
depens. Elle lui vaut meme des subsides; et Ia paix qui Ia termine lui sera
toujours avantageuse, pourvu que, toujoursfidelle a ses principes, il a it l'art
peu difficile de se trouver a Iafin de Ia guerre l'allie de Ia puissance qui l'aura
faite avec le plus de bonheur.10
lie would be embarrassed, Mably said, to expound maxims so

Machiavellian as these if it were not that from them one could draw
�nclusions useful to mankind:
II est done vrai que les puissances superieures. sont encore moins ennemies les
unes des autres, que de ces etats d'un ordre inferieur qui ne peuvent s'agrandir
qu'a leurs depens. L'union des unes obligeroit les autres a se con/enter de leur
fortune; et it semble qu'il ne soil permis aux puissances subalternes d'avoir
une ambition utile, que pour mettre un frein a celle des puissances
superieures, dont les querelles causent une desolation generate. 11
He concluded his analysis of the relationship between dominant

and secondary powers with a few observa tions on the faithlessness of
'ambitious secondary powers, and with some further advice for the
princes of such powers. Then he proceeded to discuss the third-rank
powers, again presenting interests and conduct in terms of the
relationship with the principal powers.
Essentially, the function of middle powers, as Mably saw it, was to
enhance and secure the quality of political life at the highest level of
European affairs. The upper secondary powers - which have their
counterparts in the contemporary states system 1 2 - should conduct
themselves according to much the same principles as those applying
to the powers above them, and might be expected to exert a
moderating and pacifying influence on relations between the
dominant powers. They must also be ready to take the lead in
European politics if the principal powers failed in this role. The
lower secondary powers, whose interests did not allow them to

conduct their foreign affairs in accordance with principles nearly so
high as those applying to their superiors, could still help to limit
tension and conflict at the top level of international politics, but only
through their own greed and ambition.
The last idea is the most interesting. It seems that Mably
approved of the tendency for lesser secondary powers to pursue their
selfish ambitions by almost any means because of its effect on the
principal powers. Pressure from inferior powers bent on expansion
and self-advancement, he thought, made the superior ones more
aware of a shared interest in subordinating their own quarrels to
their joint conflict with those below them, more conscious of the
need to maintain a degree of solidarity to keep down potential
challengers. Concerted opposition by the dominant powers to the
selfish drives of the middle powers, in turn, could check the
ambitions of the latter and confine their endeavours to a level where
they would be only useful. The principal benefit of this relationship
of mutual restraint, in Mably's view, was that tension between the
two levels of the hierarchy would prevent rivalry at the top level
from reaching the point where it might cause widespread desolation.
Though his main concern obviously was with the principal
powers, Mably, by generalising about the interests of the secondary
powers and relating their conduct to the politics of the dominam
powers, brought thinking about the function of middle powers in the
European states system to a more advanced stage than any other
writer before the nineteenth century seems to have done.
Rousseau, whose Contrat social and Emile were published five years
after Mably's Principes des negociations, also distinguished three classes
of states -large, small and middle-sized - but did not have much to
say about the latter. Like Bartolus four centuries before him, he
matched ideal types of government with the three sizes of states:
On a de tout temps beaucoup dispute sur La meilleure forme de
Gouvernement, sans considirer que chacune est la meilleure en certains cas, et
la pire en d'autres. Pour nous, si dans les diffirents Etats le nombre des
magistrats doit etre inverse de celui des citoyens, nous conclurons qu'en
general le Gouvernement democratique convient aux petits Etats,
l'aristocratique aux mediocres, et le monarchique aux grands. 13
Disliking large states and distrusting monarchical government, he
believed in the advantages of small states and the virtues of the
democratic form .
For the middle-sized state and the aristocratic form of govern

ment, Rousseau had no particular enthusiasm. When considering
extremes of size, he recognised, on the one hand, that states can
become too large for good government and, on the other, that they
can be too small to survive as independent units. But, unlike Botero,
who made similar observations about the disadvantages of being
very large or very small, he saw no special virtue in the middle-sized
state, as distinct from the viable small state: ' Toute grande nation est
incapable de discipline; un Etat trap petit n'a point de consistance; la
midiocrite meme ne fait quelquefois qu'unir les deux difauts.' 14 This was
hardly a view that could encourage him to speculate about the
international roles of middle powers.
\:' Nor did the international lawyers and the military writers of the
•l;tte eighteenth century show much interest in the subject of middle
,w�rs. The int�rnational la�ers, though given to c!assifying and
�kmg states, did not recogmse this_ class. To determme rank, they
�erally used formal criteria, such as degree of sovereignty, form of
p. ernment, titles, age, e�c: To these the great positi�ist _j urist,
Joh ann Jacob Moser, wntmg m _ 1777, added the cntenon of
.,wer. 15 But in his discussion of the distribution of power as a source
iJf :inequality among sovereign states, he distinguished only stronger
�d weaker states -just as in an earlier work he had recognised
p.ly big and small states when he had classified according to
i�e:
:�·; .
.L .
/: ·Die Europiiische souveraine Staaten seynd theils gross, theils klein: Und
:'r. Proportion
ob gleich jene unter einander wieder von gar verschiedener
;), seynd; so kommen doch auch die griisste dieser kleinen souverainen Staaten
· ..
: nicht einmahl dem schwiichesten grossen souverainen Staat bey sehr

'·: · weitem bey.16
When, on the eve of the French Revolution, G. F. von Martens

enumerated and classified the states of Europe, he took issue with
Moser about his use of the criterion of power. In a discussion of the
division of states into great and little, he mentioned that it was not
enough to distinguish those states that enjoyed absolute sovereignty
from those that were not fully sovereign. It was necessary to
distinguish also those that were entitled to royal honours, and that
generally were called great states, from those that were not entitled
to such honours, and that by way of opposition to the former were
called little states. Here he added a footnote:
In any other sense, this division of states into great and little which
Mr J. J. Moser appears to have introduced, is altogether
arbitrary and vague. If we would divide them according to their
power, we must make more than two classes; and then, the
Province of Holland, the Republic of Berne, and the Duchy of
Silesia, could not be ranked in the lowest class. 1 7
But having so firmly rejected the criterion of power, Martens was

in no position to pursue his idea of one or more intermediate classes
of powers.
The military writers at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, who were trying to digest the experience of the
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, generally saw only great and
small powers, and naturally enough concentrated their attention
on the former. Occasionally, however, there was a departure from
this simple division. The Prussian strategist A. H. D. von Bulow,
Clausewitz's predecessor, provides an example. Though in most
places in his works he applied the customary two-tier distinction, in
the passages where he discussed Frederick the Great's efforts to
improve the European position of Prussia through war he intro
duced an intermediate category. This king, he pointed out, had not
intended to lead his country into the rank ofthe principal powers but
had aimed only at establishing a middle-sized state. The outcome of
his efforts had been a kingdom which not only had threatened
nobody but actually had helped to protect each of its neighbours. 1 8
But, in Bulow's view, this result of Frederick's expansionist
pursuits had not at all been desirable. The King had done either too
much or too little:
,Zu vie/, indem er durch die Eroberung Schlesiens den Hass grosser Miichte
sich zuzog und aus einer gliicklichen Dunkelheit hervorgieng, in welcher des
Wohl seiner Unterthanen sein einziger Ruhm hiitte seyn sollen; zu wenig,
indem er nicht his zur abschreckenden Grosse einen gewaltsam gebildeten
Staat erhob. 19
The situation of the middle-sized state, it may be concluded from

Bulow's criticism of Frederick the Great, was neither happy nor safe.
Foreshadowing the ambitions of later generations of Prussian
writers, he considered only great-powerhood worth having - an
attitude that did not allow him to give much thought to the
international role of middle powers.
I t was not till after the reorganisation of the European and

German states systems at Vienna, it seems, that writers again
emerged who were able not only to recognise middle-ranking
powers but also to think constructively about their role in the states
sytem.
1.2 EUROPEAN RESTORATION

In the nineteenth century the ranking of states as powers became a
subject of diplomatic discussion. It was a topic of the Congress of
Vienna; and the negotiations of I 8 14-1 5 together with the diplo
matic practice of the initial restoration period introduced divisions
. in the hierarchy of states more marked than those that had existed
before. Later meetings of European statesmen brought about or
·confirmed a number of changes and modifications in the post-
• Napoleonic ranking. While some powers moved to a higher class,
others gained a new position within the same class. Those European
congresses and conferences that had some bearing on the structure of
the international hierarchy were sometimes preceded but more
often followed by some public discussion of the new order and the
changes in the grading of individual states. Hence they form a
convenient framework for a presentation and analysis of the ideas
with which we are here concerned.
It was not only in the European but also in the German states
system that the Congress of Vienna drew class divisions. In each
&ystem the states that were ranked immediately below the great
powers attracted the attention of a number of writers and became
the subject of some speculation about the nature and role of middle
powers. Since the two discussions were carried on in different con
texts and by different people, they may be treated separately here.
The problem of ranking the members of the European states
system engaged the attention of the Congress in February 1 8 1 5,
when a plan for three classes of states came before it. Spain and
Portugal, then in a marginal position in relation to the great powers,
wished for two only. When adoption of the plan was prevented by
disputes as to the ranking of the 'great republics', it was superseded
by a classification of ministers. Diplomatic officials were divided
in to three classes, with a fourth class being added three years
later through a refinement introduced by the Congress of Aix-la
Chapelle.
More important in its effect on the international hierarchy of

Europe than those formal classifications, however, was the actual
procedure adopted at Vienna. In practice, the Congress of Vienna
eventually drew a firm line between the great powers and the rest of
the members of the states system. But this it did only after some
initial uncertainty as to where the line should go and not without
some delay in imposing it. The result was that some states for a time
were left in an intermediate position, between the five principal
powers above and the more numerous minor powers below them.
Already, in the middle of September 1 8 14, at the first informal
meetings of the sovereigns and ministers of the four victorious allies
of the Napoleonic Wars, Austria, France, Russia and Britain, it
was decided unanimously that the conduct of the business to be
transacted at Vienna 'must practically rest with the leading Powers'.
On 24 September Castlereagh reported to his prime minister that
the representatives of the four powers were agreed 'that the effective
Cabinet should not be carried beyond the six Powers of the first
order' . 2 0 The power then included with the principal allies and the
defeated power was Spain. At this stage the idea was to have a
formal directing committee of the six, with an inner committee of the
four allies to conduct the real business of the Congress. But later it
was agreed to accept Talleyrand's proposal for a formal committee·
of eight with an inner committee of five, the fifth being France. The
additions to the wider committee were Portugal and Sweden, which,
together with Spain and the four allies, had signed the Treaties of
Paris, which had called the Congress of Vienna into existence. The
effect of these moves was to demote Spain and to promote Portugal
and Sweden. These were the powers that in the councils of Vienna
came to occupy the level immediately below that of the five
principal powers.
The three lesser members of the Committee of Eight were not
allowed to play an important part in the deliberations and decisions
of the Congress. The statesmen of the great powers not only took
charge of the conduct of business but also excluded the represen
tatives of all other states from the most important negotiations. The
division between the principal and the secondary members of the
Committee became so marked that when the Final Act was ready for
signature, the Spanish representative refused altogether to sign. He
pointed out that only a small proportion of the subjects dealt with in
the Act had been reported in the sittings of the Committee and
argued that a fraction of the members of the Committee ought not to
be permitted to settle the affairs of all of Europe. But the supremacy

of the great powers was upheld, and indeed was confirmed by the
European congresses of the post-war period. At the Congress of Aix
la-Chapelle, only three years later, neither Spain, Sweden nor
Portugal was admitted. Nor did any of these powers later in the
century succeed in recovering the position in Europe which they as
signatories of the Treaties of Paris and members of the Committee of
Eight originally had enjoyed.
Yet, the situation of these states - especially Spain, which in the
immediate post-war context had enjoyed the status of marginal
principal power - as well as that of a few other significant lesser
powers - not least the Netherlands, which at the Congress of Vienna
had taken the lead in protesting against impositions by the great
powers - did inspire a few writers of the restoration period to think
about the rank and role in European politics of middle, or
�condary, powers.
· The idea that the states of Europe divided into more than two
;(;lasses, which at one stage had engaged the attention of the Congress
:9f Vienna, reappeared in some post-war writings. But generally it
(was in the context of discussions about the role of the great powers
'lhat it turned up. Here, the man who, as a long-standing student of
,'the states system and latterly as the secretary to the European
:Congresses, knew the structure of post-war Europe better than
:perhaps any other writer provides the best example. In a report on
; �e congress system prepared in March 1 8 1 8, Friedrich Gentz
1described Europe as a great political family united under · the
,,Areopagus of the great powers: 'Les Etats de second, de troisieme, de
;guatrieme ordre se soumettent tacitement, et sans que rien n'ait jamais eti
stipuli a cet egard, aux decisions prises en commun par les Puissances
priponderantes', he observed. 2 1 In paying minimal attention to the
secondary powers and ascribing to them and those below them only
.the most passive of roles, Gentz was fairly typical of those writers of
his generation who were favourably impressed with, or anxious to
defend, the operation of the new congress system. But there were a
few contemporary observers who were able to look beyond the great
powers and their doings, and to help clarify the notion of secondary
powers.
One writer who gave some body to the classification of states was
Karl Heinrich Ludwig Politz, a political scientist at Leipzig
University. The first volume of Die Staatswissenschoften im Lichte unsrer
,(eit, his major work, had a section that dealt with the subject of
dividing the powers on the basis of their political importance

(Gewichte) . The theory of constitutional law, which built on the
abstract idea of the equality of all independent states, knew no such
division, he said. In practical international law, on the other hand,
which rested on history and politics, especially those of the
European states system, states were classified variously according to
political rank ( Wurde) , political importance, sovereignty, or degree
of independence. But statecraft, he continued, which stood between
constitutional law and international law in the sense that it
acknowledged the rule of law while also drawing on the facts and
lessons ofhistory, recognised that formal political rank and degree of
sovereignty could not be adequate criteria for classifying states:
'allein die Entwickelung der Begrijfe vom politischen Gewichte, und dem
davon abhiingenden politischen Range der Staaten ist ein Gegenstand der
Staatskunst ' . 2 2
Though geographical size was not to be ignored, population
figures, because they indicated the level of physical, intellectual and
moral force, were in Politz's view the best criterion for deciding
relative political importance. On this basis he divided states into
four ranks. The first rank comprised states with a population in
excess of 10 million; the second, states with a population of between
4 and 10 million; the third, states with a population of between 1
and 4 million; and the fourth, states with less than one million
inhabitants. He allowed for exceptions to this broad classification.
Internal or external misfortunes in the affairs of a state might reduce
it to a class below that indicated by its population figures; and
outstanding leadership might raise a state, temporarily or per
manently, to a level above the one accorded it in his scheme. For
these reasons, any general classification of states could rarely last
long. 2 3
Politz's main contribution was to suggest a plan for the classifi
cation of powers. Apart from some very general observations on the
importance that states of even third and fourth rank, through their
weight and position, might have in the operation of the balance of
power, he did not go into the subject of the international roles of
lesser powers. Like Gentz, he was not even particularly interested in
secondary states, and did not use the term 'middle power' .
Some years later another German writer, now rather better
known than Politz, used this term and displayed some interest in the
role of a particular type of middle power. In an article of 1 83 1 , Karl
von Clausewitz discussed the latest developments in Europe with
reference to the international situation of Germany. Commenting

on the effect of the Belgian secession from the Netherlands, he
started with the observation that since the disappearance of the
Kingdom of Burgundy as a separating middle power (trennende
Mittelmacht) between Germany and France, the former had been
always exposed to the ambitions and aggressive policies of the latter
power. 2 4 Clausewitz used the term again when he turned to the
subject of Poland. The idea of an independent Poland which would
form 'a beneficial (heilsame) middle power against Russia' he
rejected on the grounds of the inherent characteristics and the
historical record of the Polish nation. As an implacable enemy of
Germany, especially of Prussia, a new Poland would be more likely
to ally itself with France, which was Germany's real enemy, than to
provide protection against Russia, which was not hostile to
Germany. 2 5
In Clausewitz's usage, it seems, a middle power was not simply a
state that belonged in an intermediate category in a classification
according to power. It also needed certain geographical, political
and strategic qualities. Geographically, it had to be in a separating
,eosition between great powers, to be a .?,wischenmacht - though
Clausewitz may not have used this term. Politically, it had to be
:teliable and of a friendly disposition towards its neighbours, at least
towards Prussia and Germany. And strategically, it had to be able
to afford some protection to its great-power neighbours, which
meant that it had to be strong enough to defend itself- a subject that
he had already touched on in his earlier and now more famous
writings. 2 6 Altogether, his notion was a rather self-interested one,
reflecting the concerns of the great-power neighbour of the would
be middle power.
Clausewitz's contribution to thinking about middle powers
borders on, though it is not part of, the theory of buffer states. This
was a feature also of the rather different set of ideas advanced by a
prominent spokesman for certain lesser powers. Hans Christoph von
Gagern had represented the Netherlands and Luxemburg at the
Congress of Vienna, where he had taken an initiative on behalf of
the minor German states and had protested loudly against great
power domination of the negotiations. Later, in the Bundestag, he
had become an outspoken champion of constitutionalism, so much
that Metternich eventually had prevailed on the King of the
Netherlands to have him removed from office. In retirement
Gagern took it upon himself to champion what he considered to be
the rights of Spain and the Netherlands in European politics. In an

essay on the Great Alliance of the post-war years, published when
the congress system was already breaking down, he discussed the
position of those two states. The attitude that the dominant powers
in the Committee of Eight had adopted to Spain had been
disgraceful, he thought. This state had been treated with the
greatest indifference and had been allowed practically no part in
the negotiations; and, even so, the protests voiced by its representa
tive at Vienna had been found not worthy of an answer. Yet, on
historical, geographical, numerical and political as well as on moral
grounds, that country, or rather its king, Ferdinand VII, had
deserved a principal position in the Great Alliance. Much the same
was true of the Netherlands and the House of Orange, he thought.
The greatness of its history, its long maritime tradition and its
contributions to international law and European politics entitled it
to a place among the leading powers. 2 7
Gagern's argument was not only that Spain and the Netherlands
had a right to be treated as members of the first class of powers, but
also that they possessed certain qualities that enabled them to play a
particularly useful role within the Great Alliance. By exercising a
beneficial influence on the five dominant powers, they could help to
maintain peace and order in Europe:
Es ist nicht zu vergessen, jene fiinf Miichte sind allesamt essentiell
kriegerisch, - stark, - also voll Selbstvertrauen und voll <:,uversicht. Der
politische Scepticism einer sechsten oder siebenten Macht, die ihnen allen
bifreundet ist, wird zur Erhaltung eben des Friedens, eben der Ordnung
wesentlich beitragen. 2 8
More than twenty years later, in the fifth volume of an account of

his life in politics, Gagern looked back on the history of the Great
Alliance, and took up again the subject of secondary powers and
their role in the states system. Now his concern was the division of
the Netherlands after the Belgian revolt. This event, he argued, had
certainly not been good for the general state of Europe. The
Netherlands, as established by the Congress of Vienna, had been
intended as a barrier against French expansion. It had been the best
possible protection for Prussia, which already had been weakened
through the mutilation ofPoland and Saxony. Now the dismember
ment of the Netherlands as well had shaken the Great Alliance, so
violently that the bonds holding it together had loosened, with the
result that jealousy and suspicion had come to dominate relations

within it:
Das bessere System des Gleichgewichts, das nur Thoren und Unwissende
leugnen oder gering zu schiitzen scheinen, iichte Staatsmiinner aber immer
im Auge behalten, hat also dadurch keineswegs gewonnen. Der alte Begrif.f
der Barrieren ist damit gleichsam verschwunden. Der Niederlande
Missstimmung,finanzielle Unordnung und Beschriinkung, die schiidliche
Riickwirkung auf das Numerische des Heeres sind davon unmittelbare,
unzweideutige Folgen. 2 9
In the system of the balance of power, the function of secondary

states such as the Netherlands, in his view, was to provide barriers
against territorial encroachments by stronger powers. To do that
effectively, these states had to be of a certain size and strength. As
had been the case with Clausewitz, the type of separating state with
which Gagern was concerned was not a small, passive buffer state
but a middle-sized power able to play an active part in the balance
of power.
In his earlier writings, it may be observed, Gagern argued the
case for a widening of the circle of principal powers rather than for
the recognition of an intermediate class of states. If he had had his
way, the notion of great power, which he had challenged already at
the Congress ofVienna, 3 0 where it had received formal expression,
would presumably either have been abandoned altogether or have
been given a content less associated with military force than with
those other qualities which would have allowed Spain and the
Netherlands to participate in the councils of Europe. Conversely,
the notion of middle or secondary powers - terms that he was not in
the habit of using - did not particularly interest him. But, though his
immediate aim was to break down the distinction between the five
great powers and those immediately below them, he did seem to
recognise that Spain and the Netherlands would have fallen into a
category of their own if they had been allowed to join the principal
powers. They would have been different from the five others both in
nature and in role, he implied. By basing his case on historical and
moral grounds rather than on the military and political power of the
two countries, as well as by suggesting that their political attitudes
would have been different from that of the five more martial powers,
he acknowledged by implication the obvious military inferiority of
his candidates. And by stressing the potential influence of these
states in relation to the task of safeguarding peace and order, he

indicated a special role for them in European politics. Thus,
through his advocacy of great powers manquies, as well as through
his later defence ofbarrier states, Gagem did contribute to the small
stock of nineteenth-century ideas about middle powers.
Gagern's thoughts on the great and the not-so-great powers of the
restoration period may be compared with the ideas of Johann
Gustav Droysen, the founder of the Prussian school of historians.
Like Gagern, Droysen disliked the oligarchic system of I B 1 5 and
showed a certain amount of interest in the fortunes of some
secondary states. In the course of a passionate attack on the
Pentarchy, written in 1 849, he observed that the European system
introduced by the Congress of Vienna was rapidly breaking down.
Among the reasons for this he detected changes in the power
relationships of the great powers, particularly in the ratios between
Prussia and its neighbours, and a rise in the influence of certain
secondary powers:
Denn sclwn . . . ist die Stellung der minderen Staaten eine ungemein
andere, als sie es nach der pentarchistischen Theorie sein sollte; schon
beginnt Spanien die schwer ertrot;:;ten eigenen Bahnen mit Entschiedenheit
;:;u veifolgen, Schwedens Politik beginnt sich wie nach langem Schlafe
wieder ;:;u regen; der gesundeste Staat des Continents, Belgien, beginnt den
positiven Ausdruck fiir das ;:;u suchen, was ihm einst in der Form einer
ewigen Neutralitiit Seitens der London Conferen;:; ;:;ugewiesen ist. Oberall
das Bediiifniss, aus der oligarchischen Gebundenheit, die die lebensvolle
Entwickelung der ein;:;elnen Staaten hemmte, hinaus;:;utreten und ein
System der Freiheit und Gerechtigheit statt dessen der Willkiihr und Gewalt
;:;u gewinnen. Nur durch die Neugestaltung Deutschlands ist es ;:;u
gewinnen. 3 1
However, noting a rise in the influence of these powers - for which

he occasionally used the term 'second-rank' or 'middle' ( mitt/ere)
states 3 2 - did not lead Droysen to speculate about their present or
future role in the states system. To have done so would have run
counter to the whole trend of his thinking about European politics.
It would have implied acceptance of a hierarchy of powers in which
the five great powers of I B 1 5 retained their dominant position, when
his concern was to do away not only with the entire oligarchic
system but also with the very idea of the great power. 3 3 Being at
least as strongly opposed to this idea as Gagern was and far less
committed to the interests of particular secondary states, Droysen
had even less to say about middle powers.
1 .3 GERMAN CONFEDERATION
As we have seen, in European political wntmgs the age of

restoration was not rich in ideas about middle powers. Generally
speaking, neither those writers who supported the great-power
system introduced at Vienna nor those who opposed it had much to
JaY about the secondary powers in Europe. In German political
writings, however, the same age produced a fair amount of
speculation about middle states and their role, and gave rise to at
least one substantial contribution to the history of ideas about
�ddle powers. The most obvious explanation of this difference is
(hat in Europe there were no established and recognised middle
powers in this period, whereas in Germany there were.
•.. Contrary to the Committee of Eight, the German Committee of
Five, which the Congress of Vienna had set up to arrange the affairs
�Germany, ddiberately recognised a class of middle states. It did
not create such a class. In the constitutional history of Germany
there was a long tradition of grading states. Since the end of the
fifteenth century the Reichstag of the Holy Roman Empire had met
·� three estates, namely the electors, the princes and prelates, and
�e free cities. This arrangement, which had expressed the power
-'tructure within the Empire, had been for centuries a subject of
German constitutional writings, as a result of which the idea of
'grades of power can be traced in works of the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. 3 4
The originally medieval structure of Germany had lingered on
until the Empire finally collapsed in the French Revolutionary and
�apoleonic Wars. The failure of the counter-revolutionary inter
vention launched by the Emperor and the King of Prussia in 1 792
eventually led to a reorganisation ofGermany by Napoleon, the first
stage of which was completed by 1 803. While the number of states
was reduced from three hundred to thirty, the large ones were
aggrandised and their princes turned into agents ofNapoleon. After
another war with the Emperor, Napoleon took one step further in
the subordination ofGermany by decreeing the end of the Empire
in 1 806 and proceeding to establish the Confederation of the Rhine
under his own presidency. Promoting the leading German princes
to kings and giving each state a formal constitution, he imposed a

common political and social order on all of Germany outside Prussia
and Austria. The result of these arrangements was a separation of
Austria and Prussia from the rest of Germany and, within the latter,
a fairly clear division between the larger states, which came to be
known as 'middle states', and all the others.
The middle states survived the defeat of Napoleon, and the three
most important - Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Hanover -joined the
German Committee at Vienna together with Austria and Prussia.
Baden was excluded, at which it was deeply offended . The three
middle states took a rather more active part in the activities of the
German Committee than the three lesser members of the
Committee of Eight did in the arrangement of European affairs.
Generally they opposed Prussia, whose representatives wanted a
constitution for all of Germany, and supported Austria, who�
influential chancellor was against projects that might encourage a
national or liberal movement in Germany. Especially Bavaria and
Wiirttemberg in the south, supported by Baden, were against any
tendencies that might endanger their territory or royal power. But
Hanover in the north, exposed to the danger of Prussian domi
nation, leaned towards Austria too, at least in more important
issues. Yet, the middle states often took a rather more independent
line in the negotiations than Metternich would have liked .
The influence of the middle states may be seen in the shape of the
Confederation, the final result of the work of the German
Committee. This association consisted of thirty-five monarchical
states and four city republics. Its chief organ was the Federal Diet at
Frankfurt, the Select Council of which carried out the regular
business of the Confederation. On this Council the eleven larger
states had one vote each. The twenty-eight smaller states were
divided into seven 'curias', each of which had one vote. The eleven
were: Austria and Prussia, which as great powers of both the
German and the European system enjoyed a special position within
the Confederation; Hanover, Holstein and Luxemburg, whose
sovereigns were the kings of England, Denmark and the
Netherlands; and Bavaria, Saxony, Wiirttemberg, Baden, Electoral
Hesse and Grand-Ducal Hesse. Broadly, it was the last group that
came to be known as the middle states. But the term was applied
more particularly to those of them that became most prominent in
German politics, namely Bavaria, Wiirttemberg and Baden, the
three south-German states. a 5
The Federal Diet started its work in 1 8 1 6. For fifty years, until the
linal winding-up of the Confederation in 1 866, the middle states
retained their status and played parts in German politics. In the
ararious issues of the day they sometimes leaned towards one of the
two great powers, while at other times they took independent
positions. In the latter situations, they generally stood separately
from each other, but occasionally they tried to co-operate. 3 6 Yet,
though they survived and took identifiable positions in the affairs of
rhe day, they never had a great deal of influence on the course of
events. In the system dominated by Austria and Prussia, the middle
.tates were always too weak to play a major part. It is significant
that those politicians and writers who speculated about the role that
� German middle power might assume in the states system rarely
�m to have focused on the potentials of particular middle states.
,.. ore often they were inspired by the idea of an association of all the
� er German states, a confederation within the Confederation,
... hich they thought might become a third German power - perhaps
�en a new European power.
y The champions of this idea sometimes used the term 'middle
Pow-er' to describe their projection . But this was not a new term in
German political writings. Others had used it before them, but in a
i'ather different sense. Thus, some of those writers who, inspired by
,..e ideas that were emerging in Germany after the French
Jtevolution and the Napoleonic invasions, had held up the ideal of
Ge rman unity had used 'middle power' to mean central power. As
early as 1 802 the poet Johann Gottfried Herder, a forerunner of
!German nationalism, had employed the term in this sense:
[One] would wish the Prussian crown all the more happiness and
glory, since . . . the state of affairs has changed so much . Russia
has risen to a might which one did not . . . anticipate; Sweden is
impoverished; Poland has disappeared . The western and
southern parts of Europe, how they, too, have changed ! Should
we then not thank Providence that . . . [Prussia] . . . now united
with Austria . . . should become a part of that great Central
Power [Mittelmacht] which must help protect the continent of all
German peoples as well as the northern kingdoms, from subj ug
ation by foreign nations? 3 7
Here Mittelmacht referred to a power that was stituated in the

middle, geographically, not to a state that occupied an intermediate
posi tion in the power hierarchy of the states system . I ndeed , what
the men who entertained this type of notion had in mind was a
German power so strong that it would be able to hold its own
between Russia in the east and France in the west. Freiherr vom
Stein, Friedrich List, Freiherr von Bruck, Konstantin Frantz and
the other statesmen and writers who supported the grossdeutsch
movement, as it came to be called, wanted to unite all the German
lands in order to make the geographical centre of Europe also its
political centre. Since the idea of a secondary power was very far
from their minds when they thought about the future of Mitteleuropa,
their particular use of the term 'middle power' will not be further
considered here.
The type of idea with which we are concerned seems to have been
particularly prevalent in Wiirttemberg, whose king apparently
hoped to secure a top position within the proj ected third German
power. His representative in the Federal Diet from 1 8 1 7 till 1 823,
Karl August von Wangenheim, became a prominent spokesman for
what came to be known as Triaspolitik. The central idea of this
programme was to bring together in a new confederation all those
states which were only German and not also European, the 'true
Germany' , and to rearrange the German Confederation so as to give
the projected confederation a position in German affairs more or less
eq ual to that enjoyed by the two established powers, Austria and
Prussia. This plan clearly involved a strengthening of the role of the
lesser states and a weakening of the influence of Austria and Prussia
within Germany. But it is not certain that Wangenheim believed
that the third German power could become a great power, or even
that he wanted this . A point which he made in a note to Metternich
in 1 8 1 8 suggests that he may have understood and accepted that his
new power would be inferior in strength to the two existing ones.
Assuring the Chancellor that there would be no danger of the lesser
powers uniting against both of the great powers, he pointed out that
the combined forces of all the lesser states would never eq ual the
force of even one of the great powers. 3 8 No doubt this assurance was
given for diplomatic reasons; but there was enough truth in his
observation to allow us to see his ideas as part of thinking abou t
middle powers.
However, this was not a term Wangenheim was in the habit of
using; 3 9 and his writings do not amount to a significant contribution
to the theory of middle powers . Abou t the various possible roles the
new power might play in German or European politics he did not
say a great deal . Though he occasionally suggested that i t might

mediate between Austria and Prussia or hold the balance in
Germany, he seems to have conceived of the planned confederation
.mainly as a defensive arrangement against political domination by
the two German great powers.
A rather clearer picture of the character and role of the projected
third German power emerged from the writings of another, but a
less official, advocate of the ideas behind the policies of the
.government of Wiirttemberg in the early years of the
Confederation. Friedrich Ludwig Lindner was an editor and writer
of liberal political views who in Stuttgart had established a close
friendship with the King of Wiirttemberg. His Manuscript aus Sud
Deutschland, which caused a stir in Germany when it appeared
under a pseudonym in London in 1 820, is the foremost exposition of
�e reindeutsche idea.
It is a passionate attack on the German settlement of 1 8 1 5 . The
joint hegemony of Austria and Prussia amounted to a tutelage of the
rest of Germany, Lindner complained, and created a most un
satisfactory situation for the middle and small states of the
'Confederation. They had little influence on German affairs, and
had nobody to take care of their interests in European politics. Since
the negotiations at Vienna, a practice had developed of discussing
and settling matters directly related to the interests of Germany, by
which he meant the 'true' Germany, without hearing German views
other than those of Austria and Prussia. The negotiations of the
Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1 8 1 8 afforded a glaring, but in his
view not isolated, example of this. The two German great powers,
with their separate interests and special goals, were not well suited
to represent the rest of Germany. The true Germany needed
strength and independence to protect its interests, against Austria
and Prussia as well as against the rest of Europe. Consequently, he
urged the middle and small states to join forces and set up a third
German power. 4 0
This they should do not only for their own sake. Europe, too,
needed a new German power, Lindner argued. The European
balance of power, which had been overturned by Napoleon, had
not yet been restored. Until this could be done, not even the
peaceable disposition of the present rulers would ensure lasting
peace. Europe, composed of states, was like a body made up of
organs. As a body might perish if one of the organs were removed, so
the states system could collapse if it lacked the right sort of members.
To survive and prosper, Europe needed a certain number of states of

particular sizes. The fewer the number, he generalised , the greater
the danger threatening the system and the less the security of the
individual states. On the other hand , too large a number of small
states was liable to cause confusion and constant friction . Also, small
states were too weak to solve the problems of civilisation . Great
goals, this contemporary of Hegel pointed out, demanded great
strength . The most useful states were the middle powers. They were
the guardians of the balance of power, who guaranteed the peace of
Europe and the security of other powers :
Liegen sie zwischen den grossen Staaten, so sind sie urn so aujmerksamere
und niitz;lichere Wachter. Darum aher diirfen sie auch nicht zu klein seyn;
sie kiinnten sonst vom Feinde iiherschwemmt, und von ihm gez;wungen
werden, ihre Kriifte mit den seinen z;u verbinden. Die ,Zwischenmiichte
miissen im Notlifall durch eigene Starke einen feindlichen Angrijj zuriick
treihen kiinnen.
Poland had been such a barrier but existed no more. The gap left by
its elimination could be filled only by Germany. 4 1
Each of the great powers stood to gain from the creation of a
German middle power:
Die Riesenmiichte kiinnen hey jedem ungerechten Angrijj, der sie bedroht,
zuverliissig aufHiilje von Seiten der mittleren Miichte rechnen, indem diese
ihr Schicksal voraussehen miissen,jalls der grossere Staat zu Grunde geht.
Dann kiinnte sich Ieicht eine Macht z;ur alleinherrschenden erheben.
Austria would be protected both against a Russian attempt at

expansion and against an attack from France. Prussia would enjoy
the same benefits. While Russia would be guarded against a French
invasion , France would be guaranteed against Russia. And
England surely would wish to have a middle power in Europe which
would be able to command the respect of Russia, France, Austria
and Prussia and be strong enough to prevent a partition of the Polish
type . By taking the place that Poland once had occupied in the
states system, such a German power would keep the great powers
away from each other and th us guarantee the peace of Europe. 4 2
In arguing for the establishment of a third German power,
Lindner outlined a theory of middle powers . Whatever his ultimate
hopes for the true Germany may have been , the power he proj ected
in this tract was secondary i n strength to the great powers, though

strong enough to defend itself if attacked by one of them . The role he
assi gned to it in the system of the balance of power was different
from that of the great powers as well as from that of mos t small
states. Middle powers, he generalised, had a special interest in
maintaining the balance of power. More than other powers, they
could be relied on to act as balancers, to support any great power
that was exposed to attack from another. If they happened to be not
only middle powers but also 'in-between powers ' , they performed
an additional function in the system . Not easily overrun by their
neighbours, they separated great-power rivals both geographically
and strategically . Like most other wri ters, before as well as after
him, with something of substance to say on the subj ect, Lindner
drew a rather flattering picture of the international conduct of
middle powers.
; Neither those writers who campaigned for the promotion of
Spain, the Netherlands and other minor European powers nor those
writers who championed the idea of a new German power were
successful. The position and influence of the minor powers in
Europe and the middle states in the Confederation did not improve
in the course of the century . The European secondary powers of
1 8 15 were small states by 1 9 1 4. The German middle states, as long
as they lasted, never agreed to unite among themselves and rarely
managed even to concert their policies . As the hopes of moving to a
higher level and playing more prominent parts dimmed for the
lesse r powers and the middle states, they gradually ceased to be
focus for speculation about the nature and role of middle powers.
1 .4. F R O M T H E CRIMEAN WAR T O THE F I RST WORLD

WAR
I n the second half of the nineteenth century there were two states
that in some respects occupied an intermediate position in the
European hierarchy of powers. One was the Ottoman Empire,
which the great powers at the Paris Congress after the Crimean War
formally admi tted to the Concert of Europe but which they
afterwards rarely treated as an equal . The other was united I taly,
which at the London Conference of 1 867 on the Luxemburg
question gained admission for the first time to the meetings of the
principal powers but which for long remained a great power by
name only . The factual situation of these states in relation to both

the great powers and the small states was such that it might
conceivably have given rise to some ideas about middle powers and
their role in the European system.
The Ottoman Empire was in a uniq ue position in European
politics . In the firs t place, it was not really part of the international
society of Europe . Geographically marginal, culturally alien and
historically hostile, it was still a frontier country . Second , though i t
was a member o ft h e states system in t h e sense that it in teracted wi th
European powers and filled some role in the balance of power, its
status in the system was uncertain . On the one hand , its large
population of various races, nationalities and religions, its vast
territories in Europe as well as Asia, and its strategic importance to
several great powers, clearly marked it ofT from the minor powers
and small states of the system . On the other hand, its mili tary
weakness, inefficient administration and long record of economic
decline had long since taken it out of the rank of great powers . This
combination of qualities placed the Empire in a particularly
exposed position in relation to Europe .
Like Poland in the eighteenth century, the O ttoman Empire
was a candidate for partitioning. I t commanded a territory large
and attractive enough to arouse the greed and inspire the rivalry of
the great powers, and did not have the strength to defend itself
effectively against encroachments by them . But the attitude of the
great powers to the Ottoman Empire was differen t from that of the
powers to Poland in the earlier period . While the three eastern great
powers had agreed to take shares of Poland , the great powers with
an interest in the Ottoman Empire were unable to reach agreement
on such a course. I n order to avoid isolated intervention by one
great power, which might upset the balance of power in the region ,
they tentatively agreed instead t o maintain the territorial integrity
of the Empire. By curbing separate action and encouraging joint
measures the great powers largely succeeded in restraining each
other in the rivalry for influence in Constantinople. But the mixture
of rivalry and co-operation which characterised their handling of
the Eastern Question gave relations with the Ottoman Empire a
very ambiguous quality.
As ' the sick man of Europe' who had to be kept alive, the Empire
was subjected to continual interference . To reform its administra
tion and improve the conditions of its subj ects, the great powers , or
some of them, repeatedly employed diplomatic pressure , sometimes
bac king it with threats of intervention and coercion. I n one way,

this treatment, by curtailing the independence of the Empire,
reduced it to a level below that of many lesser powers, which the
great powers most of the time left in peace . On the other hand , the
continuous preoccupation of the powers with the Eastern Question
gave the Empire a degree of diplomatic prominence and political
importance not enjoyed by other non-great powers. The re
sourcefulness it displayed in its dealings with the Concert of Europe
and, especially, its abili ty to take advantage of the disagreements
and rivalries of the great powers, enhanced its international
significance, sometimes to the point where it could meet the great
powers almost on terms of equality.
It was this dual role of ward and equal of the great powers, of
object and subject in European politics, that found expression in the
Treaty of Paris of 1 856, which admitted the Sublime Porte 'aux
tZVantages du droit public et du concert europlen' . Thus, in form, co-opted
.into the Concert of Europe, the Empire was in fact placed under the
joint supervision of the great powers . That the practice of excluding
,the Sultan or his representatives from international conferences,
·even from those that were arranged specifically to deal with the
Eastern Question, continued after 1 856 shows that the Ottoman
Empire was not really accepted as a great power.
If, in fact, the place of the Ottoman Empire in the European
system was a little below that of the great powers but well above that
of the small states, this position does not seem to have led anyone to
describe the Empire as a middle power. Nor, apparently, did it
inspire much thinking about the international role of such powers .
Writers who were interested in the status of the Ottoman Empire,
most of them international lawyers, stressed the fact of its depen
dence on the Concert of Europe against the form of its membership
of this body . Thomas Erskine Holland, a leading British authority
on the legal aspects of the Eastern Question, took a particularly low
view of the status of the Ottoman Empire . Pointing to the
paramount position which the European Concert had made for
itself in Turkey, he described the Empire as 'something like a semi
sovereign State under the tutelage of Europe' . 4 3 John Westlake,
writing some 'years before the First World War, called Turkey's
position in Europe 'ambiguous' . If, in an issue with that country, the
six great powers were agreed among themselves, they treated it not
as a great power but as a state upon which their will was to be
enforced . But when Turkey was able to negotiate an agreement
with the six and participate in its execution , it ranked as a seventh

great power. 4 4 Westlake did not see the Ottoman Empire as
occupying an intermediate posi tion but rather as oscillating
between one extreme and the other.
Nor did the case of I taly give rise to much speculation about
middle powers . After unification, this country, with i ts sizable
territory and large population, rose rapidly above the rank of small
states , to which its constituent members for long had belonged .
Recognising its poten tialities, the great powers soon drew it into
European politics at the highest level. Those who expected to
benefit from its support-first Britain and later Germany-patronised
the new state and facilitated its participation in European con
ferences . The London Conference of 1 86 7 may be seen as marking
I taly's en try into the Concert of Europe. Over the next half century
it took part in various important meetings of the powers, including
the Congress of Berlin. Even more important, from 1 882, when it
joined Austria and Germany in the Triple Alliance, till l 9 1 5 , when
it went to war on the side of the Entente powers, it played a not
insignificant role in the system of alliances that took shape in
Bismarck's times and collapsed in the First World War. Mainly for
the convenience of the great powers, united I taly, it might be said,
was deemed a principal power.
But I taly, very much the marginal member of the Concert of
Europe, was never convincing in the role of great power. I ts
economic backwardness, financial confusion, in ternal conflicts of
various sorts and mili tary and naval weakness severely limited the
influence it could bring to bear in international politics . According
to relative power at its disposal , I taly was not j ust inferior to
the established great powers but rather in a different category
altogether. Like the Ottoman Empire, it could be regarded
as an intermediate-class power in fact. But while that power
played i ts role mainly outside, and often in opposi tion to , the
Concert of Europe , I taly was an insider.
This circumstance made I taly an unlikely obj ect of speculation
about middle powers . Both international lawyers and political
writers of the late nineteenth century tended to include it in the first
category of powers . Johann Caspar Bluntschli, a Swiss who
identified with the German national movement and became one of
the foremost international lawyers of Bismarck's Germany, is an
example. Writing in 1 8 78, he listed the sovereign states of Europe.
There were first the six great powers : the German Empire , France,
Great Britain, I taly, Austria-Hungary and Russia. The remaining

states he divided into seven west European and four east European
(including Turkey ) , adding to the last group the semi-sovereign
state, Bulgaria. The very small and powerless states he excluded . 4 5
Though he recognised the possibility of states moving from one class
to the other, Bluntschli had no intermediate category of powers but
distinguished only between the great powers and the rest. 4 6
Heinrich von Treitschke, too, was inclined to count I taly a great
power. I n a series oflectures on politics which he delivered regularly
at the University of Berlin in his later years, he discussed the
European states system and noted its increasingly aristocratic
character. The Pentarchy, which I taly was about to join as a sixth
great power, was consolidating its preponderance in European
affairs . States of the second and third ranks were finding themselves,
as a rule, excluded from all important business. 4 7 Though
Treitschke distinguished three classes of states, he obviously thought
the division between the great powers and the second-rank states the
only one of political importance. The impotence of all lesser states
left no special role for those of second rank.
Paradoxically, it may be concluded, two dubious or marginal
great powers which became the only plausible middle powers of the
late nineteenth century inspired less thought abou t the nature and
role of such powers than did certain states earlier in the century
which never had any possibility of establishing themselves in
intermediate positions. By elevating the two powers, the Congress of
Paris and the Conference of London provoked less speculation
about middle powers than the Congress of Vienna did by reducing
the secondary powers in Europe and curtailing the lesser states in
Germany .
Nor did certain subseq uent writings on matters of international
law and European poli tics of some relevance to our topic produce a
great many observations and generalisations of the sort that would
interest us here. One major debate, which went on during much of
the century of the European Concert and reached a high point with
the Hague Conferences of 1 899 and 1 90 7 , was between those who
upheld the old principle of the legal equality of all sovereign states
and those who, in recognition of the fact of political inequality
among powers, qualified or set aside this principle. Especially in the
works of the latter writers one might hope to come across ideas about
middle powers . But there is only little to be found here, it seems .
Thinking about the lesser powers rarely went beyond classification.
Establishing criteria for classifying states, however, sometimes

brought such wri ters up against problems very similar to those
encountered in much more recent writings about middle powers .
James Lorimer, professor of the Law of Nature and of Nations at
Edinburgh, provides a good example.
The Institutes of the Law of.Nations, which he published in 1 883 and
1 884, has a chapter on the means of ascertaining the relative value
of states. With the aim of preparing the way for a formal
organisation of in ternational society, which would involve a
ranking of all states, Lorimer set out criteria for estimating their
international value. Four factors, he thought, should be taken into
account: first, the extent or size of the state, or the quantity of
materials of which it is composed ; second , the content or quality of
the state, or of its materials; third , the form of the state, or the
manner in which its materials are combined ; and fourth, the
government of the state, or the manner in which its forces are
brought into action . Discussing the first two criteria, he pointed to a
now familiar difficulty, that of combining quantity and quality in
the estimation of the magnitude of states. To combine the elements
of area and population in an index of mere physical size was
relatively easy. To find a way of measuring material wealth and
intellectual and moral resources for the purpose of estimating
quality might not be impossible either. But as sources of power the
two were inseparable. Using a number of examples to illustrate this
point, he explored the difficulty, but did not find a way of
overcoming it. His discussion of the last two criteria shows him
attaching rather more importance to the composition of states and
the form of government than has been customary in more recent
efforts to rank powers. 4 8
Lorimer did not himself attempt to apply his criteria and rank the
states of the world . Recognising the great practical difficulties of
making stateS accept voluntarily any relative positions assigned to
them , and the even greater difficulties of imposing such positions on
them, he left the actual ranking, as well as subsequent revisions of the
order, to the chief organ of his proj ected international organisation,
in effect to the six great powers . 4 9 Nor did he try to anticipate the
work of the future international organisation by assigning special
roles to particular ranks of powers . His contribution to thinking
about secondary powers consisted entirely in presenting criteria for
ranking states according to power. But these criteria he developed
more carefully and examined tnore closely than earlier writers had
done. The concept of middle power did not attract his attention . I n
his own work, h e distinguished only between great powers and
small, or minor, states.
In a system in which there are no recognised middle powers but
only great powers and small states, such as that of Europe in the mid
nineteenth century, two developments might give rise to the
establishment of an intermediate category of powers . One is what
sociologists would call upward mobility, of which the admission of
the Ottoman Empire and the rise of united I taly are the closest
relevant examples . The other is downward mobility from the class of
: great powers . Of this the second half of the nineteenth century has no
obvious example; but the experience of the German Empire in the
·
last decades before the First World War led some observers to detect
such a tendency in the states system . The Congress of Berlin, which
had made Bismarck boast that he now drove Europe four-in-hand
from the box, had marked Germany's zenith within the Europ ean
Concert. Twenty or thirty years later, in the age of imperialism,
Germany was still in a strong position in Continental politics but was
finding itself at a disadvantage in the increasingly important world
politics. While some of the great powers were establishing them
selves as world powers, Germany was left behind in the race for
colonies . Many German writers, worried about signs of a hierarchy
developing among the great powers, began to fear that Germany
migh t end up as a secondary power. One of them was Treitschke.
The following passage, which followed some comments on the
declining influence of lesser powers in the age of the European
Pen tarchy, expressed his premonitions about Germany 's future
among the great powers :
Die ganze Entwicklung umerer Staatengesellschajt geht also unverkennbar

darauf aus die Staaten zweiten Ranges zuriickzudriingen. Und da eriiffnen
sich, wenn wir die nichteuropiiische Welt mit in Betracht ziehen, unendlich
ermte Aussichten auchfiir um. Bei der Vertheilung dieser nichteuropiiischen
Welt unter die europiiischen Miichte ist Deutschland bisher immer zu kurz
gekommen, und es handelt sich doch urn umer Dasein als Grossstaat bei der
Frage, ob wir auch jemeits der Meere eine Macht werden kiinnen. Sonst
erifffnet sich die griissliche Aussicht, dass England und Russ/and sich in die
Welt theilen; und da weiss man wirklich nicht, was umittlicher und
entsetz/icher wiire, die russische Knute oder der englische Geldbeutel. s o
After 1 900 not only the historians at Berlin but also more popular
writers became preoccupied with the class divisions that seemed to
them to be developing within the group of great powers . A
prominent case was that of Paul Rohrbach , who in the dozen years
preceding 1 9 1 4 published a stream of passionately imperialistic
writings. In Deutschland unter den Weltviilkern, of which the first edi tion
appeared in 1 903 and an expanded version in 1 908, he observed that
the old system in which six great powers had maintained a balance of
power in Europe and which had reached its highest point with the
Congress of Berlin, was changing character radically. Two of the
states, Britain and Russia, were developing into world powers; and
an outside power, the United States of America, was in the process of
j oining them . I taly and Austria-Hungary had been left behind as
purely European powers; and Germany and France were in
positions in between . The question that exercised him was whether
Germany could find a place alongside Britain, America and Russia,
the powers that would make the world history of the twentieth
century - 'oder ob wir uns damit bescheiden miissen, im Konzert der
Weltpolitik auf einen Platz zweiter Klasse zuriickzutreten' . 5 1
The mixture of patriotic fear and national ambition which
motivated imperialists such as Rohrbach did not lead them to take
up l !nes of thought of the type with which we are here concerned .
The powers of Rohrbach's 'zweiter Klasse' were not middle powers
but secondary great powers; and the possible role of such secondary
powers in the future international system was not a subj ect that
could stir his interest. As· was the case with most of that generation of
German political writers, his concern was to make sure that his own
country would not be left behind in the rivalry of the principal
powers, not at all to promote a new class of powers - whether of
Germany and France between the three world powers and the two
purely European powers , or of Germany, France, Austria and I taly
between the world powers and the small powers. Although the
perceived tendencies towards downward mobility in the decades
before the First World War, like the actual cases of upward mobility
in the decades after the Crimean War, may be seen as signs of a
development away from the sharp division between great powers
and small states which had prevailed in the earlier part of the
century, they too led neither to the establishment of an intermediate
class of powers nor to the formulation of significant ideas about
middle powers and their role in international politics .
On the whole, it must be concluded , there was not much thinking
about middle powers i n nineteenth-century Europe. The simple

reason for this was that such powers either did not exist or were not
recognised as existing in that period of European history. If the three
lesser members of the Committee of Eight had secured intermediate
status in the post- 1 8 1 5 system , if the Netherlands or another minor
power had risen above its station, if the ' third Germany' had become
a political reality, if the Ottoman Empire had entered European
society in a less ambiguous way, or if I taly had stayed outside the
Concert of Europe, the states system might have presented real cases
of middle powers round which ideas on the subj ect could have
developed . As it was, there were only small states, of various sizes,
and great powers, some of them greater than others. The large
majority of the writers who were interested in the states system and
international politics naturally focused on the latter, some of them
presenting the great powers as the pillars of order and peace in
Europe and others holding them up as sources of inj ustice and
suffering for small states and suppressed nations.
But in the earlier part of the century a few ideas on the subj ect of
middle powers did appear. Those of them that went beyond mere
classification of states, or the establishment of criteria for such
classification, were generally directed against the system of great
power domination, whether in Europe or in Germany. They were
ess e ntially projections of ambitions held on behalf of particular lesser
states, ei ther European secondary powers or German middle states,
and often took the form of arguments for the establishment of one or
more middle powers. Since they were motivated by a desire to see
these lesser states assume a more influential role in international
politics, it is not surprising that they presented the prospective
middle powers as capable of performing particularly useful services
in the states system . Middle powers were recommended as defenders
of the balance of power and providers of peace and order. They
would be friendly and peaceable, modest and responsible members
of international society, it was suggested . As in both earlier and later
writings on the subj ect, there was a marked tendency to invest such
powers with a degree of moral superiority.
If ambition to see particular states play more important roles led
to the formulation of a number of ideas abou t middle powers,
excessive ambition of this type also provided an obstacle to more
serious thought about the nature and role of such powers . Some of
the promoters of secondary powers were not too determined to stop
upward mobility at the intermediate level, sometimes failing to
make it clear whether they were thinking about a middle power or

about a new great power. Gagem, for example, aimed at having the
two states whose interests he had at heart accepted as members of the
European Concert; and some of the sponsors of the ' true Germany'
wanted the third partner in the proj ected tripartite arrangement of
Germany to assume a position equal to that of the two existing great
powers. This tendency to blur the distinction between great powers
and those immediately below them made it more difficult to note
behavioural qualities peculiar to middle powers and to discern
international roles which might be special to them . This could be
one reason why most of the thinking on the subj ect that did take
place in the nineteenth century was neither rigorous nor very
profound .
Looking back at European political writings of the past centuries,

one sees a few relatively substantial sets of ideas - those of Botero,
Mably and Lindner - and a larger number of isolated observations,
implied notions and tentative generalisations on the subj ect of
middle powers. Continuity of thought, with development of ideas
from generation to generation , is not a marked feature. Few writers
referred to earlier work on this class of powers or even showed that
they were aware of the existence of such work . Nor is there a great
deal of logical coherence among the various contributions. While
the few fairly developed sets of ideas were the products of quite
different periods of European history, the more numerous scattered
thoughts reflected a considerable variety of political concerns and
national interests. In both origin and content, the individual
contributions are too different to be pieced together and developed
into a general theory of the nature and role of middle powers.
But the writings presented here do offer a number of interesting
distinctions and suggestive insights which may serve as starting
points for a modem enq uiry into middle powers and their role.
Throughout the literature reviewed , middle power, or i ts synonyms,
has been a relational concept, in the sense that it has been defined or
described with reference to other classes of the states system,
especially that of the principal powers . While some writers have
applied political tests for distinguishing middle powers, others have
suggested statistical criteria for the ranking of states. The former
include those who have recognised middle powers on the basis of
The History rif the Idea 43
'aeneral ability to perform at a certain level in European politics as

well as those who have linked them to a particular role in the states
�tern . While Botero characterised a middle power as one that had
$uBicient force and authority to maintain i tself without help from
pthers, Mably distinguished between upper secondary powers
Wh ich were almost able to play the role of dominant powers and
.Jower secondary ones which had less in common with those powers .
·Clausewitz, o n the other hand , thought that a state would q ualify as
a middle power only if it was able to fill the part of a barrier state.
While both Botero and Mably defined their category in terms so
brpad as almost to slur the difference between great powers and
Mid dle powers, Clausewitz pinned his middle powers down to a
. cific function in the mechanics of the political system of Europe.
:�e statistical approach is exemplified by Politz, in whose ranking of
;� opean states two intermediate classes are delimited on the basis
�
: . population figures . Though this particular criterion would be
!�uite inadequate as sole indicator of the relative power of nations in
,)be contemporary world, his use of measurable material for an
�j ective classification points in the right direction . For our
pu rposes, too, it will be necessary to classify states according to the
pow r e they actually command rather than with reference to the
U1ternational performance or the political role they seem to carry
put.
The mostly rather flattering observations on the conduct and the
¥ene·rally favourable conclusions about the role of middle powers in
Ulternational politics, which form so striking a feature of the whole
literature on the subj ect, raise questions that seem worth pursuing in
a modem con text. Have secondary powers on the whole exercised a
moderating and pacifying influence on relations between principal
powers, as Mably explained was the case, or have they rather helped
to intensify and maintain rivalry at this level of international
politics? Have they been reliable guardians of the balance of power,
as German and other Con tinental writers of the restoration period
maintained , or have they often pursued their own interests regard
less of the rules of the balance of power? Have they shown themselves
more concerned about international order, security and peace than
most members of the society of states, as the champions of both
existing and projected middle powers were in the habit of insisting,
or have they in many si tuations presented a challenge to the great
powers of the system and a threat to the small states in their vicinity?
With such questions in mind, we may set out to examine the actual
conduct and role of middle powers in various typical situations of
different sorts of states systems . But first the history of the idea must
be brought up to date, and the concept of middle power be defined
in contemporary terms.
2 The League of Nations and
the United Nations
After the First World War the ranking o f states again became a
subject of diplomatic discussion, but this time on a much wider
geographical scale than after the Napoleonic Wars. While the
Congress of Vienna had attempted to classify the states of Europe
and the German Committee had succeeded in ranking the states of
Germany, the representatives of the victorious great powers who
met in Paris early in 1 9 1 9 set out to grade most of the states of the
world . At the preparatory meetings injanuary, Clemenceau, Lloyd
George and Wilson had to decide on the representation of
belligerent, neutral and new states at the Peace Conference. After a
good deal of discussion, a list of thirty-two countries to which
invitations to the first meeting were to be sent was drawn up with the
number ofdelegates assigned to each. The five great powers, namely
the United States, the British Empire, France, I taly and Japan,
were allowed five delegates each . A small group comprising
Belgium, Brazil and Serbia were allocated three each . A group
of twelve countries, including among others China, I ndia and
the three most important British Dominions, and, in Europe,
Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal and Roumania, were
given two each . The remainder, most of them small Latin American
states which had played at most a marginal role in the war, were
allowed one delegate each . Russia, which was in a state of political
chaos, and the enemy powers Germany, Austria-H ungary,
Bulgaria and Turkey were excluded . 1
The main criterion applied in this allocation was war effort.
Hence Belgium and Serbia, both of which had fought hard and
suffered much , were included in the second class ; and Canada,
Australia, South Africa and India, the armi es of which had fough t
in many theatres of war and had sustained great losses, were put in
the third class, even though that seemed to give the British Empire a
disproportionately high total representation . But considerations
45
other than war record were taken into account too, especially size
and power. It was on the latter grounds that President Wilson put
up a hard fight for Brazil, the largest of the South American
countries, and succeeded in having it placed in the second category
of states to be represented at plenary meetings, even though it had
taken only a small part in the war. Conversely, New Zealand , with
an impressive fighting record , was given only half the representation
of the larger dominions. Yet, though some account was taken of size
and power, the allocation of delegates for the Peace Conference was
far from corresponding to a division into great, middle and small
powers. According to such a division, Serbia would hardly have
gone into the upper, and Greece, Roumania and Hedj as into the
lower intermediate category. The classification ofjanuary 1 9 1 9 was
carried out by the principal victorious allies for the purpose of
negotiating a peace with the defeated powers. It was not till the
Peace Conference addressed itself to the task of setting up an
international organisation that the notion of middle powers re
ceived serious consideration .
2. 1 THE LEAGU E OF NAT IONS
As had happened at the Congress of Vienna, the victorious great

powers - the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, as they styled
themselves - took charge of negotiations at the Paris Peace
Conference. A convenient distinction between powers with 'general
interests ' , namely themselves, and those with 'special interests', the
rest of the states, was introduced, on the basis of which a steering
committee consisting of two representatives of each of the five great
powers was set up. This committee , which became known as the
Council of Ten, prepared the plenary sessions and initiated and
controlled the work of the Conference. I ts most influential members
were the representatives of France, Britain and the United States.
The authority of the Council of Ten was challenged at the second
plenary session of the Conference. When a number of commissions
were being set up through resolutions already drafted by the
Council, obj ections were raised by various delegates representing
lesser powers. Hymans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, started the
argument by questioning the proposal that the five great powers
should have two representatives each on all commissions, and the
many lesser powers only five to be chosen from among them .
The League of Nations and the United Nations 47
Belgium, he claimed, ought to have at least one and in some cases

two representatives on the commissions . A Brazilian delegate took
the same line, and went on to q uestion the right of the self
constituted Council of Ten to lay down rules . The Canadian
delegate, Sir Robert Borden, added his support. Complaining that
the matter had not been placed before the Conference in the most
a ppropriate way, he said , 'We are told that certain decisions have
been reached. The result of that is that everyone of us asks : "By
whom have these decisions been reached, and by what auth
ority?" ' 2 Representatives of other nations followed, expressing
similar criticisms and demanding representation on the proposed
commissions.
It was then that Clemenceau, the permanent President of the
Peace Conference, gave his memorable answer to the spokesmen of
the minor powers. First he reminded the delegates that it was the
great powers that had decided that there was going to be a
conference at Paris and that the representatives of interested
countries should be summoned to attend it. He admitted that the
representatives of the great powers were meeting, but insisted that
they were in a position to j ustify their action : 'The British Prime
Minister j ust now reminded me that, on the day when the war
ceased, the Allies had 1 2 000 000 men fighting on various fronts.
This entitles them to consideration . ' Pointing to the great goal of the
League of Nations, he went on to make much the same poin ts as
Metternich and Castlereagh had made a hundred years before,
about the practical need for relatively small committees and
commissions and about the various ways and means open to all
delegates of making their views known both to particular com
miss ions and to the Conference as a whole . 3
Clemenceau 's forceful reply silenced the delegates of the lesser
powers for a while. The commissions were set up as proposed, with
only five members on each to represent the powers with 'special
interests' . On the most important commission, however, that on the
League of Nations, the representation of the smaller powers was
subsequently increased from five to nine. But the great powers, with
a total of ten representatives, which included President Wilson and
Colonel House for the United States and Lord Robert Cecil and
General Smuts for Britain, retained control of this commission too.
The commission on the League ofNations had its first meeting on
3 February 1 9 1 9. In regard to middle powers, the most important
part of its work was the composition of the proposed Council of the
League. That the five great powers would have permanent seats on
this executive committee was clear from the beginning. The
question was whether other powers too should be admitted and , if
so, how many and on what terms . In the view of the British Foreign
Office, the idea of the League of Nations had grown out of the
tradition of the Concert of Europe, which always had been one of
great-power management of international relations . A British
memorandum which limited membership of the Council to the
great powers of the world was before the commission . Another
document available at this stage was General Smuts's pamphlet,
The League of Nations - A Practical Suggestion, which modified the
British proposal by suggesting the inclusion of a number of other
states drawn from two panels . Since it explicitly distinguished an
intermediate rank of powers, this was the more interesting proposal
from our point of view.
After listing the great powers entitled to permanent seats, among
which he included a future Germany under stable democratic
government, Smuts wrote :
To these permanent members I would suggest that four ad

ditional members be added in rotation from two panels, one
panel comprising the important intermediate Powers below the
rank of Great Powers, such as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Central
Russia, Poland , Greater Serbia, etc . , and the other panel
comprising all the minor states who are members of the league .
Each panel will provide two members, who will be selected from
it in rotation according to rules to be laid down in the first
instance by the permanent members, who will also fix the two
original panels . The council will therefore have nine or ten
members according as Germany is or is not a stable democratic
great Power in future.
The advantage of this constitution is that the Great Powers
obtain a majority - although only a bare maj ority - represen
tation on the council and could not therefore complain that their
interests run the risk of being swamped by the multiplicity of
small states . On the other hand the intermediate and minor states
receive a very substantial representation on the league, and could
not complain that they are at the mercy of the Great Powers.
As an alternative, he went on to suggest the idea of permanent

representation for a number of large groups of smaller states . 4
In the course of summing up his recommendations as to the

constitution and functions of the League, Smuts introduced the
term 'middle power' into the negotiations of the Peace Conference :
The council will be the execu tive committee of the league, and
will consist of the Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries or other
authoritative representatives of the Great Powers, together with
the represen tatives drawn in rotation from two panels of the
middle Powers and minor states respectively, in such a way that
the Great Powers have a bare majority. A minority of three or
more can veto any action or resolu tion of the council. 5
President Wilson, who was very impressed with Smuts's pam

phlet, incorporated some of its central ideas in his own revised draft
of the League Covenan t. Like Smuts, he acknowledged the
existence of an intermediate rank of powers . Using the terms 'Body
of Delegates' and 'Execu tive Council' for the two principal organs
of the League, he wrote:
all actions of the Body of Delegates taken in the exercise of their

functions and powers granted to them under this Covenant shall
be first formulated and agreed upon by an Executive Council,
which shall act either by reference or upon its own initiative and
which shall consist of the representatives of the Great Powers
together with representatives drawn in annual rotation from two
panels, one of which shall be made up of the representatives of the
States ranking next after the Great Powers and the other of
the representatives of the minor States (a classification which the
Body of Delegates shall i tself establish and may from time to time
alter) , such a number being drawn from these panels as will be
but one less than the representatives of the Great Powers; and
three or more negative votes in the Council shall operate as a veto
upon any action or resolution proposed. 6
Subsequently, however, the position of the United S tates moved

closer to the original British, and the next American draft provided
for a Council that consisted normally only of the great powers . This
proposal was strongly criticised by the representatives of the lesser
powers, and it was at this stage that a motion was put forward and
carried that the number of such powers represented on the
commission should be increased from five to nine. When the other
great powers failed to support Britain and the United States, with
France and I taly actually speaking up for the lesser powers, the
British modified their proposal by suggesting the inclusion of two
representatives of the other members of the League. Smuts and
others expressed their dissatisfaction with this allocation, and the
Belgian representative wanted to raise the figure to five. Lord
Robert Cecil opposed an increase; but at a later meeting, with the
four new members now present, another debate led to a final fixing
of the nu�nber at four. 7 This solution, though it gave the great
powers a majority of one at the outset, allowed a few middle powers
to voice their claims and views at the highest level of League
politics - which they did with increasing determination over the
next half dozen years .
According to the terms of the Covenant, the Assembly was to
elect the non-permanent members of the Council 'from time to time
in its discretion ' . The First Assembly, meeting in 1 920, elected three
of the four states that already had been appointed on a temporary
basis, namely Spain, Brazil and Belgium, and substituted China for
Greece. Since the Covenant made no definite provision for the
length of term and the re-eligibility of non-permanent members, it
was left to the Assembly to work out some rules and seek their
adoption by the Council. This led to a great debate, which went on
for several Assemblies and which turned largely on the claims for
special consideration advanced by certain middle powers.
The First Assembly produced numerous proposals for the
regulation of the selection of non-permanent members, the prin
cipal ideas advocated being representation by rotation and rep
resentation by regional or geographical association . 8 Both prin
ciples were incorporated in recommendations passed by later
Assemblies; and in October 1 92 1 the Second Assembly voted an
amendment to the Covenant which declared that the Assembly
'shall fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election
of the non-permanent Members of the Council, and particularly
such regulations as relate to their term of office and the conditions of
re-eligibility ' . However, adoption of this amendment, which would
have allowed the Assembly to put its principles into practice, was
held up for years by powers that had an interest in preventing the
introduction of a system of representation by rotation .
The leading opponent of any such system was Spain . I n
September 1 92 1 this country, which regarded itself a s more akin to
the great powers than to the small states, had secretly put in a claim
for a permanent seat on the Council . For reasons of their own , both
France and Britain had given their assent. But the proposal had not
gone through, because Brazil, motivated by ambitions similar to
Spain's, had refused to give its support unless it, too, received a
permanent seat, which the other members of the Council were not
prepared to give it. Tacitly maintaining its claim, Spain now
omitted to ratify the amendment passed by the Second Assembly,
and France took the same line. In the circumstances, the only way
in which some of the various groups clamouring for representation
on the Council could be given seats was to increase the number of
non-permanent members. This happened in 1 922, when the Third
Asse mbly added Sweden, a representative of the ex-neutrals, and
Uruguay, a second representative of the numerous Latin American
member states, to the list of non-permanent members.
The only other change that took place in the constitution of the
Council before 1 926 was the substitution of Czechoslovakia for
China, whose government no longer seemed representative of the
country. Thus, by that year, Spain and Brazil together with
Belgium, which enjoyed the patronage of France, had sat on the
Council for seven years . Uruguay and Sweden had been re-elected
by each Assembly since 1 92 2 , and Czechoslovakia since 1 923. Only
Greece and China had lost their seats, in both cases as a result of
domestic upheavals . The record was one that encouraged the belief
that at least some of the so-called non-permanent members of the
Council had in effect secured semi-permanent status.
The events of 1 926 produced an explosion of claims by secondary
powers for membership of the Council. The Locarno Agreements of
October 1 925, the principal aim of which was to safeguard relations
between Germany and France, provided the background . They
had been concluded on the understanding that Germany would
apply for membership of the League of Nations and that the other
signatories would support her for a permanent seat on the Council.
I n February, Germany submitted its formal demand for admission.
But before the machinery of the League could complete the
procedure of admitting a great power as a new member, a number
of other powers took the opportunity of putting in claims of their
own for permanent seats. One was Poland, which enjoyed the
support of France - whose government apparently thought that
Poland might make a useful ally against Germany on the Council
and received some encouragement from Britain and , later, also from
I taly. Spain and Brazil, too, grasped the chance and , with some
backing from one or two of the great powers, revived their earlier
claims for permanent seats. China and Belgium announced that if
any new permanent seats were created other than that intended for
Germany, they, too, would be candidates; and Persia helped to
swell the list.
Germany, fearing that its recognition as a great power would be
qualified and its influence in the Council reduced if lesser powers
were admitted on equal terms, opposed these claims and made it
clear that it would not join the League if other powers were granted
permanent seats at the same time. To save the situation, the
signatories of the Locarno Treaties went into secret session and
negotiated a proposal for settlement of the issue. The essence of their
plan was that Germany would receive a permanent seat at once,
that Sweden and Czechoslovakia would resign their temporary
seats, and that the Assembly would be asked to elect Poland and
Holland to take their places. Poland was satisfied with this solution,
but Spain and Brazil were not. Spain declared that it would resign
from the League if it did not obtain a permanent seat, and Brazil
insisted that it would veto Germany's seat if it did not itself re
ceive one at the same time. On these reactions the proposal
foundered.
Then the whole subject of Germany's admission was turned over
to the Assembly, where several representatives of small states and
some middle powers, particularly Brazil, found an opportunity to
criticise strongly the practice whereby the Locarno powers, mainly
Britain and France, had tried secretly and unsuccessfully to arrange
among themselves matters that were of general concern to all
members of the League. A committee of the Council, on which all
the parties directly interested as well as a few others were
represented, was set up to consider the problem and find a solution.
The plan it produced, and which the Assembly subsequently
adopted, represented a compromise. Membership of the Council
was to be raised from ten to fourteen, with Germany alone
becoming a new permanent member. The elected members,
increased from six to nine, were to sit for three years and were not to
be re-elected immediately. However, the last rule was qualified by a
clause that stated that up to three states might be re-elected if two
thirds of the Assembly voted for it. No limit was placed on the
number of times a state could be declared re-eligible. The effect of
this qualification was to create an intermediate category of semi
permanent members. Since it was introduced with Poland, Spain
and Brazil in mind, the clause amounted t o a n implicit recognition

of the existence of middle powers .
Poland was satisfied with this solution, but once again Spain and
Brazil were not . Presented with an opportunity of securing an
intermediate position in the hierarchy of the League, they refused to
accept being relegated to the second rank of powers. Both gave
notice of their intention to wi thdraw from the League; Spain, at the
same time, however, announcing its intention finally to ratify the
amendment passed by the Second Assembly . In the end, only Brazil
took the decisive step out of the League. When the Assembly elected
the new Council , it gave Poland a three-year seat and, by an
overwhelming majori ty , declared it re-eligible . When Spain re
turned in 1 928, it was awarded the same privilege . Thus, Poland
and Spain became the first middle powers to receive formal
recognition. 9
Some of the arguments advanced on behalf of the various powers
that in the early and mid- 1 920s aspired to permanent seats on the
Council are worth noting. On the part of the Poles it was argued
that theirs was a nation of thirty million people, which placed it
closer in size to great powers such as Britain, France and I taly than
to its small neighbours, the Baltic states; that it was situated in the
heart of Europe, which gave it a direct interest in most European
questions; and that it had so many unsettled issues with Germany
that i t was best if it could be on a footing of legal eq uality with this
power. 1 0
Spain rested its claim in the first place on i ts former position as a
great power. I ts representative at the League on one occasion
characteristically declared that it was his duty ' to watch over the
prestige of this ancient, glorious, and well-beloved Spain which has
been relegated to a position inferior to that which it merits ' . 1 1 O ther
points advanced in its favour were that Spain was the biggest state
neutral in the World War, that it occupied a detached position in
Europe, and that it enjoyed cultural and moral leadership of the
Latin American nations. 1 2
Brazil emphasised that it was a country of thirty million people
with an area larger than the United States. Despite obj ections from
other South American states, it put itselfforward as the leader of the
Latin American countries. Poin ting to the absence of the United
States from the League and to the fact that Brazil was the next
greatest American power, it claimed a representative role on behalf
of not only South America but also the entire hemisphere. 1 3
China rested its case mainly on its population , area and economic
potentialities , but also on its ancient civilisation. I ts delegate said in
the formal application put in in March 1 926:
My Government takes its stand on the international status quo and

the importance of China in comparison with other Powers. My
Government further considers that such a representation of
China, a Power which occupies the greatest area on the Asiatic
Continent, which possesses a quarter of the total population of the
globe, which disposes of unlimited resources and a considerable
economic power, and which has distinguished itself by its ancient
civilization and its traditional culture, could but enhance the
efficacy of the League of Nations . 1 4
And Persia put itself forward as the chief Mohammedan power in

the League. 1 5
Whether these powers based their claims mainly on size and
economic potential, on location and international profile, on
representative role, or on past glory, they generally displayed a
tendency to overstate their case and to belittle the difference
between themselves and the great powers . Like some of the official
and unofficial champions of the rights ofSpain, the Netherlands and
the third Germany in post-Napoleonic Europe, the representatives
of these secondary states were inclined to present them as would-be
great powers. Since they ultimately wanted their countries to be
treated on more or less equal terms with the principal powers, they
had only little to say about the characters and roles that might be
peculiar to members of a distinct middle class of powers.
The spokesmen of many of the smaller members of the League
went in the opposite direction and refused to accept the distinction
between middle powers and small states . The three Scandinavian
governments, for example, advocated the principle of equality of all
states that were not truly great powers and opposed every tendency
to introduce a three-tier classification of members of the League.
Having failed in the negotiations of 1 926 to prevent special
consideration from being given to the claims of Poland and equally
prominent secondary powers, they insisted on interpreting the
provision for re-election as not creating an intermediate class of
states. 1 6 South American governments revealed similar concerns
when many of them repeatedly obj ected to the pretensions Brazil
displayed in putting itself forward as the leader of Latin America.
Like many small states in other parts of the world, they preferred a
strict rule of representation by rotation on the Council to one giving
permanency or semi-permanency to particularly prominent sec
ondary powers . Speeches and declarations expressing the views of
small states which did not recognise any essential difference
between themselves and those secondary powers which claimed to
be more than small states must be particularly barren of ideas
about the nature and role of middle powers .
Such ideas seem more likely to be present in the works of
international lawyers, diplomatic historians, poli tical scientists and
other writers of the period with an interest in the international
system. In fact, the recognition of middle powers expressed in the
amended rules governing the composition of the League Council
was soon reflected in scholarly writings. Thus, the Anglo-Saxon
literature of the late 1 920s and the 1 930s on the League of Nations
took account of such powers . C . Howard-Ellis, in a book published
in 1 928, pointed out that the idea that certain states which could not
qualify for the rank of great powers were yet of sufficient importance
to constitute a special category went back to the first beginning of
the League, when Smuts and Wilson had suggested that the
temporary members of the Council should be elected by two panels
of states, one of which would be composed of the middle-sized
powers . Both Poland and Spain, he agreed , had strong claims to an
intermediate position . 1 7 C. K. Webster and S. Herbert, in a work
published five years later, offered the opinion that the creation of
semi-permanent seats for certain larger secondary powers corre
sponded to the reality of things, for there was an obvious difference
between states such as Spain, Poland and Brazil and the smaller
ones, which were inferior in both population and prestige . 1 8 And
Waldo E. Stephens, in a book that appeared in 1 939, observed that
at the close of the World War there was a number of states, such as
Brazil, Poland, Spain and China, that appeared to belong to an
intermediary class of powers. They were not great powers like
Britain and France. Nor could they be grouped with states such as
Belgium, Holland and Switzerland. 'The intermediary powers
considered their superiority over the small powers as being firmly
established , as the great powers had viewed their posi tion distinct
from the lesser S tates taken collectively. ' He agreed that the
demands of these powers for seats on the Council had required
special consideration. 1 9
But, though they acknowledged the existence of middle powers,
these and other writers, mostly concerned as they were with the
League of Nations, rarely ventured into generalisations and
speculations about the typical conduct and natural functions ofsuch
powers in international politics. It was not till after the collapse of
the League of Nations, the outbreak of another world war and the
establishment of a new international organisation that writers again
began seriously to think about the role of middle powers.
2.2 THE UNITED NATIONS

In the Second World War the governments of the United States, the
Soviet Union and Britain agreed to set up a new international
organisation as soon as they had defeated their enemies; and in the
last years of the war Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill exchanged
opinions about the principles and structure of the proposed
institution. They were determined that the special position their
countries had gained in the prosecution of the war should be
recognised in the peace-time organisation. On the grounds that the
burden of maintaining the peace would fall mainly on the great
powers, the three statesmen agreed to reserve decisive influence for
these powers in the organisation to be set up.
In August 1 944 representatives of the United States, the Soviet
Union, Britain and China met at Dumbarton Oaks on the outskirts
of Washington to continue their discussions about post-war inter
national organisation and to reach some provisional conclusions.
They drew up a set of proposals for the consideration of other
potential members of the future United Nations. The essence of
these proposals was that threats to international peace and security
would be the responsibility of an organ then to be called the
Executive Council, later the Security Council, which would have
the power to take decisions binding upon all members of the United
Nations. Most other matters would be the concern of an organ to be
named the General Assembly, the legal powers of which, however,
would be limited to discussion and recommendation. The Security
Council would consist of five permanent members, namely the four
powers that had drawn up the proposals and France, and six non
permanent members, which would be elected by the General
Assembly for two-year terms, three of them to retire each year. The
Big Five, as they came to be known, would have a dominating role.
That China was included in this group was not simply because of its
The League of .Nations and the United .Nations 57
huge population - which had not given it great-power status in the
inter-war years - but more in recognition of its long record of war
with Japan and, of particular concern to the United States, its
potential strategic importance in Eastern Asia.
In April l 945, representatives of the nations that had accepted the
invitation of the sponsoring powers to draw up and sign the Charter
of the United Nations met at San Francisco. One of the key issues of
the Conference was the composition and powers of the Security
Council. Though most of the smaller states sought to reduce the
overwhelming power allocated to the Big Five - whether by chang
ing the voting formula proposed, by raising the number of non
permanent seats in the Security Council, by increasing the powers of
the General Assembly, or by some other means - they generally
accepted the traditional diplomatic distinction between great
powers and others as well as the principle that the former should
enjoy some pre-eminence within the new institution. But not all
agreed that the distinction between great powers and others was the
Only one worth making. Some were of the opinion that a number of
states were so close to the Big Five in the international hierarchy of
power that they were entitled to a special position among the lesser
$lates. Such powers, they argued, ought to be given priority in the
elections to the non-permanent seats in the Security Council. Those
IOilletimes pointed out as middle powers were Canada, Australia,
Brazil, Mexico, Poland, Holland and Belgium, the last two then still
colonial powers of some importance. 2 0 The principal champions of
the rights of middle powers were Canada and Australia. It is worth
looking at their arguments in some detail.
Already at the earliest planning stages Prime Minister Mackenzie
King had expressed concern about Canada's representation in
whatever institution might be set up. In a speech to the Canadian
parliament in july 1 943 he had argued that effective representation
should be neither restricted to the largest states nor extended to all
states. It should be determined 'on a functional basis which will
admit to full membership those countries large or small which have
the greatest contribution to make to the particular object in
question'. 2 1 That principle of representation, he had suggested,
would make it possible to find a compromise between the theoretical
equality of all states and the practical necessity of limiting
representation on international bodies to a workable number. It was
a principle that Canadian spokesmen were to advance on many
occasions over the next few years.
A year later, a few weeks before the Big Four's conversations at

Dumbarton Oaks, King had evoked the functional idea with the
specific purpose of strengthening the case for representation of
middle powers in the proposed Security Council:
The simple division of the world between great powers and the
rest is unreal and even dangerous. The great powers are called by
that name simply because they posssess great power. The other
states of the world possess power and, therefore, the capacity to
use it for the maintenance of peace - in varying degrees ranging
from almost zero in the case of the smallest and weakest states up
to a military potential not far below that of the great powers. In
determining what states should be represented on the council with
the great powers, it is, I believe, necessary to apply the functional
idea. Those countries which have most to contribute to the
maintenance of the peace of the world should be most frequently
selected. The military contribution actually made during this war
by the members of the United Nations provides one good working
basis for a selective principle of choice. 2 2
Subsequently the Canadian government had dispatched to the
governments of the Big Five a memorandum on the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals, which pointed to the willingness and capacity
displayed by Canada in two world wars to participate both
militarily and industrially in concerted action against aggression,
and pressed for changes in the draft charter to ensure that states with
so much to contribute to the maintenance ofpeace and security were
elected to seats on the Council more frequently, or for longer
periods, than states with less to give. 2 3
This was the essence of the case that Canada took to the San
Francisco Conference. It pointed towards graded representation,
and rested in the first place on the war efforts of countries such as
Canada and Australia. But behind the arguments was the assump
tion, not always tacit, that middle powers could be trusted to
exercise their diplomatic influence and military power in the interest
of international society, that they were capable of being less selfish
than great powers and more responsible than small states. In later
years this tendency to assume a degree of moral superiority was to
become an even more noticeable feature of some Canadian thinking
about the nature and role of middle powers.
The Canadian case for middle powers found several practical
expressions at San Francisco. One had to do with representation on

the Security Council and took the form of an amendment proposal
' which read, 'The General Assembly shall adopt rules governing the
choice of non-permanent members, in order to ensure that due
weight be given to the contribution of members to the maintenance
of international peace and security and the performance of their
obligations to the United Nations.' 2 4 The proposal was voted down;
but the idea was incorporated in an amendment put forward by the
sponsoring powers and accepted by the Conference. Thus it found its
way into the first paragraph of Article 23 of the Charter.
Another initiative by the Canadian delegation was aimed more
directly at reducing domination by the permanent members of the
Security Council. It concerned participation by states that were not
members of the Security Council in decisions of that body involving
the use of their armed forces for punitive measures. The Canadians,
thinking that such states might well be secondary powers, acted on
the principle of 'no taxation without representation' when they
stated that they wanted to.be 'consulted rather than ordered to take
action'. 2 6 The Conference agreed that any state asked to participate
in the use of force should have the right to take part in the Security
Council's decisions to call for its forces. The result was Article 44 of
the Charter.
In the negotiations about the composition of the Economic and
Social Council, which was to be entirely elective, Canada again
introduced the functional idea. Well aware that in the economic
field Canada and other middle powers were closer to the level of the
great powers than they were in the military sphere, its represen
tatives proposed that the General Assembly, in choosing members
for that body, should give 'due regard to the necessity of arranging
for the adequate representation of states of major economic
importance'. 2 6 Representatives of small states, however, were able
to argue that the Council was to deal not only with economic but
also with social, cultural and other matters. When some of them
demanded an equal chance in the elections, Canada withdrew its
amendment proposal. But it was agreed that members of this
Council should be eligible for re-election, which would allow the
economic great powers to be continuously represented.
In the pursuit of these and other aims - such as a reduction in the
scope of the veto rights of the great powers - Canada occasionally co
operated with other secondary powers, for example Australia
and Brazil, and sometimes also with small states, particularly
New Zealand. But such co-operation was generally on an ad hoc

basis. The problems and opportunities of the lesser powers in 1 945
were not so similar that it was possible for them to co-ordinate their
policies towards the great powers on a broad front and for a long
time. Even Australia, which in so many ways had much in common
with Canada, took a line in defence of the rights of secondary powers
which at some stages of the negotiations differed significantly from
Canada's.
The Australian government, even more than the Canadian, had
been dissatisfied with the great powers' leadership of the war efforts.
In the later years of the war the Australians had felt particularly
resentful about the practice of largely excluding them from
consultation on most matters relating to the armistice and peace
settlements. Even questions of special relevance to their own region,
the Pacific, had been settled without, in their view, adequate
consultation having taken place at either the Commonwealth or the
Allied level. As a result, the government had become increasingly
concerned about the status and influence of Australia. Its reaction to
the outline proposals for a new international organisation had been
to stress the potential importance of smaller powers for the post-war
and peace-time world while accepting the need for great-power
leadership. At the time of the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations Dr
H. V. Evatt, the Minister for External Affairs, had publicly argued
the Australian case for representation of smaller powers on what
later came to be known as the Security Council:
One important point is that the representatives of the smaller
powers on the executive authority should be adequate to ensure a
balanced outlook on world affairs and so increase confidence in
all executive decisions. Further the executive should be so
constituted that no distinct region of the globe and no important
group of nations should be left unrepresented on it. 2 7
The principle of regional representation was one that was bound to
appeal more to Australia, the principal allied power in the Pacific
region, than to Canada, with the United States as its closest
neighbour. But, later, Dr Evatt had added a criterion for represen
tation more in line with Canadian thinking. In a speech delivered in
America he had introduced the test of war efforts. Arguing the case
for the smaller powers in general and for Australia in particular, he
had said, 'Regard should, of course, be paid to the claims of these
allied nations who have, both in this war and in the last, largely
contributed to the overthrow of the aggressors . ' 2 8 The emphasis,

however, had still been on regional representation.
In the months before the San Francisco Conference, Dr Evatt
and his colleagues had become increasingly preoccupied with ideas
that pointed towards enlarged roles for middle and small powers . 2 9
Here they had received some encouragement from the French,
whose spokesmen had expressed strong agreement with the
Australian government on the status and rights of what both parties
called 'middle powers' . 3 0 By the time the Conference met, the
Australian delegation was ready to take a leading role in opposing
tendencies towards domination by great powers and championing
'the rights of smaller states .
At San Francisco, where Australia was elected a member of the
Executive Committee of the Conference, Australian policy was
directed mainly at reducing the veto rights reserved by the great
.powers at the Yalta Conference and at enlarging the roles of lesser
pow ers within the new organisation. 3 1 The latter pursui t, here the
more relevant, led in the first place to an attempt to secure
representation on the Security Council for countries such as the
Netherlands, Canada and Brazil, in addition to Australia itself. In a
speech to the Conference, Francis Forde, deputy prime minister and
a member of the delegation, restated the Australian case for
representation :
It will have to be recognized that outside the great powers there

are certain powers who, by reason of their resources and their
geographical location, will have to be relied upon especially for
the main tenance of peace and security in various q uarters of the
world . Like France, Canada, and other countries, Australia has
consistently maintained this principle. But there is another
principle of even greater importance .
Certain powers, not classified as great, have proved by their
record in two world wars that they not only have the capacity but
also the will to fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the
world with tyranny . These powers are in a sense proved veterans
in the struggle against Fascist dictatorship threatening the
securi ty of the world . They are in truth security powers . They
have a claim to special recognition in any security
organization . 3 2
One of the aims of a series of amendments subsequently proposed by

Australia was:
To see that the Security Council is in fact composed of 'security'

Powers, i . e . , Powers which by their past military contribution to
the cause of world security, have proved able and willing to as
sume substantial security responsibilities, or which are willing, and
by virtue of their geographical position in relation to regions of pri
mary strategical importance are able, to make a substantial contri
bution to the maintenance of international peace and security. 3 3
In both the speech and the amendment the order o f importance of

the two principal qualifications proposed as criteria for election to
the Security Council was the opposite of that of earlier statements.
By placing proved capacity and will to fight aggression first, and
playing down geographical location and regional role, Australia
moved closer to the Canadian position. However, while the two
Anglo-Saxon middle powers might now agree that past record, in
two world wars, would make the best single test of suitability for the
Security Council, this was hardly a view that could be shared by all
secondary powers. For the principal Latin American powers, for
example, whose contribution to the war efforts had been of quite
another order, this criterion could not have great appeal . The case
for Brazil, for instance, rested better on economic resources and
geographical location. Neither at San Francisco nor at later sessions
of the United Nations did the secondary powers of the world find
common grounds for their claims for a special status and role within
the new organisation.
I n the circumstances, it is not surprising that the middle powers
on the whole failed to achieve their aims. None of the gains they
secured in these early negotiations was substantial enough to give
them a special position within the United Nations; and some of their
gains eventually turned out to be of even less significance than
initially expected . A case in point is that paragraph of Article 23 of
the Charter which laid down the rules that were to guide the
General Assembly in the election of non-permanent members of the
Security Council. As amended , it read , 'due regard being specially
paid, in the first instance to the contribution of Members of the
United Nations to the maintenance of international peace and
security and to the other purposes of the Organization, and also to
equitable geographical distribution ' . Though the functional prin
ciple clearly was given priority here, in practice it was soon
subordinated to that of equitable geographical representation . The
first election, which brought Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Poland , the
Netherlands and Australia into the Security Council, may be seen as

reflecting a compromise between the two principles . 3 4 But, shortly,
Eas t European, Latin American and Commonwealth countries laid
claims to continuous representation of their groups of states, and a
practice developed of always having representatives of these as well
as of a few other groups. By the early 1 950s the General Assembly
was repeatedly deadlocked over elections to the Security Council.
With the large increase in membership of the U nited Nations that
took place after the mid- 1 950s the situation worsened . Eventually,
in 1 963, the Security Council was enlarged and the bloc system of
representation was formally introduced . As the blocs were arranged
on a regional basis, the functional principle favouring the middle
powers was then finally eclipsed . The middle powers themselves
never formed a bloc. Having accepted the new geographical rules of
representation, they were reduced to arguing their cases for election
within the blocs to which they belonged . Thus the tendency to give
formal recognition to the intermediate class of powers which had
developed in the early years of the League of Nations was reversed
in the first decades of the U nited Nations .
Nor did the elections for the Economic and Social Council help
much to bolster the position of middle powers within the United
Nations. Formally, the rules guiding the General Assembly in the
allocation of seats on this council took little account of power. But,
by permitting re-election of members, they allowed the chief
industrial powers to enjoy an advantage over other states. The result
was that the great powers, the permanent members of the Security
Council, soon became for practical purposes also permanent
members of the Economic and Social Council. As regards election of
the remaining members, a practice developed of applying the
functional principle side by side with the geographical, as a result of
which a number of secondary powers were re-elected repeatedly.
But when, in 1 963, the bloc system of representation was adopted for
elections to this council too, the functional idea was relegated to the
regional level . However, neither the initial practice of re-election
nor the subsequent eclipse ofthe functional principle had more than
a marginal effect on the general standing of middle powers, because
by the time these developments were taking place the Economic
and Social Council had already become a rather less important
body than some of those who in 1 945 had pressed for special
recognition for middle powers in its membership had hoped would
be the case .
Furthermore , when disagreement and conflict among the per

manent members curtailed the effectiveness and influence of the
Security Council, the various limitations on its powers imposed at
San Francisco as safeguards for the secondary powers in particular,
such as Article 44, turned out to be rather less necessary than
expected, and therefore not so much of a gain. On the other hand,
the broadening of the scope and increase in the powers of the
General Assembly negotiated in 1 945, and subseq uently enhanced
through the decline of the Security Council as a decision-making
body, hardly proved of special advantage to the middle powers .
Rather, it was the new, small states, which discovered in the
General Assembly a suitable vehicle for their ambitions, that in the
long run benefited from these developments.
It is not difficult to point to a number of reasons why the middle
powers failed to gain real recognition in 1 945 and to secure a status
of their own within the new organisation . In the first place, as
already noted, these powers were unable to take a joint stand in the
negotiations and to engage in continuous co-operation. Their
difficulty in developing a degree of solidarity was not only that they
lacked a common programme but also that they barely recognised
each other. There was no generally accepted definition, or even an
agreed list, of middle powers. Second, the efforts of the champions of
middle powers met opposition from two sides . With the exception of
France - then only a marginal great power - which in the early
discussions about post-war international organisation occasionally
supported some secondary powers, the great powers largely resisted
middle-power claims, which they tended to see as challenges to their
own position ofdominance. The small states, on their side , generally
saw no special advantage in recognising an intermediate class of
powers, since it implied a relegation of themselves to a level of status
and influence even lower than the one they occupied together with
the secondary powers in a simple division between great powers and
others . So, although Australia found some supporters among the
small states when at San Francisco it put itself forward as leader of
middle and smaller powers, most of the small states were inclined to
support the great powers in their opposition to middle-power
claims. 3 6 The result was a situation in which a motley, disunited
and not always too-determined group of would-be middle powers
faced a good deal of resistance to their policies of self-enhancement,
most of it from above but some also from below their own level,
while receiving little effective support from either side.
A more fundamental and compelling reason why the middle

powers failed to establish themselves was the solidarity of the great
powers in the immediate post-war situation . As long as the principal
victorious powers, the authors of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals
and the sponsors of the San Francisco Conference, were able to
maintain a relatively solid front, their power and influence were so
overwhelming that the only significant distinction in the hierarchy
'of states was between them and others. When the concert of the
great powers took all important decisions and no other power was in
a position to bring much influence to bear, any proposal to classify
·the lesser powers and award special status to an intermediate class
was in conflict with the realities of the existing power structure of the
'world.
� t seems to be a paradox of the history ofideas of middle powers that

claims for diplomatic and legal recognition of an intermediate class
�
� powers tend to be put forward in situations where there is only
little chance of having them accepted . The history of the last two
)lundred years shows that it is normally at the end of, or soon after,
)Jeriods
of general war that prominent secondary powers feel
encouraged to press cases for having themselves and their peers
'separated from the masses of minor states and installed at a level
close to that of the great powers . For the less-than-great powers,
post-war situations often present a combination of real dangers and
apparent opportunities. On the one hand , most such powers not
only have the recent experience of being excluded from top-level
decision-making, both in the last stages of the war efforts and in the
armistice negotiations, but also face the likely prospect of being
dominated by a close concert of the principal victors, throughout
the preparations of a peace settlement as well as in the first post-war
period . On the other hand , they have seen the old , pre-war order of
international society break down and have become involved in the
setting-up of a new structure and the creation of a novel set of
institutions. All the elements of such situations are apt to spur some
of the secondary powers to attempt to improve or secure their
positions. But, whether their aim is to be accepted as near-great
powers, to be formally recognised as intermediate powers, or simply
to avoid being always ranked with the small states, to succeed in
such conditions is very difficult. The experiences of 1 8 1 5 , 1 9 1 9 and
1 945 show that the forces of collective repression exercised from the
top level of a post-war hierarchy of powers tend to prevail over

moves for increased status emanating from the level immediately
below. The best that middle powers seem able to achieve in post
war situations is a number of rather insubstantial and ultimately
impermanent advantages .
The marginal and temporary role of the three lesser members of
the Committee of Eight at Vienna, the conflict and uncertainty
surrounding the posi tion of the few semi-permanent members of the
Council of the League, and the feeble expression and declining
importance of the so-called functional idea in the Charter of the
United Nations, all bear out the generalisation that post-war
conditions do not give much scope for middle-sized powers anxious
to secure formal recognition and a lasting standing of their own. But
it is normally only at the end of general wars that great powers set
about reorganising international society and introducing changes in
the states system of the kind that conceivably could include the
establishment of a new class of powers. The conclusion suggesting
itself is that, as long as two or more great powers dominate the states
system, middle powers are unlikely to receive legal recognition and
gain institutional status - whatever the nature of the roles they may
perform and whatever the degree of influence they may command,
in non-post-war situations of international politics. 3 6
3 The Hierarchy of Powers
The small number of books and articles about the role of middle
powers that in recent decades appeared in various parts of the world
were not the last fruits of a long tradition of scholarly interest in the
subject. The work on this class of powers done by European writers
in earlier times had never amounted to a continuous tradition and,
in any case, had petered out in the first half of the nineteenth
century, with the result that the insights it had presented had been
all but forgotten. Nor did the recent writings stem from the
controversies in the early years of the League of Nations and the
United Nations, when certain secondary powers had pressed for
intermediate status in the various organs of the new institutions .
The fate of these efforts, which had been no more than partially
successful in the case of the League and largely unsuccessful in that
of the U nited Nations, had become a matter of mainly historical
interest. Contemporary concern with middle powers goes back only
to the early 1 960s, when signs of a detente in East-West relations
and hints of a transformation of the dualistic system seemed to open
possibilities for a growing number of secondary powers to pursue
new and more independent policies, whether in global or in
regional affairs. In the course of the 1 960s, developments of this
nature in the international political system encouraged writers in
Canada, Western Europe, I ndia and elsewhere to take up again the
subject of the nature and role of middle powers, which in the years of
the Cold War had been largely neglected .
In some respects, the modern literature resembled older
European writings on the subj ect. Discussions of the role of middle
powers again showed a tendency to generalise from a few cases of
powers reacting in a particular way to a certain set of international
circumstances, and an inclination not only to overlook or ignore
other possible reactions but also to pay too little attention to the
transient nature of the current international situation . Also,
descriptions of the conduct of middle powers once more revealed a
proneness to paint a rather flattering picture. In one respect,
67
however, the recent writings differed from the older literature.

Attempts to characterise middle powers generally evinced greater
care about precision in defining concepts . This concern, even more
marked in modern literature on the nature and role of small states
and part of the general movement towards a more scientific
approach to the study of politics, led to a search for absolute criteria
for ranking powers and reliable indices for distinguishing middle
powers. The quest, however, did not produce an entirely satisfac
tory way of classifying powers or a widely accepted definition of
middle powers, such as might have served as basis for more rigorous
enquiry into the nature, behaviour and role of these powers.
3. 1 CHARACTERI SATION OF M I DDLE POWERS
The virtual failure of the attempt to secure special status and lasting
advantages for middle powers within the organisation of the United
Nations did not put an end to thinking and writing about the
character and role of such powers . Especially in Canada, whose
representatives at the first meetings of the United Nations together
with the Australians had been the foremost advocates of the rights of
secondary powers, did the discussion continue into the initial post
war period . As long as the concert of the great powers survived, it
was possible to maintain some of the arguments that had been put
forward in 1 945. The role of middle powers could still be seen as
governed by the solidarity of the great powers and linked to the
security system of the U nited Nations. Thus, as late as 1 94 7, the
Canadian professor George DeT. Glazebrook was able to charac
terise middle powers by ' their opposition to undue great power
control, their growing tendency to act together, and the influence
they have individually come to exert' . 1 His list of such powers,
which he thought generally acceptable, included Belgium and the
Netherlands and excluded the three principal ex-enemies.
The following year an official of the Canadian Department of
External Affairs, R. G. Riddell, took the characterisation of the
nature and discussion of the part of middle powers a little further. I n
an address o n the role o f middle powers in t h e United Nations, h e
admitted that nobody had offered a n adequate definition o f such a
power but suggested that certain well-marked attributes, taken
singly or in various combinations, might produce an identifiable
result. 'The middle powers are those which, by reason of their size,
The Hierarchy of Powers 69
thei r material resources, their willingness and ability to accept

responsibility, their influence and their stability are close to being
great powers. ' 2 Echoing Canadian arguments at San Francisco, he
offered the opinion that performance in the recent war and the
current reconstruction had indicated some criteria that might be
applied. Turning to the role of middle powers in relation to the new
system of collective security, Riddell set out the reasons why these
powers could be expected to contribute a great deal. ' I n a predatory
world, the middle powers are more vulnerable than their smaller
neighbours, and Jess able to protect themselves than their larger
ones.' 3 Their relatively large size, coveted resources and strategic
importance, he explained , endangered their security without giving
them the means to defend themselves single-handed . The best
arrangement for their protection was a successful international
organisation . Since they had more to gain from such an organisation
than the great powers, who in the last resort could do without it, and
the small powers, whose independence always was more precarious,
h
t ey could be relied on, he concluded, to play a particularly large
part in its work. Their principal contributions to the existing
security organisation of the United Nations could take three forms,
he suggested, namely support backed by considerable resources,
participation with a strong sense of responsibility and supply of
political leadership of a high standard .
The post-war notions of middle-power roles entertained by such
writers and officials implied a degree of concert among the great
powers and a measure of success in the operation of the new security
system barely reached even in the first years after the war. When,
subsequently, bloc politics and cold war unmistakably eclipsed
these conditions, such ideas soon became so irrelevant to the real
state of the world and the actual situation of most middle powers
that they lost much of the currency that they had enjoyed in the first
years of the United Nations .
The following period was not rich in ideas about middle powers.
The polarisation of the states system that took place in the first years
of the Cold War drew most of the nations that in 1 945 had been
mentioned as middle powers into military alliances with the United
States and tied Poland even more closely to the Soviet Union .
Though the conduct of these and other powers within the two
camps provided good material for a study of certain types of roles
open to middle powers in a dualistic system with a high level of
tension, their general state of dependence on one great power or the
other did not inspire many contemporary writers to theorise about

their part in international politics. Some of the newer middle
powers, notably I ndia, were able to stay clear of both of the blocs
and to establish themselves as leading members of the group of non
aligned nations. Compared with those that had tied themselves to
one or the other of the superpowers, they enjoyed considerable
diplomatic scope. Being in a position to initiate a variety of moves
not only in regional but also in global politics, they could sometimes
don the moral mantle, which in the post-war years usually had been
worn by some of the older middle powers. But, whatever part they
played in international politics, they were acting as members of the
non-aligned group rather than as middle powers, with the result
that the various writings to which their situation and conduct gave
rise became part of the literature of non-alignment rather than on
middle powers. What is more, the differences between the inter
national problems and diplomatic possibilities of aligned and of
unaligned powers made the period of the Cold War a rather more
difficult time to generalise about the conduct and roles of middle
powers than the immediate post-war years had been .
In the early 1 960s the international situation began to change in
ways that affected most middle powers. The greater independence
of French diplomacy under de Gaulle and the growing rift between
China and the Soviet Union showed that the dualistic system of
global politics was moving from a simpler towards a more complex
form . The fitful relaxation of tension between the superpowers
initiated by Kennedy and Khrushchev after the Cuban missile crisis
indicated that East-West relations were entering a new phase. Both
developments tended to enlarge the diplomatic scope of middle
powers, particularly of those in the Western alliance system which
could conclude that considerations of security no longer required
them to steer quite so close to the alliance leader, but also of those in
the other camp, as well as of most of the unaligned ones .
At the same time, the number of middle powers in the world
seemed to be growing. Several new and populous countries,
Pakistan and Indonesia for example, as well as some neutral or non
aligned states of diplomatic significance, such as Sweden and
Yugoslavia, were finding their way into unofficial lists of middle
powers. The three former great powers that had been defeated in
the Second World War had recovered economically and had joined
the Western alliance system at the level of middle powers. Two
declining great powers , Britain and France, had been outdistanced
The Hierarchy if Powers 71
by the rise of the superpowers and, despite their residual extra
regional interests and influence, could be seen hovering at a level
not very far above that of the foremost middle powers. And China,
long since out of the circle of great powers and not yet the third
party of a global diplomatic triangle, could be counted a middle
power as well. The widening of the scope and the increase in the
number of middle powers encouraged writers to take up again the
subject of their role in international politics.
While in the writings of the first post-war years the role of middle
powers generally had been related to the operation of the system of
collective security, in the publications of the detente period it was
�often linked with the conduct of the East-West relationship. Rather
as had happened in the earlier situation, most writers, now
p reoccupied with the danger of an outbreak of major war, cast
&elected middle powers in auxiliary roles in the management of the
·.central complex of great-power relations, while a few, more
'c
oncerned about recent signs of co-operation between the super
powers, insisted that the principal task of such powers ought to be to
work together to oppose attempts at joint great-power domination. 4
As with the earlier ideas, it was in Canadian writings that the notion
of middle powers playing useful parts in connection with the East
West conflict found its best expressions . There, two roles often
mentioned were mediation between the rivals or their allies and
peace-keeping under United Nations auspices. Indeed, in the 1 960s
there was a tendency among some of those who contributed most to
Canadian thinking on the subj ect to characterise middle powers in
terms of mediatory activities rather than with reference to relative
power. Thus, when john Holmes, director general of the Canadian
Institute of I nternational Affairs, held up India under Nehru as a
great example of a middle power, it was less because of its mili tary
forces and economic resources than because of its active diplomacy
in the conflict between the two blocs. Even the practice of including,
in certain contexts, countries such as Norway, I reland and Tunisia
in the list of middle powers might be acceptab ie, he thought, on the
grounds that actual performance in international politics could be
more important than mere existence with intermediate-class stat
istics. 5 Examples of middle powers being cast collectively in the role
of opposing the great powers seem much rarer. But a few may be
found in Chinese writings of the late 1 960s and early 1 9 70s, when
Mao reacted to what he described as Russo-American 'collusion'
by advancing the doctrine of the 'second intermediate zone' , which
permitted China to co-operate temporarily with certain secondary

capitalist states, such as Britain and France.
In some of the countries less deeply involved in the rivalry
between the Soviet Union and the United States and more directly
concerned with the tension between the advanced and the develop
ing parts of the world, there was a tendency to link the notion of
middle powers with the North-South issue rather than with the
East-West conflict. One example was Australia. Speaking in 1 964,
the Australian minister for external affairs , Sir Garfield Barwick,
explained that his country was a middle power in more senses than
one :
It is clearly one in the general sense in which the expression is

used. But also it has common interests with both the advanced
and the underdeveloped countries; it stands in point of realized
wealth between the haves and the have-nots . It is at the one time
a granary and a highly industrialized country. It has a European
background and is set in intimate geographical propinquity to
Asia. 6
The last sentence became the theme of an address that Sir Alan
Watt, director of the Australian I nstitute of International Affairs,
delivered some years later. Though avoiding the use of the term
'middle power' , he q uoted Barwick's description of Australia and
called it a wanderer between two worlds, Europe and Asia. 7 This
characterisation might be seen as implying a conception of middle
powers that relates to a third type ofworld discord, namely between
civilisations.
Some scholars, perhaps less committed to a particular ideology of
middle powers or less identified with the policies of any one power
than some of the writers and officials already referred to, followed
the practice of characterising middle powers in terms of inter
national role withou t, however, casting them for special parts in
some global issue. Members of the Research Institute of the German
Society for Foreign Policy took this line when they, in the late 1 960s,
prepared a survey of middle powers . Having first tried to draw up
precise definitions to distinguish various classes of powers but having
found it impossible to establish obj ective criteria, they decided
instead to classify powers in terms of influence exercised . A middle
power, they ruled , was 'a state which plays a role in its region' . 8 In a
study of regional international politics, two American political
scientists, L. J . Can tori and S. L. Spiegel, distinguished seven types

of stateson the basis of their range of influence. The first four
categories, which included all the 'active' nations, were primary,
secondary, middle and minor powers. The secondary powers were
the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Japan and China,
and the middle powers ' those states whose level of power permits
them to play only decidedly limited and selected roles in sub
ordinate systems other than their own'. 9 In a later work on
international systems, Michael Haas distinguished more simply
between major, middle and minor powers, applying the traditional
criteria of global and regional interests . Middle and minor powers,
be laid down, had primary interests only within a localised regional
system. The former were 'locally prominent actors, who may be
'sought as allies by major powers but who are never leaders of a
subsystem ' . The only comfort of such powers, he thought, was that
they could put minor powers in their place. 1 0
Though many writers thus continued the practice of character
ising middle powers in terms of role, others showed a new interest in
definitions based directly on relative power. Indeed, a feature of the
writings of the late 1 960s was a search for reliable indices of the
power of states. For the purposes of some scholars, it was often
enough to adapt one of the simple criteria used in older writings on
the subject, such as territorial size or population . Thus, when David
Vital had to exclude middle powers from his study of small states he
very roughly defined the upper limits of the class with which he was
concerned as a population of lO to 1 5 million in the case of
economically advanced countries, and 20 to 30 million in the case of
developing countries . These then became his lower limits for middle
powers. 1 1
Those who needed greater precision often turned to economic
criteria. The Canadian economist Eric Hanson ranked and divided
nations with reference to their levels of total and per capita income
and productivity. Like many other observers, he found total gross
national product (GNP) the best single objective indicator of the
power of a state, because the various factors that make up such
power - population, area, strategic location, institutional organ
isation, leadership, participation in international organisations,
alliances, associations and trading areas, etc. - all tend to be in some
way or other reflected in this quantity. But, considering per capita
in come very important for any assessment of national power, he
related GNP to size of population . The result was that his list of
middle powers ranged from the large to the small developed nations
of Europe, with Canada as the middle power par excellence. l 2 J . D .
Sethi, director o f study in t h e I ndian Council of World Affairs, too,
used economic criteria for defining middle powers, but produced a
briefer list, including only seven, and introduced the category of
potential middle powers. 1 3
Other scholars , concentrating more exclusively on strategic
power, defined middle powers with reference to capacity for
producing nuclear weapons. John Burton, writing in 1 965, said
simply that they were those non-great powers that had a d eveloped
industry and an actual or possible nuclear capability. 1 4 William
Schneider of the Hudson Institute suggested some years later that
the 'medium powers' of the 1 9 70s and 1 980s would be ' those
industrialized or semi-industrialized nations capable of making the
S l 0-20 billion allocation over a five-to-fifteen year period to
develop a significant nuclear force' . 1 5 Since they based their
estimates of the level of nuclear capability on economic and
technological data, these writers, too, relied largely on measurable
quantities for assessing the relative power of nations.
Of the two alternative approaches to the characterisation of
middle powers distinguished in this survey of some of the literature
generated by the revival in speculation abou t such powers that took
place in the first decade after detente, namely in terms of perceived
role and on the basis of assessed power, the former is the less useful
for the purposes of the present study. Characterisations connoting a
certain type of role in a given international context seem particu
larly unsuitable. While at worst probably amounting to little more
than ideologically motivated statements about how middle powers
ought to conduct themselves, at best they may be generalisations
from the reactions of a few powers to a particular set of circum
stances presented by a transient international situation . Character
isations in the more general terms of regional role raise the problems
of deciding what playing a role means and of delimiting regions.
This approach also limits the enquiry to states systems that, like that
of the twentieth century, are complex and extensive enough to allow
distinctions between general and limited interests and global and
regional roles to be applied . 16 But a much more serious difficulty
about any definition in terms of role is that it prejudges the issue of
an enquiry into the international role of middle powers. This is so
even when the refe rence is not to a particular system-wide role but
to an unspecified regional role . Relegating the middle powers to
regional roles means excluding the possibility that such states in
certain situations may play roles at other levels of international
politics, that circumstances may arise in which they can take on
systemic parts or in which they can find themselves with a
diplomatic scope as narrow as that characteristic of minor powers or
small states. At this stage of our study, characterisations of middle
powers in terms of role could be useful only as hypotheses for further
enquiry. To avoid circular reasoning, the concept of middle power
will have to be defined in other terms.
Characterisations based on assessments of power point in the
right direction, though to be really useful they would need a little
more statistical precision and political detachment than was
.COmmonly applied in the writings of the 1 960s and early 1 970s.
Despite its advantages, a simple classification based on population
atatistics, even when related to levels of economic development,
'would scarcely be adequate for identifying the middle powers of the
,modern world. Definitions derived from relevant economic data but
l,lrawn up with an eye to the current policies of particular powers
could have only limited applicability. And definitions in terms of
military power measured as actual or potential possession of a
'certain type afforce would be too closely linked with the immediate
atrategic situation and current armament policies to be of more
lasting value. But each of these ways of identifying middle powers
draws attention to an element of national power which must not be
ignored in an attempt to evolve a more suitable system of classifying
the powers of the world.
3.2 RANKING OF POWERS

Not all of the terms in which great powers may be defined can be
adapted for use in the definition of the concept of middle powers. A
state is a great power not only because it commands military
strength and economic resources of the highest order but also
because it enjoys a certain status and belongs to a special class in
international society. Its status is acknowledged in international law
and respected in diplomatic practice. Despite their efforts in the
early years of both the League of Nations and the United Nations
to secure some recognition of their own, the middle powers have no
such formal standing in international society. Though political
scientists have developed various methods for measuring the
relative status carried by states in political and social intercourse

and have used their data to rank and classify nations, 1 7 their
divisions are recognised in neither law nor diplomacy.
That the great powers belong to a class of their own and, despite
their rivalries, share certain interests in international politics is clear
to most members of the society of states. In the habit of claiming
superior rights and accepting special responsibilities, these powers
often cast themselves as the managers of international relations. At
the end of major wars, fo.r example, they, or some of them, generally
take the lead in arranging the peace settlement and restoring the
international system, usually reserving a controlling influence for
themselves in post-war politics. In such situations, any attempt on
the part of secondary powers to gain admittance to the top council
generally serves only to emphasise the exclusiveness of the great
power class. Despite their name, which suggests a class structure on
the pattern of the most familiar national societies, middle powers do
not constitute a class to nearly the same extent as the great powers
do. For one thing, the division between them and those below in the
international hierarchy is far less marked than the distinction
between the great powers and themselves, which makes it less easy
to group them together conceptually. For another, their shared
interests are not so substantial and lasting as those of the great
powers, which makes it more difficult to develop a clal's conscious
ness. For the great powers, the need to defend their collective
authority against challenges from below and the concern to
maintain their superior position against would-be great powers can
be strong incentives to restrain their rivalry and, sometimes, even to
concert their policies. Middle powers have no such obvious shared
interests to defend against challenges from smaller powers. In
extreme situations of joint oppression by the great powers, as we
shall see in later chapters, they may move closer to each other in
defence of the rights of the lesser powers; and on particular issues of
great and general importance to middle-ranking powers they, or
some of them, may take a joint stand. But, generally, middle powers
are not able to achieve and to maintain even that minimum degree
of solidarity which has allowed the great powers of modern history
to appear as a distinct class of international society.
Middle powers, it seems, can be distinguished best in terms of the
strength they possess and the power they command. If the power of
a nation is defined as its ability to impose its will on other states and
to resist attempts by other states to impose on itself, the force, or
The Hierarchy cif Powers 77
strength, of a nation may be defined as the means by which it

exercises this power. An attempt to estimate the power of a nation
usually starts with an effort to evaluate the force at its disposal. But
total force is made up of several elements, including military,
economic and moral, each of which comprises many components
and some of which are more difficult to measure than others. What
is more, the relative importance and mutual dependence of these
elements are uncertain and varying. And the distinctions between
potential and actual force and between defensive and offensive
power point to additional difficulties of estimating accurately the
,power of nations. 1 8
'' It is not surprising that most of the earlier writers who attempted
,lib analyse the concept of international power refrained from
,quantifying the factors they listed as the elements of force, and that
those who actually tried to calculate power applied only the crudest
1indicators, such as area, population, size of army, etc. In more recent
!decades, however, there has been a marked tendency to look for
'greater precision in the measuring of power. Refined statistical
,methods have been applied to a considerable variety of data in the
!�arch for reliable indicators. Generally the focus has been on
eeonomic factors. In 1 954 Kingsley Davis proposed total national
�ncome, the grand result of all the productive forces at a nation's
command, as the best index of national power. 1 9 But it was in the
'.1960s that the attempt to quantify power got under way seriously.
, O ne of the earlier and more elaborate efforts was Clifford German's.
Under the four headings of economy, land, population, and military
power, he took account of many factors. Accepting the impossibility
of achieving absolute scientific detachment, he deliberately applied
selective and subjective criteria in combining and comparing the
different qualities. Having in this manner developed an overall
index for 'a tentative evaluation of world power', he used it for
ranking and classifying nineteen powers of the late 1 950s. 2 0
A. F. K. Organski, also searching for such an index, started with a
long list of elements of national power but reduced it to what he
regarded as the three most important determinants, namely popu
lation, political development and economic development. Through
further simplification he ended up with gross national product as his
sole index. 2 1 Later writers developed yet other methods of assessing
the relative power of nations. 2 2
A survey of this literature of the 1 960s and early 1 970s suggests a
number of conclusions. First, in the search for precision in the
estimation of national power, there was a tendency to concentrate

on factors that could be measured, especially economic ones, at the
expense of those that were less measurable, such as the moral ones.
Second, in choosing among several factors and weighting their
relative importance, there was an unavoidable element of subjec
tivity and arbitrariness. Third, the quest, as was to be expected,
produced no entirely satisfactory index, whether simple or com
bined. If measurements of force cannot be exact, we may conclude
that �stimates of power can be only approximate.
But the attempts of the 1 960s and 1 970s to reach as close an
approximation as possible show also that some indicators of national
power are more reliable and useful than others. The case for GNP
seems particularly strong. This quantity reflects most of the material
and moral factors that make up power, including population, area,
location, resources, organisation and leadership. Since it is essen
tially a measure of economic strength, it indicates potential as much
as actual military power, and therefore neither overrates countries
that for reasons of choice or necessity have assumed a military
posture much higher than they may maintain in the long run, nor
underrates countries that have not had occasion to convert a sizable
proportion of their economic force into military strength. It
correlates highly with a number of much more complex and
elaborate indices of power, such as German's. 2 3 What is more, it
corresponds fairly closely to most people's impressions of the relative
power of nations. 2 4 Finally, carefully calculated figures for GNP are
readily available.
However, when used as the sole indicator of power, GNP has a
number oflimitations and presents certain difficulties. One difficulty
relates to the phenomenon sometimes described as 'rank incon
sistency'. 2 6 Though there is a tendency for rankings of states to be
concordant, in the sense that a state that ranks high, or low,
according to one indicator, tends to rank high, or low, according to
other indicators as well, more or less striking exceptions occur not
infrequently. Thus, a country that on the basis of GNP alone would
assume a certain rank, might find itself in a much higher, or much
lower, position when ranked with reference to a more specific
indicator of power, for example population, area or armed forces. In
other words, although GNP directly or indirectly expresses a great
many factors of power, it may not in all cases adequately reflect
particular strengths or particular weaknesses. There are also
statistical problems that limit the comparability of GNP figures of
different countries. One is that of relating different currencies,
another that of allowing for the tendency of less commercialised
countries, such as the socialist states of Eastern Europe, to restrict
their data to material output and to exclude the service component,
which is normally included in the figures of other countries. 2 6
Finally, when applying this indicator to historical material, one is
limited to the last half century, as the concept of GNP was first
introduced in the 1 930s.
But, given that the aim here is not so much to rank the nations of
the world in exact order of power as simply to distinguish an
intermediate category of powers, such shortcomings may not present
insuperable obstacles to using the criterion of GNP. Though only a
crude measure of relative power, this figure seems adequate at least
as a primary indicator. In marginal cases, however, it may be
necessary to take account of other relevant data as well. For the long
term in particular, size of population can be a useful supplementary
indicator, since it normally is more permanent than GNP. For the
short term, size ofarmed forces, amount of military expenditure and
quantity of particular armaments may be more useful as secondary
indicators, because they express actual military strength. In the
future, possession of nuclear weapons in more than symbolic
numbers might become a more relevant criterion than it is now,
when most middle powers do not have these arms. But no matter
how many auxiliary indicators of power are brought into play,
deciding the category of a marginal power may be in the last resort
also a matter of personal judgement.
If the first step in distinguishing the middle powers of the
contemporary international system is to rank the states of the world
according to their GNP, the next step is to draw the dividing lines in
the hierarchy of power. For our purposes, it is enough to make two
divisions, one that separates the middle powers from those above
them, the great powers, and one that divides them from those below,
the minor powers and the various categories of small states. The
upper dividing line is the easier to draw. As is generally the case, the
great powers are few in number and are recognised by nearly all
other members of the system as being in a class of their own. The only
marginal case here is China. Its huge population and large area
together with its considerable strategic-military capability, ideo
logical appeal and political leadership allowed it in the decades after
the break with the Soviet Union to assume an autonomous role at
the top level of international politics. For the purposes of its
interaction with the superpowers in the diplomatic triangle of the

1 970s, it was deemed a great power. Yet, its GNP, below Japan's
and the richest West European countries', and its nuclear capa
bility, perhaps not superior to France's for example, indicate that it
is still only one of the leading middle powers of the world. The other
great powers of the early years of the United Nations, the United
Kingdom and France, now fit naturally into this group of middle
powers as well. Since the mid- 1 950s, their occasional appearances in
the part of great powers have been less than convincing. The
defeated great powers of the Second World War, Germany, Japan
and Italy, also find their places among the middle powers of today.
Though both japan and West Germany score very high on GNP, it
is only in economic terms that they could be called great powers.
Indicators of armed force, particularly of strategic weapons, place
them clearly among the middle powers. Thus, with only the two
superpowers in the great-power category, all secondary powers will
here be classed as middle powers.
Since middle powers enjoy no legal or conventional status to
separate them from lesser states, the lower dividing line is bound
to be more arbitrary. Deciding where to draw it is complicated by
the fact that no single minimum qualification for inclusion in the
category, whether expressed in GNP or in terms of any other
indicator, can produce a reasonably satisfactory result throughout
the system. Since it is mainly in relation to the other states of its
region that a middle power stands out as something more than a
minor power or small state, and since the level of power of the more
prominent of these lesser states is far from uniform, or even
comparable, throughout the various regions of the world, any
precise limit is bound to produce an anomalous division when
applied universally. If, instead of a single, sharply drawn line, a
fairly broad and accommoda�ing range of separation were used, so
many marginal cases would arise that the outcome would be equally
unsatisfactory. The system of division must be one that allows us to
include in our category, for example, Mexico, which geographically
is between the United States and a large number of small states and
therefore clearly in an intermediate position in the regional
hierarchy of powers, without having to include also Belgium and the
Netherlands, countries that, though one has a GNP not very much
lower and the other one considerably higher than Mexico's, do not
now, without their colonies, fit naturally into the category of middle
powers. The system must also enable us to include, for example,
The Hierarchy if Powers 81
South Africa, the strongest power in Africa, without compelling us

to take in Denmark as well; and Indonesia, with a population of
about 1 50 million, without requiring us to include Austria and
Switzerland too.
The most suitable approach, it seems, is first to consider each
region by itself and draw the line of separation at whichever level a
division between middle and lesser powers seems most natural, and
then to compare the results from region to region and see to what
extent it is possible to achieve some uniformity of standards
throughout the system, or part of it. This method involves dividing
the world into regions. For our purposes, a simple geographical
.division seems preferable to one based on established patterns
of interaction among states. Though some regional patterns of
intercourse stand out from the general background of international
politics, there is so much overlapping of relationships from area to
area that it does not seem possible to divide the global states system
into clearly segregated regional sub-systems. In the tables on the
following pages, the states of the world have been arranged into the
six geographical groups that have become conventional for the
purpose of presenting international statistics, namely those of Africa,
Asia, Europe, North and Central America, South America, and
Oceania and Indonesia.
Within each group the states have been ranked in order of GNP
on the basis of 1 975 data, and population figures for the same year
have been added. 2 7 More recent data are not necessarily preferable,
because most of the observations and generalisations about the
conduct and role of modern middle powers to be presented in the
following chapters are based more on historical material from the
last few decades than on the record of the late 1 970s and early 1 980s.
It follows, however, that there is some need to take account of trends
in the statistics of individual countries over the period with which we
are most concerned. Not all states that in the mid- 1 970s scored high
enough on GNP to be included in the category of middle powers
might have done so fifteen or twenty years earlier, while a few that
did not qualify in 1 975 might well have done so at an earlier stage.
What is more, certain countries here still in the category of minor
powers and small states are likely in the not-too-distant future to pass
what then will be deemed the minimum requirement for qualifying
as middle powers. Yet, in most cases the relative positions of states in
the international hierarchy of power do not alter radically within a
few decades.
TABLE 3.1 Africa
GNP at market prices Population

( 1975) ( mid-1975)
( US$ millions) ((}()0)
I South Africa 32 270 25 470

2 Nigeria 25 600 75 023
3 Algeria 1 3 680 1 5 747
4 Libya 1 3 510 2 442
5 Egypt, Arab Republic of 9 540 37 230
6 Morocco 7 860 16 680
7 Ghana 5 860 9 870
8 Sudan 4 1 40 1 5 550
9 Tunisia 4 090 5 594
I 0 Ivory Coast 3 630 6 700
I I Rhodesia 3 460 6 3 10
1 2 Zaire 3 450 24 72 1
1 3 Kenya 2 970 1 3 350
14 Ethiopia 2 730 27 950
1 5 Uganda 2 680 1 1 556
1 6 Tanzania 2 440 1 4 738
1 7 Zambia 2 090 4 920
18 Cameroon 2 050 7 435
19 Angola 2 030 5 470
20 Senegal 1 800 5 000
2 1 Madagascar I 720 8 833
22 Mozambique 1 640 9 240
23 Gabon 1 360 536
24 Reunion 960 500
25 Namibia 860 880
26 Guinea 750 5 540
27 Congo, People's Republic of the 670 1 329
28 Malawi 660 5 044
29 Upper Volta 640 6 032
30 Liberia 640 1 549
3 1 Sierra Leone 610 2 982
32 Niger 590 4 592
33 Togo 560 2 220
34 Mauritius 540 883
35 Mali 530 5 69 7
36 Chad 460 4 035
37 Rwanda 430 4 1 37
38 Mauritania 420 1 322
39 Burundi 410 3 732
40 Benin 390 3 1 10
4 1 Central African Empire 390 I 787
42 Somalia 340 3 1 80
43 Botswana 230 666
TABLE 3. 1 (continued)

( 1975) ( mid-1975)
( USS millions) (000)
44 Swaziland 220 494

45 Djibouti 200 1 05
.46 Lesotho 1 90 1 21 7
47 Equatorial Guinea 1 00 320
48 Gambia, The 90 519
:49 Cape Verde 80 290
50 Guinea-Bissau 70 530
51 Comoros 70 333
52 Sao Tome and Principe 4{) 80
53 Seychelles 30 57
M Spanish Sahara (former) not available 1 17
.The figures for the African states (Table 3 . 1 ) present an obvious

break between South Mrica and Nigeria at the top of the list and
Algeria, Libya and the Arab Republic of Egypt in the following
positions. It seems reasonable to include both South Africa, the
strongest power on the continent, and Nigeria, the richest and most
populous nation in black Africa, among the middle powers and to
exclude Algeria and Libya, with only about half the GNP of Nigeria
and much smaller populations . This means leaving out also Egypt,
which despite its high military posture throughout most of the years
of the struggle with Israel has a GNP less than a third of South
Africa's and a population about half of Nigeria's.
In the Asian figures (Table 3 . 2 ) , there is a fairly suitable break
between Iran, with a GNP of 55 5 1 0 million dollars and a
population of more than 33 million, and Saudi Arabia, with a
considerably smaller GNP and a population of less than one-fourth .
To draw the line there means counting among the minor powers
Iraq , with its ambitious armaments programme and willingness to
challenge Iran, Israel, with its extremely high military posture
(which may include possession of the nuclear bomb ) but small area
and population, and Pakistan , with its large population and record
of military conflict with India, as well as a number of other countries
with GNP figures higher than those of these three powers. It also
means grouping Iran together with Japan and I ndia, which have
either GNP or population figures many times greater than Iran's,
though lower defence expenditures . But when the Asian table is
TABLE 3.2 Asia
G.NP at market prices Population

( 1975) (mid-1975)
1 Japan 496 260 I l l 570

2 China, People's Republic of 3 1 5 250 822 800
3 India 85 960 608 072
4 Iran 55 5 1 0 33 390
5 Saudi Arabia 33 240 8 296
6 Korea, Republic of 1 9 850 35 280
7 Philippines 1 5 930 42 23 1
8 Kuwait 1 5 270 I 005
9 China, Republic of 1 4 890 1 6 000
10 Thailand 1 4 600 4 1 870
II Iraq 1 3 880 I I 1 20
12 Israel 1 3 1 60 3 469
13 Pakistan 1 1 270 69 229
14 Malaysia 9 340 1 2 308
15 United Arab Emirates 8 880 653
16 Hong Kong 7 700 4 367
I7 Bangladesh 7 280 78 600
18 Korea, Democratic People's
Republic of 7 1 00 1 5 848
19 Singapore 5 510 2 250
20 Syrian Arab Republic 5 330 7 410
21 Sri Lanka 3 540 1 3 603
22 Burma 3 320 30 1 70
23 Lebanon 3 290 3 1 64
24 Qatar 2 200 200
25 Afghanistan 2 060 1 3 700
26 Oman I 790 773
27 Nepal 1 340 1 2 587
28 Mongolia 1 250 1 446
29 Jordan 1 240 2 700
30 Yemen Arab Republic I 210 5 936
31 Brunei 950 1 55
32 Bahrain 580 260
33 Yemen, People's Democratic
Republic of 410 1 677
34 Lao People's Democratic Republic 300 3 200
35 Macao 220 277
36 Bhutan 80 I 1 76
37 Maldives 10 1 18
38 Viet Nam not available 47 600
39 Cambodia not available not available
related to the African, this does not seem too unreasonable a

division, since Iran has a GNP more than twice as big as Nigeria's
and a population a third larger than South Africa's.
In Europe (Table 3.3) , not only the former great powers should
be classed as middle powers but also Spain and Poland, whose
TABLE 3.3 Europe

( 1975) ( mid-1975)
1 USSR 649 470 254 393

2 Germany, Federal Republic of 4 1 2 480 6 1 830
3 France 3 1 4 080 52 790
4 United Kingdom 2 1 1 700 55 960
5 Italy 1 56 590 55 8 1 0
6 Spain 97 1 40 35 348
7 Poland 88 320 34 022
8 Netherlands 78 550 1 3 650
9 Sweden 66 830 8 200
1 0 German Democratic Republic 65 830 1 6 850
I I Belgium 6 1 470 9 799
1 2 Switzerland 53 840 6 400
1 3 Czechoslovakia 53 450 1 4 820
14 Austria 36 650 7 520
15 Turkey 36 030 40 1 98
1 6 Denmark 34 450 5 060
1 7 Yugoslavia 33 080 2 1 350
18 Norway 27 1 1 0 4010
1 9 Roumania 26 450 2 1 245
20 Finland 25 520 4 7 10
2 1 Hungary 22 690 1 0 541
22 Greece 2 1 320 9 10 1
2 3 Bulgaria 1 8 420 8 722
24 Portugal 1 5 060 9 57 7
2 5 Ireland 7 470 3 1 30
26 Luxembourg 2 1 50 358
27 Iceland I 320 223
28 Albania 1 220 2 405
29 Cyprus 780 630
30 Malta 460 328
3 1 Channel Islands 380 1 27
32 Gre�:: nland 220 48
33 Faroe Islands 200 40
34 Isle of Man 1 20 60
35 Gibraltar 90 29
existence as powers of intermediate rank may be traced back far

beyond the early years of the League of Nations, Spain's to the
nineteenth and Poland's to the eighteenth century. The line should
be drawn above the Netherlands, which since the loss of its colonies
is, like Belgium, no more than a very rich small country. This means
excluding Sweden as well as Yugoslavia, both of which sometimes
have found their way into lists of middle powers, though usually on
account of their policies of armed neutrality and stubborn non
alignment rather than because of their actual strength and
resources. It also means leaving out East Germany and
Czechoslovakia, whose GNPs are smaller than the Netherlands' and
whose populations are less than half of Spain's and Poland's, and
Turkey, which has a large population but a GNP little bigger than
Denmark's.
In North and Central America (Table 3.4) it is easier to draw the
dividing line. Canada, which has a GNP bigger than several
European middle powers' and a record as principal champion of
TABLE 3.4 North aad Ceatral Am.eric:a

(1975) (mid-1975)
( US$ millions) ({}{)())
I United States I 5 1 9 890 2 1 3 540

2 Canada 1 58 1 00 22 830
3 Mexico 63 200 59 928
4 Cuba 7 460 9 332
5 Puerto Rico 7 1 20 3 090
6 Guatemala 3 590 6 2 75
7 Dominican Republic 3 390 4 695
8 Jamaica 2 2 70 2 042
9 Trinidad and Tobago 2 1 70 I 082
10 Panama 2 1 50 1 668
II Costa Rica 1 890 1 965
12 El Salvador 1 830 4 006
13 Nicaragua 1 580 2 26 1
14 Honduras I 050 2 890
15 Haiti 850 4 584
16 Martinique 770 325
17 Bahamas 630 204
18 Guadeloupe 490 325
19 Virgin Islands (US) 480 95
20 Netherlands Antilles 410 242
21 Bermuda 360 53
TABLE 3.4 (continued)

( 1975) ( mid- 1975)
22 Barbados 350 246

23 Canal Zone 230 44
24 Belize 90 1 40
25 St Lucia 60 107
26 Antigua 60 71
27 Grenada 40 1 10
28 St Vincent 40 90
29 Dominica 40 75
30 St Kitts-Nevis 30 49
TABLE 3.5 South America

( 1975) ( mid- 1975)
I Brazil 1 1 0 1 30 1 06 996
2 Argentina 39 330 25 383
3 Venezuela 27 320 I I 993
4 Colombia 1 3 630 23 576
5 Peru I I 670 15 387
6 Chile 1 0 1 30 1 0 253
7 Ecuador 4 1 80 7 069
8 Uruguay 3 600 2 764
9 Bolivia 2 040 5 634
10 Paraguay I 470 2 553
I I Surinam 500 368
12 Guyana 400 770
13 French Guyana 1 00 56
such powers in the United Nations, and Mexico, whose closest

competitors in terms of GNP are Cuba and Puerto Rico, are not
only obvious but the only possible candidates for inclusion in our
category. South America (Table 3.5) , too, presents no problem.
Only Brazil and Argentina, which since their independence in the
nineteenth century together with Mexico have been the principal
powers of Latin America, can be included. None of the powers
below them, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru and Chile, is in the same
class. 2 8
Finally, from Oceania and Indonesia (Table 3.6) we can admit

only Australia and Indonesia, since the next states on the list are
New Zealand and Papua New Guinea. Australia has a GNP figure
between Mexico's and India's, and huge resources, but a popu
lation smaller than that of any other member ofour class. Indonesia,
on the other hand, has a population considerably larger than both
Brazil's and Japan's but a GNP not much more than twice New
Zealand's. Yet all the other countries within this geographical
group are far inferior to both Australia and Indonesia in GNP as
well as in population and area.
TABLE 3.6 Oceania and Indonesia

( 1975) ( mid-1975)
( US$ millions) ( 000)
I Australia 77 0 1 0 1 3 500
2 Indonesia 29 1 20 1 32 1 1 2
3 New Zealand 1 3 1 30 3 0 70
4 Papua New Guinea 1 290 2 756
5 Fiji 620 569
6 Guam 610 1 08
7 New Caledonia 600 1 35
8 French Polynesia 380 1 38
9 American Samoa 1 60 29
10 Pacific Islands, Trust
Territory of the 1 20 1 16
II Gilbert Islands 60 53
12 Solomon Islands 50 1 90
13 Western Samoa 50 1 52
14 New Hebrides 50 97
15 Tonga 40 99
A comparison of the levels of division between middle powers and

lesser states in the six groups shows a fairly close correspondence,
except in the case of Europe. Excluding for the moment this area,
we find that the three middle powers with the lowest GNP figures
are Nigeria with 25 600, Indonesia with 29 1 20 and South Africa
with 32 270 million dollars, and that the only overlap with the
category of minor powers and small states is of Saudi Arabia at
33 240 and Venezuela at 27 320 million dollars. Thus, if we want a
degree of uniformity of standards throughout the five areas, we may
lay down as the 1 975 minimum requirement for being a middle
power a GNP of 25 000 million dollars, and then exclude Saudi
�rabia and Venezuela. The relatively small populations of these

(bun tri es together with their very high dependence on one
�modity would make it difficult to include them. Alternatively,
We may fix the minimum at 35 000 million dollars and, relaxing the
liiq uirem ent of uniformity of standards a little, upgrade South
'tffii ca, Nigeria and Indonesia by weighting the figures for their two
�ons. The intermediate figure of 28 000 million marks the more
precise point of division, because it requires us to exclude only one
�te, Saudi Arabia, and to upgrade only one power, Nigeria.
·. \ · In Europe, the part of the world with the highest number of small
f'ates at an advanced level of development, the minimum qualifi
�pon for being counted a middle power must be much higher. The
$NP figure that would allow us to include Poland and Spain and to
it
' clude the Netherlands and countries further down the list would
� about 85 000 million dollars, which is roughly three times the
�re suggested for the rest of the world. One difficulty about
ti*ving different standards for different areas is that comparable
�tries that lie close to each other and maintain some interaction
JjJUt belong to separate areas may be treated unequally. Under the
')'s tem of divisions used here, Turkey and Iran may present such a
pile. IfTurkey, with a GNP worth more than 36 000 million dollars
and a population of more than 40 million, could have been classed
pnder Asia, it would have qualified as a middle power under the
limits proposed. Yet in Europe, according to our criterion, it is only
,� eighth-strongest
•treme
of the smaller powers. However, even this fairly
case does not seem so anomalous when it is considered that
:Turkey regards itself as part of Europe and is a long-standing
member of a military alliance which has its centre in the North
Atlantic, while Iran is clearly an Asian power. On the whole, given
the elusiveness of the concept of national power and the hetero
geneity of international society, the system of classifying the powers
of the 1 970s proposed here may be as equitable and convenient as is
possible. 2 9
Thus we end up with a list of eighteen middle powers, six from
Europe, four from Asia and two from each of the other four
geographical areas (see Table 3.7) .
The most striking feature of this list is the huge disparity of wealth
and size, ranging from a GNP of little more than 25 000 million to
one of nearly 500 000 million and from a population of under 1 4
million to one of over 800 million. The middle powers with a GNP
worth more than 200 000 million dollars may be seen as forming a
subordinate class of their own. They are all former, or successors of
Table 3.7

( 1975) ( mid-1975)
Japan 496 260 I l l 5 70

Germany, Federal Republic of 4 1 2 480 6 1 830
China, People's Republic of 3 1 5 250 822 800
France 3 1 4 080 52 790
United Kingdom 2 1 1 700 55 960
Canada 1 58 1 00 22 830
I taly 1 56 590 55 8 1 0
·Brazil 1 1 0 1 30 1 06 996
Spain 97 1 40 35 348
Poland 88 320 34 022
India 85 960 608 072
Australia 77 0 1 0 1 3 500
Mexico 63 200 59 928
Iran 55 5 1 0 33 390
Argentina 39 330 25 383
South Africa 32 270 25 470
Indonesia 29 1 20 1 32 1 1 2
Nigeria 25 600 75 023
former, great powers. Three of them, the United Kingdom, France

and China, were accepted as great powers at the end of the Second
World War and were given permanent seats on the Security
Council of the United Nations. Hence they still enjoy a formal status
in international society not shared by any other middle power.
More important, they possess substantial quantities of nuclear
weapons, which make them strategically superior to all other
middle powers and second only to the superpowers. The other two,
West Germany and Japan, started the post-war period with the
handicap of being the principal defeated powers of the Second
World War. But their recovery was so rapid and sweeping that their
economic strength for long has exceeded that of any other middle
power. Sometimes the five are referred to as 'secondary powers' or,
when considered in relation to the superpowers, as 'other major
powers'. While the former term suggests that they constitute a
separate class of states rather than a section within a wider class, the
latter implies that they belong, albeit in an inferior capacity, to the
top set of the society of states. Given that the aim of the present
enquiry is to find out what middle powers may have in common and
what may distinguish them from other classes of states, a more
suitable name here for the five is 'upper middle powers'.
The remaining middle powers are a mixed group. There are old
es tablished states, such as Spain, Poland and Brazil, which long
have enjoyed a middle position in the hierarchy of the international
system as well as fairly newly independent states, such as India,
Indonesia and Nigeria, which much more recently have found a
place at this level. There are some that are wealthy and industrially
advanced and others that are relatively poor but rapidly develop
ing, some that are stable and largely satisfied and others that are
restless and potentially ambitious. Finally, when all the eighteen
middle powers are viewed together in the perspective of recent
history, one more difference is worth noting. While some of them,
pre-eminently Canada, often have appeared highly conscious of
being middle powers, others most of the time clearly have not seen
themselves as such. The latter group includes two extreme types.
One is the upper middle power which occasionally has insisted on,
or at least never objected to, being counted with the great powers,
France under de Gaulle reviving the post-war idea of the Big Four
being one of the best examples. The other type is the middle power
which, temporarily at least, has assumed an international posture so
low and inconspicuous as to suggest that it would prefer to be ranked
with the minor powers and small states, Franco's Spain ostracised
by Western Europe being one possible example and post-war Japan
stigmatised by its former enemies another.
While all belonging to this very wide intermediate range in the
power structure of the states system, the middle powers of the
contemporary world apparently form a highly heterogeneous group
in almost every significant respect. This suggests that any similarity
that may be observed in their international conduct and any
generalisation that may be formulated about their systemic role are
likely to flow not so much from a set of inherent characteristics and
inclinations shared by such powers as from various external
pressures and incentives to which they are exposed. The nature and
force of such outside influences are determined essentially by the
number of great powers in the system and by the relationships that
exist between or among them. The way some middle powers tend to
react to the more typical situations of the several basic forms of the
international political system, and the various roles they may play
in such situations, form the subject of the remaining chapters.
4 The U nifocal System
The traditional term for an international system that is made up of

one great power and a number of lesser states is 'empire'. For the
purpose of an enquiry into the international relations of a particular
class of lesser powers, it has the disadvantage of implying the
existence of a certain type of political relationship between the
principal power and the other members of the system. The
terminology introduced by writers of the 'dependence' school,
which turns on distinctions such as between 'centre' and 'periphery'
or 'metropolis' and 'satellites', is equally unsatisfactory, because it
focuses too exclusively on the economic inequality of the relation
ship. One of the more neutral, ifless attractive, labels used by some
American writers, namely 'unicentral', 'unipolar' or 'unifocal
system', seems preferable. The latter is the term that will be used
here.
The best way of ascertaining the nature of the roles that middle
powers tend to assume in unifocal situations would be to examine
their actual conduct in a variety of international systems presided
over by one great power. However, the modern history of Europe
and the world does not present a large number of such cases. While,
from one point ofview, the record of the states system may appear as
a long series of attempts by one great power after the other to
establish just this type of international order, the bids for hegemony
have usually failed. As a result of the operation of the balance of
power, the basic structure of international society has generally
been dualistic or multiple rather than unifocal. The older history of
European civilisation, especially the mediaeval and the Roman,
and the records of some non-European systems of the past, for
example the Chinese, undoubtedly contain material of some
interest. But the different nature of those systems is likely to make
most such material, even when it is accessible, ·of only limited
relevance to a modern enquiry into the role of middle powers. The
most promising field appears to be the inter-American system,
which since the last decades of the nineteenth century has had only
92
The Unifocal System 93
one great power and which has gone through several distinct phases
of development. For long periods of its earlier history it was largely
self-contained, while at other times it was linked more or less closely
to the European system. More recently it has become a sub-system
of the global structure of international politics.
Another unifocal system that might be worth looking at is that of
contemporary Eastern Europe. But as a subject for a general study
of the role of middle powers, it seems inferior to the inter-American
in at least four respects. First, having been always a sub-system, it
has no record of separate existence and autonomous functioning
comparable to that of the inter-American. Second, with only
'Poland in our category of middle powers and with the German
:Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia not far below in the scale
'Ofpower, it does not offer a class of middle powers so substantial and
so clearly marked off from the rest of the states in the system as does
the inter-American. Third, with a much shorter history, it cannot
present a set of inter-state relationships so long and varied and
patterns of interaction so well defined as those of the inter
American. Fourth, since it is of so recent origin and has been always
under the sway of the Soviet Union, the material it offers about its
international relations is far less accessible than that of the inter
American system. Yet, it should not be ignored. The conduct of
Poland within Eastern Europe obviously helps to throw light on the
role of middle powers in a particular type of unifocal situation.
Though apparently more suitable for case study than any other,
the inter-American system is far from perfect for our purposes. Few
of the patterns of political interaction it displayed were products
solely of forces within the system. Since the world beyond the
hemisphere never was a political vacuum and since attempts to seal
off the system rarely were successful, inter-American relations were
periodically quite strongly affected by links with other international
systems. These links took two broad forms, namely involvement of
the great power in the affairs of the central or the global system and
political interaction between individual lesser powers and various
members of other systems.
Despite its occasional excursions into European politics, the
traditional policy of the United States was to stay out of the conflicts
of the old great powers. While the First World War represented a
break in the continuity of this posture, the Second World War,
followed by the post-war engagement in global politics, meant the
end of the old isolationism. Both the temporary and the more
permanent departures from the traditional position affected re

lations within the hemisphere. Particularly the acceptance of extra
hemispheric responsibilities after 1 945 put a strain on US relations
with Latin America. In the first post-war years, when the United
States devoted a great deal of effort to the economic recovery of
Europe, the Latin Americans were dissatisfied to find their own part
of the world so low in Washington's scale of priorities. In the earlier
years of the Cold War, when the United States concluded alliances
with states in various parts of the world and undertook commit
ments far beyond the hemisphere, Latin American governments
became concerned about the danger of being drawn into extra
continental conflict. The growing tension between a world power
pre-eminently concerned with the build-up and support of its extra
continental allies and a group of states almost exclusively absorbed
in their own economic development became an important factor in
the shaping of the pattern of interaction within the system. If it was
in the years of the First World War and in the period since the
beginning of the Second World War that the inter-American system
was most disturbed by US relations with extra-hemispheric powers,
it must be in the pre- 1 9 1 4 age and in the inter-war period that, as far
as this difficulty is concerned, the best material for our study is likely
to be found.
Political interaction between Latin American states and extra
continental powers, the source of the other set of extraneous
influences in the system, may be looked at both from the point of
view of the outsiders that interfered in the region and from that of
the regional states that established links with outside powers. In the
earlier part of the nineteenth century, when the Monroe Doctrine
and the power of the United States gave only limited protection,
European powers quite often intervened in Latin America, some
times also with military means. In the 1 830s and 1 840s, when the
United States was busy asserting itself in Mexico, Central America
and the Caribbean, both France and Britain took a hand in Latin
American affairs. In the 1 840s and 1 850s the United States and
Britain clashed in Central America, until they reached a detente
and came to an understanding. During the Civil War both France
and Spain took advantage of America's weakness, particularly
France in Mexico. Not till after the Civil War did the strength of the
United States become a real discouragement for European powers
with ambitions in the region. Subsequently these powers became
increasingly preoccupied with the balance of power in Europe and
their rivalries in Africa and Asia. In the later part of the century,
when the ability and determination of the United States to protect
the Americas grew, and tension in Europe rose, the incidence of
European intervention in the hemisphere declined markedly. Apart
from various attempts by enemies of the United States in the two
world wars to establish links with some of its less reliable allies and
certain other states in Latin America, not till the Russo-American
Cold War did the challenge of foreign intervention in the region
reappear in a serious form. First the Soviet Union gained a foothold
in Cuba. Later China showed an interest in some of the middle
ranking South American powers, particularly Peru, Chile and
Colombia. More recently the Soviet Union, fronted by Cuba,
threatened to engage itself in the civil conflict in El Salvador. And in
1982 Britain went to war with Argentina over possession of the
island group known to the British as the Falklands. It seems that, as
regards the difficulty presented by the incidence of diplomatic and
military intervention by overseas powers, the best period for a study
of the inter-American system starts some time after the Civil War
and ends after the beginning of the Cold War, but excludes the two
world wars.
Sometimes the initiative for developing links with outside powers
came from Latin American states themselves. While the Monroe
Doctrine helped to safeguard Latin America against encroachments
from Europe, it offered no real protection against the overwhelming
power of the United States. Indeed, the more effectively the United
States excluded other great powers from the hemisphere, the more
open the region was to the penetration of US influence. To deal with
this threat, individual Latin American states occasionally resorted
to exploiting the rivalries of the great powers, sometimes going as far
as seeking the support of an overseas power against the United
States. At one time or another each of the three secondary powers in
the system was drawn towards such a policy of calling in the old
world to redress the balance of the new. During the First World War
Mexico, then burdened by very strained relations with the United
States, took advantage of the latter's involvement in Europe by
fraternising with Germany. In the Second World War Argentina,
whose bonds with Europe had always been stronger than any other
Latin American state's, left no doubt about its sympathy with the
Axis powers. Having refused, at the Inter-American Conference in
Rio de janeiro in january 1 942, to join in a declaration ofwar and
to break relations with the Axis powers, President Castille found
many opportunities to support the Germans diplomatically . In the

Cold War there was a tendency in some capitals to balance between
the blocs instead of supporting the United States. The outstanding
example of Latin American non-alignment in the initial period of
Russo-American tension was Argentina's ' third position' under
Peron . In the early 1 960s Brazil, under the presidencies of Quadros
and Goulart, nearly gave up i ts traditional pro-US policy and, in
search of a more independent position in the world , set out to
improve relations with a number of communist countries, at the
same time seeking to identify common interests with the developing
nations of Africa and Asia . Lesser Latin American states too, from
Colombia in the nineteenth century to Cuba in the Cold War,
occasionally pursued the policy of exploiting the rivalries of the
great powers. Even the broad regional support for various inter
national institutions, such as the League of Nations and , in
particular, the United Nations, could be seen as attempts to bolster
the position of the Latin American countries within the hemisphere
by strengthening their bonds with the world beyond . From an early
stage, it was in the General Assembly and not in the Security
Council, where the United States was the most powerful member,
that Latin American countries concentrated their efforts to bring
influence to bear.
In the case of both the major and the minor Latin American states
concerned , it was the involvement of the United States in conflicts
beyond the hemisphere which gave them the opportunity to seek
greater independence and more influence through this type of
policy. If the great power in a unifocal system engages itself in a
parallel or a higher system, some of the other members, it seems, are
likely to do the same, though they are apt to take positions rather
different from that of the great power. If they assume a non-aligned
stand or move closer to the opposite side in an extra-systemic
conflict, an exacerbation of tension within the unifocal system tends
to result.
Yet, despite the willingness ofsome states to take advantage of the
engagement of the United States in rivalries and wars beyond the
region, the Latin American countries only rarely involved them
selves deeply in extra-continental politics . The reason for this lay not
only in the resistance of the United States to attempts by Latin
American governments to develop undesirable relations with
unfriendly powers outside the hemisphere but also in the attitude of
these governments themselves . In general, they were inclined to
protect the rights and pursue the interests o f their countries by
diplomatic activity confined to their own states system. Even in more
recent periods, when the Cold War and the East-West detente have
presented rather good opportunities for extra-continental dip
lomacy, this has been their attitude. With the exception of Cuba, the
Latin American governments have been wary of using the commun
ist powers for increasing their diplomatic leverage in the region.
Despite periodical attempts by certain powers to find a ' third ' , or
non-aligned, position in the global conflict and a widespread
tendency to identify with the Third World , they have basically
accepted their place in the American hemispheric order, with its
mixture of international securi ty and diplomatic imposition , econ
omic advantage and political dependence.
The psychological basis for this acceptance is a certain pan
American self-awareness, expressed in the notion that ' the peoples of
this hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another which
, sets them apart from the rest of the world ' . 1 Rooted in geography
and history, this 'Western Hemisphere Idea' is sustained by a set of
beliefs, most of them, such as that postulating common domestic
institutions and shared political aspirations, mixtures of myth and
fact. The foremost political expression of the idea is the inter
American states system itself. That its members not only have
maintained over a very long period a habit of political interaction
which stands out from the rest of the international relations of the
world but also have developed a network of international insti
tutions which regulate their various relations with each other makes
it clearly recognisable as a system. Despite its several, and serious,
shortcomings, the history of this states system provides the best
available material for a study of the conduct and role of middle
powers in a unifocal system.
I n the contemporary context, the middle powers of Latin
America have already been identified as Brazil, Mexico and
Argentina. 2 These powers, fortunately for our enq uiries, have stood
out from the lesser Latin American states and formed a class of their
own not only in the most recent times but throughout the period of
the inter-American system with which we are here concerned ,
namely the last hundred years or so. In modern times, the division
between them and the others has even found institutional ex
pression . When the Latin American Free Trade Area ( LAFTA) was
created in 1 962, its members were ranked as big, medium and small
according to the economic capacity of each . Argentina, Brazil and
Mexico went into the top group, while Chile, Peru, Colombia,
Uruguay and Venezuela went into the middle and the rest into the
bottom group . What is more, the economic and political tensions
that later developed within the LAFTA group followed broadly the
same lines of demarcation, with the clearest conflict of interest being
between the three industrial giants and the intermediate group of
states . About the identity of the great power there is even less doubt.
Throughout the period in q uestion, the only such power in the inter
American system has been the United S tates.
If in a system with two or more great powers it is the nature of the
political relationships between these powers that more than any
thing else determines the international environment of the middle
powers, in a system with only one great power the way in which this
power uses its preponderance must be a maj or influence in the
shaping of the situation of the middle powers. The manner in which
it maintains its position and the means by which it pursues its goals,
though partly no doubt determined by conditions already prevail
ing in the region, are bound to affect the conduct and influence the
role of the middle powers in the system. For other purposes, Hedley
Bull has distinguished three ways in which a great power may
exercise preponderance of power over the lesser states
in a system : through dominance, through hegemony or through
primacy . The distinctions turn on the degree of force employed by
the great power and on the measure of willing acceptance offered by
the lesser states . While dominance stands for a high degree of
coercion and a low degree of acceptance and primacy for the
opposite combination, hegemony represents an intermediate pro
portion . 3 These distinctions seem eq ually useful here .
The history of US preponderance in the inter-American system
presents periods of both dominance, primacy and hegemony. The
part of the story relevant to this enquiry starts in the 1 880s, when the
United States, with the Civil War behind it and the danger of
challenges from Europe receding, began to promote the pan
American movement and to form a 'special relationship' with the
states of Latin America. In the following years the system acquired
the unifoca1 character which has marked it ever since. From late in
the century till the end of the 1 920s, when both domestically and
internationally the Latin American countries often were in a state of
turmoil, the relationship between the great power and the others
was broadly one of dominance, with the United States persistently
interfering in the affairs of Central America and frequently using
force in pursuit of its ends. From the early 1 9 30s till some time after
the Second World War, when the Latin American countries on the
whole were absorbed in domestic affairs, the situation was rather one
of primacy, with the Uni ted States subscribing to the principle of
non-intervention in Latin American politics and in return receiving
a good deal of loyal support from its neighbours in the sou th . From
early in the Cold War till well into the East-West detente , when
many Latin American countries were economically and politically
dependent on the United States, the situation could best be
described as one ofhegemony, with the United States usually relying
on its economic power and ideological appeal in the region but
occasionally interfering with force in defence of i ts interests. While
Roosevelt's affirmation of the 'Good Neighbour' policy in 1 933
could be regarded as having marked the starting-point of a new era,
the initiation of Kissinger's ' New Dialogue' with Latin America in
1 974 seems to have ushered in only a brief revival of primacy. Each
of the three major periods shows some correspondence between the
quality of the international environment of the region and the way
in which the great power exercised its preponderance. It was in the
years of greatest confusion and conflict that the United States used
most force, and in the ages of self-absorption and dependence that i t
relied more o n the co-operation o f Latin American governments .
In each period the United States generally had a Latin American
policy, rather than either a Central American, a Caribbean and a
South American policy or a special policy towards each of the major
countries in the region . It was inclined to pursue its strategic,
commercial and ideological interests within a general set of ideas
about relations wi th Latin America, a tendency which was encour
aged by the need to conduct much of the business through inter
American institutions rather than along bilateral channels . This
makes it easier to recognise changes of policy and to distinguish
periods of interaction between the great power and the other
members of the system . Thus it allows us to relate the international
conduct of the middle powers to the way in which the great power
brought i ts weigh t to bear.
On the other hand , the United States rarely pursued its Latin
American policy with the same intensity throughout the region. In
the periods of dominance and hegemony, it used force only in
Mexico, the Caribbean and Central America, where its concerns
were most pressing and its capability for such action greatest. I n
South America it showed less determination and relied o n other
1 00 Middle Powers in International Politics
means . Indeed , this difference in the execution of policy was

sometimes so marked as to suggest that the Latin American policy of
the United States was to be taken seriously only within its 'imperial
preserve' . 4 The inclination of the great power to concentrate on the
nearer parts of the region means that the conduct of the middle
powers must be related not only to the way in which preponderance
was exercised but also to the geographical positions in which they
were placed .
Both tendencies, to evolve a general policy for the region and to
pursue it more resolu tely in the nearer parts, may apply to the great
power in most unifocal systems that are very large as well as
relatively isolated . Whether motivated largely by self-interest or
guided also by some sense of responsibility, the power in the focal
role seems likely as a rule to require a broad framework of policy to
be able to co-ordinate its actions in the system . Except where the
region borders on territory controlled by a rival outside the system,
which could make the rim countries a particularly sensitive area, the
great power also seems likely most of the time to be more concerned
with the inner than with the ou ter reaches . If both assumptions are
correct, the analytical approach already outlined may be equally
well sui ted for unifocal systems other than the one to be examined
here.
4. 1 DOM I NANCE
I n the age of dominance, which lasted from the final decade of the
nineteenth to the third decade of the twentieth century, the
hemispheric policy of the United States provoked very different
reactions from the three middle powers in the system. Mexico,
immediate neighbour of the United States and potential victim of its
imperialism, started by reluctantly submitting to the encroachments
on the region from the north . When the United States deprived
Spain of its last American colonies and went on to set up its own
protectorates in the Caribbean, supported the independence of
Panama against Colombia and began to build up its strategic
interests in Central America, introduced the Roosevelt Corollary to
the Monroe Doctrine and made itself the policeman of the
hemisphere, there was little that the Mexican dictator Porfirio Diaz
could do to protect the rights of his country and citizens . Though he
let his representatives at the pan-American and the Hague con-
ferences espouse certain principles of public and private inter
national law designed to curb foreign interests , he basically accepted
the situation .
In the turbulent first years of the Mexican Revolution, when the
American ambassador and the State Department, and later also
President Wilson, almost constantly meddled in the affairs of the
neighbour, backing their interference with economic sanctions and
an arms embargo as well as occasional acts of armed intervention,
there was again little that Mexican leaders effectively could do.
Faced with Wilson's ' moral imperialism', President Huerta tried
without much success to lean on Europe for money and arms. His
successor Carranza took his stand instead on international law. His
insistence on the principle of the territorial integrity of states, it has
been noted, put him among the first to develop the doctrine of
domestic jurisdiction. 5
After the First World War, which for Mexico had been an
opportunity to take advantage of US involvement in Europe, the
paramount preoccupation of Mexican foreign policy was still
relations with the United States. Tension between the two countries
remained high . At the centre of the conflict in the 1 920s were various
financial and economic issues, chief among them those relating to
Mexican oil . Mexico again rested its case largely on international
law, particularly on what became known as the Latin American
doctrine of non-intervention , in the formulation and refinement of
which Mexicans played a large part. The aim was to make the
United States agree that no nation had the right to intervene in the
domestic, or even the foreign, affairs of any other nation in the
hemisphere . When the Uni ted States refused to accept this prin
ciple, the matter came to a head at the pan-American conference at
Havana in 1 928. By then, however, relations between the two
countries had already begun to improve. Presiden t Coolidge
sending Dwight Morrow to Mexico as ambassador in 1 92 7 can be
seen as marking the beginning of the retreat from imperialism in the
regwn.
During this first period of US preponderance, Brazil cast itself in a
role very different from Mexico's. Far from being a potential victim
of the great power, it sought the part of ally and partner of the
United States . Earlier in the nineteenth century its closest relations
had been with Britain . But these had become strained already in the
days of the Brazilian Empire, when the British had tried to stop its
slave trade. Instead Dom Pedro I I had begun to develop a
friendship with the Uni ted States, which implici tly had been
directed against the Spanish-American republics. This phase of
Brazilian external relations had come to an end with the fall of the
Empire in 1 889, which had led to a decade of domestic turmoil. Not
till the first decade of the twentieth century did Brazil again develop
a firm line in foreign affairs . I ts new policy became identified with
Baron Rio Branco, foreign minister from 1 902 till 1 9 1 2 and the
foremost Brazilian statesman of the time . For the guidance of his
country, he formulated four principles of policy, namely, to increase
national prestige abroad , to exercise leadership in Latin America
and especially in South America, to give greater emphasis to pan
Americanism, and to enter into close alliance with the United
States . 6 Rather than standing with the Spanish-American states
against the Uni ted States, Portuguese Brazil should see its task as
bringing the three Americas together under a Brazil-United States
axis. To this end, Rio Branco led Brazil into co-operation with
Argentina and Chile, which gave rise to the notion of the ABC bloc .
In an effort to consolidate the relationship with Washington, he
exchanged ambassadors in 1 905, and the following year welcomed
the American Secretary of State in Rio de janeiro. That the United
States was by then the biggest buyer of Brazilian exports gave the
emerging entente a strong commercial base.
For decades after these developments, Brazilian foreign policy
was guided by Rio Branco's ideas. In 1 9 1 7 Brazil entered the war,
the only large Latin American country to join the United States
against the Central Powers. After the war, when the United States
refused to j oin the League of Nations, Brazil gladly took on the part
of the leading power of the western hemisphere in the new
organisation . It held a seat on the Council until 1 926, when it
withdrew from the League after Germany had been given a
permanent seat and Brazil had been denied one . 7
During most of this long period of inter-American relations
Argentina took a line almost the opposite of Brazil's. Instead of
seeking to become the ally and partner of the United States, it chose
the role of opponent and potential rival . This was a part for which
both geography and history had made it well suited . Located
farthest from the United States, it was less exposed to its domination
and better placed to oppose it d iplomatically than any of the other
Latin American middle powers. With strong traditional links with
Europe, mainly through immigration and trade, it was in a good
position to play extra-continental powers against the United States .
The Unifocal System 1 03
Its closest bonds were with Britain, whose trade and investments and
other relations with Argentina in the course of the nineteenth
century had grown to proportions so huge that Englishmen
eventually could quip that this country was the most loyal dominion
of the British Empire. As a result of the relationship with Britain,
Argentina was able to use each of the two Anglo-Saxon great powers
against the other in order to develop its own independence. This was
the policy it pursued in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century .
Within Latin America, Argentina sought leadership b y rivalling
Brazil and Chile in the military and naval spheres and by
challenging the United States in the pan-American movement. The
ambitions of the Argentine oligarchy were revealed already at the
first pan-American conference in 1 889 . But the clearest manifes
tation came in 1 902, when its foreign minister issued a statement
condemning the use of force by foreign powers for the collection of
debts, later known after him as the Drago Doctrine. This declar
ation, by which Argentina made a bid for diplomatic leadership in
the most sensitive of all issues , could be regarded as a challenge to the
United States, whose statesmen had been in the habit of regarding
the Monroe Doctrine as a unilateral declaration . Two years later
Theodore Roosevelt countered by issuing his Corollary to the
Monroe Doctrine, which intimated that the United States intended
to keep Latin American countries from getting themselves into such
a state as to provoke European intervention. From then on the
Argentine attitude to the United States was clearly hostile, the
animosity being sustained also by economic competition. Shortly,
Argentina, in a clear attempt to capitalise on Spanish-American
suspicions of the 'colossus in the north' , made a renewed bid for
leadership of Latin America against the United States and its ally
Brazil .
In the First World War Argentina marked its position against the
United States by maintaining diplomatic relations with Germany.
In the 1 920s, when Argentina, now under middle-class regimes,
went through a strongly nationalist phase, it was as keen as in the
days of the pre-war oligarchy to lead Latin America against
the United States . Thus, at the Havana conference in 1 928 the
Argentine delegate launched a strong attack on the United States
under the cover of a general denunciation of the practice of
intervention . In the following years, too, Argentina maintained a
resolutely unco-operative atti tude towards the United States, for
example doing its best to obstruct Washington's efforts to end the

Chaco War. Again the policy ofopposing the giant was supported by
economic considerations , this time to do with the American tariffs ,
which barred Argentine grain and wool. As in t h e case o f the other
middle powers in the system, the stance assumed by Argentina
during the period of dominance was not only a reaction to the
strategic and political impact of the great power but also an
expression of the economic, and even cultural, preoccupations of the
nation .
4.2 PRI MACY
In the course of the first half of the 1 930s the political environment of
the hemisphere changed profoundly. A situation developed which
was characterised by considerably less international turmoil and
rather more domestic absorption in the region than in earlier
periods. Partly in response to the new conditions, the United States
introduced changes in its Latin American policy which went beyond
rhetoric and affected the substance of inter-American relations .
American policy-makers , having come round to the view that their
goals might be achieved more easily through co-operation than
through coercion, repudiated the Roosevelt Corollary, reaffirmed
the Good Neighbour policy and accepted the doctrine of non
intervention . Eventually the US government, partly in reaction to
the deterioration in the global political situation, went one step
further in recognising the rights of the Latin American nations when
it accepted the principle of consultation in matters relating to the
possibility of an outbreak of a war that might affect the hemisphere.
To implement the new policy and give substance to the changed
relationships, various conferences were arranged and new inter
national agencies set up.
The three secondary powers in the system reacted variously to the
new si tuation . Mexico, which in the age of dominance had moved
from the part of reluctant victim to that of outspoken critic, finished
the period of primacy as a j unior partner of the United States. I t
started b y taking the lead i n demanding ' non-intervention' for Latin
America. Thus, at the I nter-American Conference for the
Maintenance of Peace, held at Buenos Aires in 1 936, it was the
Mexican delegation that initiated the Additional Protocol Relative
to Non-Intervention . Imbued with a new self-confidence and a
greater sense of dignity, which sprang also from favourable domestic

developments, Mexican representatives took up a variety of other
international causes as well, both in the League of Nations, which it
bad joined in 1 93 1 , and elsewhere. The oil expropriation in 1 938,
which became the symbol of economic independence, and the
successful resistance to the resulting pressures from Britain and the
l.Jnited States further increased Mexican self-confidence .
By 1 940 Mexico seemed to be drifting towards the Axis powers .
But shortly before Pearl Harbour, relations with the United States
reached a more harmonious phase, and later on relations with
Britain too . After a spell as partner in the ' belligerent neutrality' of
the United States, Mexico declared war on the Axis in 1 942 .
Th rough a significant contribution to the war, the Mexican
� vernment gained some national prestige and strengthened the
)x>s t-war position of the country. In 1 945 its foreign minister chaired
an inter-American meeting at Mexico City arranged to prepare for
the United Nations and to discuss other matters affecting post
war relations between the United States and Latin America .
Subseq uently Mexico gained one of the original non-permanent
seats in the Security Council. Relations with the United States
probably reached their highest point in 1 94 7 , when an exchange of
ceremonial visits was arranged . Noting that Mexico was no longer a
vassal or an enemy of its neighbour, President Aleman, in an address
to a j oint session of the United States Congress, used this occasion to
stress that it was only as a partner that his country could join the
United States in the pursuit of the hemispheric ideals of peace and
progress . 8
I n the same period, Brazil displayed some uncertainty about its
regional role. While never q uite abandoning the traditional policy
of acting as the main bulwark of the United States in South America,
it showed signs in the 1 930s of a growing ambition to go beyond this
position in search of a new part in international politics. On the one
hand, President Vargas, in office from 1 930 till 1 945, knew that
Brazil needed the United States and was careful to keep on good
terms with Roosevelt. On the other hand, as leader of a country that
was going through a new nationalist phase, he did not hide that he
was attracted ideologically by the Axis powers. However, once the
war in Europe had broken out, Brazil step by step engaged itself on
the side of its traditional ally, finally declaring war in August 1 942.
By allowing the United States to maintain bases on its territory,
supplying natural resources and even despatching expeditionary
forces, it made a substantial contribution to allied efforts, in return

for arms and funds. Thus strategic considerations triumphed over
ideological inclinations.
While Brazil was moving closer to the United States, Argentina
went in the opposite direction . The first reaction of the Argentine
government to the change in the regional policy of the U nited States
in the early 1 930s was to become a little more co-operative, or at
least to reduce its opposition to the great power slightly . But this was
only a temporary development. In the middle and late 1 930s,
Argentina reverted to the traditional policy of asserting its indepen
dence of the United States and seeking leadership of the region.
Conscious as always of its ties with several European nations, it
generally opposed the efforts of Washington to bring about a
continental concert of peace and security to deal with the growing
danger of war. In particular, it obstructed the establishment of an
effective machinery for consultation.
After the outbreak of the war in Europe Argentina ·stuck to the
policy of neutrality, refusing until a very late stage to break
diplomatic relations with the Axis powers and even then failing to
deal effectively with their activities within its territory. Under a
military government, Argentina at the same time entered into tense
rivalry with Brazil, thus once again revealing an ambition to
dominate South America. These policies put a strain on the
diplomatic relations of Argentina .. The other Latin American states,
most of them on the side of the United States in the war and some of
them insecure about the ambitions of Argentina, preferred the
leadership of the great power to that of the middle power. By
the end of the war Argentina was isolated . Excluded from the
Chapultepec conference in 1 945, it was subjected to diplomatic
pressure in the post-war years as well, especially from the United
States. Thus the would-be leader of Spanish America ended up
ostracised by all of the Americas.
While Mexico and Brazil eventually joined the United States as
allies, Argentina took the part of near-enemy. But these develop
ments, primarily responses to the dangers and temptations presented
by the war, were results of events taking place outside the
hemisphere rather than effects of conditions prevailing within the
system. As indications of the typical conduct and likely roles of
middle powers under conditions of primacy, the initial reactions of
the three powers to the change in regional policy of the United States
may be more reliable than their ultimate diplomatic choices .
Mexico gaining self-confidence and moving towards a more inde

pendent position, Brazil becoming ambivalent in its policy and
revealing new ambitions in the region, and Argentina moderating
its opposition and striking a slightly more responsive attitude, could
all be seen as largely results of a loosening in the control and a
red uction in the pressure exercised by the great power in the system ,
:3s conseq uences of the change from dominance to primacy . In each
case, the reactions of the middle power pointed towards a more
flexible line in foreign policy and a less clear-cut role within the
system . In the new situation, the part of Mexico, though still
fundamentally defensive, could be played in a spirit of greater
independence; that of Brazil, while still largely supportive, could be
performed wi th a keener awareness of alternatives; and that of
:Argentina, though still on balance adversary, could be pursued with
'b fixedness of purpose . It is significant that the change in attitude
.� policy was most marked in the case of Mexico. More exposed to
�e preponderance of the United States than the other middle
powers, it was more affected by changes in the way in which this was
exercised .
4.3 HEGEMONY
The last period distinguished here is the age of the Organization of

American States ( OAS) . Though it started with the establishment of
a number of inter-American institutions, it presented a marked
deterioration in relations between 'the one and the twenty' . The
incompatibility of the global engagement of the Uni ted S tates in the
struggle against communism and the nationalistic preoccupations of
the Latin American states with the development of their own
economies pushed the relationship in the direction of hegemony .
Though the contact between the great power and the other
members of the system went through several phases in the course of
the period, on the whole it showed a higher degree of coercion and a
smaller measure of willing co-operation than it had done before the
war. While most of the time the United States was able to rely on its
ideological influence and economic power, occasionally it found it
necessary or expedient to intervene with force or by stealth to defend
or further its interests, as in Guatemala in 1 954, Cuba in 1 96 1 , the
Dominican Republic in 1 965 and Chile in the early 1 970s . After the
last exercise in meddling this period seemed to be coming to an end .
On the one hand, the detente in East-West relations and the

proliferation of military, authoritarian governments in Latin
America now made it less necessary for the United States to
intervene for reasons of security. On the other hand , a growing
concern with economic issues in the region , an increased awareness
of the dependence of most of the national economies of Latin
America, and a widespread hostility to mili tary intervention from
outside, made it less expedient for the United States to resort to the
more heavy-handed means in dealing with individual countries in
the hemisphere. However, the ' New Dialogue' of the mid- 1 9 70s may
not have initiated a lasting return to primacy . Rather, it seems from
the record of the first years of the Reagan administration , the
improvement in the relationship between the great power and the
others amounted to no more than a lull in the exercise of hegemony,
perhaps brought about by temporary circumstances in global and
regional politics and prolonged by the diminished capabilities of the
first post-Vietnam administrations.
Of the three broad periods in inter-American relations dis
tinguished here, that of hegemony must be the least suitable for the
purposes of the present enq uiry . The deep involvement of the
Uni ted States in global politics during the decades of the Cold War
and its aftermath exposed the hemispheric system to the pulls and
pressures of the central system, with the result that the pattern of
interaction in the former became more seriously disturbed than it
had been in the decades before the First World War and in most of
the inter-war years . Not least the conduct and role of the middle
powers in the system were affected by influences from outside the
hemisphere . Yet, this period of American history does provide some
clues for an enquiry into the typical reactions of such powers under
conditions of hegemony.
The conduct of the immediate neighbour of the United S tates was
probably least affected by global politics, though even here the effect
of extra-hemispheric influences may be detected . When the wartime
partnership came to an end and relations between the United States
and Latin America began to deteriorate, Mexico reacted by once
again taking up the cause of non-intervention. It opposed not only
unilateral intervention by the United States but also collective
intervention under the auspices of the OAS . Thus, in the case of
Cuba, which became the key issue of this period , Mexico was among
the most steadfast of Latin American opponents of the idea of
intervening, maintaining the righ t of the Cuban government to
adopt any domestic programme it chose. In this stand some

observers saw signs of a potential Mexican leadership of Latin
America against the United S tates . But if the Mexicans ever
harboured such aspirations, the influence of the United States
prevented their realisation. It may not be unreasonable to interpret
the Cuban policy of the Mexican government as the result of a tacit
deal with the United S tates, which allowed the middle power to
demonstrate its independence on the condition that it refrained from
attempting to organise a bloc against the hegemonic power. As in
earlier periods, Mexican policy was essentially defensive. Carried
out with caution and restraint, it did not exclude a degree of tacit co
operation with the powerful neighbour.
To the extent that Mexico succeeded in going beyond the inter
American system and taking part in world politics, it did so mainly
through its voting in the United Nations, which was more
independent than that of any other Latin American state except
Guatemala. Most other steps in the same direction , such as President
Echeverria's visits to various parts of the world, his presence at the
UNCTAD meetings in Chile, and a good deal of talk abou t the
Third World , may have been gestures of independence aimed
primarily at domestic nationalist opinion rather than real depar
tures from traditional policy . In this period, too, the international
conduct of Mexico reflected its political dependence on the United
States, but with a difference. If its role before the First World War
had been not very unlike that of Poland in the East European system
ofSoviet dominance in the first decade after the Second World War,
the part it played in the period of the Cold War and detente seemed
at least as independent as that of Finland in more recent years .
In the course of the same period, Brazil involved itself rather more
deeply in experiments with world politics . This did not happen
immediately, however. In the 1 950s, its government still con
cen trated on developing the national economy and securing
diplomatic leadership of Latin America. A significant step in that
direction was 'Operation Panamerica', which could be described as
a Marshall Plan for Latin America. Put forward as a proposal by
President Kubitschek in 1 958, it did not draw much response from
the United States, until President Kennedy, concerned about the
dangers of subversion in the region, eventually took over the idea
and turned it into the Alliance for Progress . It was between 1 96 1 and
1 964 that the great departure from traditional policy took place.
Under the leadership ofQuadros and Goulart, Brazil entered global
politics by assuming a non-aligned position in the East-West issue,

developing relations with certain communist countries and display
ing an interest in various Third World nations in Africa and Asia. I n
inter-American politics, it adopted a much more unco-operative
attitude towards the United States than before . When Quadros
reached an agreement with Frondizi of Argentina he seemed to be
engaged not only in an attempt to overcome the old rivalry between
the two principal powers of South America but also to be taking a
first step towards forming a Latin American bloc to counterbalance
the preponderance of the United States in the region . And early in
1 962 Goulart led the unsuccessful opposition to the efforts of the
United States to expel Cuba from the OAS .
After the mili tarist revolution in 1 964 the foreign policy of Brazil,
though still the resul t of global as well as hemispheric considerations,
reverted to more tradi tional lines. While Quadros apparently had
calculated that the most advantageous course for his country would
be to balance between East and West and seek economic aid from
both sides, Castello Branco clearly had no doubt that the safest
policy in the global struggle between communism and democracy
would be a close alliance with the United States . Rej ecting the
neutralist position ofhis predecessors, he hailed the United States as
the leader of the free world. Returning to the principles laid down by
Rio Branco more than half a century earlier, he entered into close
collaboration with the government in Washington . In hemispheric
matters, Brazil reversed the policy towards Cuba and participated
in the intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1 965 . Thus Brazil
once again cast itself in the part of regional agen t of the United
States.
But the signs of an ambition to go beyond the role of ally and
agent, which had been visible already in the 1 930s, were becoming
increasingly apparent. To secure a more independent and powerful
position for Brazil in the hemisphere seemed to be the principal
concern of Castello Branco's successors. Domestically, they con
centrated their efforts on economic development, and managed to
bring about the remarkable boom of the late 1 960s and early 1 9 70s.
Their plans significantly included an ambitious programme for the
development of nuclear energy . In the foreign field , they made the
weigh t of Brazil felt most strongly in the buffer states, Uruguay,
Paraguay and Bolivia, which traditionally had looked towards
Argentina but now increasingly fell under the sway of Brazil . By the
end of the period under consideration, the tendency of Brazilian
foreign policy seemed to be towards a Latin American hegemony .
Whether such a role might be combined wi th that of ally and agent
of the hegemonic power in the system at large must depend on the
existence of a substantial degree of harmony between the interests
and policies of the two powers concerned . That it was only towards
the end of the period , when the presence of the United States in the
region was becoming less keenly felt, that Brazil seemed to be
moving towards hegemony suggests that this role might be more app
ropriate to situations where the great power takes a lower profile than
that which normally would be characteristic of a hegemonic power.
Argentina, too, went through a stage where it tried to balance
between East and West. President Peron, till his fall in 1 955, pursued
the old policy of exploiting a rivalry between the United States and a
great power outside the system . Grandiosely assuming a ' third
position' in the ideological conflict between communism and
capitalism, he set out to make his country militarily strong and
socially united in the hope that his system of 'j usticialism ' one day
would triumph over both of the other political systems . In regional
politics, he strove for a Latin American bloc under Argentine
leadership against 'Yankee imperialism' . This policy, however, did
not survive Peron. Exposed to the pressures of the Cold War, his
successors found it safer to side with the West and seek accommod
ation with the United States. Once they had abandoned the ' third
position' , they turned their attention to domestic development and
exports.
The governments of the 1 960s, though they sided with the
democratic countries in the Cold War, stopped short of co-operating
with the United States in regional politics. President Frondizi, while
maintaining correct relations wi th Washington , entered into the
diplomatic agreement with Brazil partly, apparently, with the aim
of establishing a counterweight to the influence of the United States
in South America. Late in 1 96 1 Argentina j oined Mexico, Brazil
and three other Latin American countries in opposing the efforts of
the United States to organise measures against Cuba through the
OAS . The later governments of the 1 960s moved further to the right,
maintaining a strongly anti-communist line in foreign as well as
domestic affairs. While stepping up the rivalry with Brazil, they were
careful not to strain relations with the United States too much . For
Argentina, anxiety about the potential hegemony of the neighbour
ing middle power increasingly came to overshadow concern about
the actual hegemony of the much more distant great power.
organise an anti-hegemonial alliance were three . In the first place,

rivalry among themselves, which affected also relations with and
among the smaller states in the vicinity, presented a serious obstacle .
The strongest tension was generally between Brazil and Argentina.
But if Mexico had not been quite so dependent on the United States
and had been freer to play an active role in the region to the south,
the natural competition between it and Brazil might well have
developed into a fairly tense rivalry too. Second , despite the pressure
from the United States and the tensions among the lesser powers, the
middle powers shared with the great power, as well as with nearly all
other states in the region, certain fundamental values and concerns
which stood in the way of a grouping into opposite camps . I n
addition t o the common ideological bonds o f pan-American unity
referred to already and the shared strategic interests arising from the
existence of hostile extra-hemispheric powers, there was the steadily
growing web of economic interdependence. This relationship, at
first between uneq ual trading partners and later between a highly
advanced and immensely powerful economy and a number of
developing countries with uneven but generally inferior resources,
made Latin America too dependent economically on the United
States to allow its leading powers to organise a collective political
opposition . Last but not least, the power of the United States was
simply so overwhelming as to make all attempts at establishing a
counterforce within the system seem futile.
The historical conduct of Canada, the fourth middle power in the
hemisphere though not a part of the inter-American system , is a
further indication that a unifocal system marked by great ineq uality
between the principal and the secondary powers tends to breed
'special relationships' rather than to generate a common front. Far
from seeking a diplomatic concert with the two South American
middle powers, Canada never even managed to set up diplomatic
machinery for co-ordinating the efforts of the two North American
middle powers to deal with the giant between them . The record of
Poland in the system of communist states also supports the
conclusion that middle powers in a unifocal system tend to seek
accommodation with the central power rather than to form anti
hegemonial alliances . For China, the outsider in that system , it was
j ust as impossible to draw Poland away from the Soviet Union as it
was for Argentina, the only would-be opponent in the inter
American system , to coax Mexico away from the United States.
While the inter-American system had no balance of power, it did
present certain rudimentary patterns of power. One was geographi
cal. If buffer states and other small states are ignored , signs may be
detected of the old geopolitical structure of odd and even numbers,
where one's neighbour is an enemy and the neighbour's neighbour
on the opposite side a friend . 1 0 Thus, the alignment of Brazil with
the United States was a fairly permanent feature of the picture . But
the pattern was not completed by a corresponding relationship
between Argentina and Mexico, largely, presumably, because of the
disability of Mexico mentioned already . The other pattern of power
was in the hierarchical dimension, where the tendency of some small
states to lean towards the great power in order to gain protection
against a local middle power sometimes gave the system a structure
resembling a sandwich . Thus, at times Paraguay and Bolivia, often
more afraid of Argentina than of the fai rly remote great power,
sought refuge in a closer relationship wi th the United States . At
other times it was the ambitions of Brazil that drove the small
neighbours towards the great power. I n Central America, where the
presence of the United States weighed much more heavily than in
the south , this tendency could not be so pronounced . Though
Guatemalans might refer to Mexico, more than half-seriously, as
' the colossus of the north ' , they were in no position to ignore the
pressure from the real colossus. The nature of their dilemma was
demonstrated in 1 954, when Mexico and the United States
interfered competitively in their affairs, each backing its own side in
the domestic political conflict. Where the great power was regarded
as no less of a threat than the middle power, the sandwich pattern of
alignment could not take shape . As the preponderance of the great
power prevented the formation of a balance of power, so it stood in
the way of the completion of both the geographical and the
hierarchical pattern of power.
It was this preponderance of the focal power together with the
geographical position of each of the middle powers that more than
anything else determined the systemic roles of the latter. The
overwhelming power of the Uni ted States , occasionally brought to
bear by military means but most of the time manifested only in
poli tical, economic and ideological terms, not only helped to shape
the characteristic parts of the three powers but also conduced to
limit their possibilities of performing these parts. Indeed, it restricted
the ways and means open to them almost to the point where their
roles in the system became nominal more than real . Thus , when
Mexico took up the defence of its region against impositions by the
United States, it was reduced to relying mainly on the weapons

provided by international law. When Brazil gave its support to the
U nited States, the medium at its disposal was rarely a conventional
alliance but more often simply a diplomatic concert, an arrange
ment marked by a habit of co-operating in inter-American insti
tutions and elsewhere. And when Argentina took the path of the
adversary of the great power, it found it very hard to go beyond the
position of the would-be organiser of Latin American blocs and anti
hegemonial alliances, generally having to restrict its opposition to a
refusal to co-operate in regional organisations and to diplomatic
obstruction in general. Even in their own relationship Brazil and
Argentina, like most smaller Latin American states involved in local
rivalries, found it prudent to exercise a good deal of self-restraint .
While the force and authority of the great power stifled conflict and
protected order in the unifocal system of states , its domination and
penetration of large parts of the system reduced the political
independence and circumscribed the diplomatic freedom of the
middle powers.
5 The Dualistic System
Ancient, medieval and modern history all present cases of states

systems in which two powers enjoyed preponderance over all others.
While the foremost classical example is that of Athens and Sparta,
'SOme of the most prominent medieval ones are those of the Byzantine
Empire and its successive enemies. Each of the great powers of
t.rnodern history has at one time or another been involved in a
tdualistic system. Such situations present great variety as regards
both the structure of the system and the nature of the relationships
among its units. In the first place, the ratio of strength between the
preponderant powers can vary considerably, with marked in
equality perhaps being more common than rough eq uality. In the
longest-lasting dualism of the nineteenth century, that of Prussia
and Austria within the German Confederation, Prussia started as
much the inferior party but gained relative strength until in the end,
under Bismarck, it could defeat Austria in war. In the most recent
case, of the Soviet Union and the United States since the Second
World War, the Soviet Union was for long both strategically and
economically inferior but eventually achieved parity in strategic
terms. Second, the quality of the relationship between the two
preponderant powers may vary from extreme hostility to a high
degree of co-operation, with conflict, however, being the most usual
state of affairs . Such conflict is sometimes largely political, while at
other times it may have also a substantial doctrinal element. The
Austro-Prussian rivalry was overridingly political, being essentially
about the mastery of Germany . The ideological differences between
the two powers in regard to constitutional and national issues were
overshadowed by their doctrinal alliance against the revolutionary
movements in Germany and Europe. In the Russo-American
conflict, ideology played a much larger role, though its influence
seemed to decline after the Cold War. Third, as in the unifocal
system, each of the principal powers may use its preponderance in
several ways and may enter into various sorts of relationships with
other members of the system. The situation that has been called
117
' tight bipolarity', where all the states in the system are divided into
opposed blocs , is a rare phenomenon in history. ' Loose bipolarity' ,
where some or most of the states are divided into two opposite
alliances or coalitions but where at least some states remain
unaligned , seems much the more normal state of affairs. This
chapter will explore the connection between the quality of the
relationship between the two principal powers and the type of
conduct characteristic of the middle powers in the system .
If we exclude from consideration the extremely rare case where
the principal powers lose interest in each other and stop interacting
politically, we may think of the various types of relationship possible
between them as forming a spectrum, with war at one end and
condominium at the other. Between the extremes are, next to war,
the intense, sub-military conflict that has come to be known as cold
war; next to condominium, the relationship of co-operation short of
joint government ihat is traditionally described as diplomatic
concert; and , in the middle, a broad range made up of various
mixtures of rivalry and co-operation , of which the East-West
detente of the 1 960s is one example. The spectrum is arranged
according to level of tension between the two powers and degree of
control of such tension, with war marking a high level of tension and
a low degree of control, condominium the opposite combination,
and cold war, diplomatic concert, and restrained rivalry and limited
co-operation intermediate proportions. Here neither the extreme
situation of war, where the middle powers normally become allies or
neutrals, nor that of condominium, where they may end up as
subjects or agents of the two partners in joint government, will be
considered . Nor will mixtures of two or more of the five typical
situations distinguished here, or transitions from one situation to
another, be brought into the analysis . The focus will be on the three
types of relationship most relevant to the Russo-American dualism
of the third quarter of the twentieth century, namely cold war,
diplomatic concert, and rivalry mixed with co-operation .
The cen tral relationship is the dominant one in the states system .
I t is in the light of the interaction between the two preponderant
powers that all other states have to conduct their own relationships,
with them as well as with each other. The middle powers in the
system , especially those closest to the top level of international
politics, are particularly affected by what passes between the great
powers . For them, each type of relationship is likely to present
dangers as well as opportunities, the precise nature of the challenge
The Dualistic System 1 19
to each depending mainly on its geographical position and political

resources . Just how each middle power perceives the various d angers
and opportunities is conditioned by a number of subj ective factors,
such as the ideas, emotions and goals of its leadership . And how it
reacts to them depends to a certain extent on its domestic institutions
and political style. Nevertheless, the challenge issued by the central
relationship, the threats and inducements presented to lesser
powers, are often strong and general enough to produce certain
tendencies in the reactions of the middle powers. Examining these
tendencies in different dualistic situations, we may distinguish
certain types ofinternational conduct characteristic of these powers.
And relating such types of conduct to the dynamics of the system in
general , we may reach some tentative generalisations about the
international roles of middle powers in conditions of duality . The
material for such an enquiry may be drawn from the two principal
dualistic systems of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, that
ofAustria and Prussia in the German Confederation and that of the
United States and the Soviet Union in the East-West period of
global politics .
5. 1 COLD WAR
Intense conflict between the two great powers, even when short of
open war, creates a particularly dangerous situation for the lesser
members of the system. They are in peril of becoming victims of the
central rivalry by being encroached upon, perhaps even swallowed
up, by one of the parties. In the Cold War from the late 1 940s to the
early 1 960s, which was marked by recurrent crises between the
Soviet Union and the United States and local wars between their
allies or agents, the lesser states faced the additional danger of the
situation developing into a major war of the sort that might subject
the world to nuclear warfare. But, as we shall see, cold war between
the great powers may also present the middle powers, or some of
them, with the opportunity of enhancing their diplomatic position
and securi ng some political gains.
For the middle powers, having to protect their interests in such a
situation, the basic choice is between joining one of the sides or
remaining uncommitted in the central conflict. Which course they
take will depend to a large extent on their geographical position and
the nature of their relations with the protagonists. A middle power
located close to a centre of tension between the great powers and

exposed to pressure from one or both of them is more likely to join
one of the camps than a middle power in a more remote position and
not subj ect to q uite the same pressures. While the middle powers of
Western and Eastern Europe, dependent in various respects on one
superpower or the other, were divided already at the outset of the
Russo-American Cold War and soon became firmly integrated in
opposite military camps, India and Indonesia, both much more
removed from the central conflict, were able to retain their
independence and remain uncommitted in the rivalry. Domestic
considerations may be important as well. In the case of India, for
example, a policy of non-commitment in the political and ideo
logical issue between East and West was essential for the internal
stability of the country.
For those middle powers that take sides, the choice between the
protagonists may depend on a variety of considerations . Those based
on power calculations have received most attention from students of
international politics, especially in the older literature on the
subject. They are of two kinds and may lead to opposite decisions.
Some middle powers may seek security by joining the weaker or
more threatened side in an anti-hegemonial alliance. Others may
think it in their interest to ally themselves with the stronger or more
aggressive party on the calculation that, if war does break out, they
will avoid the ravages of defeat and perhaps even share the spoils of
victory . Good examples of either course may be found in the history
of ancient states systems . Corinth, which could be regarded as a
middle power in the system dominated by Sparta and Athens,
showed considerable elasticity in its alliance policy. Because its
leaders recognised that the city's interests would be seriously
threatened if any one state secured domination of the Hellenic
society of states, it regularly supported the weaker of the rivals and
sometimes took the initiative in organising anti-hegemonial
alliances.
An opposite example is that of Cheng in ancient China. In the
periods 1 1 1-XI, in the seventh and sixth centuries BC , Cheng, led
by a long line of able statesmen supported by a patriotic and well
organised people, was a very considerable power. Occupying an
extensive territory, which geographically was placed between the
poles of power in the north and the south, it played a very different
balancing game in a period of almost constant insecurity and
expectation of violence. In principle always ready to switch sides, it
The Dualistic System 121
generally supported the stronger of the two camps, one of which was
led first by Ch'i and then by Chin, and the other by Ch' u:
During the course of its fluctuations between the camps of Ch 'ior

Chin and Ch' u the statesmen of Cheng seized every possible
opportunity to improve the position of their own country.
Occasionally Cheng transferred its allegiance quite voluntarily
when it sensed that the other power was on the rise so that it would
not have to suffer the ravages of an attack directed against it. This
was the case in 642 Be , when there was internal strife in Ch'i
following the death of Duke Huan. Cheng immediately trans
ferred its loyalty to the Ch'u camp. 1
Whether a middle power caught in a dualistic conflict seeks security

in an anti-hegemonial alliance or whether i t pursues its interests
together with the potentially dominating power will depend on a
number of factors, such as its geographical position, its political
tradition, the nature of the issue, and the norms of the states system . 2
However, the choice of sides is not governed by power calcu
lations alone . Sometimes the ideas and emotions of the actors may be
as importan t as the relation of forces in the dualism. This will be the
case where the central conflict is ideological as much as power
political. At the outset of the Cold War, the secondary and middle
powers of Western Europe immediately sided with the stronger,
conservative power against the weaker, revolutionary power. They
did so not merely out of concern for the military balance on the
European continent but also because their ideological orientation
and political sympathies favoured the West rather than the East.
They considered that culturally, economically and politically they
had more in common with the United States and more to fear from
Soviet Russia. On the other side, it was for reasons of the same nature
that the governments of Poland and Communist China accepted the
leadership of the Soviet U nion in the Cold War with the West.
Among the secondary members of the opposed blocs or alliances
in a dualistic system with a high degree of tension, a distinction may
be made between satellites and allies . The relationship between the
alliance leader and a satellite is one of control and compliance. The
great power may exercise its control mainly by force, for example by
stationing troops on the territory of the satellite or by threatening to
invade it, but may use other sanctions as well, both political and
economic . The satellite may pursue its policy of compliance out of a
sense of extreme dependence on the great power, whether in

military, political or economic affairs. The tightness of control and
the degree of dependence will determine the diplomatic scope of the
middle-power satellites. If Poland before 1 956 was an example of the
firmly controlled and highly dependent satellite, after that year it
appeared in the role of a rather freer satellite. In the earlier period of
the Cold War, this middle power, guided by its traditional
preoccupation with Germany and a recurring fear of an accord
between Moscow and Bonn, led by a government that depended for
its control of the people on the support of the Soviet Union, and
constrained by the integration of its post-war economy with that of
the great-power neighbour, was strategically , politically and econ
omically so dependent on the Soviet Union that it saw no alternative
to a policy of servile compliance. In the later 1 950s and early 1 960s,
however, the same country, benefiting from a slight loosening of the
bonds of Soviet control in Eastern Europe and a corresponding
increase in its political self-confidence, was in a position to take some
initiatives of its own, in East-West as well as in intra-bloc affairs .
Thus, in 1 957 the Polish government presented to the United
Nations the so-called Rapacki Plan, which called for the establish
ment of a denuclearised zone in central Europe. In the early 1 960s,
the Polish leader Gomulka, though obviously loyal to the Russians,
tried to conciliate between the Soviet U nion and China. 3 Through
subsequent measures, too, Poland laboured to build up an identity
of its own in international politics.
The relationship between the alliance leader and a middle-power
ally, though of course also highly unequal, is one based more on
reward and less on threats of the more extreme kind . Although the
needs of the ally may be great, there is an element of choice in i ts
alliance policy. Here a distinction may be made between the faithful
ally, which in most matters of importance is prepared to pursue,
more or less unquestioningly, a policy that is in conformity with the
goals of the alliance leader, and the critical ally, which mixes
conditional support with a fair amount of advice and criticism. If
Australia, on the whole, seems a good example of the former type,
especially France but also Britain fall in the latter category .
Australia, distant from the part of the world to which historically
and culturally it belongs, and close to Asia, e ,hanced i ts sense of
security by strengthening i ts bonds with the United States and
identifying demonstratively with its policies in Asia, despatching
troops first to Korea and then to Vietnam . France and Britain, both
European powers with a long tradition of independent conduct at

the top level of international politics, presented a more measured
response to American conduct of global politics in the Cold War.
While the French, preoccupied with their own problems in North
Mrica and elsewhere, urged the Americans to support the policies
that suited French interests best, the British, conscious of having a
'special relationship' with the alliance leader, combined public
support for American policies with private advice and words of
caution . Canada, with the advantages and disadvantages of being a
neighbour of the alliance leader, found a middle course between
unquestioning support and outspoken criticism .
If the parts assumed by aligned middle powers range from
obedient agent to friendly critic of the great power, it is primarily in
relation to the central conflict of the dualistic system t.hat their
diplomatic influence must be estimated and their international role
assessed . On behalf of such powers it has often been claimed that
they have a particularly important part to play in reducing tension
and easing relations between the great-power opponents . Aligned
middle powers are particularly well placed, it has been argued , for
performing such ameliorating functions as restraining the alliance
leader, mediating between the contestants, and helping to observe a
truce and keep the peace in a local conflict. Some good reasons may
be advanced in support of this view . Close contact with the alliance
leader, together with a certain amount of weight within the alliance,
allow some middle powers to express their views regularly and, if
they see a need , to urge caution and moderation in the right
quarters. This was Lester Pearson's point when he said about
Canada's relations wi th the United States, 'We know them so well.
We can really talk to them like nobody else can . ' 4 If the policy
makers of the great power happen to be uncertain or divided , the
influence of its middle-power advisers can be q uite considerable,
especially if they concur in their urgings. In attempting mediation,
contact and influence with one of the opponents may again be an
advantage. In some situations such assets may be of greater benefit
than impartiality in the central issue, not only because they allow
the middle power to encourage its great-power ally to enter into
negotiation and seek agreement, but also because they can help it to
gain the ear of the opposite party. I talians, for example, thought that
when their country in some critical phases of the Vietnam conflict of
the 1 960s was able to play a role in the search for a solution, it was
precisely because I taly enj oyed friendly relations with the United
States which allowed its representatives to speak in terms that

sounded credible to Hanoi . 5 Finally, the record shows that in peace
keeping, whether in the form of truce observation or in that which
involves a military presence, some aligned middle powers, notably
Canada, have been particularly active, both in the initiation of
operations and through actual participation.
However, there are eq ually solid reasons for not relying on
aligned middle powers always to be playing the parts of controlling
or reducing tension in cold-war situations. I n the first place, such
powers cannot be expected at all times and in all circumstances to
prefer moderation in the conduct of the rivalry and to show
determination in the search for solutions. Indeed , in a situation
where their own stake in the conflict is at least as great as that of the
alliance leader, they may push for a strong line in relations with the
opposite side. In the issue over the offshore islands in the Far East in
the 1 950s, Communist China, with what it regarded as an unfinished
civil war on its hands, seemed at least as keen as the Soviet Union to
initiate probing operations against their enemies . And it is doubtful
that the voice of Australia, a country much closer to Asia and no less
conscious of the communist threat than the United States, was
always one of caution and restraint when debate in Washington was
about the interventions in Korea and Indochina.
Second , the nature of international society is such that even when
one or more middle powers are inclined to play an ameliorating role,
they are not always able to influence the conduct of the central
relationship in any significant way. A great power involved in keen
rivalry with another great power and determined on a particular
line of action will only rarely allow itself to be curbed or guided by
the urgings oflesser powers, even when they are its principal allies . I f
both great powers are s e t o n pursuing the cold war with t h e means a t
their disposal, t h e middle-power allies can neither restrain them,
mediate in the issue, nor intervene effectively to dampen the conflict.
Leaders of allied powers who believe that they can exert decisive
influence behind the scenes when tension is running high are apt to
be deceiving themselves . The so-called special relationship between
Britain and the United States, often more salient to the British than
to the Americans, provides an instructive example. When Harold
Wilson avoided public criticism of Lyndon Johnson 's policy in the
Vietnam War on the grounds that he was playing a crucial role in
private diplomacy, he found that the President was taking practi
cally no notice of him. 6
In intense conflict, the two great powers deal with each other
directly . 7 Only if one or both of them want to achieve some form of
accommodation with the adversary may it be possible for a few of the
lesse r powers to enter the conflict in a mediatory capacity. For this
role, being aligned can in some circumstances be an advantage,
though in others it will be a handicap. But the success of the middle
powers as mediators will depend less on their international standing
and diplomatic efforts than on the .attitudes and responses of the
great powers themselves. This is likely to be so also in situations
where the middle powers intervene physically in a dispute, for
example by taking part in a peace-keeping operation . The interven
tion of the United Nations Emergency Force, which Canada
initiated in the later stage of the Suez crisis in 1 956, succeeded
largely because the superpowers, unable to intervene themselves
without great risk, gave active or passive support, the United States
facilitating the enterprise diplomatically and the Soviet Union
acquiescing, or at least refraining from sabotaging it.
Not always willing and only in certain conditions able to help
reduce tension and promote agreement between the camps, middle
powers in a cold-war alliance are no more than occasionally to be
found in the role of mediators . Their real part in relation to the
central conflict is as supporters or lieutenants of the alliance leader.
In a global system, they normally play this part on a regional level,
either as major allies in a collective security arrangement dominated
or led by the great power, like Poland in the Warsaw Treaty
Organisation, Canada and the West European middle powers in
NATO and Australia in ANZUS and SEA TO, or as parties to a
bilateral pact with the great power, like China and Spain in the
1 950s. Here their influence can be q uite considerable. While Britain
and France had major roles in the issue over Berlin in the earlier
period of the Cold War, China took the leading part in the clash over
the offshore islands in the later 1 950s . These upper middle powers,
which for historical and geographical reasons were at least as deeply
involved in the respective conflicts as their alliance leaders, had
policies of their own which in neither case could be ignored by
the superpower ally.
In their occasional role of promoters of detente between the great
power rivals, aligned middle powers may be not very much more
important than some smaller allies attempting the same part .
Though their weight in the alliance may give them a rather better
chance of influencing the alliance leader when they try to exert
diplomatic restraint or of attracting the interest of both parties when

they advance mediatory proposals, the fact that the success of such
initiatives depends largely on the attitudes of the great powers may
leave them in a situation only marginally more advantageous than
that of smaller would-be mediators. And when it comes to peace
keeping functions, the role of middle powers is even less clearly
demarcated than that of small states. Though such functions, in
their various forms, certainly have attracted a number of middle
powers, some of them aligned , they have never become typical
middle-power activities. While some such powers have been
unwilling or unable to involve themselves or have been found
unsuitable for the task, many small states have taken a particularly
active part in the operations . 8 But as lieutenants of the alliance
leader, most middle powers stand out from the lesser members of a
cold-war alliance . Though sometimes a small state, for example
because of its strategic location, may enjoy an importance as ally
quite out of proportion to its military might and economic resources,
a middle power, especially an upper middle power, generally carries
greater weight in an alliance. To the extent that middle powers form
a rank of their own in the international system they are likely to do so
within an alliance as well, since here, too, their standing and
influence rest in the last resort on the force they command and the
resources they possess .
The unaligned middle powers, less affected by the polarising
forces of the dualistic system, have a wider range of possible roles in
the cold war. I n relation to the central conflict, the number of
possibilities theoretically open to them is four. If they take the level
of tension between the two camps for given and unalterable, they
may keep aloof from the conflict and mind their own domestic or
local business, or they may play one side off against the other in an
attempt to draw benefits from the situation . If they regard the level
of tension as open to manipulation or influence, they may try to
heighten it by sharpening some of the issues between the camps , or
they may try to lower it by offering their good offices or their services
as mediators between the parties . The dynamics of cold war in a
dualistic system will make some of these logical possibilities more
likely than others; and the actual conduct of the unaligned middle
powers will in each case depend also on a number ofspecial obj ective
and subjective factors, such as the geographical location of the state,
the nature of its regime, the ideological convictions of its government
and the political fears and ambitions of its leaders .
Sta nding aloof from the conflict of the great powers and their
allies and concentrating on nearby issues and domestic matters is
basically an attractive policy. It is likely to appeal to many of the
smaller unaligned states . Middle powers that calculate that they
.llave nothing much to gain from occupying themselves with the
central conflict as well as middle powers that see no alternative to
.keeping a very low profile in international politics might take the
same course. An example of the former type might be a power that
was fairly confident of i ts ability to survive as a neutral in any major
war and of its chance at least to maintain its position in any post-war
system and that was preoccupied with matters more pressing than
those dividing the great powers. In a world of nuclear weapons, such
an attitude must be rarer than in earlier times . The declaratory
policy of China in the 1 960s, when the leaders who had accused
Khrushchev of 'capitulationism' in the Cuban missile crisis went on
'to suggest that there was so little need to fear nuclear war that armed
struggle in the Third World should be encouraged regardless, was
sometimes seen as tending in that direction . But, advanced in a
situation of strategic stalemate and in a climate of growing detente
between the superpowers, this policy probably turned on a low
assessment of the likelihood of nuclear war erupting, and in any case,
as we shall see, did not stop China from assuming other, more active
parts in response to the changing central relationship. An example of
the type of power that stood aloof out of necessity rather than from
choice might be one relatively isolated from the central conflict and
deeply absorbed in domestic and local or regional affairs . In the
years after the Congo crisis, when Africa was not an important scene
of East-West rivalry, newly independent Nigeria had little energy
left for global issues and could pursue only a passive course in the
Cold War. However, for most unaligned middle powers in the
system, the dangers and, not least, the opportunities presented by a
very high level of tension in the central relationship will be too great
for them to take no initiative whatever and to play no role at all in
regard to the great-power conflict.
One of the more active ways for such powers of seeking to protect
and further their interests is to play one great power off against the
other. By threatening to lean towards one side, an unaligned middle
power may be able to gain support or force concessions from the
opposite side, particularly if the two camps maintain at least a rough
balance of power and the middle power has something of real
interest to offer one or both of the rivals. But in a situation of high
tension, when the polarising forces in the system are at their

strongest and the risk of the cold war becoming real war is ever
present, this is a difficult and dangerous game to play for a power
that is in principle already an object of competition between the
great powers. The middle power attempting it may find itself unable
to maintain its unaligned position, and may even end up a victim
instead of a beneficiary of the central conflict. As a preferred policy,
it seems more suitable for a situation with a lower l�vel of tension
between the great powers. If in the 1 950s India befriended the
communist bloc, it was hardly because Nehru at that stage aspired to
the role of a ' trimmer' seeking benefits from either or both sides, but
probably, rather, because he, in the age of Dulles, thought the
United States a greater danger to the independence of the countries
of the Third World than the Soviet U nion .
An even more dangerous policy in a cold-war situation is
deliberately to exacerbate tension in the central relationship .
Though, as we shall see, there may be some diplomatic advantage
for uncommitted powers in having tension between the camps run at
a high level, there are good reasons why they should avoid acting as
trouble-makers . Above all, the risk of a major war, in which they
could be drawn into the hostili ties and after which they might have
to face an all-dominant victor, would tend to hold them back. In any
case, it is a role which often is easier to play for a member of one of
the camps, even a small-power ally, than for an unaligned power.
While an ally directly involved in a local conflict in which the great
powers have a stake sometimes may be able to draw the alliance
leader close to war with the opponents, an uncommitted power will
rarely have the means to do so. Taiwan, in a clash over the offshore
islands, and Egypt, in a crisis in the Middle East, could exert
considerable pressure on their great-power allies , who in each case
had to exercise restraining influence to avoid a dangerous escalation
of the local conflict. But China in the 1 960s, after the rift with the
Soviet Union in effect an unaligned middle power, which had no
desire for a reduction of tension between the superpowers and which
professed not to be afraid of major war, was unable to prevent first
Soviet 'capitulation ' and then East-West detente. 9
For most unaligned middle powers, as for many other states in the
system , the overriding concern in relation to the cold war must be to
avoid the outbreak of a major war. Hence they are often drawn
towards the role of ameliorators of the relations between the great
powers or between the allies and friends of these powers. At
opportune moments, they may offer their good offices in a local war
or even propose to mediate between the parties . In the 1 950s, after
the outbreak of the Korean War, India made itself available as a
channel of communication between the principal countries in
volved ; and at one stage of the war in Vietnam , Indonesia offered to
mediate provided all the parties concerned wanted it. 1 0 I n situ
ations where a cease-fire has been brought about, middle powers not
committed to either side and with significant armed forces at their
disposal may play a part in peace-keeping together with various
other powers . India took part in the United Nations Emergency
Force, which moved in after the Suez action, and played com
parable roles in the Congo and , as a member of the International
Control Commission , in Vietnam . By providing troops and officials
for activities of this kind , the middle powers may perform a useful
role in helping to damp down or extinguish local conflicts . Their
offers of good offices and mediation , however, can be, as a rule, of
only marginal value in practical terms . If great powers that are
involved in conflict with each other, whether directly or through
proxies, want to enter into negotiation, they can generally find a
way. If they do not wish to negotiate, no third party can make them
do so; and if they do not in tend to reach agreement, not even a
concert of middle powers is able to bring enough pressure to bear to
make them come to terms . 1 1 Yet the existence of a number of
significant uncommitted powers eager to bring about a reduction in
tension is bound to have some effect on the climate in which the
antagonists pursue their cold war. In some situations , particularly
where the decision-makers of one or both of the alliance leaders are
divided , pressure from the would-be ameliorators among such
powers migh t well have a sobering influence on the conduct of the
great-power rivalry .
While their efforts to facilitate negotiation are unlikely to be a
major influence on the course of the conflict, the middle powers
making the attempts may draw considerable diplomatic advan tages
for themselves as a result of their initiatives . By appearing in the role
of helpfu l third parties in situations where fear of major war is
widespread, they can sometimes enhance their diplomatic status
and strengthen their international position in the world at large,
which migh t prove to their benefit particularly when they deal with
more immediate concerns at regional and local levels . The most
substantial result of Nehru's diplomatic efforts in the Cold War of
the 1 950s, it may be argued, was to establish I ndia as leader of the
non-aligned nations and spokesman of the Third World . If the great

powers and their allies happen to be locked in a tight balance of
forces with little apparent room for diplomatic manoeuvres from
either side, the opportuni ties for third parties to secure advantages of
this nature are particularly good. In such a situation , even
uncommitted small states may attempt the part of mediators .
However, since they generally carry less weight and appear less
convincing than the more prominent middle powers, they are likely
to derive fewer advantages from this role.
I n relation to the central conflict, the typical role of uncommitted
middle powers is that of would-be ameliorators. But there are other
ways in which such powers may assert themselves in cold-war
situations and play a part in the dualistic system . By raising or
drawing attention to political issues other than those that divide the
blocs, they may help to increase the complexity of the pattern of
conflict and to diversify tension in the system . In the 1 950s, I ndia did
not only oppose the Cold War and power politics of the two blocs but
also spoke up against colonialism and racism in various parts of the
world . By the 1 960s, when most of the former colonies in Asia and
Africa had become independent, the keynote of the non-aligned
nations was no longer the struggle of oppressed peoples but the
economic inequality between the advanced and the under
developed parts of the world. Thus again new topics were added
to the agenda of world politics .
Sometimes unaligned middle powers may push their alternative
concerns so hard as to suggest that they supersede the matters at
issue between the camps of the cold war. An outstanding example is
Indonesia under Sukarno. Describing a world divided along lines
very different from those that had obtained in the earlier period of
the Cold War, its spokesmen insisted that the real issue of the present
and the future was the confrontation between the new, poor
countries and the old, established forces of oppression and exploi
tation . Putting itself ahead of ' the new emerging forces ' , the
Indonesian government pursued what it described as an in
dependent active foreign policy. President Sukarno said in a speech
to the Non-Bloc Summit Conference in Belgrade in 1 96 1 :
Prevailing world opinion today would have us believe that the

real source of international tension and strife is ideological
conflict between the great powers . I think that is not true . There is
a conflict which cuts deeper into the flesh of man, and that is the
conflict between the new emergent forces for freedom and j ustice
and the old forces of domination , the one pushing its head
relentlessly through the crust of the earth which has given it its
lifeblood , the other striving desperately to retain all it can trying
to hold back the course of history. 1 2
In presenting a heightened North-South confrontation as eclipsing

a recedin g East-West conflict and in advocating a decidedly radical
policy for the non-aligned coun tries, Sukarno's I ndonesia of the
early 1 960s dissociated itself from the more moderate views and
policies that had been expounded by Nehru 's I ndia in the 1 950s.
However, whether their programme is to reform international
society or whether it is revolutionary, such middle powers are likely
to find it very hard to deflect the attention of the world from the
issues that divide the great powers and their allies. In a situation of
cold war, the general preoccupation of governments with peace and
national security tends to override concerns with j ustice and
economic eq uality . Yet, by adding matters of such nature to the
international agenda, uncommitted middle powers may play a
useful role in helping to widen the horizons of the political world
and to prepare the international system for a more complex pattern
of issues.
In attempting to alter the pattern of conflict, uncommitted
middle powers may resort to even more radical measures. They
may try to change, or at leaS t modify, the power structure of the
international system itself. To defend themselves and others against
the dangers of too high a level of tension in the central relationship
and to promote interests other than those at issue between the great
powers, they may take steps to form themselves into a third bloc and
transform the simple dualism into a more complex system . In doing
so, they may initially want merely to increase their diplomatic
leverage in the central conflict, but may ultimately aim at setting
themselves up as the balancers of the system.
I n the middle of the nineteenth century, the German 'middle
states' became linked with such a policy. 1 3 In the earlier part of the
history of the Confederation, when rivalry between the two German
great powers had been only moderate, the line of Bavaria,
Wiirttemberg and Baden in the south and Hanover in the north had
generally been to lean on Austria, the stronger of the two powers .
From Metternich's Austria they had sought protection against
various Prussian schemes for national unification and hegemony as
well as against the growing popular national and radical move

ments. By 1 848 the conditions that had facilitated this policy were
disappearing. With the anti-revolutionary partnership of Austria
and Prussia breaking up and the competition between them
intensifying, the position of the states located in between was
becoming much more difficult. Caught between two rivals for
influence over Germany, they feared a victory of either. At the
Frankfurt Assembly, the representatives of some of the states in the
south and the middle turned to the old idea of a tripartite
organisation for Germany, of a federal structure in which the lesser
states together would form a third power comparable to, and
independent of, Austria and Prussia. After 1 849, too, these
governments, facing the danger of having their states crushed
between the Habsburg 'grossdeutsch' and the Prussian 'kleindeutsch'
programme, joined each other in putting forward various proposals
along such lines. 1 4 Thus some of the middle states, along with a
number of minor states, finally became involved in the scheme that
thirty years earlier had been championed in vain by the representa
tive of W i.irttemberg. 1 5
Aimed at transforming the dualism into a triangular system, the
scheme involved taking the middle states out of their traditional role
of supporters of one of the great powers and placing them at the
head of a third party in German politics. It did not work. The ' third
Germany' never became a third power; and German politics
remained dualistic, until Bismarck defeated Austria and went on
to unite Germany under Prussian leadership. The middle states,
which in the war of 1 866 supported Austria, were annexed or
subdued, while Austria was excluded from the new Reich. As victims
of the rivalry of the great powers , the German middle states are a
reminder of the ultimate fate that may befall middle powers in a
dualistic system.
Despite the great and obvious differences between the German
states system of the mid-nineteenth century and the global
international system of the mid-twentieth, the two cases show
certain similarities in the reactions of significant third parties to
situations of intense conflict between the great powers. In the global
system, too, there was a tendency for some lesser powers to move
closer to each other with the idea of possibly forming some sort of
composite third party to the central relationship. To be sure,
prominent leaders of non-aligned countries repeatedly denied that
they intended to create a third force or bloc in global politics,
insisting that such an aim would be both contradictory and harmful

to the spirit and policy of non-alignment. Given the differences of
i nstitutions, ideologies and preoccupations displayed by their
co untries, they almost certainly would also have found it impossible
to achieve the degree of solidarity required to maintain such a bloc.
Instead they pursued a less demanding form of co-operation . At a
series of conferences, of which Bandung in 1 955 and Belgrade in
1 96 1 mark the highest points , the representatives of non-aligned
countries attempted to co-ordinate their diplomatic efforts. Finding
some consensus in their views of the world , they called for joint
action in pursuit of certain broad goals, such as peace, indepen
dence and equality. The principal forum for their collective efforts
became the United Nations. H ere, with the spokesmen of the small
and new nations being rather more vociferous than those of the
longer-established middle powers, the Afro-Asian countries did
reach a degree of collaboration which at times brought them close to
constituting a third bloc in the General Assembly. In the 1 950s,
their platform was largely that of anti-colonialism, while later,
especially after the establishment of UNCTAD, the same countries
became essentially a pressure group of have-not states clamouring
for a redistribution of the material goods of the world . But it was on
such issues, rather than on those more germane to the political
ideological conflict between East and West, that countries of the
Third World achieved a measure of co-operation. When they
succeeded in turning the debate in the United Nations into a three
cornered struggle, it was largely because this organisation was no
longer the principal arena of the central conflict. Outside the
United Nations, global politics remained essentially dualistic
throughout the period of the Cold War.
As in the German Confederation, Triaspolitik had no real
prospect in the global system . Even if the uncommitted countries of
the Third World had been willing and able to overcome their
differences and act collectively, they could not have turned the duel
into a triangular conflict. The superpowers were too preponderant
and the polarising tendencies too strong for any group of lesser
powers to set itself up as an effective third party. Yet, the efforts of
the non-aligned leaders to find a position of their own had some
effect on the pattern of international conflict. By achieving a degree
of concert on a range of issues, they managed somewhat to
complicate the simple structure of the East-West confrontation .
If in a dualistic system with a high level of tension committed
middle powers may be said to accentuate the central conflict by

siding with one great power against the other, the uncommitted
middle powers may be seen as helping to limit this conflict. By
steering clear of the alliances and opposing bloc politics, they
prevent the division from becoming universal and secure a degree of
looseness in the system . By putting themselves forward as would-be
mediators in inter-bloc conflicts and bringing up issues from
different political spheres, they demand consideration for the world
beyond the camps and point to alternative dimensions of inter
national conflict. Finally, by seeking ways of organising co
operation among third parties to the central conflict, they hint at
the possibility of a more complex system of international politics. By
their mere existence as well as by their actual policies, unaligned
middle powers help to create the condi tions in which cold war in a
dualistic system may be overcome .
5.2 DI PLOMAT I C CONCERT
Opposite cold war, in the spectrum of relationships theoretically

possible between the parties to a dualistic system, we have
diplomatic concert. It is a state of affairs characterised by a degree of
co-ordination of foreign policies and diplomatic measures high
enough to allow the two great powers to share managerial functions
in the society of states, but not enough to permit them to exercise
joint government through a condominium. The process of co
ordination involves a great deal of negotiation between the two
powers. Though most of this usually goes through normal diplo
matic channels, some of it may take place at 'summit meetings ' .
Such meetings, especially if they are regular o r frequent, tend to
give the concert a more formal character. Though secondary and
lesser powers may be consulted on particular matters and may be
represented at some meetings, negotiations between the great
powers are often exclusive and meetings of their leaders frequently
arranged above the heads of all or most other states .
For the middle powers in the system, a great-power concert
generally presents obvious dangers, though , as we shall see, in some
cases also real opportunities . Essentially, the danger is that of being
reduced to obj ects in the international political process . Between
them, the great powers may manage affairs so efficiently that the
scope of all or most lesser powers is severely restricted . They may
remain in concert for so long that their management comes to

resemble joint government of the society of states. Indeed , as cold
war situations carry the ever-present risk of all-out war, so the
existence of concert conj ures up the prospect of condominium.
What is more, though the establishment of a great-power concert
brings order to the international relations of the system, the actual
dispositions of the managers are likely to reflect the in terests of the
great powers themselves at least as much as the needs of inter
national society at large . Hence, to many lesser powers, a great
power concert may come to appear as a conspiracy against other
members of the states system, especially against those most likely to
challenge the authority of the great powers.
One natural response of middle powers in such a situation would
be to explore the possibility of protecting their interests by co
operating with each other, and perhaps with small states as well.
The purpose of such co-operation would be to create a diplomatic
counterweight to the concert strong enough to resist the encroach
ments of the great powers . This was the policy pursued by
Wiirttemberg in the early years of the German Confederation ,
when politics in central Europe were dominated by the conservative
partnerShip of Austria and Prussia. Then acting under the motto of
'peaceful dualism' , Metternich, representing the senior partner, as a
rule took great care to consult the Prussian statesmen and secure
their agreement on all matters of mutual concern . To some of the
lesser states, this arrangement appeared, in the words of Gagern,
who represented Dutch interests, rather as a 'masked duum
virate'; 1 6 and Wiirttemberg took the lead in opposing it. U nder the
guidance of Wangenheim, its representative in the Federal Diet,
this middle state became the spokesman of the ' third Germany' and
the champion of Triaspolitik, according to which the middle and the
smaller states would come together in a 'confederation within the
Confederation' and Germany assume a tripartite structure . 1 7 From
a less official position , Lindner, eq ually concerned about the
rights of the lesser states, advocated a similar policy. 1 8 But, contrary
to Wangenheim, he countenanced foreign patronage for the ' pure
German confederation' . 1 9 I n doing so, he implicitly acknowledged
the central difficulty about realising the scheme of Triaspolitik,
namely the weakness of the rest of Germany in relation to Austria
and Prussia. Even if all the other states had combined under the
leadership of one or more middle states, they could not have
transformed the dualism into a triangular balance of power.
As it was, the attempt never got off the ground . Absence of

solidarity among the middle states themselves and lack of support
from the smaller states doomed Triaspolitik from the start. In the
early years of the Confederation, Bavaria and Hanover, the
strongest of the middle states, professed to see themselves as near
eq uals of the two great powers, which made it difficult for them to
identify with the other middle states . Many of the smaller states
were more afraid of the pretensions and ambitions of various middle
states, with whom some of them shared borders, than of the
overwhelming power of Austria and Prussia. Hence they often
found it safer to lean towards the great powers, especially towards
Prussia, which had particularly tense relations with the middle
states, than to back these states . Like the unifocal system, 2 0 the
dualistic one presen ts signs of a 'sandwich' pattern, with the top and
the bottom layers of the society of states tending to combine against
the middle.
I n the 1 960s, certain faint tendencies of the two superpowers to
concert their policies in various important fields provoked reactions
from apprehensive middle powers not unlike those of the middle
states in the early years of the German Confederation . The nuclear
test-ban treaty negotiated by the Russian and American govern
ments in the Kennedy years was seen by the Chinese and French as
essentially a scheme to maintain the overwhelming strategic
superiority of the superpowers . The tentative Soviet rapprochement
with the U nited S tates after Russia's disengagement from China in
the later Khrushchev years raised apprehensions in Warsaw, where
Russian overtures to West Germany seemed a possible parallel with
frightening prospects. The attempt to impose the nuclear non
proliferation treaty on the world , spearheaded by the superpowers
and Britain in the later 1 960s, drew initially a rather negative
response from such countries as Brazil, I ndia and West Germany,
which were anxious not to close for ever the option of developing
nuclear explosives, whether for economic or for diplomatic or for
strategic purposes. And the superpowers' tacit recognition of each
other's spheres of influence, particularly in Central America and
Eastern Europe, which allowed the United States to interfere in the
Dominican Republic in 1 965 and the Soviet U nion to invade
Czechoslovakia in 1 968 with impunity , further enhanced the sense
of insecurity that some middle powers had about Russo-American
detente. Their earlier fear of the Cold War leading to a real war had
in some cases been replaced by anxiety abou t an emerging concert
which might conceivably develop into something that could be
called a 'condominium' .
As in post- 1 8 1 5 Germany, such middle-power fears gave rise to a
num ber of sporadic, and largely futile, moves to co-operate against
the would-be 'duopolists ' . Most of these efforts, such as West
German and Japanese consultations about a joint response to the
pressure to have the non-proliferation treaty accepted , were limited
or half-hearted . The best thought-out and most determined attempt
to build up opposition to a superpower concert came from Mao's
China. As part of its reaction to Russo-American 'collusion ' , it
advanced what became known as the doctrine of the 'second
intermediate zone ' , according to which China was permitted to
exploit the contradictions between the United States and its
principal allies by co-operating temporarily with some secondary
capitalist states . Under Chou-en-lai's direction, the Chinese govern
ment began to make overtures to various West European powers .
If Mao's China may be said to have assumed Wiirttemberg's old
role, that of the would-be prompter of an association of lesser states
to counter a great-power concert, France and Britain in the 1 960s
often took courses that resembled more those of Bavaria and
Hanover. Both of them reluctant to relinquish the great-power
status they had enjoyed in the post-war years, France under de
Gaulle occasionally revived the concept of the Big Four while
Britain steadfastly clung to the notion of a special relationship with
the United States.
The German states system of the earlier years of the Confed
eration as well as the global system of the first decade of East-West
detente showed tendencies towards the formation of a class struc
ture. 2 1 In both cases, a degree of co-ordination between the great
powers provoked some attempts at co-operation among the secon
dary states . But the record also shows j ust how scattered and
irresolute, and unsuccessful, these efforts on the whole were. Neither
the German middle states nor the modern middle powers were able
to sink their differences and concert their policies enough to provide
joint opposition to a great-power concert and collective protection
against the risks of condominium. While a few called for co
operation, most followed their own separate lines . The notorious
difficulty of establishing and maintaining an effective concert of two
great powers is apparently matched by an even greater difficulty of
co-ordinating the reactions of a group of middle powers .
The reasons for this may be twofold . First, the dangers presented
by a great-power concert seem to be not quite overwhelming enough

to frighten the middle powers into solidarity. Though substantial,
they can rarely be of the most extreme kind . For these powers, as well
as for most other members of the system, even a high degree of co
operation between the two great powers must be preferable both to
the domination that might result if one great power secured
hegemony and to the anarchy that might prevail if no great powers
were able or willing to assume international responsibilities. Second,
the great-power concert may present some of the more prominent
middle powers with opportunities attractive enough to tempt them
to dissociate themselves from the rest of their group . Bavaria and
Hanover posing as would-be great powers in the early years of the
German Confederation, and France and Britain clinging to their
special status as former great powers in the first period of East-West
detente, are indications that the chance of being accepted at a level
dose to that of the great powers may sometimes loom larger than the
risk of being reduced to a position not far above that of the ranks of
small powers. Middle powers faced with such an opportunity may
be more likely to seek an association with the great powers than to
make a bid for leadership of the lesser ones.
Whether such middle powers succeed in forming a special
relationship with the great powers, perhaps even j oining them in an
enlarged concert, will depend partly on how much they have to
contribute to the management of international politics and partly on
how willing the great powers are to share responsibility with them .
Neither Bavaria nor Hanover had its claims accepted by the two
German great powers . And when France and Britain in the initial
phase of the conflict in the Middle East in 1 967 separately took
certain diplomatic steps to help manage the crisis, they were
frustrated in their attempts and forced to leave all further efforts to
control the situation to the superpowers. Only one of these powers,
the United States, responded positively to the French proposal for a
revival of the Big Four concert of the post-war years and the British
plan for a multilateral force . 2 2 In more favourable situations,
however, there may well be subordinate parts for a few middle
powers . In a global dualistic system, they are likely to be of a
specialised or regional character. One example is the nuclear
concert of the late 1 960s, in which two former great powers played
secondary roles. Britain, acting together with the United States and
the Soviet Union, was one of the original sponsors of the non
proliferation treaty . Though France refused to sign the treaty, this
power, too, in effect joined the concert by declaring that it would act
as if it had signed . Occasionally the same two middle powers secured
roles of some importance in informal concerts set up to deal with the
affairs of a particular region, especially the Middle East. However,
the superpower concert of the 1 960s was rarely substantial enough to
provide solid material for a study of the roles of secondary powers in
relation to this type of central relationship.
While a dualistic concert may inspire some middle powers with
fear and others with hope, their reactions in either case are likely to
differ markedly from those of most smaller states in the system . The
fear of being reduced to the level of the near-powerless must be felt
more strongly by middle-ranking powers endangered by the great
power concert than by the maj ority of small states . The latter, too,
may well have their diplomatic scope curtailed as a result of great
power co-operation but, being weak already, will generally have less
to lose, and therefore less reason to be concerned about the central
relationship. If some of them believed that certain middle powers
presented a greater threat to them than any or both of the great
powers did, they might even welcome and support such j oint
measures of the latter as seemed likely to restrain the middle powers.
In the German Confederation, as we have seen, many of the small
states were inclined to support one or both of the great powers
against the middle states, their traditional enemies . The reactions to
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty may be seen as further evidence
of tendencies towards the formation of a 'sandwich' pattern of
support. The small states, most of them without either the possibility
or the intention of ever developing nuclear arms, were generally in
favour of the treaty sponsored by the superpowers and Britain, while
its more determined opponents were those middle powers that were
reluctant to give up the option of acquiring such weapons. Often
having more to lose and sometimes also less to gain from great-power
control than other states, many middle powers are likely to be more
opposed to a dualistic concert than most of the lesser powers in the
system - even though they may act separately rather than jointly
and protest rather than resist.
For the middle powers with the opportunity of becoming either
j unior partners or agents of the great powers, the situation created
by a dualistic concert must be even more different from that facing
the small states. None of the latter can normally hope to gain a share
in the management of international politics. What is more, some of
them may actually find themselves at a disadvantage as a result of
the strengthening in the diplomatic position of the middle-power

collaborators . For an African nation under pressure from France or
Britain, for example, it must be a matter of serious concern to know
that the middle power in question is backed, passively or actively, by
one or both of the superpowers. Here it is the small state that stands
to lose more and gain less than the middle power. Thus, for middle
powers with the possibility of associating themselves with the great
powers, a dualistic concert must be a good deal easier to accept than
it can be for at least some small states .
Though a few middle powers may see opportunities in a great
power concert, most are likely to greet it with apprehension . Though
some small states may find the concert a drawback, many are likely
to consider it an advantage . Even where a number of middle powers
and small states find themselves on the same side in their reactions to
th e concert, their motivations for either opposing or supporting it
will probably be rather different. While most middle p(>wers will
oppose it out offear of the great powers, some small states may dislike
it mainly because of their tense relations with one or more middle
power collaborators . While some middle powers may support the
concert with a view to j oining it, many small states may welcome it
as a means of securing protection against certain middle powers.
But, whatever their rank and motivation, states that take the same
side may ultimately rest their case on the same sort of arguments.
Those that see themselves as potential victims of a d ualistic concert
can base their opposition on the sovereign rights of states, while those
that consider themselves among the likely beneficiaries of such an
arrangement can rest their support on the need for international
order.
5.3 R IVALRY AND CO-OPERATION
The third situation of the dualistic system to be considered here is

characterised by a mixture of conflict and harmony in the cen tral
relationship. Both of the elements that mark the situations already
discussed are present, but in weaker forms . Rivalry is generally less
intense, being conducted perhaps on the political and economic as
much as on the strategic and military levels, and crises normally less
frequent or less dangerous than in cold war. Co-operation is on the
whole not so advanced as in diplomatic concert, being limited in
either degree or extent, and may take the less demanding form of
tacit co-ordination. The various possible mixtures of the two

elements form a wide range, with a situation approaching cold war
at one extreme and a state of affairs close to diplomatic concert at
the other. But any particular relationship is more likely to present a
fluctuating combination than a stable balance between conflict and
harmony.
I n a situation in which rivalry between the great powers is
tempered with a measure of co-operation, the polarising tendencies
in the system will be weaker than in cold war. It will not be quite so
important for each of the two powers to put pressure on other states
to fall in line, and not quite so necessary for such states to seek
protection in a tight alliance system, or to guard their independence
by remaining strictly unaligned . The likely results are alliances with
a degree of looseness rather than firm blocs, and a large number of
floating states rather than a group of determined neutrals. In such a
structure, the distinction between aligned and unaligned states will
be more blurred than in a highly polarised system . On the one hand ,
the aligned states will enjoy greater autonomy in relations with the
alliance leader. They will be freer to challenge the great power,
especially on matters not of decisive importance for the issue with
the opposite side, and may sometimes also take initiatives of their
own in relations with the other great power and its allies . On the
other hand , the unaligned states will be in a better position to play
the balance between the great powers and their allies . Being more
than principal objects and potential victims of a rivalry between
hostile camps, they will be freer to lean one way or the other in order
to take advantage of a favourable bargaining position .
Conversely, where co-operation between the great powers is
modified by considerable rivalry, the oppressing tendencies in the
system will be weaker than under diplomatic concert. The two
quasi-partners in the management of international politics will find
it harder to co-ordinate their policies and more difficult to carry out
parallel measures. With less to fear and less to gain from the efforts of
the great powers, the other members of the system will not have so
strong an incentive to either oppose or support would-be collabor
ation at the top level. Hence, in the system at large at any rate, the
tendencies towards the formation of a class structure of inter
national society and a sandwich pattern of alignment are likely to be
weaker than under diplomatic concert.
Compared with both cold war and diplomatic concert, a mixed
situation tends to offer the middle powers in the system greater
diplomatic scope. The dangers generally attending those more

extreme situations, particularly of the outbreak of general war on
the one hand and of the establishment ofcondominium on the other,
being rather more remote, these powers are not subject to quite the
same restraints and can contemplate policies and actions that
otherwise might be too dangerous or simply impossible. The actual
conduct of middle powers in dualistic systems of mixed relations may
be studied in certain periods of German politics in the nineteenth
century as well as in at least one stage of global politics in more
recent years. Relations between Austria and Prussia in the decades
before 1 848, after ' peaceful dualism' had given way to moderate
rivalry and before the rivalry developed into a more intense conflict,
as well as in the later 1 850s displayed a mixture of rivalry and co
operation . So, on a grander scale, did Russo-American relations in
the middle and late 1 960s, after the post- 1 962 detente had failed to
lead to a broad diplomatic concert and before the rise of China
created a diplomatic triangle which pointed towards the transform
ation of the dualism into a more complex structure . Though
something can be learned from an examination of the reactions of
the German middle states within the relatively simple organisation
of the Confederation, it is the much larger and more intricate global
political system of the 1 960s that best illustrates the wide range of
roles open to middle powers in a situation of ambiguous relations
between the great powers .
In a survey of these roles, a broad distinction, obviously more
applicable to a global than to a geographically confined system of
states, may be made between those that belong to the central
relationship or the states system at large and those that are
essentially regional or local , between systemic and sub-systemic
roles. Considering first the former category, we may introduce a
secondary distinction, which is related to the nature of the
international situations in which the middle powers perform these
roles. Given that the relations between the great powers are
ambiguous and changing, the proportion between the elements of
rivalry and co-operation may vary in both time and space, with
rivalry predominating some time or somewhere and co-operation
prevailing at other times or elsewhere . Hence we may try to
separate the type of situation where middle powers face two great
powers that are engaged in what is essentially restrained rivalry
rather than limited co-operation, from the type of situation where
the opposite is the case. Dealing first with the former type, we may
introduce a third distinction, namely the familiar one between

middle powers that tend to take sides and those that prefer to remain
unaligned . That the various categories are not always mutually
exclusive but present a certain amount of overlapping will in some
cases allow us to view the same type of role in different perspectives .
In discussing the systemic roles typical of aligned middle powers
in conditions of restrained rivalry, we may start by noting the
reasons why such states take sides and support one great power
against the other. They are much the same as in dualistic situations
of more intense conflict. Like other states, the middle powers are
guided by power calculations or ideological considerations or by
both, either or both of which could lead them into a defensive or an
aggressive alliance . When the middle states in the rivalry of the
German Confederation sided with anti-national and anti-liberal
Austria in opposition to the constitutional schemes and hegemonial
ambitions of Prussia, they were not only supporting conservatism
against revisionism but also backing what appeared to be the
stronger of the two powers and the one more likely to respect their
rights. However, they were dependants rather than supporters of
Austria. Though they liked to see themselves as holding the balance
in German politics, it was in fact the balance of power between
Austria and Prussia that was maintaining them. When this balance
eventually collapsed and gave way to Prussian hegemony, the
middle states soon disappeared altogether. In the periods of limited
rivalry that preceded these developments, before 1 848 and in the
later 1 850s, the roles performed by the four principal middle states
in relation to the issue between the two great powers were minimal.
Too weak and disunited to exert much influence, they could do little
of real consequence to the central relationship. We must look
elsewhere for material to throw light on the roles open to middle
powers in such situations .
East-West politics of the detente period of the 1 960s had
something in common with the limited rivalry within the German
Confederation as far as the alignment of secondary states was
concerned . Again, most middle powers found themselves on the side
of the more conservative and , as yet, stronger of the great powers . Of
the European states here defined as middle powers, only Poland was
with the Soviet Union . In Asia, China escaped the restraints of the
alliance with its superpower neighbour and moved towards an
unaligned position . On the Western side, de Gaulle took advantage
of the detente by challenging Washington within NATO and
seeking support for his obstruction of American policies from other

powers in Europe, which set up cross-pressures in a few capitals,
especially Bonn, and led to some loosening of the bonds of alliance.
But the division that had come about in the Cold War largely
survived, with the result that most of the middle powers of the world
remained on the Western side. In this situation, it was the conduct of
the European middle powers, Eastern as well as Western, that most
clearly indicated the nature of the parts that such powers may
assume in conditions of limited rivalry.
Some of the parts seem to be much the same as in cold war,
though the reduced risk of general war is apt to affect both the
salience of the roles and the ability of the middle powers to perform
them. This applies not least to the whole field of amelioration of the
central relationship. In a rivalry already of only moderate intensity,
restraint of the alliance leader may well seem less necessary. If the
exercise of such restraint depends on a degree of intimacy between
the middle power and the great power, the looser quality of the
alliance could in some cases make it also more difficult to carry out.
On the other hand, to the extent that a successful exercise of
restraint presupposes a measure of independence on behalf of the
ally, the same quality of the alliance could make it instead easier to
achieve . I t may be a matter of the relative effectiveness of the private
warnings and urgings of a Lester Pearson and the public disagree
ment and criticism of a Charles de Gaulle. Providing good offices
and mediating between the great powers, too, are services likely to
be in less demand than in situations of cold war, because of the lower
level of tension and easier contact between the rivals. Yet, Poland 's
role in relation to the parties involved in the Vietnam war in the
1 960s shows that such acts are still possible. For peace-keeping, the
third way in which middle powers may play an ameliorating role,
the need may be greater than in cold war, since truces and
accommodations of the type requiring such action are more likely to
be arranged when the level of tension is lower. I t is significant that
interest in peace-keeping functions reached its highest point in the
1 960s .
However, the situation of restrained conflict may also present
aligned middle powers with the possibility of assuming roles other
than those characteristic of cold war. I n relation to the central
division, perhaps the most constructive part that they might
attempt is that of 'bridge-building' . While, under conditions of cold
war, discipline within each alliance often is such that political
relations between the camps tend to be conducted directly and

exclusively by the great powers, in the more relaxed situation of
limited rivalry the middle-power allies often enjoy diplomatic
autonomy enough to allow them to initiate contacts of their own
with the other side. Sometimes a middle power may actually find
itself better placed than the alliance leader to launch such
initiatives. Though some significant moves may be in the direction
of the great-power opponent, the general tendency seems to be to
aim at its middle- and small-power allies. While de Gaulle's France
directed its efforts at both Russia and the lesser East European
countries, other Western middle powers concentrated their diplo
matic offensive of the 1 960s on the allies of the Soviet U nion . West
Germany in particular, through Ostpolitik, exploited its special
position in relation to the countries of Eastern Europe. On the other
side of the division too, Poland , though anxious to improve its
relations with the United States, pursued its detente policy mainly
in Europe. Rapprochement with West Germany, realisation of the
Gomulka Plan for a freeze on nuclear weapons in central Europe,
and convening of a European security conference were among the
main points of the policy initiated by Gomulka and continued by
the Gierek government. 2 3 After the Warsaw visit of Nixon and
Kissinger in 1 9 72 a Polish writer could conclude that the role of
middle powers 'increases proportionately to the progress of detente
in East-West relations ' . 2 4
While, on balance, there may be more scope for aligned middle
powers under conditions of limited rivalry than in cold war, it
cannot be assumed that they will always use their enhanced
influence so as to ease relations between the two sides . As in cold
war, they may have so large a stake in the conflict, or in particular
issues, that they are driven to pursue policies that tend to exacerbate
tension . In such cases, too, a lower risk of war and a greater measure
of independence of the alliance leader are likely to be of advantage
to the middle powers concerned . In the Suez crisis of 1 956, Britain
and France, unable to disregard the dangers of intensifying the Cold
War and very aware of their dependence on the United States, had
to abandon their action in response to American pressure and
demand for a withdrawal . But twelve years later, in conditions of
detente, a middle power on the other side of the East-West division
successfully sponsored action of a type that tended to aggravate
tension in the central relationship. In the crisis over Czechoslovakia,
Poland, together with East Germany, apparently encouraged , and
perhaps even pressed, the Soviet Union to organise an invasion of

the territory of their ally. Only a tacit and tentative agreement
between the superpowers to respect each other's spheres of in
fluence, backed by a shared concern to keep East-West tension
below a certain level, allowed the Warsaw Pact countries to carry
out their invasion and occupation with impunity. Without such an
agreement, what started as an intramural crisis in Eastern Europe
could conceivably have developed into a major East-West crisis .
Thus, while a lower level of tension between the two sides may leave
latitude enough for middle powers and others to promote policies
that involve a significant risk of intensifying the central conflict, the
desire or need of the great powers to restrain their rivalry may be
strong enough to prevent too serious an exacerbation of tension
between the alliances. If in conditions of intense conflict the risk of
major war limits the scope of middle powers bent on potentially
aggravating conduct, in situations of restrained conflict the element
of co-operation in the central relationship may limit the effect of
such conduct.
The list of systemic roles characteristic of unaligned middle
powers in situations of restrained rivalry, too, shows a marked
change of emphasis when compared with that of cold war. For such
powers as well, a lower level of tension in the central relationship
presents a rather different set of problems and opportunities which
is bound to have some effect on their international conduct. The
results may be detected not only in their roles in relation to the
central conflict but also in certain other systemic parts occasionally
attempted by unaligned middle powers.
As in situations of cold war, powers that tend to take the level of
tension between the two sides for given might either stay aloof from
the central conflict and mind their own business or play the balance
and try to benefit from the rivalry of the great powers. From choice,
or more likely from necessity, a few middle powers may take the
former course. In the first years of the East-West detente, Nigeria
remained almost entirely uninvolved in anything but narrow local
affairs. And South Africa, ostracised by international society, was
compelled to confine its role to its immediate neighbourhood . But
such a degree of willing or enforced passivity is likely to be rare.
Though the pressures on middle powers to involve themselves in
systemic politics may be weaker than in cold war, the opportunities
to secure substantial advantages by doing so are such that most
unaligned middle powers may be expected to take a more active
line.
For some, the most attractive policy will be balancing between

the two sides of the central conflict and playing one off against the
other. While the lower degree of tension generally limits the risk of
being caught up in major war and the danger of ending up as victim
of the rivalry, the keenness of the competition that still goes on
between the great powers may allow middle powers that choose this
part to exploit a favourable bargaining position, perhaps to the
point of drawing benefits from both sides . In the restrained rivalry of
the 1 960s, some unaligned middle powers were able to make the
superpowers compete for the supply of aid and arms. The I ndian
government of the time, having changed the priorities of its foreign
policy, in effect did 'this . When, after its earlier preoccupation with
limiting the Cold War and reforming world politics, it found that it
had to concentrate on securing foreign aid , this government made
the realisation of its second five-year plan virtually dependent on
both American and Russian aid, some of which it received directly
and some indirectly . After the war with China, I ndia became more
concerned with defence and securi ty. While clinging to the doctrine
of non-alignment, it gradually abandoned the principle of equi
distance and moved closer to the Soviet Union, until the relation
ship seemed to be one of almost open dependence on the superpower
that was nearer and had more to offer.
For the unaligned middle powers that regard the central rivalry
as open to manipulation , the number of possibilities is again, as in
cold war, two: namely, attempting to exacerbate tension between
the parties, and intervening to ease relations between them . The
former course, though less dangerous than in situations of more
intense conflict, is still a difficult one. Even in conditions of
restrained rivalry, an uncommitted secondary power may rarely be
able seriously to aggravate conflict between two great-power
opponents which want to keep tension between themselves and
their allies below a certain level. China, which in the 1 960s pursued
a policy of dividing the superpowers and enjoyed a measure of
support from other have-not states, was unable to prevent the
establishment of a detente. There is no reason to suppose that any
lesser middle power could have been more successful in the role of
troublemaker.
As in the case of the aligned ones, the need for unaligned middle
powers to act as catalysts of detente is on the whole less pressing than
in cold war. Only in peace-keeping, for which such powers often are
well suited , might there be, as already explained, more of a role in
conditions of restrained conflict . For good offices and mediation by
third parties there is likely to be less of a demand because of the

lower level of tension and the greater amount of direct contact
between the principal parties . This may have been one reason why
soon after the Belgrade Conference of 1 96 1 the traditional concerns
with East-West politics became partially eclipsed by other issues in
the eollective thinking of the leaders of non -aligned states. While the
I ndian government, as we have seen, allowed its earlier preoccup
ations with the Russo-American dualism to be superseded by its
concern first with development and aid and then security and
defence, the I ndonesian government, under Sukarno's leadership,
tried to shift the attention of the world from the East-West issue to
the North-South confrontation . 2 5 These departures from the spirit
of Bandung and Belgrade, which for India at least involved a
marked diminution in diplomatic standing in the world, pointed
towards a variety of international roles not directly related to the
central rivalry .
On the systemic level, one such role was that of bringing to the
fore global issues other than those that had been prominent in the
East-West conflict. The period of detente, when the superpowers
seemed to be moving towards a relationship of peaceful co
existence , seemed a good time for certain unaligned middle powers
to demand more attention for matters of special concern to
themselves . Beset by intractable economic difficulties and preoc
cupied with the striking contrast between the rich and the poor
parts of the world, some of the foremost members of the non-aligned
movement, backed by most other countries of the Third World ,
reinforced their efforts to bring the economic ineq uality among
nations to the notice of the world and to effect some real changes in
the global distribution of wealth. While I ndia, under Nehru and his
successors, continued to follow the more moderate, reformist line,
I ndonesia with increasing vigour pressed for confrontation . 'I think
we can have full confidence in the ability of Moscow and
Washington to find additional accommodation and increased
rapprochement', Sukarno said in a speech at the conference of non
aligned states in Cairo in 1 964, developing the view of the world
that he had ou dined already at Belgrade: 2 6
I am convinced that they will continue to co-exist peacefully, and

with increasing ease. I think we should compliment them on their
achievement. Long live peaceful co-existence between Moscow
and Washington ! I do not think they are in need of us at this
present j uncture ! However, we will do well to transfer our

attention and to exert our energies upon a more complicated and
more urgent matter. And that is the serious problem of peaceful
co-existence between the old forces of domination and the new
developing nations. 2 7
As part of its policy, I ndonesia made a bid for joint leadership with
China of all the have-not states. That middle power, too, was
determined to belittle the ideological and political issues between the
Soviet Union and the United States and to intensify the conflict
between the advanced and the disadvantaged parts of the world .
Whether they favoured reform or whether they pursued revolution ,
by stressing the North-South issue so strongly the unaligned middle
powers played an important part in varying the focus of global
politics and increasing the complexi ty of international relations.
The last systemic role of unaligned powers distinguished in the
discussion of cold-war situations, that of uniting to transform the
dualistic structure of the system, may be even less typical under
conditions of restrained conflict. The reasons for this are twofold .
First, if the two principal motivations for exploring the possibility of
forming a third bloc and turning the dualism into a diplomatic
triangle are fear of the possible results of a very high level of tension
between the great powers and desire to acq uire greater leverage in
inter-bloc politics, the incentives will tend to be weaker when
tension is lower and polarity looser. Second, if one of the main
obstacles to forming a third bloc is disagreement among the
unaligned powers themselves, the task seems likely to be even more
difficult to accomplish in conditions of restrained rivalry, which
may offer at least some of these powers such tempting opportunities
to pursue separate goals, particularly at sub-systemic levels, that
they will find schemes of diplomatic concert and unity even less
attractive . It is significant that the non-aligned powers as a whole
found it much more difficult to agree on a common set of principles
in the 1 960s than in the 1 950s. To the extent that I ndonesia and
China had any success at all in uniting the poorer countries behind
their leadership, it was on the North-South issue only. When,
eventually, the global political system did begin to take on the
character of a triangle, it was not as a result of the formation of a
bloc of unaligned countries, but through the diplomatic rise of
China.
Mixed situations characterised by limited co-operation between
the great powers rather than restrained rivalry do not present quite
so wide a range of systemic roles for the middle powers, and can be
dealt with more briefly here. As under conditions of full diplomatic
concert, middle powers may either oppose or support the central
relationship, though their systemic incentive to do either may not be
q uite so strong. Those that take the former line are more likely to
oppose separately than jointly. The known difficulties that at the
best of times stand in the way of a j oint effort, namely weakness in
relation to the great powers, disagreement among themselves and
lack of support from small powers , will be particularly difficult for
the middle powers to overcome in a situation where co-operation at
the top level is only limited and oppression oflesser powers therefore
less pronounced than under concert. On the other hand , since co
operation between the great powers is already tempered with a
substantial measure of rivalry, individual middle powers de
termined to oppose the quasi-partnership of the great may find it a
little easier than under conditions of concert to keep the would-be
partners apart, and in favourable circumstances perhaps even to
divide them further. The case of China in the 1 960s is instructive.
Before its cultural revolu tion, this power, as we have seen , explored
the possibility of organising joint opposition with certain other
middle powers to a Russo-American relationship that showed some
signs of developing into diplomatic concert but never really went
beyond rather limited co-operation in special fields and occasional
tacit co-ordination of diplomatic measures . Later, having failed to
prevent a Russo_:-American detente in this manner, China managed
to maintain a pressure of its own on the superpowers, the aim of
which was to disrupt, or at least curb, a relationship which, seen
from Peking, then appeared as a mixture of collusion and struggle,
with the former element directed at itself in particular.
However, since a great-power relationship of no more than quite
limited collaboration in many cases can present only little real
danger to secondary powers in the system and in some cases may
even offer interesting diplomatic opportunities for them, most
middle powers may well be inclined to support the arrangement.
Some of them may actually seek to play an active part in it. To the
extent that they sucr.eed , their roles are likely to be either as junior
partners or, if the system covers a very large area, as regional agents
of the great-power collaborators. In the former case, they may join a
quasi-concert presided over by the two great powers, perhaps on a
temporary basis to help deal with a crisis in the relations between
certain other states, or more permanently to assist in the manage

ment of a particular set of international issues . Thus Bri tain and
France, the latter after some delay and with a number of
reservations, joined the nuclear concert of the late 1 960s, of which
the foremost expression was the non-proliferation treaty . Middle
powers may find themselves in the other role, of regional agents of
the principal powers, if they take a hand in the management of the
international politics of a particular part of the world and have the
support or at least the approval of the great powers . Again Britain
and France in the 1 960s provide an example, this time in relation to
African affairs. In a situation where the superpowers seemed to be
groping for ways of engaging each other in limited collaboration
and at a stage when Africa was not an important arena ofEast-West
rivalry, these powers, each of them then still with considerable
influence and a number of responsibilities in the region, occasion
ally assumed managerial functions in local conflicts, sometimes with
the backing of one superpower and the acquiescence of the other.
For the role of junior partner as well as for that of regional agent,
upper middle powers, with their greater political experience and
diplomatic weight, often seem better suited than others . But, as in
the case of full diplomatic concert, the possibility of any middle
power assuming a supporting part, of whichever type distinguished
here, must depend not only on its ability and inclination to perform
the role but also on the willingness of the two great powers to share
or delegate some of their international responsibilities.
One of the most striking features of a global, or at least very
extensive, dualistic system characterised by a mixture of rivalry and
co-operation in the central relationship is that it gives most middle
powers considerably larger scope for autonomous roles than they
normally enjoy in conditions of either cold war or diplomatic
concert. Neither exposed to those intense pressures to relate their
international conduct to the central rivalry, which are character
istic of cold war, nor subj ect to that high degree of managerial
control that is inherent in diplomatic concert, the middle powers in
such a system are often much freer to pursue regional interests and
local concerns of their own . In doing so, they are likely to develop
complex patterns of international relations, which may involve
other middle powers in the vicinity, one or both of the great powers
in the system, and some smaller states in the region , and to take on
various sub-systemic roles which in spite of the geographical
limitations may be quite important . The character of their
relationships and the nature of their roles present a broad range of

possibilities . In some regions and under some conditions, a middle
power may enj oy preponderance and influence enough to establish
itself as the local great power, with or without great-power backing.
I n other regions or in other circumstances, two or more middle
powers may engage each other i n rivalry, with or without great
power involvement . Elsewhere or under different conditions, a
number of middle powers may establish a regional concert, with or
without support from the great powers and with or without
participation by local small states .
The role of the regional great power that is backed , tacitly or
explicitly, by the two great powers in the system is, when viewed in
the context of the central relationship, essentially that of an agent. I t
depends o n a degree of co-operation between the great powers . The
nearest examples in the 1 960s migh t be the parts played by France
and Britain in Africa, already mentioned . However, given the
tension between the great powers, it is more likely that such a
middle power will have the support of only one of them, or that it
will maintain itself more or less independently of both of them .
When Brazil , in the second half of the 1 960s, began to cast itself for
the role of the great power of South America, the background was
its long history in the part of ally and agent of the United States .
Japan had the benefit of military and strategic protection from the
same great power when it went all out to develop its industrial
potential and secure economic dominance in South East Asia. And
I ndia was on friendly terms with the Soviet Union when it
consolidated its position in the subcontinent by defeating Pakistan
and assisting in the creation of Bangia Desh . Support from above
may also take the form of an upper middle power encouraging a
lower middle power to pursue or develop certain regional am
bitions . I ndonesia derived more than moral support from China
when, in the first half of the 1 960s , it cast itself as the guardian of the
hemisphere; and Nigeria received much encouragement from
Britain before it ventured on to the path of regional primacy, first in
West Africa and then in most of black Africa . The best example of a
middle power asserting itself independently of both principal and
secondary powers may be South Africa, which enj oyed little real
support from above when it reacted to international ostracisation by
securing its position among the immediate neighbours and de
pendencies of the Republic .
For the purpose of examining the relations between a middle
power in the position of local great power and the smaller states
under its influence, some of the distinctions introduced in the
analysis of the unifocal system may be useful. 2 8 Here, too the
various ways of exercising preponderance can be arranged accord
ing to degree of force employed and measure of willing acceptance
offered . If the term 'dominance' stands for a combination of
habitual use, or threat, of force and a minimum of willing
acceptance, South Africa's struggle for racial survival and
I ndonesia's pursuit of over-ambitious goals may have produced the
best examples of dominant middle powers . If hegemony means
occasional coercion and a moderate degree of acceptance , Brazil,
allowing for the relatively low incidence of international violence in
the region to which it belongs, and I ndia may be seen as cases of
hegemonic middle powers . And if primacy is the term we use for
situations where force is not brought into play and acceptance is
granted in substantial measure, Japan, having exercised its pre
ponderance in South East Asia almost exclusively in the economic
sphere, and Nigeria, having been careful to maintain an extremely
low profile in foreign affairs, seem among the most obvious
examples .
Where there are two or more middle powers in a region, a rivalry
may develop . Such a rivalry, especially if it became both keen and
prolonged , could not easily take its course without at least some
involvement or intervention by the great powers . The influence
exercised by these powers would be likely to reflect the ambiguity of
their own relationship . While most of the time they might support,
perhaps even encourage, a rival each, in situations of crisis they
might try to impose restraint as well. That it is from the politics of
the Middle East in the 1 960s that this mixture of encouragement
and restraint has become most familiar shows that regional or local
rivalry with a degree of great-power involvement is by no means
limited to the states that here have been classed as middle powers .
The best examples of regional conflict between such powers in the
same period were those of I ndia, Pakistan and China, all of which
then could be regarded as middle powers . Like the intensification of
the struggle between Israel and the Arab states, the enmities in the
subcontinent might be seen as part of the broad shift from direct
conflict and crises between the great powers to local rivalries and
wars between lesser powers that followed the detente in Russo
American relations. But the pattern of great-power involvement in
the subcontinent was rather more complex than in the Middle East.
I n the I ndo-Pakistani conflict, the U nited States, the stronger but

more distant of the great powers, traditionally supported Pakistan,
the weaker and newer of the rivals, while the Soviet Union generally
backed India, the stronger and more established party. In the Sino
Indian conflict, the Soviet Union, after its rift with China, involved
itself ever more deeply with I ndia, while the United States
gradually disengaged itself from the region - a move that could be
seen as a reaction to early signs of a diplomatic triangle emerging in
the global system . The result for the three middle powers was
somewhat unequal degrees of dependence on the great powers .
While China, relying on its own resources, enjoyed considerable
autonomy in regional politics, I ndia and Pakistan, each in varying
measures dependent on military, diplomatic and economic support
from outside, had to accept certain limitations on their roles in the
local rivalries.
Where two middle powers engage each other in regional rivalry,
a dualistic sub-system, with some of the features of the central
system examined in this chapter, may establish itself. Here, too, the
intensity of the rivalry will condition the international conduct of
the smaller states in the vicinity . Both the I ndo-Pakistani and the
Sino-Indian conflict went through various levels of tension, ranging
from restrained rivalry and cold war to crisis and war, each of which
influenced the policies and actions of most of the small states in the
area . A similar conflict in a region with a larger number of states, for
example between Brazil and Argentina in South America or
between Nigeria and South Africa in Africa, might conceivably
produce patterns of small-state behaviour almost as varied as those
distinguished in the discussion above of the conduct of middle
powers in conditions of dualistic conflict at the systemic level . If the
rivalry is intense and lasting enough to give rise to a degree of
polarisation in the sub-system, a few of the more prominent small
powers, some of them aligned and others perhaps unaligned , might
attempt roles in regard to the middle-power duel comparable to
some of those occasionally assumed by middle powers in relation to
great-power rivalry. However, the possibility of such initiatives,
whether of the ameliorating or of the exacerbating kind , having any
effect at all on the conflict must be subj ect to the influence exerted
on the middle-power rivals by the great powers.
The third of the regional middle-power roles distinguished here,
that of concert leader, also seems often to depend on a degree of
support from one of the great powers . The EEC, in which France,
West Germany and I taly, later joined by Britain, took the principal
parts, owed a good deal to American sponsorship . While the United
States encouraged the creation and aided the early development of
the Community, NATO provided the military and strategic
protection under which the members could pursue their goal of a
degree of economic and political integration . Similarly, LAFT A, in
which Argentina, Brazil and Mexico accepted the parts of big
members, took shape within the protective framework of OAS . 211
ASEAN , on the other hand , in which Suharto's I ndonesia from the
outset played the leading role, was essentially an autonomous
enterprise with little backing from outside the region . I ndeed , while
the declared aim of this association of South East Asian states with
non-communist governments was to facilitate economic co
operation, one of the principal concerns of its members was to
protect the region against interference by outside great and maj or
powers . But ASEAN was an exception . I n a dualistic system with a
substantial amount of rivalry and some tendencies towards polaris
ation, regional associations of states may only rarely be able to
establish themselves and survive without some form of support from
one great power or the other .
As in the case of central concerts, the obj ectives as well as the form
and style of regional concerts can vary greatly. A sub-systemic
association of states may be set up for economic, for political or for
strategic reasons , or for a combination of motives . ASEAN , formally
an organisation for economic ends, implicitly expressed, in addi tion
to the strategic _concern to prevent foreign intervention, a political
preoccupation with the danger of communist insurrection . The
association may comprise any number of middle powers in the
region , as shown by the examples mentioned . ASEAN counted only
one such power among its members, but came into being in a
political climate marked by improved relations among the middle
powers in the wider region . Though I ndonesia, Australia, Japan
and I ndia never developed a diplomatic concert, in the later 1 960s
their relations had reached a state that allowed Indonesia to take
the lead in organising formal international co-operation in the
limited area of South East Asia. The concert may be of middle
powers only or, as in all of the three examples, may include also a
number of smaller states . I t may be a closed club or, like the EEC,
may be continually expanding its membership. I t may present
various degrees of formality in structure, ranging from an ad lwc
diplomatic arrangement to an established international organisation.
Finally, the concert may pursue its objectives with more or with less
regard for the interests and sensibilities of other states within its reach .
The more such states feel oppressed or ignored by it, the more likely
they will be to look beyond the region for support and protection.
Apparently, it is at the sub-systemic level that a global duali.sm
with mixed relations offers middle powers their most substantial
roles . While their parts in regard to the central relationship can be
only secondary, as preponderant powers , rivals or concert leaders
in their own regions they act as principals . However, even at this
level the difference between their parts and those of some smaller
states is sometimes unclear . Certainly , middle powers that enjoy
regional preponderance, particularly if this takes the form of
dominance or hegemony, as well as middle powers that control a
regional concert, especially if it is of the more formal and oppressive
type, are in positions quite different from those of smaller states
under their sway . If some of these smaller states attempted to protect
themselves against the middle powers by seeking an understanding
with one or both of the great powers in the system , the difference
would be further accentuated . But between the middle-power
partners and other members of a broader regional concert and
between middle-power rivals and other parties to regional conflict
the distinction may be less clear . Thus, a comparison between the
records of Holland and I taly in the EEC suggests that some concert
minded smaller states may perform functions not essentially
different from those of a middle-power member of the same
association . And events in the Middle East and South East Asia in
the 1 960s demonstrated that some smaller states involved in a local
conflict may take on parts no less consequential than those of
middle-power rivals . Even in regional poli tics the distinction
between middle powers and small s tates is more blurred than that
between great powers and middle powers in the system at large .
On the whole, middle powers have a greater role in the dualistic

system when the central relationship is ambiguous than when it
takes the more clear-cu t forms of cold war or diplomatic concert .
When the great powers are engaged in intense conflict, the middle
powers tend to be either dependent allies or obj ects of the rivalry .
When the great powers are involved in advanced co-operation ,
middle powers are among the most obvious victims of their concert,
though a few may become ju nior partners or agents of the two
collaborators . But when the great powers are engaged i n both
rivalry and co-operation with each other, whether their relationship
is in the nature of restrained rivalry or whether, rather, it has the
character of limited co-operation, most of the middle powers are
likely to enj oy considerable scope. In regard to the more negative
manifestations of such a mixed relationship, some of the middle
powers may be in a position to exert significant influence, which
they often , though not always, use to help reduce tension between
the two sides . As regards the more positive expressions of the
relationship , some of them may -attempt to oppose exercises in great
power co-operation while others may lend their support by actively
associating themselves with such efforts . And in regional politics,
assuming that the system comprises many states and covers a large
area, a number of middle powers may set themselves up as
preponderant powers , engage each other in rivalry or take the lead
in forming an association of states . Despite the tendency of great
powers to involve themselves in regional affairs and the inclination
of regional powers to lean on stronger outside powers , middle
powers in such roles are often independent enough to exercise
decisive influence within their areas .
I t follows that, in this type of dualistic situation , the state of
international relations in large parts of the area covered by such a
system must depend to a considerable degree on the conduct of the
middle powers . I ndeed , in some regions the level of international
order will be determined largely by the nature of the roles these
powers assume and the way they play them . When the East-West
detente brought the first clear signs of a rise in the importance of
middle powers in certain parts of the world , some observers greeted
the development with confidence while others were apprehensive .
On the one hand , there was the possibility of particular powers
securing greater influence on the management of the central
relationship and the even more attractive prospect of some powers
being able to devote more attention to the issues and obj ectives of
their own regions . On the other hand , there was uncertainty about
the qualifications of various middle powers for taking on new
responsibilities , especially about the ability and will of those in the
Third World , where overwhelming domestic difficulties and dis
turbing foreign ambitions apparently left few candidates for the role
of regional guardians of international order . 30 I n retrospect,
however, some of these doubts and fears seem to have been
exaggerated . A contemporary observer looking back at the actual
performance of middle powers in the last few decades might take a

more favourable view of the capabilities of such powers to
contribute to the orderly management of the international political
process . Though mixed , the record of the middle powers in their
various regions does not on the whole seem inferior to that of the
great powers in the system at large .
6 The Triangular System
International systems o f three great powers seem t o b e relatively

rare and , when they do appear, tend to be also rather short-lived .
More often than not they are resolved by war. Through conquest,
whether by one great power of two, by two ofone, or by one ofone , a
triangular system may be reduced to a simpler system, either
unifocal or dualistic. 1 Sometimes, however, they are dissolved by
peaceful transformation. Through the appearance, or reappear
ance, of one or more additional great powers, a triangular system
may be turned into a multiple one. Both too few and too transient,
the historical examples available seem scarcely adequate for an
inductive study of the triangular system .
Occasionally, however, international systems that are not triadic
in composition present patterns of diplomatic interaction that are
clearly triangular. In a multiple system, four or more great powers
may divide for diplomatic purposes into three corners. In a dualistic
system, a leading secondary power may form a diplomatic triangle
with the two principal powers. And in a unifocal system, two
important secondary powers may engage the preponderant power
in triangular interaction. To regard such cases as instances of the
triangular system would be to confuse the structure of a system with
the processes that go on within it. 2 Yet, diplomatic triangles of these
types are not necessarily irrelevant to our purposes . If they are the
dominant relationship of the system, stand out clearly from the rest
of its international relations and last for some considerable time,
they can provide useful additional material for an analysis of the
dynamics of international triangles . If, at the same time, the system
to which they belong contains a number of middle powers, other
than any that may be part of the triangle itself, such patterns of
interaction may cause some of these powers to react in ways that can
help to indicate the type of conduct that would be characteristic of
middle powers in various situations of the triangular system. Thus,
certain historical cases of diplomatic triangles may furnish valuable
1 59
supplementary material for a study of the role of middle powers in

great-power triangles .
Even so, modern history provides only a fairly limited number of
triangular situations relevant to such a study. Neither of the two
supposed triangles of the nineteenth century, Europe at the height
of the Napoleonic Empire and Germany in the age of the
Confederation, is a very satisfactory case from our point of view .
The triangle of France, Russia and Bri tain between the battle of
J ena in 1 806 and the retreat from Moscow in 1 8 1 3 was brief and
precarious . It arose when Austria and Prussia temporarily left the
ranks of the great powers, and disappeared when they returned . To
call it a triangular system is to ignore the existence of the United
States, which already then had proved itself able to bring influence
to bear in European politics . What is more , since the triangle rested
on the treaty of Tilsit, by which Napoleon and Alexander had
partitioned Continental Europe in preparation for the struggle with
Bri tain, it afforded little scope for middle powers . Most non-great
powers not eliminated or crippled had been reduced to subservient
allies of Napoleon . The Tilsit situation illustrates mainly the
extreme difficulties of middle powers subjected to a local great
power condominium . By the time the geographically more mar
ginal middle powers , Spain and Portugal in the south and Sweden
in the north, were able again to assert themselves in the system, it
was no longer triangular. When they were ready to join the fourth
coalition, in the summer of 1 8 1 3 , the situation was once again
characterised by dualistic struggle within a multiple system, with
Napoleonic France on one side and the maj ority of the European
great powers on the other.
The triangle of Austria, Prussia and the ' third Germany' in the
half century after the Congress of Vienna was always more an idea
than part of political reality. As we have seen, the scheme of
bringing the lesser German states together in a confederation within
the Confederation and turning the great-power dualism into a
triangular system had a number of champions among the spokes
men of middle states . 3 And in certain situations, some of these states
actually took steps to realise the plan . They did so, on the one hand ,
when the two German great powers were close enough to each other
to make some of the lesser states in the system fear their joint
ascendancy, especially in the years of ' peaceful dualism' at the
beginning of the restoration period but also at the time of the
Austro-Prussian alliance of 20 April 1 854; and , on the other hand ,
The Triangular System 161
they did so when the same great powers were involved in a rivalry
intense enough to pose the danger for lesser states of becoming
victims of the conflict, particularly in the period starting with the
Frankfurt Assembly of 1 848. 4 But none of these efforts came to
fruition. The middle and the smaller states, with their diversity of
goals and fears, remained as lacking in unity and direction as the
Third World was in the East-West dualism of the post-war decades .
Even if they had been able to achieve a high degree of political
unity, they would have been too weak to assume the part of a third
great power. In any case, a united and independent ' third
Germany' joining Austria and Prussia in a Central European
triangle would have left no middle powers in the German states
system . The history of the German Confederation, despite occa
sional tendencies towards triangularity, is of little use in a study of
middle powers in triangular systems.
A third triangular situation worth considering is that of Europe in
the late 1 930s. Made up of the League powers , the Axis powers and
the Soviet Union, this triangle underwent remarkable changes of
shape . In the original configuration, which was established with the
Hitler-Mussolini treaty of October 1 936, the three rivalling parties
were all q uite far from each other. But through the Anglo-French
policy of appeasement of M ussolini's I taly and Hitler's Germany
and the Munich agreements of September 1 938, the Western
powers and the Axis powers drew closer to each other.
Subsequently, through the Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1 939, the
Soviet U nion and the Axis powers moved near each other.
Eventually, after the German invasion of Russia in june 1 94 1 , the
Soviet U nion joined the Western powers to fight and defeat
Germany and its allies. At all stages, it was a composite triangle,
consisting of five great powers . To regard it as a triangular system
would be to ignore not only its multiple composi tion but also the
existence of the non-European great powers, especially the United
States, which, despite its temporary withdrawal into isolation,
repeatedly had vindicated its part in the states system. The
international relations of Europe in the 1 930s , it may be said ,
presented a triangular constellation of a multiple system, in which
some great powers stayed close enough to each other jointly to make
up a comer of the triangle and others remained far enough from the
centre of interaction to allow the triangle to take shape . Only on the
ideological level was there a true triangular system , in which
eventually also Japan and the United States became involved . Here
the three-cornered struggle between the liberal democrats , the

fascists and the communists has been compared to the Wars of
Religion from the mid-sixteenth to the mid-seventeenth century ,
between catholics, Iutherans and calvinists. Despite its shortcom
ings, however, the political triangle that existed in Europe before
the Second World War is not irrelevant to our enquiry. The trials of
Spain, which suffered the intervention of the Axis powers and the
Soviet U nion and the non-intervention of the League powers in its
civil war, and the fate of Poland , which after much manoeuvring
within the triangle became the victim first of Russo-German
agreement and then of Russo-German war, point to some of the
dangers to which middle powers in great-power triangles may be
exposed .
But a rather more illuminating case is the diplomatic triangle of
the Soviet U nion, the United States and China that emerged in the
1 9 70s. Though far from perfect for our purposes, it is the
relationship best suited for case s tudy here . Withou t eclipsing the
Russo-American dualism , which rested on the huge strategic
superiority of the superpowers and their long tradition of exclusive
relations, the interaction of the three powers formed a pattern in
global politics which stood out fairly clearly from the rest of
international relations and lasted long enough to allow it to become
the subject of analytic enquiry. Before the first appearance of this
triangle there was much speculation about a five-power system of
international politics, which would involve also J apan and Western
Europe as full participants. Neither of these , however, was able to
fill its part in such a structure . ] apan, without nuclear weapons, and
Western Europe, lacking in political cohesion, were hardly in the
same class as China for diplomatic purposes . Strategically de
pendent on the U nited States and economically insecure, they were
not capable of sustained autonomous action at the top level of
international politics. But China, relying on its political strength
and ideological appeal and commanding an already considerable
strategic capability, was both willing and able to assume an
independent role close to the centre of the world stage . Once each of
the superpowers had engaged it in separate interaction , the Soviet
U nion through the conflict and rivalry that developed in Asia in the
1 960s and the U nited States through the rapprochement arranged
by the Nixon administration in the early 1 970s, the triangle took
shape rapidly. Made up of two superpowers and one upper middle
power which for the purposes of this interaction had been deemed a
The Triangular System 1 63
great power, it soon established i tself at the centre of the global

system. The longer it lasted the more conscious the three powers
became of belonging to a triangular system of interaction , and the
more aware other states became of having to conduct their affairs in
conditions of triangular dynamics. 6
However, as a case of triangular interaction , the Sino-Russo
American relationship has two shortcomings, namely the great
inequality of the parties and the brief duration of its existence.
Though even rough equality of power may be fairly unusual in any
type of international constellation, the inferiority ·or China was so
marked that the diplomatic relationships presen ted and the inter
national conditions created by this constellation of powers may not
be typical of international triangles . Hence, for the purpose of
setting out some of the various situations that may arise in a proper
triangular system, it will be necessary to rely rather more on
abstract analysis of the dynamics of the ideal triangle, in which the
capabilities and goals of the three parties are comparable, than on
an examination of the properties and potential of this historical
triangle, which developed in what was still basically a dualistic
system. Second , the incipient nature of the triangle of the 1 970s ,
together with the paucity of other historical examples , inevitably
limits the amount and the variety of material available to indicate
the characteristic reactions of middle powers in the several types of
triangular situations. For this reason , observations about the
international conduct of such powers have to be more tentative and
statements abou t their typical roles more speculative than in the
discussions of the other systems explored in this study.
6. 1 . EQU I LATERAL TRIANGLES
In classifying the various types of relationships possible between

three great powers, a distinction may be made between those that
describe an equidistant, or equilateral, triangle and those that
produce a lopsided shape, a figure in which the three sides are not all
similar. Of the former class, three different sets of trilateral relations
will be considered here, namely unmitigated rivalry, diplomatic
concert and restrained rivalry. As in the discussion of the dualistic
system, the two extremes, condominium and war, will be excluded .
U nmitigated rivalry is a state in which each great power rivals
the other two at a high level of intensity, without, however, entering
into an all-out war, which would be likely to lead first to a break

down of the equilateral form of the triangle and then perhaps to a
knock-ou t defeat of one or two of the three powers. Such a state of
relations never developed in the diplomatic triangle of the 1 970s ,
but can easily be imagined . In the conditions that would prevail,
the middle powers in the system would face much the same dangers
as in a cold-war situation of the dualistic system . In common with
most other states, they would be exposed, on the one hand , to the
risk of being encroached upon, or even swallowed up, by one of the
rivals and , on the other hand , to the danger of suffering great
damage, or in conditions of modern warfare perhaps obliteration , if
one or more of the three cold wars broke out into open and major
hostilities. As in the Cold War of the late 1 940s and the 1 950s many
middle powers, caught as they were between the Sovi et U nion and
the United States and exposed to pressure from each side, entered
into military alliance with the superpower on which they were most
dependent or against the one from which they had most to fear, so
most of the middle powers in a triangular cold war would be likely
to take sides and draw close to one or other of the three corners .
Some, particularly those adj acent to and dependent on one of the
great powers, could be expected to side with that power, in some
cases probably almost regardless of the balance of forces and the
nature of the issues between the two sides. Thus , in a rivalry
between the three principal powers of the 1 9 70s , Poland and
Canada could be relied on each to take the side of its overwhelming
neighbour and ideological ally. Others, those whom geography and
history had left in a position of choice, would be freer to apply
calculations of power. While some could follow traditional balance
of-power principles and support whichever side seemed weaker or
more threatened , others might take the course Poland took in
January 1 934, when it signed a 1 0-years' non-aggression pact with
Nazi Germany, and backed what appeared to be the side more
likely to prevail .
Within each alliance, the middle powers would enjoy the
advantages and , no doubt, seize some of the opportunities that go
with being the major allies of a great power involved in serious
conflict. In certain situations, some of them might use such influence
as they had to try to restrain the alliance leader or otherwise
moderate the conflicts with the other blocs, as several middle-power
allies of the United States occasionally did in the Cold War. In
different circumstances , a few other such powers might find it more
in their interest to encourage the alliance leader to take a strong

line, even at the risk of exacerbating tension with the rivals, as
middle powers on both sides seem to have done at certain junctures
of the East-West conflict. 6 Whatever the direction of the influence
actually exercised by the middle-power allies, it could hardly be
decisive for the course of the conflict, which normally would be in
the hands of the great powers. As in dualistic cold war, the real role
of aligned middle powers · in intense triangular conflict would
usually be that of principal supporters and first lieu tenants of the
great-power rivals.
Compared with the corresponding situation of the dualistic
system, a triangular cold war would present fewer opportunities for
middle powers to remain unaligned . Few middle powers would be
so removed from all the centres of tension as to be able, and so
unimportant to all the great powers as to be allowed , to maintain
positions of neutrality or non-alignment. Hence, the various roles
that may go with such policies, particularly that of would-be
mediator between great powers, which Nehru's India and others
occasionally took on in the Cold War, could only rarely find takers
in trilateral conflict.
At the opposite side of the spectrum of relationships possible in a
triangular system of the equidistant shape is diplomatic concert.
Marked by a high degree of consultation and co-operation among
the partners, though not so high as that characteristic of con
dominium, concert is not easily established or maintained .
Normally appearing only at the end of a maj or war and then usually
dissolving already in the early post-war period, it did not materialise
in the triangle of the 1 9 70s. Had it done so, the result might have
been a mixed blessing for the middle powers of the world . Like other
members of the states system , they would have benefited from the
fairly high degree of international erder which would have been the
probable result of great-power co-operation. Some might have
aspired to the part of associates of the great powers. If they had
succeeded, their roles in the concert would probably have been
subordinate, of the types distinguished in the discussion of the
corresponding situation of the dualistic system . 7 But most middle
powers would have been more likely to find their scope severely
narrowed . Since with the great powers close enough to each other to
form a concert it hardly would have mattered greatly to others if
there were less than or more than three of them, instances of
dualistic and multiple concerts in nineteenth-century Europe might
be a guide to the likely effects of a triangular concert as well as to the

possible reactions of the middle powers in the system . 8 Although
there are obvious difficulties about applying lessons drawn from a
German duopoly and a European quadruple or quintuple congress
system to a global triangular concert, the general effect would
probably have been much the same . As long as the solidarity of the
three las ted , most middle powers would have been likely to enjoy
less freedom and find fewer opportunities in the international
sphere . More than any of the other triangular situations to be
considered here , concert would tend to reduce middle powers to the
role characteristic of small states. While our study of the dualistic
system indicates that middle powers exposed to great-power
collaboration are inclined to explore possibilities of co-operating to
resist the impositions of the concert, it also shows that such efforts are
likely to be, on the whole, not very successful.
Compared with either of the more extreme possi bilities discussed
above, an intermediate set of relations , in the form of rivalry with
restraint, seems a rather more likely solution for an equilateral
triangle. In a world of nuclear powers, the element of mutual
restraint in each of the relationships making up such a triangle
would stem mainly from the need to avoid major war, as it did in the
detente between the superpowers. Given time , this shared habit of
restraint might generate a set of loosely defined guidelines and
tacitly agreed rules for regulating the competitive interaction of the
three powers, as it may have done already in the Russo-American
relationship. The pattern of rivalry that might result could perhaps
follow that which developed between the United States, the Soviet
Union and China in recent decades . After the height of the Cold
War, conflict among these powers began to take the form less and
less of direct confrontation and more and more of indirect clash . I n
Soviet-American relations the change was from confrontation i n
central Europe, especially over Berlin, t o crisis and something
resembling 'war by proxy' in the Middle East. In Sino-Soviet
relations the shift was from direct clash along the common border in
central Asia, to rivalry and war between allies or friends first in the
subcontinent and then in South East Asia. And in the relationship
between the U nited States and China the same development may
be detected if the Korean War and the open confrontations of the
Taiwan Strait crises are compared with the war in Indochina,
where China never committed troops and the U nited States
eventually withdrew them. The overall pattern in such a set of
relationship could be one i n which the three parties tried to avoid

direct clashes by respecting each other's minimum spheres of
influence and relegating their rivalries to parts of the world where
their influence was less clearly demarcated .
When considering the various possible roles of middle powers in
such a state of a triangular system, a distinction would have to be
made between powers located within a great-power sphere of
influence and powers beyond such spheres. For the former category,
one of the main features of the international situation in which they
found themselves would be their dependence on the great power.
Not only their diplomatic scope within the sphere but also their
ability to take initiatives beyond would depend to a large extent on
the way in which the great power exercised its preponderance, on
the degree of domination it established . Their conduct and role in
relation to the great power might be much the same as in a unifocal
system . 9
The middle powers outside the three spheres of the great powers
would presumably enj oy more latitude, with a variety of roles open
to them. Some might enter into the limited conflicts of the great
powers and , as in the case of unmitigated rivalry, take sides and play
the familiar parts characteristic of major partners of an alliance
leader. O thers might prefer to try to steer clear of all great-power
rivalries and concentrate on their own domestic, local or regional
concerns . But, as in the situation of unmitigated rivalry, the
polarising tendencies on each side of the triangle would presumably
offer less scope for unalignment than the corresponding dualistic
situation .
Some of the regional roles that may be open to middle powers
under conditions of dualistic limited conflict might well be possible
for several such powers also in situations of triangular restrained
rivalry. 1 0 One of the most significant would probably be that of
regional rivals. As in the corresponding situation of the dualistic
system, middle powers that entered into a keen rivalry with each
other might find it difficult to stay out of great-power conflict.
Particularly a prolonged regional struggle between two midd le
powers would be likely sooner or later to become mixed up with the
rivalry between the great powers most interested in the region.
While each of the middle powers might need the support of one of
the great powers, each of the great powers might want to use the
middle power for ends of its own. While in some situations the
middle powers might be in a position to manipulate their great-
power principals, in other circumstances the principals would be

able to influence their middle-power clients, sometimes giving
encouragement and sometimes imposing restraint in the regional
conflict. To the extent that the great powers channelled their own
rivalry through the regional struggle of the middle powers, the latter
might play a useful role in helping to reduce direct conflict between
the former and limit tension in the equilateral triangle .
6.2. NON-EQU I LATERAL TRIANGLES
The two typical lopsided configurations of a triangular system are

that in which two powers engage in keen rivalry while the third
keeps i ts distance and that in which two powers collaborate against
the third . If the most advantageous state of affairs for one party in a
competitive triangle is where the other two are embroiled with each
other in a rivalry short of war, the most unfavourable state for it is
where they are engaged with each other in close co-operation
against itself. I ndeed , whatever the concrete issues dividing the
three parties, the desire of each to be tertius gaudens and the fear of
each of becoming victim of a hostile coalition of the others may be
seen as the basic concerns activating the dynamics of the triangular
system . These concerns will affect not only the interaction of the
great powers themselves but, indirectly, also the conduct of the
lesser powers in the system.
First, let us consider the case of two rivals and an outsider. One of
the findings of triad theory is that a triangle with one competitive, or
negative, and two co-operative, or positive, relationships is un
stable, and that the pressure towards stability will be directed
mainly at the party involved in both of the positive relationships. 1 1
Each of the rivals wants the third party to join a coalition against the
other. The weaker the third party , the harder it may find it to resist
the pressure to choose between the others. Pressure will be directed
also at any uncommi tted secondary power that in any way may be
able to influence the course and outcome of the rivalry. Each such
power will have its own triangular relationship with the two rivals
and, unless its position is strengthened through the presence in the
system of the uncommitted third great power, will be in much the
same situation as when exposed to great-power rivalry in a dualistic
system . Middle powers situated close to the centre of tension will fee l
the polarising forces a t work between the opponents, a n d will find it
difficult to avoid taking sides and entering into some form of alliance
with one or the other of the rivals. I ndia, which had been able to
remain unaligned in the conflict between East and West, found i t
much harder t o balance between the two principal communist
powers when the centre of friction moved to Asia and I ndia found
itself on the Sino-Soviet side of an emerging triangle.
Middle powers that are more removed from the area of tension
between the great powers and are determined to stay out of the
conflict may succeed in balancing between the two opponents .
Some of them may be content merely to enjoy the role of secondary
tertius gaudens, either simply standing by while concentrating on
their own affairs, or actually attempting to draw benefits from the
competition of the great powers. In relation to the Sino-Soviet issue
in the triangle of the 1 970s , I ndonesia may be the best example.
Others may attempt to mediate, in the manner of some nonaligned
middle powers in the dualistic Cold War of the 1 950s and 1 960s. 1 2
Such attempts are as unlikely to be successful as i n similar situations
of the dualistic system. A middle power usually cannot mediate
between great-power opponents , though trying to do so may
enhance its diplomatic status for a while. The third course,
sometimes open to the great-power outsider, namely to s tir up strife
between the two opponents in order to prolong their rivalry and
thus maintain its own position of advantage, would normally be
beyond the reach of a middle power, especially one well removed
from the scene of action.
So far, the role of middle powers in this type of triangle has been
considered only in regard to the relationship between the two rivals.
Those powers whose international conduct would be conditioned
more by the relationship of one or both of the two relatively co
operative pairs of great powers wou ld have more freedom of
movement than those which, so to speak, were on the third side of
the triangle. Exposed neither to the polarising tendencies which
would go with a high degree of rivalry nor to the suppressing
tendencies which would be a likely result of an advanced stage of
exclusive co-operation between the great, they would be rather
freer to follow their local pursuits and take regional initiatives. I n
such a situation a number o f courses o f action can b e imagined . I n
some circumstances, an ambitious middle power might secure
leadership of its region . I n a future global triangle, an economically
and militarily stronger Indonesia, if left in peace by all of the great
powers, could conceivably pursue such a policy. I n other circum-
stances , two or more middle powers might find themselves engaged

in a regional rivalry in which the great powers , otherwise preoc
cupied in such a triangle, might take only a moderate interest. In
appropriate circumstances, Nigeria and South Africa could con
ceivably develop such a relationship.
Yet another possibility for the middle powers on the relatively co
operative sides of the triangle would be regional co-operation. The
interest that European powers, both' Western and Eastern, took in
the European Security Conference could be related to the shift of
tension from the Soviet-American to the Sino-Soviet side of the
emerging triangle. Similarly, the idea of a regional association
championed by some West Pacific powers, particularly Australia, in
the early and mid- 1 970s could be seen as reflecting the correspond
ing shift of tension from the Sino-American to the Sino-Soviet
relationship . Co-operation in the fields of security and economics,
especially if it involved also the smaller states in the region, would
afford the middle powers some protection against the dangers
bound up with the instability of this type of triangle. In the event of
the great-power third party abandoning its position of balance and
joining the great-power rival closer to the middle powers concerned ,
their practice of co-operation would enhance their ability to oppose
encroachments by the great-power alliance, which now would
dominate the international relations of the region. If the third party
in the central relationship jumped the other way and joined the
opposite rival, regional arrangements might give some protection
against the intensification of great-power rivalry, to which these
middle powers now would be exposed. Whether the centre of
tension in the triangle of the 1 970s really was between the Soviet
U nion and China or whether it still was between the Soviet U nion
and the United S tates, whether it was the United States or whether
it was China that occupied the position of tertius gaudens, the
Australian project for some form of regional co-operation could be
seen as aimed at meeting the alternative dangers for the region of
too much collaboration and too much competition between the
great powers .
If the third party in an unstable non-equilateral triangle of this
type did join one of the rivals , perhaps after engaging the o ther in
separate rivalry and thus temporarily bringing about another
unstable isosceles triangle, the final situation to be considered here
would arise . If the most significant property of any triad is its
propensity to divide into a combination of two against one, this
situation must in the long run be the most likely of the various
triangular possibilities. As regards the role of the middle powers in
the system, it seems also the most interesting. Those that find
themselves caught between the two great powers involved in
relatively close collaboration with each other are sometimes
inclined , it appears , to move nearer to the third great power, the one
in the opposite corner. With that power they often have problems in
common . While the great power is faced with a hostile coalition , the
middle powers on the opposite side of the triangle may be exposed to
the dangers of a local great-power concert, or even a condominium.
They and it may share an interest in dividing the two collaborators
or, if they cannot do that, in establishing some sort of counterweight
to them. The pattern that may result can be seen fairly clearly in
some of the earlier triangles of European history . At the time of the
signing of the treaty of Tilsit, Sweden leaned towards Britain. I n
1 92 1 , when the coolness of the Western powers towards both the ex
enemy and the new Soviet government tended to throw Germany
and Russia together, Poland, afraid of a German national revival
and suspicious of Russian designs on her frontiers, signed a treaty of
alliance with France. The Nazi-Soviet pact of August 1 939 was
followed immediately by an Anglo-Polish treaty. The subsequent
fate of Sweden and Poland in the two triangles shows not only that
their concerns were only too well founded but also that their
diplomatic moves were in the right direction. Sweden, after being
defeated first by France and then by Russia and being forced to
declare war on Britain, ended up as a member of the fourth coalition
against Napoleon, gaining Norway as compensation for the loss of
Finland. Poland was invaded, occupied and partitioned by
Germany and the Soviet U nion but, through the victory of the
Allies, eventually restored , though under Russian patronage .
Even the global triangle of the United States , the Soviet Union
and China showed signs of the tendency towards the formation of an
axis in this kind of situation . Already the first hints of Russo
American co-operation after the detente in the dualistic structure of
the 1 960s provoked middle-power moves in the direction of the
third power in a potential triangle. Late in 1 963 de Gaulle, in an
attempt to further his plans for a European Europe against what he
regarded as tendencies towards a Soviet-American condominium,
'played the Chinese card ' by switching recogni tion from Taipeh to
Peking. 'The two hegemonic conspirators of Yalta', he apparently
calculated , 'could be unbalanced and budged by throwing China's
weight into the equation . ' 1 3 With the rise of China and the
emergence of a diplomatic triangle, further signs of the pattern
appeared . While the Chinese went out of their way to express
approval of the European Economic Community and offer en
couragement to its members, the governments of several middle
powers in Western Europe set out to improve their relations with
China.
If, in the event, the Soviet Union and the United States had
moved close enough to each other to j ustify French suspicions and
Chinese accusations , perhaps a rather more substantial Sino
European axis would have developed in the triangle of the 1 9 70s.
Thus, if the superpowers had entered into a much wider and deeper
understanding than the SALT agreements , several European
middle powers, perhaps not only Western ones, might have
responded even more favourably to Chinese overtures and might
have taken important steps of their own to develop relations with
China . I f, on the other hand, Russian fears had proved j ustified and
the U nited States and China had entered into an entente directed
against the Soviet U nion, Japan might have had second thoughts
about its choice between the two principal communist powers . If its
leaders had thought such a development of the Sino-American
rapprochement a threat to their own relations with the Americans,
they might well have followed traditional balance-of-power prin
ciples and moved closer to the Soviet U nion . In such a situation,
perhaps even I ndonesia would have given up balancing between all
of the three powers and would have followed India's example and
inclined towards the Soviet U nion . If, instead, the Soviet U nion and
China had found a way of patching up their political and
ideological quarrels and formed a new anti-capitalist alliance on the
third side of the triangle, Japan could have been expected to turn its
back on both of the communist powers and again look only towards
the U nited States . Even I ndia and the United States might
conceivably have fou nd it easier to improve their relations in such
circumstances .
If these are the reactions of some middle powers caught between
two great-power collaborators, they are likely to differ from those of
many small states in the region . The latter, generally having less to
lose than the middle powers in terms of international standing,
might not be quite so opposed to great-power co-operation . If they
thought a concert of the two great powers likely to prove a useful
check on the ambitions of their middle-power neighbours, they
might even welcome i t . For example, situations of a Sino--Russo-

American triangle could be imagined in which some of I ndia's
smaller neighbours would be more concerned about I ndian
intentions than about Sino--Soviet co-operation, or situations in
which some of l ndonesia's weaker neighbours would be more afraid
of l ndonesian expansionism than of a Sino-American entente. And
in Europe, it was generally the middle powers, not the small states,
that in the 1 960s protested most vigorously against the so-called
tendencies towards a Soviet-American condominium . The small
states, it seems, could not be expected to take the same line towards
the third great power as some of their middle-power neighbours . On
the whole more willing than most middle powers to trade part of
their diplomatic independence for a measure of international order
in the region, they would have less incentive to try to set up an axis
with the power in the opposite corner of the triangle . I ndeed , their
role in relation to the general equilibrium of the system might well
be quite different from that of those middle powers which followed
the principle of the balance. of power. If the small states went as far
as supporting the great-power collaborators against the middle
powers, a sandwich pattern of alignment , similar to that character
istic of some concert situations in the dualistic system, might come
about on the co-operative side of the triangle.
So far, only the conduct of the middle powers in immediate
danger of becoming victims of local great-power collaboration has
been considered , not that of those less directly threatened by a
degree of co-operation between the two . But the other middle
powers too, usually those on the other sides of the triangle, so to
speak, must be affected by the lopsidedness of the great-power
constellation . If the two collaborators entered into a close and
hostile alliance against the third great power, the system would take
on some of the character of a dualism . The result might be a cold
war, in which the polarising forces between the two sides would be
so strong that m ost of those other middle powers would be likely to
end up on one side or the other, where they would assume the parts
of major allies of the great powers . Even in a situation of limited co
operation between the two great powers and restrained rivalry
between them and the third , several of the middle powers would
probably take sides . Some of those which were not tied to ei ther of
the two collaborators might follow conventional balance-of-power
principles and lean towards the isolated great power . One way they
could do this would be to engage in regional co-operation sponsored
by that power . Thus, the Soviet idea of an Asian collective security

arrangement gained some attraction in the region through the
Sino-American rapprochement of the Nixon and Kissinger years .
Conversely, China's bid for leadership of medium and small nations
in the early 1 9 70s might have met with more local success if the
Chinese accusations of Russo-American collusion had been more
credible to the world at large . If the coalition of two pursued
revisionist goals and the third great power defended the inter
national status quo, the supporters of the latter power might have a
strong incentive to form a more solid anti-hegemonial alliance .
Thus, if the two communist powers in the triangle of the 1 9 70s had
moved in the direction of a new revolutionary alliance , the
governments of some principal West European nations might well
have decided to restrain their post-detente inclination to stress
independence of the alliance leader, while Australian political
leaders might have favoured a return to the theme of 'our great and
powerful friend ' in foreign policy .
But, whatever the nature of the great-power relations , it is
unlikely that all middle powers on the two ' negative ' sides of the
triangle would follow those on the 'positive' side which moved
towards the great-power outsider. Some might protect their
interests, or seek their fortune, by leaning towards one or both of the
great-power collaborators . Thus, if the U nited States and China in
the 1 9 70s had entered into a form of co-operation that did not
present an obvious threat to Japan, the latter power might well have
adhered to its earlier policy of leaning on the U nited States and
opposing the Soviet U nion . Similarly, if the bond had been between
the Soviet Union and the United States, it is doubtful that I ndia
would have broken off its good relations with the former in order
to support China against a possible attempt by the superpowers to
establish a dual hegemony . A few other middle powers might try to
remain unaligned . Thus, if the collaborators in the triangle of the
late 1 9 70s had been the two communist powers, a revolutionary and
self-absorbed anti-American and anti-communist I ran would have
been likely to prefer this course to throwing its weight in with the
U nited States . In this probably no more than in other si tuations of
the triangular system can the middle powers be relied on to adhere
to the traditional rules of the balance of power. Their alliance
policy, in so far as it affects the general equilibrium, may sometimes
be a destabilising influence in the system .
As in the dualistic system, it may be concluded tentatively from this

largely deductive analysis, middle powers in a triangular system
generally enjoy wider scope when the great powers are involved in
mixed relationships than when they are united in concert or
engaged in keen rivalry with each other . I n situations of only
moderate rivalry in an equilateral triangle as well as in the two types
of non-equilateral situations considered here, in which all or some of
the three great-power relationships tend to be ambiguous, a number
of middle powers may be in a position to take a variety of initiatives
at the systemic level . Occasionally, no doubt, the effect of such
initiatives can be considerable . Yet, whether the middle powers are
aligned with one or two of the great powers , as may be often the
case, or whether they are unaligned , their influence may be on the
whole of less-than-decisive importance in the conduct of the central
relationships of the triangle . In any case, it cannot be assumed that
their actions will be always motivated by a desire to play a positive
role in the management of systemic conflict and the pursuit of
international order .
Assuming that the triangular system i s o f global o r a t least very
large dimensions, the middle powers, most of which are motivated
primarily by regional goals and guided mainly by local consider
ations, seem likely to find their more autonomous and influential
parts at sub-systemic levels . Here, in situations of mixed relations at
the top level of the system, they may be able to set themselves up as
preponderant powers, to engage in rivalry with each other or to take
the lead in forming an association of states . In each of such roles,
they may exercise decisive influence within their regions . A middle
power that enjoys a position of preponderance, whether it imposes
dominance , establishes hegemony or accepts primacy, is likely to be
the principal regulating agent in the international relations of i ts
sphere . Two or more middle powers that engage in rivalry , with
whatever degree of intensity they pursue it, tend to divide the lesser
states in the vicinity and shape the pattern of conflict in the area .
And one or more middle powers that organises an association of
states, whatever its aims and practices, helps to reduce or control
certain types of tension and friction among its members . If used to
secure order, maintain stability or organise co-operation among the
states of the regions, such influence may be highly beneficial in
terms of some of the basic goals ofinternational society . Compared
with their systemic roles, which may be often relatively unimport-
ant and not always conducive to stability and order, the sub
systemic roles of middle powers in various types of triangular
situations seem much more likely to be of real substance and positive
value .
7 The Multiple System
The last type of in ternational system to b e considered here contains

more than three great powers. Though, historically, the number of
great powers in multiple systems has ranged from four to more than
half a dozen, 1 five seems to be typical. The I talian states system of
the century before the Reformation had five principal powers, after
Florence had joined Naples, Rome, Venice and Milan. In large
parts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, European politics
were dominated by five great powers, namely Britain, France,
Austria, Russia and Prussia. I n 1 9 1 9 there were five great powers,
the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the Paris Peace
Conference. The European states system of the 1 930s counted five
great powers, namely Britain, France, Russia, Germany and I taly.
And in 1 945 the victorious powers again decided that there were five
great powers in the world, those that became the permanent
members of the Security Council . The five-power structure, it
appears, is not only the typical form of the multiple system but also a
fairly common phenomenon in the history of international politics.
The actual number of great powers in the system must be of some
significance for its dynamics , the difference between four and five
probably being the most important. Yet, the effect on the character
of the whole system of having one great power less than five, or one
or two more than five, is likely to be much smaller than the result of a
difference between one and two, or between two and three or even
three and four, great powers in a system . The reduced significance of
the extra great power that seems to go with an increase in the
number of such powers, together with the observed tendency of the
multiple system to comprise five great powers, make it possible to
consider systems of more than three great powers under one
heading, and unnecessary to make an analytical distinction be
tween the quadruple, the quintuple , the sextuple and other
multiplex systems.
But variety in the composition of the multiple system goes beyond
the number of great powers. Like dualistic and triangular systems ,
1 77
multiple ones more often than not display considerable ineq uality of
power among their principal members. For several decades after
1 8 1 5 , Prussia was considered much·weaker than the other powers in
the European Pentarchy. I taly was inferior to nearly all the other
great powers in the League of Nations in the 1 920s, and to the other
European great powers in the 1 930s. And j ust as France, Britain and
the United States had been able to dominate international politics
at the end of the First World War, so the U nited States , the Soviet
U nion and Britain could take the lead after the Second World War,
both France and China then being weak and exhausted . Yet,
differences of power, whether temporary or lasting, within the rank
of great powers are often smaller t h an the difference between the
weakest among them and those below in the hierarchy of power, the
middle powers . Also, the larger number of great powers tends to
make inequalities among them rather less important for the
dynamics of the system than similar inequalities would be in the
dualistic or the triangular system. For these reasons, it is possible
here largely to ignore the effects of such inequalities and to treat all
the great powers in the system as at least comparable .
As in the dualistic and triangular systems, the principal determi
nant of the role of middle powers in the multiple system is the
q uality of the political relationships existing among the great
powers. In conformity with the analysis of the other systems, the
extremes of joint government and war will be excluded here . The
former situation, which sometimes arises at the end of a major war
but usually lasts only till the wartime solidarity of the victorious
allies is sapped by inevitable post-war rivalries, will tend to reduce
the middle powers to subj ects of the great-power collaborators. War
among the great powers, which is most likely to occur when their
rivalries lead to a breakdown of the multiple balance of power and a
division into two hostile camps, presents the middle powers with a
choice between the roles of allies and of neutrals and exposes them to
the danger ofbecoming victims of the hostilities. The situations to be
considered here are the three most typical intermediate possibilities,
namely diplomatic concert short of joint government, intense
rivalry short of maj or war, and a moderate rivalry which may have
elements ofboth co-operation and conflict. Material for the analysis
of such situations will be drawn from the historical cases of Europe
in the nineteenth century, of the world and Europe in the inter-war
period , and of the world in the first years after the end of the Second
World War, before the global international system became truly
The Multiple System 1 79
dualistic . The discussion of each type of situation will be rounded off

with some brief speculations about the various imaginable roles of
middle powers in a possible future multiple system of global
international politics.
7. 1 D I PLOMAT I C CONCERT
Multiple concerts, like dualistic and triadic concerts , are marked by

a degree of diplomatic co-ordination high enough to allow the
parties to assume managerial functions in international society. The
more formal type, often distinguished by regular or frequent
meetings of representatives of the great powers and the establish
ment of special diplomatic machinery, rests on a considerable
measure of consensus among the parties, and is normally the result
of a major war . At times it may be so efficient as almost to assume the
character ofjoint government. The more informal type, generally
operating through ad hoc meetings and normal diplomatic channels,
expresses certain shared concerns of the parties and comes into play
more intermittently. It rarely excludes a fair amount of rivalry
among the great powers . A good example of the formal multiple
concert is the so-called congress system, which dominated European
politics for a decade after the end of the Napoleonic Wars . After the
Congress of Vienna the powers of the Quadruple Alliance,
preoccupied with the dangers of revolution and French expansion
ism , and France, j oining them at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in
1 8 1 8, proceeded to manage the affairs of Europe through periodic
congresses of sovereigns and ministers. The best example of the
informal type of concert may be found in the subsequent history of
the European Concert. Sharing a number of concerns , some of them
relating to the Eastern Question , the European great powers
developed a practice of regularly consulting each other about
critical issues and occasionally meeting in conference to co-ordinate
their measures. Though their attempts to co-operate often collapsed
in rivalry, the great powers, or a majority of them, repeatedly
achieved a degree of concert in their dealings with other states .
The j ustification for a great-power concert rests on the need for a
measure of international order, which is often expressed in terms of
peace and security. Usually seeking the protection of such values on
the basis of the existing territorial division and the established legal
structure, the powers of the concert as a rule discourage revisionist
initiatives which have not been arranged or approved by them

selves. Guided by conservative ideas, they generally try to stop the
advancement of separate designs of the type that might upset the
international status q uo, and to frustrate all popular demands for
change which might disturb the harmony of international society .
Thus they easily come to appear as suppressors of lesser powers and
thwarters of peoples. If, as is apt to happen, they at the same time
seek to defend the interest they share in maintaining their joint
supremacy, their concert also takes on some of the character of a
conspiracy against other states, particularly against those im
mediately below them in the hierarchy. In such a situation, many of
the middle powers are likely to find the concert of doubtful
advantage . Though, like most other states, they may benefit from
the absence of various forms of international disorder, they are in
danger of ending up as the principal victims of the solidarity of the
great. They may find their exercise of power and independence
curtailed almost to the point where they have , in effect, been
reduced to the ranks of small powers. Other middle powers,
however, may see an opportunity for themselves . Believing that they
have something to contribute to international· order, they may try to
join the great powers as j unior partners in the concert or to become
its agents in particular spheres or regions . The great concert
situations of the past provide examples of both reactions.
For most middle powers, the Concert of Europe was a repressive
institution . The three states that as members of the Committee of
Eight at the Congress of Vienna had enjoyed some sort of
intermediate position in the first post-war system , namely Spain ,
Portugal and Sweden , soon found themselves excluded from all
important negotiations, at Vienna as well as at the later European
congresses. 2 Apart from occasional protests at high-handed treat
ment by the powers above them, their voices were not heard again
in the post-war period . 3 Through the solidarity of the great, they
were in effect reduced to the ranks in international society. The
Ottoman Empire, which on account of its ambiguous posi tion in the
European system might be regarded as a middle power, 4 was
sometimes treated worse than most small powers . As the 'sick man of
Europe ' , it was subj ected to continual interference . To reform its
administration and protect certain sections of its subjects , the great
powers repeatedly resorted to concerted diplomatic pressure, often
backing it with threats of intervention and coercion . Though from
1 856 formally a member of the Concert of Europe, the Ottoman
The Multiple System 181
Empire was not normally allowed representation a t European

conferences, even when they had been called together to deal with
the Eastern Question. Only when the great powers failed to agree
and the concert broke down was it possible for the Ottoman Empire
temporarily to escape from its role as the ward of Europe.
The multiple concerts of 1 9 1 9 and 1 945, too, placed middle
powers at a disadvantage and provoked some of them to protest.
When the representatives of the five great powers, through the
Council of Ten , took control of the Paris Peace Conference,
spokesmen of several prominent lesser powers, notably Brazil and
Canada, challenged their authority - though with little success. 5 At
the Yalta Conference in 1 945 , the three principal allied powers,
acting as a directorate, settled the fate of Poland without Polish
representation. At the San Francisco Conference the same year, as
well as in United Nations meetings of the first post-war years, the
great powers successfully resisted the pressure from certain lesser
powers, whose representatives, at one stage under the leadership of
the Australians, opposed tendencies towards domination by great
powers and championed the rights of smaller states. 6 In neither of
these situations of formal concert did the protests of middle powers
and other states have much effect.
These examples from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
show not only that great-power solidarity in a multiple system, as in
dualistic and triangular ones, is a threat to middle powers, but also
that there is little such powers can do to defend themselves
effectively against the dangers facing them. The overwhelming
preponderance of several great powers in concert dwarfs all lesser
powers in the system . Even if the middle powers co-ordinated their
diplomatic efforts and sought the support of small states in their
opposition to the concert, the distribution of power in the system is
such that they would have little chance ofbringing real influence to
bear . Besides , achieving such a common front is itself very difficult.
As in the three other types of international systems examined above,
there is a tendency in the multiple system for some small states to
lean towards the great powers rather than to support the middle
powers. When here, too, the outlines of the familiar 'sandwich
pattern' emerge, it is again because a number of small s tates feel
more threatened by their middle-power neighbours than by the
great-power concert. 7 Even to bring the middle powers themselves
into line may prove impossible. Some, like Poland in 1 945, may be
in no position to j oin a common diplomatic front. Some, benefiting
from the peace and order that usually characterise a situation of

concert, may turn their attention to domestic affairs. Some , while
sharing the concern about great-power domination, may make
their stand against it on grounds all of their own . And others, more
impressed with the opportunities than with the dangers presen ted
by multiple concert, may take quite a different course : rather than
accept the part of protesting victims, they may assume the role of
would-be collaborators.
In relation to the Concert of Europe, Spain was the first power to
attempt the role of partner. Having been counted among the
' powers of the first order' at the initial meetings at Vienna in
September 1 8 1 4, it subsequently insisted on retaining this status
but, as we have seen, ended up a victim and outspoken critic of
great-power solidari ty. 8 A generation later, Sweden played a minor
role at the London conferences of 1 850, 1 852 and 1 864, which
followed the wars over the Danish duchies . In order to strengthen its
own position in the negotiations with the other great powers, Britain
arranged for the participation of Denmark's Scandinavian neigh
bour. The Ottoman Empire, though formally admitted to the
European Concert after the Crimean War, remained an object
rather than a subject in European politics . To the extent that it had
a role among the principal powers of Europe , it was essentially a self
defensive one , aimed at resisting their concerted pressure and
warding off separate encroachments.
The role played by united I taly was rather more impressive than
those of the other middle powers . Though deemed a principal
power and drawn into European politics at the highest level, I taly
never became more than a near great power. On account of its late
arrival and marked inferiority in the circle of principal powers, it
could well be regarded as in fact no more than a middle power. 9
Patronised by, in turn , Britain and united Germany, the two powers
that expected to benefit from its support, it was allowed to
participate in a succession of important meetings of the great powers
in the later part of the century, starting with the London Conference
of 1 86 7 and including the Congress of Berlin in 1 8 78. In contrast to
the Ottoman Empire, it was an insider in the European Concert,
where it had a role considerably more substantial and varied than
that of Sweden in the middle of the century .
In 1 9 1 9, none o f the secondary powers was admitted a s j unior
partner in the formal concert of Versailles and Paris , even though
some of them , notably Spain and Brazil , saw reasons to regard
themselves as more akin to the great powers than to the small states.
By the time a few middle powers managed to secure semi
permanent status in the Council of the League of Nations, the post
war concert no longer existed . 1 0 Nor did the Big Five of 1 945 allow
any of the middle powers of the time to join their counsels . The
spirited advocacy of the functional idea by Canada together with
the arguments of a few other secondary powers secured a small
number of rather insubstantial safeguards against great-power
domination, but failed to establish a special position for middle
powers in the organisation of the United Nations . 1 1
To be associates in a multiple concert is apparently a rarer role for
middle powers than to become victims of great-power solidarity.
Judging by the circumstances in which a few secondary powers did
secure some sort of associate position, the case of united I taly being
the best example, it is easier to do in an informal type of concert than
in the less flexible situation of formal concert. The possibility of a
middle power being drawn into the counsels of the great will depend
partly on how useful it is likely to be and partly on how willing the
principal powers are to share their responsibilities and privi leges .
Thus, both Sweden and I taly joined European conferences because
one or more of the great powers thought their presence useful and
the others accepted it. The influence of such co-opted mem bers on
the management of international politics, though probably greater
than that of most outsiders, whether suppressed middle powers or
impotent small states, is likely to be in most cases only marginal . On
the whole, middle powers in a multiple system tend to have less of a
role in international politics when the great powers are in concert
than when they are engaged in conflict and rivalry.
Whether these generalisations , based as they are on a small
number of diverse historical cases, would apply also to a fu ture
world concert of several great powers must be a matter for
speculation. The first question that ought to be considered here is
whether the idea of such a concert is at all likely to be realised in the
not-too-distant future . Both of the assumptions on which it rests, one
relating to the number of great powers in the proj ected global
system and the other to the nature of their relationships, can be
questioned . Already in the 1 960s , certain developments in inter
national politics, especially the detente in East-West relations and
the rise of China and a few other secondary powers, inspired
speculation abou t an emerging multiple system of powers . And in
the 1 970s, as we have seen, the dualistic system took on a triangular
character when China engaged in diplomatic interaction with both

of the superpowers. But so far, there are still at most only three
powers in the world that could be called great, only two of which are
superpowers in the accepted usage of the term . Neither Japan nor
'Western Europe' , the two powers that were cast for parts in a
multiple system, has up to now emerged as an autonomous actor at
the. top level of international politics. While the former is, as yet,
without nuclear weapons, the latter still lacks adequate poli tical
cohesion; and both are strategically dependent on the Uni ted States
and economically not too secure. On present indications, it is
unlikely that a truly multiple system will take shape for at least
another decade. If and when it does, it seems equally unlikely that
the relationships among the four, five or more great powers will be
such as to constitute a diplomatic concert. Apart from the shared
danger that arises from the risk of major war with nuclear weapons ,
few or none of the political and cultural conditions on which the
great multiple concerts of the past depended appear to be present
today, or seem likely to come about over the next decade or two. 1 2 If
a multiple system did emerge , either of the two typical situations to
be discussed below, namely intense conflict between two camps and
limited rivalry within a complex balance-of-power structure, would
seem a more likely outcome than concert.
If, nevertheless , for the purposes of our speculations abou t the
future, we imagine the development of a concert of more than three
great powers , we might expect it to be informal rather than formal .
Barring the catastrophe of a major war among the great powers , it
seems very unlikely that they would be able to develop the sort of
close concert that normally follows only a general war. However, an
informal concert of the world could be of various kinds. It could be a
concert for the management of international politics in general ,
perhaps with a concentration o n dangerous crises. Or it could b e a
concert for dealing with a particular set of problems , such as those of
controlling the proliferation and use of nuclear weapons. For the
middle powers in the system, the two kinds of concert would present
dissimilar conditions and might open different possibilities . Hence
their potential roles are best considered separately.
An informal concert for the general management of international
politics might be of at least two types, depending on the way the
great powers went about the task. If they engaged in collective
management, we would have something like the European Concert
of the ad hoc conferences, but on a global scale . If, instead, they
divided their labour along geographical lines and managed the
world by separate, though co-ordinated , efforts, we might end up
with a system of spheres of influence, based no doubt on the various
regional interests of the several great powers. Each type of concert
would create its own conditions for the middle powers. Collective
management on a global scale might lead to the development of a
number of regional, and perhaps overlapping, informal concerts , in
each of which the gr.eat powers, or those of them most interested in
the region , would take the principal parts and one or two of the
foremost local rniddle powers might acquire subsidiary roles . Thus,
I ndia might be co-opted into a regional concert that handled
subcontinental affairs, rather as Sweden was allowed to participate
in the conferences that dealt with the issue over the Danish duchies.
The possibility of select middle powers assuming such a role would
depend again on what they had to offer and on the willingness of the
great powers to draw them in. Many middle powers, especially the
less prominent ones, would be left out, and might become victims of
the solidarity of those above them. As in most situations of concert,
the policies imposed by the partners would be likely to reflect their
own interests rather than those of the lesser powers in the
region.
A system of spheres of influence, for example of the type that
Churchill at one stage envisaged for the post-war world , would
require a degree of co-ordination of the rights and responsibilities of
the great powers but might well leave them with a free hand within
their respective spheres . As long as each respected the au thority of
the others, they would all be at liberty to pursue their own policies
within the spheres allocated to them. For the middle powers which
within each sphere would be left to deal with the local great power
the situation would be much the same as in a unifocal system . 1 3
Their conduct and role would depend on the way the great power
exercised its preponderance as well as on their own individual
inclinations . Though conceivably the great power might be satisfied
with hegemony or even with no more than primacy, the need to
hold i ts own among the other great powers and to avoid interference
from outside in the affairs of the region might well impel it to secure
a degree of dominance within the sphere. 1 4 The inclinations of
the middle powers would depend on a number of objective and
subjective factors, such as geographical position and political
traditions, and might lead them in different directions. I n respond
ing to the preponderant power, some might support its policy, while
others would see it as a threat. Though a few might be attracted by

the idea of actively opposing the great power, such a course would
rarely be open to a middle power. Their typical roles would be
either as agents or would-be agents of the local great power, perhaps
not unlike the traditional part of Brazil in the inter-American
system, 1 5 or as victims or potential victims of great-power control,
possibly rather like the recurrent part of Poland in the East
European sub-system .
If, under a system of collective management, a few middle powers
might become j unior partners in regional concerts and, under a
system of separate spheres, some middle powers could become
regional agents of a great power, a future global concert for the
general management of international politics would offer more
scope for such powers than they had in the informal concert of
nineteenth-century Europe, where the geographical limitations of
the states system left few possibilities of similar roles. However,
probably only a minority of the middle powers of the future would
qualify for such parts . Most of them would be more likely to remain
disadvantaged outsiders or oppressed victims. If a future multiple
concert of this type managed to secure a degree of international
order, it might be largely at the expense of the influence and
independence of these powers.
This might be true also of a multiple concert that concentrated on
the control of nuclear weapons. Just how such a concert could be
established is very difficult to see in present circumstances. Perhaps
only the shock and devastation of one or more local or regional wars
in which nuclear weapons were actually used could bring the great
powers of the future together to check the proliferation of and control
the use of these weapons. If a concert of this type were reached , it
might include not only all of the great powers but also some or all of
the lesser powers that in the meantime had acq uired nuclear
weapons. Thus a small number of middle powers, perhaps together
with several minor powers, might become associates of the great
powers. As members of the nuclear club and j unior partners in the
concert, they would enjoy a certain status. But their possibilities of
taking diplomatic advantage of the possession of nuclear weapons in
d ealings with other powers would be almost certainly reduced .
Without a firm control of the use of such weapons, especially of those
belonging to the new and more marginal members of the club, it is
difficult to see how an attempt to prevent further proliferation could
be any more successful than the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
introduced i n the late 1 960s. I f, for example, India had j oined both
the club and the concert and Pakistan were still only a potential
nuclear-weapons power, there would be little chance of stopping
the latter power from 'going nuclear' unless the former had
accepted a very substantial curb of its ability to threaten or resort to
the use of nuclear weapons in relations with neighbours and rivals .
Thus, membership of a nuclear concert would for middle powers be
likely to involve acceptance of ou tside control of their ultimate
weapons. Such control, no doubt, would be vested in the great
powers, the senior members of the concert. If it were to be effective,
the control would have to extend also to any nuclear-weapons
powers that had remained outside the concert .
However, the principal victims of the solidarity o f the great
powers and their associates would be those powers that were
considering or planning to start the development of nuclear
weapons capability, or that had started but not completed the
process . If their option of joining the circle of nuclear-weapons
powers were closed , their diplomatic status might suffer con
siderably and their relative power fall behind . No longer would they
be able to pursue regional ambitions or defend local interests as
potential nuclear powers ; and no longer could they look forward to
one day being able to threaten their enemies with nuclear weapons.
This set-back would be likely not only to weaken their position in
relation to neighbours and rivals but also to reduce their leverage
with the great powers. If they happened to belong to the Third
World , it would, furthermore, help to maintain the inferiority of the
developing countries in the power struggle known as the North
South conflict. Among the potential nuclear-weapons powers there
would probably be some middle powers that would be ready to
accept all of these handicaps as the price to be paid for a necessary
degree of general control of nuclear weapons , a price that most of
the countries that did not have to pay it undoubtedly would find a
very reasonable one . But other middle powers in the same category
would be bound to see the nuclear concert as a conspiracy of haves
against have-nots . Together with lesser potential nuclear-weapons
powers, they would find themselves confronted on one side by those
that already possessed the bomb and on the other by those that had
no possibility or intention of ever acq uiring i t . Perhaps more than
anything else , a concert for the control of nuclear weapons would
bring out the sandwich pattern of alignment inherent in the
hierarchy of the states system. For most of the middle powers, those
with as well as those without nuclear weapons , a concert for

controlling the use and preventing the spread of such weapons
would be in effect an instrument for keeping secondary powers in
their place. Any imaginable multiple concert of the future, it may
be concluded , would be as likely as those of the past to consolidate
the superiority of the great powers at the expense mainly of the
middle powers.
7.2 INTENSE R IVALRY
The opposite of diplomatic concert is international conflict short of

major war. When rivalry within a multiple system reaches a certain
level of intensity, the great powers begin to form alliances against
each other. They may not all take sides immediately; and if they are
more than five, several groups may form at the earlier stages . But
eventually, if tension keeps rising, all of the great powers are likely to
d ivide into two hostile sides, normally with at least two of them in
each group . I f there is a balance of power in the system, it is now a
dualistic one. Two alliances face each other in conflict rather as the
two powers in the corresponding situation of the dualistic system do.
As in the latter situation , the issue is likely to be abou t vital political
interests but may have an ideological dimension as well. Though
the conflict is apt to lead to general war, the only situation with
which we are here concerned is that of cold war between two groups
of great powers.
Such a pattern of conflict established itself in the European
system during the last decades before the First World War. In 1 89 1
Germany, Austria-Hungary and I taly renewed their Triple
Alliance, and the following year Russia and France signed a
military agreement. Britain, conscious of its long tradi tion of
holding the balance in Europe and preoccupied elsewhere, re
mained undecided and isolated till the following decade, when it
formed an entente and started military conversations with France.
Eventually, Germany and Austria-Hungary stood against France,
Russia and Britain. A similar pattern began to work i tself out among
the European powers in the late 1 930s but did not reach completion
till the second year after the outbreak of war. Starting with the
Hitler-Mussolini treaty of 1 936, it first took the shape of a composite
triangle, made up of the League powers, the Axis powers and the
Soviet Union . 1 6 Not till Germany invaded Russia in 1 94 1 and the
Soviet Union joined the Western powers in the war against the Axis
powers did the system finally break down into two sides. The schism
that rent the world in the late 1 940s might be seen as a third
example of this pattern . However, by the time this division was
taking place, the structure of the global system itself was already in
fact, though not in form, d ualistic rather than multiple·. With China
absorbed in civil war and Britain and France in effect reduced to
secondary positions in the hierarchy of powers, international
politics were no longer dominated by the Big Five or the Big Four,
but by the Big Two. Hence the two pre-war situations seem the
more appropriate illustrations .
For the middle powers in the system , an intense rivalry between
groups of great powers creates a situation that can be both difficult
and dangerous. Some of them will experience a degree of pressure
from one or both of the groups to take sides in the central conflict.
Though a few may find it necessary or desirable to seek security or
advantage in an alliance, most of them seem likely to resist the
pressure and steer clear of the groupings . While the former lose some
of their diplomatic independence and expose themselves to the
influence of their great-power allies, the latter maintain their
freedom to manoeuvre but risk becoming obj ects of the rivalry
between the camps. And in common with the rest of the members of
the states system, all of the middle powers, whether aligned or not,
are in peril of suffering the ravages of war, if the conflict between the
camps breaks out into open and general hostilities.
In the earliest of the historical cases considered here, both of the
two secondary powers which we have deemed to be middle powers
managed to remain uncommitted in the central rivalry till the latest
possible stage . The Ottoman Empire signed a treaty of alliance with
Germany on 2 August 1 9 1 4, the day after the latter had declared
war on Russia. I taly joined the Entente powers in April 1 9 1 5 and
declared war on Austria-Hungary the following month. In the
other pre-war situation , too, the middle powers found their final
place only on the eve of war. Spain, barely out of the civil war in
which the Axis powers had intervened on one side and the Soviet
U nion on the other, formed an alliance with Germany and I taly in
March 1 939, but remained formally neutral when war broke out.
Poland, which had had a non-aggression pact with Germany in the
earlier stages of triangular conflict, sought protection in a treaty
with Britain when Ribbentrop and Molotov signed the Nazi-Soviet
pact in August 1 939. This apparent tendency for middle powers in
multiple systems to make their final choice of sides only at a very

advanced stage of conflict may be contrasted with the reactions of
middle powers on the outbreak of the Russo-American Cold War.
No sooner had the multiple concert of the post-war world given way
to the dualistic conflict of the later 1 940s than most of the powers
that in 1 945 had been listed as middle powers entered into military
alliances with the United States, while Poland tied itself even more
closely to the Soviet U nion . The polarising forces, it seems, are
rather weaker in a multiple system divided by intense rivalry than in
the corresponding situation of the dualistic system .
This difference, the explanation of which must be sought in the
plurality of great powers on either side of the conflict, is bound to
affect the situation , and perhaps also the role, of any middle power
that does take sides in the central rivalry. In relation to its great
power allies , such a power is likely to enjoy rather more freedom
than its counterpart in the dualistic system, where the dependence
of the ally and the control of the alliance leader often create a very
tight relationship . While the middle power may be in a position
occasionally to adopt nonconformist attitudes and policies, the
great powers in the alliance, often in disagreement among them
selves about the various matters at issue, will generally find it very
difficult to dominate and discipline the middle power. In relation to
the conflict with the opposite side, the aligned middle power may
have little scope for ameliorative initiatives, probably even less than
under the dualistic system. The presence of two or more great
powers on each side will make it particularly difficult for any lesser
power to exercise a restraining or a mediating influence . Nor is the
complex structure of the system, which makes negotiation between
the camps cumbersome and agreements precarious, likely to give
rise to a need for executive functions such as peace-keeping. Even
more than in the dualistic system, it may be expected , the typical
role of an aligned middle power will be simply that of supporter.
However, it is the conduct and role of the uncommitted middle
powers that are the more pertinent here. In the European system
that finally collapsed in the First World War, both the Ottoman
Empire and I taly, as we have seen , remained unaligned throughou t
the crucial period . While Turkey always had been an ou tsider in the
alliance system that began to take shape in Bismarck's times, I taly
had defected from the Triple Alliance at the conference at Algeciras
in 1 906. In the last years before the war, when tension between the
great powers was reaching its highest point, both of them tried to
turn the si tuation to advantage by balancing between the two

camps . While the Ottoman Empire was anxious to defend itself
against intervention from outside, I taly was eager to pursue certain
ambitions abroad . To compare the performances and contrast the
fates of the two powers is instructive . For I taly, it was a successful
policy. After a war with Turkey in 1 9 1 1 - 1 2 , it gained Tripoli and
Cyrenaica, and subsequently held out for good terms before
committing itself in the European war. Eventually joining the
Entente powers, it ended up on the victorious side and became one
of the five great powers at Versailles .
The fate of the Ottoman Empire was very different. In the 1 890s,
when international tension had been more moderate and diffuse,
the Sultan's government had been able to resist most outside
pressure by playing one great power off against another. But as
tension in Europe increased , the situation became more com
plicated . By the time the two groups of powers were locked in hostile
rivalry with each other, the most serious challenge to the territorial
integrity of the Empire came no longer from the side of the great
powers . In 1 9 1 2 the small Balkan states, each with claims of its own,
saw an opportunity to act jointly against the power that so often in
the past had enjoyed the protection of the European concert. After
forming a league, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia went
to war and defeated the Turks. Thus the Ottoman Empire , which
for so long had been both the ward of the Concert of Europe and a
principal obj ect of the rivalry of the great powers, became a victim
of the aggression of small states. That Russia, guided by strategic
considerations rather than by pro-Slav sentiment, had involved
itself in the negotiations surrounding the formation of the Balkan
league was a hint of the ultimate predicament of a middle power,
where its great-power adversary joins its small-state enemies to seek
its elimination . 1 7 However, it was not till after the First World War
that the fall and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire was finally
brought about.
I f the case of the Ottoman Empire points to the risk of a
'sandwich' alignment of the upper and the lower enemies of a
middle power, the history of Spain and Poland on the eve of the
Second World War illustrates the dangers of intense rivalry among
the great powers themselves . While the final pattern of conflict was
still working itself out in the multiple system of the late 1 930s , Spain
became the battleground for competitive intervention by three of
the great powers and Poland the prey of occupation and partition
by two of them. In their different ways, the three cases show middle
powers in the passive role of victims . Where secondary powers are
caught between hostile groups of great powers , this may be a not
untypical role for them to fill.
Of the various more active parts that conceivably might be open
to unaligned middle powers in such situations, balancing between
the groups while seeking advantages from either side seems the most
likely possibility. I n the two historical cases considered here, only
I taly, as we have seen, succeeded in this role. But none of the other
theoretically possible roles had any real takers . 1 8 In a system so
geographically constrained as the European of the two pre-war
periods, there was little or no possibility of standing aloof from the
conflict between the great powers. With tension at so high a level
and with so many powers involved , mediation between the parties
was not open to any secondary, if indeed to any, power. And with
the magnitude of the risks involved in an outbreak of general war,
deliberate exacerbation of the conflict could hardly be considered a
rational course, at least not by powers that might have more to lose
than to gain from such war. 1 9 No other role than that of trimmer
seemed both possible and reasonable . This part, which in the highly
polarised conditions of cold war in a dualistic system is usually both
too difficult and too dangerous to attempt, may well be the typical
choice of unaligned middle powers wanting to play an active role in
the more diffuse dynamics of a multiple system.
That some middle powers are able to draw substantial diplomatic
benefits from balancing between the camps while others end up as
victims of the rivalry, shows that intense conflict within a multiple
system may present greater opportunities as well as greater risks for
such powers than a multiple concert normally does. Though a
great-power concert may offer some middle powers the chance to
become junior partners or agents, it might not give them more
independence and scope than favourably placed unaligned middle
powers enj oy in a great-power conflict. Though such a concert may
check or even suppress some of the middle powers, it is probably less
likely to endanger their very survival as independent states than
keen great-power rivalry is. On basis of the necessarily limited
material presented here, it is not possible to decide whether middle
powers on the whole benefit more from the measure of international
order that goes with concert than from the scope for diplomatic
manoeuvre that may result from conflict among the great powers.
While a degree of security, even if acquired at the expense of some
diplomatic freedom, may meet the needs of some middle powers,

the opportunity to play the balance, though often associated with
considerable risks, may be important for others . But, though each
situation may have its advantages and disadvantages, neither
concert nor conflict among the great powers really seems to favour
the middle powers as a group . The diplomatic successes of the
Ottoman Empire in the 1 890s, as well as in earlier periods when
there was neither diplomatic concert nor intense rivalry among the
great powers, suggest that a mixture of co-operation and conflict,
the third type of situation to be considered here, offers rather better
conditions for the middle powers than either of the more extreme
situations .
If we conclude that middle powers in a multiple system divided
by intense rivalry tend to remain unaligned rather than to take
sides, and to play the balancing game rather than to attempt any
other active part, we may ask whether such conclusions would be
likely to apply to a future global situation of this type . Assuming that
the world in some later decade will be dominated by four, five or
even half a dozen great powers, a divided system seems a more
probable outcome than mu ltiple concert. Given that great powers
are natural rivals , the principal powers of such a world would be
more likely to carry their competition to a high level of tension than
to bring their policies into harmony with each other. If they did
engage in such a rivalry, they would tend to divide up into two
hostile groups, though the final pattern might well take some time to
establish itself. The division might leave two or more great powers
on each side, as in the pre- 1 9 1 4 system , or it might be between one
and the rest of them, as could be the result if the power and policies
of one of the superpowers came to present an obvious threat to the
entire system. In either case, the middle powers of the future would
have to respond to the problems and opportunities characteristic of
a system divided into hostile camps.
Since both sides would be armed with nuclear weapons, some of
the special considerations that have affected the alignment of
secondary powers in the Russo-American conflict of recent decades
might be relevant here too. The record of that rivalry, in the view of
some observers, shows that it has become in some ways less necessary
as well as less desirable for the great powers to acquire allies and
supporters among the lesser powers than it was in pre-nuclear times.
With the nature of the balance of deterrence being such that
competition for strategic advantage is conducted mainly through
research, development of armaments programmes and deployment

of forces by the great powers themselves, there is now relatively little
that most lesser powers can contribute in the way of armaments,
especially of the strategic kind . Second , the notorious difficulty of
managing the lesser members of an alliance and the recurrent
danger of being manipulated by them for their own ends sometimes
make it too risky, in an age of nuclear weapons, for the great powers
to commit themselves to the protection of such powers. From the
point of view of the secondary powers, too, alliances with great
powers have sometimes come to seem of more doubtful advantage
than they were before. Ever unable to ignore the danger of major,
nuclear war, the great powers cannot in all situations be relied on to
come to the aid of lesser allies whose security is threatened . All of
these considerations, assuming that they would apply also to a
multiple system of nuclear powers, must have a weakening effect on
any tendency for the middle powers to take sides in a future rivalry
between groups of great powers. If such a tendency is likely in any
case to be weaker in a multiple than in a dualistic system, most of the
middle powers might well be inclined to remain unaligned.
However, there are also reasons to believe that some of the middle
powers would be caught up in the conflict and be drawn towards
one side or the other. Even though they would have less to
contribute to an alliance in the way offorces and armaments than in
the age of conventional warfare, the great powers might need them
for bases and various other facilities that they could provide or for
the resources which they would command . Thus, if the United
States and japan were on the same side, both would probably want
Australia as an ally. In certain cases, one set of great powers might
draw a potentially useful middle power towards their own side
primarily in order to stop it from joining the opposite camp . In this
way , even a middle power which showed as many signs of becoming
an inconvenient and unreliable ally as post-revolutionary I ran does
today might conceivably end up within one of the camps. From the
point of view of the middle powers themselves, there might be
weighty considerations encouraging them to take sides . Some might
be so exposed to the dangers inherent in the great-power conflict,
whether because of their geographical position or for some other
reason, that they wou ld want to seek protection within one of the
camps. Thus , if the Soviet U nion and the United States were on
opposite sides and there were still middle powers left in Eastern and
Western Europe, at least some of them would be likely to seek, or to
want to retain, an alliance relationship with one side or the other. So

even though the polarising forces in the system at large might be no
stronger, and perhaps rather weaker, than in past situations of
multiple conflict, some middle powers would probably end up in the
part of supporters of one set of great powers or the other in such a
future global rivalry.
For the unaligned middle powers, the most characteristic active
role would probably still be balancing between the camps , as Italy
did in the pre- 1 9 1 4 system . While taking care not to become victims
of the global rivalry, such powers might try to exploit their
intermediate position by seeking diplomatic advantage from either
or both sides . But there would be other possibilities as well. I n a
global system, unaligned middle powers would have more scope
for keeping aloof from the central conflict than they had in the
geographically confined systems of Europe before each of the two
world wars. Whether from choice or from necessity, some of those
well removed from the centres of tension between the great powers
and their allies might assume an essentially passive part in global
politics and devote most or all of their attention to domestic, local
and regional affairs. If, for example, tension between the two sides in
the multiple system found its centres in Europe and Asia, both the
Latin American and the African middle powers might be free to
limit their diplomatic efforts to their own continents . In most cases,
however, middle powers that chose this course would still be likely
to find their opportuni ties to pursue local ambitions and assume
regional roles limited by considerations arising from the divided
state of the global system and the high level of tension elsewhere in
the world . In the last resort, they, too, would be in danger of being
drawn into the central conflict and perhaps falling prey to the
rivalry of the great powers.
In a multiple system of global extent, yet another role might be
open to unaligned middle powers. As in the dualistic rivalry of the
Russo-American Cold War, some of these powers might take it
upon themselves to raise issues other than those that divided the two
sides in the central conflict. 2 0 Third World middle powers, for
example, might advance the claims of the have-not countries
against the privileges of the rich and developed nations, the
principal representatives of which would be the rivalling great
powers. In pursuing policies of redistribution of the wealth of the
world, such middle powers might urge reform, as India did in the
corresponding situation of the dualistic system, or call for more
revolu tionary measures , as Indonesia did under Sukarno. In either

case, their pressure would tend to complicate the pattern of
international conflict and to diversify tension in the global system .
Future middle powers that set out to shift the attention of the world
to new issues of one sort or another might act separately or jointly,
and with or without the support of smaller unaligned states. If a
comparative weakness of the polarising forces in a divided multiple
system might make i t a little easier to play the balancing game than
it is in conditions of dualistic cold war, the same weakness could
conceivably make it j ust possible to overcome the familiar obstacles
to the formation of some kind of third grouping in global politics.
Though most middle powers still might take the parts of either
supporters or trimmers, the roles open to them in a future multiple
system divided by intense rivalry might well be rather more varied ,
and perhaps also more important, than they were in the two
situations of European history that have formed the basis of the
present analysis.
7.3 MODERATE R I VALRY
If the several types of great-power relationships possible within a

multiple system are seen as forming a spectrum, with diplomatic
concert on one side and intense rivalry on the other, the middle area
will be taken up by various mixtures of co-operation and conflict,
which may be described collectively as moderate rivalry. Here,
co-operation, if it involves all of the great powers , is generally
minimal and intermittent and conflict usually restrained or local.
Characteristically, both elements are distributed unevenly through
out the system, with some great powers co-operating against others,
and are subject to fairly frequent changes of location . A complex
balance of power, operating through shifting combinations of
powers, maintains the system and protects the independence of its
units. With reversals of alliances being a normal feature and minor
adj ustments continually taking place, this type of situation has
greater mobility and flexibility than both diplomatic concert, where
all the great powers tend to stand together, and intense rivalry, in
which they usually end up sharply divided against each other. If
diplomatic concert is a phenomenon of post-war periods in
particular, �nd intense rivalry often the mark of pre-war situations,
moderate rivalry may be regarded as the normal state of affairs in a
multiple system.
In fact, such a rivalry characterised the European states system

for long periods of its history, particularly in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries . Thus, the middle part of the nineteenth
century, from the breakdown of the post-Napoleonic congress
system to the division into armed camps of the pre- 1 9 1 4 period , was
largely an age of great-power rivalry regulated by a multiple
balance of power. Though the latent Concert of Europe occasion
ally was brought into play , most of the time the great powers were at
odds with each other. Though wars now and then broke out, some of
them involving one, two or even three great powers, they never for
long divided Europe into two hostile camps. A moderate rivalry,
with elements ofboth co-operation and conflict, again distinguished
international politics in the 1 920s and earlier 1 930s. Co-operation
among the European great powers, particularly Germany, France
and Britain , reached its highest point in the later 1 920s, after which
the great powers engaged in a rivalry which became increasingly
tense. Both historical situations present useful material for an
analysis of the role of middle powers in a multiple system with
moderate rivalry among the great powers.
This type of situation generally provides the best conditions for
the middle powers in the system . Exposed neither to the oppressing
tendencies of a great-power concert nor to the dividing influences of
a keen rivalry, they often have considerable scope for manoeuvre .
Some of them may play a part in the operation of the balance of
power, letting themselves be drawn into one or more of the shifting
combinations organised and led by the great powers. In 1 834 Spain
and Portugal, which as members of the Committee of Eight at
Vienna had secured some sort of intermediate position in the post
Napoleonic states system but which since 1 8 1 5 had been particu
larly passive in European politics, joined France and Britain in a
Quadruple Alliance. From one point of view, this alliance, which
Palmerston hoped 'would serve as a powerful counterpoise to the
Holy Alliance of the East' , was a response to the convention signed
by Russia and Austria the previous year, when the Tsar and the
Emperor had met at Miinchengratz . For the British, however, its
more immediate aim was to prevent the French from acting on their
own in support of the liberal forces in Spain and Portugal, then both
at civil war. Soon disrupted as a result of rivalry between Britain
and France in the Mediterranean region , the Quadruple Alliance
was an early example of secondary powers being co-opted to play
minor parts in the brief constellations of forces characteristic of the
complex balance of power.
Later in the century the Ottoman Empire and united I taly

played rather more substantial roles in the European balance of
power, the former in the Crimean War and the latter in the
Bismarckian alliance system . As the principal obj ect of the rivalry of
the great powers , the Ottoman Empire provided the occasion for
the hostilities that led to the Crimean War. Once the Russians
had presented an ultimatum in Constantinople and invaded the
Danubian principalities and the Turks had gone to war and suffered
a spectacular defeat, it became increasingly difficult for Britain and
France , the principal rivals of Russia in the East, to stay out of the
hostilities. After signing a treaty with Turkey, they declared war on
Russia and subsequently entered into a formal alliance with each
other. The two other great powers stayed out of the war, Austria
playing off one side against the other and Prussia remaining neutral .
The worsting of Russia in the war vindicated the principle of
collective control of the affairs of the Ottoman Empire instead of
separate intervention by one great power. At the peace congress at
Paris, the Ottoman Empire was in effect made the ward of all the
great powers of Europe. Thus a middle power that, as enemy of one
great power and ally of two, briefly had been an independent actor
in the balance of power became again an obj ect in European
poli tics.
I taly, diplomatically rather closer to the great powers of Europe,
had a much more lasting part in the balance of power. I n 1 882 it put
an end to its isolation by joining Germany and Austria-Hungary in
the Triple Alliance . While anger with the French over the
annexation of Tunis the previous year was part of its motivation for
making a treaty with the Germans , the hope of securing some
support in its difficulties with the Pope encouraged it to form an
alliance with the Austrians. Germany saw I taly as a possible ally
against the French, and Austria-Hungary appreciated the promise
of I talian neutrality in the event of a war with Russia. The Alliance,
essentially defensive, was renewed five years later, when new
treaties going considerably further than the original arrangements
were added . The same year I taly signed a treaty first with Britain
and then with Austria-Hungary, the purpose of which was to
maintain the status q uo in the Mediterranean . Later that year the
same three powers made a further agreement, which provided for
some support of the Ottoman Empire against Ru�sia. The Triple
Alliance was subsequently renewed again . When I taly eventually,
at the conference of Algeciras in 1 906, defected from this combi-
nation of powers and started playing the balance between the two
camps, the European situation was rio longer one of moderate
rivalry. If this later role of l taly, sustained till after the outbreak of
general war, shows how a middle power may benefit from in tense
rivalry in a multiple system, its participation in the operation of the
complex balance of the 1 880s and early 1 890s demonstrates how
such a power may exploit a situation of moderate rivalry to the point
where it gains a systemic importance out of proportion to its
intrinsic merit.
In the inter-war period , the example of a middle power entering
into balance-of-power alliances is Poland . In 1 92 1 this country,
caught between Russia and Germany and afraid of both, signed a
treaty of alliance with France, which was seeking protection against
a revival of German power. It was the first in a series of such treaties
between France and east European countries. Four years later
Poland , together with Czechoslovakia, signed arbitration treaties
with Germany, which complemented the Locarno treaties guaran
teeing Germany's western frontiers, and strengthened the arrange
ment with France for mutual defence in the case of German
aggression . The year of Hitler's accession to power, 1 933, became a
turning-point in Polish diplomacy towards the West. When the
French government in that year rej ected a Polish proposal for
preventive war against Germany, the Polish government began to
lose confidence in the alliance with France . Its reaction was to seek
protection in a better relationship with the neighbour. The
following year it signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with
Germany, on which Hitler based his foreign policy until the conflict
over Danzig on the eve of the Second World War. This reversal of
alliances shows that middle powers do not always follow traditional
balance-of-power principles in their alliance policies. When ex
posed to the overwhelming power of a potentially hostile great
power neighbour, they, like smaller states in similar situations, may
resort to seeking accommodation with the preponderant power
rather than stick to the policy of looking for security in an anti
hegemonial alliance.
These four examples suggest a number of points about the role of
middle powers in balance-of-power alliances. First, their parts seem
to vary greatly in both importance and duration. If the case of Spain
and Portugal in the brief Quadruple Alliance represents one
extreme, that of I taly in the long-lasting Triple Alliance stands for
the other. Second , though they may not be the only lesser powers to
participate in such alliances, their parts tend to be more substantial

than those of smaller allies. Piedmont, too , joined the alliance of the
Crimean War; but the influence it gained was negligible compared
with that of the Ottoman Empire. Other east European states
signed treaties of alliance with France in the 1 920s; but that with
Poland came first and formed the basis of the French security
system . Third , membership of an alliance may do as much for the
middle powers themselves, in terms not only of security but also of
prestige and influence, as it does for the strength and effe ctiveness of
the alliance . While being deemed a great power facilitated I taly's
entry into Bismarck's alliance system, membership of the Triple
Alliance greatly helped this country to pass itself off as a great
power. Fourth, the motivations of middle powers for entering into
alliance with a great power tend to stem from interests of a
geographically limited kind . In all of the cases considered here ,
the overriding concerns of the middle powers were with local ,
sometimes even domestic, affairs rather than with the states system
in general. And fifth, a corollary of the previous point, the middle
powers' choice of allies does not always conform with the established
rules of the balance of power. The action of Poland in 1 934, though
understandable in terms of the geographical position of the country
and the policies of the great powers, had a destabilising influence in
the system.
The typical conduct of those secondary powers that did not
become involved in the shifting alliances of the complex balance of
power was to stay aloof from the moderate rivalry of the great
powers and concentrate on local and domestic affairs. Spain and
Portugal followed this line before as well as after the Quadruple
Alliance of 1 834 to the point where their international role in no
significant way differed from that characteristic of the small powers
in the European system . So, most of the time , did Sweden, which in
the Crimean War refused various attempts by the allied powers to
draw it out of a cautious neutrality. In the multiple system of the
1 920s and early 1 930s, Spain played a particularly self-absorbed
role . Going through a series of political upheavals, which cul
minated in the civil war of the later 1 930s, it was quite unable to
play an active role at the systemic level.
The only unaligned middle power to do so habitually was the
Ottoman Empire . Exposed to continual diplomatic pressure from
the principal European powers and unable to strengthen i tself
through effective domestic reform , it took every opportunity to
defend its pos1t10n and prolong its survival by playing on the

rivalries of the great powers. The skill it displayed and the successes
it achieved in exploiting their different approaches to the Eastern
Question and conflicting designs on Turkish territory, indicate
clearly that the moderate rivalry of these powers provided better
conditions for defensive diplomacy of the Turkish type than either
diplomatic concert or intense rivalry among the great powers could
do. Neither reduced to the J>lace of ward of the European Concert
nor left unprotected against the competition of great powers and the
ambitions of small nations, it had greater scope and more leverage
than in the more extreme situations of the multiple system .
However, in struggling for survival by playing o n e great power off
against another, the Ottoman Empire sometimes deliberately
encouraged rivalry among the parties, thereby nourishing tension
in the area. Thus, while tactical skill frequently allowed this middle
power to engage in diplomatic interaction on terms of near equality
with the great powers , a determination to defend its interests, even
at the risk of causing a European crisis, forced it to share with several
small states the role of exacerbator of conflict in the system .
Participating in the shifting alignments of the balance of power
and concentrating on regional and local affairs might well be the
two most typical roles of middle powers also in a future multiple
situation of this sort . Assuming the emergence of a global multiple
system in the last decades of this century, a moderate rivalry
regulated by a complex balance of power seems the most realistic
hope for the world , more likely than a solid diplomatic concert of all
the great powers and less dangerous than an intense rivalry between
two hostile camps. I f such a situation were to come about, a number
of middle powers would undoubtedly take some part in the
operation of the global balance . But there is no reason to believe
that they would be always guided by anti-hegemonial principles . As
in both similar and other situations of the past, the alliance policies
of most middle powers would be likely to reflect separate, regional
concerns at least as much as general, systemic considerations. For
many of them, not only geography but also ideology would present
major obstacles to flexibility in alignment. Whether from necessity
or from choice, some middle powers would be likely to steer close to
a great power on which they were militarily or economically
dependent or with which they had political ideas in common , rather
than to apply the classical balance-of-power calculations. Thus,
whatever the constellation of forces in a future complex balance of
power, both Poland and Canada would probably remain allies, or

at least supporters, of their great-power neighbours. Even I ndia and
Australia might be reluctant to break out of the Soviet and the
American orbit in search of allies in other qu arters, probably
preferring to rely on their traditional friends instead of playing a
creative part in the formation of anti-hegemonial alliances . Other
middle powers, some perhaps yet to emerge as such, would be freer
to respond to the dynamics of the global balance of power and to
take a hand in the stabilisation of the multiple system. Whatever
their motives for entering into an alliance and whatever their choice
of partners, all of the middle powers that involved themselves
actively in the central balance of power would be able to play the
familiar roles of maj or allies, perhaps sometimes encouraging and
sometimes restraining the alliance leaders in the rivalry with other
great powers .
But the most significant roles would probably be played by those
middle powers that remained unaligned in relation to the rivalry of
the great powers . Some of them might be close enough to a centre of
tension, or for some other reason be important enough to the great
powers, to be able to seek advantages by playing one rival off against
another - a policy that, as in the case of the Ottoman Empire, might
result in an exacerbation of tension at the systemic level . An
unaligned I ran could conceivably play such a role by exploiting a
future competition for its allegiance among the great powers most
interested in its region. Others, unable or unwilling to take more than
a very minimal part in global politics, would concentrate on
domestic, local or regional affairs . Here the global dimensions of the
system could offer rich opportunities . As long as tensions in the
system at large remained well below the critical point, unaligned
middle powers would be relatively free to pursue their ambitions at
sub-systemic levels and seek autonomous roles in their various
regions. As in similar conditions of the dualistic system, such powers
might establish a variety of regional relationships, not only among
themselves but also with some of the smaller states and perhaps with
one or more of the great powers as well . 2 1 In some cases, a middle
power might set itself up as the local great power, with or without
the backing of great powers and with or without the willing support
of small states within its sway. I n other situations, two or more
middle powers, possibly encouraged and sometimes perhaps re
strained by great powers with an in terest in the region, might
engage in a local rivalry, which could divide the smaller states in the
VICimty. In different circumstances, one or more middle powers

might take the lead in organising a regional concert of nations,
whether for military, political or economic ends. Such patterns
might conceivably work themselves out among the future middle
powers of South America, Africa and South East Asia. Whichever
form they took, the middle powers involved would have a decisive
part in determining the quali ty of international relations in their
regions. Peace and security in large parts of the world , perhaps in
most of the Third World, would depend in the first place upon the
policies pursued and the relationships developed by these middle
powers .
The conduct and role of middle powers in a multiple system seem to

be as affected by the nature of the political relations among the great
powers as they are in dualistic and triangular systems. I ndeed , the
characteristic responses of such powers to the dangers and oppor
tunities presented by each of the three broad types of great-power
interaction distinguished here have much in common with their
reactions in the corresponding situations of the other systems . When
the great powers form a diplomatic concert, the middle powers
generally face the danger of becoming victims of the solidarity of the
great, though some may see an opportunity of gaining influence by
joining them . As under a dualistic or a triangular concert, some
middle powers will protest against the tendencies towards j oint
management of international politics , while others may seek to
establish themselves as j u nior partners in the concert.
In conditions of intense rivalry between hostile groups of great
powers, however, the situation of the middle powers seems to be a
little different from the corresponding case of, at any rate, the
dualistic system. Since the polarising forces tend to be weaker than
in a cold war between only two great powers, the middle powers
may sometimes find it a little safer to play the balancing game, and
in some systems perhaps rather easier to keep aloof from the
interaction ofthe great powers and concentrate on other affairs. The
result seems to be that, although some middle powers end up �aking
sides in the central conflict, most tend to stay unaligned . While in
dualistic situations of this type middle powers generally find
themselves in the roles of either dependent allies or obj ects of the
rivalry of the great powers, here they more often can take the parts
of either supporters or trimmers, unless the system is large enough to
allow some of them to turn their backs on the great powers and mind
their own business .
The mixed type of situation characterised by moderate rivalry
and limited co-operation among the great powers again presents
striking similarities, particularly with the dualistic system . While
some middle powers participate in the central system by joining
balance-of-power alliances, others devote their attention more
exclusively to various sub-systemic concerns. As in dualistic situ
ations of the same type, the opportunities for the latter form of
activity tend to be particularly good , especially in a multiple system
of large dimensions .
In the multiple, the triangular and the dualistic system the
ambiguous situation created by mixed relations among the great
powers provides the best conditions for the middle powers . At the
systemic level, where they can perform secondary roles of varying
degrees of importance, as well as at sub-systemic levels, where in
favourable circumstances they may assume more or less auton
omous roles as local principals, they have on the whole greater scope
than in the more clear-cut situations of diplomatic concert or
intense rivalry among the great powers . In the future, too, it is
ambiguous great-power relations, whether characterised by mod
erate rivalry or by limited co-operation , that seem likely to give
middle powers the best opportunity to play parts of real con
sequence in international politics.
Conclusion
T o make a general assessment o f the role o f middle powers, it is

necessary to relate their typical contributions to the international
political process to the basic goals of the society of nations . Foremost
among these have generally been international order, on which
security and peace depend , and international j ustice . 1 Most of the
claims that in the past were advanced on behalf of the middle
powers were based on their conduct in relation to international
order. Such powers were presented as guardians of the balance of
power, protecting the security of other states and the peace of the
whole system; 2 as moderating and pacifying influences in the society
of states, reducing tension and limiting conflict among the great
powers; 3 or as principal supporters of international organisations,
evincing a particularly high sense of responsibility. 4 In recent times,
however, some middle powers have concerned themselves rather
more with matters of international j ustice than with order. Most
middle powers of the Third World have put themselves forward as
champions of anti-colonial, racial and economic justice. The
contributions actually made by middle powers to the maintenance
of order and the pursuit of j ustice may be considered first at the
systemic level .
The bearing of the conduct of middle powers upon the order of
the states system can be discussed most conveniently under the
headings of balance of power, diplomacy and international law,
three main pillars of international order. Have middle powers on
the whole conducted their relations with the great powers in
accordance with the traditional rules of balance of power, or have
they pursued their interests in disregard , and perhaps deliberate
violation, of such rules? U ndeniably, they have often done the
latter. When the great powers have been united , whether through
the singular structure of a unifocal system or in concert situations of
a dualistic, a triangular or a multiple system, the middle powers
generally have shown only limited inclination to join each other,
and the smaller states, in an attempt to create a counterweight .
205
Though an individual middle power in a unifocal system sometimes

has taken the part of potential organiser of anti-hegemonial
alliances, the typical reaction to the imbalance of power that is
characteristic of such a system seems to have been for each to seek a
special relationship with the great power. Though some have voiced
protests and a few have sought ways of co-operating against a
concert of two or more great powers , the ou tcome seems only very
rarely to have been collective opposi tion to great-power preponder
ance . What is more , in both the unifocal system and the various
concert situations one or more prominent middle powers have
arranged to co-operate with the great, either as regional agents or as
j unior partners. When, instead , the great powers have been divided ,
the middle powers have far from always let their policies of
alignment be guided by consideration for the equilibrium of the
system . Some have remained unaligned , either staying aloof from
the central relationship and minding their own domestic and local
affairs or, more often, attempting to play the balance between the
two sides to their own advantage. O thers have aligned themselves
but have been too dependent on one side or the other to choose
freely between them. Those that have been in a position of choice
have sometimes let themselves be guided by immediate or narrow
concerns rather than by long-term and systemic considerations .
And even when their decision has been based on calculations of a
broader and more lasting kind , the result has occasionally been
alignment with the stronger and potentially more aggressive side.
Though many middle powers have taken their place in anti
hegemonial alliances , on the whole such powers have not proved
reliable guardians of the balance of power. I ndeed , to the extent
that they have carried sufficient weight to affect the balance
significantly, their influence in the system has sometimes been
destabilising.
Have middle powers through their diplomacy generally exer
cised a restraining and mitigating influence on the rivalry and
conflict of the great powers and their allies, or have they, rather,
managed to steer clear of the issues dividing the parties to the central
relationship, tried to draw advantages from the division , or even
acted so as to exacerbate tension in the system? Here again their
record , though probably rather better than in relation to the
balance of power, is fairly mixed . Their efforts to play a role have
been particularly manifest in situations of dualistic rivalry, where
both aligned and unaligned middle powers have intervened in a
Conclusion 207
variety of ways . Aligned powe�, relying on their position and

contacts within the alliance, have at times tried to restrain the
alliance leader, particularly in situations of high tension between
the opponents . Given the difficulty of curbing or even guiding a
great power involved in keen rivalry with another great power, such
attempts, though occasionally probably not without some effect, are
unlikely by themselves to have been decisive for the course of any
conflict. Other initiatives by aligned middle powers have taken
the form of offers to provide good offices or to mediate in critical
situations, whether local wars or central confrontations . Since
diplomatic intervention of this kind , though often useful when the
great powers already are seeking accommodation , cannot by itself
bring the rivals to negotiate, such moves too are unlikely to have
been of major importance in the settlement of crises. On the whole,
aligned middle powers seem to have had their best opportunities to
exercise an ameliorating influence when the central rivalry has been
more restrained . In such situations, some of them have taken on the
valuable role of ' bridge-building' , for which they often may be
better suited than the alliance leader. On a more practical level,
some middle powers have made a contribution by supporting or
participating in peace-keeping operations, though this has never
been a function characteristic of such powers in particular.
However, the efforts of aligned middle powers in relation to the
central rivalry have not always been designed to mitigate conflict.
Sometimes their stake in one or more of the issues dividing the
parties has been so great that they have preferred simply to back the
alliance leader or, when tension seemed below the critical level,
even been willing to encourage action of a kind that might be
expected to exacerbate relations with the opposite side.
The diplomatic efforts of unaligned middle powers in similar
situations of dualistic conflict may on the whole have had greater
effect than those of aligned ones. Though in their case , too, offers to
provide good offices or to arrange mediation seem to have been of
less practical use than participation in peace-keeping and truce
observation , the very existence of a number of significant powers
that refused to commit themselves in the central conflict and
occasionally offered their services in a mediatory capacity must
have had a somewhat sobering effect on the antagonists. Of greater
importance may have been various attempts to accentuate issues
other than those dividing the blocs, and certain efforts to change the
structure of the system by organising a third group of powers . I n
such ways unaligned middle powers of the Cold War and detente
periods of East-West politics have played a significant part in
varying the focus of global politics and complicating the pattern of
the in ternational system, thereby helping to overcome the sharp
division between two opposed blocs. But unaligned middle powers
have had other roles as well. Some have simply stood apart from
great-power conflict and concentrated on domestic and local affairs .
Others, as already noted, have played the balancing game and tried
to secure benefits from the rivalry . And some have deliberately run
the risk of exacerbating the conflict for purposes of their own. Thus,
while the diplomacy of middle powers, particularly of unaligned
ones , sometimes has helped to restrict or surmount conflict between
the great powers, it has not at all times been a constructive influence
in the central relationship .
Have middle powers tradi tionally been among the main props of
international law, or have they been more conspicuous as violators
of its rules and conventions? The presen t study throws too little light
on the connection between the behaviour of middle powers and the
law of nations to allow us to decide j ust where the balance in their
conduct has lain . But even a glance at our list of contemporary
middle powers makes it clear that certain past claims extolling
the virtues of this class of powers must be q ualified by reference to
the character and style of some existing powers. The argument
advanced by Botero nearly four hundred years ago, that the
moderate wealth and power of such states make them less violent,
ambitious and licentious than large states , 5 has been echoed in those
more recent writings where middle powers have been presented as
the most reliable guardians of the interests of international society,
on the grounds that they tend to be less selfish than great powers and
more responsible than small states . 6 But, while the category of
middle powers today includes many satisfied and conservative
nations which have gained a reputation for law-abiding conduct, it
also comprises a number of ambitious and restless states of which
some occasionally have resorted to acts of aggression and a few have
pursued programmes of international revolution. Though there
are more ofthe former kind than of the latter, and a few that partake
of both sets of q ualities and are difficult to classify, there are rather
too many of the latter type to allow us to accept the proposition that
modern middle powers by and large can be relied on to use their
resources in support of law and order.
Conclusion 209
Yet, despite the apparent character of some contemporary

powers, the claims traditionally advanced on behalf of middle
powers may be not without some foundation . The position of such
states in the hierarchy of powers does suggest that their incentives to
respect and uphold international law may be in some respects
stronger than those of others . Being weaker and more exposed than
great powers, they are less able to override the law in their dealings
with other states and more dependent on a system of rules and
conventions protective of the sovereign rights of states. Being richer
and less dependent on others than most small states, they have more
to lose from a state of international lawlessness and perhaps also
more to gain from a degree of international organisation . This was
the reasoning that led some spokesmen for middle powers to argue
in 1 945 that such powers had a special stake in international
organisations that were designed to protect the security of their
members. 7 The historical record of middle powers in the principal
international organisations of the twentieth century, however, only
partly bears out this argument. Though many such powers certainly
have had prominent positions in the various institutions and have
played constructive parts in their work, not all of them have done so,
a few even having resigned from the League or the United Nations. 8
While abstract analysis proceeding from the place of middle powers
in the rank ordering of states may point to a tendency for such
powers to appear in the role of supporters of international law and
organisations, a detailed study of their actual performance within
the various institutions may well give a more mixed picture.
Though many middle powers, particularly through their dip
lomacy in situations of great-power rivalry, have made useful and
sometimes important contributions to the pursuit of international
order, the general conduct of such powers in the several kinds of
systems does not appear to have been highly conducive to the
promotion of order among states. Do middle powers have a better
record in relation to the pursuit of international j ustice? Here it is
even more difficult to generalise . Having not had j ustice among
states as one of its chief concerns , this study casts only limited light
on the conduct of middle powers in this respect . Yet it is apparent
that such powers have tended to be divided both in their attitudes to
the general goal and in their policies on particular issues . The
division in their general attitudes to the promotion of inter-state
j ustice can perhaps be inferred from their reactions to situations
where international relations have been managed by one great

power enjoying preponderance or by two or more great powers
acting in concert . As already recapitulated , most middle powers
exposed to the oppressive tendencies and conservative inclinations
inherent in such an arrangement have protested against it, having
occasionally also looked for ways of organising a joint defence of the
political independence and diplomatic freedom of the lesser states
affected. While generally based on the sovereign rights of states laid
down by international law, such a reaction does not necessarily
preclude support for revisionist claims advanced in the name of
inter-state j ustice . But some middle powers , usually either former
great powers or regionally preponderant powers, have instead
associated themselves with the system ofgreat-power management
by seeking the role of j unior partner or regional agent. This
reaction , usually j ustified by reference to the need for a degree of
international order, hardly seems reconcilable with support of
demands for change in the international status quo advanced in
furtherance of j ustice between states.
The pursuit of certain particular kinds of international j ustice
has divided the middle powers much more explicitly. The struggles
for anti-colonial, racial and economic j ustice that have occupied
such large parts of the world since the end of the Second World War
have in one way or another involved most of the contemporary
middle powers and have turned some of them into opponents of
each other. Old imperial powers have confronted former de
pendencies in the anti-colonial struggle; states tainted by racist
ideologies have stood against nations championing the cause of
racial equality; and rich and industrially advanced countries have
faced states struggling with the plight of poverty and the difficulties
of economic development. This difference in ideas and concerns ,
which reflects the heterogeneity of the whole group of middle
ranking powers, characterises also their positions on issues of
individual j ustice. While some middle powers have made their mark
in codifying and defending human rights, others have gained a
reputation as notorious violators of the same rights. Even if the five
upper middle powers were considered separately from the rest of the
intermediate class of powers, it would still be very difficult to
generalise abou t the roles of modern middle powers in relation to
the pursuit of the several kinds of j ustice. While the upper group
would have China in a position of its own on many issues, the lower
group would present wide disagreement on most matters. Though
Conclusion 21 1
many middle powers clearly have played important parts in the

various struggles for j ustice, in general the systemic conduct of such
powers does not appear to have been of any greater help in the
pursuit of this goal than in that of order in international society.
At regional and local levels of the global system of the late
twentieth century, however, the situation may be rather different. I t
i s here that middle powers usually have their most pressing concerns
and make their greatest efforts . Provided they are not exposed to the
suppressing tendencies of a concert ofgreat powers or to the dividing
influences of a keen rivalry of these powers, this is also the sphere in
which they normally have their widest diplomatic scope . While
their roles in the system at large nearly always have to be of a
secondary kind , at the sub-systemic level they can sometimes take
the parts of principals. The three most typical such parts are that of
a single middle power that enjoys a regional preponderance of
power, that of two or more middle powers that are engaged in
regional rivalry with each other, and that of one or more middle
powers that are at the centre of a regional association of states. In
each of such roles, the middle powers concerned are in a position to
exercise decisive influence on the s tate of the international relations
of their region. If they found it possible to conduct their relations
and pursue their interests with an eye to order and j ustice among the
states of the region, they could make a valuable contribution to the
pursuit of the basic goals of international society.
The goal of a degree of international order they could help pursue
by seeking to maintain stability, control conflict and uphold
international law in their regions. A middle power enjoying pre
ponderance might set about securing the sort of s tability that
sometimes goes with imbalance of power. Middle powers engaged
in rivalry, on the other hand , might seek stability through a balance
of power. And middle powers at the head of an association of states
might pursue the same goal by maintaining diplomatic concert . A
preponderant middle power might attempt to control international
conflict by skilful management of relations with and among other
states, probably using much the same means as a great power in a
unifocal system would do. Rivalling middle powers might en
deavour to do the same by limiting tension and managing crises
between themselves as well as between their allies. And middle
powers in an association might take a similar course in their
relations with states not part of the regional concert. A preponder
ant middle power might help to uphold international law by
striving to comply with its rules and conventions and by encourag

ing other states to do the same. Middle powers in conflict might play
a similar part by accepting legal restraints on the pursuit of their
rivalry and by insisting that their allies and friends do so too. And
middle powers in concert might exert influence in the same
direction by observing the various sets of rights and duties that
govern their relations with lesser members of the association and
their dealings with states outside it. Also the cause of international
j ustice could be advanced by middle powers acting in their various
regional roles. A preponderant middle power might occasionally
facilitate changes in the international status quo in order to
accommodate a particularly disadvantaged state . Rivalling middle
powers might conceivably restrict their competitive pursuit of self
interests out of regard for each other's just needs . And middle
powers in concert might show more than minimal consideration in
their dealings with states not only inside but also outside the
association .
Since the international conduct of middle powers at sub-systemic
levels has been only the secondary concern of the present study, the
findings do not allow us to determine to what extent such powers
have managed to allow for the goals of international society in their
regional and local policies . But, though obviously their conduct
here too has been of mixed quality, a broad review of international
politics in recent decades leaves the impression that their record at
these levels may be no worse than that of the great powers in the
system at large and perhaps rather better than their own in the same
sphere. Given the current trend towards greater regional autonomy
in the global international system, 9 there would be some grounds for
optimism about the future if it could be established that middle
powers tend to perform more responsibly in the spheres where they
have most scope and influence.
Middle powers, it may be concluded , are not innately wiser or
more virtuous than other states . If they seem disposed to behave
differently from great powers and small states, it is essentially
because they are placed in a different position in the hierarchy of
powers and exposed to other pressures . Having neither the superior
strength nor the general interests and wide responsibilities of great
powers , they are rarely faced with temptations quite so big as those
that great powers sometimes come up against. Commanding
greater resources than lesser powers and carrying more weight in
international relations, they are often led to attempt parts that
Conclusion 213
would be beyond the capabilities of most small states . But their

scope for diplomatic initiatives , the nature of their international
roles and the extent of their influence depend to a large extent on the
form and state of the international system to which they belong. In
systems wi th two or more great powers, a mixture of co-operation
and conflict in the central relationship usually provides the best
conditions for the middle powers . While even in favourable
circumstances the systemic roles within the reach of such powers are
in most cases quite limited , the sub-systemic parts open to them in
very large systems are often of decisive importance. Thus, while the
principal responsibility for maintaining a degree of order in the
system at large rests with the great powers, one of the ways of
discharging it in a global context is to bring abou t conditions
favourable for middle powers willing and able to help pursue the
fundamental goals of international society within their own spheres .
Notes
INTRODUCTION
l . Niels Amstrup, i n a useful critical survey o f the literature o n the subject, notes
'an astonishing lack of cumulation' in the contributions to the theory of small
states ( 'The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts',
Cooperation and Co r!fiict, no. 3, 1 976, p. 1 78) .
2. See pp. 30-3 .
3. Strupp's Wiirterbuch des Vo·tkerrechts has no entry entitled ' Mittelmiichte' or
' Mittelstaaten'; and a contribution on the ranking of states distinguishes only
between great powers and small states (v. Frisch, 'Rang der Staaten im
Volkerrechtsverkehr', in H.-J . Schlochauer (ed . ) , Wo·rterbuch des Viilkerrechts
(Berlin: de Gruyter & Co. , 1 960-2 ) , vol. I I , pp. 33 1 -2 ) .
4. See Chapter 2 .
5. While some o f the arguments advanced by champions o f middle powers in
earlier centuries, as we shall see in the following chapter, carry distinct
Aristotelian echoes, bringing to mind the pass age of Politics that extols the
qualities of the middle class , the views expressed by some more recent
spokesmen of such powers seem to s p ring from a faith resembling that ofjames
Mill, who in 1 820 confidently described the middle rank as ' both the most wise
and the most virtuous part of the community' (An Essay on Government,
Cambridge University Press, 1 93 7, p. 7 1 ) .
6. Some of the more common syrtonyms of 'middle power' in the English language
are 'medium power' , 'secondary power' and 'semi power'. Despite the various
ideological connotations with which it has been loaded in recent times, 'middle
power' is the term preferred in this study. Not only has it been the most
commonly used expression in English since the end of the Second World War,
when Canadians and Australians took the lead in arguing the case for 'middle
powers' (see pp. 57--62 ) ; it also has a background in German political writings of
the nineteenth century, where both 'Mittelmacht' and 'Mittelstaat' appeared at
an early stage (see pp. 22-3, 26, 3 1 -3) . 'Secondary power', though frequently
used in earlier writings in most European languages, is more suitable for the
strongest of the middle-ranking powers, those that here will be called 'upper
middle powers' , than for the whole broad range of intermediate powers.
'Semi power' is misleading, because it seems to refer to a state that is less than a
power, not just less than a great power (for a fuller discussion oflerminology and
definitions, see Chapter 3.)
7. 'Role', here conceived in terms of the reciprocal relationship between typical
behaviour and systemic processes, is used in a looser sense than is normal in the
social sciences. A conventional definition, in terms of expectations entertained
by other units of the system, would be less suitable to international society than
it is to more developed and more static forms of society.
214
Notes 215
T H E H I ST O R Y O F T H E I D EA
1. M. Wight, Power Polities, eel. H . Bull and C. Holbraad ( Penguin and Leicester
Univenity Press , 1 978) pp. 295-30 1 .
2 . Ibid, pp. 295-6. Wight saw two ideas linked in Aquinas's proviw, namely the
declining idea of the Roman imperial political unit and the rising idea of the
over-grown city state or the pays. His reference is to a passage in the fint
chapter of De Regimilli Prin&ipam.
3. Wight, Power Politics, pp. 296-7. The relevant passages are printed in R. W.
and A. J. Carlyle, Mediuval Political Tluory i11 tlu West, vol. VI (London:
Blackwood, 1 936) p. 78, n. 2.
4. G. Botero, Tlu Reason ofState, trans. P. J. and D. P. Waley (London: Routledge
&: Kegan Paul, 1 956) , book I, 2, pp. 3-4. Wight points out that Botero's
examples of middle powen were out of date and suggests that it was really the
Duchy of Savoy, of which Botero was a subject, that he had in mind (Power
Politics, p. 299) . See also M. Wight, Systems of States, eel. H. Bull (Leicester
Univenity Press , 1 977) p. 1 38) .
5. Tlu Reason of State, trans. Waley, book I, 6, pp. 8-9.
6. Wight merely mentions Mably's classification of powen, before closing the
fragment with a brief reference to the class of middle powen in the Napoleonic
reorganisation of Germany between 1 797 and 1803 and the su 61eq uent
reorganisation of Europe in 1 8 1 4- 1 5 (Power Politics, p. 30 1 ) .
7. G . Bonnot de Mably, Collection complete des OIUDTU til I'Abhlde Mobly (Paris: Ch.
Desbriere, 1 794-5) vol. V, pp. 74-5.
8. I bid, p. 75.
9. Ibid, pp. 8 1 -2.
10. Ibid, pp. 82-3.
1 1. Ibid, p. 84.
1 2. Mably lilted the powen he had in mind as the court of Vienna, Russia, Spain,
Denmark, etc. (ibid, p. 75) . The distinction is parallel to that applied in
Chapter 3 below, where China, japan, France, United Kingdom and West
Germany are described as upper middle powen.
13. C. E. Vaughan ( eel . ) , Tlu Political Writings oj]etJII ]tiCqws &uss1� ( Cambridge
Univenity Press , 1 9 1 5) vol. I I , 'Emile' , p. 1 57.
14. I bid, vol. I, 'Premiere venion du Contrat social', p. 489.
15. J . J. Moser, Versuch des MUSlin EuropiJisclun Vol/cer-Rechts i11 Fritdells- und Kritgs
Zeiten (Frankfurt am Mayn: Varrentrapp Sohn &: Wenner, 1 777) part I , pp.
35 and 44--6; see also J . J. Moser, GrrauJ-S�, rks jekt iihlitlun Europlisclun
Vol/cer-Rechts in Frittiens-Zeiten (Frankfurt am Mayn: Johann August Rupe,
1 763) p. 23.
16. Moser, Grund-Siitz:.e, p. 1 9.
1 7. G. F. von Martens, The lAw of .Nations, 4th edn, trans. W. Cobbett (London:
William Cobbett, 1 829) p. 29.
18. A. H . D. Freiherr von Bulow, Blitke alif z:.ulcflriftige B•gebmheiten, 'aber keW
Propluz:.eihrmgm ( 1 806) pp. 6-7.
1 9. I bid, pp. 67-8.
20. C . Webster, T/u Congress of Vitrma, 1814-1815 (London: G. Bell &: Sons, 1 950)
p. 6 1 .
21. F . Gentz, Dlplclus inldites du Chevalier de Gmtz:. tJWC Hospot/Drs til ValtiChu, ptw.r
216 Notes
servir a l'histoire de La politique europeenne ( 1813 ti 1828) , ed . A. Prokesch-Osten

( Paris: Pion, 1876-7) vol. I, pp. 354-5. Gentz's Areopagus comprised the
members of the Quadruple Alliance and France, soon to emerge from the state
of tutelage in which it had temporarily found itself. He did not list the
secondary powers.
An alternative view of the hierarchy of powers found expression in the works
of the French writer, and former archbishop, Dufour de Pradt, whom Gentz
engaged in a polemic about the new system of European politics. De Pradt saw
post-Napoleonic Europe in dualistic terms. Britain and Russia shared a
protectorate of the rest of Europe, and all other states had to defend themselves
against the dangers of exploitation and domination by these powers. Among
the states of the second order he distinguished at least two class es , putting the
Netherlands, but not Sweden and Spain, in the upper one. But he did not
use the term 'middle powers' about this or any lower class of powers. (See
especially de Pradt, L'Europe apres le Congres d'Aix-la-Ciulpelle, faisant suite au
Congres de Vienne (Brussels: de Mot, 1 8 1 9) and Paralltle de Ia puissance anglaise et
russe relativement tl l'Europe (Paris: Bl:chet Aim':, 1 823) ) .
22. K. H. L. Politz, Die Slalltswissensclulften im Lichte unsrer ,(tit, 2nd edn (Leipzig:
Hinrichsche, 1 827-8) vol. I, p. 585.
23. I bid, pp. 585-7.
24. C. von Clausewitz, Politische Schriften und Briife, ed. H. Rothfels ( Munich: Drei
Masken, 1 922) 'Zuriickfuhrung der vielen politischen Fragen, welche
Deutschland beschiftigen, auf die unserer Gesamtexistenz ( 1 83 1 ) ', pp. 229-
30.
25. Ibid, pp. 233-4,
26. Hinterlassene Werke des Generals Carl von Clausewit;: uber Krieg und Kriegfuhrung.
Vom Kriege (Berlin: Diimmler, 1 832-4) book VI, chs 1 and 6.
2 7 . H. C. von Gagern, Der Einsiedkr odtr Fragmente uber Sittenlehre, Staatsrecht und
Politik (Stuttgart and Tiibingen: Cotta, 1 822-3) vol. I I , 'Die grosse Allianz',
pp. 58-9.
28. Ibid, p. 62.
29. H. C. Freiherr von Gagern, Mein Antheil an dtr Politik, vol. V, Der ,(weite Pariser
Frieden (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1 845) part I, p. 426.
30. The Cambridge Modern History, ed. A. W. Ward, G. W. Prothero and S. Leathes
(Cambridge University Press , 1 902-1 1 ) vol. IX, p. 652.
3 1 . J. G. Droysen, Politische Schriften, ed. F. Gilbert ( Munich and Berlin:
Oldenbourg, 1 933) 'Preussen und das System der Grossm achte', p. 228. In a
footnote, the editor suggests which events Droysen might have had in mind
when he noted the rising influence of these secondary states.
32. See, for example, ibid, 'Die politische Stellung Preussens' ( 1 845) , p. 48, and
'Zur Charakteristik der europaischen Krises' ( 1 854) , p. 330.
33. For an exposition of Droysen's ideas about European politics and the future
role of Prussi a, see C. Holbraad, The Concert of Europe: A Study in German and
British International Theory 1815-1914 (London: Longman, 1970) pp. 55-8.
34. Wight, Power Politics, p. 297.
35. For details of the composition and structure of the German Confederation,
see, for example, H. Holborn, A History of Modern Germany, 1648-184()
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1 965) pp. 44-4-6; and F. Schnabel, Deutsche
Geschichte im Neun;:,ehnten ]ahrhundtrt, vol. II (Freiburg: Herder, 1 949)
p. 552.
Notes 217
36. See Chapter 5, in which the pattern of conduct of the German middle states is
analysed.
37. Quoted in H. Cord Meyer, Mittelellropa in Germtlll Tlwught and Action 181�1945
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1 955) p. 9.
38. Die Wahl des Frtiherm von Wangenheim . . . .tum Abgeordneten in die
Wiirtembergische Stiindtversammlung (Tiibingen: Laupp, 1 832) appendix 1 ,
p. 2 1 6.
39. In a constitutional tract published in Weimar in 1 849 - even the title ofwhich,
Osterreich, Preussen und das reine Deutschland arif der Grundlage des deutschen
Staatenbundes organisch .tum deutschen Bundesstaatl vereinigt, shows that the author
had not changed his views much over the years - Wangenheim described the
projected confederation as the Mittelglied of the German federation he had in
mind (see, for example, p. 54) . But from the context it is clear that this term
referred to geographical position and political role rather than to relative
power. For a study ofWangenheim's ideas for the reorganisation of Germany,
see C. Albrecht, Die Triaspolitik des Frhr. K. Aug. v. Wangenhtim, vol. XIV of
Darstlllungen aus der Wiirttlmbergischen Geschithtl (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer,
1 9 1 4) .
40 . G . Erichson (pseud. ) , Manuscript aus Siid-Deutschland (London: Griphi, 1 820)
pp. 1 5(}-9 and 168.
4 1 . Ibid, pp. 22 1 -4.
42. Ibid, pp. 223-9.
43. T. E. Holland, Studies in International Low (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 898)
'Pacific Blockade' ( 1 89 7 ) , p. 1 48.
44. J. Westlake, lntemational lAw, 2nd edn (Cambridge University Press, l 9 1 Q
l 3) , part I, p. 325 n.
45. J . C. Bluntschli, Gesammelte kleine Schriften (Nordlingen: Beck, 1 879-8 1 ) vol. II,
'Die Organisation des europaischen Statenvereines', p. 300 .
46. In his own project for the international organisation of Europe, Bluntschli gave
two votes to each of the great powers and one vote to each remaining state
(ibid, p. 303) .
47. H. von Treitschke, Politik, ed. M. Cornicelius (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1 897-8) vol. I ,
p . 42.
48. J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Low ofNations. A Treatise of the Jural Relations of
Separate Political Communities (London: Blackwood, 1 883-4) vol. I , pp. 1 82-
2 1 2.
49. Ibid, vol. I, pp. 2 1 2- 1 5 and vol. II, pp. 28o- l .
50. Treitschke, Politik, vol. I, pp. 42-3.
5 1 . P. Rohrbach, Deutschland untlr den WeltvOikern, 2nd edn (Berlin: Schoneberg,
1 908) pp. 3 1 9 and 3 1 .
2 T H E LEAG U E OF N A T I O N S A N D T H E U N I T ED N A T I ONS
l. Lord Hankey, The Supreme Control at the Peace Conference 1919 (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1 963) p. 37.
2. Ibid, p. 45.
3. Ibid, p. 46.
4. D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1 928)
vol. II, pp. 4 1 -2 .
218 Notes
5. Ibid, p. 45.
6. C. Howard-Ellis, The Origi11, Stntcture, and Working of the uague of NatitJns
(London: Allen &: Unwin, 1 928) p. 82.
7. A. Zimmcrn, The uague of Nalions and the lbJI of Law, 1918-35 (London:
Macmillan, 1 939) pp. 255--8; F. Morley, The Socie9 of Nalions (Washington,
'
DC: Brookings Inatitution, 1 932) pp. 82--4.
8. W. E. Stcphcna, Rn1isions of the Trt� of Versailles ( New York: Columbia
Univenity Press, 1 939) p. 1 28.
9. For an account of the evenb of 1 926, see F. P. Walten, A History of the uague of
Nalitms (Oxford Univenity Press, 1 952) ch. 2 7 .
10. Howard-Ellis, Till Origi11, Stru&ture, and Working of the uague of.NatitJns, p. 1 43.
1 1 . Stephena, RevisitJns, p. 1 32 n. The passage occurred in a speech of September
1 926 in reply to a apecial request that Spain's seat on the Council should not
be left vacant.
1 2. Howard-Ellis, Till Origill, Stntctwr�, and Working of the League of NatitJns, p. 1 43.
1 3. See, for example, a speech by the Brazilian presiden t after the negotiations at
Geneva in March 1 926 ( Till Timu, 24 March 1 926, p. 1 6 ) .
1 4. The Timts, 5 March 1 926, p . 1 4.
1 5. Howard-Ellis, Till Oripl, Slntdure, and Working of the uague ofNatitJns, p. 143.
16. S. S. Jones, The &andiNwiall States and the uague of .NatitJIIS (Princeton
Univenity Press, 1 939) pp. 1 23-5.
1 7. Howard-Ellis, The Origi11, Stru&ture, and Working of the uague of NatitJns,
pp. 1 52-3.
1 8. C. K. Webeter and S. Herbert, The uague of NatitJns in Theory and Pr4Ctice
(London: Allen &: Unwin, 1 933) p. 86.
1 9. Stephens, RevisitJns, p. 1 3 1 .
20 . Wight, Por«r Poiitiu, p . 64 ; see also A . Vandenbosch and W . Hogan, The
Ullilld NatitJns - Ba&lcgrtnm4, Org411isatitJII , Flltl&titJIIS and Activities (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1 952) p. 86, where Canada, Brazil, the Netherlands and
Auatralia are mentioned as states regarding themselves as middle powen.
2 1 . F. H. Soward and E. Mcinnis, C4114da and the Unilld .NatitJns (New York:
Manhattan Publishing Co., 1956) p. 1 0.
22. R. A. MacKay, ' The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powen', in H. L. Dyck
and H. P. Kr01by (eds) , Empire and .NatitJns. Essays in Ho11011.r of Frederic H.
Soword {Toronto: Univenity of Toronto Press , 1 969) p. 1 34.
23. Ibid, pp. 1 34-5.
24. C. Eagleton, 'The Share of Canada in the Making of the United Nations', The
U11il!lf'si9 of Tor011 to Law Joumal, vo1. VII. no. 2 ( 1 948) p. 334.
25. Ibid, p. 338.
26. Ibid, p. 343.
27. J. D. E. Plant, 'The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and
Posture at the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San
Francisco - 1945' ( unpubl . Ph. D. thesis, Australian National Univenity)
p. 1 1 5 .
2 8 . Ibid, p. 250.
29. Ibid, p. 286.
30. I bid , p. 290.
3 1 . Dr Evatt bas given his own account of Australian policies and activities at San
Francisco in ch. IV of his The Task of .NatitJns (New York: Duell, Sloan &:
Notes 2 19
Pearce, 1 949) ; but see also, for example, A. Watt, The Evolution of Australian
Foreign Policy 1938-1965 ( Cambridge University Press, 1 967) pp. 78-93.
32. Plant, 'The Origins and Development of Australia's Policy and Posture',
p. 3 1 8.
33. Ibid, p. 328.
34. Canada withdrew on the third ballot in favour of Australia, who argued
strongly that it was the only power to represent the Pacific area. For a survey of
the early history of elections to the Security Council, see MacKay, 'The
Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers' , pp. 1 35--6.
35. I t was as a result of a certain harmony of views between some small states and
the great powers, especially between a number of Latin American states and
the United States, that the Canadian proposal for specific rules to give effect to
the functional idea was replaced by the watered-down amendment that
became part ofArticle 23 (Soward and Mcinnis, Canada and the United Nations,
pp. 26-7 ) .
36. The outcome of the Napoleonic reorganisation o f Germany o f 1 803, to which
the middle states of the later German Confederation owed their origin,
suggests that middle powers may stand a better chance of establishing
themselves when the post-war restructuring of the states system is carried out
by one great power only.
3 T H E H I E R A R C H Y OF POW E R S
I . G. DeT. Glazebrook, 'The Middle Powers i n the United Nations System',

Internationo.l Organization, vol. I , no. 2 (June 1 947) p. 308. For some critical
remarks on the Canadian post-war doctrines of the role of middle powers, see
MacKay, 'The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers', p. 1 39.
2. R. G. Riddell, 'The Role ofthe Middle Powers in the United Nations. Extracts
from an address . . . June 22, 1 948' (unpublished) p. I .
3 . Ibid, p . 2 . This observation should be compared with Botero's of 1 589, that
middle powers 'are exposed neither to violence by their weakness nor to envy
by their greatness' (see p. 1 2) . Riddell's statement is the obverse of Botero's.
4. In the earlier period, this difference in the conception of the role of middle
powers may be seen not only in the debates of 1 945 but also in the first post-war
writings. Note, for example, the difference of emphasis between Glazebrook ,
characterising middle powers in terms of their opposition to great-power
control, and Riddell, reflecting the views of the Canadian government of the
time, presenting the same powers as being both willing and able to support and
participate in the most important work of the permanent members of the
Security Council (see pp. 68-9) .
5. J. W. Holmes, 'Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?' , in J. King
Gordon (ed . ) , Canada's Role as a Middle Power, Contemporary Affairs No.
35 (Toronto: The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1 966) pp.
1 5-18.
6. Current Notes on Internationo.l Affairs, March 1 964 (Department o f External
Affairs, Canberra) vol. 35, no. 3, p. 24 ( House of Representatives, 1 1 March) .
7 . A . Watt, 'Ost und West - Australien und die Probleme Siidostasiens',
Oesterreichische <:,eitschrift fiir Aussenpolitik, vol. 9, no. 1 ( 1 969) pp. 1 5-3 1 .
220 Notes
8. The Role of Middle Powers in World Politics (Bonn: Forschungsinstitut der

Deutschen Gesellschaft ftir Auswartige Politik, 1 968) p. 4.
9. L.J. Cantori and S. L. Spiegel, The lnttmational Politics ofRegions ( Englewood
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1 970) p. 1 4. In a subsequent work, Spiegel used the same
basic distinctions but made a few changes in the list of middle powers (S. L.
Spiegel, Dominance and Diversi�. The Inttmationtll Hierarchy (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1 972) ch. 3) . In both studies, the classification of nations according to
range ofinftuence was backed up by attempts to assess their relative power, the
elements of power being divided into material, military, and motivational.
10. M. Haas, lnttmatioTIIll Conflict (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1 974) pp. 324 and
33 1 . For a division along similar lines, between great powers and minor
(including middle) powers, see Wight, Power Politics, pp. 43 and 65. Wight
used the distinction applied at the Versailles Peace Congress , between general
and limited interests.
1 1 . D. Vital, The lnequali� ofStates. A Study ofthe Small Power in InttmatiOTUll Relations
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967) p. 8.
1 2. E. Hanson, 'The Economic Policies of a Middle Power', in Gordon, Cantlda's
Role as a Middk Power, pp. 1 02-4 and 1 08- 1 0.
1 3 . J. D. Sethi, 'India as Middle Power', /Nlia Q]larter!J, vol. XXV, no. 2 (April
June 1 969) pp. 107-8.
14. J. W. Burton, lnttmationtll Relations. A General Theory (Cambridge University
Press, 1 965) p. 1 05.
1 5. W. Schneider, 'The French Nuclear Force and the Economic and Strategic
Prospects for Medium Powers Independent Nuclear Deterrent', Arms Control
and National Securi�, vol. I ( 1 969) p. 73 n.
16. For an expansion ofthis point, see C. Holbraad, 'The Role of Middle Powers',
Cooperation and Conflict. Nordic Journal ofInttmationtll Politics, no. 2 ( 1 97 1 ) pp. 81-
2.
1 7. Singer and Small found diplomatic representation of other states a good index
of the status of a state and ranked the members of the international system on
this basis (J. D. Singer and M. Small, 'The Composition and Status Ordering
of the International System: 1 8 1 5- 1 940', World Politics, vol. XVI II, no. 2
(January 1 966 ) pp. 236-82) . Both Wallace and East used the same data when
they measured the 'ascribed status', or 'prestige', of states for the purpose of
examining the relationship between 'status inconsistency' and violence in the
international system (M. D. Wallace, 'Power, Status, and International War',
]ourntll of Peace Research, vol. 8 ( 1 97 1 ) pp. 23-35; M . A. East, 'Status
Discrepancy and Violence in the International System: An Empirical
Analysis', in J . N. Rosenau, V. Davis and M. A. East (eds) , The Analysis of
Inttmational Politics (New York: The Free Press , 1 972) p. 305) . Johan Galtung
and his disciples have used a variety of other indicators of international status.
18. For a discussion of the distinctions mentioned here and a critique of attempts at
precise measuring of the strength and power of countries, see R. Aron, Peace aNi
War. A Theory of Inttmationtll Relations, trans. R. Howard and A. B. Fox
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1 962) ch. I I .
1 9. K. Davis, 'The Democratic Foundations of National Power', i n M. Berger,
T. Abel and C. H. Page (eds) , Freedom and Control in Modern Socie� (New York:
Van Nostrand, 1 954) p. 1 0. Katherine and A. F. K. Organski, writing in 1 96 1 ,
listed the deficiencies of national income as an indicator o f national power but
Notes 22 1
agreed that it was still thought the best general index (K. and A. F. K.
Organski, Population and World Power (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 96 1 ) .
p. 28) .
20. F. C. German, 'A Tentative Evaluation of World Power', Journal of Co'!flict
&solution, vol. IV, no. 1 ( March 1960) pp. 1 38-44 .
21. A. F. K. Organski, World Politics, 2 nd edn (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1 968)
pp. 1 89-220. For a critique of the studies of German and Organski, see S.
Rosen, 'War Power and the Willingness to Suffer', in B. M. Russett ( ed. ) , Peace,
War, and Numbers (London: Sage Publications, 1 972) pp. 1 7Q- l . Rosen
accepted the case for GNP as the most useful simple measure of 'war power',
but for his own purposes used instead the revenue of the central govern
ment.
22. See, for example, some of the contributions to the literature on classification of
powers referred to above. Cantori and Spiegel, in examining the material
characteristics of power, concentrated on three factors, namely size of
population, size of GNP and amount of energy consumed. While their
criterion of military power was size of armed forces, their indication of
motivation was percentage of GNP devoted to military expenditures. When
they found these five factors insufficient, t h ey introduced supplementary data
( The lntmultional Politics of &gions, p. 54) . Spiegel refined this method in his
later work (Dominance and Diversiry, ch. 2) . Wallace used five indices of
'achieved status', or 'national power capability', namely total population,
urban population, iron and steel production, armed forces personnel and
military expenditures ('Power, Status, and International War', pp. 25-6) .
23. Rosen, 'War Power and the Willingness to Suffer', p. 1 7 1 .
24. See, for example, a study by Alcock and Newcombe, in which thirty-eight
Canadians were asked to rank nations according to perceived power (N. Z.
Alcock and A. G. Newcombe, 'The Perception of National Power', Journal of
Co'!flict &solution, vol. 14 ( 1 970) pp. 335--43 ) . A similar study of Latin
American countries had previously been carried out in Chile (S. Schwartzman
and M. Mora y Araujo, 'Images of International Stratification in Latin
America', Journal of Peace &search, no. 3 ( 1 966 ) ) .
25. This term and its synonym 'rank disequilibrium' have been used by Johan
Galtung and other sociologists and political scientists who have investigated
the domestic and international consequences of the phenomenon.
26. Spiegel, Dominance and Diversiry, p. 52.
27. The source is World Bank Atlas, 1 977 (International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development) , where relevant statistical explanations and notes qualify
ing individual figures may be found. For a comparison of the 1 975 figures with
earlier and later ones, see note 29.
28. The ranking of Latin American states is discussed on pp. 97-8.
29. To see just how reliable the system of classifying powers used here is, over
relatively short periods, we may compare the GNP figures for 1 975, on which
the classification rests, with those for 1 970 and 1 980. In general, the 1 970
figures (see World Bank Atlas, 1 972) do not show a great difference in the
positions of the states here defined as middle powers in relation to the lesser
powers immediately below them in the area lists of 1 9.75. The most notable
discrepancies are in Africa, where Egypt in 1 970 was a little ahead ofNigeria,
then only just recovering from the Biafran war; and in Asia, where Pakistan,
222 Notes
before the independence of Bangladesh, was ahead of Iran. In 1 970, thus, it

would have been reasonable to exclude Nigeria from the list of middle powers
and to include Pakistan. In Europe, East Germany was ahead of Spain,
though behind Poland. But the case for East Germany being included might
already then have appeared weaker than that for Spain, with its much larger
size and population and, not least, its long history as a middle power.
Nor do the 1 970 figures show startling differences in the ranking of the states
here defined as middle powers, none of them being more than a few places
higher or lower in the list than five years later. The difference in the price of oil
seems to have had a rather greater effect on the relative economic strength of
oil-producing countries not on our list than on that of those on it. Thus, Iran
though then, as later, a marginal case - could well be counted a middle power
already in 1 970, when its place was after Argentina and South Africa but
before Indonesia.
For 1 980, preliminary GNP figures (see World Bank Atlas, 1 98 1 ) available
for the states here defined as middle powers are as follows:
( US S millions)
Japan 1 1 52 9 1 0
Germany, Federal Republic of 827 790
France 627 700
United Kingdom 442 820
Italy 368 860
China 283 250
Brazil 243 240
Canada 242 530
Spain 1 99 780
India 1 59 430
Mexico 1 44 000
Australia 1 42 240
Poland 1 39 780
Nigeria 85 5 1 0
South Mrica 66 960
Argentina 66 430
Indonesia 6 1 770
Iran not available
The most marked divisions between middle powers and those immediately
below them in the area lists were again in North and Central America, where
Mexico was followed by Puerto Rico at 1 1 070 million dollars; in Oceania and
Indonesia, where Indonesia was followed by New Zealand at 23 1 60 million
dollars; and in Africa, where South Mrica was followed by Algeria at 36 4 1 0
million dollars. In South America, Argentina w as again succeeded by
Venezuela, at 54 220 million dollars. In Asia, where Saudi Arabia headed the
list of non-middle powers at 100 930 million dollars, no comparison is possi ble,
as figures for Iran were not available. In Europe, the Netherlands at 1 6 1 440
million dollars was well ahead of Poland, with East Germany at 1 20 940
million dollars and Belgium at 1 1 9 770 million dollars not very far behind. But
the population, area and history of Poland still make it reasonable to keep this
Notes 223
power in the Jist, while excluding the three others. On the basis of the 1 980
figures, we may say that the minimum qualification for being counted a middle
power is a GNP of about 60 000 million. dollars in the geographical areas of
Africa, South America and Oceania and Indonesia, and a GNP of about
1 40 000 million dollars in the areas of Asia, Europe and North and Central
America.
Comparing the relative order of middle powers in the 1 980 list with that of
1 975, we note that one of the upper middle powers, China, has slipped so much
as to be overtaken by I taly. Further down the list two oil-producing countries,
Mexico and Nigeria, have improved their positions, the latter by £Our places,
while Poland has moved down three places. Otherwise there are no great
changes in the order. As measured in terms of GNP, the comparative strength
of middle powers, whether in relation to minor powers or to each other,
apparently does not tend to vary a great deal over relatively short periods.
4 T H E UN I F O C A L S Y S T E M
I . A. P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea: Its Rise and Decline ( I thaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1 954) p. l ; quoted in R. N. Burr, Our Troubled
Hemisphere. Perspectives on United States-Latin A merican Relations (Washington,
DC: Brookings I nstitution, 1 96 7 ) p. 1 2 .
2. See pp. 86-7 .
3. H . Bull, The Anarchical Sociery: A Study of Order in World Politics ( London :
Macmillan, 1 97 7 ) pp. 2 1 3- 1 9.
4. For the tendency in the United States to divide the hemisphere into areas, see
D. Bronheim, 'Latin American Diversity and United States Foreign Policy', in
D. A. Chalmers (ed . ) , Changing Latin A merica, APS Proceedings, vol. 30, no. 4
(New York: Academy of Political Science, 1 972) pp. 1 67-8.
5. See J. Castaneda, ' Revolution and Foreign Policy: Mexico's Experience', in
C. A. Astiz (ed . ) , Latin A merican International Politics: A mbitions, Capabilities, and
the National Interest of Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1 969) pp. 1 43--4.
6. See E. Bradford Burns, 'Tradition and Variation in Brazilian Foreign Policy' ,
i n Astiz, Latin A merican International Politics, pp. 1 78-9.
7. See pp. 5 1 -3 .
8. H. F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1 953) p. 3 1 4.
9. See pp. 2 7-8 .
10. This is the system that Lewis Namier described as 'the "sandwich system" of
international politics' (L. B. Namier, Conflicts. Studies in Contemporary History
(London : Macmillan, 1 942) p. 1 4; see also L. B. Namier, Personalities and Powers
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1 955) pp. 1 1 1 - 1 2 ) .
5 T H E D U A L I ST I C SYSTEM
I . R. L. Walker, The Multi-State System of Ancient China ( Hamden, Connecticut:

The Shoe String Press, 1 95 3 ) p. 5 1 . A table on p. 50 presents the general slant
224 Notes
of Cheng's allegiance between 678 BC and 546 Be Walker describes the role
of Cheng in the states system as that of a 'passive balancer' , and points out
that this balancing process involved the states in almost constant warfare
(p. 52) .
2. Martin Wight, discussing the balance of power as policy in the context of the
European states system - though without special reference to the conduct of
middle powers in dualistic situations - stressed particularly the moral factor.
Listing the wartime cases of Prussia's relations with Napoleon before the
battle ofJena, Roumania's relations with Russia in the Russo -Turkish War of
1 877-8 and Mussolini's policy in 1 94{), he used Gibbon's term 'jackal powers'
for those that simply chose what they thought was the winning side. It tended
to be a futile policy because it ignored the needs of the balance of power. The
law of the balance of power, Wight noticed, 'is true of states in proportion to
their strength, confidence and internal cohesion. Weak and corrupt states, and
especially those ruled by an unrepresentative despot or clique, tend to
gravitate towards the dominant power' (Power Politics, p. 1 8 1 ) .
3. After the Moscow Conference o f November 1 960, Gomulka stayed on for
several weeks in an attempt to conciliate in the strained relations between the
two principal communist powers (R. Hiscocks, Poland: Bridge for the Abyss?
(Oxford University Press , 1 963) p . 259) . Late in 1 963, too, Poland's leadership
was reported to be trying to mediate in the ideological quarrel between the
Soviet Union and China (New York Times, 2 November 1 963, p. 1 ) .
4. Address delivered a t Banff, Alberta, o n 2 7 August 1 965 (Gordon, Canada's Role
as a Middle Power, pp. 2QO-l ) .
5. A . Farace, 'The Role of Middle Powers i n a Changing World' (unpublished

paper delivered at Carleton University, Ottawa, on 1 3 February 1 969 by the
I talian ambassador to Canada) p. 29. For a general discussion of partiality in
mediation, see S. Touval, 'Biased Intermediaries' , Jerusalem Journal of
International Relations, vol. I, no. I ( 1 975) .
6. H. Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970 (London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson
and Michael Joseph, 1 9 7 1 ) , for example pp. 79-80. Wilson's own conception
of the Anglo-American relationship is set out on p. 50.
7. In an interesting study of East-West interaction patterns, Johan Galtung
shows that in conditions of conflict within a dualistic system there is a tendency
for the 'topdogs' (in which categcry he includes not only the Soviet Union and
the United States but also the United Kingdom, France and China) to
dominate interaction. The 'topdogs' discourage the 'underdogs' (a category
which takes in all lesser bloc members, including powers that in a study which
operated with more than two classes of states might be called 'middledogs')
from establishing contact with their counterparts and with the 'topdogs' on the
other side ( J . Galtung, 'East-West Interaction Patterns' , Journal of Peace
Research, vol. 3 ( 1 966) pp. 1 48-9) . The analysis suggests that the conclusions
would be broadly similar if the division were between the two alliance leaders
only and all lesser members of the blocs.
8. For a discussion of participation in peace-keeping operations, see MacKay,
'The Canadian Doctrine of the Middle Powers', pp. 1 40- 1 .
9. The diplomatic influence of Taiwan and Egypt in the role of troublemaker
may be compared with that of China in chs I I, I I I and IV of C. Holbraad,
Superpowers and International Conflict (London: Macmillan, and New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1 979) .
Notes 225
1 0 . Some of the mediatory moves of the Suharto government are listed in 0 . G.

Roeder, 'Fetching Filipino', Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. LIX, no. 4 ( 25
January 1 968) p. 1 33.
I I . The literature on uncommitted states in the role of intermediaries in dualistic
conflict is reviewed in 0 . R. Young, The Intermediaries. Third Parties in
International Crises ( Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1 967) pp. 94-
1 02. After surveying the arguments for and against expecting useful results
from diplomatic intervention from such quarters, Young concludes that,
although there appears to be some potential in uncommitted states for
successful intervention, 'the role must ultimately be described as rather limited
and circumscribed for any practical purpose' (p. 1 02) .
1 2 . Towards Friendship, Peace and Justice, Speech by President Sukarno before the
Non-Bloc Summit Conference in Beograd, on I September 1 96 1 (Department
of Information, Republic of Indonesia) .
1 3. See pp. 2 7-33.
1 4. H . C . Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action 1815-1945 ( The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1 955) pp. 20 and 23.
15. See pp. 30- 1 .
1 6. H. von Treitschke, History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century (Lndon: Jarrold,
1 9 1 5- 1 9 ) vol. I I , p. 1 08.
1 7 . For a discussion of Wangenheim's ideas, see pp. 30- 1 .
1 8. For a discussion of Lindner's views, see pp. 3 1 -3 .
1 9 . For a discussion o f the difference between Wangenheim and Lindner o n this
point, see Albrecht, Die Triaspolitik des Frhr. K. Aug. v. Wangenheim, p. 5 .
2 0 . See p. 1 1 5 .
2 1 . For a n analysis o f th e class structure o f the international system, see Galtung,
'East-West Interaction Patterns', pp. 1 4 7-8.
22. Holbraad, Superpowers and International Corifiict, pp. 7 7-8.
23. For details of Polish relations with various European middle powers in this
period, see J. F. Morrison, The Polish People's Republic: Integration and Communiry
Building in Eastern Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1 968) pp. 1 1 2-
13.
24. Quoted i n A . Bromke, 'Poland under Gierek: A New Political Style' , Problems
of Communism, vol. XXI, no. 5 ( Sept-Get 1 972) p. 1 7 . The writer was Janucz
Stefanowicz.
25. In the later 1 960s, however, the Indonesian government, now under the
leadership ofSuharto, revealed some lingering concern with the issues dividing
the great powers, at one juncture actually offering to mediate between the
parties to the war in Indochina. Yet, there was no real return to the spirit of
Bandung and Belgrade.
26. See pp. 1 30- 1 .
27. Quoted in B. Prasad, 'The General Experience of Nonalignment and its
Prospects for the Future', in L. Acimovic (ed . ) , Nonalignment in the World of
Today (Beograd: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1 969)
p. 1 06.
28. See p. 98.
29. See pp. 97-8.
30. See, for example, Sisir Gupta's subtle analysis of the implications for the Third
World of the relations between the great powers in the late 1 960s and early
1 9 70s. Distinguishing between an 'inner' and an 'outer' world, he noted a
226 Notes
tendency for the superpowers to become increasingly absorbed in their

relationship of limited co-operation and restrained rivalry, and expressed the
fear that they and their major allies would be tempted to confine their
attention to the problems and crises of the developed parts of the world and to
leave the regions beyond to their own devices (S. Gupta, 'Great Power
Relations and the Third World' , in C. Holbraad (ed. ) , Super Powers and World
Order (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1 9 7 1 ) pp. 1 29-33) .
Gupta's concern that it might no longer be possible for the 'outer world' to look
to the great powers for minimum protection against the worst effects of
international anarchy implied considerable scepticism about the ability of
Third World powers on their own to maintain an acceptable level of order in
their regions, which in the circumstances of the late 1 960s seemed well justified .
6 THE T R I A N G U L A R SYST E M
1 . The various processes of conquest whereby a great-power triangle may be

resolved have been explored by Martin Wight in 'Triangles and Duels', in
M. Wight, Systems ofStates, ed. H. Bull ( Leicester University Press, 1 9 7 7 ) . The
evidence of history, Wight suggested, shows that 'triangles, like duels, are
relationships of conflict, and are resolved by war' (p. 1 79) . P. A. Reynolds took
a similar view when he set out to show by a process of reasoning that the three
state system has 'an inherent probability of self-destruction' (P. A. Reynolds,
An Introduction to International Relations ( London: Longman, 1 97 1 ) pp. 204--6) .
However, R. J . Yalem, concerned about the stability of the triangle of the
United States, the Soviet Union and China, provided a critique of this position
and set out some rules to be followed by the three actors if the stability of the
system was to be maintained ( 'Tripolarity and World Politics' , The Year Book of
World Affairs 1974, London, val. 28, pp. 23-42) .
2. The confusion of structure and process has been clarified by Kenneth Waltz in
Theory of International Politics ( Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1 979) ; see, for
example, pp. 1 30- 1 .
3. See pp. 30-3 .
4. See pp. 1 3 1 -2.
5. Elsewhere ·I have discussed the character and analysed the dynamics of
the incipient triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union and China
( Holbraad, Superpowers and International Conflict, ch . V I ) . Some of the distinc
tions introduced there form the basis of the present enquiry into the roles of
middle powers in a triangular system.
6. For a discussion of the roles of aligned middle powers in dualistic cold war, see
pp. 1 23--6.
7. See pp. 1 38-9.
8. For dualistic concerts, see pp. 1 34-40; for multiple concerts, see pp. 1 79-83.
9. See Chapter 4.
1 0. The typical regional roles of middle powers in dualistic limited conflict are
ou tlined on pp. 1 5 1 --6.
I I . See, for example, T. Caplow, Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads ( Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1 968) p. 79.
1 2 . See pp. 1 28-30.
Notes 227
1 3 . For details o fde Gaulle's move in this game, see W . A. C. Adie, ' "One World"
Restored? Sino-American Relations on a New Footing', Asian Survry, vol. X I I ,
no. 5 ( May 1 9 72) pp. 3 73-4. The quotation i s from Adie's interpretation of
de Gaulle's reasoning.
7 T H E M U LT I PLE SYSTEM
I . If the two powers that for some purposes had · been treated as great powers,
namely the Ottoman Empire and I taly, and the two non-European great
powers, the United States and japan, are included, the international system of
the decades before the First World War counted nine great powers.
2. For the emergence of Spain, Portugal and Sweden in intermediate positions,
see pp. 1 9-2 1 .
3. The strongest protest came from the representative of Spain at Vienna, who
refused to sign the Final Act (see p. 20) . Three years later, on the occasion of
the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, where the powers of the Quadruple Alliance
had put some pressure on Sweden in connection with the transfer of Norway,
the Swedish king wrote a letter to Metternich's master in which he complained
bitterly about the joint domination of the great powers over all other members
of the European system (see H. von Treitschke, Deutsche Geschichte im
.Neunz.ehnten ]ahrhundert, vol. II ( Leipzig: H irzel, 1 883) p. 4 77, where extracts of
the letter are given) .
4. The argument for regarding the Ottoman Empire as a middle power is set out
on pp. 33-5.
5. For details of the reactions of lesser powers to the Council ofTen, see pp. 46-7.
6. For details of the reactions of lesser powers to tendencies towards great-power
domination in 1 945 , see pp. 57--62.
7. For examples ofthe reactions ofsmall states to a concert ofgreat powers, see pp.
1 36, 1 39-40.
8. For the story of Spain's demotion, see p. 20; details of its reactions may be
found in Comte d'Angeberg (ed. ) , Le Congres de Vienne et les Traitis de 1815
( Paris: Amyot, 1 864) vol. I I , pp. 1 34 1 -2 and 1 45 7 .
9. Some reasons for treating united I taly as a power of intermediate class are set
out on p. 36.
1 0. For the story ofthe recognition of an intermediate category of semi-permanent
members of the League Council, see pp. 47-54.
I I. For an account of the attempt by middle powers to secure a special position in
1 945, see pp. 57--6 5.
1 2. For an analysis of the historical circumstances that conditioned the rise of the
Concert of Europe and an assessment of the possibility of a multiple concert of
the world emerging in the future, see Holbraad, Superpowers and International
Corifiict, pp. 1 42-5 1 .
1 3. See Chapter 4.
1 4. For the distinction between dominance, hegemony and primacy, see p. 98.
15. See pp. 1 0 1 -2, 1 05--6, 1 09- 1 6.
1 6. For the changing configurations of the composite triangle of the League
powers, the Axis powers and the Soviet Union, see p. 1 6 1 .
1 7. Parallels to Russia's involvement with Turkey's Balkan enemies may be seen in
228 Notes
the great powers' support of the Belgians against the Netherlands and of the
Norwegians against Sweden . Indeed, there is some truth in the generalisation
that the European great powers suppressed national rebellions when they were
directed against a great power, as in the case of the Poles, the Hungarians and
the I rish, but actually helped such uprisings when they were against a lesser
power (see V. V. Sveics, Small Nation Survival (Jericho, NY: The Exposition
Press, 1 970) p. 88) .
18. For a discussion of the logically possible roles of unaligned middle powers in
relation to cold war in a dualistic system, see pp. 1 26-30.
1 9. The conduct of the small Balkan states on the eve of the First World War
suggests that, in some circumstances, the part of troublemaker is more likely to
be taken by small states than by middle powers.
20. For a discussion of the corresponding role in a dualistic system divided by keen
rivalry, see pp. 1 30--4.
21. For a discussion of regional relationships and sub-systemic roles of middle
powers in dualistic systems characterised by a mixture of rivalry and co
operation between the great powers, see pp. 1 5 1 -8.
CONCLU S I ON
I . Hedley Bull has clarified the relationship between the various goals of
international society and discussed the question of priorities (Bull, The
Anarchical Sociery, pp. xii-xiv and 77-98) .
2. See, for example, the writings of F. L. Lindner discussed on pp. 3 1 -3.
3. See, for example, the ideas of the Abbe de Mably discussed on pp. 1 3- 1 6 .
4. See, for example, t h e arguments o ft h e Canadian official R . G. Riddell outlined
on pp. 68-9.
5. See p. 1 2.
6. Such ideas may be found in, for example, Canadian writings of the first years of
the United Nations, some of which have been discussed on pp. 68-9.
7. See pp. 58--62.
8. Brazil withdrew from the League of Nations after the controversy in the mid-
1 920s about membership of the Council (see pp. 5 1 -3) ; Indonesia resigned from
the United Nations in january 1 965 but returned in Sep tember 1 966.
9. The current tendency towards more regional autonomy in global politics has
been demonstrated by the decline in the ability of the superpowers to influence
middle powers and small states, especially those that are not members of the
principal military alliances. It is not only a result of the detente in East-West
relations, which has weakened the polarising forces in the states system, and the
diplomatic rise of China, which has made the dualistic structure of the system
more complex, but has to do also with the nature of the weaponry of the
superpowers and the determination of many countries in the Third World to
base their foreign policies on their own regional interests.
I ndex
Africa 82-3, 95, 1 5 1 , 1 52 Belgium 23, 24, 26, 45-7, 50-2, 55,
Aix-la-Chapelle, Congress of 1 9, 2 1 , 57, 68, 80, 85, 86
3 1 , 1 79 Belgrade conference 1 30, 1 33, 1 48
Albania 85 Berlin, Congress of 36, 39, 4{), 1 82
Aleman, President 1 05 Bismarck 36, 39, I I 7, 1 32
Algeciras conference 1 90, 1 98 bloc politics 63, 69, 70, 96, 1 1 3, 1 30--
Algeria 82, 83 4, 1 49
alignment and non-alignment 70, 86, Bluntschli, J. C. 36, 3 7
96, 1 27 , 1 32-3, 1 40-58, 1 68, 206, Bolivia 87, 1 1 0, 1 1 5
207 : see also alliances Botero, Giovanni I I , 1 2, 1 7 , 42, 43 ,
Alliance, Great 24 208
alliances 1 2 1 -8, 1 34, 1 4 1 , 1 44-7 , 1 52, Branco, Castello I I 0
1 56, 1 67 , 1 74, 1 89, 1 94-204 Branco, Rio 1 02, 1 1 0
Aquinas 1 1 Brazil 45-7 , 50-7 , 59, 6 1 , 62, 87, 88,
Argentina 86, 87, 90-8, 1 02--4, 106, 90, 9 1 , 96, 97, 1 0 1 - 1 6, 1 24, 1 25,
1 07 , 1 1 0- 1 6, 1 54, 1 55 1 36, 1 52-5, 1 8 1 , 1 82
Association of South East Asian States Bri tain: in Europe 20, 36, 37, 1 55,
(ASEAN) 1 55 1 60, 1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 97 ; Crimean War
Australia 45, 57-64, 68, 72, 88, 90, 1 98; League of Nations 46-53,
1 22, 1 24, 1 25, 1 55, 1 70, 1 74, 1 8 1 , 55; United Nations 56-8; Latin
1 94 America 94, 95, 101, 1 03;
Austria 1 3, 20, 28-32, 36, 37, 4{), 8 1 , Africa 1 5 1 , 1 52; non-prolif
85, 1 1 7, 1 3 1 , 1 32 , 1 35, 1 36, 1 42, eration treaty 1 36, 1 39; Suez
1 43 , 1 60, 1 97 , 1 98 cns1s 145; status 4{), 70, 72, 73,
Austria-Hungary 4{), 45, 1 88, 1 89, 80, 85, 90, 1 22, 1 3 7, 1 38, 1 89
1 98 British Empire 45, 1 03
Axis powers 95, 1 05, 1 6 1 , 1 62, 1 88-9 Bruck, Freiherr von 30
buffer states 23, 25, 26, 32, 33, 43, 1 1 5
Baden 28, 1 3 1 Bulgaria 37, 45, 85, 1 9 1
balance of power 25, 32, 33, 4{), 43, Bull, Hedley 98
92, 94, 1 1 0- 1 4, 1 20- 1 , 1 27 , 1 3 1 , Bulow, A. H. D. von 1 8
1 35, 1 43, 1 46, 147, 1 73, 1 74, 1 88, Burgundy 2 3
1 92-206, 208, 2 1 1 Burton, John 74
Baltic states 53, 1 9 1
Bandung conference 1 33, 1 48 Cairo conference 1 48-9
Bangia Desh 1 52 Canada 45, 57-62, 68, 69, 7 1 , 74, 86,
Bartol us of Sasso ferrato I I , 1 3 90, 9 1 , 1 1 4, 1 23-5, 1 8 1 , 1 83
Barwick, Sir Garfield 72 Cantori, L. J . 73
Bavaria 28, 1 3 1 , 1 36-8 Caribbean 99, 1 00
229
230 Index
Carranza, President 1 0 1 diplomacy 1 1 6, 1 1 9, 1 29, 1 30, 1 45 ,

Castille, President 95 205, 207-9
Castlereagh 20, 47 diplomatic concert 1 1 8, 1 34--4 1 , 1 49-
Cecil, Lord Robert 4 7, 50 56, 1 63 , 1 65, 1 66, 1 79-88, 1 92-3,
Chaco war I 04 21 1-13
Chapultepec conference I 06 diplomatic status 58, 65, 70, 7 1 , 75,
Cheng 1 20- 1 76, 1 48 , 1 69
Chi!� 87, 95, 98, 1 02, 1 03, 1 07 dominance 1 3- 1 5 , 98, 1 ()0-4, 1 53
China: in League of Nations 50-2, Dominican Republic 86, 1 07, 1 1 0,
54, 55; in South America 95; in 1 36
United Nations 56, 57; relations Drago Doctrine l 03
with Russia 70, 1 1 4, 1 2 1 , 1 22, Droysen, Johann Gustav 26, 27
1 27, 1 28, 1 36, 1 37, 1 54, 1 66, 1 70, Dulles, J. F. 1 28
I 7 1 , 1 72 ; status 7 1 -3, 79, 80, 84, Dumbarton Oaks 56, 58, 60, 65
90, 1 42, 1 43, 1 47, 1 49, 1 50, 1 52,
1 53, 1 62-3, 1 74, 1 78, 1 83, 1 84 East Germany 85, 86, 93, 1 45
Chou-en-lai 1 3 7 Eastern Question see Ottoman
Churchill, W . S . 56 Empire
classification of states 37-9, 4 1 , 45- Echeverrias, President 1 09
55, 89, 97-8 economic factors in international
Clausewitz, Karl von 1 8, 22-3, 25, 43 status 36, 59, 62, 73, 74, 77, 92 ;
Clemenceau 45, 47 see also gross national product,
cold war 67, 69, 70, 95-7 , 99, 1 08, poverty
I l l , 1 1 7-35, 1 40, 1 4 1 , 1 44-7, Egypt 62, 82, 83, 1 28
] 64--{i , 1 88, 1 90, 1 95 Eight, Committee of 20, 2 1 , 24, 27,
collective security 69, 7 1 , 1 25 28, 4 1 , 66, 1 80, 197
Colombia 87, 95, 96, 98, 1 00 EI Salvador 86, 95
colonies 39 England 28, 32: see also Britain
colonialism 1 30, 2 1 0 Europe: ranking . of powers in 85--6,
communism 97, 1 1 0, I l l , 1 55 89; US relations with 94--5 ; see
Congo crisis 1 27, 1 29 also Monroe Doctrine
congress system l 79 Europe, Concert of 33, 35-7 , 4 1 , 42,
Coolidge, President 1 0 1 48, 1 79-82, 1 9 1 , 1 97
Corinth 1 20 European Economic Community
Crimean War 1 98, 200 1 54--6, 1 72
Cuba 86, 87, 95-7 , 1 07-1 1 , 1 1 3 Evatt, Dr H. V. 60, 61
Cuban missile crisis 70, 1 27
Cyprus 85 Falkland Islands 95
Czechoslovakia 45, 5 1 , 52, 85, 86, 93, Federal Diet of Germany 28-30, 1 35
1 36, 1 45, 1 99 Ferdinand V I I of Spain 24
Finland 85, I 7 1
Five, Committee of 27
Danzig 1 99 Forde, Francis 61
Davis, Kingsley 77 F ranee: in European balance of power
Denmark 28, 8 1 , 85, 86, 1 82 1 3, 20, 23, 24, 30, 32, 36, 40, 1 60,
detente 67, 7 1 , 97, 99, 1 08, 1 2 7, 1 28, 1 6 1 , 1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 97-200; League of
1 36, 1 43, 1 45, 1 47, 1 48, 1 50, 1 57 , Nations, 45, 46, 50-3 , 55; United
1 66 Nations 56, 61 ; in Latin
Diaz, Porfirio l 00 America 94; in Africa 1 23,
Index 23 1
151, 1 52; in EEC 1 54-5 ; Hesse 28

status 40, 64, 70, 72, 73, 80, 85, Hitler 1 6 1 , 1 88, 1 99
90, 9 1 , 1 22, 1 25, 1 36, 1 37 , 1 38, Holland see Netherlands
1 45, 1 78, 1 89 Holland, Thomas Erskine 35
Franco, General 9 1 Holmes, John 7 1
Frankfurt Assembly 1 32, 1 6 1 Holstein 28
Frantz, Konstantin 30 How ard Ellis C. 55
- ,
Frederick the Great 1 8 House, Colonel 4 7

Frondizi, President 1 1 0, I l l Huerta, President 1 0 1
functional idea 57-9, 62-3, 66, 1 83 Hungary 3 7 , 48, 85
Gagern, Hans Christoph von 23-6, ideology 1 1 7 , 1 2 1 , 1 6 1

42, 1 35 Iceland 85
Gaulle, Charles de 70, 9 1 , 1 3 7, 1 43-5, I ndia 45, 70, 7 1 , 83, 84, 88, 90, 9 1 ,
171 1 20, 1 28-3 1 , 1 36, 1 47, 1 48, 1 52-5,
Gentz, Friedrich 2 1 1 65, 1 69, 1 72, 1 7 3, 1 95
German, Clifford 7 7 , 78 Indonesia 70, 8 1 , 88-9 1 , 1 20, 1 29-3 1 ,
German Committee 28, 45 1 48, 1 49, 1 52, 1 53, 1 55, 1 69, 1 72,
German Confederation 2 7-33, 1 1 7 , 1 73, 1 96
1 32, 1 35-9, 1 43, 1 60, 1 6 1 International Control Commission
Germany: alliances 36, 1 88, 1 89, 1 98; 1 29
relations with Argentina 95-6; international organisations 97, 1 55,
with France 5 1 ; with Mexico 205, 209
95; with Poland 25, 53, 1 22 , I 7 1 , Iran 83-5 , 89, 90, 1 74
189, 199; status 36-- 7 , 39--42, 45, Iraq 83, 84
48, 52, 80; thi rd Germany' 36,
'
I reland 7 1 , 85
4 1 , 1 32, 1 35, 1 60, 1 6 1 ; see also East Israel 83, 84, 1 53
Germany, German Confederation, I taly 33, 36, 37, 39--4 1 , 50, 5 1 , 53, 80,
Hitler, Nazi-Soviet Pact, West 85, 90, 1 23, 1 55, 1 56, 1 6 1 , 1 77,
Germany 1 78, 1 82, 1 83, 1 88-91 , 1 98-200
Gierek 1 45
Glazebrook, George DeT. 68 Japan 45, 57, 73, 80, 83, 84, 88, 90,
Gomulka 1 22, 1 45 9 1 , 1 37, 1 52, 1 53, 1 55, 1 62, 1 72,
Good Neighbour policy 99, 1 04 1 74, 1 84
good offices 1 26, 1 29, 1 44, 1 47, 207 Johnson, President 1 24
Goulart, President 96, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 j ustice, international 205, 209- 1 2
Greece 45, 46, 50, 5 1 , 85, 1 9 1
gross national product 7 3 , 7 7-90
Kennedy, President 70, 1 09
Guatemala 86, 1 07, 1 09, 1 1 5
Khruschev 70, 1 27
Haas, Michael 73 King, Mackenzie 57, 58
Hague conferences 37, 1 00 Kissinger, Henry 99, 1 45, 1 75
Hanover 28, 1 3 1 , 1 36, 1 37, 1 38 Korea 1 22, 1 24, 1 29, 1 66
Hanson, Eric 73 Kubitschek, President 1 09
Havana conference 1 03
Hedjas 46 Latin America 94-1 1 1
hegemony 98, 99, 1 07-1 4, 1 53 Latin American Free Trade Area 97,
Herbert, S. 1 55 98, 1 1 3, 1 55
Herder, J. G. 29 law, constitutional 22
232 Index
law, international 22, 36, 37, 55, 65, Nixon, Richard 1 45, 1 62, 1 74
75, 76, 1 0 1 , 1 1 2, 1 1 3, 1 1 6, 205, non-intervention 1 04, 1 08, 1 1 2, 1 1 3
208- 1 0 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
League of Nations 46-56, 63, 66, 67, (NATO) 1 25, 1 43, 1 55
75, 96, 1 02, 1 05, 1 6 1 , 1 62, 1 78, Norway 7 1 , 85, 1 7 1
1 83, 209 nuclear weapons 74, 79, 80, 83, 90,
Libya 82, 83 I 10, 1 22, 1 2 7, 1 36, 1 38, 1 39, 1 45 ,
Lindner, F. L. 3 1 -3, 42 1 5 1 , 1 84-7, 1 94
List, Friedrich 30
Lloyd, George 45 Oceania 88
Locarno treaties 5 1 , 52, 1 99 offshore islands 1 24, 1 25, 1 28
London conferences 26, 33, 36, 37, Organization of American States
1 82 1 07, 1 08, 1 1 0, 1 1 1 , 1 55
Lorimer, James 38-9 Organski, A. F. K. 77
Luxemburg 23, 28, 33, 85 Ottoman Empire 33-6, 39, 41, 1 79-
82, 1 89-93, 1 98, 200, 20 1
Mably, Abbe de 1 3- 1 6, 42, 43
Malta 85 Pak�tan 70, 83, 84, 1 52-4
Mao 7 1 , 1 37 Panama 86, I 00
Martens, G. F. von 1 7 , 1 8 Paraguay 87, I 1 0, 1 1 5
mediation 7 1 , 1 23, 1 25, 1 26, 1 29, 1 30, Paris Congress 33, 37
1 34, 1 47, 1 65, 1 69, 207 Paris Peace Conference 45-9, 1 77 ,
Metternich 23, 28, 30, 47, 1 3 1 , 1 35 1 8 1 , 1 98
Mexico 57, 62, 80, 86-8, 90, 94 , 95 , Paris, Treaties of 20, 2 1 , 35
97-1 0 1 , 1 04- 1 5, 1 55 peace-keeping 58, 59, 6 1 , 62, 7 1 , 1 23-
middle powers, definitions of 2, 4, 9, 5, 1 26, 1 29, 1 44, 207
1 8, 1 9, 23, 27, 29, 49, 55, 57, 68- Pearson, Lester 1 23, 1 44
75, 90-1 Pentarchy 26, 37, 39, 1 78
military power 25, 36, 58, 59, 7 7 -9, Peron 96, I l l
1 29: see also nuclear weapons Persia 52, 54
Monroe Doctrine 94-5, 100, 1 03 Peru 87, 95, 98
Montenegro 1 9 1 Piedmont 200
Morrow, Dwight 1 0 I Poland: in balance of power 23, 24,
Moser, J. J . 1 7, 1 8 29, 32, 69, 1 1 4, 1 2 1 , 1 22, 1 25 , 1 43,
Miinchengriitz 1 97 1 45, 1 62, 1 64, 1 7 1 , 1 89-9 1 , 1 99,
Munich agreements 1 6 1 200; in League of Nations 45, 48,
Mussolini 1 6 1 , 1 88 5 1 , 52, 54; in United Nations 57,
62; as mediator 1 44; status 53,
Napoleon 27, 28, 1 60, 1 7 1 55, 85, 86, 89-9 1 ' 93, 1 8 1
Nazi-Soviet pact 1 6 1 , 1 7 1 , 1 89 Politz, K . H. L . 2 1 , 22, 43
Nehru 7 1 , 1 28, 1 29, 1 3 1 , 1 48, 1 65 population 22, 43, 53, 54, 57, 73, 75-
Netherlands 2 1 , 23-5, 28, 33, 41 , 52, 89
55, 57, 6 1 , 63, 68, 80, 85, 86, 89, Portugal 1 9, 20, 2 1 , 45, 85, 1 60, 1 80,
1 56 1 97 , 200
neutrality 5 1 , 53, 1 27, 1 89, 200: see poverty 89, 1 30, 1 48, 1 49, 2 1 0
also alignment primacy 98, 99, 1 04-7
New Zealand 46, 60, 88 Principal Allied and Associated
Nigeria 82, 83, 85, 88-9 1 , 1 27, 1 46, Powers 46, I 77
1 52-4, 1 70 Prussia 1 8, 24, 26-32, 1 1 7, 1 3 1 , 1 32,
Index 233
1 35, 1 36, 1 42, 1 43, 1 60, 1 6 1 , 1 98 Stalin 56

Puerto Rico 86, 87 Stein, Freiherr von 30
Stephens, Waldo E. 55
Quadros, President 96, 1 09, 1 1 0, 1 1 2 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties
Quadruple Alliance 1 79, 1 97 , 1 99, 1 72
200 strategic power 74, 75, 79, 90
Suez crisis 1 25, 1 29, 1 45
racism 1 30, 2 1 0 Sukarno 1 30, 1 3 1 , 1 48
ranking of powers 68, 75-9 1 Sweden 20, 2 1 , 26, 29, 5 1 , 52, 70, 85,
Rapacki Plan 1 22 86, 1 60, 1 7 1 , 1 80, 1 82, 1 83, 200
Rhine, Confederation of 27 Switzerland 55, 8 1 , 85
Riddell, R. G. 68, 69
Rio de Janeiro conference 95 Taiwan 1 28, 1 66
rivalry 43, 76, 96, 1 1 4, 1 1 8, 1 32, 1 40- Talleyrand 20
58, 1 63-9, 1 73, 1 75, 1 78, 1 88-204 Ten, Council of 46, 47, 1 8 1
Rohrbach, Paul 40 tension, as factor i n international be
Roosevelt, F. D. 56, 99 haviour 69, 1 1 8, 1 2Q--33, 1 44-9,
Roosevelt Corollary 1 00, 1 03, 1 04 1 52, 1 57 , 1 68-70, 1 75
Roumania 45, 46 , 85 Tilsit, treaty of 1 60, 1 7 1
Rousseau 1 6, I 7 Treitschke, H . von 37, 39
Russia 20, 23, 29, 30, 32, 37, 40, 45, Triaspolitik 30, 1 33, 1 35, 1 36
48, 1 60, 1 7 1 , 1 88, 1 97 , 1 98: see also Triple Alliance 36, 1 60, 1 88, 1 90,
Soviet Union 1 98-200
truce observation 1 23, 1 24, 1 44, 207
sandwich structure m alignments Tunis, annexation of 1 98
1 1 5, 1 36, 1 73, 1 8 1 , 1 9 1 Tunisia 7 1
San Francisco conference 57-9, 6 1 , Turkey 37, 45, 48, 85, 86, 89: see also
62, 64, 65, 69, 1 8 1 Ottoman Empire
satellites 1 2 1 , 1 22
Saudi Arabia 83, 84, 88, 89 United Kingdom see Britain
Saxony 24, 28 United Nations 56-69, 7 1 , 75, 96,
Schneider, William 74 1 05, 1 09, 1 29, 1 33, 1 77 , 1 8 1 , 1 83
Serbia 45, 46, 48, 1 9 1 United Nations Conference on Trade
Sethi , J . D. 74 and Development (UNGTAD)
Smuts, General 47-9, 50, 55 1 33
South Africa 45, 82, 83, 85, 88, 89, United Nations Emergency Force
1 47 , 1 52, 1 53, 1 54, 1 70 1 25, 1 29, 209
South America 54, 55, 8 1 , 94, 95: see United States of America 40, 45, 49,
also Latin America 50, 53, 56, 69, 7 1 , 72, 86, 93- 1 1 7,
South East Asia Treaty Organisation 1 36-8, 1 42 , 1 43, 1 6o-3, 1 7Q--3 : see
1 25 also cold war
sovereignty 1 7, 22, 37, 2 1 0 Uruguay 5 1 , 87, 98, 1 1 0
Soviet Union 56, 69-72, 85, 93, 95,
1 1 4, 1 1 7 , 1 36-8, 1 42, 1 43, 1 6 1 -3, Vargas, President 1 05
1 70-4, 1 99: see also cold war Venezuela 87-9, 98
Spain 1 9-2 1 , 24-6, 33, 48, 5Q--5, 85, Vienna, Congress of 1 9-2 1 , 23-7, 3 1 ,
86, 89-9 1 , 94, 1 00 , 1 60, 1 80, 1 82, 37, 45, 46 , 1 60, 1 79, 1 80, 1 82, 197
1 89, 1 9 1 , 1 97, 200 Vietnam 1 22-4, 1 29, 1 44, 1 66
Spiegel, S. L. 73 Vital, David 73
234 Index
Wangenheim, K. A. von 30, 1 35 Westlake, John 35, 36

war effort as criterion of rank 45, 46, Wight, Martin 1 0, I I , 1 3
57, 58, 6 1 , 69 Wilson, Harold 1 24
Warsaw Treaty Organisation 1 25, Wilson, Woodrow 45-7
1 46 Wiirttemberg 28, 30, 3 1 , 1 3 1 , 1 32,
Watt, Sir Alan 72 1 35 , 1 37
wealth see poverty
Webster, C. K. 55 Yalta Conference 56, 6 1 , 1 7 1 , 1 8 1
West Germany 73, 85, 90, 1 36, 1 37, Yugoslavia 70, 85, 86
1 45, 1 55

Si HOLBRAAD - Middle Powers in International Politics (1984)

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Si HOLBRAAD - Middle Powers in International Politics (1984)

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MIDDLE POWERS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The book traces the history of the idea of middle-ranking powers

Carsten Holbraad is Deputy Director of the Centre for

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE: A Study in German and British

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be

First published 1984 by

ISBN 0 333 �5443 5

Printed in Hong Kong

1 The History of the Idea 10

2 The League of Nations and the United Nations 45

3 The Hierarchy of Powers 67

' The Unifocal System. 92

5 The Dualistic System. 117

6 The Triangular System. 159

7 The Multiple System. 177

7.2 Intense Rivalry 188

In the 1 960s and 1 970s, a number of departures from the traditional

Yet, despite the rather limited achievements of the first spate of

unfamiliar angle but may also present some of its processes in a

condu ct in regard to the central relationship of each system. Though

tends to be conditioned by the prevailing forces in the system to

stage takes in various scholarly efforts of more recent decades to

1.1 BEFORE 1814

A sketch of the earliest history of the notion of middle powers in

neighbours. So a little state is one that is not able to maintain itself

Obviously preferring states of middle size, for which he used the

position of Bartol us and other earlier writers, who had connected

A decline in the influence of the dominant powers presented a

Elles peuvent profiter des querelles qu'ont les puissances supirieures, et

Mably went on to explain how such secondary powers should

L'interet de ses itats, pour se rendre recommandables pendant la paix, c'est

et par de doubles negociations, conduites avec finesse et d'une maniere

lie would be embarrassed, Mably said, to expound maxims so

He concluded his analysis of the relationship between dominant

lower secondary powers, whose interests did not allow them to

For the middle-sized state and the aristocratic form of govern­

: nicht einmahl dem schwiichesten grossen souverainen Staat bey sehr

When, on the eve of the French Revolution, G. F. von Martens

But having so firmly rejected the criterion of power, Martens was

The situation of the middle-sized state, it may be concluded from

I t was not till after the reorganisation of the European and

1.2 EUROPEAN RESTORATION

More important in its effect on the international hierarchy of

be permitted to settle the affairs of all of Europe. But the supremacy

dividing the powers on the basis of their political importance

reference to the international situation of Germany. Commenting

the rights of Spain and the Netherlands in European politics. In an

More than twenty years later, in the fifth volume of an account of

result that jealousy and suspicion had come to dominate relations

In the system of the balance of power, the function of secondary

states in relation to the task of safeguarding peace and order, he

However, noting a rise in the influence of these powers - for which

As we have seen, in European political wntmgs the age of

to kings and giving each state a formal constitution, he imposed a

Here Mittelmacht referred to a power that was stituated in the

say a great deal . Though he occasionally suggested that i t might

To survive and prosper, Europe needed a certain number of states of

Austria would be protected both against a Russian attempt at

in this tract was secondary i n strength to the great powers, though

1 .4. F R O M T H E CRIMEAN WAR T O THE F I RST WORLD

name only . The factual situation of these states in relation to both

bac king it with threats of intervention and coercion. I n one way,

with the six and participate in its execution , it ranked as a seventh

Great Britain, I taly, Austria-Hungary and Russia. The remaining

For the middle-sized state and the aristocratic form of govern

To these permanent members I would suggest that four ad

President Wilson, who was very impressed with Smuts's pam

Furthermore , when disagreement and conflict among the per