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The middle power

a
Adam Chapnick
a
Completing an MA at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Published online: 14 Mar 2011.

To cite this article: Adam Chapnick (1999): The middle power, Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 7:2, 73-82

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 99-000 Winter_99_ 07.11.2000 3:13 PM Page 73

THE MIDDLE POWER

73
ADAM CHAPNICK*

I n spite of its historical prominence in international relations and Canadian foreign policy
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literature, the term “middle power” remains deceptively ambiguous.1 States whose roles in
international affairs are defined by their functional capabilities are sometimes designated
middle powers. Countries that display definitive middle power characteristics, such as interests in
multilateralism and peacekeeping often claim the same title. States of medium size, capable of
moderate international influence which are perceived as neither objectively great nor small, are
referred to similarly. Since the various interpretations of middle power have never been formally
nor explicitly evaluated, an objective conception of the international power structure has been
impossible. A consistent definition would provide the clarity needed to assess why Canadian
scholars and foreign policy practitioners have shown such an interest in two simple words.
First Principles
To develop an objective understanding of middle power, one must begin with the most basic of
analyses. A middle power is a state. The use of the term assumes a state-centric conception of the
international community in which “powers” are defined as geographically delineated entities. The
word “middle,” meaning, “equidistant from extremes,” implies at least two other types of powers—
traditionally referred to as great and small. A middle power, in its most basic form, is a state which
is neither a great power nor a small power. “Middle power” is therefore a relative term. To find the
middle, one must be able to identify the extremes.
Three Approaches
Scholars and practitioners have traditionally assumed the meaning of middle power to be self-
evident. In fact, a review of the literature suggests three distinct middle power models—the
functional, behavioural and hierarchical.2 States classified as middle powers in one model are small
powers in another. This obscures the concept, and denies modern scholarship a consistent
definition without which it becomes difficult to appreciate the significance of middle power status.
The first two approaches are politically motivated. The functional model attempts to normalize
the status of states when their power is temporarily exaggerated. The reasoning behind the
behavioural explanation is circular—it characterizes middle power behaviour as the actions of
■
* Adam Chapnick is completing an MA at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs with an emphasis on
Canadian foreign policy. He would like to thank Dr. Norman Hillmer for his support and feedback, the three
anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions and Jordana Fienberg for her research assistance.
1. Most recently, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy (1997) has referred to Canadian actions as “middle power
diplomacy.” In response, Fen Hampson and Dean Oliver (1998) reflected that Canada had been portrayed as a
“confident middle power.”
2. Bélanger and Mace’s work on “middle states” also cites three “criteria dominating the literature”. They call these
criteria relational, behavioural and positional. The weakness in this analysis is its insistence that the positional, or
hierarchical, interpretation cannot succeed objectively (1999:153-58). This paper challenges that assumption.
© Canadian Foreign Policy, ISSN 1192-6422, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1999), 73-82
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74 states it already considers middle powers.3 The hierarchical interpretation seeks to organize states
according to their international standing. This approach can be understood in three stages: the
middle power before and outside of the negotiations for the creation of the UN, the middle power
as negotiator of the UN Charter, and the middle power post creation of the UN. While the
functional and behavioural approaches use the middle power label to increase state power, the
hierarchical model only affirms recognized positions in the international system. Acceptance of the
hierarchical interpretation would de-politicize future middle power literature and reveal why the
term has been deliberately confused.
The Functional Model
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In 1942, Canadian diplomat Hume Wrong articulated what became the first philosophy of
Canadian engagement in international affairs, calling his idea the functional principle. In discussing
Canada’s right to a voice in Allied war deliberations, he argued that Canada’s influence should be
based on three functional criteria: the extent of its involvement, its interests, and its ability to
contribute to the situation in question. J.L. Granatstein (1970:2) has argued that the functional
principle “was really the first enunciation of the ‘middle power’ concept”.4
Prime Minister Mackenzie King championed Wrong’s theory, and then fused the functional
principle onto his own conception of “middlepowerhood”. In 1944, he argued that Canada should
be represented “at least as one of the middle powers, medium powers that should be brought into
the world organization in some way that would recognize that power and responsibility go
together” (Fraser, 1966:7). King believed that states with functional interests in international affairs
were of greater importance than those without. These so-called middle powers were influential
international policy makers who were looked upon differently by the great powers. As such,
middle power states deserved formal recognition.
The link between functional capabilities and middle power status was promoted by Lionel
Gelber: “Since major powers are differentiated by their greater functions from the rest, the Middle
Powers ask that they be distinguished from the lesser ones by the same criteria. A voice in
decisions should correspond with strength in enforcement” (1945:280-281). Gelber’s notion
persisted. In 1988, Bernard Wood observed: “informally, middle powers have often come to
assume such responsibilities, and to gain special influence in functional areas where their interests
have appeared strongest” (1988:4).
The functional approach to “middlepowerhood” certainly has its strengths. It identifies states
which are capable of exerting influence in international affairs in specific instances, and
differentiates them from all the rest. Through this model, great powers can be understood as those
states which exercise international influence regardless of circumstance. Small powers are those
incapable of exercising real influence.
But there are problems with this explanation. The power of functional middle power states
fluctuates based on their relative political and economic capabilities. Status is limited by time and
circumstance. The functional model is therefore imprecise. Whereas the greatness of great powers
persists, the influence of middle powers fluctuates constantly.
Since Wrong’s principle was never intended to apply to the leading allies, the functional model
recognizes only two tiers of states: great powers and all the rest. In the appropriate circumstance,
■
3. Bélanger and Mace (1999) concede that their argument is tautological; however, they suggest that states still have
to choose to become middle powers, and that this negates the negative ramifications of the tautology. This paper will
demonstrate that “middlepowerhood” need not be seen as elective.
4. Functionalism originally referred to a conception of world government in which smaller states were delegated
influence based on their relative capabilities.
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any non-great power can achieve at least temporary middle power status. There is no objective way
to differentiate small states that might sometimes qualify for middle power status from those that
will never qualify. Thus, middle powers are actually small powers of temporarily elevated stature.
75
They lose their middle quality as soon as their ability to contribute to a given issue in international
affairs decreases. Paradoxically, the functional approach to “middlepowerhood” denies the
existence of middle powers: middle power status is a mirage that can disappear as quickly as it
emerges.
Why, then, has this model been so popular?5 The incorporation of the functional principle
within the middle power concept is advantageous for smaller states that appear relatively strong
in given situations. For example, Hume Wrong began his advocacy of the functional principle
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during the mid-1940s, a time when the Canadian state was one of the most economically and
militarily powerful in the world. Successful implementation of the principle—meaning the
affirmation of substantive Canadian influence in the economic, political and military affairs of the
international community—would have lent permanence to Canada’s temporarily elevated status.
Once a seat at a bargaining table had been acquired, or a position within an international
organization assumed, it would be difficult to take away.
Wrong’s functionalism gives smaller states the opportunity to use current strength to justify
future influence.6 It gives them a title that encourages the international community to forget
that they are small. It creates a perception of a third tier in the international system which really
is not there.7
The Behavioural Model
Current middle power literature tends to favour the behavioural model. Robert Cox has said: “the
middle power is a role in search of an actor” (1989:827). Bélanger and Mace have explained that,
since middle power has no clearly accepted definition, “we are forced to deduce that states
accorded the diplomatic and scientific status of middle power are those demonstrating the will
and capacity to conform to the behavioural model associated with this category” (1997:167 and
1999:153). The model has been best articulated by Cooper, Higgott and Nossal (1993:19). The trio
identify middle powers by “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international
problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and their
tendency to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide their diplomacy”.
These three notions, multilateralism, conflict management and moral power, represent a
synthesis of much of the behavioural literature. G.P. Glazebrook’s pioneering article on middle
powers acknowledged a tendency among these states to support international multilateral activity
(1947:308). Lester Pearson spoke of middle powers as mediators (1966:204), as did Carsten
Holbraad in the 1970s (1971:80). Peyton Lyon and Brian Tomlin described the historic need for
middle powers to locate themselves in the middle “of the ideological spectrum between extreme
positions,” and emphasized how “the ‘middle power role’ was seen to involve special
responsibility for such functions as peacekeeping, mediating and communicating” (1979:12-13). In
the 1980s, David Dewitt and John Kirton reflected on how the Canadian government had chosen
the phrase, “helpful-fixer role” (1983:403), to describe its middle power activities.
■
5. Other proponents have included Brooke Claxton (1944: 409-21); Mitchell Sharp (1969:3) and, to an extent, Robert
O. Keohane (1969:291-310).
6. Wrong’s interpretation varies from that of Mitrany (1933).
7. From a political perspective, using a title to promote one’s international position has been an excellent strategy.
Many would argue today that the states deserving the title of most powerful in the world are not the ones holding veto
power on the United Nations Security Council.
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76 The behavioural model also identifies middle powers by their expressed desire for greater
international status. Bernard Wood has characterized middle powers as regional leaders, conflict
managers, multilateral moral powers and status seekers (1988:19-20). Cranford Pratt has explained
the middle power tendency to act multilaterally as a strategy to promote national interests
(1990:151). Glazebrook classified middle powers by “their opposition to great power control”
(1947:308).
Cooper calls this behavioural approach progressive, praising the recasting of the middle power
concept “from an emphasis on generic criteria based on normative qualities and quantitative
attributes to a more contoured mode of analysis based on a distinctive ‘mode of statecraft’”
(1993:21). He defines “statecraft” as threefold: building coalitions and promoting cooperation,
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providing entrepreneurial leadership, and acting as catalyst and facilitator (1993:9). Cooper is only
able to be so specific because he defines this statecraft through actions of states that he already
considers to be middle powers. He works backwards, examining the international activities of a
state such as Canada and then defining middle power behaviour by these same actions.
Nevertheless, the analysis seems to have been well-received.8
In spite of its popularity, the behavioural model does not satisfy the basic requirements of an
objective middle power definition. Through Cooper’s approach, any state, great or small, could
be—or could at least behave like—a middle power. As Cox has said, these middle powers are not
even states; “middlepowerhood”, or as he calls it, “middlepowermanship” (or Bélanger and Mace’s
“middlestateness”), is an instrument of interaction on the international stage.
Such middle power behaviour can and should be more appropriately labelled middle power
internationalism—the idea that certain international activities are most often practised by, and
indeed best left to, states that are neither the greatest nor the smallest in size and capabilities.
Unfortunately, even here the explanation does not define middle powers. That middle powers are
those that practice middle power internationalism, and that middle power internationalism
describes the behaviour of middle powers is a tautology.
The behavioural model cannot define middle powers objectively because its list of middle
power behavioural characteristics is neither the same across the literature, nor tangibly
measurable. In fact, the list often appears to be based on the characteristics of states that
behavioural scholars have already assumed to be middle powers. The theory is grounded in the
belief that its proponents are best able to identify middle powers, and that the rest of the
international community should defer to their judgement. The only means of verifying whether a
state is, or is acting like, a middle power, is to consult a proponent of the model. This allows the
modelers to promote their own chosen states as “greater” in the international community.
The Hierarchical Model
Supporters of the functional and behavioural models have difficulty denying that the middle
power concept originated in the writings of proponents of the hierarchical school. Holbraad dates
middle power writing to Thomas Aquinas: “middle power, or its synonyms, has been a relational
concept, in the sense that it has been defined or described with reference to other classes of the
system, especially that of the principal powers” (1984: Ch 1 and p 42). Dewitt and Kirton explain:
“The early authors saw a hierarchical, stratified international system in which objective capability,
asserted position, and recognized status combined to produce three classes of states” (1983:22).
These classes were great, middle and small.
■
8. Most recently, Bélanger and Mace have relied upon it extensively. Laura Neack also refers to this idea while offering
a condensed explanation of the middle power concept (1995).
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The middle power concept was not significant in international relations until the publication of
David Mitrany’s work on world government in the early 1930s.9 Mitrany argued that the
international community was comprised of only two tiers of state powers: great and small. He
77
noted, however, that some of the small states were becoming stronger, and proposed that their
strength be recognized through a “scheme of gradation” (1933:107). This proposal gently
reintroduced the almost disregarded idea of dividing the international community into more than
two tiers.
Negotiations for the creation of the United Nations presented Canada, and other smaller states
such as Belgium, with an opportunity to normalize their middle power status. Andrew Gelber has
explained: “Canada wanted to ensure that the ‘middle’ powers had some special rights to the non-
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permanent seats on the Security Council” (1945:363). Implicitly, Gelber defined great powers as
those states which held exceptional powers at the Security Council (UNSC). The US, USSR, China,
France and Britain qualified as great because of their veto power. Small powers were those with
no special rights (or every other state in the international community). Middle powers would have
to have lesser, but still distinct, powers at the UNSC. They would have to receive preferential
treatment in the selection of non-permanent members. Unfortunately for these smaller states,
while Article XXIII of the UN Charter recognized state capabilities as a factor in selection for
membership on the Security Council, it also recognized geographic location, thereby eliminating
any objective distinction between non-great states.10
The passage of Article XXIII should have ended the campaign
for middle power status—and for some it did. Theodore Ropp ... middle power
did not differentiate between small and middle powers in a 1963 was a tool of
study (1963:18). Four years later, David Vital wrote about only foreign policy.
two types of powers although, he conceded, some small powers
were also middle, or “intermediate” (1967:87). Even John
Holmes admitted that middle power was “a term of convenience with no standing in international
agreements or organizations … its significance [was] in a play on words”. To Holmes, middle
power was a tool of foreign policy. It connoted greater status than was deserved of a small power
and provided justification for states such as Canada to pursue international initiatives beyond
traditional small state capabilities.
Nevertheless, scholars and commentators continued to press for middle power recognition.
Glazebrook had vaguely differentiated small states by their “limited resources or small population”
(1947:309). In Holbraad’s later work, he ranked middle powers by region according to population
and GNP (1984:89-90). Wood used GNP in his analysis (1990:70). More recently, American political
scientist Laura Neack has combined five national indicators within a cluster analysis to facilitate an
investigation of what she has called middle state behaviour (1990:70).
These means of identification are arbitrary. Glazebrook’s article defined “limited” subjectively.
Holbraad and Wood used their own subjective interpretations of “middle” to differentiate between
tiers of powers. Neack’s “five broadly used national indicators” (1992:6), although arguably
legitimate, were arbitrary. Not surprisingly, these “objective” approaches reached different
■
9. J.C. Smuts (1918) suggested that representation on an executive League Council within the proposed League of
Nations be weighted, based on the classification of states into Great Powers, Middle Powers and minor states, but
nothing came of his comments.
10. By 1949, the meaning of Article XXIII had been made clear. A letter from US representative at the UN, Austin, to
Secretary of State Acheson, included a statement of principle: “all the principal regions of the world should be
represented on the Security Council, and it is in accordance with this that non-permanent seats in the Security Council
should be distributed,” in Foreign Relations of the United States 1949: 276.
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78 conclusions. Canada was a middle power to Glazebrook, Holbraad and Wood, but a great state to
Neack. None of the tests were truly objective. Was GNP the real indicator? Or was population? Was
a combination of characteristics best? What about international opinion? And what of Canadian
diplomat R.G. Riddell’s statement (1948:1): “The middle powers are those which, by reason of
their size, their material resources, their willingness to accept responsibility, their influence and
their stability are close to being great powers”? Although this definition was reasonable, like all the
rest, it isolated factors that could not be measured.
Hume Wrong first intimated that the middle powers could be understood hierarchically as
those states which were a part of the North American Treaty Organization, but were not great
powers. In the 1970s, James Eayrs suggested that changes in the international system increased
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the importance of Canada’s global capabilities, establishing its capacity as a foremost power
(1975:15-24). A few years later, Dewitt and Kirton called Canada a principal power. Once again,
however, these interpretations left room for debate. Eayrs’ assessment of the international system
was subjective. Dewitt and Kirton’s decision to divide the international community into three
sections and to include Canada in the first was equally arbitrary, as were the criteria which they
used in making their divisions.
Were it not for the Cold War, the hierarchical view could not have been called a model, since it
would have excluded middle powers completely. The Cold War provided the international
community with a tier of superpowers. As Arthur Andrew has explained, superpowers “will be near
the top of everyone’s list regardless of issue or circumstances being considered” (1970:23).
Andrew’s superpowers were the United States and the Soviet Union.
With this new differentiation, middle powers could exist. They became those non-superpowers
that were recognized in the international community as tangibly different from the rest of the small
states. China, Britain and France immediately qualified through their veto power at the Security
Council. In the 1990s, with the collapse of Soviet Russia, one
might suggest that a fourth middle power has emerged.
In actuality, they Regardless, one issue is clear: the Canadas, Belgiums,
are no more than Argentinas and Indias of the world should not be considered
sometimes strong middle powers. They are more accurately labelled functional
powers: states that are capable of exercising influence in the
small powers. international community based on their relative capabilities,
interests, and involvement in specific issues at specific times. In
actuality, they are no more than sometimes strong small powers.
The hierarchical model satisfies the basic requirements of an objective middle power definition.
It defines all powers as states, delineates small and great powers clearly and objectively, and
represents middle powers in relation to them. Critics might argue that states such as Canada and
Belgium have been strong functional powers for long enough to have earned the title of middle
power. In response, one must reflect on the basis of these states’ power. Economically poor Russia
is still consulted on issues of international economic policy, while Canada is criticized publicly for
attempting to maintain its influence in NATO policy as it decreases its military capacity.
Furthermore, to argue that the end of the Cold War and the decline of bipolarity have caused
a reorganization of power in the international community relies upon a subjective and normative
■
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CHAPNICK

conception of power.11 Having established the United Nations Security Council veto as an
objective criterion to differentiate between states, and recognizing that veto status has remained
unchanged, one must conclude that, for organizational purposes, the end of the Cold War has had
79
little impact on power status.
The main dissenters to the hierarchical explanation seek to attach political significance to
middle power.12 They hope to make the term more than just a tool for the classification of states.
By ascribing to a smaller state “middle power” attributes, these scholars and politicians enhance
the status of that state. It is no surprise that Canada has campaigned endlessly to be recognized as
a middle power: to be accepted as such would increase (or, in fact, increases) relative Canadian
influence in the international community. If Canada is a middle, rather than a functional power,
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then it must be consulted on, and has the right to be involved in, all international issues, regardless
of its relative capacity to contribute. The promotion of niche diplomacy—the concept of foreign
policy specialization—becomes unnecessary (Cooper, 1997:1-24). On the other hand, states such
as Britain and France never discuss the middle power concept, for fear of being forced to accept
that they are no longer truly great.
Conclusion
By definition, today’s so-called middle powers13 are not really middle powers, and the true middle
powers do not want to be regarded as such. Is this paradox significant? Many would argue that the
behavioural mode of analysis has normalized a new interpretation of “middlepowerhood” and
made middle power internationalism (and perhaps also “middlestateness”) the predominant idea
in discussions of power. Furthermore, so long as there is a general understanding of the term,
many will not accept the need to be overly objective. Nevertheless, this brief analysis certainly
explains why Canada and other states continue to campaign for such an apparently
inconsequential title. Status is power, and in the international community, simply to call oneself
important seems to be an ideal way to promote national self-worth, and maintain at least the
illusion of international influence.
■
11. Neack (1992) argues that the emergence of a new world order and the change in the focus of international power
from security capabilities to economic might necessitates a re-evaluation of middle power classification. She
differentiates Cold War “middle powers” (the traditional middle powers in the behavioural model) from post Cold War
middle states. The old middle powers become great states as the middle and great power categories are collapsed
into one. The larger small powers become middle states, and countries with predominately developing economies
inherit a category of their own as small states. The argument for the decline in the significance of the state and its
military capacity is similar to that presented by Minister Axworthy (1997) and capably refuted by Hampson and Oliver
(1998).
12. Neack is an exception. She uses the classification for more theoretically based reasons, corresponding with her
interest in foreign policy analysis. Arguably, it is not coincidental that Neack lives in a state which is considered a great
power.
13. See Glazebrook, Wood, Holbraad or Neack for different lists.
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____________(1990). “Towards North-South Middle Power Coalitions” in Cranford Pratt (ed.) Middle
Power Internationalism: The North South Dimension (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press).

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