FIFTH EDITION EE LOGIC BOOK MERRIE BERGMANN JAMES MOOR JACK NELSONfh Online Philosophy and Religion The Logic Book Sth Edition Bergmann-Moor-Nelson McGraw-Hill A Division of The McGraw-Hill Companies McGraw-Hill Primis ISBN-10: 0-38-046233-0 ISBN-13: 978-0-39-D46233-6 Text: The Logic Book, Fifth Edition Bergmann-Maor-Nelson& This book was printed on recycled paper. Philosophy and Religion http://www.primisonline.com Copyright ©2008 by The McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc. All rights reserved, Printed in the United States of America. Except as permitted under the United States Copyright Act of 1976, no part of this publication may be reproduced or distributed in any form or by any means, or stored in a database or retrieval system, without prior written permission of the publisher. This McGraw-Hill Primis text may include materials submitted to McGraw-Hill for publication by the instructor of this course. The instructor is solely responsible for the editorial content of such materials. 111 PHILGEN ~—ISBN-10: 0-39-046233-0 —_‘ISBN-13: 978-0-39-046233-6Philosophy and Religion Contents Bargmenn-Mocr—Nelsdn’ + The Lagic Book, Fifth Edition Fram Mattor 4 Preface 1 1. Basic Notions of Logic 5 Text 5 2. Sestantal Logic: Spmbolization ond Syotax 2 Text 2 teaieaiel ee ees Text 4. Soutastal Logic: Truth-Troee 18 Text 9 5. Samteutil Logi: Derivations rs Text 108 6. Semtantial Logic: Metatheory Ey Text 2k 1. Pradicato Logie: Syeboliznton and Syntax ™ Text 200 6. Pradicate Lagi: Semantics ea Text m2 8. Pradioata Lage: Truth-Trove nz Text 2 18 Predicate Logie: Derivations = Text 56mz B12 os eet eur 508F ean te-itT Fa t Petes Temswiws = 1@ fotogebec ee Sema pal PREFACE In the fifthvedition of The Logie Book we retain our overall goal: to present syme bolic logic im an accessible yet formally rigorous manner, This involved a major averhaul of several chapters, along with some terminological and notational changes. ‘Most of the material in Chapters 5 and 1W/is new or extensively rewrit- ten. We have tied to present the derivation stems we develop in ways that make them more uansparent, We emphasize the need Jor and use of specilic surategies in constructing derivations, and in each chapter we explicitly list those strategies: We have also inttoduced new annowations for the assumptions that begin sub- derivations, annotations that specily the reason these assumptions are being made, We use the notation “A /DI", for example, to indicate that an auxiliary assump- tion has been made to inweduce a Conditional Invoduction subderivation, We helieve that these annotations underscore the point that auxiliary assumptions should always be made with clear strategies in mind. We have signilicandy expanded the number and variety of exercises in these: chapters aswell. ‘There are also signilicant changes to Chapters 4and 9. The tatter sections of Chapter 9 have been reorganized so that systematic inees for PL are presented ptior to, and independently of, trees for PLE, and the sections motivating the rules for PLE are less circuitous. In Chapter 4 we dispense with walk of fragments of trutl-value assignments and instead adapt the convention that a display such as A B c D T F T T specifies the infinitely many truthwalie assignments that each assign the spec ified values to ‘A’, ‘B', ‘C’, and “D’. In both chapters we have also introduced PREBACE ixC2 es Pate Tetmenter cae pes a new annotation for wees to indicate completed open branches ('o°) ai well as closed ones (*x’). Chapter 8 now introduces the concept of a model, to be used theve and in subsequent chapters. ‘As always, we have corrected known ‘errors and typos from: previous The Logic Book presupposes no previous taining in logic, and because it covers sentential logic through the metatheory of lirstorder predicate logic, itis suitable for bath introductory and intermediate courses in symbolic logic. ‘Thece is sullicient material in the text for a one- or twosemester course, There are several sequences of chapters that would farm good syllabi for courses in symbolic logic. If am instructor has two semesters (or one semester with advanced students), it is possible to work through the entire book. ‘The instructor who does not want to emphasize metatheory can sim- ply omit Chapters 6 and 11. The chapters on wuth-trees and the chapters on derivations are independent, so it is possible to. cover wuth-trees but not deri- vations, and vice versa. The chapters on truth-trees do depend on the chapters presenting semantics; (hat is, Chapter 4 depends on Chapter 3, and Chapter 9 depends on Chapter 9. And although most instructors will want to cover seman- tics belore derivations, the apposite order is possible. Finally, in covering pred- cate logic, the instructor has the option in each chapter of skipping material on identity and functions, as well as the option of including the material on identity but omitting that on functions. The Logic Rook. includes lange numbers of exercises in all chapters, Answers to the starred exercises-appear in the Instructor's Manual; answers to the unstarred exercises appear in the Student Solutions Manual. SOFTWARE ‘Two software packages, BERTIE and TWOOTIE, are available for use with The Logic Hook. BERTI is a program that allows students .o construct derivations online and checks those derivations for accuracy. TWOOTIE allows students to construct wuth-wees online (and checks thase wees for accuracy) and also pro- duces tees for Specified sets of sentences. Both programs were written by Austen Clarke; BERTIE is based on an earlier program by James Moor and Jack Nelson, Both programs run in a DOS environment, Information om the solt- ware can be faund at hhttp:/ /selfpace.ueonn.edu/BertieTwootie software. ham Both software packages can also be downloaded from this site. x PREEACE.[ siegamsaooe-ictoa: | Frat ie Pratice Terrien “Ta Lae Boa. Fh orceiae 8 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS: ‘We are grateful to Lorne Falkenstein, Richard Grandy, Richard Shedenheim and his students at the University of Georgia, and Takashi Yagisawa for valu- able comments and suggestions on the previous edition. PREEACE gtThis page intentionally left Blank[ime siechene | Lee maimed ge [en T Temuco 1@ tees ae bs BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGIC 11 BACKGROUND This is a text in deductive logio—more specifically, im symbolic deductive logic. Chapters 1-6 are devoted to sentential logic, that braneh of symbolic dedue- live logic. that takes sentences as the fundamental units of logical analysis. Chapters 7-10 are devoted to predicate logic, that branch of symbolic dedue- tive logic that takes predicates and individual terms as the fundamental units of logical analysis. Chapter 6 is devoted to the metatheory of sentential logic; Chapter 11, to the metatheary of predicate logic. In the following chapters we will explore séntential and predicate logic ieonsiderable detail. Here, we wy to place that material in a larger context. Historically ovo overlapping concerns have driven research in deductive logic and the development of specific formal systems of deductive logic: the desire to formulate canons or principles of good reasoning in everyday Lile, as well as in-science and mathematics, and the desire to formalize and systematize e: ing and emerging work in mathematics and science. Common to these con cerns is the view that what distinguishes good reasoning from bad reasoning. and what makes good deductive reasoning “logical” as opposed to “illogical”, is wuth preservation, LEBACKGROUND 4QU carn ttance Te emictivmnatige | tox Treteatinsin “eta Fh Conc 2 A method or pattern of reasoning is wuth-presérving if it never takes ‘one [rom truths ta. falsehood, The hallmark of good deductive reasoning is that it is truch-preserving. If one starts rom truths and uses good deductive reasoning, the results one arrives at will also be tue. Because we ave all inter- esied, as students and scholars, in everyday life and in our careers, in gaining truths and avoiding falsehoods, we all have reason to be interested in reasoning that is truth-preserving, Most of the deductive systems of reasoning thar have been developed for geometry, mathematics, and selected areas of stience have been axiomatic systems, And most of us-are familiar with at least one axiomatic system—that ‘of Euclidean plane geometry. Euclid, a Greek scholar of the third century 2., may have been the first person to develop a reasonably complete axiomatic sys- tem, Axiomatic systems start with a relatively small number of basic principles, relecred to variously as axioms, delinitions, postulates, and assumptions, and provide a way of deducing or deriving from them the rest of the claims or asser- tions Of the discipline being axiomatized (in Euclid’s case plane geometry). If the starting principles are signilicandly altered, a new theory may emerge. For example, when Euclid’s fifth postulate (the parallel postulate) is modified, theorems of non-Euclidean geometry can be deduced. ‘Through the cenuuries scholars have attempted to produce axiomatic systems for a wide variety of disciplines, ranging from plane and solid geome- icy, to arithmetic (which was successfully axiomatized by Giuseppe Peano in 1889), to parts of the natural and social sciences. Since successliul axiomatic 5ys- tems use only rules of reasoning that are truth-preserving, that never take one from tuths to a falschood, the advantage of successfully axiomatizing a body ‘of knowledge ix that it makes all the claims of that body of knowledge as cer tain asvare the starting principles and the rules of reasoning used. At about the same time that Euclid was developing his axiomatic treatment of plane geometry, another Greek scholar, Aristotle (384-322 B.C), was developing a general system of logic intended to incorporate the basic principles of good reasoning and to-provide a way of evaluating spe- cific cases of reasoning, The system Aristolle produced is variously known as’ syllogistic, traditional, or Aristotelian logic. Predecessors of Aristotle, in the Greek world and elsewhere, were interested in reasoning well—in. offering cogent arguments‘for their theses and theories and in identifying flaws and fallacies in their own and others’ reasoning, But Aristotle was apparently the first person in the Western world to offer at least the outlines of a compre- hensive system for cadilying and evaluating a wide range of arguments and reasoning. The following is an argument that has the form of an Aristotelian syllogism: All mammals are vertebrates, Some sea creatures are mammals, Some sea Creatures are vertebrates 2 BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGICPiscean sine | 1 Bac Moin dtage | Tox Terestaonsi “ho Lagi wk Fm Concie 0 ‘The horizontal line separates the two premises of this syllogistic argument from the conclusion. This syilogism is an example af good reasoning—it constitutes a good argument—because it is truth-preserving. If the first wo sentences (the premises) of the syllogism are tue, the third semtence (the eonelusion) must also be true, Arisiode’s achievement was not in identifying this particular argument about vertebrates, mammals, and sea creatures as a good or wuth- preserving argument, but rather in providing an explanation of why dhis and all reasoning of this form are instances ef good reasoning, Aristole would slassily the preceding syllogism as being of the form All As are Bs, Some Gs are As, Some Cs are Bs. And this form! or schema produces truth-preserving reasoning whenever ‘ “BY, and 'G' are uniformly replaced by general terms, asin All eandiologists are wealthy individuals, Some doctors are cardiologists Some doctors are wealthy individuals, Aristotelian logie is a variety of deductive symbolic logie, It is symbolic because it analyzes reasoning by identifying the form or structure of good reasoning, independent of die specilic content of particular instances of such reasoning. It is deductive because the requirement it lays down for good rea- soning is full wuth-preservation. Argument forms all of whose instances are truhepreserving, as well as the arguments that are of those forms, are tradi- tionally termed valid. The syllogistic form just displayed is a valid form; that is, ng syllogism of this form has wue premises and a false conclusion. All actual arguments that ean becast in this syllogistie form are therefore valid arguments, An example of an invalid syllogistie form is Some Asace Bs. All Cesare as, All Cs are Bs, ‘There are, to be sure, actual arguments that are of chis form and haye true premises ‘and a true conclusion—for example, Some birds are hawks All osprey are birds. All osprey are hawks, 1.1 BACKGROUND 3I cernsiveseine Te suse noon ertagie Tro T Terieavcinen Se See But there aré also arguments of this forms that have true premises and a false conclusion—lor example, Some positive numbers are even numibers All numbers greater thanzero are positive numbers. All numbers greater than zero are even numbers. ‘The two premises of this syllogism are true, but the conclusion, ‘All numbers greater than zero are even’, is false, The syllogistic form just displayed is an invalid form precisely because there are instances of it that have true premises and a false conclusion. Aristotelian logie is very powerful. During the cénruries following Aris- totle, the rules and techniques associated with syllogistic logic were relined, and various test procedures developed, by Roman, Arabic, medieval, and modern logicians, Until the late nineteenth century Aristotelian logic remained the pre- dominant system for formalizing and evaluating reasoning. It is still waught today in many introductory courses. Nonetheless, there are important drawbacks to Aristotelian logic. Syllogisms are at the heart of Atistotelian logic, and each syllogism must have exactly two premises and a conclusion. Moreover, every sentence ola syllogism must be of one of the four following forms: AIL As are Bs. No As are Bs, Some Asiare Bs. Some As are not Bs. Aristotelian logic is thus best suited to reasoning about relations among groups; “All members of this group are members of that group’, ‘Some members of this gFoup are members of that group’, and so on. Aristotelian logic thus strains 1 handle reasoning about individuals. For example, ‘Socrates is human’ must be recast as something like ‘All things that are Socrates [there is, we here assume, only one] are things that are human’, ‘The Aristotelian requirement that every Conclusion be drawn from exactly wo premises is unduly restrictive and does not mirror the complexity of actual reasoning and argumentation, a single instance of which may make use of a very large number of premises, Consider, for example, the following reasoning: Sarah and Hank are the only Jinalists'for a position with Bowles, Blithers, and Blimy, an accounting Jirm. Whoever is hired will have a baccalaureate degree in ateounting. Hank will pet his baccalaure- ate in accounting only il'he passes all the business courses he is taking, this semester and completes the general education requirements. 4 BASIC NOTIONS OF LogicVeena Tac nnn tae | Tot Terence “Thalys Bek ih Tove 20 ave Sarah will get her baccalaureate only if she passes all her courses and raises her grade point average to 2.5, Hank will fail logic and so will not complete the general education requirements, Sarah will pass all her courses, but her grade point average will not reach 25, Therefore Bowles, Blithers, and Blimy will hire neither of che finalists, ‘The above reasoning, is wuch-preserving. That is; if the premises are all wue; then the conclusion, the Jast sentence of the paragraph, must also be true. But it would be extremely difficult to recast this chain of reasoning in syllogistic ‘terms. Finally reasoning that relies on relations' cannot readily be accommo dated within Aristotelian logie, For example, the feasoning ‘Sarah is taller than ‘Tom, and Tom is taller than Betty; therefore Sarah is taller than Betty’ presupposes the transitivity of the tallerthan relation, that is, presupposes the following: truth: For any three things, if the first is taller than the second, and the second is taller than the third, then the first is taller than the third. Principles such as the abave and arguments relying on them cannot be incor- porated within the Aristotelian framework in any intuitive way. For these and other reasons, logicians in the midtodate 1800s looked for alternatives: to Aristotelian logic. This work involved the development of systems of sentential logic, that is, systems based on the way sentences of natural languages cam be generated from other sentences by the use of such expressions as ‘or’, ‘and’, “if, .. then. . 7, and ‘not’. Consider this example: Karen is either in Paris or in Nairobi. She isnot in Nairobi. So Karen is in Paris. Simple arguments such as this one are not zeadily represented within. syllogie tic logic. Yer the argument is clearly an example of good reasoning, Whenever the first two sentences are true, the last sentence is also true. Reasoning of this sort can readily be symbolized in. systems of sentential logic. ‘On the other hand, sentential logic cannot easily deal with reasoning that rests on claims about all, some, or none of this'soct of thing being of chat sort—the sort of claims Aristotelian logic can often handle. Predicate logic incorporates semtential logic: and is also able to handle all the kinds of sen- tences that are expressible in Aristotelian logic, as well as many of those that pose difficulties for Aristotelian logic. "See Chapter 7 for un explication af eaiions BACKGROUND 5OI cirri Tiina TT Teena es foo = 12 WHY STUDY LOGIG? ‘There are a variety of reasons fir studying logic. Iisa well-developed discipline that many find interesting in its own right, a discipline that has a rich history and important current research programs and practical applications. Certainly, anyone whe plans to major or do graduate work in areas such as philosophy, mathematics, computer science, or linguistics should have a solid grounding in symbolic logic. In general, the study of formal logic also helps develop the skills needed to present and evaluate arguments in any discipline. Another reason Lor studying symbolic logic is that, in learning to sym bolize natural language sentences (in our case English sentences} in a formal language, students become more aware and more appreciative of the importance of the structure and complexities of natural languages. Precisely what words are used often has a major bearing on whether an argument is valid or invalid, a piece of reasoning convineing or unconvincing. For example, distinguishing ‘beoveen ‘Roberta will pass if she completes all the homework’ and "Roberta will pass only if she completes all the homework’ is essential to anyone who wants to reason well about the prospects lor Roberta's passing. ‘However; the Focus of this text is not primatily on sharpening the crit- ical and evaluative skills readers bring to bear on everyday discourse, newspa- ‘per colunins, and the rhetoric of politicians’ Inculcating these skills is the goal of texts on “critical thinking” or “informal logic”, where the primary emphasis is on nonlormal techniques for identifying fallacies, figuring out puzzles, and constructing persuasive arguments, Formal or symbolic logic, which is the domain of this book, is a discipline with. its own body of theory and resulis, just asare mathematics and physics. This text is an inuoduction to that discipline, a discipline whose principles underlie the techniques presented in informal logic texts, This (ext will help readers not only identify good and bad argu- ments but also understand why arguments are good arguments or bad argue ments. Even though only the most avid devatees of formal systems will be constructing truthtables, truth-trees, or derivations alter completing this text, mastering these formal techniques is a way of coming to undersiand the prin- ciples underlying reasoning and the relations among sentences and. sets of sentences, ‘There is‘another, quite practical, reason for studying symbolic loge, In most of the chapters that follow, the discussion will center on seven or fewer central concepts. These concepts are related, [rom chapter to chapter. For example, the concept of wuthdunctional validity developed in Chapter 3 is one ‘way of relining the concept of logical validity laid out in this chapter: All these concepts are abstract, They cannot be touched or weighed or examined under A microscope. Mastering these concepts and the relations among them is an exercise in abstract thinking, The skills involved are, we think, important and ‘Will be useful in a wide variety of theoretical and applied fields. For these rea sons the “theory questions” found at the end of most exercise sets are in many ‘ways the most important part of the exercise sets. 6 BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGIGVicsamana-siaenaiea | tease piconn agi | ts Toteteonin ‘Th Logic Book Fith Compan, 8 dion 1.3 SENTENCES, TRUTH-VALUES, AND ARGUMENTS “True” and “false’ are properties of sentences. That is, it is sentences that are either true or false.” Throughout this text we will use the notion of a truth- value, We will say that tue sentences have the wuthwalue T, and false sen- tences the trath-value F. ‘Washington; DC, is the capital of the United States’ and “The yolume of a gas is directly proportional te its: temperature and inversely proportional to its pressure’ are both tue, and so both have the truth-value T, The wuth of the first derives from the political organization of the United States, and the truth of the second from the fundamentals of physics and chemistry. “Toronto is the capital of Canada’ and "Atoms are indi ible’ are both false, so both have the wuth-valie F—the first for reasoms hav- ing to do with the political organization of Canada, and the second for rea sons having to do with the:existence and behavior of subatomic particles. Although it ig only Sentences that are either true or [alse, not every sentence of English is one or the other. Sentences that are obviously neither true nor false-inelude questions (‘Where is Kansas City?’}, requests (‘Please shut the door when you leave"), commands ("Don't darken my door again’), and exclamations ('Quch!"). The formal systems we develop in this (ext are imended to deal only with sentences that are either true or false as asserted on a particular occasion in a particular context, To say that the sentences we will be dealing with are chose chat are either true or false is not, of course, 10 say that for any given sentence we know which itis, true or false, but only that ivisone or the other. Much of this text i devoted to the study of arguments. Previously, in discussing syllogistic arguments, we presented them by listing the premises followed by the conclusion, with a horizontal line-separating the premises from the conclusion. Arguments so displayed are presented in standard form. OF course, in natural languages, whether in spoken discourse or in writing, arguments are rarely presented in standard form. Indeed, in English and other natural languages, arguments, or bits of reasoning that can be recon- sweucted as one of more arguments, generally neither occur in what we call standard form nor are set off from preceding and following discourse, Moreover, che premises are not always given first and the conclusion last. Consider Michael will noc get the job, for whoever get the job will have swong references, and Michael's refevences are not strong. Many philosophical dinpares sree about mach Toric concepts at veniences: meaning, content, and truth, For eemple, tome philaeophers argue that propositions are the Hinds of enddes that are really tne ox flee, propo- tices Being txken tobe the meanings of vertence: and to exin independeniy of any particular language. Orher philosophers eecherr Bt innecesury metupivsical bagwage, Because we have to ado sorae term ology and because all pllloeaphers agree dhat ueatencer play some role bs language, we shall talk of sentences 2 betng. rue or fale. Thu we ener each talk eo be shorcand for tlk: of wetences thar have certain many fnge as wed in parsicalar context. 1.3 SENTENCES, TIRLUTH-VALUES, AND ARGUMENTS 7OL eects Tittle Tet Tete —— = ‘This single sentence can be recast as the (allowing explicit argument in Stan- dard form: ‘Whoever gets the job will have. strong references. Michael's references are not stong. Michael will not get the job. ‘As we just saw, in everyday discourse the conclusion is sometimes given ‘bélore the premises: The conclusion can also come between premises, with the whole argument being buried in an ongoing text: T’ve got more relatives than 1 know what to do with, I've got reladved in Idaho and in New Jersey, in Ireland and in Israel, Among them are acouple of consins, Tom and Fred Culverson. Both Tom and Fred are hard working, and Tom is as tenacious as a bulldog, So ‘Tom is sure to be a success, for if there is one thing I have learned in life, it is:thar everyone who is both hard working and tenacious succeeds. But I'm sure success Won't change Tom. He'll work just as hard alter he makes: his (ust million:as he dees now, He is, alter all, a Culverson, And no one is as predictable as-a Culverson, unless it’s a Hutchings. There are Jocs of Hutchings on my mother’s side, but I baven’t had much ta de with them... The following explicit argument ean be-extracted from this passage and placed in standard form: ‘Tom and Fred are hard working. ‘Tom is tenacious Everyone who is bath hard working and tenacious succeeds, Tom will succeed. ‘There is a lot of information in this passage that is not relevant to the specilie argument we have extracted. This is lrequently the case. ‘The first step in analyzing arguments isto exwact them from the dis- course within which they are embedded and present them in standard form. Doing so requires ‘practice. In natural language the presence of an angument is alten signaled by the use of premise and/or conclusion indicator words. Conclusion indicator wordy—that is, words indicating that what follows is intended as the conclusion of an arguinent—include therefore thus it follows that @ BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGICFrome: T tenicbiiiaat tte | Ten Tienes “Tho Lapc Bel Fh omen: 28 aon so hence consequently as a result Premise indicator words—that is, words whose use signals that what follows is intended as a premise of an argument—include since for because ‘on account of inasmuch as fox the reason that Not every piece of discourse is intended as an argument, Consider ‘Our galaxy is made up of our sun’and billions of other stars. The galaxy isa huge; flav spiral system that rotates like a wheel, and the myriad of Stars move arotind its cemter somewhat a3 the planets revolve around ‘our'sun, There are millions of other galaxies in addition to our galaxy. Each of the sentences in this passage is either true or false, but there is no good reason 10 treat one of the sentences as.a conclusion and the others as premises. So far we have given examples of arguments, talked about them, and presented several of them in standard form. But we have not defined ‘argu- ment’, and it is time do so, In our definition we make use, as we frequently ‘will throughout the rest of this text, of the notion of a set of sentences, Seis are abstract objects that have members (no members, one member, wo mem- bers, ... an infinite number of members). The identity of a set is determined by its members. That is, if set A and set B have exacily the same members, then they are the same set; if they do not, they are different sets. An. érgument is a set of evo or more sentences, one of which is designated as the conclusion and the others as the premises. Thisis a very broad notion of'an argument. For example, it allows us'to count the following as an argument: Herbert is four years old. ‘The sun will shine tomorrow, ‘This is, of course, a paradigm of a bad argument. The one premise supplies no support whatsoever for the conclusion, The advantage of this broad 1.5 SENTENCES, TRUTH-VALUES, AND ARGUMENTS 9© | esrrmin-sion-ssen: Te eee mniensertagie [tem T otieneor Tealage ak Fah Perms IE definition is that it sidesteps the problem of having to give an account of how plausible a line of reasoning has to be to count a3 an argument or of how likely. it is that a given group of sentences will be taken to support a designated sentence in order for those sentences together to count as an argument. Given our broad definition, we could reeast the passage about our galaxy as an argument for one or another of the constituent claims. But there is no reason to do so except to demonstrate that, by our account, any set of two or more sentences can be taken as an argument and evaluated as such. It is; in fact; our contention that itis the job of the logician, nat co set limits on, what counts a an argument, but rather t provide means of distinguishing good anguments from bad ones, And this we will do. That said, most (but not all) of the examples of arguments we use in this text will be ones in which someone might think that the premises do support the conclusion. Sometimes an argument turns out to be a good argument even when the premises do not appear, om lirst review, to support the conclusion, This is another reason for not appealing to some level of apparent support in the del inition of an argument, Consider, for example, this passage: Everyone loves’a lover. Toni loves Alice. Everyone loves everyone I by ‘lover” we mean ‘someone who loves someone’, and if we cake the last sentence as the conclusion of an argument of which the first wo sentences are premises, we have a valid argument. The conclusion does follow, though not obviously, from the premises. The missing reasoning is this; I'Tom loves Alice, then Tom is a lover, It follows Irom the Lirst premise, ‘Everyone loves a lover’, that everyone loves Tom. And if'a lover issomeone who laves someone, it fur- ther [ollows that everyone is a lover (because everyone loves Tom). And if everyone is a lover and everyone loves a lover, it follows, finally, that everyone loves evervone, OF course, this reasoning does not work if ‘loves’ is not being used in the same way in all its occurrences in the original argument, and it may not be (‘Everyone loves a lover’ may be being used, [or example, in the sense of ‘Everyone is fond of a person who is in love"), LSE EXERCISES (Note; The accompanying Stlutions Manual contains answers to all unstarred exercisca.) 1. For cach of the following, indicate whether it is che kind of sentence that falls ‘within the scope of this text—that is, is cither true or false. If it is not, explain ‘why mot a. George Washington was the second president of the United States b. ‘The next president of the United States will be a Republican. c. Tum in your homework on time or net at all. "d. Would that John Kennedy bad not been assassinated. ¢. ‘Two is the smallest prime number. 10 BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGiGBoryam-Moar-tuvee | kanie ations attogie | Text | erent ‘Tha hagie Beak, FR Crneereg 08 aan e, E oh. °b. ea. “t *h One is the smallest prime number: George Bush senior was the immediate predecessor to George W. as president On January 15, 1154, there was a snowstorm in what is now Manhattan, at ‘May you live long and prosper. ‘Never look a gift horse in the mouth. Who created these screwy examples? ‘This scntcnee is false. Beware of Greeks bearing gifts For cach of the following passages, specify what argument, if any, is being advanced. Where the intent is. probably not 1) express an argument, explain why this is so. Where an argument is probably being expresed, restate the argument in standard form, ‘When Mike, Sharon, Sandy, and Vicky are all out of the. office, ne important decisions get made. Mike is off skiing, Sharon is in Spokane, Vicky is in Obmpia, and Sandy is in Seattle. So no decisions will be made.today. ‘Our press rcleases are always crisp and upbeat. That's becausc, though Jack doesn't like sound bytes, Mike'does “nd Mike is the press officer. Shelby and Noreen are wonderful in dealing with irate smdents and faculty. Stephanie is wonderful at managing the chancellor's very demanding sched- cule, and Tina keeps everything moving and cheers-cveryone up. ‘This is. great office to work in, Shelby and Norcen are wonderful in dealing ‘with irate students and Zaculty. Stephanie is wonderful at managing the chan- cellor's very demanding schedule, and Tina keeps everything moving and cheers everyone up ‘Vhe galvanized nails, both common and finishing, are in the first drawer ‘The plain nails/are in the second drawer. The third drawer contains Sheetrock screws af various sizes, and the fourth drawer contains wood screws. The bot tom drawer contains miscellaneous hardwate. ‘The galvanized nails, both common and finishing, are in the first drawer. ‘The plain nails are in the second drawer, The third drawer contains Sheetrock -screws of various sizes, and the fourth drawer contains wood screws. The bot- tom drawer contains misecilancous hardware. So we should have everything we need to repair the broken deck chair "The weather is perfect; the view ix wonderful; and we're on vacation. So why are you unhappy? ‘The new kitchen cabinets are-done, and the installers are scheduled to come Monday. But there will probably be a delay of at least a week, for the old cab- incts haven't becn removed, and the carpenter who is to do the removal is off for a.week of duck hunting in North Dakota. ‘Wood beats are beautiful, but they require too much maintenance. Fiberglass boats require far less maintenance, bur they tend to be more floating bathtubs than real sailing craft. Steci boats are hard to find, and concrete boats never caught om. So therc’s no boat that will pleasc mc. j- Sarah, John, Rita, and Bob have all worked hard and all deserve promotion. Bur the company is having a cash flow problem and is offering those over 55 a $60,000 bonus if they will retire at the end of this year. Sarai. John, and Bob are all over 55 and will take early redrement. So Rita will be promoted. (LS SENTENGES, TRUTHWVALUES, AND ARGUMENTS 11OL argentine “Ta tale Beak Fn ratien k 1 m on 2. *p. Tepeictatomattage | te T T erect ance 2 ‘Everyone from anywhere who's anyone knows Barrett All those who know her respect her and like her. Friedman is from Minneapolis and Barrett is from Duluth, Friedman doesn't like anyone from Duluth. Therefore, either Fried- man is a nobody or Minneapolis is a nowhere. I'm not going t0 die today. I didn’t die yesterday, and I didn’t die the day betiore that, or the day before that, and so om back some fifty years. ‘Having cancer is a good, for whatever is required by something that is a good is itself a good. Being cured of cancer is a good, and being cured of cancer requires having cancer. ‘The Soviet Union disintegrated because the perceived need for the military sccurity offered by the union disappeared with the end of the cold war and because over 70 years of union had produced few economic benefits. More- over the Soviet Union never successfully addressed the problem af how to inspire loyalty to a single state by peoples with vastly different cultures.and histories ‘Only the ceo-parry system is compatible both with effective governance and ‘with the presenting and comtesting of dissenting views, for when there are more than two political partics, support tends to split among the parties, with no ‘party receiving the mupport of a majority of voters, And no party can govern effectively without majority support When there is only one political party, dis- senting views are neither presented nor contested. When there are two or mare ‘viable patties, dissenting views arc presented and contested, ‘Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall. Humpty Dumpty had.a great fall. All the king’s horses and all che King’s men couldn's put Humpty gether again, So they made him into an omelet and had a great hunch, 1.4 DEDUCTIVE VALIDITY AND SOUNDNESS ‘We have already noted that truth-presérvation is what distinguishes good rea- soning from bad reasoning. A deductively valid argument is ene whose form or swucture is fully truth-preserving—that is, whese form or structure is such that instances of it never proceed [rom true premises to a false conclusion.* A deductively invalid argument is one whose form or structure is such that instances of it do, on occasion, proceed [rom true premises 1o a false conclusion. An example of a valid deductive argument is ‘There are three, and only three, people in the room: Juarez, Sloan, and Wang. Juarez is leltchanded Sloan is left-handed. Wang is leli-handed, ‘All the people in the room are lefchanded. "With apologies to Lewis Carsadl “There are good arguments that Ste not vali deductive anjumiéne. Set Section 1.5 19: Rig NING oF Por.Tice siesta: | recreate T Tem T Teremcunit “ai uF Caer 238 bbe ‘This argument is truth-preserving, That is; if the premises (“There are three, and only three, people in the room: Juarez, Sloan, and Wang’, ‘Juarez is lefthanded’, ‘Sloan is lefchanded’, and ‘Wang is lef-handed’) are all (rue, then the conélusion (’All the people in the room are left-handed”) must also be true. ‘Arguments that are truth-preserving in this strong sense, where it is not possi- ble at the same time for all the premises to be true and the conclusion false, are said « be deductively valid. Such arguments never have tue premises and a false conclusion. An argument is dafuctively vatid if and only if iL is not possible for the prem- ises to be true and the conclusion false, An argument is deduesively invalid if and only if it is not deduetively valid. Consider this example of an invalid deductive argument: Sloan is left-handed. ‘Wang is left-handed, Everyone is lel-handed, Ibis invalid because, whereas the premises may well be wue, the conclusion is false. Not everyone is lefthanded. Logic is about the relations among sentences and groups of sentences, For example, if'we are told that a given argument is deduetively valid, we can con- elude that if the premises-are true the: conclusion must also be uue; But we can- not conclude, given only that the argument is valid, that the premises are true or that the conclusion is true. Consider, for example, the following angument: ‘The corner grocery store was burglarized, and whoever did it both knew the combination to the sale and was in town the night of the burglary. Carolyn, Albert, and Barbara are the only ones who knew the combination to the sale. ‘Albert and Barbara were aut of town the night of the burglary. Carolyn committed the burglary. ‘This argument is deductively valid; that is, if the premises are true, che con clusion must also-be tue, But it does not follow thar the premises are tue, and hence it does not follow that the conclusion is true. If we have good rea son to believe each of the premises, then we also have good reason to believe the conclusion. But note: that it is also the case that, if we have good reason to doubt the conclusion (suppose, for example, that we know Carolyn and alse know that burglary is just Hot her style), then we have good reason to believe that at feast one of the premises is false, ia DEDUCTIVE VALIDILY AND SOUNDNESS 13OL rrr noses Ticino Te Sethi a oe The important point to note here is thai, given only that‘an argument Is deductively valid, it may still be reasonable to doubt the conclusion or (© doubt one or more premises. But what is not reasonable is to accept the prem- ises and doubt or reject the éonclusion. One who accepts the premises of a deductively valid argument ought, on pain of irrationality, also accept the con- clusion, Correspondingly one who denies the conclusion of a deductively valid argument ought, again'on pain of irrationality, reject at least one of the premises of thal argument. (In the previous case, mo police detective would ‘be impressed by a “defense” of Carolyn that consisted of accepting the prem ises of the argument but steadfastly denying that Carolyn committed the burglary. If Carolyn did not commit the burglary, then éither there was no burglary, or the burglar was not someone who kiew the combination, or more people than those mentioned knew the combination, or Carolyn did. not know the combination, or Albert and Barbara were not both out of town, the night of the burglary, or Carolyn was out of town the night of the bur glary; or the person whe committed the burglary was not in town the night of the burglary.) It follows from the definition of deductive validity that if'an argument is deductively valid then it does not have all true premises and a false conch sion, But every other combination is possible. For example, a deductively valid argument may have all ue premises and a true conclusion. The following is such as argument; In 2000 Bush and Gore were the only major party candidates in the presidential ‘election. A major party candidate won. Gore did not win. Bush won the presidential election in 2000, Deductively valid arguments all of whose premises are true are said to be deduo- tively sound. AG arguunent is deductivety sound. if and only iit is deductively valid and its premises are true, An argument is deductively unsound if and only if it is not deductively sound, The foregoing argument edncerning Bush and Gore is both dedicetively valid and deductively sound. A deductively valid argument may also have-one or more false prem ises and a conclusion that is false, Here is such an argument: ‘France and Great Britain were the major powers in the Napoleonic Wars. France had the largest army, Great Britain the largest navy. 14, BASIC NOTIONS OF LoicTisermme-sieticten: | 1 te Notmaat age | Tost T T erick “Th Lagi Bok Fh Pons, 29 eaten ‘The power with the largest army won in the end, ‘France won in the end. ‘The third premise, "The power with largest army won in the end’, is false (and the argument if, for this reason, deductively unsound). The conclusion is also false. (Great Britain won the Napoleonic Wars when Wellington defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815.) Finally a deduetively valid argument may have a true conclusion and ‘one or more false premises. An example is Chicago is the capital of the United States. ‘The capital of the United Staces is in Mlinois. Chicago is in Linois Both premises of this angument are false (and the argument is therefore deduc- tively unsound); the conclusion is true, This illustrates that good reasoning can move [rom one or more false premises to a tue conclusion. A deduetively invalid argument may have any combination of wuths and falsehoods as premises and conclusion, That is, such am argument may have all uue premises and a true conclusion, or all wue premises and a false com clusion, or one or more false premises and a wue conclusion, or one or more false premises and a false conclusion. Here are some examples: ‘Albany is the capital of New York State, Annapolis is the capital Of Maryland. ‘Columbus is the capital of Ohio. Denver is the capital of Colorado. ‘The three preniises and the conclusion are all true. But the argument is obvi- ously deductively invalid. Were the legislature of Colorado to vote to-move the capital (0 Boulder, the three premises of this argument would be uue and the conclusion false, So it is possible for the premises to be tue and the conclu sion Jalse. Consider Albany is the capital of New York State. Annapolis is the capital of Maryland, Columbus is the capital of Ohio. Minneapolis is the capital of Minnesota, ‘This deductively invalid argument has true premises and a false conelusion. (St. Paul, not Minneapolis, is the capital of Minnesata:) It is also easy wo 14 DEDUCTIVE VALIDJTY AND SOUNDNESS 15(> ee en ss ee oT produce a deductively invalid argument with at least one false premise (ovo in the following case) and a true conclusion: Albany is the capital of New York State, Minneapolis is the capital of Minnesota. Annapolis is the capital of Maryland. Boulder is the capital of Colorado. Columbus is the capital of Ohio; ‘The conclusion of this argument is true; the sécond and fourth premises are false. By. changing the conclusion ta ‘Dayton is the capital of Ohio’, we pro- duce a deductively invalid argument with at least one (here two) Jalse premise and a false conclusion, ‘The point to remember is that the only time we can determine whether an aggument is deductively valid, given only the wuth-values of the premises and conclusion, is when the premises are all true and the conclusion false. We ‘know, again, that such an angument is deductively invalid, In all other cases, to determine whether an argument is deductively valid, we have to consider not what the actual wuth-values of the premises and conelusion are, but whether it is possible for the premises all to be (ue and the conclusion false, For example, consider this argument: No sea creatures are mammals. Dolphins are sea erearures. Dolphins are not niamnials, Ithas ome false premise (the first), one we premise (the second), and a fae conclusion. This information does not determine whether the argument is deductively valid or deduetively invalid. Rather, we come to See that the argu- ment is deductively valid when we realize that if both premises were wue then the conclusion would have to be-true as well—that is; that dolphins, being sea creatures, would have to be nonmammals. This argument is valid because it is ot possible for the prentises to be true and the conclusion false AE, EXERCISES 1. Which of the following are truc and which are falec> Explain your answers, gi ing cxamples as appropriate. a. Han argument’is valid, all the premises of chat argument are true: ‘b. Hall the premises of an argument arc true, the argument is valid. €. All sound arguments are valid. a. All valid arguments are sound, 10 BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGic[ prgmau tose naten T 1 corto tage | Ta Teresina ‘Te Logie Book Fh Conese, 2058 Eaiien ¢. Ne argument with a false conclusion is valid. "f Every argument ith a tru coneinsion is valid § Ill the premises of an argument are true and the conclusion is true, then the argument is valid h. If all the premises of an-argument are trueand the conclusion is false; the argument is invalid, ‘There are sound arguments with false conchusions, ‘There are sound arguments with at-least anc false promise. Cive argumicnts wich the following characteristics: A-valid angument with true premises and-a trae. conclusion. A valid argument with at least one false premise and a rue conclusion, ‘A valid angument with a false conclusion. An invalid argument all of whose premises are mie and whose conchision is ime. €. An invalid argument all of whose premises are'true and whose coneinsion is false. f An invalid argument with at least one false premise.and a false conclusion, S05 1.8 INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS ‘There ate good arguments that are not deductively valid—that is, whose use involves some acceptable risk of proceeding from true premises to a false con clusion. Consider the following example: Juarez, Sloan, and Wang are all lefchanded. Juarez and Sloan both have trouble using can openers made for righthanded ‘people. Wang’ also has trouble using can openers made for righthanded people. This argunient is not deductively valid, But the conclusion, ‘Wang also bas'trou- ble using can openers made lor righthanded people’, is to some extent proba- ble gives the fact that Wang is left-handed and that Juarez and Sloan, who are also left-handed, have trouble using can openers made Jor right-handed people, Nonetheless, the premises could be true and the conclusion false. This might be the case if, for example, Wang is especially adroit with kitchen implements or if the wouble the other ovo have derives from their having arthwitis rather than from their being left-handed, ‘An argument that is mot deductively valid can still be a useful argumeni—the premises can, as in the prior case, make the conclusion likely even though not certain. Such arguments are said to have inductive strength, the strength being proportional to the degree of probability the premises.lend to the conclusion, LB INDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS. 17 1eI cme toectnee, Tr emictvona tage [Ten Teteitionstn soe cep Ab argument has: iaductive strength 10 the extent that the conclusion is probable given the premises Inductive swength is thus a matter of degree, Inductive reasoning is extremely commen both in'scienice and in every day life. Walter Reed's hypothesizing that mosquitoes spread yellow lever is an. example of inductive reasoning. While serving in Cuba alter the Spanish-American War, Reed, a physician, noticed that those stricken with yellow lever always had fecent mosquito bites and that those not suicken tended to work im areas not infested by mosquitoes. Based on. these observations, Reed hypothesized that mos- quitoes spread yellow lever, He then asked volunteers not infected with yellow fever to allow themselves 10 be bitten by mosquitoes that had recenuly bitten yellow-fever- infected patients: The volunteers quickly contacted yellow fever. Reed concluded that mosquitoes uansmit yellow lever. His reasoning can be represented as follows: Individuals stricken with yellow fever have recent mosquito bites; Individuals nov stricken with yellow fever tend to Work in areas not infested with mosquitoes. Most individuals biten by mosquitoes that have recently bitten yellow fever patients soon contract yellow Lever, Mosquitoes transmit yellow fever, Reed's observations made his conclusion probable but not certain. The mech- anism of wansmission might have turned out to be an airborne bacterium that survives only under conditions that also encourage a high density of mosqui- toes, It might have been a coincidence that the Volunteers contracted yellow fever soon alter being bitten by the test mosquitoes. So we can say of this argument that it is inductively strong but deductively invalid, Deductive logic, which is the province of this text, and inductive logic, which lies beyond the scope of this text, both provide methods for evaluating arguments, and methods of both sorts ean be applied to: the same argument, as above. Which methods are most appropriately applied depends on the con- text. Ifan argument is given with the assumption that if the premises are ue the conclusion must also be true, then the argument should be evaluated by the standards of deductive logic. However, if an argument is given with the ‘weaker assumption that if the premises are true the conclusion is probable, then the argument should be evaluated by the standards of inductive logic. 1.5E EXERCISES Evaluate the pasiages in Exercise 2 in Section 1.4 that contain arguments. In cach case say whether deductive or inductive standards are most appropriate. If the former, state whether the argument is deductively valid. Jf the Latter, state to what extent the argument is inductively serong, 18. BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGIC[ earn storcnne | tran inset toie ex T ‘eneNeeiet Thai Bak a ect 0 tn 1.6 LOGICAL CONSISTENCY, TRUTH, FALSITY, AND EQUIVALENCE, One of the important relations that can hold among a set of sentences is consistency. A set ol sentences is logically consisient if and only if it is possible for all the members of that set to be true, A set of sentences is logically inconsistent if and only if it isnot logically consistent. We will indicate that we are talking about @ sev of sentences by enclosing the component sentences within curly braces— ‘{'-and ‘}’. The following set is log- ically consistent: {Texas is larger than Oklahoma. The Phlogiston theory of heat has been disproven. The United States Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives)” Note that there is no requirement that the members of a set have “something to do with each other”. The three sentences listed are langely if not entirely unrelated. Together they constitute a consistent set because it is possible that all three are true at the same time. (In faet, all three are true.) We obtain a different but also consistent set by replacing the second sentence, "The Phlo- giston theory of heat has'been disproven”, with "The Phlogiston theory of heat has been proven’, {Texas is larger than OMahoma, The Phlogiston theory of heat has been proven, The United States Congress consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives} Someone who believes all the members of this new set has, to be sure, at least one false belief (‘The Phlogiston theory of heat has been proven’), but this does not make. the set inconsistent. There is nothing in the nature of the three sentences and their relations to one another that keeps all three from being true, What keeps the second listed sentence from being wue is the nature of heat, that it does not behave the way the Phlogiston theory says it behaves. ‘The following Set of sentences is inconsistent: (Michael and Benjamin both applied for positins at the local fast-food ‘outlet, and at least one of them will be hired. Ne one whe applied lor a position will get it] "Techical what should be sted beneren the curly braces ane dhe names nf the members of the set-—here-te ames of sentences. These are formed by planing angle quotstion marks around the sentences, Sex Chapter 2, Section 24, 1.6 LOGICAL CONSISTENCY, ‘TRUTH, FALSITY, AND EQUIVALENCE 19 10OL erste sore: Teaicronca ae | ton ‘eka see oe IF the first listed sentence is true, then thé second ‘sentence, ‘No one who applied for a position will get it’, is false. In contrast, if the second semtence is tue, then it cannot be (as the fist semtence claims it is) that Michael and Benjamin both applied and that at least one of them will be hired. That is, if the second sentence is wue, then the first sentence is false, So 11 1s not possi- ble for both members of this set ta be tue. We are able to figure this out with- out knowing whe Michael and Benjamin are. The relationships between the members of the set make it impossible for all the members to be wue. ‘The following set is also inconsistent {Anyone who takes astrology seriously is foolish. Alice is my sister, and no sister of mine has a husband who is foolish. Horace is Alice’s hus band, and he reads the horoscope column every morning. Anyone who reads'the hocescope column every morning takes astrology seriously.) A litle reflection shows that not all the members of the foregoing set can be true. Af the first, third, and fourth sentences are true, the second cannot be, Alterna- tively, if the second, third, and fourth are wue, the first cannot be, And so on, Logic cannot normally ell us-whether a given sentence is true or Lalse, but we can use logic to discover whether a set is consistent or inconsistent. And ia set is inconsistent, we know that at least one member of it is Lalse, and hence that believing all the members of the set would involve believing at least one false sentence, something we don’t want to do. Establishing that a set is consistent does not establish that all, or even any, of its members are true; but it does establish that it is possible far all the members to be tue. Although logic cannot normally be used to determine whether a par ticular sentence is true or lalse, there are two special cases. Some sentences are tue because of their lorm or structure, For example, ‘Either Cynthia will get a job or she will not get a job’ is tne no matter how Cynthia fares visdvis her Jobseeking activities, Indeed, every sentence that is of the form ‘either... or and is such that what comes alter the ‘or’ is the denial of what comes alter the ‘either’ is true, Sentences such as these do not give us any new information. ‘They do not “tell us anything about the world”, Whoever Cynthia is, we all know that she either will or will not get a job, and so being told this does not convey any new information, Other sentences of this type include ‘If Henry gets lired, he gets fired’, ‘If everyone passes, Denise will pass’, and ‘I Sarah will go moun- tain climbing if and only if Marjorie does, then if Marjorie does not go, neither will Sarah’, Sentences of this sort are said to be logically true, E sentenee is lygieily érue if and only if iis not passible for the sentence co be false, Jest as sontie sentences are wue by virtue of their form or structure, so {oo some sentences are lalse by virtue of their form. or swucture, These include “Sarah is an A student and Sarah is not an A student’, ‘All lions are ferocious but 20. BASIC: NOTIONS OF LOGIC[ parame aiesies Te ne ino ane | Te ‘Tanagi Bu Ft Caer 238 in there are lions in 200s that are not ferocious’, ‘I'm here and nobody is here’, and. ‘Some dollar bills ave not dollar bills’. Such sentences are said to be logically false. if iris not possible for the sentence to Logically false sentences, like logically uue sentences, give us no information about the world.” Sentences that purport to give us information about the world—and these constitute most of the sentences we encounter outside logic and mathe- matics—are neither logically true nor logically false. They include ‘Ivan is driving from Boston to New Orleans’, ‘Anyone who takes astrology seriously is foolish’, and ‘Perkins advocates the relaxation of air pollution standards because he owns a lot of stock in a company producing coal with a high sulfur content’. Such sentences claim that the world, or some part of it, is a certain way, and to determine whether they are true we have to gather information about the world, and not merely about how those sentences are constructed. Such sentences are said to be logically indeterminate. A séntenee is logically indeterminate if and only if it is neither logically true nor logically False, ‘The final concept we inwoduce in this chapter is that of logical equiv- alence, Sentences are sometimes related in such a way that, because of their structure or form, if one is true the other is as well, and vice versa, Examples of such pairs of sentences include these: Henry loves Sarah. Sarah is loved by Henry. Both Sarah and Henry will pass. Both Henry and Sarah will pass. Not all tumors are cancerous, Some tumors are nat cancerous. OF course, the meinbers of this pair, perhaps to Henry's dismay, are not logically equivalent: Henry loves Sarah, Saral loves Henry. ‘iat logically tra sentences are seid in aye tae logically lee entenoee dre not bp some aeconnes mathe: sontce consists exchaceely of logical rutht. 1.6 LOGICAL CONSISTENCY, TRUTH, FALSHY AND EQUIVALENCE 21 TenewaweneI errr stems: Tr sovennner tae | oe T Terence Soe oe ‘The members of a pair of sentences are logically éguivalens i! and only if itis not possible for one of the sentences to be true while the other sentence is false, Note that we allow a sentence to be equivalent to itsell, by counting, for example, ‘Sarah is very bright’ and ‘Sarah is very bright’ as constituting a pair of (identical) sentences. On this definition of logical equivalence, it also lollows that all logically true sentences are logically equivalent and that all logically false sentences are logically equivalent. But it does not follow that all logically inde- terminate sentences are logically equivalent Clearly, logically indeterminate sen- tences with different truth-values—for example, ‘Philadelphia is in Pennsylvania’ (rue) and “Denver is.in Wyoming’ (false)—are not logically equivalent. More- cover, not all logically indeterminate'sentences with the same tath-value are log- ically equivalent, ‘California produces red wine’ and ‘California produces white wine’ are both wue, but these claims are not logically equivalent, The test for logical equivalence is not’sameness of truth-yalue, but rather whether the sen- tences in question must have the same wuth-yalue—whether it is impossible for them to have different truth-values, Since it is possible lor ‘California produces white wine’ co be une buc ‘California produces red wine’ to be false (California vintners might decide that all the money is to be made in white wine and stop producing red wine), these sentences are not lopically equivalent. LOE EXERCISES 1. Where possible, give an example of each of the following: Where not possible, explain why no example can be given. & A-consiment set all of whose members are true b. Acconsistent set with at least one true member and.at least one false member. €. An inconsistent set all of whose members are truc, "dA consistent sct all of whose members arc false. % For cach of the following sets of Sentences indicate Whether the set is condi. tent or inconsistent, and why. a. [Good vegetables are hard to fifid. ‘The Dodgers are no longer in Brooklyn. ‘Today is hotter than yesterday.) ‘b. [Hemry likes real ice cream. Real ice crcam isa dairy product ‘There im't/a dairy product Henry likes} ¢. (Washington, D.C,, is the capital of the United States. Paris is the capital of France, Ottawa is the capital of Canada) d. (Washington, D.C., is the capital of the United States. Paris is the capital of France, Toronto is the capital of Canada.| ¢. (The weather is fine. Tomorrow is Tnesday: ‘Two plus oo-equals tour. We're almost out of 335) £: (Sue is taller than Tom, "Tom is taller than Henry: Henyy is just-as tall as Sue] g (Tom, Sue, and Robin are all bright. No one who fails “Poetry for Scientists" is bright. Tom failed “Poetry for Scientists™| 22 BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGIC[ exermam-ttaneiea: | eae minut aie | Tost ‘8 Resa ‘Teaglc Bek ith Cocca, 3 Fano h, (The United States does not support dietaiorships. In the 198s che Unitedt Py 5 a oh “a *t State supported rag. Iraq has been a dictatorship sinec 1974] [Roosevelt was a better president than Truman, as was Eisenhower Eidenhower ‘was also a beticr president than his micccssor, Kennedy. Kennedy was the best ‘president we ever had| (Jones and his relatives own all the land in Gaylord, Minnesom. Smith is no relation to Jones. Smith owns land in Gaylord, Minnesom| [Everyone who likes film classics likes Casablanca, Kveryone who ‘likes Humphrey Bogart likes Gasobianca. Sarah likes Casablanca, but she doesn't Hike most film classics and she docsn’t like Humphrey Bogart] [Everyone who likes film classics likes GasaWanca, Everyone who likes Humphrey Bogart likes Casablance. Sarah likes film classics and she likes Humphrey Bogart, but she can't stand Casablanca) Give an example of cach of the following. Explain, in each case, why the given example is of the sort requested. ‘A logically true: sentence ‘A logically false sentence ‘A logically indeterminate sentence For each of the following, indieare whether it or logically indeterminate, and why. Sarah passed the bar exam but she never went to law school, ‘Helen is a doctor but not an MD. ‘Helen is an MD but nota doctor, ‘Bob is in London but his heart és in ‘Teas. ‘Robin will either make it-to clans by starting time or she won't. Robin will cither make it to class by starting time or she will be ste! ‘Bob knows everyone in the class, which includes Robin, whom he docsn'tinow. ‘Sarah likes all kinds of fish but she doesn't like ocean fish. logically true, logically false, i. Lf Sarah likes all Kinds of fish, then she likes ocean fish, Anyone who likes rare beef likes rare emu. ‘Anyone who loves everyone is lacking in discrimination. Anyone who loves everyone loves a lot of people: ‘Where possible, gine cxamples of the following. Where not possible, explain ‘why not pao es both of which are logically indeterminate and are logically equivalent. A pair of sentenices that are not logically equivalent but that are both true. A pair of sentences that are logically equivalent, one of which is logically true, and one of which is not. ‘A pair of sentences that are logically equivalent and both false. ‘A pair of sentences, at least one of which is logically true, that are logically equivalent ‘A pair of sentences that are logically equivalent, one of which is logically tase and the other of which is logically true. For each of the following pairs of sentences, indicate whether the sentences are logically equivalent, and explain why. ‘Henry is in love with Sue, Sue is in love with Henry, 1.6 LOGICAL CONSISTENCY, TRUTH, FALSITY, AND EQUIVALENCE. 23OL cere ston netnee Te eenemns tiie Tr T erseneconsan ‘Tha apie Book, Doneeres 208 ation "b. Sue married Barbara Barbara married Sue. © Tom likes all kinds of fish. ‘Tom claims to like all kinds of fish. a. Bill'and Mary were both admitted to the Colde Key Honor Society. Bill was admitted to the Golden Key Honor Society and Mary was admitted 10 the Golden Key Honor Society. ©. Neither Bill nor Mary will get into law school Bill well not get inte law schoo! or’ Mary will get into law school, °f. ‘The judge pronounced Bill and Mary husband and wife. Bill and Mary got married. g Only Mariner fans came to the rally All Mariner fans came to the rally. Sh. I know there are people who-are starving in every large city in America, In every large city m America 1 know people who are starving. i Every newscamt reported that a strike is imminent Avstike is imminent. A bad day of sailing is better than a good day at-work. ‘A good day at work isn’t as good as a bad day of sailing: k. Sarah and Anna won't both be lected president of the senior class Either Sarah will be elected president of the senior class or Anna will be elected, president af the senior class. #1 Sarah and Anna wan't both be clected president of the senior class Kither Sarah will not be elected president of the senior class or Anna‘vill not bbe clecied president of the schior class m: Everyone distikes someone. ‘There is someone whom everyone dislikes n, Everyone dislikes someone, There is no universally Hked person. 9. Everyone likes someone. Someone is liked by everpone. p. Not creryone likes someone ‘There is someone who docsn't like anyone. 1.7 SPECIAL CASES OF VALIDITY Having introduced the notions of logical consisteney, logical wruth, and logical in a position to consider some special and rather counterin- ‘We have defined a deductively valid argument to be one in which it is impossible for the premises ta be true and che conclusion. false, Such an argument, we have said, is (cuthepreserving in chav it never takes us irom true premises to a false conclusion. Here we consider two special cases of valid ity. Consider first an argument whose conclusion is logically une. An example is The Philadelphia Phillies are the best team in the National League. Either the next president will be a woman or the next president will not be a woman. 24 BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGIC[ergmon-aoieien Ti tne Room tage | To T Teneivomcan Tastes Be Fm Ont 0 taioe ‘The conclusion of this argument Is clearly togically true. No matter who wins the next presidential election, chat person either will or will not be a woman. ‘The premise is, at the moment of this writing, anything but true, Note that the premise is utterly unconnected with the conclusion, For the latter reason one might very well be tempted to say that this is an invalid argument, for surely the premises of a valid argument must be relevant to (have some connection with) the conclusion: But recall our definition of validity: An argument is deductively valid if'and only if it is not possible for the premises wo be tue and the conclusion false, The above argument does satisly this requirement I is not possible for the conclusion, a logical wurh, to be false. Therefore it is not possible for the premises to be true and the conclusion [alse—again, because the conclusion cannot be false? ‘To put the point another way, this argument is truth-preserving. It will never lead us from truths to a falsehood because it will never lead us to a lalse- hood—because the conclusion is logically ue, There is no sisk of reaching a false conclusion here precisely because there is no risk that the conclusion is false. All arguments whose conclusions are logically true are deduetively valid for this reason." Consider next arguments whose premises form logically inconsistent sets, This may be because one or more of an argument’s premises are logically false (in which case it is impossible for those premises to be tue, and hence impossible forall the premises to be true), or it may be because, while na sin- ple premise is logically false, the premises taken together are nonetheless logically inconsistent. The following is-a-case of the latier sort: Albert is brighter than all his sisters, ‘Albert and Sally are brother and ‘sister: “Sally is brighter than all her brotliers. Tyranmasauris me was the liercest of all dinosaurs. In thil case, if the first and second premises are both tue, the thitd premise cannot be true, And, if the second and third premises are both wue, the Jirst premise cannot be true. So not all the premises can be true. The set consist- ing of the premises is logically inconsistent. Here, as in the preceding case, there is no obvious connection between the premises and the conclusion. Yet the argument does satisly our definition of deductive validity because it impossible for all the premises of this argument to be tue and therefore | Apquments whowe conclusions re lagicaly tre are dedactirely ald whether or nat their comclusiensare relate fo thelr premises Bor example, “The Philadelphia Phillies are the beer eam inthe Natal Leagan; therefire the Piles eichr will for wil not wia the Natal League pennant fc a deductvely valid argument, nat becaume che prenise and canchun both concern the Phillies bn beeanse fhe conchusom i logically ante and i x cherefce nome for dhe premine to be ue end the comchawiom fee One vey to think of sock an argument is that. sce the conclusion i logically true, it requires my muppet Hence, whatever tuppore the premies pride (even iftt iy none atall—even if the premises are tier unre lated © the conchason} is encgh, 4.7 SPECIAL CASES OF VALIDITY. 23©) [errr sires Treaicieon tone Tae T Tetieiwawen Tag Bok Fa Pads 28 impossible for all Uie premises to be trie and the'conefusion false: The aigue ment is wudepreserving because it will never ke us from truths (a False- hood. It will not do so because the premises cannot all be tue, and hence there is no possibility of going from teuths.to a falsehood. Arguments whose premises are inconsistent, while valid, are of course never sound. Every argument whose. premises constitute a logically inconsistent set is thus deductively valid. As a further example, consider Sandra will get an A in the course and Sandra will not get an A in the course, Sandra will graduate, ‘The oné premise of this argument is logically (alse: Therefore that prémise can- not be true, And so it is impossible for every premise of this argument (there is only one) ta be true and the conclusion false. The conclusion may be False, but not while the premise is true. ‘Arguments of the sort we are discussing lieve are Sometinies dismissed’ as not being arguments at all, precisely because their validity does not depend on a relation between the premises and conclusion. There are, however, sys- tematic reasons for allowing these cases to constitute arguments and thus for recognizing them as valid deductive arguments. It is important to remember that such: arguments are valid because they meet the requirement of truth preservation—they will never take us from truths to a lalsehood—not because the premisessupport the conclusion in any intuitive way. LE EXERCISES 1), Which of the following are ene, and which are false? Explain your ansyers gie, jing examples where appropriate. a. Eat least one member of a set of sentences is logically flee, ‘then. the set is Iogically inconsistent. “b. No two false sentences are logically equivalent. Every angument whose conclusion is logically equivalent tp one-of its premises is vali dL Any argument that includes. among its premises ‘Everyone is a scoundrel’ and ‘Tm-no scoundrel’ is deductively valid ¢. Every argument that has ‘Whatever will be, will be’ as a conclusion is deduc- tively valid, st Every argument that has “Eversone is a'scoundrel and I'm no'scoundre!’ af a conclusion is. decuctively invalid, & Every argument all of whose premises aré logically true is decuctively valid, Answer-cach of the following: Does every person who believes that New York Gity is the capital of the United States have inconsistent beliefs? b. Need one be engaged in a disagreement or dispute to have tue for an ange ment ane have becn using the tcrm ‘argument’? Explain pe 26 BASIC NOTIONS OF LOGG[ cargoam-moseninet | teammate | Tot T eristeoaecn ‘Ths Logic Bak, Fit Conca, 2088 aaton ¢. Explain why logic cannot normally tell tis whether a valid argument is sound Under what conditions could we decide,:on logical grounds alone, that a valid argument is sound? "d. Suppose an argument is valid but has’ false conchision. What can'we con: clade about the premises? Explain, © Explain why an argument with at least one logically false premise must be valid no matter what the other premises are and no matter what che conclusion is. f Suppose an argument has a premise that is logically equivalent to a logical false- hood. Must the argument he valid? Explain. & Suppose an argument has a logical truth as its conchision. Explain why-the argument must be valid no matter what its premises are. Explain why some such arguments are sound and some are not "h, Suppose the premises of an argument form an inconsistent'set of sentences. Explain why the argument must be valid but unsound. i. Suppose a set of a million sentences is consistent. Now suppose anew set of setitences is constricted so that crery sentence in the new set is logically cqui= alent to at least onc of the sentences in the old sct. Must the new sct be com sistent? Explain, GLOSSARY ARGUMENT: An angument is a act of tro or tore sentences, one of which is desige ‘nated as the conclusion and the others as che premises DEDUCTIVE VALIDITY: An argument is deductively valid if and only if it is nat possi- ble for the premises to be tue and the conclusion false. An argument is daductioely inewlid if and only if it is not decmetively valid DEDUCTIVE SOUNDNESS: An argument ié deduatively sound if anid only if it is deduetively valid and all ita premises are truc. An argument is deductisely unsound if and only if'it is not deductively sound. INDUCTIVE STRENGTH: An argument has énduetive strength to the excent that the conclusion is probable given the premises. LOGICAL CONSISTENGY: A set of sentences is degically consistent if and only if ir is ‘possible for all the members of that sct to be truc. A set off sentences ia logically inomsisient if and only if it ia not logically consistent LOGICAL TRUTH: A sentence is iagieatly erve if and only if it is not possible for the sentence to be false. LOGICAL FALSITY: A sentence is fogicatty fats it and ony if it is not possible for the sentence to be true. LOGICAL INDETERMINACY: A:sentence is logically indeterminate if and only if it is neither logically true nor fogically false. LOCICAL EQUIVALENCE: The members ofa pair of semtences'are iagieally aputvialent if and only if it is not possible for one of the sentences to be true while the other sentence is false. GLOSSARY 97