BU YADYOK P4

Spring 2023

FROM AUTHORITARIANISM TO DEMOCRACY

Careful Reading

1 Few issues are more likely to seize world attention for the remainder of this century
than the question of whether authoritarian countries in the Third World will make a transition
to democratic civilian rule. The Philippine experience and the promising developments in
South Korea have heartened democrats in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Taiwan. In
each of these countries democrats are pondering over what the appropriate strategy is for
pressing authoritarian rulers and their military supporters to open up the political system to
competitive politics. What coalitions against authoritarian rulers are most likely to succeed? Is
a centrist or leftist stance is likely to win maximum popular support? Is popular support
sufficient or is it also necessary to win over sections of the military and if so, how is that to
be done? Is external support helpful or harmful? Is a popular, mass, non-violent movement
sufficient or are there circumstances when an armed struggle is necessary to force an
authoritarian ruler to step down?

2 Alas, empirical democratic theory offers little of use to those who seek answers to
these questions. The many attempts to formulate a theory on the prerequisites of conditions
for the creation and persistence of democratic regimes have not stood well the test of time.
The various theories are by now familiar to political scientists: the efforts by Seymour Martin
Lipset, Phillips Cutright, Daniel Lerner, Deane Neubauer, and Leon Hurwitz to correlate
modernization, economic growth and the development of democracy; the related work by
Philip Coulter testing the hypothesis that social mobilization produces liberal democracy;
neo-Marxist theories focusing on the nature of dependent development in the context of
world capitalism to explain why democratic regimes have been replaced by bureaucratic
authoritarian states; and Barrington Moore’s efforts to identify the class configurations that
emerge during the process of development, refining Aristotle’s thesis that a strong urban
middle class is indispensable for the growth of parliamentary democracy.

3 The relationship between rates of growth (or rates of social mobilization), class
structure and the development and persistence of democratic institutions in low-income
countries has had several contradictory hypotheses. One is that a high rate of economic
development is a precondition for democratic development, and hence that a low rate is
destabilizing. A variant hypothesis (indeed, its antithesis) is that a high rate of development
can be destabilizing, especially when rapid social mobilization occurs without a
commensurate increase in institution building and power sharing. Still another variant is the
famous “J curve” hypothesis, which asserts that stagnation or low growth following a period
of high growth is destabilizing. For each of these hypotheses one can find examples,
suggesting that they have little explanatory power.

4 Other theories have focused on the kinds of values essential for the maintenance of a
democratic system, and then looked at the value patterns of particular societies to see how
good the fit is. Among the more sophisticated and influential of these theories was the work of
Harry Eckstein on the congruence (or lack of it) between the authority patterns of democratic

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regimes and the social norms of intermediate institutions such as the family, the school and
voluntary organizations. Gabriel Almond, Sidney Verba, and Robert Dahl, among others,
have argued that attitudes and beliefs are ultimately decisive in whether democratic
institutions can be made to work. There is, of course, some circularity in these arguments
because, as John Stuart Mill suggested, the character of people may shape political
institutions, but it is also the case that democratic institutions shape attitudes toward political
participation and can create a spirit of public-mindedness, tolerance for opposing viewpoints
and interests, and increasing competence among citizens.

5 A list of countries in the contemporary third world that sustained democratic

institutions suggests how difficult it is to find an explanation that fits all the cases. They
include India, Sri Lanka (its current ethnic turmoil notwithstanding), Costa Rica, Venezuela,
Colombia, Malaysia, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Papua New Guinea, and the small states
of the Bahamas islands, Barbados, Botswana, Nauru, Gambia, Mauritius, and until recently,
Fiji. They include several countries that have slipped back and forth between military and
civilian democratic rule: Nigeria, Turkey and Greece. The list has grown in recent years to
include the Philippines, Argentina, Brazil, and several other Latin American countries.
Paradoxically, many of these cases are often cited by democratic theorists as exceptions to
their propositions, but for those of us trying to understand the conditions and prospects for
democracy in the third world these are the very cases that theories need to explain!

6 One of the few generalizations that appears possible from this diverse list is that
British colonial model of tutelary democracy has been more successful than other colonial
models in creating democratic institutions and processes in newly independent countries.
Almost every country that has emerged from colonial rule since the Second World War with a
continuous democratic experience is a former British colony. Not a single newly independent
country that lived under French, Dutch, American or Portuguese rule has continually
remained democratic. This finding undermines the assumption that political institutions and
procedures cannot be transplanted from one society to another, that such transplants would be
rejected as alien to the body. But the success of the British model, limited as it is since not all
former British colonies have remained democratic, suggests that we need to reexamine our
assumptions. Robert Dahl, in his seminal work, “Polyarchy 1, Participation and Opposition”,
argued that foreign rule does not necessarily impede the emergence of a democratic system
and may even make it possible. He noted that of twenty-nine countries with polyarchical
regimes in 1970, seventeen were inaugurated during a period of foreign domination, including
Austria, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia and Canada, as well as some of the developing
countries!
7 It ill serves the cause of democracy in the Third World for countries to be told that
their growth rates are too low, their middle class not large enough, their political culture
inappropriate for democracy to thrive, or that an independent judiciary, a free press, and
political pluralism are alien to their political tradition. Imagine if Lenin and Mao, after
reading Marx, had concluded that communism was not possible in their countries because the
proletariat was too small, capitalism had not yet reached an advanced enough stage for a
revolution, and that one could not leap from ’feudalism’ and ‘semi feudalism’ to socialism.
Marxist theory proved to be useless for predicting the rise of Marxist-Leninist regimes among

1
Dahl uses the term polyarchy as an alternative to the word democracy because he believes that it is important
to make a distinction between democracy as an ideal system and the institutional arrangements that currently
exist in the world as imperfect approximations of this ideal. These “imperfect approximations” are polyarchies,
which he defines as relatively (but incompletely) democratized regimes that have been substantially popularized
and liberalized, that is, highly participatory and extensively open to public contestation (opposition).

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low-income countries. Perhaps it is time to recognize that democratic theory, with its list of
conditions and prerequisites, is a poor guide to action as well.

8 The characteristics of societies that have become democratic are sufficiently diverse to
suggest that less attention should be paid to the conditions and prerequisites, more to the
strategies available to those who seek a democratic revolution. A review of the experiences of
countries that have made successful transitions may point to workable strategies. There are, of
course, unique features to every case and one must know the concrete circumstances before
one can devise an appropriate strategy. But enough countries have made the transition from
authoritarian regimes to democracy to suggest some of the major features of a strategy. We
shall focus exclusively on transitions involving military and military-supported regimes since
we do not as yet have any cases of transitions to democratic rule of authoritarian countries run
by Marxist-Leninist parties. Efforts to end the domination of communist parties in Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola and Mozambique (not all,
of course, in a democratic direction) have thus far been unsuccessful.

9 While the successful historical struggles for democracy were largely against absolute
monarchies2, in the 20th Century they have primarily been against military regimes or
military-backed regimes. Overthrowing the military is quite different from overthrowing a
monarchy. A monarchy that is overthrown can be removed from the scene, but the military
remains even after its political domination has ended. For this reason, popular mobilization
against a military regime is not sufficient. Sections of the military must be won over, and for
democracy to be sustained, military acquiescence to democratic civilian rule must continue.
While power almost never reverts back to a monarchy after it has been deposed, there are
numerous instances of alterations in power between the military and civilians Greece, for
example, has had a relatively long history of democratic politics in modern times, beginning
in the middle of the 19th Century, with frequent interventions by the military. The military
coup3 of 1967 and the reversion to democratic government in 1974 is the most recent example
of this pattern.
10 Turkey inaugurated its democratic process with its first competitive elections in 1946,
but there was a brief military takeover in 1960 for a year, another military takeover in 1971, a
period of civilian rule, and still another military coup in 1980. A new constitution was
installed by the military regime in 1982 and civilian government was once again established
with democratic elections in 1983.

11 The Nigerian experience is also instructive as an example of a regime shifting back

and forth from civilian to military rule. Nigeria was one of a handful of post-colonial African
countries to sustain competitive parties and elections after independence, but democratic
politics came to an end with a military coup in 1966. In 1979 civilian party rule was
reestablished with competitive elections. Elections were again held in 1983 but the elected
government was subsequently overthrown by the military a few months later.

12 Two developments increase the likelihood that the military will no longer acquiesce to
civilian rule. One is a renewal of societal violence and the failure of a civilian government to
2
Absolute monarchy is a monarchial form of government in which the monarch exercises ultimate governing
authority as head of state and head of government; his or her powers are not limited by a constitution or by the
law. An absolute monarch wields unrestricted political power over the sovereign state and its people. Countries
where the monarch still maintains absolute power are Brunei, Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, and the
emirates comprising the UAE.
3
Also known as a coups d’état, a coup is a sudden, decisive exercise of force in politics involving the
sometimes violent attempt by citizens or the military to take control of the government 

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keep adversarial politics within an orderly framework. A second is an effort by the

government to sharply restrict the military, by cutting its budget, giving it too subordinate a
position within the state bureaucracy or humiliating its senior leaders.

13 Popular support for democratic government has rarely been sufficient for ending
military rule or for keeping the military in the barracks. Successful transitions have taken
place when popular support for democratic rule has been combined with a willingness of the
military to relinquish power. For the military to step down it is necessary that the military be
assured that the conditions of disintegration that precipitated the decision to take power not be
reestablished. Sometimes the military rewrites the rules of government in such a way as to
enable it to accept the restoration of civilian democratic rule. The Nigerian military, for
example, eager to prevent the recurrence of ethnic conflicts that might lead to renewed civil
war, reconstructed the constitutional framework to discourage the formation of tribal parties.
They set new ground rules under which political parties could run, including how many votes
each had to obtain from the several regions of the country to be declared a political party. It
was the failure of the elected government of President Shagari to play by the democratic rules
– the elections of 1983 were badly marred by violence and charges of rigging, and corruption
was widespread – that made the return to military rule popular.

14 Other military regimes feared the return to radical parties. Outlawing the Communist
and other radical groups has enabled the military to set constraints on who could participate in
the political arena. In Greece, Turkey and Spain the Communist parties were declared illegal.
Such a ban need not persist, of course. In Spain the centrist government of Suarez ended the
ban on the Communists imposed earlier by the military and thereby deprived the left of the
political advantages of martyrdom4. Similarly, in Greece the Papandreou government restored
civil rights to the parties of the left.
15 In Latin America the pressure of the center and of right-wing parties to re-democratize
politics has generally proven to be a more potent force than pressure from left-wing parties,
which often only brought on increased repression. Pressure for political participation by the
center and right tends to reassure a military that has justified domination as a means of
preventing the rise to power of radical forces. In Greece, Turkey, Colombia, Argentina,
Portugal, Spain and the Philippines the transition to democratic rule was made possible by the
presence of a centrist or conservative party to which power could be transferred. In Greece for
example, the military transferred power to Constantine Karamanlis, a right-wing politician
who assured the military of many of its prerequisites. The conservatives may, of course, prove
to be a transition to a more left-of-center government, as in Greece. Moreover, elections
permitted by the military may not result in the election of the military’s choice, as
demonstrated in Turkey in 1983 when the Motherland party, led by Turgut Ozal, won over the
objections of President (and General) Kenan Evren. Still, Ozal was acceptable to the military,
for the Motherland party was committed to a liberal economic policy and took no positions
threatening to military interests.

4
In politics, a martyr is someone who suffers persecution and/or death for advocating, renouncing, refusing to
renounce, and/or refusing to advocate a political belief or cause.

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