Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Mausumi Das
17 May, 2022
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 1 / 17
Addressing ‘Dynamic Ine¢ ciency’in Solow Model:
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 2 / 17
Extensions of Solow Model: Optimizing Households
There are two di¤erent frameworks of optimizing households:
(1) The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans In…nite Horizon Framework
(henceforth, R-C-K);
(2) The Samuelson-Diamond Overlapping Generations Framework
(henceforth, OLG).
The …rst framework was developed by Frank Ramsey in 1928 in the
context of a centralized (planned) economy, and was subsequently
applied to a perfectly competitive decentralized (market) economy by
David Cass and Tjalling Koopmans independently in 1965.
The second framework was developed by Paul Samulson in 1948 in
the context of an exchange economy, and was subsequently extended
for a production economy by Peter Diamond in 1965.
In both frameworks, the production side story is exactly identical to
Solow; but now the households choose their consumption and savings
decisions optimally.
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 3 / 17
Extensions of Solow: Optimizing Households (Contd.)
The main di¤erence between the two frameworks arises from the time
horizon speci…ed for the households’optimization exercise:
In the R-C-K framework, the utility function of an agent is de…ned over
in…nite horizon;
In the OLG framework, the utility function of an agent is de…ned over
…nite horizon.
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 4 / 17
Optimizing Households: The R-C-K Model
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 5 / 17
The R-C-K Model: Household Side Story
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 6 / 17
Main Tenets of the DGE Approach:
The DGE approach postulates that
Households are rational and make economic decisions on the basis of
an explicit ego-centric optimization exercise subject to their
constraints and subject to their information set. They optimize not
only over their current choice variables but also the choices that would
be realized in future.
Households have rational expectations: thus their ex ante optimal
future choices would ex post turn out to be less than optimal if and
only if their information set is incomplete and/or there are some
random elements in the economy which cannot be anticipated perfectly.
Households are atomistic is the sense that they treat the market
factors as exogenous in their optimization exercise. The optimal
choices of all agents are then mediated through the markets to produce
an equilibrium outcome for the macroeconomy (which, by construction,
is also consistent with the optimal choice of each agent).
Is the assumption of "rational" agents endowed with "rational
expectations" realistic? No!! But it provides a good benchmark!
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 7 / 17
DGE Approach: (Contd.)
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 8 / 17
Household’s Choice Problem under In…nite Horizon:
The household now has to decide how much it wants to consume and
how much to save.
Let us assume that the household is not allowed to borrow.
Then the consumption of the household is likely to be limited by its
‡ow income yth = wt + rt ath .
But in this one good world, the household also has the option of
eating up its existing asset stocks (which constitutes negative
savings).
Thus under no berrowing, the maximum consumption possible in time
period t is: yth + (1 δ)ath .
This de…nes the feasible consumption set available to the household
at every point of time t as follows:
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 11 / 17
Household’s Problem: In…nite Horizon & No Borrowing
(Contd.)
The ‡ow income of the household is distributed between consumption
and savings. Thus, by de…nition:
sth yth cth
All savings are invested is buying various new assets, which means the
asset stock of the household at the beginning of next period (period
t + 1) will be
ath+1 = sth + (1 δ)ath
Note that if the household decides to eat up its existing asset stocks
(over and above its ‡ow income) then that will constitute negative
savings and would lower the asset base of the household over time.
Putting all these information together, we write the period by period
budget constraint of the household as
ath+1 = yth cth + (1 δ)ath for all t = 0, 1, .....∞
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 12 / 17
Household’s Problem: In…nite Horizon & No Borrowing
(Contd.)
∞
Max. ∞ ∑ βt u cth ; u 0 > 0; u 00 < 0; 0 < β < 1 (1)
fcth gt =0 ,fath+1 gt =0 t =0
subject to
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 13 / 17
Household’s Utility Function: Some Explanations
Then the above utility function de…nes the discounted values of his
‘life-time’utlity.
By this de…nition, β is to be interpreted as the agents’innate
preference for present vis-a-vis future (or their rate of time
preference).
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 14 / 17
Household’s Utility Function: Some Explanations (Contd.)
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 15 / 17
Household’s Utility Function: Some Explanations (Contd.)
There are alternative "behavioural" speci…cations of agent’s utility
function where the relative weightage given to today’s utility vis-a-vis
tomorrow’s utility is di¤erent from the relative weightage given to
tomorrow’s utility vis-a-vis day-after-tomorrow’s utility.
For example, consider the following utility function:
u (c0 ) + β δu (c1 ) + δ2 u (c2 ) + δ3 u (c3 ) + ......
Notice that in this formulation, the rate at which the agent discounts
future utilities at each successive time periods does not remain the
same. In particular,
Sitting at time 0, when the agent is comparing between utilities today
and tomorrow, the relative weightage given to today’s utility vis-a-vis
tomorrow’s utility is βδ1 .
Das (Lecture 2, EC004, DSE) Solow to RCK & OLG 17 May, 2022 17 / 17