IN THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH (INDORE BENCH)
Misc. Criminal Case No. 14664 of 2022 Decided On: 22.06.2022 Appellants: Jaykumar Vs. Respondent: Central Narcotics Bureau Mandsaur (Madhya Pradesh) Hon'ble Judges/Coram: Anil Verma, J. Counsels: For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Mrigendra Singh, Sr. Advocate and Manu Maheshwari, Advocate For Respondents/Defendant: Manoj Soni, Advocate ORDER Anil Verma, J. 1. Applicant/petitioner has filed this first bail application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He is in Jail since 27/08/2021 in connection with Crime No. 1/2021 registered at P.S.-CBN Mandsaur District Neemuch (M.P.) for commission of offence punishable under Section 8/15, 8/18, 25, 29 of NDPS Act. 2. As per the prosecution story, on 26.8.2021, the respondent/CBN officials got discrete information from the informer that present applicant/Jay Kumar doing some illegal act in his factory/godown. Acting upon said information, CBN officials while searching the factory/godown which was under the ownership of present applicant Jay Kumar, seized 98 bags of wheat mixed poppy straw total 7841.760 kg, 3 bags containing poppy straw powder weighting 100.190 kg, two bags containing poppy straw husk weighting 21.540 kg, 300 bags containing Afeem Kala Dana (Black Opium) weighting 17557.460 kg and one bag containing 56 kg poppy straw. Four persons were found in the factory namely present applicant/Jai Kumar, Vishambhar, Rajendra and Anurag Agrawal. It is also alleged that one cheque book of HDFC bank account No. 50200052872479 in cheque No. 000138 to 000175 issued in the name of Padamnath Enterprises. Accordingly, a case has been registered against the present applicant other co-accused persons. 3. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that applicant is innocent and has been falsely implicated in this offence. He is in custody since 27/08/2021. He was not present at the place and time of the incident and no recovery has been made from his possession. He is made accused only on the basis that the place of seizure was under his ownership, but he has rented out the aforesaid premise to Padmanath Enterprises on 01/09/2020 and again renewed the same by renewal dated 01/08/2021, wherein three Godowns except for office belong to Padmanath Enterprises. The same was designated as principal place of business for Padmanath Enterprises. The same reflected by rent agreement, invoices, GST register of Padmanath Enterprises and Padmanath Enterprises has been carrying his business from the aforesaid premise for last two years, therefore, the present applicant has no role in the alleged seizure from the premise. The applicant i s carrying out his proprietorship business in the name of M/s. Hitanshi Trading Co
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since 18/07/2018 having its registered principal place for business at 20, Industrial Area, Neemuch. He carries wholesale business in posta dana with all due permissions and sanctions of the Excise Department. He along with co-accused persons were harassed and kept in illegal detention since 25/08/2021. No offence under sections 25 and 29 of NDPS Act has been made out. The applicant is aged about 42 years and sole bread-earner in his family. Learned counsel further contended that challan has not been filed within the stipulated period of 180 days, therefore, present applicant deserves for default bail and hence, he be released on bail. 4. Per-contra, learned counsel for the respondent/CBN opposed the bail application and prays for its rejection by submitting that the seized quantity of contraband is more than 25.57 tons, which is more than commercial, then punishment is of rigorous imprisonment upto 20 years with fine, which may be extended to Rs. 2,00,000/-. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Ram Samujh and another reported in MANU/SC/0530/1999 : 1999 SCC (Cri.) 1522, while canceling bail, observed that the offence under the NDPS Act are the offence against the society and accused should not be released unless requirement of section 37 of the NDPS Act are satisfied. Co-accused Kailash Chand Gadiya in his statement in his bail application submitted that he had never taken factory/Godown of the present applicant on rent note and rent note dated 01/08/2021 is a forged document. The applicant is kingpin of drug cartel and was running syndicate across the multiple states. Four offences including three offences under section 8/15 and 8/29 of NDPS Act have been registered against the applicant. He is habitual and repeat offender. If he is released on bail, he would again repeat the offence and may influence the witnesses, therefore, he does not deserve for bail. 5. Perused the impugned order of the trial Court as well as the case dairy. 6 . For the purpose of proper appreciation of contention of learned counsel for the applicant, it would be appropriate to reproduce the section 167 of Cr.P.C. and section 36_A(4) of the NDSPS Act., which are as follow. "Section 167 of CrPC: "167-Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours,--(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well-founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of sub-inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has no jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorize the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction: Provided that,--(a) the Magistrate may authorize the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the
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police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorize the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding- (i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years; (ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail, if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter; (b) no Magistrate shall authorize detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage; (c) no Magistrate of the second class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorize detention in the custody of the police." Explanation I.--For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in paragraph (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail. Explanation II.--If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under clause (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be. Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution. (2A) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2), the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of a sub- inspector, may, where a Judicial Magistrate is not available, transmit to the nearest Executive Magistrate, on whom the powers of a Judicial Magistrate or Metropolitan Magistrate have been conferred, a copy of the entry in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall, at the same time, forward the accused to such Executive
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Magistrate, and thereupon such Executive Magistrate, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, authorise the detention of the accused person in such custody as he may think fit for a term not exceeding seven days in the aggregate; and, on the expiry of the period of detention so authorised, the accused person shall be released on bail except where an order for further detention of the accused person has been made by a Magistrate competent to make such order; and, where no order for such further detention is made, the period during which the accused person was detained in custody under the orders made by an Executive Magistrate under this sub-section, shall be taken into account in computing the period specified in paragraph (a) of the proviso to sub- section (2): Provided that before the expiry of the period aforesaid, the Executive Magistrate shall transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate the records of the case together with a copy of the entries in the diary relating to the case which was transmitted to him by the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, as the case may be. (3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing. (4) Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate. (5) If in any case triable by a Magistrate as a summons-case, the investigation is not concluded within a period of six months from the date on which the accused was arrested, the Magistrate shall make an order stopping further investigation into the offence unless the officer making the investigation satisfies the Magistrate that for special reasons and in the interests of justice the continuation of the investigation beyond the period of six months is necessary. (6) Where any order stopping further investigation into an offence has been made under sub-section (5), the Sessions Judge may, if he is satisfied, on an application made to him or otherwise, that further investigation into the offence ought to be made, vacate the order made under sub-section (5) and direct further investigation to be made into the offence subject to such directions with regard to bail and other matters as he may specify." Section 36-A (4) of NDPS Act: (4) In respect of persons accused of an offence punishable under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A or for offences involving commercial quantity the references in subsection (2) of section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) thereof to "ninety days", where they occur, shall be construed as reference to "one hundred and eighty days": Provided that, if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public
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Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days." 7. A bare reading of Section 167 of CrPC reveals that an accused, who is in custody, is entitled to default bail without going into the merits of the allegations, if the investigation is not completed within sixty days in offences attracting punishment upto ten years or within a period of ninety days in offences attracting sentence more than ten years. 8. NDPS Act, 1985 prescribe for longer period of 180 days to be eligible for default bail provided where offences u/S. 19 or Section 24 or Section 27-A of NDPS Act are alleged or any offence under NDPS Act involving commercial quantity. Reference in Subsection 2 of Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 thereof to "ninety days", where they occur, shall be construed as reference to "one hundred and eighty days" 9 . In present case, total 25.57 tons contraband has been recovered from the Godown/factory owned by the applicant 1 0 . Learned counsel for the applicant has places reliance upon the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Thamisharasi and others reported in MANU/SC/0714/1995 : (1995) 4 SCC 190, wherein it has been held as under: "10. The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. By its very nature the provision is not attracted when the grant of bail is automatic on account of the default in filing the complaint within the maximum period of custody permitted during investigation by virtue of sub-section (2) of Section 167 CR.P.C. The only fact material to attract the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167 is the default in filing the complaint within the maximum period specified therein to permit custody during investigation and not the merits of the case which till the filing of the complaint are not before the court to determine the existence of reasonable grounds for forming the belief about the guilt of the accused. The learned Additional Solicitor General submitted that this belief can be formed during investigation by reference to the contents of the case diary even before the charge-sheet has been filed. This is fallacious. Till the complaint is filed the accused is supplied no material from which he can discharge the burden placed on him by Section 37(l) (b) of the N.D.P.S. Act. In our opinion, such a construction of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 is not permissible." In Bikramjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab reported in MANU/SC/0749/2020 : (2020) 20 SCC 616, it has been held as under: "37. On the facts of the present case, the High Court was wholly incorrect in stating that once the challan was presented by the prosecution on 25.03.2019 as an application was filed by the Appellant on 26.03.2019, the Appellant is not entitled to default bail. First and foremost, the High Court has got the dates all wrong. The application that was made for default bail was made on or before 25.02.2019 and not 26.03.2019. The charge sheet was filed on 26.03.2019 and not 25.03.2019. The fact that this application was wrongly dismissed on 25.02.2019 would make no difference and ought to have been corrected in revision. The sole ground for dismissing the application was that the time of 90 days had already been extended by the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial
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Magistrate, Ajnala by his order dated 13.02.2019. This Order was correctly set aside by the Special Court by its judgment dated 25.03.2019, holding that under the UAPA read with the NIA Act, the Special Court alone had jurisdiction to extend time to 180 days under the first proviso in Section 43-D(2)(b). The fact that the Appellant filed yet another application for default bail on 08.04.2019, would not mean that this application would wipe out the effect of the earlier application that had been wrongly decided. We must not forget that we are dealing with the personal liberty of an accused under a statute which imposes drastic punishments. The right to default bail, as has been correctly held by the judgments of this Court, are not mere statutory rights under the first proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code, but is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which is, therefore, a fundamental right granted to an accused person to be released on bail once the conditions of the first proviso to Section 167(2) are fulfilled". In the case of Union of India Vs. K.A. Najeeb reported in MANU/SC/0046/2021 : (2021) 3 SCC 713 it has been held that: "19 Adverting to the case at hand, we are conscious of the fact that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony. Had it been a case at the threshold, we would have outrightly turned down the respondent's prayer. However, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. An attempt has been made to strike a balance between the appellant's right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent's rights guaranteed under Part III of our Constitution have been well protected ". Learned counsel for the applicant has also placed reliance upon the orders/judgment delivered in the case Jai Kumar Vs. State of M.P. (MCRC no. 20957/2022 dated 06/05/2022); Sanjay Kumar Kedia Vs. Intelligence Officer, NCB and another reported in MANU/SC/1963/2009 : (2009) 17 SCC 631; Bira Singh Vs. State of Odisha (BLAPL no. 9138/2021 decided by High Court of Orissa vide order dated 22/02/2022) 11. In rebuttal, learned counsel for the respondent/CBN has placed reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of State of (NCB) Bengaluru (Special Leave to Appeal no. 242/2022); State of M.P. Vs. Kajad reported in MANU/SC/0541/2001 : 2001 SCC (Cri.) 1520 and Union of India Vs. Ram Samujh and Another reported in MANU/SC/0530/1999 : 1999 SCC (Cri.) 1522. 1 2 . It is also noteworthy to say that section 36-A(4) also provides that if it is not possible to complete the investigation within the said period of one hundred and eighty days, the Special Court may extend the said period up to one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for the detention of the accused beyond the said period of one hundred and eighty days. 13. In the present case, respondent/CBN has moved an application under section 36- A(4) of the NDPS Act before the Special Judge, (under NDPS Act), Neemuch for extension of the said 180 days upto to one year, which was decided by the Special Judge vide order dated 18/02/2022. From perusal of the said order, it appears that present applicant is given sufficient opportunity of hearing for the said application and after giving opportunity of hearing to both the parties, the trial Court has extended the
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Leave Granted. 2. The Judgment Dated 21.11.2019 Passed in Crl. O.P. No. 9750 of 2019 by The High Court of Judicature at Madras Is Called Into Question in This Appeal