ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE ENERGIA NUCLEAR – ABEN

2019 International Nuclear Atlantic Conference - INAC 2019

Santos, SP, Brazil, October 21-25, 2019

A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION AND TENDENCY OF

EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLANS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

Jefferson B. Araujo1 , Marcia Rocha da Fonseca2 and Jocelaine Jaloto de Lima3

1
Comissão Nacional de Energia Nuclear (CNEN)
Rua General Severiano 90
22290-901Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brazil
jeferson@cnen.gov.br
2
Uniabeu Centro Universitário (UNIABEU)
Rua Itaiara 301
26113-400 Belford Roxo, RJ, Brazil
mfonseca.terceirizado@cnen.gov.br
3
Universidade Estácio de Sá (UNESA)
Av dos Trabalhadores 179
23914360 Angra dos Reis, RJ, Brazil
jocelaine.lima@estacio.br

ABSTRACT

Accidents can occur in any industrial facility. When this installation is from the nuclear area
the consequences are considerable and can cause deaths, severe health effects and
psychological effects, and can also have economic and sociological consequences affecting the
public. An emergency at a nuclear power plant can involve damage to the fuel in the reactor
core or in a spent fuel pool and can releases radioactive material into the atmosphere as a plume.
External emergency plans should be developed, tested and improved and updated in a
systematic way to protect workers and the population from the effects and consequences related
to this plume. These effects and consequences can be prevented or mitigated by the prompt
implementation of protective actions and other emergency response actions. The accidents at
the nuclear power plants at Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima, showed the
importance of a good and well tested external emergency plan. In Brazil, the Nuclear plant in
Angra 1 started operation in 1982, and as a regulatory requirement, local emergency plans and
external emergency plans were developed. Since then, these plans have been tested
periodically, receiving several improvements. Operational experience of other countries and
recommendations of international organizations. such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA) can contribute substantially to the
improvement of these plans. This work presents the results of a research in these sources with
proposed improvements that can be used to optimize the external emergency plan of the
Brazilans nuclear power plants.

1. INTRODUCTION

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) consistently generate electricity with a high degree of safety and
reliability and one of the lowest generation costs per MW. However, like any industry, it is
prone to failures and accidents. It is necessary to identify possible scenarios, even with very
low probability of occurrence, and to design structures, systems and components to cope with
these scenarios. Additionally, once these consequences are identified, actions should be
developed to protect industry workers, the local population and the environment, ie an
Emergency Plan.

There are many events related to industrial accidents in the technical literature, where the
deficiency or even the absence of emergency plans had serious consequences. For example, the
accident of Bhopal (Union Carbide - Fertilizers, 1984), India, Flixborough, England
(caprolactam production, June 1974), Deepwater Horizon (North Sea, April 2010), Piper Alpha
( North Sea, 1988) and P-36 (Petrobras, March 2001). More recently, we can mention the events
of the Brazilian dams of Brumadinho (2019) and Samarco (Mariana, 2015), both in Minas
Gerais, with significant consequences of material and human losses.

Having an efficient and effective Emergency Plan can save lives and minimize impacts on the
environment. Verification of the effectiveness, efficiency and effectiveness of these plans can
be measured through response planning, testing and evaluation at various levels. The use of
safety indicators related to the assessment of these contingency plans is an important tool to
assess the effectiveness and correct aspects for improvement.

When we talk about accidents at nuclear power plants, the topic is much broader, as the
consequences of an accident can cross country borders and involve many national and
international organizations. The history of the nuclear industry shows three major accidents,
which have been extensively evaluated and studied, in order to improve and optimize
emergency plans. The accidents were at the TMI plants in the USA in 1979, Chernobyl in the
Ukraine in 1986 and Fukushima in Japan in 2011. Assessments of these nuclear accidents
produced design improvements and modifications that substantially improved the emergency
plans of the Angra dos Reis NPPs.

The general objective of this study is to present an overview of emergency plans and evolution
trend and improvements of these plans for nuclear power plants.

2 – EMERGENCY PLANS

The CNEN Standard NN 1.04 [1] establishes as an initial step in the nuclear licensing process
the preparation, for approval by CNEN, of a Preliminary Safety Analysis Report (RPAS),
containing a chapter for the Preliminary Local Emergency Plan, during the construction phase.
Subsequently, upon completion of the nuclear facility, it involves the development of a Final
Safety Analysis Report (RFAS) containing a chapter for the Local Emergency Plan. CNEN
periodically conducts PEL regulatory inspections and audits to verify its effectiveness,
efficiency and effectiveness.

CNEN has the Emergency Situation Plan (PSE) [4], a global plan establishing basic guidelines
for the preparation of emergency plans for regulatory agency actions in nuclear facilities. For
power reactors, there is the Power Reactor Emergency Plan (PESRPot) [5]. This plan sets out
the necessary requirements, including infrastructure and resources needed by the regulator to
manage its actions during a nuclear emergency. This Safety Analysis Final Report (RFAS) has
also a chapter describing accident analysis, including sequence of events and actions and

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consequences, and a chapter called Technical Specification, which sets safety limits,
requirements for operation, reliability and testing of safety systems.

For nuclear power plants, Eletronuclear has the Local Emergency Plan (PEL) [26], with
coverage within the area owned by Eletronuclear. Also available is the Plant Operation Manual
(MOU) [24] [25] which presents a specific chapter for the Local Emergency Plan (PEL). This
MOU includes procedures for emergency operation and abnormal operation as well as
procedures for severe accident management [24] [25]. It should also be mentioned that several
studies and improvements were implemented following the Fukushima accident in the Plan
called Fukushima Accident Improvement Program, such as the acquisition of portable
equipment for core cooling and increased availability of electricity, among others.

The Brazilian Nuclear Program Protection System (SIPRON), through its Committee
(COPRON) and its Committee (COPREN-AR), establishes General Standards, with
responsibilities for various agencies, for requirements for the preparation of External
Emergency Plans [6] for nuclear installations. COPREN-Ar is responsible for planning,
conducting and evaluating exercises to verify the effectiveness, efficiency and effectiveness of
these plans. It is also responsible for updating and including available enhancements as the
state of the art develops.

To meet the External Emergency Plan (PEE) [6] there are Nuclear Emergency Coordination
and Control Centers at the Municipal (CCCEN), State (CESTGEN) and National (CENAGEN)
levels. Like COPREN-AR, several governmental and non-governmental organizations are part,
which somehow take action during the nuclear emergency. These organizations have
Complementary Emergency Plans (PECs) that indicate the responsibilities, infrastructure
required, and the actions each must take during a nuclear emergency.

The Angra Power Plants Local Emergency Plans were based primarily on the US bibliography
using USNRC documents. The classification of emergencies has been updated to the latest state
of the art and follows the requirements of NEI-99-01 - “Development of Emergency Action
Levels for Non-Passive Reactors” [23].

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has developed safety guides and related
bibliography containing the experience and lessons learned over the past few years from
nuclear power plants around the world. Additionally it performs special missions, called
OSART, where among other areas, it also evaluates the Local Emergency Plan (PEL) [26].

The Fukushima Power Plant Accident (2011) represents a milestone in accident analysis and
development and / or updating of emergency plans. Prior to this accident, only project-based
accidents were considered, without core degradation for activation of Local (PEL) and External
(PEE) Emergency Plans. Later, during the accident sequence, other failures could arise.
Following the Fukushima accident, the implementation of Severe Accident Management
began. The definition of severe accident is an accident more severe than a design basis accident
and involving significant core degradation [27].

Over time, Brazil has made several technical cooperation to improve the Plan d Emergency of
nuclear plants. Technical cooperation can be cited with the USNRC (Computer Code
Provision), the European Community (Selection of Parameters to be Evaluated during Accident
Situations and Required Regulatory Infrastructure - TECNATOM), among others, and has been

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actively participating in several Technical Committees of the IAEA on nuclear facility
emergency.

The IAEA is an organization that encompasses all countries in the world that somehow use
nuclear energy, such as for electricity production, use research reactors, irradiated food
production, industrial applications and medical applications, among others. The theme of this
paper is Power Reactor Emergency Plan and the focus will be on nuclear power plants. In 2018
there were 418 nuclear plants in operation in 33 countries and 49 nuclear plants under
construction in 16 countries [17]. Additionally, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) holds frequent technical meetings to discuss the experience of its member countries
and proposals for improvements. It also produces, by consensus of these countries, good
practice guides with recommendations. The IAEA has developed a number of bibliographies
that have and can significantly contribute to Emergency Plan improvements and optimization.
We can mention, among the most current:

- "Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency Due to Serious Conditions at the LWR", from
the EPR series [7];
- "Communcation w Public in Nuclear or Radiation Emergency", from the EPR series [8];
- "Lessons Learned from the Response to Radiation Emergency - 1945 to 2010", from the EPR
series [9];
- "Method for Development of Arrangements Response" from the EPR series [10];
- EPR series "Preparation Conduct and Evaluation of Exercises for a Nuclear or Radiation
Emergency" [11];
- "Criteria for Use in Preparedness & Response of Nuclear Emergency", GSG-2 [12];
- "Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency", GSG-2.1 [13];
- Preparedness & Response for a Nuclear or Rad Emergency, GSG-7 [14]; and
- "Arrangements for the Termination of Nuclear or Radiological Emergency", GSG-11 [15].

3. NUCLEAR PLANT TRADITIONAL EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN

In general, an Emergency Plan should describe the nuclear facility, including its barriers against
the release of fission products, the geography of the area where the nuclear facility is located,
and consider the region's environmental, weather and population conditions.

It should consider the types of postulated, project-based accidents and those beyond project
bases (severe accidents), mitigation measures and their consequences for workers, the
population and the environment and the typical phases of an emergency. nuclear. The plan
should also consider that under normal operating conditions the dose of an individual from the
public should be limited to 1 milliSivert / year and that of workers at 20 milliSivert / year, and
may reach special and properly approved conditions up to 50 or 100 milliSivert. / year [3]. The
Plan shall also establish criteria for activating the Emergency Plan, establishing criteria for
defining and areas of Emergency Planning Zones (ZPEs) and Protective Measures for each of
the emergency classes and for each of the ZPEs.

Emergency Planning Zones

For nuclear installations with the potential for accidents that may result in the release of radionuclides
into the environment, Emergency Planning Zones (ZPE) should be established, which should

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consider response actions in the event of an accident and the distance and geographical location of
the site.

The reference "Basic Criteria for Establishing Planning Guidelines for CNAAA Emergency
Population Protection Actions" [3] provides the following definitions for the zones of interest of a
nuclear emergency based on TECDOC-953 [16] :
(a) Emergency Planning Zone (ZPE) - Areas around a nuclear facility for which protective me
asures are provided for in an emergency plan in the event of an accident;
b) Preventive Action Zone - Predetermined areas around the facility for which protective mea
sures are planned to be implemented urgently and preventively from the general declaration o
f emergency;
c) Environmental Control Zone - A predetermined area around the facility where preparations
are made to promptly implement protective measures based on environmental monitoring mea
sures;
d) Environmental Monitoring Zone or Long Term Action Zone - A predetermined area aroun
d the facility where preparations are made to implement protective measures to reduce long-te
rm doses due to deposition and ingestion.

Based on international experience, the IAEA document recommends the following generic cir
cular radius values for ZPEs for nuclear power plants:

a) Preventive Actions Zone: from 3 to 5 km;

b) Environmental Control Zone: from 10 to 25 km;
c) Environmental Monitoring Zone: 50 to 100 km.

Figure 1 shows the Emergency Planning Zones of Angra plants.

Figure 1 – Emergency Planning Zones of Angra site

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In case of activation of the External Emergency Plan, with the general Emergency Class, with
the possibility of damage to the reactor core, pre-planned protective actions, immediate worke
rs and the public must be provided.

Figure 2 presents the studies done by NRC, in reference NUREG-0396 [20], showing dose lev
els as a function of distance from nuclear installation, considering equation 1. Ground level re
leases and wind invariability are considered. (equation 1).

Where:
D1 – Dose on distance r1
D2 – Dose on distance r2
a – power as function of stability (values from 1 – moderately stable, to 2,5 - extremely
unstable)

Figure 2 – Dose reduction as Function of Distance (NUREG-0396)

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From these data, it is concluded that the preventive evacuation of the population would be an effective
protection measure up to a radius of 5 km around the plant. From this distance, no significant benefit
would be obtained with preventive evacuation protection measure. From EPZ-10 and EPZ-15 it is
preferable to recommend, in the short term, that the population remain sheltered. After the passage
of the radioactive cloud, due to the detection of places with the highest concentration of deposited
radioactive materials (“hot spots”), selective evacuation of these sites may be necessary beyond the
Preventive Actions Zone, ie, beyond 5 km. plant distance [20].

Report WASH-1400 [21] presents specific studies, consolidated in report NUREG-0396 [20], which
defined as suitable for the implementation of the actions provided for in emergency planning, a ZPE
with a radius of 15 km. This reference presents Also a study on risks and consequences arising from
accidents at nuclear plants, defining the various sequences of major accidents and estimates of their
consequences.

The NSAC-100 [22] reference showed that the probability of lethal doses occurring is about 100
times lower, which allowed the reduction of the preventive actions SPA from a radius of 15 km to a
radius of 5 km (figure 3 ).

Figure 3 – Probability of Exceeding an Effective Dose (NSAC-100)

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Emergency Classes

Reference NUREG-654 [19] features 4 ratings for activating the Emergency plan of a nuclear
facility. This classification has been updated by considering the concepts and experiences (bas
ically changing the classification criteria) contained in reference NEI-99-01 [23]:

- Unusual Event
- Alert
- Area Emergency
- General Emergency

In an Unusual Event situation it basically involves a failure or malfunction that has no conseq
uences for workers, the public or the environment. An event in this class does not cause activa
tion of the External Emergency Plan (PEE) or organizations outside the nuclear facility. It onl
y causes activation of the Local Emergency plan, involving the nuclear facility and the regulat
or only.

In an ALERT situation, there is complete mobilization of the Emergency Centers (CCCEN, C

ESTGEN and CENAGEN) and related organizations. These Centers are on standby, awaiting
developments in the nuclear facility. In this class, an initial condition may occur that indicates
actual or probable degradation in the safety level of the nuclear facility or the verification and
/ or prediction that significant amounts of radioactive material have been or are likely to be re
leased, but below specific regulatory limits. NN 3.01 [2] and without endangering the health o
f persons within the nuclear installation.

In an Area Emergency situation, significant releases may occur, but there is no indication of
imminent core compromise (fusion). In this class it is recommended, in addition to the full
mobilization of emergency personnel, to send teams to the field for radiological monitoring,
and to validate available tools and prediction codes (eg the ARGOS radiation monitoring and
weather monitoring system). Depending on the results of the assessments carried out, the
evacuation of site personnel (Eletronuclear Property Area - APE), not directly involved with
the emergency situation, may be recommended. This evacuation is preventative and must be
carried out before any significant release of nuclear material occurs.

In a general emergency, degradation of the reactor core cooling conditions and the total or
potential loss of two or more of the three barriers against the release of fission products (nuclear
fuel lining, piping and pressure vessels) may occur. primary system and containment). It
involves an initial condition at the Plant that indicates actual or probable release of radioactive
products to the environment or the prediction and / or verification that there has been or is
likely to be an unplanned release of radioactive products into the EPA. There is a preventive
need to apply protective measures in the EPA and ZPE-3 emergency planning zones, with
evacuation to the ZPE-5. If the general emergency situation worsens, with substantial damage
to the nucleus, the public evacuation protection measure should be applied outside the
perimeter of the ZPE before any detrimental release to the health of the population occurs.

Types of Accidents Considered

The major accidents postulated in the project bases contained in the Final Safety Analysis (RFAS)
report [28] are:

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- Loss of reactor cooling water (LOCA);
- Breakage of steam generator tubes (SGTR);
- Breakage of main steam pipe (MSLR)
- Transients where automatic or manual reactor shutdown is required and this action fails;
- Complete loss of internal and external electricity;
- Accident during nuclear fuel handling; or
- Break of a control bar mechanism.

It should be mentioned that these accidents have very low probability of occurrence and are often
monitored by Probability Analysis tools to identify undesirable or disallowed operational
configurations. For each of these accidents, the sequence of events, actual behavior, and trends of
critical and sensitive parameters for each event, automatic and manual actions, procedures used,
systems required for emergency treatment, consequences, mitigating actions and data comparisons
are evaluated. simulated events arising from operational experience. Emergency planning should
consider all of these factors when establishing protective measures in each Emergency Planning Zone
in each Emergency Class.

A nuclear accident can be classified as severe when it involves significant impairment or damage
(fusion) of the reactor core and as very serious when, in addition to core fusion, containment integrity
loss occurs. It is only in the case of core meltdown and containment failure that damage to the health
of workers, the public and the environment may occur in the area of the nuclear facility's emergency
planning zones.

WASH-1400 Table 6 [21] shows the major release categories and their respective source terms. This
table ranks the release categories, by degree of accident severity, in descending order of the amount
of radionuclides released. The PWR Reactor Accident Release Categories table indicates the
sequence of PWR-4 accidents for Angra 1 and Angra 2 reactors. This sequence has the following
characteristics:

- Probability per reactor per year: 9 x 10E-7;

- Time interval between the beginning of the hypothetical accident and the release of radioactive
material to the environment: 2 hours;
- Total time during which most of the radioactive material is released into the environment: 3 hours;
- Time interval between the recognition of an imminent release (commencement of protective
measures for the public) and the release of radioactive material to the environment: 2 hours;
- Energy (10E6 BTU / hr): 1.0;
- Fraction of total inventory of fission products released from the core:
I - 0.090
Xe - 0.60
Cs / Rb - 0.04

Also according to WASH-1400, a PWR-4 release would occur due to a refrigerant loss accide
nt, concurrently with a failure of the core emergency cooling systems and the containment iso
lation system.

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Protective Measures

There are several protective measures that can be applied, all on a preventive basis, depending
on the assessment of the operational conditions of the nuclear facility and the anticipated evol
ution of the nuclear emergency scenario. The main objectives of the application of these prote
ctive measures should be:
a) Prior disclosure, in the Emergency Planning Zones and surrounding areas, of actions and care
related to the External Emergency Plan;
b) Prevent deterministic effects (such as hyperthyroidism) caused by high exposure rates of the
thyroid gland; and
c) Reduce the possibility of stochastic effects (such as cancer and the formation of benign
nodules) on the thyroid gland caused by high exposure rates.
d) Some of the key protection measures, listed in the “Basic Criteria for Establishing Planning
Guidelines for CNAAA Emergency Population Protection Actions” [3], which should be
evaluated for their application are:Notificação para que a população permaneça em casa, local
de trabalho, estudo ou lazer, aguardando instruções;
e) Notification that the population of this area should remain sheltered at home, work, study or
leisure, awaiting further instructions;
f) Shelter - stay inside buildings under adequate shelter conditions to reduce external exposure
to airborne contamination and radioactive material deposited on surfaces if timely evacuation
is not possible. To be effective and effective, shelter should include sealing doors and
windows and shutting down ventilation systems to prevent or minimize inhalation of
radioactive material contained in the air from the outside environment;
g) Immediate preventive evacuation of the population - urgent removal of persons from their
normal place of residence, work or play for a limited period of time;
h) Stable iodine administration;
i) Food Control;
j) Access control;
k) Skin protection;
l) Respiratory protection;
m) Decontamination of people;
n) restrictions on food production, marketing and / or consumption; and
o) Restrictions on water consumption;

Stages of an Emergency

According to [3], a nuclear emergency can have three phases: Initial, Intermediate and Final or
Recovery Phase.

The Initial Phase covers the initial period of classification of an emergency situation, including
the possibility of release of radioactive material into the environment, until the source is again
under control, including the release period. This phase can last from a few hours to days. At
the first moment of this phase there is a potential radiation source, generically called the
potential thermo-source, that attempts to control, isolate or eliminate. During this phase there
are major uncertainties regarding dose levels and the extent of areas that may be affected by
radioactive release into the environment. Stable iodine distribution may be required to protect
the resident population in the areas closest to the plant. Preventive administration of stable
iodine will effect the saturation of the thyroid gland, preventing radioactive iodine (or
radioiodine) from being incorporated into the population.

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The Intermediate Phase begins a few hours after the release of radioactive material begins and
may extend for days or weeks. At this stage most of the release has already taken place, and
unless it is predominantly noble gases, it is likely that significant amounts of radionuclides are
deposited in the soil. Measurements should be taken to determine the radiation fields from these
deposited radionuclides in the soil as well as from contamination of water, food and air.

The Final or Recovery Phase is characterized by making decisions regarding the return to
normality of the areas affected by the accident. It is planned at this stage the gradual suspension
of protection actions implemented in the initial and intermediate phases. This phase may extend
from a few weeks to years after the accident, as evidenced by the Chernobyl and Fukushima
accidents. Criteria should be established to allow the completion or termination of each of these
phases.

4. UPDATED REFERENCES

As mentioned earlier, IAEA provides up-to-date documentation considering state-of-the-art

developments and lessons learned from the operational experience of operating plants. There
are safety guides, GSGs, and Emergency Response Preparedness (EPR) collection guides that
make significant recommendations for enhancing and optimizing Local (PELs) and External
(PEEs) Emergency Plans. The reference “Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency Due
to Serious Conditions at the LWR” [7], is the most up-to-date and applicable to the
development and implementation of External Emergency Plans (PEE). The application of
protective measures for workers and the public starts from the emergency classification in
EMERGENCY AREA.

An Nuclear Emergency begins with the occurrence of an event (eg loss of a safety system) in
the nuclear power plant or facility storing the spent fuel pool which will result in conditions
(eg severe fuel damage) needing to take urgent off-site protective actions before or shortly after
a release in order to be effective in protecting the public.

This guide [7] sets out acting times, notification and responsibilities at the start of the event.
Within 15 minutes of detection of the event (or its symptoms), the nuclear power plant shift
supervisor declares to a General Emergency on the basis of predetermined conditions and
instrument readings in the nuclear power plant. These instrument readings are called
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) and the declaration of a General Emergency triggers a
coordinated response by all response organizations since each organization has predetermined
the actions it is to take upon declaration of the emergency. The nuclear power plant staff also
immediately take all possible on-site actions to prevent or mitigate any release and take
immediate actions to protect the on-site people.

Within 30 minutes of detection of the event (or its symptoms), the shift supervisor notifies the
off-site decision maker (s) responsible for the jurisdictions where urgent protective actions
need to be taken promptly to reduce the risk to the public within the predetermined emergency
zones and distances around the nuclear power plant, Precautionary Action Zone (PAZ), Urgent
Protective Action Planning Zone (UPZ), Extended Planning Distance (EPD) and Ingestion and
Commodities Planning Distance (ICPD). Based on information from the Regulatory Body and
from the NPP the off-site decision maker (s) may immediately start to take the predetermined

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urgent protective actions (eg evacuation, relocation, Iodine Thyroid Blocking (ITB), food
restrictions) needed to protect the public within these areas.

Within 45 minutes of detection of the event (or its symptoms), the off-site decision maker (s)
may starts implementation of the predetermined urgent protective actions by warning those
near the nuclear power plant in the PEACE and the UPZ (eg with sirens and a loudspeaker to
explain the siren) and informing them via media (i.e. means of public communication,
including radio, television, internet web sites, newspapers and magazines and social media) of
the actions to take.

Within 1 hour of detection of the event (or its symptoms), having been instructed in advance
as part of the preparedness programme, the public may start to promptly take the protective
actions recommended.

Following a radioactive release, the areas not evacuated shall be are promptly monitored. Based
on predetermined operational criteria, called Operational Intervention Levels (OILs), areas are
identified where additional protective actions and other response actions are warranted. The
goal is to determine areas where the predetermined OILs are exceeded that require further:

a) evacuation within a day;

b) relocation within a week to a month; and
c) restrictions on consumption of local produce, milk from grazing animals, rainwater and
animal feed within days for those areas where ingestion will result in doses in excess
of international criteria.

Soon after the public have been warned, the media are briefed by a single official spokesperson.
A communication channel shall be maintained periodically to provide a single and
understandable message to the public. This information shall present a perspective in terms of
the possible health hazard and answer any concerns of the public and others. In all cases, the
public shall be provided with a plain language explanation of the hazards to them, and the
actions they can take to reduce those risks, as well as the actions being taken to ensure that they
are safe and their interests are being protected. The media (including internet web sites and
social media) shall be monitored in order to identify and address inappropriate responses being
taken by the public and others and address new concerns that may arise.

Within hours of detection of the event (or its symptoms), the full emergency response,
including all local and national response organizations, shall be activated and operating under
a single Emergency Command System (ECS or CCCEN).

Within a day of detection of the event (or its symptoms), controls are implemented to ensure
that all traded goods meet international standards and to reassure interested parties (e.g. other
States) that such controls are in place.

Within a week implement a sampling and analysis programme to verify food, water and milk
controls are adequate beyond where controls are already established and remove restrictions,
as appropriate.

All of these recommendations above, if implemented on the External Emergency Plan, will
lead to significative improvements.

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 Figure 4 – Main Steps of Emergency Event – General or Area Emergency

A prompt and effective response can only be implemented if everyone knows what to do when
the emergency is declared. This rapid and coordinated response is accomplished through the
use of an emergency classification system. It is based on increasing levels of hazard for those
on and off the site of the nuclear power plant and tied to the response needed for the protection
of workers, the public and others. The IAEA suggest the following emergency classes related
to possible off site consequences [7]:

- Alert is declared once something uncertain, or a decrease in the level of protection has
been detected, but no action is needed to protect those off the site;
- Area Emergency is declared when the population off the site need to prepare to take
protective actions and other response actions and monitoring needs to be conducted in
the vicinity of the facility;
- General Emergency is declared when protective actions and other response actions
need to be taken immediately to protect the public off the site.

The declaration of a General Emergency means that either:

(a) events have occurred at the nuclear power plant that will lead to severe damage to the fuel
in the reactor core or the spent fuel pool, or
(b) severe damage to the fuel has been detected. Therefore, the declaration of a General
Emergency triggers immediate implementation of urgent protective actions and other response
actions to protect the public.

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The sequence of events at Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan also showed that
initiating protective actions when damage to the fuel is projected provides time for their
effective implementation before a release. The figure 5 shows a typical accident sequence.

Figure 5 – Typical Accident Sequence on NPP (BWR)

The definitions above are compatible with those currently in use in Angra Emergency Plans.

Figure 6 shows na example of Emergency Zones and distances and figure 7 shows Example
of establishing boundaries for PAZ and UPZ.

FIGURE 6 - Emergency zones and distances FIGURE 7 - Example of establishing boundaries for PAZ and
UPZ

The Table 1 of the reference “Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency Due to Serious
Conditions at the LWR” [7] presents sizes suggestion for the Emergency Zones and
distances. There are significant differences between the IAEA Guide and the CNAAA
External Emergency Plan regarding the dimensions, perimeters, and formats of the Planning
Zones.

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Table 2 shows the description of the Emergency Zones and the associated distances. Using
the recommendations in this IAEA guide contained in these figures and tables can bring
significant improvements to the current External Emergency Plan.

Emergency zones and distances Suggested maximum radius (km)

>1000 MW (th) 100 to 1000 MW (th)
Precautionary action zone (PAZ)d 3 TO 5
Urgent protective action planning 15 TO 30
zone (UPZ)d
Extended planning distance (EPD) 100 50
Ingestion and commodities planning 300 100
distance (ICPD)
TABLE 1. SUGGESTED SIZES FOR EMERGENCY ZONES AND DISTANCES

Emergency zones DESCRIPTION

and distances
Precautionary action An area where comprehensive arrangements are made at the preparedness stage to notify
zone (PAZ) the public and have the public start to take urgent protective actions and other response
actions listed in Table 4 within one hour of the declaration of a General Emergency by the
shift supervisor of the nuclear power plant. The goal is to initiate protective actions and
other response actions before the start of a release warranting protective actions off the
sitea, in order to prevent severe deterministic effects. The boundary of the PAZ needs to
be established to minimize evacuation times and evacuation of the PAZ to beyond the UPZ
is given priority over evacuation of the UPZ. In addition, provisions are made within this
zone for the protection of personnel staffing special facilities such as hospitals, nursing
homes and prisons that cannot be immediately evacuated.
Urgent protective An area where comprehensive arrangements are made at the preparedness stage to notify
action planning zone the public and have the public start to take the urgent protective actions and other response
(UPZ) actions listed in Table 4 within about one hour of the declaration of a General Emergency
by the shift supervisor. The goal is to initiate protective actions and other response actions
before or shortly after the start of a release warranting protective actions off the site, but in
such a way as not to delay the implementation of the urgent protective actions and other
response actions within the PAZ. In addition, provisions are made within this zone for the
protection of personnel staffing special facilities such as hospitals, nursing homes and
prisons that cannot be immediately evacuated.
Extended planning The distance to which arrangements are made at the preparedness stage so that upon
distance (EPD) declaration of a General Emergency: (a) instructions will be provided to reduce inadvertent
ingestion; and (b) dose rate monitoring of deposition conducted to locate hotspots
following a release which could require evacuation within a day and relocation within a
week to a month. Evacuation of patients and those requiring specialized care would be to
locations outside of the EPD to ensure that further evacuations would not be required after
a release.
Ingestion and The distance to which arrangements are made at the preparedness stage so that upon
commodities planning declaration of a General Emergency instructions will be provided to:
distance (ICPD) (a) place grazing animals on protected (e.g. covered) feed,
(b) protect drinking water supplies that directly use rainwater (e.g. to disconnect rainwater
collection pipes),
(c) restrict consumption of non-essential local produce, wild-grown products (e.g.
mushrooms and game), milk from grazing animals, rainwater and animal feed, and
(d) stop distribution of commodities until further assessments are performed.
The ingestion and commodities planning distance is also the distance within which
arrangements are made at the preparedness stage to collect and analyse, during the
emergency, samples of local produce, wild-grown products (e.g. mushrooms and game),
milk from grazing animals, rainwater, animal feed and commodities to confirm the
adequacy of controls.
Table 2 - DESCRIPTION OF EMERGENCY ZONES AND DISTANCES

This IAEA guide also makes several significant recommendations regarding the application
of urgent and anticipatory protective measures and their bases, monitoring of intervention
levels and communication with the public.

INAC 2019, Santos, SP, Brazil.

 5. CONCLUSIONS

The Emergency Plans of the Angra plants have been periodically updated, reflecting the
improvements implemented over the years and the external operational experience resulting
from the exercise assistance and disclosure of occurrence reports in other plants. However,
there is still a significant path to follow in order to harmonize the requirements and actions of
the current Emergency Plan with the recommendations contained in the IAEA EPR Series
Guides. Comparing, evaluating, selecting and adapting and implementing the
recommendations contained in these guides, particularly the IAEA guide, “Actions to Protect
the Public in an Emergency Due to Serious Conditions at the LWR” [7], may constitute
significant improvements to the Plan. Nuclear Power Plants External Emergency Station. This
methodology for comparing, evaluating, selecting and adapting and implementing the
recommendations of the other IAEA safety guides in the area of emergency planning should
also be considered in future updates to this External Emergency Plan. Specifically, the
application of this methodology in the "Preparation Conduct and Evaluation of Exercises for a
Nuclear or Radiation Emergency" guides, "GSG-2 - Criteria for Use in Preparedness &
Response of Nuclear Emergency" and other guides in this series will also bring significant
optimization for CNAAA Emergency Plans

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INAC 2019, Santos, SP, Brazil.

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INAC 2019, Santos, SP, Brazil.