[G.R. No. L-16218. November 29, 1962.

ANTONIA BICERRA, DOMINGO BICERRA, BERNARDO BICERRA, CAYETANO BICERRA,

LINDA BICERRA, PIO BICERRA and EUFRICINA BICERRA, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. TOMASA
TENEZA and BENJAMIN BARBOSA, Defendants-Appellees.

Agripino A. Brillantes and Alberto B. Bravo, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Ernesto P. Pariel, for Defendants-Appellees.

Facts:
1. The Bicerras are supposedly the owners of the house worth P200, built on a lot owned
by them in Lagangilang, Abra; which the Tenezas forcibly demolished in January 1957,
claiming to be the owners thereof.
2. The house's materials were placed in the custody of the barrio lieutenant. 
3. The Bicerras filed a complaint claiming actual damages of P200, moral and
consequential damages amounting to P600, and the costs. 
4. The CFI Abra dismissed the complaint claiming that the action was within the exclusive
(original) jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court of Lagangilang, Abra.

Issues:
1.  Whether or not the action involves title to real property.
2. Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint was proper.

Rule of Law:

A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on

which it is built (Article 415, paragraph 1, Civil Code). This classification holds true regardless of
the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to a different owner. But once the
house is demolished, as in this case, it ceases to exist as such and hence its character as an
immovable likewise ceases.
The complaint is for recovery of damages, the only positive relief prayed for. Further, a
declaration of being the owners of the dismantled house and/or of the materials in no wise
constitutes the relief itself which if granted by final judgment could be enforceable by execution
but is only incidental to the real cause of action to recover damages. As this is a case for
recovery of damages where the demand does not exceed PhP 2,000 and there is no real
property litigated as the house has ceased to exist, the case is within the jurisdiction of the
Justice of the Peace Court (as per Section 88, RA 296 as amended) and not the CFI (Section
44, id.)
 [G.R. No. L-15334, January 31, 1964]

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, CITY ASSESSOR and CITY TREASURER OF

QUEZON CITY, petitioners,
vs.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, respondent.

Assistant City Attorney Jaime R. Agloro for petitioners.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for respondent.

Facts:
1. On October 20, 1902, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484 which authorized
the Municipal Board of Manila to grant a franchise to construct, maintain and operate an
electric street railway and electric light, heat and power system in the City of Manila and
its suburbs to the person or persons making the most favorable bid. 
2. Charles M. Swift was awarded the said franchise on March 1903, the terms and
conditions of which were embodied in Ordinance No. 44 approved on March 24, 1903.
3. Respondent Manila Electric Co. (Meralco for short), became the transferee and owner of
the franchise.
4. The respondent Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City,
on land belonging to it, and these three steel towers were inspected by the lower court
and parties.
5. On November 15, 1955, petitioner City Assessor of Quezon City declared the aforesaid
steel towers for real property tax under Tax declaration Nos. 31992 and 15549
6. After denying respondent's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken by
respondent to the Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City, which required
respondent to pay the amount of P11,651.86 as real property tax on the said steel
towers for the years 1952 to 1956.
7. Respondent paid the amount under protest and filed a petition for review in the Court of
Tax Appeals (CTA for short) which rendered a decision on December 29, 1958, ordering
the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the petitioner City Treasurer of Quezon
City to refund to the respondent the sum of P11,651.86. 
8. The motion for reconsideration having been denied, on April 22, 1959, the instant
petition for review was filed.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the steel towers are real property taxable. 

Rule of Law:
Article 415 of the Civil Code does, by stating the following are immovable property:

(1) Land, buildings, roads, and constructions of all kinds adhered to the soil;

(3) Everything attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object;
(5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement
for an industry or works which may be carried in a building or on a piece of land, and which
tends directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works;

Application of the Law:

The steel towers or supports in question, do not come within the objects mentioned in
paragraph 1, because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. They
are not construction analogous to buildings nor adhering to the soil. As per the description,
given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by
means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to
place. They can not be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable
in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. Each of these steel towers or supports
consists of steel bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts, which can be
disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and reassembled by screwing the same. These steel
towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries, receptacles,
instruments, or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works
on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel
supports or towers are constructed.

Conclusion: 
It is finally contended that the CTA erred in ordering the City Treasurer of Quezon City to
refund the sum of P11,651.86, despite the fact that Quezon City is not a party to the case. It is
argued that as the City Treasurer is not the real party in interest, but Quezon City, which was
not a party to the suit, notwithstanding its capacity to sue and be sued, he should not be ordered
to effect the refund. This question has not been raised in the court below, and, therefore, it
cannot be properly raised for the first time on appeal. The herein petitioner is indulging in legal
technicalities and niceties which do not help him any; for factually, it was he (City Treasurer)
whom had insisted that respondent herein pay the real estate taxes, which respondent paid
under protest. Having acted in his official capacity as City Treasurer of Quezon City, he would
surely know what to do, under the circumstances.
 [G.R. No. L-40411, August 7, 1935]

DAVAO SAW MILL CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
APRONIANO G. CASTILLO and DAVAO LIGHT & POWER CO., INC., defendants-appellees.

Arsenio Suazo and Jose L. Palma Gil and Pablo Lorenzo and Delfin Joven for appellant.
J.W. Ferrier for appellees.

Facts:
1. The Davao Saw Mill Co., Inc., is the holder of a lumber concession from the Government
of the Philippine Islands.
2. It has operated a sawmill in the sitio of Maa, barrio of Tigatu, municipality of Davao,
Province of Davao. However, the land upon which the business was conducted
belonged to another person.
3. Part of the lease agreement was a stipulation in which after the lease agreement, all
buildings and improvements would pass to the ownership of the lessor, which would not
include machineries and  accessories.
4. Some of the implements thus used were clearly personal property, the conflict
concerning machines which were placed and mounted on foundations of cement.

Issue:
1. Whether or not the trial judge erred in finding that the subject properties are personal in
nature.

Rule of Law:
Article 334, paragraphs 1 and 5, of the Civil Code, is in point. According to the Code,
real property consists of —

1. Land, buildings, roads and constructions of all kinds adhering to the soil;

5. Machinery, liquid containers, instruments or implements intended by the owner of any

building or land for use in connection with any industry or trade being carried on therein and
which are expressly adapted to meet the requirements of such trade of industry.

Application of the Law:

The lessee placed the machinery in the building erected on land belonging to another,
with the understanding that the machinery was not included in the improvements which would
pass to the lessor on the expiration of the lease agreement.
The lessee also treated the machinery as personal property in executing chattel
mortgages in favor of third persons.    
The machinery was levied upon by the sheriff as personalty pursuant to a writ of
execution obtained without any protest being registered.
Furthermore, machinery only becomes immobilized when placed in a plant by the owner
of the property or plant, but not when so placed by a tenant, usufructuary,  or any person
having  temporary rights,  unless such person acted as the agent of the owner.
Conclusion:
The machinery must be classified as personal property.