Anh Nguyen

SSCI 452

15 February 2023

Critique on Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals

Immanuel Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is a philosophical work that

aims to establish a foundation for moral philosophy based on reason and the concept of

autonomy. Published in 1785, it is one of Kant’s major works in moral philosophy and has been

influential in shaping contemporary ethical theories. The text seeks to explore the fundamental

principles of moral reasoning and provides a systematic account of moral law, including the

concepts of the categorical imperative and universal law. In this book, Kant emphasizes the

universality of moral principles, arguing that morality is based on reason and should apply to all

rational beings equally, regardless of their cultural or social context.

To understand Kant, first, one must analyze his definition of “metaphysics”. Kant (1785)

distinguishes between empirical and pure philosophy, with the former being based on experience

and the latter on a priori principles. He explains that pure philosophy can be either formal, in the

case of logic, or limited to specific objects of the understanding, in which case it is called

metaphysics (1). To put it simply, the “metaphysics of morals”, according to Kant, is the pure

philosophy of morals by ways of logic and reasoning, rather than experience and/or real-life

evidence. By this definition only, we can see that Kant has already disregarded the social and

cultural aspects of morality, as those aspects can be considered “experience”/”evidence”. In fact,

Kant, in his preface, states that “the ground of obligation here must not be sought in the nature of

the human being or in the circumstances of the world in which he is placed, but a priori simply in

concepts of pure reason” (1785:3). Here, Kant argues that the basis of moral obligation does not

come from the nature of human beings or their social circumstances, but rather from a priori

concepts of pure reason. In other words, moral duty is not contingent on our desires or

inclinations, nor is it dependent on any external factors such as cultural or social norms. Instead,

it is a universal and necessary principle that is inherent in the very structure of reason itself.

Kant (1785) emphasizes on separating the metaphysics of morals from other branches of

study - and to that extent, from influences outside of morality itself.

“But such a completely isolated metaphysics of morals, mixed with no

anthropology, theology, physics, or hyperphysics and still less with occult
qualities (which could be called hypophysical), is not only an
indispensable substratum of all theoretical and surely determined
cognition of duties; it is also a desideratum of utmost importance to the
actual fulfillment of their precepts.” (22)
This passage argues for the importance of having a “completely isolated” or independent

metaphysics of morals, separate from other branches of philosophy such as anthropology,

theology, physics, and hyperphysics. According to Kant, having a pure and independent

metaphysics of morals is not only necessary for a theoretical understanding of moral duties, but

also crucial for the practical fulfillment of moral principles. By insisting on the independence of

the metaphysics of morals from other branches of philosophy, Kant is emphasizing the

importance of a clear and well-defined moral framework, free from the influence of cultural,

social, or religious factors that might otherwise cloud or confuse our understanding of moral

duties and obligations.

 Kant does not directly mention cultural or social context much in his argument for

morality; but he does focus on the notion of judging one’s morality based on one’s motivation.

He argues that the morality of an action should be based on one’s motivation and motivation

only; and thus, if a “good” action stems from anything but goodwill itself, is anything but moral.

“A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes,

because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its
volition, that is, it is good in itself and, regarded for itself, is to be valued
incomparably higher than all that could merely be brought about by it in
favor of some inclination and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all
inclinations” (Kant 1785:7).
In the quoted text above, we can see that Kant argues that an action should be valued

more if it stems from goodwill, in comparison with a good action that stems from any

inclinations. In this sense, an action stemming from a social context or in adherence to a cultural

norm would not be considered moral, since it clearly stems from an inclination, rather than

goodwill itself. In fact, Kant even goes as far as saying sympathy is an inclination - meaning that

if you find joy in helping other people, it is a good action yet not a moral action. Inclinations are

subjective and based on our particular desires and needs; and sympathy, along with other

feelings such as compassion or benevolence, may motivate us to act similarly with moral duty,

but they are inherently not moral (Kant 1785:11-12).

What is moral duty then, according to Kant? “We shall set before ourselves the concept

of duty, which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and

hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, rather bring it

out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly” (Kant 1785:10). A good will is one

that acts out of a sense of duty, and the morality of an action is determined by the motive behind

it. In this sense, the concept of duty acts as a limiting principle that helps to distinguish between
actions that are morally good and those that are not. Kant argues that the subjective limitations

and hindrances that we encounter in life can help us to recognize the value of a good will, as they

highlight the importance of acting out of a sense of duty rather than merely following our

inclinations. Therefore, while sympathy may be a valuable inclination, it is not considered a part

of the concept of duty or the good will, which are the central components of Kant's moral

philosophy. This duty is not a duty to society or community - but rather the duty to adhere to the

universal law of morals, applicable equally to everyone, no matter where they come from and

what their background is. By focusing solely on the duty and the motivation of an action, Kant

essentially entirely disregards the consequence of it: “Thus the moral worth of an action does not

lie in the effect expected from it and so too does not lie in any principle of action that needs to

borrow its motive from this expected effect” (Kant 1785:14).

Therefore, Kant argues that an action is only moral when it’s “in accordance with that

maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (Kant

1578:31). Kant’s concept of the universal moral laws can be called the “categorical imperative”;

and a maxim is only considered moral if it fits within this categorical imperative, which means

can be universalized, or if it can be adopted as a rule that everyone could follow without causing

conflict or contradiction. If a maxim fails this test, it is considered immoral.

“Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and thus as
necessary for a subject practically determinable by reason, all imperatives
are formulae for the determination of action that is necessary in
accordance with the principle of a will which is good in some way. Now,
if the action would be good merely as a means to something else the
imperative is hypothetical; if the action is represented as in itself good,
hence as necessary in a will in itself conforming to reason, as its principle,
then it is categorical” (Kant 1785:25).
 This passage discusses the distinction between hypothetical and categorical imperatives.

Hypothetical imperatives are those that represent actions as necessary only as a means to

something else, while categorical imperatives are those that represent actions as necessary in and

of themselves. In other words, hypothetical imperatives are conditional, and apply only under

certain circumstances, while categorical imperatives are unconditional and apply to all

individuals, at all times, and in all circumstances. Kant argues that the morality of an action is

determined by whether it is guided by a hypothetical or a categorical imperative. If an action is

performed because it is considered to be necessary only as a means to something else, it lacks

moral worth and is not considered to be a truly moral action. On the other hand, if an action is

performed because it is considered to be necessary in and of itself, it is considered to be a moral

action, and has moral worth. We can boil down three characteristics of the categorical

imperative: firstly, when making moral decisions, one should always consider how the decision

would apply universally to all rational beings; secondly, national beings must never be used

merely as means to an end, but must always be valued and respected as ends in themselves; and

lastly, all moral maxims must form a consistent system, in which they all support each other and

contribute to the overall good (Kant 1785:44-45).

We have discussed the first point of the categorical imperative: when making moral

decisions, one should always consider how the decision would apply universally to all rational

beings. The second point of the categorical imperative points out that one should not view other

human beings as tools to serve your goals; and that rational beings must always be valued and

respected as ends in themselves. The third point assesses that all maxims must harmonize with a

possible kingdom of ends as with a kingdom of nature - this means that all moral maxims must

form a consistent system, in which they all support each other and contribute to the overall good.
In this sense; Kant is arguing for one system of law that is universally good and that such a

system is above all cultural and social structures.

Despite being focused on the “universal law” and the concept of “duty”, Kant (1785) also

stresses the importance of freedom - or free will - within the moral discussion.

“A perfectly good will would, therefore, equally stand under objective

laws (of the good), but it could not on this account be represented as
necessitated to actions in conformity with law since of itself, by its
subjective constitution, it can be determined only through the
representation of the good” (25).
Even though a perfectly good will would be guided by objective laws of the good, it

would still have the freedom to choose whether or not to act in accordance with these laws. The

perfectly good will would not be forced or compelled to act in a certain way, but rather would be

motivated by a representation of the good. Morality, thus, must be based on the free and

autonomous choice of the individual, rather than being imposed from the outside. A perfectly

good will is not determined by external forces, but rather is motivated by the internal

representation of the good. In this way, Kant is emphasizing the importance of personal

responsibility and individual choice in moral decision-making. By putting the responsibility of

morality on the individual, Kant is assuming such free will apart from culture and social

experience exists (or at least theoretically possible) - and thus, cultural and social context should

not be a factor in one’s moral decision.

Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is a significant contribution to the field

of moral philosophy and continues to be studied and debated by scholars today. His work

presents a compelling argument for a universal and objective approach to morality that is

independent of cultural and social contexts. Kant emphasizes the universality of moral principles,

arguing that morality is based on reason and should apply to all rational beings equally,
regardless of their cultural or social context. Ultimately, Kant believes that morality is universal,

and is above all cultural and social context.

 Annotated Bibliography

Kant, I. (1996). Groundworks of the Metaphysics of Morals. (M. Gregor, Trans.). Cambridge

University Press.

Kant's Groundworks of the Metaphysics of Morals is a seminal work in the field of moral

philosophy that explores the foundations of moral theory and provides a systematic

examination of moral principles. In this work, Kant argues for the existence of universal

moral laws and the importance of individual autonomy in moral decision-making.